ML20007E338: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:25A5675AL Revision 7 October 2019 ABWR Design Control Document Tier 2 Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems Copyright 1994, 2010, 2016, 2019 GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC All Rights Reserved
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Chapter 9 Table of Contents 9.0    Auxiliary Systems..........................................................................................................................9.1-1 9.1    Fuel Storage and Handling ............................................................................................................9.1-1 9.1.1      New-Fuel Storage..........................................................................................................9.1-1 9.1.2      Spent-Fuel Storage ........................................................................................................9.1-2 9.1.3      Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System........................................................................9.1-7 9.1.4      Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling)..................................................9.1-13 9.1.5      Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems (OHLH)....................................................9.1-33 9.1.6      COL License Information............................................................................................9.1-41 9.1.7      References ...................................................................................................................9.1-43 9.2    Water Systems ...............................................................................................................................9.2-1 9.2.1      Station Service Water System .......................................................................................9.2-1 9.2.2      Closed Cooling Water System.......................................................................................9.2-1 9.2.3      Demineralized Water Makeup System..........................................................................9.2-1 9.2.4      Potable and Sanitary Water System ..............................................................................9.2-1 9.2.5      Ultimate Heat Sink ........................................................................................................9.2-5 9.2.6      Condensate Storage Facilities and Distribution System..............................................9.2-10 9.2.7      Plant Chilled Water System.........................................................................................9.2-10 9.2.8      Makeup Water (MWP) Preparation System................................................................9.2-10 9.2.9      Makeup Water Condensate System.............................................................................9.2-15 9.2.10    Makeup Water Purified System...................................................................................9.2-17 9.2.11    Reactor Building Cooling Water System ....................................................................9.2-19 9.2.12    HVAC Normal Cooling Water System .......................................................................9.2-26 9.2.13    HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System .................................................................9.2-28 9.2.14    Turbine Building Cooling Water System ....................................................................9.2-32 9.2.15    Reactor Service Water System ....................................................................................9.2-35 9.2.16    Turbine Service Water System....................................................................................9.2-40 9.2.17    COL License Information............................................................................................9.2-43 9.3    Process Auxiliaries ........................................................................................................................9.3-1 9.3.1      Compressed Air Systems...............................................................................................9.3-1 9.3.2      Process and Post-Accident Sampling System ...............................................................9.3-1 9.3.3      Non-Radioactive Drainage System ...............................................................................9.3-7 9.3.4      Chemical and Volume Control System (PWR)...........................................................9.3-10 9.3.5      Standby Liquid Control System ..................................................................................9.3-10 9.3.6      Instrument Air System.................................................................................................9.3-16 9.3.7      Service Air System ......................................................................................................9.3-19 9.3.8      Radioactive Drain Transfer System.............................................................................9.3-21 9.3.9      Hydrogen Water Chemistry System............................................................................9.3-27 9.3.10    Oxygen Injection System ............................................................................................9.3-29 9.3.11    Zinc Injection System..................................................................................................9.3-30 9.3.12    COL License Information............................................................................................9.3-31 9.4    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems ......................................................9.4-1 9.4.1      Control Building HVAC................................................................................................9.4-1 9.4.2      Spent Fuel Pool Area HVAC System............................................................................9.4-9 9.4.3      Auxiliary Area HVAC System......................................................................................9.4-9 Table of Contents                                                                                                                                    9.0-i
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table of Contents (Continued) 9.4.4    Turbine Island HVAC System.......................................................................................9.4-9 9.4.5    Reactor Building HVAC System.................................................................................9.4-15 9.4.6    Radwaste Building HVAC System .............................................................................9.4-29 9.4.7    R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System.................................................9.4-32 9.4.8    Service Building HVAC System .................................................................................9.4-32 9.4.9    Drywell Cooling System .............................................................................................9.4-35 9.4.10    COL License Information............................................................................................9.4-37 9.5    Other Auxiliary Systems................................................................................................................9.5-1 9.5.1    Fire Protection System ..................................................................................................9.5-1 9.5.2    Communication Systems .............................................................................................9.5-28 9.5.3    Lighting and Servicing Power Supply System............................................................9.5-33 9.5.4    Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System ............................................9.5-43 9.5.5    Diesel-Generator Jacket Cooling Water System .........................................................9.5-47 9.5.6    Diesel-Generator Starting Air System.........................................................................9.5-49 9.5.7    Diesel Generator Lubrication System .........................................................................9.5-51 9.5.8    Diesel-Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System ..................................9.5-52 9.5.9    Suppression Pool Cleanup System ..............................................................................9.5-55 9.5.10    Motor-Generator Set....................................................................................................9.5-56 9.5.11    Combustion Turbine/Generator...................................................................................9.5-59 9.5.12    Lower Drywell Flooder ...............................................................................................9.5-62 9.5.13    COL License Information............................................................................................9.5-67 9.5.14    Reference.....................................................................................................................9.5-73 9A    Fire Hazard Analysis ..................................................................................................................9A.1-1 9A.1      Introduction ................................................................................................................9A.1-1 9A.2      Analysis Criteria.........................................................................................................9A.2-1 9A.3      Analysis Approach .....................................................................................................9A.3-1 9A.4      Analysis ......................................................................................................................9A.4-1 9A.5      Special Cases ..............................................................................................................9A.5-1 9A.6      Fire Hazard Analysis Database ..................................................................................9A.6-1 9B    Summary of Analysis Supporting Fire Protection Design Requirements ..................................... 9B-1 9B.1      Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9B-1 9B.2      Fire Containment System .............................................................................................. 9B-1 9B.3      References ................................................................................................................... 9B-10 9C    Regulatory Guide 1.52, Section C, Compliance Assessment ........................................................ 9C-1 9C.1      ABWR Compliance with RG 1.52, Revision 2, Section C ........................................... 9C-1 9D    SRP 6.5.1, Table 6.5.1-1 Compliance Assessment........................................................................9D-1 9.0-ii                                                                                                                              Table of Contents
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Chapter 9 List of Tables Table 9.1-1    Not Used......................................................................................................................9.1-44 Table 9.1-2    Fuel Servicing Equipment ...........................................................................................9.1-44 Table 9.1-3    Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment ..........................................................................9.1-45 Table 9.1-4    Under-Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment and Tools..............................................9.1-45 Table 9.1-5    Tools and Servicing Equipment ..................................................................................9.1-46 Table 9.1-6    Reference Codes and Standards ..................................................................................9.1-47 Table 9.1-7    Heavy Load Equipment Used to Handle Light Loads and Related Refueling Handling Tasks............................................................................................................9.1-48 Table 9.1-8    Heavy Load Operations...............................................................................................9.1-49 Table 9.1-9    Legend for In-Plant Locations/Elevations...................................................................9.1-53 Table 9.1-10  Single-Failure-Proof Cranes........................................................................................9.1-53 Table 9.1-11  Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger and Performance Data ........................................9.1-54 Table 9.1-12  RHR-FPC Joint Heat Removal Performance Table (150 Hours Following Shutdown)....................................................................................................................9.1-55 Table 9.2-1    Users of Makeup Water-Condensate...........................................................................9.2-45 Table 9.2-2    Users of Makeup Water-Purified.................................................................................9.2-45 Table 9.2-2a  Water Quality Characteristics for the Makeup Water Purified System ......................9.2-46 Table 9.2-3    Capacity Requirements for Condensate Storage Tank................................................9.2-47 Table 9.2-4a  Reactor Building Cooling Water Division A ..............................................................9.2-48 Table 9.2-4b  Reactor Building Cooling Water Division B...............................................................9.2-49 Table 9.2-4c  Reactor Building Cooling Water Division C...............................................................9.2-50 Table 9.2-4d  Design Characteristics for Reactor Building Cooling Water System Components ....9.2-51 Table 9.2-5a  Reactor Building Cooling Water Active Failure Analysis ..........................................9.2-52 Table 9.2-5b  Reactor Building Cooling Water System Passive Failure Analysis............................9.2-53 Table 9.2-6    HVAC Normal Cooling Water System Component Description................................9.2-54 Table 9.2-7    HVAC Normal Cooling Water Loads .........................................................................9.2-55 Table 9.2-8    HECW System Component Description .....................................................................9.2-56 List of Tables                                                                                                                                9.0-iii
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Tables (Continued)
Table 9.2-9  HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System Heat Loads..............................................9.2-57 Table 9.2-10 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System Active Failure Analysis ..........................9.2-58 Table 9.2-11 Turbine Island Auxiliary Equipment...........................................................................9.2-58 Table 9.2-12 Not Used......................................................................................................................9.2-59 Table 9.2-13 Reactor Service Water System (Interface Requirements) ...........................................9.2-59 Table 9.2-14 Potable and Sanitary Water System Components (Interface Requirements) ..............9.2-60 Table 9.2-15 Makeup Water Preparation System Component (Interface Requirements) ................9.2-62 Table 9.2-16 Turbine Service Water System (Interface Requirement) ............................................9.2-64 Table 9.3-1  Standby Liquid Control System Operating Pressure/Temperature Conditions...........9.3-32 Table 9.3-2  Water Quality Instrumentation ....................................................................................9.3-33 Table 9.3-3  Service Air Consumption During Normal Plant Operation ........................................9.3-37 Table 9.3-4  Instrument Air Consumption During Normal Plant Operation (Response to Question 430.215) .......................................................................................................9.3-37 Table 9.4-1  Drywell Cooling System Non-Safety-Related Components .......................................9.4-38 Table 9.4-2  Drywell Cooling System Non-Safety-Related Heat Loads .........................................9.4-39 Table 9.4-3  HVAC Flow Rates (Response to Question 430.243) ..................................................9.4-40 Table 9.4-4  HVAC System Component DescriptionsSafety-Related Heating/Cooling Coils (Response to Question 430.243) ........................................................................9.4-41 Table 9.4-4a HVAC System Component DescriptionsSafety-Related Fans (Response to Question 430.243) .......................................................................................................9.4-42 Table 9.4-4b HVAC System Component DescriptionsSafety-Related Filter (Response to Question 430.243) .......................................................................................................9.4-43 Table 9.4-4c HVAC System Component DescriptionsEmergency Use Adsorption Units (Safety Related) (Response to Question 430.243) ......................................................9.4-43 Table 9.4-4d Not Used......................................................................................................................9.4-44 Table 9.4-4e HVAC System Component DescriptionsSafety-Related Fan Coil Units (Response to Question 430.243)..................................................................................9.4-44 Table 9.4-4f HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Heating Cooling Coils (Response to Question 430.243) ........................................................................9.4-45 9.0-iv                                                                                                                            List of Tables
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Tables (Continued)
Table 9.4-4g  HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Fans (Response to Question 430.243).................................................................................9.4-45 Table 9.4-4h  HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Filters (Response to Question 430.243).................................................................................9.4-45 Table 9.4-4i  HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Air Handling Units (Response to Question 430.243) .......................................................................9.4-46 Table 9.4-5    Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment....................................................................................................................9.4-47 Table 9.4-5a  Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued) ...............................................................................................9.4-48 Table 9.4-5b  Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued) ...............................................................................................9.4-49 Table 9.4-5c  Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued) ...............................................................................................9.4-50 Table 9.5-1    Normal and/or Standby Lighting (Non-Class 1E AC Power Supply).........................9.5-74 Table 9.5-2    Lighting and Power Sources........................................................................................9.5-75 Table 9.5-3    Standby Lighting (Class 1E AC Power Supply) .........................................................9.5-75 Table 9.5-4    DC Emergency Lighting..............................................................................................9.5-76 Table 9.5-5    Summary of Automatic Fire Suppression Systems .....................................................9.5-77 Table 9A.2-1  Core Cooling ..............................................................................................................9A.2-8 Table 9A.5-1  Redundant Instrumentation or Equipment in Same Fire Area .................................9A.5-19 Table 9A.5-2  Summary of the Reactor Building Special Cases.....................................................9A.5-20 Table 9A.6-1  Fire Hazard Analysis Equipment Data BaseSorted by MPL Number ...................9A.6-5 Table 9A.6-2  Fire Hazard Analysis Equipment Database Sorted by RoomReactor Building .....9A.6-6 Table 9A.6-3  Fire Hazard Analysis Equipment Data BaseSorted by RoomControl Building ....................................................................................................................9A.6-96 Table 9A.6-4  Fire Hazard Analysis Equipment DatabaseSorted by RoomTurbine Building ..................................................................................................................9A.6-106 Table 9A.6-5  Fire Hazard Analysis Equipment DatabaseControl Building Annex .................9A.6-116 Table 9B-1    Estimated Fire Severity for Offices and Light Commercial Occupancies .................. 9B-11 List of Tables                                                                                                                                9.0-v
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Tables (Continued)
Table 9B-2 Fire Severity Expected by Occupancy ........................................................................ 9B-12 Table 9B-3 Cable Type and Configuration for Ul Tests ................................................................ 9B-13 Table 9B-4 Summary of Burning Rate Calculations...................................................................... 9B-13 9.0-vi                                                                                                        List of Tables
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Chapter 9 List of Figures Figure 9.1-1    Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System P&ID (Sheets 1-3)...................................9.1-56 Figure 9.1-2    Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System PFD (Sheets 1-2) .....................................9.1-56 Figure 9.1-3    Fuel Preparation Machine Shown Installed in Facsimile Fuel Pool ........................9.1-57 Figure 9.1-4    New-Fuel Inspection Stand ......................................................................................9.1-58 Figure 9.1-5    Channel Bolt Wrench ...............................................................................................9.1-59 Figure 9.1-6    Channel-Handling Tool............................................................................................9.1-60 Figure 9.1-7    Fuel Pool Vacuum Sipper ........................................................................................9.1-61 Figure 9.1-8    General-Purpose Grapple .........................................................................................9.1-62 Figure 9.1-9    Not Used...................................................................................................................9.1-63 Figure 9.1-10  Jib Crane Channel-Handling Boom .........................................................................9.1-64 Figure 9.1-11  Fuel Assembly Sampler ...........................................................................................9.1-65 Figure 9.1-12  Plant Refueling and Servicing Sequence .................................................................9.1-66 Figure 9.1-13  Simplified Section of Refueling Facilities ...............................................................9.1-67 Figure 9.1-14  Simplified Section of New-Fuel Handling Facilities ...............................................9.1-68 Figure 9.2-1    Reactor Building Cooling Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-9) .................................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-1a  Not Used...................................................................................................................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-2    HVAC Normal Cooling Water System P&ID .........................................................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-3    HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-3) ..............................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-4    Makeup Water System (Condensate) P&ID ............................................................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-5    Makeup Water System (Purified) P&ID (Sheets 1-3) .............................................9.2-65 Figure 9.2-6a  Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram..................................................9.2-66 Figure 9.2-6b  Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram..................................................9.2-67 Figure 9.2-6c  Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram..................................................9.2-68 Figure 9.2-7    Reactor Service Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-3) .................................................9.2-69 Figure 9.2-8    Turbine Building Service Water System..................................................................9.2-70 Figure 9.2-9    Potable and Sanitary Water System .........................................................................9.2-71 List of Figures                                                                                                                              9.0-vii
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Figures (Continued)
Figure 9.2-10 Makeup Water Preparation System..........................................................................9.2-72 Figure 9.3-1  Standby Liquid Control System P&ID ....................................................................9.3-38 Figure 9.3-1a Standby Liquid Control System PFD.......................................................................9.3-38 Figure 9.3-2  Sodium Pentaborate Volume Concentration Requirements.....................................9.3-39 Figure 9.3-3  Saturation Temperature of Sodium Pentaborate Solution........................................9.3-40 Figure 9.3-4  Sample Probe ...........................................................................................................9.3-41 Figure 9.3-5  Sample Probe ...........................................................................................................9.3-42 Figure 9.3-6  Instrument Air System P&ID (Sheets 1-2)..............................................................9.3-43 Figure 9.3-7  Station Service Air System P&ID (Sheets 1-2).......................................................9.3-43 Figure 9.3-8  Hydrogen Water Chemistry System.........................................................................9.3-44 Figure 9.3-9  Divisional Radioactive Floor Drains........................................................................9.3-45 Figure 9.4-1  Control Building HVAC Flow Diagram (Sheets 1-5) .............................................9.4-51 Figure 9.4-2a Turbine Building Ventilation System Air Flow Diagram........................................9.4-51 Figure 9.4-2b Turbine Building Ventilation System Control Diagram (Sheets 1-2) .....................9.4-51 Figure 9.4-2c Electrical Building HVAC System Diagram ...........................................................9.4-52 Figure 9.4-3  Secondary Containment HVAC System (Sheets 1-3) .............................................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-4  R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System (Sheets 1-3) .................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-5  Reactor Internal Pump Control Panel Room HVAC System...................................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-6  Not Used...................................................................................................................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-7  Not Used...................................................................................................................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-8  Drywell Cooling System P&ID ...............................................................................9.4-53 Figure 9.4-9  Drywell Heat Load Area Drawing ...........................................................................9.4-54 Figure 9.4-10 Radwaste Building HVAC (Sheets 1-3)..................................................................9.4-55 Figure 9.5-1  Suppression Pool Cleanup System P&ID ................................................................9.5-79 Figure 9.5-2  OutlineTelephonic Communication Systems.......................................................9.5-80 Figure 9.5-3  Lower Drywell Flooder System Arrangement/Configuration .................................9.5-81 9.0-viii                                                                                                                        List of Figures
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Figures (Continued)
Figure 9.5-4    Fire Protection Water Supply System ......................................................................9.5-82 Figure 9.5-5    Fire Protection Yard Main Piping ............................................................................9.5-84 Figure 9.5-6    Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil and Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust Systems ....................................................................................................................9.5-86 Figure 9.5-7    Standby Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water System ........................................9.5-86 Figure 9.5-8    Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air System........................................................9.5-86 Figure 9.5-9    Standby Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil System ..................................................9.5-86 Figure 9A.4-1  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation -8200 mm...................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-2  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation -1700 mm...................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-3  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 4800/8500 mm ...........................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-4  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-5  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 18100 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-6  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 23500 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-7  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 27200 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-8  Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 31700/38200 mm .......................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-9  Reactor Building Fire Protection, Section A-A ..................................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-10  Reactor Building Fire Protection, Section B-B...................................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-11  Control Building Fire Protection, Section B-B ...................................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-12  Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation -8200 mm ...................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-13  Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation -2150 mm ...................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-14  Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 3500 mm ....................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-15  Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 7900 mm ....................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-16  Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-16a Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 17150 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-16b Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 22200 mm ..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-17  Turbine Building Fire Protection, Section A-A ..................................................9A.4-466 List of Figures                                                                                                                              9.0-ix
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 List of Figures (Continued)
Figure 9A.4-18 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 5300 mm....................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-19 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-20 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 20300 mm..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-21 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 30300 mm..................................9A.4-466 Figure 9A.4-22 Service Building Fire Protection, Section B-B (See Figure 9A.4-11) ................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-23 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation -2150 mm (See Figure 9A.4-13)...........................................................................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-24 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 3500 mm (See Figure 9A.4-14)...........................................................................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-25 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 7900 mm (See Figure 9A.4-15)...........................................................................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-26 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm (See Figure 9A.4-16)...........................................................................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-27 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 17150 mm (See Figure 9A.4-16a) .........................................................................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-28 Radwaste Building Fire Protection, Section A-A ...............................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-29 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation -1500 mm ...............................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-30 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 4800 mm.................................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-31 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm ...............................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.4-32 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 21000 mm ...............................9A.4-467 Figure 9A.5-1  Typical RPS Contact Interface Turbine Building to Control Building.................9A.5-28 Figure 9A.5-2  Typical Electrical Equipment Connection Block Diagrams of Special Cases......9A.5-29 Figure 9B-1    Possible Classification of Building Contents for Fire Severity and Duration ......... 9B-14 9.0-x                                                                                                                      List of Figures
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.0 Auxiliary Systems 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling Spent fuel removed from the reactor vessel must be stored underwater while awaiting disposition. Spent-fuel storage racks, which are used for this purpose, are located at the bottom of the fuel storage pool under sufficient water to provide radiological shielding. This pool water is processed through the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (FPC) to provide cooling to the spent fuel in storage and for maintenance of fuel pool water quality. The spent-fuel pool storage capacity is a minimum of 270% of the reactor core.
