|
|
| Line 1: |
Line 1: |
| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[05000339/LER-1981-039-03]] |
| | number = ML20004D486
| |
| | issue date = 06/03/1981
| |
| | title = LER 81-039/03L-0:on 810510,redundant Hydrogen Recombiner 1-HC-HC-1 Return Piping Found Inoperable.Caused by Blank Flange Installed During Const for Initial Leak Rate Testing. Flange Removed & 1-HC-HC-1 Return Flow Path Established
| |
| | author name = Cartwright W
| |
| | author affiliation = VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
| |
| | addressee name =
| |
| | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| |
| | docket = 05000339
| |
| | license number =
| |
| | contact person =
| |
| | document report number = LER-81-039-03L, LER-81-39-3L, NUDOCS 8106090453
| |
| | package number = ML20004D482
| |
| | document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| |
| | page count = 2
| |
| }}
| |
| | |
| =Text=
| |
| {{#Wiki_filter:o-_.,
| |
| U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT h
| |
| /0/1/
| |
| CONTROL BLOCK g,/ / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
| |
| /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
| |
| LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT S E LL/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/5/1/0/8/1/ (8) / 0/ 6/ 0/ 3/ 8/1/ (9)
| |
| L'OCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
| |
| /0/2/ / On May 10, 1981 during Mode 5 operation, a blank flange was found to be in- /
| |
| /0/3/ / stalled on the redundant hydrogen recombiner (1-HC-HC-1-) return piping to Unit /
| |
| /0/4/ / 2 containment. The hydrogen recombiner remained operable as required by T.S. /
| |
| /0/5/ / 3.6.4.2 through a discharge path to the process ventilation system and 'o Unit /
| |
| /0/6/ / No. I containment; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not /
| |
| /0/7/ / affected. This item constitutes a loss of administrative control of an ESF /
| |
| /0/8/ / system and is therefore reportable pursuant,to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c. /
| |
| SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE. COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
| |
| /0/9/ /S/E/ (11) /A/ (12) LB/ (13) /X/X/X/X/X/X/ (14) g/ (15) LZ/ (16)
| |
| SEQUENTIAL , OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
| |
| (17) REPORT NUMBER /8/1/ /-/ /0/3/9/ /\/ /0/3/ LL/ /-/ /0/
| |
| ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT :JRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER L/ (18) L/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) LN/ (24) LA/ (25) /Z/9/9/9/ (26:
| |
| CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
| |
| /1/0/ / The blank flange was installed during construction for the initial leak rate /
| |
| /1/1/ / testing of Unit 2 containment penetration No. 31. When testing was pompleted, /
| |
| /1/2/ / this blank flange was not removed. The blank flange was subsequent:y removed /
| |
| /1/3/ / and the 1-HC-HC-1 return flow path to Unit 2 containment established. /
| |
| /1/4/ / /
| |
| FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS %POWEF OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
| |
| /1/5/ LD/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) DISCOVERY LA/ (31) / OPERATOR OBSERVATION /
| |
| ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
| |
| /1/6/ LZ/ (33) G/ (34) / NA / / NA /
| |
| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
| |
| /1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA
| |
| /
| |
| PERSONNEL INJURIES
| |
| -NUMBER DESCP.IPTION (41)
| |
| /1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /
| |
| LOSS TYPE OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
| |
| DESCRIPTION
| |
| /1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /
| |
| 3 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
| |
| /2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA ////////////
| |
| F PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 0 6 0 9 0 % g AME
| |
| | |
| ~
| |
| -k__,_%
| |
| Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #2
| |
| | |
| ==Attachment:==
| |
| Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 81-039/03L-0 Description of Event On May 10, 1981 during Mode 5 operation, the Unit 2 Shif t Supervisor noticed that a blank flange was installed on the discharge piping to
| |
| ' Unit 2 containment from the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner (1-HC-HC-1).
| |
| This blank flange was originally installed during pre-operational leakage testing of Unit 2 containment penetration. Since both hydrogen recombiners remained operable at all times as per T.S. 3.6.4.2, there was no effect on the health and safety of the genera 1 'public.
| |
| Probable Consequences of Occurrence
| |
| . The hydrogen recombiner is required for the removal of hydrogen released into the containment within 24 hours following a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident. Installed redundant piping system; provide suction and discharge piping to two skid-mounted hydrogen recombiners -
| |
| which are completely interchangeable. In addition, an alternate discharge path is provided for each recombiner to the gaseous waste system via the containment vacuum pump discharge line and another path to the alternate contaian' nt.
| |
| e Cause of Event
| |
| ~
| |
| This event was caused b'y inadequate administ rative control of the pre-operational leakage testing of containment penetration No. 31.
| |
| Immediate Corrective Action The blank flange was removed.
| |
| Scheduled Corrective Action l No further corrective action required.
| |
| , Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence i
| |
| No further action required.
| |
| Generic Implications .
| |
| There are no generic implications of this event.
| |
| _ , . . , - -- -- ---r-
| |
| * Tr- --}}
| |