New fuel will be stored in the spent-fuel storage racks in the fuel storage pool.
9.1.1 New-Fuel Storage 9.1.1.1 Design Bases 9.1.1.1.1 Nuclear Design See Subsection 9.1.2.1.1.
9.1.1.1.2 Storage Design See Subsection 9.1.2.1.2.
9.1.1.1.3 Mechanical and Structural Design See Subsection 9.1.2.1.3.
9.1.1.1.4 Thermal-Hydraulic Design See Subsection 9.1.2.1.4.
9.1.1.1.5 Material Considerations See Subsection 9.1.2.1.5.
9.1.1.1.6 Dynamic and Impact Analysis See Subsection 9.1.2.1.3 for COL license information requirements.
9.1.1.1.7 Not Used 9.1.1.2 Facilities Description (New-Fuel Storage)
The new fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool, which is described in more detail in section 9.1.2.2.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1.1.3.1 Criticality Control See Subsection 9.1.2.3.1.
9.1.1.3.2 Structural Design See Subsection 9.1.2.3.2.
9.1.1.3.3 Protection Features of the Fuel Storage Facility The spent fuel storage pool vault is housed in the Reactor Building. The spent fuel storage pool and Reactor Buildings are Seismic Category I, and are designed to withstand natural phenomena such as tornadoes/hurricanes, tornado/hurricane missiles, floods and high winds.
Fire protection features are described in Subsection 9.5.1 and Appendix 9A.
Procedural fuel-handling requirements and equipment design dictate that no more than one bundle at a time can be handled over the storage racks and at a maximum height of 1.8m above the upper rack. Therefore, the racks cannot be displaced in a manner causing critical spacing as a result of impact from a falling object.
The auxiliary hoist on the Reactor Building crane can traverse the full length of the refueling floor. This hoist is used to move new fuel from the entry point into the Reactor Building, up the main equipment hatch to the refueling floor and from there to the new-fuel inspection stand and rechanneling area at the end of the spent-fuel storage pool.
Should it become necessary to move major loads along or over the pools, administrative controls require that the load be moved over the empty portion of the spent-fuel pool.
9.1.2 Spent-Fuel Storage 9.1.2.1 Design Bases 9.1.2.1.1 Nuclear Design A full array in the loaded spent-fuel rack is designed to be subcritical, by at least 5% k.
Neutron-absorbing material, as an integral part of the design, is employed to assure that the calculated keff, including biases and uncertainties, will not exceed 0.95 under all normal and abnormal conditions.
9.1.2.1.2 Storage Design The fuel storage racks provided in the spent-fuel storage pool provide storage for a minimum of 270% of one full core fuel load.
9.1-2                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.2.1.3 Mechanical and Structural Design The spent-fuel storage racks in the Reactor Building contain storage space for fuel assemblies (with channels) or bundles (without channels). They are designed to withstand all credible static and seismic loadings. The racks are designed to protect the fuel assemblies and bundles from excessive physical damage which may cause the release of radioactive materials in excess of 10CFR20 and 10CFR100 requirements, under normal and abnormal conditions caused by impacting from either fuel assemblies, bundles or other equipment.
The spent-fuel pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a 6.4 mm (minimum) thick stainless steel liner. The fuel storage pool liner seismic classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. The bottom of all pool gates are sufficiently high to maintain the water level over the spent-fuel storage racks to provide adequate shielding and cooling. All pool fill and discharge lines enter the pool above the safe shielding water level. Redundant anti-siphon protection is provided to preclude a pipe break from siphoning the water from the pool and jeopardizing the safe water level by locating two holes in each pool recirculation line at 10 mm and 510 mm below the lowest normal water level.
The racks are constructed in accordance with a quality assurance program that ensures that the design, construction and testing requirements are met.
The fuel storage racks are designed to handle irradiated fuel assemblies. The expected radiation levels are well below the design levels.
In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29, the fuel storage racks are Seismic Category I. The structural integrity of the rack will be demonstrated for the load combinations described in SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D.
Thermal loads are not included in the above combinations because they are negligible due to the design of the rack (i.e., the rack is free to expand/contract under pool temperature changes).
The loads experienced under a stuck fuel assembly condition are typically less than those calculated for the seismic conditions and, therefore, need not be included as a load combination.
The storage racks are designed to counteract the tendency to overturn from horizontal loads and to lift from vertical loads. The analysis of the rack assumes an adequate supporting structure, and loads were generated accordingly.
Stress analyses will be performed by the vendor using classical methods based upon shears and moments developed by an acceptable dynamic analysis method. Using the given loads, load conditions and analytical methods, stresses will be calculated at critical sections of the rack and compared to acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Section III, Subsection NF.
The loads in the three orthogonal directions are considered to be acting simultaneously and are combined using the SRSS method suggested in Regulatory Guide 1.92.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Under fuel drop loading conditions, the acceptance criterion is that, although deformation may occur, keff must remain <0.95. The rack is designed such that, should the drop of a fuel assembly damage the tubes and dislodge a plate of poison material, the keff would still be <0.95 as required.
The effect of the gap between the fuel and the storage tube is taken into account on a local effect basis. Dynamic response analysis has shown that the fuel contacts the tube over a large portion of its length, thus preventing an overloaded condition of both fuel and tube.
The vertical impact load of the fuel onto its seat is considered conservatively as being slowly applied without any benefit for strain rate effects. See Subsection 9.1.6.7 for COL license information requirements.
9.1.2.1.4 Thermal-Hydraulic Design The fuel storage racks are designed to provide sufficient natural convection coolant flow to remove decay heat without reaching excessive water temperatures (100&deg;C).
In the spent-fuel storage pool, the bundle decay heat is removed by recirculation flow to the fuel pool cooling heat exchanger to maintain the pool temperature. Although the design pool exit temperature to the fuel pool cooling heat exchanger is far below boiling, the coolant temperature within the rack is higher, depending on the naturally induced bundle flow which carries away the decay heat generated by the spent fuel. The purchase specification for the fuel storage racks requires the vendor to perform the thermal-hydraulic analyses to evaluate the rate of naturally circulated flow and the maximum rack water exit temperature. See Subsection 9.1.6.8 for COL license information requirements.
9.1.2.1.5 Material Considerations All structural material used in the fabrication of the fuel storage racks is in accordance with the latest issue of the applicable ASTM specification at the time of equipment order. This material is chosen due to its corrosion resistance and its ability to be formed and welded with consistent quality. The normal pool water operating temperatures are 16&deg;C to 66&deg;C.
The storage tube material is permanently marked with identification traceable to the material certifications. The fuel storage tube assembly is compatible with the environment of treated water and provides a design life of 60 years.
9.1.2.2 Facilities Description (Spent-Fuel Storage)
(1)    The spent-fuel storage pool is located in the R/B (Figure 1.2-12).
(2)    The R/B is a Seismic Category I building protecting the spent fuel from seismic events and externally generated missiles. There are no non-seismic systems, high or moderate energy pipes, or rotating machinery located in the vicinity of the spent-fuel pool or cask loading area on the refueling floor.
9.1-4                                                                                    Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    The spent-fuel storage and adjacent cask loading area are separated by Seismic Category I gates. These gates isolate the cask loading area from the spent-fuel pool.
The gates between the spent-fuel pool and other pools are all Seismic Category I.
(4)    The shipping cask is placed in a walled off and drained portion of the spent-fuel pool.
The drained volume is flooded, and the Seismic Category I gates removed. The spent fuel is then transferred. This process is reversed to remove the cask. The ratio of the two volumes is such that failure of the gates will not lower water level enough to be unacceptable. Interlocks on the main crane prevent the shipping cask from being carried over any other portion of the spent-fuel storage pool.
(5)    The spent fuel storage racks provide storage in the R/B spent-fuel pool for spent fuel received from the reactor vessel during the refueling operation. The spent-fuel storage racks are top-entry racks designed to preclude the possibility of criticality under normal and abnormal conditions. The upper tieplate of the fuel elements rests against the rack to provide lateral support. The lower tieplate sits in the bottom of the rack, which supports the weight of the fuel.
(6)    The rack arrangement is designed to prevent accidental insertion of fuel assemblies or bundles between adjacent modules. The storage rack is designed to provide accessibility to the fuel bail for grappling purposes.
9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Control The spent-fuel storage racks are purchased equipment. The purchase specification for the spent-fuel storage racks will require the vendor to provide the information requested in Question 430.190 on criticality analysis of the spent-fuel storage, including the uncertainity value and associated probability and confidence level for the keff value. See Subsection 9.1.6.3 for COL license information requirements.
9.1.2.3.2 Structural Design and Material Compatibility Requirements (1)    The spent-fuel pool racks provide storage for 270% of the reactor core.
(2)    The fuel storage racks are designed to be supported vertically by the pool floor. The fuel storage racks allow sufficient pool water flow for natural convection cooling of the stored fuel. The fuel rack modules are freestanding (i.e. not attached to the floor and can be removed).
(3)    The racks include individual solid tube storage compartments, which provide lateral restraints over the entire length of the fuel assembly or bundle.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                      9.1-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)    The racks are fabricated from materials used for construction and are specified in accordance with the latest issue of applicable ASTM specifications at the time of equipment order.
(5)    Not used.
(6)    The racks are designed to withstand, while maintaining the nuclear safety design basis, the impact force generated by the vertical free-fall drop of a fuel assembly from a height of 1.8m.
(7)    The rack is designed to withstand a pullup force of 17.79 kN and a horizontal force of 4.45 kN.
(8)    The fuel storage racks are designed to handle irradiated fuel assemblies. The expected radiation levels are well below the design levels.
The fuel storage facilities will be designed to Seismic Category I requirements to prevent earthquake damage to the stored fuel.
The fuel storage pools have adequate water shielding for the stored spent fuel. Adequate shielding for transporting the fuel is also provided. Liquid level sensors are installed to detect a low pool water level, and adequate makeup water is available to assure that the fuel will not be uncovered should a leak occur.
Since the fuel storage racks are made of noncombustible materials and are stored under water, there is no potential fire hazard. The large water volume also protects the spent-fuel storage racks from potential pipe breaks and associated jet impingement loads.
Fuel storage racks are made in accordance with the latest issue of the applicable ASTM specification at the time of equipment order. The storage tubes are permanently marked with identification traceable to the material certifications. The fuel storage tube assembly is compatible with the environment of treated water and provides a design life of 60 years, including allowances for corrosion.
Regulatory Guide 1.13 is applicable to spent-fuel storage facilities. The Reactor Building contains the fuel storage facilities, including the storage racks and pool, and is designed to protect the fuel from damage caused by:
(1)    Natural events such as earthquake, high winds and flooding (2)    Mechanical damage caused by dropping of fuel assemblies bundles, or other objects onto stored fuel 9.1-6                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.2.4 Summary of Radiological Considerations By adequate design and careful operational procedures, the safety design bases of the spent-fuel storage arrangement are satisfied. Thus, the exposure of plant personnel to radiation is maintained well below published guideline values. Further details of radiological considerations, including those for the spent-fuel storage arrangement, are presented in Chapter 12.
The pool liner leakage detection system and water level monitoring system, including the corrective action for loss of heat removal capability, are discussed in Subsection 9.1.3. The radiation monitoring system and the corrective action for excessive radiation levels are discussed in Subsections 11.5.2.1.2 and 11.5.2.1.3.
9.1.3 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 9.1.3.1 Design Bases The Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPC) System is a non-safety-related system designed to remove the decay heat from the fuel pool, maintain pool water level and quality and remove radioactive materials from the pool to minimize the release of radioactivity to the environs.
The FPC System shall:
(1)    Minimize corrosion product buildup and shall control water clarity, so that the fuel assemblies can be efficiently handled underwater.
(2)    Minimize fission product concentration in the water which could be released from the pool to the Reactor Building environment.
(3)    Monitor fuel pool water level and maintain a water level above the fuel sufficient to provide shielding for normal building occupancy.
(4)    Maintain the pool water temperature below 52&deg;C under normal operating conditions.
The temperature limit of 52&deg;C is set to establish an acceptable environment for personnel working in the vicinity of the fuel pool. The design basis for the FPC System is to provide cooling after closure of the fuel gates at the completion of refueling (21 days after shutdown). The normal design basis heat load at this time is the sum of decay heat of the most recent 35% spent-fuel batch plus the heat from the previous four fuel batches after closure of the fuel gates. The RHR System will be used to supplement the FPC System under the maximum load condition as defined in Subsection 9.1.3.2.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.3.2 System Description The FPC System (Figures 9.1-1 and 9.1-2, and Table 9.1-11) maintains the spent-fuel storage pool below the desired temperature at an acceptable radiation level and at a degree of clarity necessary to transfer and service the fuel bundles.
The FPC System cools the fuel storage pool by transferring the spent fuel decay heat through two 6.91 GJ/h heat exchangers to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RCW) System.
Each of the two heat exchangers is designed to transfer one half of the system design heat load.
The FPC System utilizes two parallel 250 m3/h pumps to provide a system design flow of 500 m3/h. Each pump is suitable for continuous duty operation. The equipment is located in the Reactor Building.
The system pool water temperature is maintained at or below 52&deg;C. The decay heat released from the stored fuel is transferred to the RCW System. During refueling prior to 21 days following shutdown, the reactor (shutdown cooling) and fuel pool cooling are provided jointly by the RHR and FPC Systems in parallel. The reactor cavity communicates with the fuel pool, since the reactor well is flooded and the fuel gates are open. RHR suction is taken from the vessel shutdown suction lines, pumped through RHR heat exchangers and discharged into the upper pools to improve water clarity for refueling. For the FPC System, fuel pool water is circulated by means of overflow through skimmers around the periphery of the pool and a scupper at the end of the transfer pool drain tanks, pumped through the FPC heat exchangers and filter-demineralizers and back to the pool through the pool diffusers.
After 21 days the fuel pool heat exchangers are capable of maintaining the spent fuel pool temperature below 52&deg;C at the normal heat load from the decay heat of the most recent 35%
batch of discharged fuel plus the 4 previous batches stored in the pool. If the fuel pool gates are installed prior to 21 days, or if more than 35% of the most recent batch of fuel is stored in the pool (maximum heat load condition) it may be necessary to utilize one of the RHR systems to supplement the cooling of the spent fuel pool. Supplemental cooling from RHR can be achieved by aligning the RHR B or C in the fuel pool cooling mode. In the fuel pool cooling mode of RHR a suction is taken from the skimmer surge tanks, passed through an RHR heat exchanger, and returned to the fuel pool. In the event one of the RHR systems is aligned in the fuel pool cooling mode it is permissible for that system to be counted as one of the minimum required Emergency Core Cooling systems during shutdown (Modes 4 or 5) as long as the system can be manually realigned and the system is otherwise operable.
Clarity and purity of the pool water are maintained by a combination of filtering and ion exchange. The filter-demineralizers maintain total corrosion product metals at 30 ppb or less with pH range of 5.6 to 8.6 at 25&deg;C for compatibility with fuel storage racks and other equipment. Conductivity is maintained at less than 1.2 S/cm at 25&deg;C and chlorides less than 20 ppb. Each filter unit in the filter-demineralizer subsystem has adequate capacity to maintain the desired purity level of the pools under normal operating conditions. The flow rate is designed to be approximately that required for two complete water changes per day for the fuel 9.1-8                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 transfer and storage pools. The maximum system flow rate is twice that needed to maintain the specified water quality.
The FPC System is designed to remove suspended or dissolved impurities from the following sources:
(1)    Dust or other airborne particles (2)    Surface dirt dislodged from equipment immersed in the pool (3)    Crud and fission products emanating from the reactor or fuel bundles during refueling (4)    Debris from inspection or disposal operations (5)    Residual cleaning chemicals or flush water A post-processed strainer in the effluent stream of the filter-demineralizer limits the migration of filter material. The filter-holding element can withstand a differential pressure greater than the developed pump head for the system.
The filter-demineralizer units are located separately in shielded cells with enough clearance to permit removing filter elements from the vessels.
Each cell contains only the filter-demineralizer and piping. All valves (inlet, outlet, recycle, vent, drain, etc.) are located on the outside of one shielding wall of the room, together with necessary piping and headers, instrument elements and controls. Penetrations through shielding walls are located so as not to compromise radiation shielding requirements.
The filter-demineralizers are controlled from a local panel. A differential pressure and conductivity instruments provided for each filter-demineralizer unit indicate when backwash is required. Suitable alarms, differential pressure indicators and flow indicators monitor the condition of the filter-demineralizers.
System instrumentation is provided for both automatic and remote-manual operations. A low-low level switch stops the circulating pumps when the fuel pool skimmer-surge tank reserve capacity is reduced to the volume that can be pumped in approximately one minute with one pump at rated capacity (250 m3/h). A level switch is provided in the fuel pool to alarm locally and in the control room on high and low level. Temperature elements are provided to display and alarm pool temperature and inlet temperature to the filter-demineralizers in the main control room. In addition, leakage flow detectors in the pool drains and pool liners are provided and alarmed in the control room.
The Spent Fuel Pool is also equipped with two independent safety-related wide-range level transmitters that transmit water level signals to the MCR. In addition, the water level signals Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 will also be provided to the Remote Shutdown Panels or other appropriate location accessible post-accident. The instrument channels shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable separation and protection of the level indication function against missiles that may result from damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. To meet Order EA-12-051 (Reference 9.1-1) the separation and location guidance outlined in NEI 12-02 (Reference 9.1-2) will be considered to provide protection for installed instruments from external hazards. The signals are used both for water level indication and to initiate three low-level alarms, as conditions may require. At a minimum, alarm set points will include 1) Level 1 at the top of the fuel assembly bail handle, (the lowest level); 2) Level 2 is the safe shielding level, 3.05 m above TAF (the middle level); and 3) Level 3 is an elevation at a point just below normal water level (the uppermost alarm level) in order to provide the operators with warning of a decrease in the SFP coolant level. The uppermost alarm level will be the first alarm associated with the spent fuel pool level that the operators receive. For further details on the instrumentation, refer to DCD Section 7.5. This instrumentation will meet the requirements of Reference 9.1-1 and the guidance of Reference 9.1-2.
The circulating pumps are controlled from the control room and a local panel. Pump low suction pressure automatically shuts off the pumps. A pump low discharge pressure alarm is indicated in the control room and on the local panel. The circulating pump motors are powered from the normal offsite sources backed by the combustion turbine generators.
During normal plant operation the water level in the spent-fuel storage pool is maintained at a height sufficient to provide shielding for normal building occupancy with indication of level from non-safety narrow range level transmitters. Radioactive particulates removed from the fuel pool are collected in filter-demineralizer units which are located in shielded cells. For these reasons, the exposure of plant personnel to radiation from the FPC System is minimal. Further details of radiological considerations for this system are provided in Chapter 12.
The circulation patterns within the reactor well and spent-fuel storage pool are established by placing the diffusers and skimmers so that particles dislodged during refueling operations are swept away from the work area and out of the pools.
Check valves prevent the pool from siphoning in the event of a pipe rupture.
Heat from pool evaporation is handled by the building ventilation system. Makeup water is provided through a remote-operated valve.
9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation The maximum possible heat load for the FPC System upon closure of the fuel gates (21 days) is the decay heat of the full core load of fuel at the end of the fuel cycle plus the remaining decay heat of the spent fuel discharged at previous refuelings upon closure of the fuel gates; the maximum capacity of the spent-fuel storage pool is 270% of a core. The temperature of the fuel pool water may be permitted to rise to approximately 60&deg;C under these conditions. During cold 9.1-10                                                                                    Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 shutdown conditions, if it appears that the fuel pool temperature will exceed 52&deg;C, the operator can connect the FPC System to the RHR System. Combining the capacities enables the two systems to keep the water temperature below 52&deg;C. The RHR System will be used only to supplement the fuel pool cooling when the reactor is shut down. The reactor will not be started up whenever portions of the RHR System are needed to cool the fuel pool.
These connections may also be utilized during emergency conditions to assure cooling of the spent fuel regardless of the availability of the FPC System. The volume of water in the storage pool is such that there is enough heat absorption capability to allow sufficient time for switching over to the RHR System for emergency cooling.
During the initial stages of refueling, the reactor cavity communicates with the fuel pool, since the reactor well is flooded and the fuel pool gates are open. Decay heat removal is provided jointly by the RHR and FPC Systems and the pool temperature kept below 60&deg;C. Evaluation studies concluded that after 150 hours decay following shutdown (fuel pool gates open), the combined decay heat removal capacity of the 1-RHR and 1-FPC heat exchangers (single active failure postulated) can keep the pool temperature well below 60&deg;C. The RHR-FPC joint decay heat removal performance evaluation is shown in Table 9.1-12.
The spent-fuel storage pool is designed so that no single failure of structures or equipment will cause inability to:
(1)    Maintain irradiated fuel submerged in water (2)    Re-establish normal fuel pool water level (3)    Remove decay heat from the pool In order to limit the possibility of pool leakage around pool penetrations, the pool is lined with stainless steel. In addition to providing a high degree of integrity, the lining is designed to withstand possible abuse when equipment is moved. No inlets, outlets or drains are provided that might permit the pool to be drained below a safe shielding level, i.e. below a point 3m above the top of active fuel located in the spent fuel storage racks. Lines extending below this level are equipped with siphon breakers, check valves, or other suitable devices to prevent inadvertent pool drainage. Interconnected drainage paths are provided behind the liner welds.
These paths are designed to:
(1)    Prevent pressure buildup behind the liner plate (2)    Prevent the uncontrolled loss of contaminated pool water to other relatively cleaner locations within the containment or fuel-handling area (3)    Provide liner leak detection and measurement Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 These drainage paths are designed to permit free gravity drainage to the equipment drain tanks or sumps of sufficient capacity and/or pumped to the Radwaste Building.
A makeup water system and pool water level instrumentation are provided to replace evaporative and leakage losses. Makeup water during normal operation will be supplied from condensate. The Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPCU) System can also be used as a Seismic Category I source of makeup water in case of failure of the normal Makeup Water System.
Both FPC and SPCU Systems are Seismic Category I, Quality Group C design with the exception of the filter-demineralizer portion, which is shared by both systems. Following an accident or seismic event, the filter-demineralizers are isolated from the FPC cooling portion and the SPCU System by two block valves in series at both the inlet and outlet of the common filter-demineralizer portion. Seismic Category I, Quality Group C bypass lines are provided on both FPC and SPCU Systems to allow continued flow of cooling and makeup water to the spent-fuel pool.
Connections from the RHR System to the FPC System provide a Seismic Category I, safety-related makeup capability to the spent-fuel pool. The FPC System from the RHR connections to the spent-fuel pool are Seismic Category I, safety-related. The manual valves which permit the RHR System to take suction from the spent-fuel storage pool and cool the pool are accessible following an accident in sufficient time to permit an operator to align the RHR System to prevent the spent-fuel storage pool from boiling.
Furthermore, fire hoses can be used as an alternate makeup source. The fire protection standpipes in the Reactor Building and their water supply (yard main, one diesel engine driven pump and water source) are seismically designed. A second fire pump, driven by a motor powered from the combustion turbine generator, is also provided. Engineering analysis indicates that, under the maximum abnormal heat load with the pool gates closed and no pool cooling taking place, the pool temperature will reach about 100&deg;C in about 16 hours. This provides sufficient time for the operator to hook up fire hoses for pool makeup. The COL applicant will develop detailed procedures and operator training for providing firewater makeup to the spent-fuel pool. See Subsection 9.1.6.9 for COL license information.
The FPC components, housed in the Seismic Category I Reactor Building, are Seismic Category I, Quality Group C, including all components except the filter-demineralizer. These components are protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as: earthquake, external flooding, wind, tornado/hurricane and external missiles. The FPC System is non-safety-related with the exception of the RHR System connections for safety-related makeup and supplemental cooling. The RHR System connections will be protected from the effects of pipe whip, internal flooding, internally generated missiles, and the effects of a moderate pipe rupture within the vicinity. See Subsection 9.1.6.10 for COL license information.
From the foregoing analysis, it is concluded that the FPC System meets its design bases.
9.1.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements No special tests are required because, normally, one pump, one heat exchanger and one filter-demineralizer are operating while fuel is stored in the pool. The spare unit is operated 9.1-12                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 periodically to handle abnormal heat loads or to replace a unit for servicing. Routine visual inspection of the system components, instrumentation and trouble alarms is adequate to verify system operability.
9.1.3.5 Radiological Considerations The water level in the spent-fuel storage pool is maintained at a height which is sufficient to provide shielding for normal building occupancy. Radioactive particulates removed from the fuel pool are collected in filter-demineralizer units which are located in shielded cells. For these reasons, the exposure of plant personnel to radiation from the FPC System is minimal. Further details of radiological considerations for this and other systems are described in Chapters 11, 12, and 15.
9.1.4 Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling) 9.1.4.1 Design Bases The fuel-handling system is designed to provide a safe and effective means for transporting and handling fuel from the time it reaches the plant until it leaves the plant after post-irradiation cooling. Safe handling of fuel includes design considerations for maintaining occupational radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Design criteria for major fuel-handling system equipment are provided in Tables 9.1-2 through 9.1-4, which list the safety class, quality group and seismic category. Where applicable, the appropriate ASME, ANSI, Industrial and Electrical Codes are identified. Additional design criteria are shown below and expanded further in Subsection 9.1.4.2.
The transfer of new fuel assemblies between the uncrating area and the new-fuel inspection stand to the fuel storage pool is accomplished using a 49.82 kN auxiliary hoist on the R/B crane equipped with a general purpose grapple.From this point on, the fuel will either be handled by the telescoping grapple (or auxiliary hoist) on the refueling machine.
The refueling machine is Seismic Category I from a structural standpoint in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A. The refueling machine is constructed in accordance with a quality assurance program that ensures the design, construction and testing requirements are met.
Allowable stress due to safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loading is 120% of yield or 70% of ultimate, whichever is least. A dynamic analysis is performed on the structures using the response spectrum method with load contributions resulting from each of three directions acting simultaneously being combined by the RMS procedure. Working loads of the machine structure are in accordance with the AISC Manual of Steel Construction. All parts of the hoist systems are designed to have a safety factor of at least ten, based on the ultimate strength of the material. A redundant load path is incorporated in the fuel hoists so that no single component failure could result in a fuel bundle drop. Maximum deflection limitations are imposed on the main structures to maintain relative stiffness of the platform. Welding of the machine is in accordance with AWS D14.1 or ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section IX. Gears and Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 bearing meet AGMA Gear Classification Manual and ANSI B3.5. Materials used in construction of load bearing members are to ASTM specifications. For personnel safety, OSHA Part 1910.179 is applied. Electrical equipment and controls meet ANSI CI, National Electric Code, and NEMA Publication No. ICS1, MG1.
The auxiliary fuel grapple and the main telescoping fuel grapple have redundant lifting features and an indicator which confirms positive grapple engagement.
The fuel grapple is used for lifting and transporting fuel bundles. It is designed as a telescoping grapple that can extend to the proper work level and, in its fully retracted state, still maintain adequate water shielding over fuel of 2591 mm (8.5 ft).
In addition to redundant electrical interlocks to preclude the possibility of raising radioactive material out of the water, the cables on the auxiliary hoists incorporate an adjustable, removal stop that will jam the hoist cable against some part of the platform structure to prevent hoisting when the free end of the cable is at a preset distance below water level.
Provision of a separate cask pit, capable of being isolated from the fuel storage pool, will eliminate the potential accident of dropping the cask and rupturing the fuel storage pool.
Furthermore, limitation of the travel of the crane handling the cask will preclude transporting the cask over the spent-fuel storage pool.
9.1.4.2 System Description Table 9.1-5 is a listing of typical tools and servicing equipment supplied with nuclear system.
The following paragraphs describe the use of some of the major tools and servicing equipment and address safety aspects of the design where applicable.
Subsection 9.1.5 provides the data that verifies the ABWR Standard Plant heavy load handling systems and satisfies the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
9.1.4.2.1 Spent Fuel Cask Out of ABWR Standard Plant scope.
9.1.4.2.2 Overhead Bridge Cranes 9.1.4.2.2.1 Reactor Building Crane The Reactor Building (R/B) crane is a seismically analyzed piece of equipment. The crane consists of two crane girders and a trolley which carries two hoists. The runway track, which supports the crane girders, is supported from the R/B walls at elevation 34,600. The trolley travels laterally on the crane girders carrying the main hoist and auxiliary hoist.
The R/B crane is used to move all of the major components (reactor vessel head, shroud head and separator, dryer assembly and pool gates) as required by plant operations. The R/B crane is 9.1-14                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 used for handling new fuel from the R/B entry hatch to the new fuel inspection stand and the spent-fuel pool. It also is used for handling the spent fuel cask. The principal design criteria for the R/B crane are described in Subsection 9.1.5.
9.1.4.2.3 Fuel Servicing Equipment The fuel servicing equipment described below has been designed in accordance with the criteria listed in Table 9.1-2. Items not listed as Seismic Category I, such as hoists, tools and other equipment used for servicing, shall either be removed during operation, moved to a location where they are not a potential hazard to safety-related equipment, or seismically restrained to prevent them from becoming missiles.
9.1.4.2.3.1 Fuel Prep Machine Two fuel preparation machines (Figure 9.1-3) are mounted on the wall of the spent-fuel pool and are used for stripping reusable channels from the spent fuel and for rechanneling of the new fuel. The machines are also used with the fuel inspection fixture to provide an underwater inspection capability.
Each fuel preparation machine consists of a work platform, a frame, and a movable carriage.
The frame and movable carriage are located below the normal water level in the spent fuel pool, thus providing a water shield for the fuel assemblies being handled. The fuel preparation machine carriage has a permanently installed up-travel-stop to prevent raising fuel above the safe water shield level.
9.1.4.2.3.2 New-Fuel Inspection Stand The new-fuel inspection stand (Figure 9.1-4) serves as a support for the new-fuel bundles undergoing receiving inspection and provides a working platform for technicians engaged in performing the inspection.
The new-fuel inspection stand consists of a vertical guide column, a lift unit to position the work platform at any desired level, bearing seats and upper clamps to hold the fuel bundles in position.
The new-fuel inspection stand will be firmly attached so that it does not fall into or dump personnel into the spent fuel pool during an SSE. (See Subsection 9.1.6.5 for COL license information requirements.)
9.1.4.2.3.3 Channel Bolt Wrench The channel bolt wrench (Figure 9.1-5) is a manually operated device approximately 3.76m in overall length. The wrench is used for removing and installing the channel fastener assembly while the fuel assembly is held in the fuel preparation machine. The channel bolt wrench has a socket which mates and captures the channel fastener capscrew.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.4.2.3.4 Channel-Handling Tool The channel-handling tool (Figure 9.1-6) is used in conjunction with the fuel preparation machine to remove, install, and transport fuel channels in the spent fuel pool.
The tool is composed of a handling bail, a lock/release knob, extension shaft, angle guides and clamp arms which engage the fuel channel. The clamps are actuated (extended or retracted) by manually rotating the lock/release knob.
The channel-handling tool is suspended by its bail from a spring balancer on the channel-handling boom located on the spent fuel pool periphery.
9.1.4.2.3.5 Fuel Pool Vacuum Sipper The fuel pool vacuum sipper (Figure 9.1-7) provides a means of identifying fuel suspected of having cladding failures. The fuel pool vacuum sipper consists of a fuel isolation container, fluid console, monitoring console with program controller and beta detector and the interconnecting tubing and cables. The suspected fuel assembly is placed in the isolation container. A partial vacuum is established in the gas volume above the fuel assembly. The fission product gas leakage is sensed by the beta detector and monitoring console.
9.1.4.2.3.6 General-Purpose Grapple The general-purpose grapple (Figure 9.1-8) is a handling tool used generally with the fuel. The grapple can be attached to the jib crane to handle fuel during channeling, or the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.
9.1.4.2.3.7 Jib Crane The jib crane consists of a motor-driven boom monorail and a motor-driven trolley with an electric hoist. The jib crane is mounted along the edge of the storage pool to be used during refueling operations. Use of the jib crane leaves the refueling machine free to perform general fuel shuffling operations and still permit uninterrupted fuel preparation in the work area. The hoist has two full-capacity brakes and in-series adjustable up-travel limit switches. Upon hoisting, the first of two independently adjustable limit switches automatically stop the hoist cable terminal approximately 2.4m below the jib crane base. Continued hoisting is possible by depressing a momentary contact (up-travel override pushbutton on the pendant) together with a normal hoisting pushbutton. The second independently adjustable limit switch automatically interrupts hoist power at the maximum safe uptravel limit. When the jib crane is used in the handling of hazardous radioactive materials that must be kept below a specific water level, a fixed mechanical stop is installed on the hoist cable to prevent further hoisting when that travel is reached.
9.1.4.2.3.8 Refueling Machine Refer to Subsection 9.1.4.2.7.1 for a description of the refueling machine.
9.1-16                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.4.2.3.9 Channel Handling Boom A channel handling boom (Figure 9.1-10) with a spring-loaded balance reel is used to assist the operator in supporting a portion of the weight of the channel as it is removed from the fuel assembly. The boom is set between the fuel preparation machines. With the channel handling tool attached to the reel, the channel may be conveniently moved between the fuel preparation machines.
9.1.4.2.4 Servicing Aids General area underwater lights are provided with a suitable reflector for illumination. Suitable light support brackets are furnished to support the lights in the reactor vessel to allow the light to be positioned over the area being serviced independent of the platform. Local area underwater lights are small diameter lights for additional illumination. Drop lights are used for illumination where needed.
A radiation hardened portable underwater closed circuit television camera is provided. The camera may be lowered into the reactor vessel and/or spent fuel pool to assist in the inspection and/or maintenance of these areas.
A general purpose, plastic viewing aid is provided to float on the water surface to provide better visibility. The sides of the viewing aid are brightly colored to allow the operator to observe it in the event of filling with water and sinking. A portable, submersible-type, underwater vacuum cleaner is provided to assist in removing crud and miscellaneous particulate matter from the pool floors or reactor vessel. The pump and the filter unit are completely submersible for extended periods. The filter package is capable of being remotely changed, and the filters will fit into a standard shipping container for offsite burial. Fuel pool tool accessories are also provided to meet servicing requirements. A fuel sampler is provided to detect defective fuel assemblies during open vessel periods while the fuel is in the core. The fuel sampler head isolates individual fuel assemblies by sealing the top of the fuel channel and pumping water from the bottom of the fuel assembly, through the fuel channel, to a sampling station, and returning the water to the primary coolant system. After a soaking period, a water sample is obtained and is radiochemically analyzed to determine possible fuel bundle leakage.
9.1.4.2.5 Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment The essentiality and safety classifications, the quality group, and the seismic category for this equipment are listed in Table 9.1-3. Following is a description of the equipment designs in reference to that table.
9.1.4.2.5.1 Reactor Vessel Service Tools These tools are used when the reactor is shut down and the reactor vessel head is being removed or reinstalled. Tools in this group are:
Stud Handling Tool Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Stud Wrench Nut Runner Stud Thread Protector Thread Protector Mandrel Bushing Wrench Seal Surface Protector Stud Elongation Measuring Rod Dial Indicator Elongation Measuring Device Head Guide Cap RIP Impeller/Shaft Assembly Tool Impeller Storage Rack The tools are designed for a 60-year life in the specified environment. Lifting tools are designed for a safety factor of 10 or better with respect to the ultimate strength of the material used. When carbon steel is used, it is either hard chrome plated, parkerized, or coated with an approved paint per Regulatory Guide 1.54.
9.1.4.2.5.2 Steamline Plug The steamline plugs are used during reactor refueling or servicing; they are inserted in the steam outlet nozzles from inside of the reactor vessel to prevent a flow of water from the reactor into the main steamline during servicing of safety/relief valves, main steam isolation valves, or other components of the main steamlines, while the reactor water level is at the refueling level. The steamline plug design provides two seals of different types. Each one is independently capable of holding full head pressure. The equipment is constructed of corrosion-resistant materials. All calculated safety factors are 5 or better. The plug body is designed in accordance with the Aluminum Construction Manual by the Aluminum Association.
9.1.4.2.5.3 Shroud Head Stud Wrench This is a hand-held tool for tightening and loosening the shroud head studs. It is designed for a 60-year life and is made of aluminum for easy handling and to resist corrosion. Calculations have been performed to confirm the design.
9.1-18                                                                                    Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.4.2.5.4 Head Holding Pedestal Three pedestals are provided for mounting on the refueling floor for supporting the reactor vessel head and strongback/carousel during periods of reactor service. The pedestals have studs which engage three evenly spaced stud holes in the head flange. The flange surface rests on replaceable wear pads made of aluminum.
When resting on the pedestals, the head flange is approximately 0.9m above the floor to allow access to the seal surface for inspection and O-ring replacement.
The pedestal structure is a carbon steel weldment coated with an approved paint. It has a base with bolt holes for mounting it to the concrete floor.
A seismic analysis was made to determine the seismic forces imposed onto the pedestals and floor anchors, using the floor response spectrum method. The structure is designed to withstand these calculated forces and meet the requirements of AISC.
9.1.4.2.5.5 Head Stud Rack The head stud rack is used for transporting and storage of eight RPV studs and is suspended from the R/B crane hook when lifting studs from the reactor well to the operating floor.
The rack is made of aluminum to resist corrosion and is designed for a safety factor of 5 with respect to the ultimate strength of the material.
The structure is designed in accordance with the Aluminum Construction Manual by the Aluminum Association.
9.1.4.2.5.6 Dryer and Separator Strongback The dryer and separator strongback is a lifting device used for transporting the steam dryer or the shroud head with the steam separators between the reactor vessel and the storage pools. The strongback is a cruciform-shaped I-beam structure, which has a hook box with two hook pins in the center for engagement with the R/B crane sister hook. The strongback has a socket with a pneumatically operated pin on the end of each arm for engaging it to the four lift eyes on the steam dryer or shroud head.
The strongback has been designed such that one hook pin and one main beam of the cruciform will be capable of carrying the total load and so that no single component failure will cause the load to drop or swing uncontrollably out of an essentially level attitude. The safety factor of all lifting members is 10 or better in reference to the ultimate breaking strength of the materials.
The structure is designed in accordance with The Manual of Shell Construction by AISC. The completed assembly is proof-tested at 125% of rated load, and all structural welds are magnetic particle inspected after load test.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.4.2.5.7 Head Strongback/Carousel The RPV head strongback/carousel is an integrated piece of equipment consisting of a cruciform-shaped strongback, a circular monorail and a circular storage tray.
The strongback is a box-beam structure which has a hook box with two hook pins in the center for engagement with the reactor service crane sister hook. Each arm has a lift rod for engagement to the four lift lugs on the RPV head. The monorail is mounted on extensions of the strongback arms and four additional arms equally spaced between the strongback arms. The monorail circle matches the stud circle of the reactor vessel and serves to suspend stud tensioners and nut-handling devices. The storage tray is suspended from the ends of the same eight arms and surrounds the RPV flange. A manifold is mounted underneath the hook box for distributing hydraulic and pneumatic pressures to equipment traveling on the monorail. The head strongback/carousel serves the following functions:
(1)  Lifting of Vessel HeadThe strongback, when suspended from the R/B crane main hook, will transport RPV head plus the carousel with all its attachments between the reactor vessel and storage on the pedestals.
(2)  Tensioning of Vessel Head ClosureThe carousel, when supported on the RPV head on the vessel, will carry tensioners, its own weight, the strongback, storage of nuts, washers, thread protectors, and associated tools and equipment.
(3)  Storage with RPV HeadThe carousel, when stored with the RPV head holding pedestals, carries the same load for (2) above.
(4)  Storage without RPV HeadDuring reactor operation, the carousel is stored on the refueling floor.
The strongback, with its lifting components, is designed to meet the Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Specification No. 70. The design provides a 15% impact allowance and a safety factor of 10 in reference to the ultimate strength of the material used. After completion of welding and before painting, the lifting assembly is proof load tested and all load-affected welds and lift pins are magnetic-particle inspected.
The steel structure is designed in accordance with the Manual of Steel Construction by AISC. Aluminum structures are designed in accordance with the Aluminum Construction Manual by the Aluminum Association.
The strongback is tested in accordance with American National Standard for overhead hoists ANSI B30.16, Paragraph 16-1.2.2.2, such that one hook pin and one main beam of the structure is capable of carrying the total load, and so that no single component failure will cause the load to drop or swing uncontrollably out of an 9.1-20                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 essentially level attitude. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX (Welder Qualification) is applied to all welder structures.
Regulatory Guide 1.54  General compliance or alternate assessment for Regulatory Guide 1.54, which provides design criteria for protective coatings, may be found in Subsection 6.1.2.
9.1.4.2.6 In-Vessel Servicing Equipment The instrument strongback attached to the RBC auxiliary hoist is used for servicing the local power range neutron monitoring (PRNM), startup range neutron monitoring (SRNM), and dry tubes, should they require replacement. The strongback initially supports the dry tube into the vessel. The incore dry tube is then decoupled from the strongback and is guided into place while being supported by the instrument handling tool. Final incore insertion is accomplished from below the reactor vessel. The instrument handling tool is attached to the refueling machine auxiliary hoist and is used for removing and installing PRNM fixed incore dry tubes as well as handling the SRNM dry tubes.
9.1.4.2.7 Refueling Equipment Fuel movement and reactor servicing operations are performed from platforms which span the refueling, servicing and storage cavities. The Reactor Building is supplied with a refueling machine for fuel movement and servicing, and an auxiliary platform for servicing operations from the vessel flange level.
9.1.4.2.7.1 Refueling Machine The refueling machine is a gantry crane, which is used to transport fuel and reactor components to and from pool storage and the reactor vessel. The machine spans the spent fuel pool on bedded tracks in the refueling floor. A telescoping mast and grapple suspended from a trolley system is used to lift and orient fuel bundles for placement in the core or storage rack. Control of the machine is from an operator station on the refueling floor.
A position indicating system and travel limit computer is provided to locate the grapple over the vessel core and prevent collisions with pool obstacles. Two auxiliary hoists of 4.71 kN and 9.81 kN capacity, one main and one auxiliary monorail trolley-mounted, are provided for incore servicing. The grapple in its retracted position provides sufficient water shielding over the active fuel during transit. The fuel grapple hoist has a redundant load path so that no single component failure will result in a fuel bundle drop. Interlocks on the machine:
(1)    Prevent hoisting a fuel assembly over the vessel with a control rod removed (2)    Prevent collision with fuel pool walls or other structures (3)    Limit travel of the fuel grapple (4)    Interlock grapple hook engagement with hoist load and hoist up power Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                9.1-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)    Ensure correct sequencing of the transfer operation in the automatic or manual mode 9.1.4.2.7.2 Auxiliary Platform The auxiliary platform provides a reactor flange level working surface for in-vessel inspection and reactor internals servicing, and permits servicing access for the full vessel diameter.
Typical operations to be performed are inservice inspections. No hoisting equipment is provided with this platform, as this function can be performed from the refueling machine. The platform operates on tracks at the reactor vessel flange level and is lowered into position by the reactor building crane using the dryer/separator strongback. The platform weighs approximately 17.79 kN and features 1.5m wide work areas and motorized travel. The platform power is supplied by a cable from the refueling floor elevation.
9.1.4.2.7.3 Fuel Assembly Sampler The fuel assembly sampler (Figure 9.1-11) provides a means of obtaining a water sample for radiochemical analysis from fuel bundles while installed in the core. The fuel assembly sampler consists of a sampling station, two sampling chambers and interconnecting tubing. The sampling chambers are lowered over four adjacent assemblies and samples are obtained of the water in the fuel channels.
9.1.4.2.8 Storage Equipment Specially designed equipment storage racks are provided. Additional storage equipment is listed on Table 9.1-5. For fuel storage racks description and fuel arrangement, see Subsections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2.
Defective fuel assemblies are placed in special fuel storage containers, which are stored in the equipment storage rack, both of which are designed for the defective fuel. These may be used to isolate leaking or defective fuel while in the fuel pool and during shipping. Channels can also be removed from the fuel bundle while in a defective fuel storage container.
The fuel pool sipper may be used for out-of-core wet sipping at any time. They are used to detect a defective fuel bundle while circulating water through the fuel bundle in a closed system. The bail on the container head is designed not to fit into the fuel grapple.
9.1.4.2.9 Under-Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment The primary functions of the under-reactor vessel servicing equipment are to:
(1)    Remove and install control rod drives (2)    Install and remove the neutron detectors (3)    Remove and install RIP motors 9.1-22                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-4 lists the equipment and tools required for servicing. Of the equipment listed, the equipment handling platform and the FMCRD handling equipment are powered pneumatically.
The FMCRD handling equipment is designed for the removal and installation of the control rod drives from their housings. This equipment is used in conjunction with the equipment-handling platform. It is designed in accordance with OSHA-1910.179, and American Institute of Steel Construction, AISC.
The undervessel platform provides a working surface for equipment and personnel performing work in the undervessel area. It is a polar platform capable of rotating 360&deg;. This equipment is designed in accordance with the applicable requirements of OSHA (Vol 37, No. 202, Part 1910N), AISC, ANSI-C-1, National Electric Code.
The spring reel is used to pull the incore guide tube (ICGT) seal or incore detector into the ICGT during incore servicing.
The water seal cap is designed to prevent leakage of primary coolant from incore detector housings during detector replacement. It is designed to industrial codes and manufactured from corrosion-resistant material.
The incore flange seal test plug is used to determine the pressure integrity of the incore flange O-ring seal. It is constructed of corrosion-resistant material.
9.1.4.2.10 Fuel-Handling Tasks The Fuel-Handling and Transfer System provides a safe and effective means of transporting and handling fuel from the time it reaches the plant until it leaves the plant after post-irradiation cooling. The following subsections describe the integrated fuel transfer system which ensures that the design bases of the fuel handling system and the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 are satisfied.
9.1.4.2.10.1 Arrival of Fuel on Site The new fuel is delivered to the plant on flatbed truck or railcar. The new fuel is delivered to the receiving stations in the Reactor Building (R/B) through the rail and truck entry door. There, the incoming new fuel is unloaded, removed from their shipping crates and moved up to the refueling floor for inspection and channeling.
9.1.4.2.10.2 Refueling Procedure A general plant refueling and servicing sequence diagram is shown in Figure 9.1-12. Fuel handling procedures are shown in Figures 9.1-13 and 9.1-14 and described below. Typical R/B layouts are shown in Section 1.2 and component drawings of the principal fuel-handling equipment are shown in Figures 9.1-3 through 9.1-11.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 When the reactor is sufficiently cooled, the drywell head, head insulation and vessel head are removed by the R/B crane and placed in their respective storage areas. The R/B crane and cruciform-shaped strongback will be used to handle the RPV head and attachments. The strongback is designed so that no single component failure will cause the load to drop or swing uncontrollably out of an essentially horizontal attitude.
The strongback attaches to the crane sister hook by means of an integral hook box and two hook pins. Each pin is capable of carrying the rated load. Each main beam of the cruciform is capable of carrying the rated load.
On both ends of each leg are adjustable lifting rods, suspended vertically to attach the lifting legs to the RPV head. These rods are for adjustment for even four-point load distribution and allow for some flexibility in diametrical location of the lifting lugs on the head.
The maximum potential drop height is at the point where the head is lifted vertically from the vessel and before moving it horizontally to the head storage pedestals.
The shroud head load and the steam dryer load will both be lifted with the dryer/separator strongback.
This strongback is a cruciform shape with box-shaped adapters at the four ends. Each socket box has two compartments to accommodate the two different lug spacings on the dryer and on the shroud head. Pneumatically operated lifting pins will penetrate the sockets to engage the lifting lugs.
Each of the above strongbacks is load tested at 125% rated load. At this test, measurements are taken before test load, under test load and after releasing load, to verify that deflections are within acceptable limits. A magnetic particle test of structural welds is performed after the load test to assure structural integrity.
An outer seal exists around the vessel flange to seal the drywell from the reactor well. Water is pumped into the reactor well. Once the reactor well is filled, the dryer and separator are removed and transferred to their storage areas within the dryer/separator (D/S) pit using the D/S strongback. The tools are used in these and subsequent reactor servicing operations are listed in Table 9.1-2. Once access to the core is possible, the refueling machine can relocate and move fuel assemblies to and from the pool storage racks. Simultaneously, the RIP, FMCRD hydraulic system, and the Neutron Monitoring System may be serviced from beneath the vessel.
During refueling, the refueling machine transfers the spent fuel from the core to the spent fuel pool. The spent fuel assembly is placed in the fuel preparation machine, where its channel is removed and fitted to the new-fuel bundle previously placed in the machine. During channeling, the spent fuel bundle is placed in the storage racks by the refueling platform. The refueling platform then places another new-fuel bundle in the fuel preparation machine for channeling.
9.1-24                                                                            Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 When refueling and servicing are completed, the steam separator assembly is replaced in the vessel, the steamline plugs removed and the steam dryer returned to the vessel. At this point, the gates are installed, isolating the reactor well from the other pools. The reactor well is then drained to the main condenser. With the reactor well empty, the vessel and drywell heads are replaced.
9.1.4.2.10.2.1 New Fuel Preparation 9.1.4.2.10.2.1.1 Receipt and Inspection of New Fuel The incoming new fuel will be delivered directly to the refueling floor where the new fuel is examined for damage during shipment.
The crate dimensions are approximately 813 x 813 x 5486 mm. Each crate contains two fuel bundles supported by an inner metal container. Shipping weight of each unit is approximately 13.35 kN. The receiving station shall include a separate area where the crate cover and the inner metal container can be removed from the crate. Both inner and outer shipping containers are reusable. Handling during uncrating is accomplished by use of the R/B cranes. The inner container is tilted to a position which is almost vertical, while the fuel bundles are unstrapped and removed from the container with the R/B crane. They are then transported to one of the following locations:
                  -    Fuel prep machine for storage in the spent fuel pool
                  -    New fuel inspection stand for further inspection 9.1.4.2.10.2.1.2 Channeling New Fuel The new fuel can be channeled using new channels in the new fuel inspection stand. If previously irradiated channels are to be used, the procedure is as follows:
Using the refueling platform, a spent fuel bundle is transported to the fuel prep machine. The channel is unbolted from the bundle using the channel bolt wrench.
The channel handling tool is fastened to the top of the channel and the fuel prep machine carriage is lowered removing the fuel from the channel. The channel is then positioned over a new-fuel bundle located in fuel prep machine No. 2 and the process reversed. The channeled new fuel is stored in the pool storage racks ready for insertion into the reactor.
9.1.4.2.10.2.1.3 Equipment Preparation Another ingredient in a successful refueling outage is equipment and new fuel readiness.
Equipment long lying dormant must be brought to life. All tools, grapples, slings, strongbacks, stud tensioners, etc., will be given a thorough inspection and operational check, and any defective (or well worn) parts will be replaced. Air hoses on grapples will be checked. Crane Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 cables will be routinely inspected. All necessary maintenance will be performed to preclude outage extension due to equipment failure.
9.1.4.2.10.2.2 Reactor Shutdown The reactor is shut down according to a prescribed planned procedure. During cooldown, the reactor pressure vessel is vented and filled to above flange level to promote cooling.
9.1.4.2.10.2.2.1 Drywell Head Removal Immediately after cooldown, the work to remove the drywell head can begin. The drywell head will be attached by a quick disconnect mechanism. To remove the head, the quick disconnect pins are withdrawn and stored separately for reinsertion when the head is replaced. The drywell head is lifted by the R/B crane to its storage space on the refueling floor. The drywell seal surface protector is installed before any other activity proceeds in the reactor well area.
9.1.4.2.10.2.2.2 Reactor Well Servicing When the drywell head has been removed, several pipe lines are exposed. These lines penetrate the reactor well through openings. The piping must be removed and the openings sealed. There are also various vent openings which must be made watertight.
Water level in the vessel is now lowered to flange level in preparation for head removal.
9.1.4.2.10.2.3 Reactor Vessel Opening 9.1.4.2.10.2.3.1 Vessel Head Removal The combination head strongback and carousel stud tensioner is transported by the R/B crane and positioned on the reactor vessel head.
Each stud is tensioned and its nut loosened in a series of two to three passes. Finally, when the nuts are loose, they are backed off using a nut runner until only a few threads engage. The suspended nut is hand rotated free from the stud, and the nuts and washers are placed in the racks provided for them on the carousel. When all the nuts and washers are removed, the vessel stud protectors and vessel head guide caps are installed.
Next, the head, strongback and carousel are transported by the R/B crane to the head holding pedestals on the refueling floor. The head holding pedestals keep the vessel head elevated to facilitate inspection and O-ring replacement.
The studs in line with the fuel transfer gates are removed from the vessel and placed in the rack provided for them. The loaded rack is transported to the refueling floor for storage. Removal of these studs provides a path for fuel movement.
9.1-26                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.4.2.10.2.3.2 Dryer Removal The dryer-separator strongback is lowered by the R/B crane and attached to the dryer lifting lugs. The dryer is lifted from the reactor vessel and transported underwater to its storage location in the D/S pit adjacent to the reactor well.
9.1.4.2.10.2.3.3 Separator Removal In preparation for the separator removal, the steamline plugs are installed in the four main steam nozzles. The separator is then unbolted from the shroud using shroud head bolt wrenches. When the unbolting is accomplished, the dryer separator strongback is lowered into the vessel and attached to the separator lifting lugs. The separator is lifted from the reactor vessel and transported underwater to the storage location in the D/S pit adjacent to the reactor well.
9.1.4.2.10.2.3.4 Fuel Assembly Sampling During reactor operation, the core offgas radiation level is monitored. If a rise in offgas activity has been noted, the reactor core may be sampled during shutdown to locate any leaking fuel assemblies. The fuel sample isolates up to a four-bundle array in the core. This stops water circulation through the bundles and allows fission products to concentrate if a bundle is defective. After 10 minutes, a water sample is taken for fission product analysis. If a defective bundle is found, it is transferred to the spent fuel pool and stored in a special defective fuel storage container to minimize background activity in the spent fuel pool.
9.1.4.2.10.2.4 Refueling and Reactor Servicing The gate isolating the spent fuel pool from the reactor well is removed, thereby interconnecting the pool areas. The refueling of the reactor can now begin.
9.1.4.2.10.2.4.1 Refueling During a normal outage, approximately 25% of the fuel is removed from the reactor vessel, 25% of the fuel is shuffled in the core (generally from peripheral to center locations) and 25%
new fuel is installed. The actual fuel handling is done with the refueling platform. It is used as the principal means of transporting fuel assemblies between the reactor well and the spent fuel pool; it also serves as a hoist and transport device. The machine travels on a track extending along each side of the reactor well and spent fuel pool and supports the trolley, refueling grapple, and auxiliary hoists. The grapple is suspended from a trolley that can traverse the width of the platform.
The refueling machine has two auxiliary hoists of 4.71 kN and 9.81 kN capacity. One hoist normally can be used with appropriate grapples to handle control rods, guide tubes, fuel support pieces, sources and other internals of the core. The auxiliary hoist can also serve as a means of handling other equipment within the pool. A second auxiliary hoist is mounted on the platform trolley.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The machine control system permits variable-speed, simultaneous operation of all three platform motions. Maximum speeds are:
(1)    Bridge              20 m/min (2)    Trolley            10 m/min (3)    Grapple hoist      12 m/min In the refueling machine control room, a single operator can control all the motions of the platform required to handle the fuel assemblies during refueling. Interlocks on both the grapple hoist and auxiliary hoist prevent hoisting of a fuel assembly over the core with a control rod withdrawn; interlocks also prevent withdrawal of a blade with a fuel assembly over the core attached to either the fuel grapple or auxiliary hoists. Interlocks block travel over the reactor in the startup mode.
The refueling machine contains a system that indicates the position of the fuel grapple over the core. The readout, in the local control room, matches the core arrangement cell identification numbers. The position indicator is accurate within 5 mm, relative to actual position, and minimizes jogging required to correctly place the grapple over the core.
To move fuel, the fuel grapple is aligned over the fuel assembly, lowered and attached to the fuel bundle bail. The fuel bundle is raised out of the core, moved through the refueling slot to the spent fuel pool, positioned over the storage rack and lowered into the rack. Fuel is shuffled and new fuel is moved from the spent fuel pool to the reactor vessel in the same manner.
9.1.4.2.10.2.5 Vessel Closure The following steps, when performed, will return the reactor to operating condition. The procedures are the reverse of those described in the preceding sections. Many steps are performed in parallel and not as listed.
(1)  Core Verificationthe core position of each fuel assembly must be verified to assure that the desired core configuration has been attained. Underwater TV with a video tape is utilized. Cable optional.
(2)  FMCRD Teststhe control rod drive timing, friction and scram tests are performed as required.
(3)  Replace separator.
(4)  Bolt separator and remove four steamline plugs.
(5)  Replace steam dryer.
9.1-28                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)    Install gates.
(7)    Drain reactor well.
(8)    Remove drywell seal surface covering; open drywell vents.
(9)    Replace vessel studs.
(10) Install reactor vessel head.
(11) Install vessel head piping and insulation.
(12) Hydro test vessel if required.
(13) Install drywell head; leak check.
(14) Install shield plugs.
(15) Stow gates.
(16) Startup Teststhe reactor is returned to full power operation. Power is increased gradually in a series of steps until the reactor is operating at rated power. At specific steps during the approach to power, the incore flux monitors are calibrated.
9.1.4.2.10.3 Departure of Fuel From Site The empty cask arrives at the plant on a special flatbed railcar or truck. The personnel shipping barrier and transfer impact structure are removed from the large casks and stored outside the rail entry door. Health physics personnel check the cask exterior to determine if decontamination is necessary. Decontamination, if required, and washdown to remove road dirt, is performed before removal of the cask from the transport vehicle. The R/B equipment entry airlock door is opened and the cask with its transport device moved into the building. The rail car or truck is blocked in position.
The airlock door is closed and the cask is inspected for shipping damage.
The cask cooling system of the transport vehicle is disconnected. The cask yoke is removed from its storage position on the flatbed and attached to the cask trunnions. The yoke engagement, car brakes and wheel blocks and clearances for cask tilt and lift are checked. The cask is tilted to the vertical position with combined main hoist lift and trolley movement. With the cask in a vertical position, the cask is lifted approximately 1.5m off the transport device skid mounting trunnions to clear the upper coolant duct. The cask is moved up to the refueling floor and then into the cask washdown pit and slowly lowered to the floor of the pit. Closure head lifting cables on the yoke are attached to the head and secured and the closure nuts are disengaged. The cask is next raised and transferred into the cask pit.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The cask is moved to a position over the center of the cask pit and slowly lowered into the cask pit until it rests on the cask pit floor.
The cask lifting yoke is lowered until disengaged from the cask trunnions and the closure head lifted off the cask. The closure head and yoke are moved into the cask washdown pit for storage.
The canal gates between the cask pit and the spent fuel pool are removed and spent fuel transfer from the storage racks to the cask is started.
Spent fuel is transferred underwater from storage in the spent fuel pool to the cask using the telescoping fuel grapple mounted on the refueling machine. When the cask is filled with spent fuel, the gate between the cask pit and the spent fuel pool is replaced. The closure head is replaced on the cask and the lift yoke engaged with the cask trunnions. The loaded cask is raised, transferred to the cask washdown pit, and slowly lowered to the pit floor.
The cask is checked by health physics personnel and decontamination is performed in the cask washdown pit with high pressure water sprays, chemicals and hand scrubbing as required to clean the cask to the level required for transport. Cooling connections are available in the cask washdown pit in the event cooling is required during decontamination activities. The remaining closure nuts are replaced and tightened. Smear tests are performed to verify cleaning to offsite transportation requirements.
The cleaned cask is lowered from the refueling floor to the R/B entry lock onto cask skids with the R/B crane and mounted on the transport vehicle. The cask cooling system of the transport vehicle is connected to the cask and the cask internal pressure and temperature are monitored.
When they are at equilibrium conditions, the cask is ready for shipment. The personnel barrier and impact structure are replaced. The R/B airlock facility doors are opened and the cask and transport device are moved out of the R/B.
9.1.4.3 Safety Evaluation of Fuel-Handling System Safety aspects (evaluation) of the fuel servicing equipment are discussed in Subsection 9.1.4.2.3, and safety aspects of the refueling equipment are discussed throughout Subsection 9.1.4.2.7. In addition, a summary safety evaluation of the fuel-handling system is provided below.
The fuel prep machine removes and installs channels with all parts remaining underwater.
Mechanical stops prevent the carriage from lifting the fuel bundle or assembly to height where water shielding is not sufficient. Irradiated channels, as well as small parts such as bolts and springs, are stored underwater. The spaces in the channel storage rack have center posts which prevent the loading of fuel bundles into this rack.
There are no nuclear safety problems associated with the handling of new-fuel bundles, singly or in pairs. Equipment and procedures prevent an accumulation of more than two bundles in any location.
9.1-30                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 The refueling machine is designed to prevent it from toppling into the pools during a SSE.
Redundant safety interlocks, as well as limit switches, are provided to prevent accidentally running the grapple into the pool walls. The grapple utilized for fuel movement is on the end of a telescoping mast. At full retraction of the mast, the grapple is sufficiently below water surface, so there is no chance of raising a fuel assembly to the point where it is inadequately shielded by water. The grapple is hoisted by redundant cables inside the mast, and is lowered by gravity. A digital readout is displayed to the operator, showing him the exact coordinates of the grapple over the core.
The mast is suspended and gimbaled from the trolley, near its top, so that the mast can be swung about the axis of platform travel, in order to remove the grapple from the water for servicing and for storage.
The grapple has two independent hooks, each operated by an air cylinder. Engagement is indicated to the operator. Interlocks prevent grapple disengagement until a slack cable signal from the lifting cables indicates that the fuel assembly is seated. The slack cable indication is also used to determine if a fuel bundle is lodged in a position other than its normal, seated position in the core.
In addition to the slack cable signal, the elevation of the grapple is continuously indicated. Also, after the grapple is disengaged, the position of the upper part of the fuel bundle can be observed using television.
In addition to the main hoist on the trolley, there are two auxiliary hoists on the trolley. These three hoists are precluded from operating simultaneously because control power is available to only one of them at a time.
The two auxiliary hoists have electrical interlocks which prevent the lifting of their loads higher than a specified limit. Adjustable mechanical jam-stops on the cables back up these interlocks.
The cask is moved by the R/B crane to the cask pit and gated off and the cask pit filled with water. Only then is the spent fuel pool connected to the cask pit and the fuel transfer begun.
When the cask is loaded, the spent fuel pool is gated closed and the cask removal procedure reversed. A cask decontamination pit area is provided.
Light loads such as the blade guide, fuel support casting, control rod or control rod guide tube weigh considerably less than a fuel bundle and are administratively controlled to eliminate the movement of any light load over the spent fuel pool above the elevation required for fuel assembly handling. Thus, the kinetic energy of any light load would be less than a fuel bundle and would have less damage induced. Secondly, to satisfy NUREG-0554, the equipment handling components over the spent fuel pool are designed to meet the single-failure-proof criteria.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-31
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The spent fuel storage racks are purchased equipment. The purchase specification for these racks will require the vendor to provide the information requested in Question 430.192 pertaining to load drop analysis (see Subsection 9.1.6.4 for COL license information).
In summary, the fuel-handling system complies with General Design Criteria 2, 3, 4, 5, 61, and 63, and applicable portions of 10CFR50.
The safety evaluation of the new and spent fuel storage is presented in Subsections 9.1.1.3 and 9.1.2.3.
9.1.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.1.4.4.1 Inspection Refueling and servicing equipment is subject to the strict controls of quality assurance, incorporating the requirements of federal regulation 10CFR50 Appendix B. The fuel storage racks and refueling machine have an additional set of engineering specified quality requirements that identify features which require specific QA verification of compliance to drawing requirements.
For components classified as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III, the shop operation must secure and maintain an ASME N stamp, which requires the submittal of an acceptable ASME quality plan and a corresponding procedural manual.
Additionally, the shop operation must submit to frequent ASME audits and component inspections by resident state code inspectors. Prior to shipment, every component inspection item is reviewed by QA supervisory personnel and combined into a summary product quality checklist (PQL). By issuance of the PQL, verification is made that all quality requirements have been confirmed and are on record in the products historical file.
9.1.4.4.2 Testing Qualification testing is performed on refueling and servicing equipment prior to multi-unit production. Test specifications are defined by the responsible design engineer and may include a sequence of operations, load capacity and life cycles tests. These test activities are performed by an independent test engineering group and, in many cases, a full design review of the product is conducted before and after the qualification testing cycle. Any design changes affecting function, that are made after the completion of qualification testing, are requalified by test or calculation.
Functional tests are performed in the shop prior to the shipment of production units and generally include electrical tests, leak tests, and sequence of operations tests.
When the unit is received at the site, it is inspected to ensure no damage has occurred during transit or storage. Prior to use and at periodic intervals, each piece of equipment is again tested to ensure the electrical and/or mechanical functions are operational.
9.1-32                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Passive units, such as the fuel storage racks, are visually inspected prior to use.
Fuel-handling and vessel servicing equipment preoperational tests are described in Subsection 14.2.12.
9.1.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.1.4.5.1 Refueling Machine The refueling machine has a X-Y-Z position indicator system that informs the operator which core fuel cell the fuel grapple is accessing. Interlocks and a control room monitor are provided to prevent the fuel grapple from operating in a fuel cell where the control rod is not in the proper orientation for refueling.
Additionally, there is a series of mechanically activated switches and relays that provides monitor indications on the operators console for grapple limits, hoist and cable load conditions, and confirmation that the grapples hook is either engaged or released.
A series of load cells is installed to provide automatic shutdown whenever threshold limits are exceeded for either the fuel grapple or the auxiliary hoist units.
9.1.4.5.2 Fuel Support Grapple Although the fuel support grapple is not essential to safety, it has an instrumentation system consisting of mechanical switches and indicator lights. This system provides the operator with a positive indication that the grapple is properly aligned and oriented and that the grappling mechanism is either extended or retracted.
9.1.4.5.3 Other Refer to Table 9.1-5 for additional refueling and servicing equipment not requiring instrumentation.
9.1.4.5.4 Radiation Monitoring The fuel area ventilation exhaust radiation monitoring is discussed in Subsection 11.5.2.1.3.
9.1.5 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems (OHLH) 9.1.5.1 Design Bases The equipment covered by this subsection concerns items considered as heavy loads that are handled under conditions that mandate critical handling compliance.
Critical load handling conditions include loads, equipment, and operations which, if inadvertent operations or equipment malfunctions either separately or in combination, could cause:
(1)    A release of radioactivity.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                    9.1-33
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)    A criticality accident.
(3)    The inability to cool fuel within reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
(4)    Prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. This includes risk assessments to spent fuel and storage pool water levels, cooling of fuel pool water, new fuel criticality. This includes all components and equipment used in moving any load weighing more than one fuel assembly, including the weight of its associated handling devices (i.e. 4.45 kN).
The R/B crane as designed shall provide a safe and effective means for transporting heavy loads, including the handling of new and spent fuel, plant equipment and service tools. Safe handling includes design considerations for maintaining occupational radiation exposure as low as practicable during transportation and handling.
Where applicable, the appropriate seismic category, safety class quality group, ASME, ANSI, industrial and electrical codes have been identified (Tables 3.2-1 and 9.1-6). The designs will conform to the relevant requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4 and 61 of 10CFR50 Appendix A.
The lifting capacity of each crane or hoist is designed to at least the maximum actual or anticipated weight of equipment and handling devices in a given area serviced. The hoists, cranes, or other lifting devices shall comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6, ANSI B30.9, ANSI B30.10 and NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5). Cranes and hoists are also designed to criteria and guidelines of NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.1(7), ANSI B30.2 and CMAA-70 specifications for electrical overhead traveling cranes, including ANSI B30.11, ANSI B30.16, and NUREG-0554 as applicable. For design of Type 1 cranes, ASME NOG-1 is an acceptable approach to meeting NUREG-0554 criteria.
9.1.5.2 System Description 9.1.5.2.1 Reactor Building Crane The Reactor Building (R/B) is a reinforced concrete structure which encloses the reinforced concrete containment vessel, the refueling floor, the storage pools for spent-fuel and the dryer and separator and other equipment. The R/B crane provides heavy load lifting capability for the refueling floor. The main hook 1.471 MN will be used to lift the concrete shield blocks, drywell head, reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head insulation, RPV head, dryer, separator strongback, RPV head strongback carousel, new-fuel shipping containers, and spent-fuel shipping cask.
The orderly placement and movement paths of these components by the R/B crane precludes transport of these heavy loads over the spent fuel storage pool.
The R/B crane will be used during refueling/servicing as well as when the plant is online.
During refueling/servicing, the crane handles the shield plugs, drywell and reactor vessel heads, steam dryer and separators, etc. (Table 9.1-7). Minimum crane coverage includes R/B refueling 9.1-34                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 floor laydown areas, and R/B equipment storage pit. During normal plant operation, the crane will be used to handle new-fuel shipping containers and the spent-fuel shipping casks. During normal operating conditions, the R/B crane will be parked at the Reactor Building North wall when not in use. Minimum crane coverage must include the R/B equipment hatches, and the spent-fuel cask loading and washdown pits. A description of the refueling procedure can be found in Section 9.1.4.
The R/B crane will be interlocked to prevent movement of heavy loads over the spent-fuel storage portion of the spent-fuel storage pool. Since the crane is used for handling large heavy objects over the open reactor, the crane is of Type I design. The R/B crane shall be designed to meet the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554. For design of Type 1 cranes, ASME NOG-1 is an acceptable approach to meeting NUREG-0554 criteria.
9.1.5.2.2 Other Overhead Load Handling System 9.1.5.2.2.1 Upper Drywell Servicing Equipment The upper drywell arrangement provides servicing access for the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), feedwater isolation valves, safety/relief valves (SRVs), emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) isolation valves, and drywell cooling coils, fans and motors. Access to the space is via the R/B through either the upper drywell personnel lock or equipment hatch. All equipment is removed through the upper drywell equipment hatch. Platforms are provided for servicing the feedwater and MSIVs, SRVs, and drywell cooling equipment with the object of reducing maintenance time and operator exposure. The MSIVs, SRVs, and feedwater isolation valves all weigh in excess of 4.45 kN. Thus, they are considered heavy loads.
With maintenance activity only being performed during a refueling outage, only safe shutdown ECCS piping and valves need be protected from any inadvertent load drops. Since only one division of ECCS is required to maintain the safe shutdown condition and the ECCS divisions are spatially separated, an inadvertent load drop that breaks more than one division of ECCS is not credible. In addition, two levels of piping support structures and equipment platforms separate and shield the ECCS piping from heavy loads transport path.
This protection is adequate such that no credible load drop can cause either:
(1)    A release of radioactivity.
(2)    A criticality accident.
(3)    The inability to cool fuel within reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
9.1.5.2.2.2 Lower Drywell Servicing Equipment The lower drywell (L/D) arrangement provides for servicing, handling and transportation operations for the RIP and FMCRD. The lower drywell OHLHS consists of a rotating Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                9.1-35
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 equipment service platform, chain hoists, FMCRD removal machine, a RIP removal machine, and other special purpose tools.
The rotating equipment platform provides a work surface under the reactor vessel to support the weight of personnel, tools, and equipment and to facilitate transportation moves and heavy load handling operations. The platform rotates 360&deg; in either direction from its stored or idle position. The platform is designed to accommodate the maximum weight of the accumulation of tools and equipment plus a maximum sized crew. Weights of tools and equipment are specified in the interface control drawings for the equipment used in the lower drywell. Special hoists are provided in the lower drywell and reactor building to facilitate handling of these loads.
(1)  Reactor Internal Pump Servicing There are 10 RIPs and their supporting instrumentation and heat exchangers in the L/D that require servicing. The facilities provided for servicing the RIPs include:
(a)    L/D equipment platform with facilities to rotate the motor from vertical to horizontal and place it on a cart for direct pull out to the R/B. The equipment platform rotates to facilitate alignment with the installed pump locations.
(b)    Attachment points for rigging the RIP heat exchanger into place. The RIP heat exchanger can be lowered straight down to the equipment platform.
(c)    Access to the RIP equipment platform is via stairs. There is a ladder access to the RIP heat exchanger maintenance platform.
(d)    The L/D equipment tunnel and hatch are utilized to remove the RIP motors from the lower drywell.
(e)    The RIP motor servicing area is directly outside the L/D equipment hatch.
The 10 RIPs have wet induction motors in housings which protrude into the lower drywell from the RPV bottom head. These are in a circle at a radius of 3162.5 mm from the RPV centerline. For service, the motor is removed from below and outside, whereas the diffuser, impeller and shaft are removed from above and inside the RPV.
The motor, with its lower flange attached, weighs approximately 32.36 kN, is 830 mm in diameter and 1925 mm high. The flange has ears that extend from two sides, 180&deg; apart. These ears, which are used to handle the motor, increase the flange diameter to 1200 mm for a width of 270 mm.
The motor, suspended from jack screws, is lowered straight down out of its housing onto the equipment platform. The motor is then moved, circumferentially and lifted onto a rail-mounted transport cart for direct removal through the equipment removal L/D equipment tunnel and hatch. The motor is transported horizontally out of the 9.1-36                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 containment and into the motor service shop immediately adjacent to the L/D equipment hatch.
The RIP servicing equipment includes the cart to transport the motor from the service area through the equipment hatch to the L/D equipment platform. The interface for this equipment is the rails on the equipment platform that permit locating the motor below its nozzle on the RPV. The servicing equipment includes a chain hoist for rotating the RIP motor from horizontal to vertical and a hydraulic lift to raise it from the equipment platform to its installed position below the RPV. Facilities are provided for handling stud tensioners, blind flanges, other tools, drains and vents used in RIP servicing.
Servicing of the RIP heat exchanger, such as removal of the tube bundle, will be accomplished by rigging to attachment points on the RPV pedestal and structural steel in the area. A direct vertical removal path is provided from the heat exchanger installed position to the equipment platform. The operation is performed by a chain hoist. This is considered to be a nonroutine servicing operation.
These RIPs are serviced only when the reactor is in a safe shutdown mode. In addition, there is no safety-related equipment below either the RIPs or the RIP heat exchangers. Inadvertent load drops of either component cannot cause either (1) a release of radioactivity, (2) a criticality accident, or (3)the inability to cool fuel within reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
(2)    Fine Motion Control Rod Drive There are 205 FMCRDs in the L/D that require servicing. There are two types of servicing operations: (1) replacement of the FMCRD drive mechanism and (2) motor and seal replacement. Separate servicing equipment is provided for each of these operations.
(a)    The FMCRD servicing machine has its own mechanisms for rotating and raising FMCRD assemblies from a carrier on the equipment platform to their installed position. This servicing machine interfaces with the L/D equipment platform, which permits positioning the servicing machine under any of the 205 FMCRDs.
(b)    A separate machine and cart are provided for servicing FMCRD motors and seal assemblies and transporting them to the service shop located immediately outside the L/D equipment hatch.
There is no safety-related equipment below either component. Inadvertent load drops by the FMCRD servicing equipment cannot cause either (1) a release of radioactivity, (2) a criticality accident, or (3) the inability to cool fuel within the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                        9.1-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.5.2.2.3 Main Steam Tunnel Servicing Equipment The main steam tunnel is a reinforced concrete structure that surrounds the main steamlines and feedwater lines. The safety-related valve area of the main steam tunnel is located inside the Reactor Building. Access to the main steam tunnel is during a refueling/servicing outage. At this time, MSIVs or feedwater isolation valves and/or feedwater check valves may be removed using permanent overhead monorail type hoists. They are transported by monorail out of the steam tunnel and placed on the floor below a ceiling removal hatch. Valves are then lifted through the ceiling hatch by valve service shop monorail. During shutdown, all of the piping and valves are not required to operate. Any load drop can only damage the other valves or piping within the main steam tunnel. Inadvertent load drops by the main steam tunnel servicing equipment cannot cause either:
(1)    A release of radioactivity.
(2)    A criticality accident.
(3)    The inability to cool fuel within reactor vessel or spent fuel pool.
9.1.5.2.2.4 Other Servicing Equipment In the Reactor Building and Control Building (except within the containment, within the main steam tunnel and on the refueling floor), no safety-related components of one division shall be routed over any portion of a safety-related portion of another division. A load drop accident in one division causing the complete loss of a second division is not credible. Hence, inadvertent load drops cannot cause either (1) a release of radioactivity, (2) a criticality accident, (3) the inability to cool fuel within reactor vessel or spent fuel pool, or (4) prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, all servicing equipment located outside the containment, the main steam tunnel, or the refueling floor are not subject to the requirements of Subsection 9.1.5.
9.1.5.3 Applicable Design Criteria For All OHLH Equipment All handling equipment subject to heavy loads handling criteria will have ratings consistent with lifts required and the design loading will be visibly marked. Cranes/hoists or monorail hoists will pass over the centers of gravity of heavy equipment that is to be lifted. In locations where a single monorail or crane handles several pieces of equipment, the routing shall be such that each transported piece will pass clear of other parts. If, however, due to restricted overhead space the transported load cannot clear the installed equipment, then the monorail may be offset to provide transport clearance. A lifting eye offset in the ceiling over each piece of equipment can be used to provide a Y-lift so that the load can be lifted upward until free and then swung to position under the monorail for transport.
Pendant control is required for the bridge, trolley and auxiliary hoist to provide efficient handling of fuel shipping containers during receipt and also to handle fuel during new-fuel inspection. The crane control system will be selected considering the long lift required through 9.1-38                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 the equipment hatch as well as the precise positioning requirements when handling the RPV and drywell heads, RPV internals, and the RPV head stud tensioner assembly. The control system will provide stepless regulated variable speed capability with high empty-hook speeds.
Efficient handlings of the drywell and RPV heads and stud tensioner assembly require that the control system provide spotting control. Since fuel shipping cask handling involves a long duration lift, low speed and spotting control, thermal protection features will be incorporated.
Heavy load equipment is also used to handle light loads and related fuel handling tasks.
Therefore, much of the handling systems and related design, descriptions, operations, and service task information of Subsection 9.1.4 is applicable here. The cross reference between the handling operations/equipment and Subsection 9.1.4 is provided in Table 9.1-7. See Table 9.1-8 for a summary of heavy load operation.
Transportation routing drawings will be made covering the transportation route of every piece of heavy load removable equipment from its installed location to the appropriate service shop or building exit. Routes will be arranged to prevent congestion and to assure safety while permitting a free flow of equipment being serviced. The frequency of transportation and usage of route will be documented based on the predicted number of times usage either per year and/or per refueling or service outage.
Safe load paths/routing will comply with the requirements of NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.1(1).
9.1.5.4 Equipment Operating Procedures Maintenance and Service Each item of equipment requiring servicing will be described on an interface control diagram (ICD), delineating the space around the equipment required for servicing. This will include pull space for internal parts, access for tools, handling equipment, and alignment requirements. The ICD will specify the weights of large removable parts, show the location of their centers of gravity, and describe installed lifting accommodations such as eyes and trunnions. An instruction manual will describe maintenance procedures for each piece of equipment to be handled for servicing. Each manual will contain suggestions for rigging and lifting of heavy parts and identify any special lifting or handling tools required.
All major handling equipment components (e.g., cranes, hoist, etc.) will be provided with an operating instruction and maintenance manual for reference and utilization by operations personnel. The handling equipment operating procedure will comply with the requirements of NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.1(2).
9.1.5.5 Safety Evaluations The cranes, hoists, and related lifting devices used for handling heavy loads either satisfy the single-failure guidelines of NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.6, including NUREG-0554 or evaluations are made to demonstrate compliance with the recommended guidelines of Section 5.1, including Subsections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5.
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                9.1-39
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The equipment handling components over the fuel pool are designed to meet the single-failure-proof criteria to satisfy NUREG-0554. Redundant safety interlocks and limit switches are provided to prevent transporting heavy loads other than spent fuel by the refueling bridge crane over any spent fuel that is stored in the spent-fuel storage pool.
A transportation routing study will be made of all planned heavy load handling moves to evaluate and minimize safety risks.
Safety evaluations of related light loads and refueling handling tasks in which heavy load equipment is also used are covered in Subsection 9.1.4.3.
The CRD and RIP maintenance equipment on the rotating bridge below the RPV used during refueling operation will be withdrawn through the personnel equipment tunnel to outside primary containment.
9.1.5.6 Inspection and Testing Heavy load handling equipment is subject to the strict controls of Quality Assurance (QA),
incorporating the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B. Components defined as essential to safety have an additional set of engineering specified Quality Requirements that identify safety-related features which require specific QA verification of compliance to drawing/specification requirements.
Prior to shipment, every lifting equipment component requiring inspection will be reviewed by QA for compliance and that the required records are available. Qualification load and performance testing, including nondestructive examination (NDE) and dimensional inspection on heavy load handling equipment, will be performed prior to QA acceptance. Tests may include load capacity, safety overloads, life cycle, sequence of operations and functional areas.
When equipment is received at the site, it will be inspected to ensure that no damage has occurred during transit or storage. Prior to use and at periodic intervals, each piece of equipment will be tested again to ensure that the electrical and/or mechanical functions are operational, including visual and, if required, NDE inspection.
Crane inspections and testing will comply with the requirements of ANSI B30.2 and NUREG-0612, Subsection 5.1.1(6).
9.1.5.7 Instrumentation Requirements The majority of the heavy load handling equipment is manually operated and controlled by the operators visual observations. This type of operation does not necessitate the need for a dynamic instrumentation system.
Load cells may be installed to provide automatic shutdown whenever threshold limits are exceeded for critical load handling operations to prevent overloading.
9.1-40                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.5.8 Operational Responsibilities Critical heavy load handling in operation of the plant shall include the following documented program for safe administration and safe implementation of operations and control of heavy load handling systems:
(1)    Heavy Load Handling System and Equipment Operating Procedures (2)    Heavy Load Handling Equipment Maintenance Procedures and/or Manuals (3)    Heavy Load Handling Equipment Inspection and Test Plans; NDE, Visual, etc.
(4)    Heavy Load Handling Safe Load Paths and Routing Plans (5)    QA Program to Monitor and Assure Implementation and Compliance of Heavy Load Handling Operations and Controls (6)    Operator Qualifications, Training and Control Program See Subsection 9.1.6.6 for COL license information.
9.1.6 COL License Information 9.1.6.1 Not Used 9.1.6.2 Not Used 9.1.6.3 Spent Fuel Storage Racks Criticality Analysis The COL applicant shall provide the NRC a confirmatory critically analysis for the inadvertent placement of a fuel assembly in other than prescribed locations, as required by Subsection 9.1.2.3.1. A confirmatory criticality analysis for spent fuel storage will be prepared and verified in accordance with ITAAC 2.5.6.1, 2.5.6.2 and 2.5.6.3.
The analysis will document:
(1)    Assumptions and input parameters (i.e. number of racks, fuel capacity, rack material, neutron poison content, fuel center to center distances). Assumptions include highest reactivity fuel assembly and optimum moderator under normal and accident conditions.
(2)    The highest reactivity fuel storage array is maintained subcritical (keff  0.95) when fully loaded under optimum moderator condition.
(3)    Maximum uplift forces from fuel handling equipment will not increase keff > 0.95 for fuel array Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)    Failure of non-safety related structures in vicinity of spent fuel storage, fuel load drop or missiles generated by surrounding equipment will not increase keff > 0.95 (5)    Rack design precludes inadvertent placement of fuel in other than design locations 9.1.6.4 Spent Fuel Racks Load Drop Analysis The COL applicant shall provide the NRC a confirmatory load drop analysis, as required by Subsection 9.1.4.3. This analysis is dependent on a vendor specific design and the as-built configuration of spent-fuel storage racks.
The load drop analysis will confirm that keff  0.95 for a drop of one fuel assembly and its associated handling tool from a height of 1.8 m above the spent fuel racks.
9.1.6.5 New Fuel Inspection Stand Seismic Capability The COL applicant shall install the new fuel inspection stand firmly to the wall so that it does not fall into or dump personnel into the spent fuel pool during an SSE (Subsection 9.1.4.2.3.2).
9.1.6.6 Overhead Load Handling System Information The COL applicant shall provide a list of all cranes, hoists, and elevators and their lifting capacities, including any limit and safety devices required for automatic and manual operation.
In addition, for all such equipment, the COL applicant shall provide:
(1)    Heavy load handling system operating and equipment maintenance procedures.
(2)    Heavy load handling system and equipment maintenance procedures and/or manuals.
(3)    Heavy load handling system and equipment inspection and test plans; NDE, visual, etc.
(4)    Heavy load handling safe load paths and routing plans.
(5)    QA program to monitor and assure implementation and compliance of heavy load handling operations and controls.
(6)    Operator qualifications, training and control program.
9.1.6.7 Spent Fuel Racks Structural Evaluation The COL applicant shall provide the NRC a confirmatory structural evaluation of the spent fuel racks, as outlined in Subsection 9.1.2.1.3. This evaluation is dependent on a vendor specific design and the as-built configuration of spent fuel storage racks.
Structural integrity of the racks will be demonstrated for the load combinations described in SRP 3.8.4 Appendix D. The fuel storage racks meet Seismic Category 1 requirements.
9.1-42                                                                                  Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.1.6.8 Spent Fuel Racks Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis The COL applicant shall provide the NRC confirmatory thermal-hydraulic analysis that evaluates the rate of naturally circulated flow and the maximum rack water exit temperatures, as required by Subsection 9.1.2.1.4. A confirmatory thermal-hydraulic analysis will be prepared and verified in accordance with ITAAC 2.5.6.4.
Fuel bundle data in the analysis will use maximum decay heat generation rates for worst case power history. Natural circulation flow through the rack arrangement prevents water temperatures from exceeding 100&deg;C under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions.
9.1.6.9 Spent Fuel Firewater Makeup Procedures and Training The COL applicant shall develop detailed procedures and operator training for providing firewater makeup to the spent fuel pool (Subsection 9.1.3.3).
9.1.6.10 Protection of RHR System Connections to FPC System The COL applicant shall assure that the RHR system connections are adequately protected from the effects of pipe whip, internal flooding, internally generated missiles, and the effects of a moderate energy pipe rupture in the vicinity. (Subsection 9.1.3.3) 9.1.7 References 9.1-1      USNRC JLD-ISG-2012-03, Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, Interim Staff Guidance, Revision 0, August 29, 2012 9.1-2      NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation",
Revision 1, August 24, 2012 Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                  9.1-43
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-1 Not Used Table 9.1-2 Fuel Servicing Equipment Essential        Safety        Quality        Seismic No.      Component Identification            Classification
* Classification  Group        Categoryf 1    Fuel Prep Machine                            NE                N            E            NA 2    New Fuel Inspection Stand                    PE                2            E              O 3    Channel Bolt Wrench                          NE                N            E            NA 4    Channel-Handling Tool                        NE                N            E            NA 5    Fuel Pool Vacuum Sipper                      NE                N            E            NA 6    General-Purpose Grapple                      NE                N            E            NA 7    Jib Crane                                    PE                2            E              O 8    Refueling Machine                            PE                2            E              O 9    Channel-Handling Boom                        NE                N            E            NA
* NE    =  Non-Essential PE    =  Passive Essential N    =  Non-nuclear safety-related 2    =  Safety Class E    =  Elements of 10CFR50 Appendix B are generally applied, commensurate with the importance of the requirement function.
f NA    =  No Seismic Requirements O    =  Designed to hold its load in a SSE 9.1-44                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-3 Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment Safety                            Quality Seismic No. Essential Component Identification              Classification*    Classification Group Categoryf 1    Reactor Vessel Service Tools                        NE                  N              E          NA 2    Steamline Plug                                      NE                  N              E          NA 3    Shroud Head Bolt Wrench                            NE                  N              E          NA 4    Head Holding Pedestal                              NE                  N              E            I 7    Head Stud Rack                                      NE                  N              E          NA 6    Dryer and Separator Strongback                      NE                  N              E        NA**
7    Head Strongback Carousel                            PE                  2            E          NA 8    RIP Impeller Shaft                                  PE                  N              E          NA 9    RIP Impeller Rack                                  NE                  N              E          NA 10    Fuel Assembly Sampler                              NE                  N              E          NA
* NE    =    Non-Essential PE    =    Passive Essential N      =    Non-nuclear safety-related 2    =    Safety Class E      =    Elements of 10CFR50 Appendix B are generally applied, commensurate with the importance of the requirement function.
f NA      =    No Seismic Requirements I    =    Seismic Category I
    ** Dynamic analysis methods for seismic loading are not applicable, as this equipment is supported by the reactor service crane. Lifting devices have been designed with a minimum safety factor of 10 and undergo proof testing.
Table 9.1-4 Under-Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment and Tools No.              Equipment/Tool                  Classification    Safety Class      Seismic Category 1  FMCRD Handling Equipment                          NE                  N                    NA FMCRD Motor/Seal Assembly                        NE                  N                    NA 2  Equipment Handling Platform                      NE                  N                    NA 3  Water Seal Cap                                    NE                  N                    NA 4  Incore Flange Seal Test Plug                      NE                  N                    NA 5  Key Bender                                        NE                  N                    NA 6  RIP Motor Servicing Equipment                    NE                  N                    NA Notes:
NA    =    No Seismic Requirements N    =    Non-nuclear safety-related NE    =    Non-Essential Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                                      9.1-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-5 Tools and Servicing Equipment Fuel Servicing Equipment                        In-Vessel Servicing Equipment (Continued)
Channel Handling Boom                            Blade Guides Fuel Preparation Machines                        Fuel Assembly Sampler New Fuel Inspection Stand                        Peripheral Orifice Grapple Channel Bolt Wrenches                            Orifice Holder Channel Handling Tool                            Peripheral Fuel Support Plug Fuel Pool Vacuum Sipper                          Fuel Support Plug Tool Jib Crane                                        RIP Handling Tools General-Purpose Grapples Refueling Machine Servicing Aids                                  Refueling Equipment Pool Tool Accessories                            Refueling Machine Actuating Poles                                  Auxiliary Platform General Area Underwater Lights Local Area Underwater Lights Drop Lights Underwater TV Monitoring System Underwater Vacuum Cleaner Viewing Aids Light Support Brackets Underwater Viewing Tube Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment              Storage Equipment Reactor Vessel Servicing Tools                  Fuel Storage Racks Steamline Plugs and Installation Tools          Channel Storage Racks Shroud Head Bolt Wrenches                        Defective Fuel Storage Containers Head Holding Pedestals                          In-Vessel Racks Head Stud Rack                                  CR Guide Tube Storage Rack Dryer-Separator Strongback                      CR Storage Rack Head Strongback/Carousel                        Defective Fuel Storage Rack (including Stud Tensioners)
In-Vessel Servicing Equipment                    Under-Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment Instrument Strongback                            Fine Motion Control Rod Grapple                              Control Rod Drive Servicing Tools Control Rod Guide Tube Grapple                  CRD Hydraulic System Tools Fuel Support Grapple                            Water Seal Cap Grid Guide                                      FMCRD Handling Equipment Control Rod Latch Tool                          Handling Platform Instrument Handling Tool                        Thermal Sleeve Installation Tool Control Rod Guide Tube Seal                      Incore Flange Seal Test Plug Incore Guide Tube Seals                          Key Bender Spring Reel Radiation Shield RIP Handling Equipment 9.1-46                                                                          Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-6 Reference Codes and Standards Number                                            Title ANS-N14.6          Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing (5 ton) or More for Nuclear Materials ANSI B30.9        Slings ANSI B30.10        Hooks ANSI B30.2        Performance Standards for Overhead Electric Wire Rope Hoists ANSI B30.16        Performance Standards for Air Wire Rope Hoists ANSI B30.11        Overhead and Gantry Crane CMAA70            Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes NUREG-0554        Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants NUREG-0612        Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants ASME NOG-1        Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridges, Multiple Girder)
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                          9.1-47
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-7 Heavy Load Equipment Used to Handle Light Loads and Related Refueling Handling Tasks Applicable Light Load Handling Operations/Equipment                        Handling Subsections Overhead Bridge Cranes                              9.1.4.2.2 Reactor Building Crane                              9.1.4.2.2 Fuel Servicing Equipment                            9.1.4.2.3 Servicing Aids                                      9.1.4.2.4 Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment                  9.1.4.2.5 Steamline Plug Head Stud Rack Dryer/Separator Strongback Head Strongback/Carousel In-Vessel Servicing Equipment                      9.1.4.2.6 Refueling Equipment                                9.1.4.2.7 thru 9.1.4.2.10 Refueling Machine Vessel Platform Storage Equipment Under-Reactor Vessel Servicing Equipment Fuel Handling Service Tasks Reactor Shutdown Handling Tasks Drywell Head Removal Reactor Well Servicing Reactor Vessel Head Removal Dryer Removal Separator Removal Fuel Bundle Sampling Refueling Vessel Closure 9.1-48                                                                      Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-8 Heavy Load Operations Hardware                                  Handling      Handling                  In-Plant Location Handling Tasks                            Systems*      Equipment                Elevation*
RPV Opening/Closing Operations:
DrywellShield Blocks:                    RBS            RB Crane                  RB 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Main Hoist                RF 26700 D/S Pool, Spent Fuel Pool, Fuel Cask Pit, RBS            RB Crane Main or          RF 26700 Shield Plugs and Pool Seal Gates                        Auxiliary Hoist, Slings  D/S P 18700 Removal, reinstallation and storage on                  and Strongbacks the refueling floor on in the D/S Pool Drywell Head                              RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Main Hoist                R/W 23700 Drywell Head Strongback Reactor Vessel Head Insulation            RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Main Hoist                R/W 18700 Lifting Sling Reactor Vessel Head                      RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation,                    Main Hoist                RW 18700 includes handling stud tensioner studs,                  Auxiliary Hoist nuts, head strongback/carousel                          Head Strongback/
Carousel RPV Head Support Pedestal Steam Dryer                              RBS            RB Crane                  RW 18700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Main Hoist                D/SP 18700 Dryer/Separator          IRV 14500 Strongback D/SP Cover Plates                        RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Auxiliary Hoist Lifting Slings RPV Service Platform                      RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Removal, storage and reinstallation                      Auxiliary Hoist          IRV 14500 Lifting Slings RPV Opening/Closing Operations: (Continued)
Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                          9.1-49
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-8 Heavy Load Operations (Continued)
Hardware                                    Handling      Handling                  In-Plant Location Handling Tasks                              Systems*      Equipment                  Elevation*
Steam Plugs                                  RBS            RB Crane                  RF 26700 Temporary Tool                                              Auxiliary Hoist            IRV 15500 Installation and removal                                    4447 N Chain Hoist Service Platform Refueling Machine Steam Separator/Shroud Head Removal, RBS                    RB Crane                  RW 18700 storage and reinstallation. Include                        Main Hoist                IRV 9500 unbolting shroud head bolts from                            Dryer/Separator            D/SP 18700 Refueling Platform                                          Refueling Machine Fuel Bundle Sampler Tool                      RBS          Refueling Machine or RB RW 18700 Positioning, sampling and removal,                          Crane                      IRV 9100 storage                                                    Auxiliary Hoists Refueling Operations:
New-Fuel:                                    RBS            RB Crane                  RB 7300 Receive at G/F & lift to RF Receiving,                      Auxiliary Hoist            RF 26700 inspection, remove outer container Remove inner container and move fuel to RBS                RB Crane                  RF 26700 new fuel inspection stand and perform                      Auxiliary Hoist            NFS 18700 inspection.                                                                            NFI 18700 Move new fuel from inspection stand to      RBS            RB Crane                  NFS 18700 fuel pool, storage of fuel channel fixtures.                Auxiliary Hoist Refueling  FSP 14800 Channel new fuel and store. Move                            Machine Auxiliary Hoist    FCF 14800 channeled fuel and load into reactor core.                  Fuel Grapple              RF 26700 RVC 9500 Spent-Fuel:
Remove spent fuel from RPV core.            RBS            Refueling Machine          RW 18700 Transport spent fuel to storage racks                      Auxiliary Hoists          FSP 14880 and/or fuel channel fixture remove                          Fuel Grapple              FCF 14800 channels and store spent fuel bundles                      Channel Handling Boom      RVC 9500 9.1-50                                                                                Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-8 Heavy Load Operations (Continued)
Hardware                                    Handling      Handling                  In-Plant Location Handling Tasks                              Systems*      Equipment                Elevation*
Refueling Operations: (Continued)
Fuel Cask:
RBS            RB Crane                  G/F 7300 Receive, lift to refueling floor. Lower into                Main Hoist                RF 26700 cask washdown pit, washdown and move                        Auxiliary Hoist Refueling FWP 18700 to load pit. Move spent fuel to cask load                  Machine Auxiliary Hoists  FLP 14800 pit. Move loaded cask to cask washdown                      Fuel Grapple pit. Move cask to G/F for shipment.
Reactor Service Operations:
Control Rod Blades                          RBS            Refueling Machine        RVC 9500 Replacement including adjacent fuel                        Auxiliary Hoists          RV 5300 bundles moving and storage in in-vessel                    Fuel Grapple rack and blade guide removal &                              Fuel Support Grapple installation. Fuel support removal and                      Control Rod Grapple reinstallation.
Control Rod Guide Tube (CRGT)                RBS            Refueling Machine        RVC 5300 (Nonroutine) removal & replacement.                        Auxiliary Hoists Prior removal of control rod, fuel, fuel                    CRGT Grapple support and blade guide. See above.
Internal Recirculation Pump                  RBS            Refueling Machine        FSP 18700 Servicing: Removal of pump impeller                        Auxiliary Hoist          IRV 3000 shaft, diffuser, wear ring, piston ring and                Service Platform stretch tube through annulus between                        Pump Impeller shroud and RPV I.D. wall. Move impeller                    Grapple to fuel storage pool.
Upper Drywell Servicing MSIVs and SRVs                              UDS            Monorail for servicing    UDW 12500 Servicing: removal, installation, and        SRM(C)        MSIVs and SRVs            RB 12500 transportation for repair and calibrations                  Monorail Hoist            RB 18700 from installed location to RCCV entrance                    Transportation Cart      SRM 18700(c) and up to special service room area and                    Hatchway Hoist return.                                                    Wall Mount Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                              9.1-51
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-8 Heavy Load Operations (Continued)
Hardware                                  Handling      Handling                    In-Plant Location Handling Tasks                            Systems*      Equipment                  Elevation*
Upper Drywell Servicing (Continued)
MSS            Steam Tunnel Crane          MST 12500 Hoist                      SRM 18700(c)
Transportation Cart Hatchway Hoist Wall Mount Lower Drywell Servicing:
RIPs Motors                              LDS            Jack Screws                L/D(-)2500 Removal and installation and transport to SRM(B)        Transportation Cart        L/D(-)6700 service area and return during                          Equipment Platform          SRM(-)6700 (C) maintenance.                                            Turntable L/D RIP Hoist RIP Heat Exchangers                      LDS            Special Rigging            L/D(-)2500 Removal and installation for replacement RBS            Transportation Cart        L/D(-)6700 or servicing                                            Equipment Platform L/D      R/B(-)6700 RIP Hoist                  R/B(-)7300 FMCRD Control Rod Drives                  LDS            FMCRD Remote                LDW/URV Removal and installation from/to RPV for SRM(A)          Handling Machine            (-)6700 maintenance (1) Motor and seal replacement (2) FMCRD drive mechanism            SRM(A)        FMCRD motor servicing      SRM(-)6700(A) replacement                                    machine (3) Move CRD hardware to service    LDS            Lifting/handling device to LDW(-)6700 room area for service                          move CRD hardware to SRM(-)6700(A) service room area for service Neutron Monitor Sensor                    LDS            Refueling Platform          RVC 5300 Replacement and servicing                RBS            Auxiliary Hoist Special Tools cask onto tunnel track.
* See Table 9.1-9 for Legend.
9.1-52                                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-9 Legend for In-Plant Locations/Elevations Elevations            Legend        Location/Description 18700                  D/SP          Dryer/Separator Storage Pool 14800                  FCF          Fuel Channeling Fixtures 18700                  FSP          Fuel Storage Pool 14800 14800                  FLP          Fuel Cask Load Pit 18700                  FWP          Fuel Cask Wash Pit 7300                  G/F          Ground Floor Equipment Access 18700                  IRV          Inside Reactor Vessel 3000
(-)6700                LDW          Lower Drywell Area Receiving 7300                  MST          Main Steam Tunnel Area 18700                  NFI          New Fuel Inspection Stand 33200 to              RB            Reactor Building 7300 26700                  RF            Refueling Floor 9500                  RVC          Reactor Vessel Core (TOP) 18700                  RW            Reactor Well (TOP RPV) 18700(C)              SRM          Service Rooms:
(-)6700(A) & (B)                    (a) CRD (b) RIP (c) MSIV & SRV 26,700 to              D/W          Drywell Area 7300 LDS          Lower Drywell Servicing MSS          Main Steam Tunnel Servicing RBS          Reactor Building Servicing SSR          Special Service Rooms UDS          Upper Drywell Servicing Table 9.1-10 Single-Failure-Proof Cranes
: 1. Reactor Building crane
: 2. Refueling machine crane Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                      9.1-53
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-11 Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger and Performance Data Number of units                            2 Seismic                                    Category I design and analysis Types of exchangers                        Horizontal U-tube/shell Maximum primary/secondary side              1.57 MPaG/1.37 MPaG pressure Design Condition                            Normal heat load operating mode Primary side (tube side) performance data:
(1) Flow                                    250 m3/h (2) Inlet temperature                      52&deg; C maximum (3) Allowable pressure drop                0.069 MPa Max.
(4) Exchanged heat                          6.91 GJ/h Secondary side (shell side) performance data:
(1) Flow                                    280 m3/h (2) Inlet temperature                      35&deg;C maximum (3) Allowable pressure drop                0.069 MPa Max.
(4) Type of cooling water                  RCW water 9.1-54                                                                          Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.1-12 RHR-FPC Joint Heat Removal Performance Table (150 Hours Following Shutdown)
Maximum Heat      Pool Temp                            Cooling Time to RHR-FCP Cooling          Load *@ time = 0  @ time = 0          Maximum Pool    Max. Temp. From Loops Combination t0=150 hours            t0=150 hours        Temp            t=0 2-RHR Hxs        46.1 GJ/h        52&deg;C                52&deg;C            t=0
            +
2-FPC Hxs 2-RHR Hxs        46.1 GJ/h        52&deg;C                52&deg;C            t=0
            +
1-FPC Hx 1-RHR Hx          46.1 GJ/h        52&deg;C                54&deg;C            8 h
            +
2-FPC Hxs 1-RHR Hx          46.1 GJ/h        52&deg;C                58&deg;C            12 h
            +
1-FPC Hx
* Heat load based on BTP ASB 9-2 Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                    9.1-55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.1-1 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System P&ID (Sheets 1-3)
Figure 9.1-2 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System PFD (Sheets 1-2) 9.1-56                                                            Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 UPPER FRAME LOWER FRAME CARRIAGE Figure 9.1-3 Fuel Preparation Machine Shown Installed in Facsimile Fuel Pool Fuel Storage and Handling                                                          9.1-57
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 UPPER CLAMPS HYDRAULIC INSPECTION STAND FUEL SUPPORT STRUCTURE LOWER SWIVEL CLAMPS Figure 9.1-4 New-Fuel Inspection Stand 9.1-58                                                            Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 TEE OUTER TUBE                                          HANDLE FOR BOLT COUPLING -
UNCOUPLING                                                                          TOP 22.9 cm COUPLING MECHANISM    CABLE FOR                INNER TUBE (SEE DETAIL  ATTACHING                FOR BELOW)      SAFETY LINE              TORQUING BOLTS
                                                ~ 3.7 m DETAIL OF COUPLING MECHANISM UNCOUPLED                                            BOLT COUPLED INNER TUBE                                                  INNER TUBE OUTER TUBE Figure 9.1-5 Channel Bolt Wrench Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                      9.1-59
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 BAIL ACTUATING KNOB HANDLE ACTUATING SHAFT ARMS CHANNEL STOP GUIDES (TYPICAL OF 2)
Figure 9.1-6 Channel-Handling Tool 9.1-60                                                              Fuel Storage and Handling
 
ABWR Fuel Storage and Handling BETA SCINTILLIATION DETECTOR SHIELDING (BY OTHERS)
PROGRAM CONTROLLER 25A5675AL Revision 7 FLUID CONSOLE Design Control Document/Tier 2 MONITORING FUEL ISOLATION                          CONSOLE CONTAINER Figure 9.1-7 Fuel Pool Vacuum Sipper 9.1-61
 
ABWR 9.1-62 13.11 cm A
17.96 cm A
25A5675AL Revision 7 51.74 cm +0.20, -0.36 cm Design Control Document/Tier 2 SECTION A-A APPROX WEIGHT: 20.5 kg OPERATING AIR PRESSURE: 549-686.5 kPa Fuel Storage and Handling      Figure 9.1-8 General-Purpose Grapple
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Figure 9.1-9 Not Used Fuel Storage and Handling                                                  9.1-63
 
ABWR 9.1-64 3.49 m 2.74 m MAX SPAN LIFTING LUG 25A5675AL Revision 7 4.34m MAX Design Control Document/Tier 2 2.39m MAX HOOK TRAVEL 2.67 m Fuel Storage and Handling MAX        FLOOR Figure 9.1-10 Jib Crane Channel-Handling Boom
 
ABWR Fuel Storage and Handling SAMPLE WATER FILTERS STATION PRESSURE GAUGE FILTER REGULATOR SAMPLE                                        25A5675AL Revision 7 PUMP CONTROL                                            CHAMBER VALVES PURGE VALVES Design Control Document/Tier 2 AIR REGULATOR (HANDWHEEL)
DRAIN              TUBE BUNDLE CONNECTION Figure 9.1-11 Fuel Assembly Sampler 9.1-65
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figure is located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.1-12 Plant Refueling and Servicing Sequence 9.1-66                                                            Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 REFUELING MACHINE CHANNEL HANDLING BOOM TELESCOPING TELESCOPING                                        MAST MAST REACTOR WELL                    FUEL POOL FUEL PREP MACHINE FUEL STORAGE RACKS CORE Figure 9.1-13 Simplified Section of Refueling Facilities Fuel Storage and Handling                                                                    9.1-67
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Figure 9.1-14 Simplified Section of New-Fuel Handling Facilities 9.1-68                                                        Fuel Storage and Handling
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2 Water Systems 9.2.1 Station Service Water System The functions normally performed by the Station Service Water (SSW) System are performed by the systems discussed in Subsection 9.2.15.
9.2.2 Closed Cooling Water System The functions normally performed by the Closed Cooling Water (CCW) System are performed by the systems discussed in Subsections 9.2.11, 9.2.12, 9.2.13, and 9.2.14.
9.2.3 Demineralized Water Makeup System The functions normally performed by the Demineralized Water Makeup (DWM) System are performed by the systems discussed in Subsections 9.2.8, 9.2.9 and 9.2.10.
9.2.4 Potable and Sanitary Water System 9.2.4.1 Portions Within Scope of ABWR Standard Plant Those portions of the Potable and Sanitary Water (PSW) System that are within the Standard Plant buildings (Subsection 1.1.2) are in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant and are described in Subsections 9.2.4.1.1 and 9.2.4.1.6.
All portions of the PSW System which are outside the ABWR Standard Plant buildings are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant.
A separate portion of the PSW, the non-radioactive drains, is described in Subsection 9.3.3.
9.2.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases The PSW System has no safety-related function. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component, nor does it prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.
9.2.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The PSW System shall be designed with no interconnections with systems having the potential for containing radioactive materials. Protection shall be provided through the use of air gaps, where necessary.
9.2.4.1.3 System Description Part of the PSW System is a hot and cold potable water distribution system. It includes piping, valves, instrumentation, sinks, toilets and other facilities.
The PSW System includes a sanitary drainage system, which is designed to collect liquid wastes and entrained solids discharged by all plumbing fixtures located in the Standard Plant Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 buildings, from areas with no sources of potentially radioactive wastes and conveys them to a sewage treatment facility.
Potable water is provided to flush the service water sides of the RSW and TSW heat exchangers whenever they are put into a wet standby condition.
9.2.4.1.4 Safety Evaluation The PSW System has no interconnections with systems having the potential for containing radioactive materials.
9.2.4.1.5 Instrumentation and Alarms The subsystems of the PSW System are provided with control panels located in the control building which are designed for remote manual and automatic control of the processes.
9.2.4.1.6 Tests and Inspections An integrity test is performed on the PSW System upon completion of construction and before putting the system into operation.
The operability of the PSW System is demonstrated by use during normal system operation.
9.2.4.2 Portions Outside the Scope of ABWR Standard Plant All portions of the PSW System which are outside the Standard Plant buildings are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant. Subsections 9.2.4.2.1 through 9.2.4.2.8 provide conceptual design of these portions of the PSW as required by 10 CFR 52. The interface requirements for this system are part of the design certification.
The portions of the PSW System which are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant shall meet all requirements in Subsections 9.2.4.1.1 through 9.2.4.1.6 and all following requirements. The following subsection provides a conceptual design and interface requirements for these portions of the PSW System and are a part of the design certification.
9.2.4.2.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
The PSW System has no safety-related function. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component, nor does it prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.
9.2.4.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
(1)  The PSW System is designed to provide to all buildings a minimum of 45 m3/h of potable water during peak demand periods.
(2)  Potable water is filtered and treated to prevent harmful physiological effects on plant personnel.
9.2-2                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  The PSW System includes a sanitary drainage system which is designed to collect liquid wastes and entrained solids discharged by all plumbing fixtures located in areas with no sources of potentially radioactive wastes and conveys them to a sewage treatment facility.
(4)  The PSW System includes a sewage treatment system which treats sanitary waste using the activated sludge biological treatment process. The aeration tanks are capable of receiving waste at a rate between 45 m3/d and 185 m3/d.
(5)  The PSW System shall be designed with no interconnections with systems having the potential for containing radioactive materials. Protection shall be provided through the use of air gaps, where necessary.
9.2.4.2.3 System Description (Conceptual Design)
The PSW System includes a potable water system, a sanitary drainage system and a sewage treatment system.
9.2.4.2.3.1 Potable Water System Filtered water flows by gravity from the filtered water storage tank of the Makeup Water Preparation (MWP) System into a potable water storage tank. A hypochlorite addition pump and tank are provided which adds sodium hypochlorite to the water entering the potable water storage tank. Two potable water pumps send water from the potable water storage tank to a hydropneumatic pressure tank. A hydropneumatic pressure tank and air compressor are provided to maintain adequate pressure within a potable water distribution piping system.
Potable water is sent to a heater where it is heated and distributed throughout the plant.
9.2.4.2.3.2 Sanitary Drainage System The sanitary drainage system collects liquid wastes and conveys them to the Sewage Treatment System. This system is installed in accordance with ANSI A40.8, National Plumbing Code, and applicable local or state codes.
9.2.4.2.3.3 Sewage Treatment System The Sewage Treatment System (STS) is a concrete structure containing several compartments.
The STS uses the activated sludge biological treatment process. The STS includes a comminutor with a bypass screen channel, two aeration tanks, three final clarifiers, one chlorine contact tank, two aerobic digesters, three air blowers, a froth spray pump, a hypochlorite pump and related equipment. The system can be operated in two modes: extended aeration and contact stabilization.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.4.2.4 System Operation (Conceptual Design) 9.2.4.2.4.1 Normal Operation The potable water pumps take water from the potable water storage tank and discharges it into the potable water hydropneumatic pressure tank. Under automatic control, a low pressure switch starts one of the two potable water pumps when the hydropneumatic pressure tank water pressure falls below a specified limit. A pressure switch automatically starts the second potable water pump when a single pump is unable to maintain the tank pressure above a specified limit.
When water level reaches a specified high level in the hydropneumatic pressure tank, a level switch automatically stops the potable water pumps. If high water level in the pressure tank is reached and the tank pressure is low, the air compressor is automatically started and is stopped at a specified pressure by a high pressure switch.
The air compressor controls are interlocked with the potable water pump controls so that the air compressor may operate only when the pumps are stopped and the hydropneumatic pressure tank water level is at the specified high limit.
Downstream of the hydropneumatic pressure tank, a branch sends potable water to a heater and a hot water distribution system.
Normally, the STS is operated in the extended aeration mode. The sanitary wastes enter the STS via the comminutor, in which any solids are shredded, and flows into the aeration tanks. In the aeration tanks, the waste liquids are continuously aerated. Occasionally, foaming occurs in the aeration tanks. A froth spray system is provided which uses processed sewage to control any froth which is present. The aeration tank contents are then transferred to the clarifiers where the sludge is allowed to settle. The clarified sewage passes into the chlorine contact tank for chlorination prior to being discharged via the cooling tower blowdown line. The settled sludge is sent to the aerobic digesters and disposed of offsite.
9.2.4.2.4.2 Abnormal Operation The components of the PSW System are designed to meet the increased needs during refueling operations when additional people are onsite.
The STS may be operated in the contact stabilization mode to process the substantially higher waste water flow rates during outages. In this mode, a portion of the settled sludge from the final clarifiers is aerated, sent to the aeration tanks and mixed with incoming sewage.
9.2.4.2.5 Evaluation of Potable and Sanitary Water System Performance (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall analyze the PSW System to assure that the system meets all applicable regulatory requirements and is compatible with site conditions.
9.2-4                                                                                            Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.4.2.6 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirements)
The PSW System has no interconnection with systems having the potential for containing radioactive materials. Protection includes, where necessary, the use of air gaps.
9.2.4.2.7 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface Requirements)
The subsystems of the PSW System are provided with control panels located in the Control Building which are designed for remote manual and automatic control of the processes.
A flow proportioning controller is used to operate the hypochlorinator pump as water enters the PSW System. Pressure and level switches are provided to start and stop the potable water pumps and the air compressor. Low hydropneumatic tank pressure is alarmed. Low level in the hypochlorite feed tank is alarmed.
The minimum instrumentation requirements for the STS are a treated effluent sewage flow meter and a common air blower discharge pressure gauge.
9.2.4.2.8 Tests and Inspections (Interface Requirements)
Drainage piping is hydrostatically tested to the equivalent of a 3-meter head of water for a minimum of 15 minutes.
The operability of all other parts of the PSW System is demonstrated by use during normal system operation.
9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink This subsection provides a conceptual design of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) as required by 10CFR52. The interface requirements for the UHS are part of the design certification.
9.2.5.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
(1)  The UHS is designed to provide sufficient cooling water to the Reactor Service Water (RSW) System to permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. The RSW water temperature at the inlet to the RCW/RSW heat exchangers is not to exceed 35&deg;C during a LOCA.
(2)  In the event of an accident, the UHS is designed to provide sufficient cooling water to the RSW System to safely dissipate the heat for that accident. The amount of heat to be removed is provided in Tables 9.2-4a,9.2-4b and 9.2-4c.
(3)  The UHS is sized so that makeup water is not required for at least 30 days following an accident and design basis temperature and chemistry limits for safety-related equipment are not exceeded.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)    The UHS is designed to perform its safety function during periods of adverse site conditions, resulting in maximum water consumption and minimum cooling capability.
(5)    The UHS is designed to withstand the most severe natural phenomenon or site-related event (e. g., SSE, tornado, hurricane, flood, freezing, spraying, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire, failure of non-Seismic Category I equipment, flooding as a result of pipe failures or transportation accident), and reasonably probable combinations of less severe phenomena and/or events, without impairing its safety function.
(6)    The safety-related portion of the UHS shall be designed to perform its required cooling function assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical system.
(7)    The UHS is designed to withstand any credible single failure of man-made structural features without impairing its safety function.
(8)    All safety-related heat rejection systems shall be redundant so that the essential cooling function can be performed even with the complete loss of one division.
Single failures of passive components in electrical systems may lead to the loss of the affected pump, valve or other components and the partial or complete loss of cooling capability of that division but not of other divisions.
(9)    The UHS and any pumps, valves, structures or other components that remove heat from safety systems shall be designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Assurance B, Quality Group C, IEEE-279 and IEEE-308 requirements.
(10) The safety-related portions of the UHS shall be mechanically and electrically separated. The site specific design of the UHS demonstrates that sufficient capacity is maintained to support RSW System cooling capacity following postulated aircraft impact strike locations on the UHS. Divisional separation of the RSW SSCs that interface with the UHS is required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.150.
(11) The UHS is designed to include the capability for full operational inspection and testing.
9.2.5.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
The UHS is designed to remove the heat load of the RSW System during all phases of normal plant operation. These heat loads are provided in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b and 9.2-4c. However, it is not a requirement that the UHS temperature be assumed to be the maximum temperature for all operating modes during normal plant operations.
9.2-6                                                                                            Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.5.3 System Description (Conceptual Design)
The UHS is a spray pond which serves the safety-related functions of providing cooling water and acting as a heat sink for the RSW System during accident conditions. The spray pond also serves as a heat sink during normal operation by accepting the heat load of the RSW System.
There are no other heat loads associated with the spray pond in addition to the RSW System.
9.2.5.3.1 General Description The UHS is a highly reliable, Seismic Category I spray pond that provides that an adequate source of cooling water is available at all times for reactor operation, shutdown cooling and for accident mitigation. The RSW System (Subsection 9.2.15) receives cooling water from the UHS and returns the water to the spray pond via the spray networks.
9.2.5.3.2 Spray Pond Description The spray pond is of Seismic Category I design, excavated below grade and sized for a water volume adequate for 30 days of cooling under design basis conditions.
The pond is lined to minimize seepage. The pond is provided with a Seismic Category I overflow weir to accommodate normal water level fluctuations and an emergency spillway to limit the maximum water level in the pond during maximum precipitation conditions.
Six spray networks are arranged in the pond to provide cooling for the RSW return water. Two spray networks are assigned to each division and are mechanically separated from the other divisional networks. The networks and their supply piping are suspended above the pond surface on reinforced concrete columns.
9.2.5.3.3 Spray Pond Pump Structure The spray pond pump structure houses the RSW pumps and associated piping and valves (Subsection 9.2.15). The pump structure is located on the edge of the spray pond. Openings are provided in front of the pump structure to allow pond water to flow into the wet pits where the pump suctions are located. Each pump is located in its own bay. A removable screen is placed at the entrance of each bay.
The pump structure is designed to provide adequate net positive suction head for the pumps.
HVAC equipment maintains necessary conditions for proper operation of the equipment in the pump structure.
9.2.5.3.4 System Components Six spray networks are provided. During normal plant operation, three of the networks are in operation. When the heat load is increased during cooldown, shutdown or accident, the RSW return water will be sent to all six networks. Network header piping is sized for proper flow Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 rates to all nozzles in the network. Piping is sloped to allow complete drainage of the networks and network supply piping to minimize corrosion and prevent freezing.
The spray nozzles are of corrosion-resistant materials and designed to provide good thermal performance while minimizing drift loss. The system is designed so that the pressure drop across the nozzles for proper spray performance is achieved for all anticipated modes of RSW System operation. The nozzles are designed to be resistant to clogging.
Cold weather bypass lines are provided for each RSW return line to allow bypassing the spray networks and returning the heated water directly to the pond.
Makeup water to the spray pond is supplied via the power cycle heat sink makeup line. A makeup water valve is provided which is controlled by a level detector in the spray pond to maintain proper water level. The makeup water valve can also be operated remotely when desired to maintain desired water level or quality. Failure of the makeup water system shall not adversely affect the operation of the UHS.
A blowdown weir and line are provided which conducts blowdown to the power cycle heat sink blowdown line. Blowdown from the spray pond occurs to remove excess water from precipitation and to maintain water quality control. Failure of the blowdown system shall not adversely affect the operation of the UHS.
9.2.5.4 System Operation (Conceptual Design) 9.2.5.4.1 Normal Operation Normally, the RSW System has one pump per division in operation. Return water from each RSW division is sent to the UHS where it is routed to three of the six spray networks. The operators may change the operating RSW pumps and the UHS spray networks when desired.
During operation without spray pond blowdown, the concentration of scale-forming constituents in the water would increase due to evaporation impairing heat exchanger performance. Also, biofouling may occur under some conditions. To prevent these adverse conditions from occurring, chemical addition equipment may be provided or blowdown may be increased by increasing the makeup rate. Sufficient spray pond water inventory is provided such that scale-producing agents, such as calcium sulfate, do not reach concentrations that might cause scaling during the 30-day post-accident period when no makeup or blowdown is assumed.
9.2.5.4.2 Cold Weather Operation The spray pond is designed to perform its safety function with an initial ice layer on the pond surface. During icing conditions, RSW System return flow to the pond is initially sent to the cold weather bypasses. These bypasses direct the warm water toward the ends of the pond under any ice that may be present to allow the return water to circulate and mix with the water in the 9.2-8                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 pond. Any ice layer present on the pond surface will melt. Once a hole is formed in the ice layer, a return path for spray water is available and the spray networks may be used if needed.
9.2.5.5 Spray Pond Thermal Performance (Conceptual Design) 9.2.5.5.1 Design Meteorology The COL applicant shall obtain and use conservative site-specific design meteorological data in the detailed design of the spray pond.
9.2.5.5.2 Spray Pond Water Requirements The COL applicant shall determine the water requirements used in selecting spray pond design volume and used in the pond thermal performance analysis. These requirements include:
(1)  Evaporation Due to Plant Heat Load (2)  Natural Evaporation (3)  Drift Loss (4)  Seepage (5)  Sedimentation (6)  Water Quality (7)  Minimum Water Level for Operation 9.2.5.6 Evaluation of UHS Performance (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall analyze the UHS performance to assure that UHS is adequate for 30 days of cooling without makeup or blowdown and that the cooling water temperature does not exceed the design limit for design basis heat input and site conditions.
9.2.5.7 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirements) 9.2.5.7.1 Thermal Performance The COL applicant shall demonstrate by analysis that the UHS is capable of providing cooling water within the design temperature limit for at least 30 days for the design basis event using conservative meteorology and assumptions.
9.2.5.7.2 Effects of Extreme Natural Events or Site-Related Events The COL applicant shall demonstrate by analysis that the UHS is capable of fulfilling its safety function concurrent with any of the following events: SSE, tornado/hurricane, flood, drought, transportation accident, or fire.
Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.5.7.3 Freezing Considerations The COL applicant shall demonstrate by analysis that the UHS is designed for operations under any freezing conditions that may occur.
9.2.5.8 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.27 and 1.72 (Interface Requirement)
The COL applicant shall demonstrate that the UHS meets all applicable requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.27.
If any spray pond piping is made from fiberglass-reinforced thermosetting resin, the COL applicant shall provide information to show that all applicable requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.72 are met.
9.2.5.9 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface Requirement)
UHS low water level (if applicable) and high water temperature are provided and alarmed in the control room. UHS surface water temperature indication is provided (if it can differ appreciably from the bulk temperature) in the control room.
UHS makeup and blowdown volumes (if applicable) are indicated by flow totalizers located in the makeup and blowdown lines.
Any components required for UHS system operation in Divisions A and B shall be operated from the Remote Shutdown System.
9.2.5.10 Tests and Inspections (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall prepare and perform a preoperational test program in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14. During normal operation the system shall have capability for full operational testing and inspection.
9.2.6 Condensate Storage Facilities and Distribution System The functions of the storing and distribution of condensate are described in Subsection 9.2.9.
9.2.7 Plant Chilled Water System The functions of the Plant Chilled Water (PCW) System are performed by the systems described in Subsections 9.2.12 and 9.2.13.
9.2.8 Makeup Water (MWP) Preparation System This subsection provides a conceptual design of the Makeup Water Preparation System as required by 10CFR52. The interface requirements for this system are part of the design certification.
9.2-10                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.8.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
The MWP System has no safety-related function. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component, nor does it prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.
9.2.8.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
(1)    The MWP System consists of two divisions capable of producing at least 45 m3/h of demineralized water each.
(2)    Storage of demineralized water shall be at least 760 m3.
(3)    The quality of the demineralized water shall meet the requirements in Table 9.2-2a.
(4)    Demineralized water shall be provided at a minimum flow rate of approximately 135 m3/h at a temperature between 10&deg; to 38&deg;C.
(5)    The MWP System is not connected to any system having the potential for containing radioactive material.
(6)    The MWP System provides 45 m3/h of filtered water to meet maximum anticipated peak demand periods for the PSW System.
(7)    Any purified water storage tank located outdoors shall be provided with adequate freeze protection and adequate diking and other means to control spill and leakage.
9.2.8.3 System Description (Conceptual Design)
The MWP System consists of both mobile and permanently installed water treatment systems.
The permanently installed system consists of a well, filters, reverse osmosis modules and demineralizers which prepare demineralized water from well water. The demineralized water is sent to storage tanks until it is needed. The components of the MWP System are listed in Table 9.2-15 and the system block flow diagram is in Figure 9.2-10.
While it is planned to install both permanent divisions, only one division may be installed if plant water requirements and economic conditions indicate that the second division will not be needed.
Mobile water treatment systems will be used before the permanent system is installed and later if water requirements exceed the capacity of the permanent system or if economic condition make use of mobile equipment attractive compared to operating and maintaining the permanent system.
Water Systems                                                                                          9.2-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.8.3.1 Well System A well, water storage tank and two well water forwarding pumps are provided which can produce sufficient water to meet the concurrent needs of the MWP System and the PSW System.
9.2.8.3.2 Pretreatment System Two dual media filters are provided in parallel which are backwashed when needed using one of two backwash pumps and water from a filtered water storage tank. This tank is provided with a heater to maintain a water temperature of at least 10&deg;C at all times. Water may be sent from the filtered water storage tank to the PSW System or to the next components of the MWP System.
9.2.8.3.3 Reverse Osmosis Modules Chemical addition tanks, pumps and controls are provided to add sodium hexametaphosphate and sodium hydroxide to the filtered water.
Four high pressure, horizontal multistage reverse osmosis (RO) feed pumps provide a feed pressure of approximately 3.14 MPaG. Reverse osmosis membranes are arranged in two parallel divisions of two passes each with the permeate of the first passes going to the inlet of the second passes. The reject or brine from the first passes are sent to the cooling tower blowdown by gravity. A chemical addition tank, two pumps and controls are provided to add sodium hydroxide to the permeate of the first pass. The reject from the second passes is recycled to the RO feed pump suction line. The permeate from the second pass is sent to a RO permeate storage tank.
9.2.8.3.4 Demineralizer System Two demineralizer feed pumps are provided in each parallel division. Three mixed bed demineralizers are provided in parallel in each division with two normally in operation with the third in standby. The demineralized water is monitored and sent to the demineralized water storage tanks.
9.2.8.3.5 Demineralized Water Storage System Two demineralized water storage tanks are provided with a heater to maintain a water temperature of at least 10&deg;C at all times. Three demineralized water forwarding pumps are provided to send water to the MUWP System.
9.2.8.3.6 Makeup Water Preparation Building A building is provided for all of the subsystems listed above except for the well water storage tank and the demineralized water storage tanks which are located outdoors. The building is provided with a heating system capable of maintaining a temperature of at least 10oC at all times.
9.2-12                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The building does not contain any safety-related structures, systems or components. The MWP System shall be designed so that any failure in the system, including any that cause flooding, shall not result in the failure of any safety-related structure, system or component.
The building has a large open area about 7.6m by 12m with truck access doors and services for mobile water processing systems. These services include electric power, service air, connections to the water storage tanks and a waste connection. This area will be used for mobile water treatment systems or storage.
9.2.8.4 System Operation (Conceptual Design) 9.2.8.4.1 Normal Operation During normal operation, the well pump is controlled by a water level controller to keep the well water storage tank full. The well water forwarding pumps are controlled by a water level controller to keep the filtered water storage tank full. Normally, one filter will be operating with the other filter in standby. The second filter is started from the Control Building or is automatically started by a low water level in the filtered water storage tank. When any filter develops a high pressure drop, it is isolated and any standby filter is put into operation. One of the two backwash pumps is operated to backwash the filter. The backwash is sent to the cooling tower blowdown by gravity.
Sodium hexametaphosphate is added to control calcium sulfate or other fouling in the RO membranes and sodium hydroxide is added to adjust the pH for RO treatment.
The RO feed pumps are controlled by a water level controller which keeps the RO permeate storage tank full. These pumps feed the water through both RO passes. The RO membranes are of the thin film composite type. The first pass permeate, which becomes feed for the second pass, has a pressure of about 1.37 to 1.77 kPaG. Sodium hydroxide is added to the first pass permeate to adjust the pH to improve dissolved solids rejection in the second pass.
The demineralizer feed pumps are controlled by a water level controller in the demineralized water storage tanks. Each demineralizer contains 1.1 m3 of ion exchange resin in a cation/anion ratio of 1 to 2. When the effluent quality of a demineralizer becomes unsatisfactory, it is automatically removed from operation and the standby demineralizer is automatically put into operation. The exhausted resins are regenerated offsite.
The demineralized water forwarding pumps are controlled by a pressure switch in their discharge piping. Normally, one pump is operated to maintain a specified system pressure.
When the pressure drops below a specified pressure, the second pump is automatically put into operation until system pressure returns to the normal range. If this does not occur, the third pump is automatically put into operation.
Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.8.4.2 Abnormal Operation During the early construction period and at certain times later, the Makeup Water Preparation System may either not be installed or may not be in operation. Also, there may be times when demineralized water requirements exceed the production capacity. During these periods, mobile water treating systems will be used. They will be transported to the site by truck and will enter the Makeup Water Preparation Building through large doors. When no longer required, they will be removed.
9.2.8.5 Evaluation of Makeup Water System Preparation Performance (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall analyze the raw water quality and availability and the required makeup water quality and amounts to assure that these requirements can be met. Any deficiencies in either quality or production capability shall be met with mobile water treating systems.
9.2.8.6 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirements)
The MWP System is not connected to any systems having the potential for containing radioactive material.
9.2.8.7 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface Requirements)
One division of MWP components is normally in operation. The components of the standby division are automatically placed into operation upon receiving a low level signal from their downstream water storage tank.
The following shall be displayed and alarmed locally and in the control building:
Water level in all water storage tanks Running status of all pumps System pressures and differential pressures associated with the filters and RO modules Water quality monitors, including conductivity, pH, turbidity and silica analyzers All water storage tanks are provided with low-low water level switches which stop the forwarding pumps for that tank.
9.2.8.8 Tests and Inspections (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall prepare and perform a preoperational test program and tests in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.2-14                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.9 Makeup Water Condensate System 9.2.9.1 Design Bases (1) The Makeup Water-Condensate (MUWC) System shall provide condensate quality water for both normal and emergency operations when required.
(2) The MUWC System shall provide a required water quality as follows:
Conductivity (S/cm)< 0.5 at 25&deg;C Chlorides, as Cl (ppm)< 0.02 pH 5.9 to 8.3 at 25&deg;C Conductivity and pH limits shall be applied after correction for dissolved CO2. (The above limits shall be met at least 90% of the time.)
(3) The MUWC System shall supply water for the uses shown in Table 9.2-1.
(4) The MUWC System is not safety-related except as noted in items (7) and (8) below.
(5) The condensate storage tank shall have a capacity of 2110 m3. This capacity was determined by the capacity required as shown in Table 9.2-3.
In accordance with guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout, Position C3.2 through C3.5 as applicable, and 10CFR50.63, the condensate storage tank (CST) is designed to provide approximately (570,000 L) of water for use during station blackout. This volume of water is located in the lower portion of the CST and is sufficient for operation of the RCIC System to remove decay heat during the first eight hours of station blackout.
(6) All tanks, piping and other equipment shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials.
(7) The HPCF and RCIC instrumentation, which initiates the automatic switchover of HPCF and RCIC suction from the CST header to the suppression pool, shall be designed to safety-grade requirements (including installation with necessary seismic support).
(8) The instrumentation is mounted in a safety-grade standpipe located in the Reactor Building secondary containment. With no condensate flowing, the water level is the same in both the CST and the standpipe. A suitable correction will be made for the effect of flow upon water level in the standpipe.
(9) High water level shall be alarmed both in the Radwaste Building control room and in the main control room (Subsection 11.2.1.2.1).
Water Systems                                                                                      9.2-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.9.2 System Description The MUWC P&ID is shown in Figure 9.2-4. This system includes the following:
(1)  A condensate storage tank (CST) is provided. The volume is shown in Table 9.2-3.
(2)  The following pumps take suction from the CST:
(a)    RCIC pumps (b)    CRD pumps (c)    HPCF pumps (d)    SPCU pumps (e)    MUWC transfer pumps (three 149 m3/h at 0.971 MPa head)
(3)  Water can be sent to the CST from the following sources:
(a)    MWP pumps (b)    CRD system (c)    Radwaste disposal system (d)    Condensate demineralizer system effluent (main condenser high level relief)
(4)  Associated receiving and distribution piping valves, instruments, and controls shall be provided.
(5)  Overflow and drain from the CST shall be sent to the radwaste system for treatment.
(6)  Any outdoor piping shall be protected from freezing.
(7)  All surfaces coming in contact with the condensate shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials.
(8)  All of the pumps mentioned in (2) above shall be located at an elevation such that adequate suction head is present at all water levels in the CST.
(9)  Instrumentation shall be provided to indicate CST water level in the main control room, Radwaste Building control room and Remote Shutdown System. High water level shall be alarmed both in the Radwaste Building control room and in the main control room (Subsection 11.2.1.2). Low water level shall be alarmed in the main control room.
(10) Potential flooding is discussed in Subsection 3.4. Potential flooding from lines within the Reactor Building and the Control Building are evaluated in Subsection 3.4.1.1.1.
9.2-16                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the MUWC System is not required to assure any of the following conditions:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)  Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
(3)  Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events that could result in potential offsite exposures.
The MUWC System is not safety-related. However, the system incorporates features that assure reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations.
9.2.9.4 Tests and Inspections The MUWC System is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure operability and the integrity of the system.
9.2.10 Makeup Water Purified System 9.2.10.1 Design Bases (1)  The Makeup Water Purified (MUWP) System shall provide makeup water purified for makeup to the reactor coolant system and plant auxiliary systems.
(2)  The MUWP System shall provide purified water to the uses shown in Table 9.2-2.
(3)  The MUWP System shall provide water of the quality shown in Table 9.2-2a. If these water quality requirements are not met, the water shall not be used in any safety-related system. The out-of-spec water shall be reprocessed or discharged.
(4)  The MUWP System is not safety-related.
(5)  All piping and other equipment shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials.
(6)  The system shall be designed to prevent any radioactive contamination of the purified water.
(7)  The interfaces between the MUWP System and all safety-related systems are located either in the Control Building or Reactor Building, which are Seismic Category I, tornado/hurricane missile resistant and flood protected structures. The interfaces with safety-related systems are safety-related valves which are part of the safety-related systems. The portions of the MUWP System, which upon their failure during Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 a seismic event can adversely impact structures, systems, or components important to safety, shall be designed to assure their integrity under seismic loading resulting from a safe shutdown earthquake.
(8)  Safety-related equipment located by portions of the MUWP System are in Seismic Category I structures and protected from all system impact.
9.2.10.2 System Description The MUWP System P&ID is shown in Figure 9.2-5. This system includes the following:
(1)  Distribution piping, valves, instruments and controls shall be provided.
(2)  Any outdoor piping shall be protected from freezing.
(3)  All surfaces coming in contact with the purified water shall be made of corrosion-resistant materials.
(4)  Continuous analyzers are located at the MUWP System. These are supplemented as needed by grab samples. Allowance is made in the water quality specifications for some pickup of carbon dioxide and air in any demineralized water storage tank. The pickup of corrosion products should be minimal because the MUWP piping is stainless steel.
(5)  Intrusion of radioactivity into the MUWP System from other potentially radioactive systems are prevented by one or more of the following:
(a)    Check valves in the MUWP lines.
(b)    Air (or siphon) breaks in the MUWP lines.
(c)    The MUWP System lines are pressurized while the receiving system is at essentially atmospheric pressure.
(d)    Piping to the user is dead ended.
(6)  There are no automatic valves in the MUWP System. During a LOCA, the safety-related systems are isolated from the MUWP System by automatic valves in the safety-related system.
(7)  The outboard primary containment isolation valve is locked closed during standby, hot standby and power operation.
9.2.10.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the MUWP System is not required to assure any of the following conditions:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
9.2-18                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
(3)  Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events which could result in potential offsite exposures.
The MUWP System is not safety-related. However, the systems incorporate features that assure reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations.
9.2.10.4 Tests and Inspections The MUWP System is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure operability and integrity of the system.
Flow to the various systems is balanced by means of manual valves at the individual takeoff points.
9.2.11 Reactor Building Cooling Water System 9.2.11.1 Design Bases 9.2.11.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)  The Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System shall be designed to remove heat from plant auxiliaries which are required for a safe reactor shutdown, as well as those auxiliaries whose operation is desired following a LOCA, but not essential to safe shutdown.
The heat removal capacity is based on the heat removal requirement during a LOCA with the maximum RSW water temperature at the inlet to the RCW/RSW heat exchangers of 35&deg;C. As shown in Table 9.2-4a, the heat removal requirement is higher during other plant operation modes, such as shutdown at 4 hours. However, the RCW System is designed to remove this larger amount of heat to meet the requirements in Subsection 5.4.7.1.1.7.
(2)  The RCW System shall be designed to perform its required cooling functions following a LOCA, assuming a single active or passive failure.
(3)  The safety-related portions and valves isolating the non-safety-related portions of the RCW System shall be designed to Seismic Category I and the ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Assurance B, Quality Group C, IEEE-279 and IEEE-308 requirements.
(4)  The RCW System shall be designed to limit leakage to the environment of radioactive contamination that may enter the RCW System from the RHR System.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Safety-related portions of the RCW System shall be protected from flooding, spraying, steam impingement, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire, and the effect of failure of any non-Seismic Category I equipment, as required.
(6)  The safety-related portion of the RCW System shall be designed to meet the foregoing design bases during a loss of preferred power (LOPP).
(7)  The safety-related electric modules and safety-related cables for the RCW System are in the Control Building and Reactor Building, which are Seismic Category I, tornado/hurricane missile resistant and flood protected structures.
(8)  Protection from being impacted adversely by missiles generated by any non-safety-related component shall be provided as discussed in Subsection 3.5.1.
(9)  Protection against high-energy and moderate-energy line failures will be provided in accordance with Section 3.6.
(10) Piping within the Control Building shall be fabricated and installed as all welded piping. Major components may have flange bolted or welded connections to the piping system. No expansion joints or bellows assemblies shall be used within the Control Building.
9.2.11.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The RCW System shall be designed to cool various plant auxiliaries as required during: (a) normal operation; (b) emergency shutdown; (c) normal shutdown; (d) testing; and (e) loss of preferred power (LOPP).
9.2.11.2 System Description The RCW System distributes cooling water during various operating modes, during shutdown, and during post-LOCA operation. The system removes heat from plant auxiliaries and transfers it to the Reactor Service Water System (Subsection 9.2.15). Figures 9.2-1, sheets 1 through 9, show the piping and instrumentation diagram. Design characteristics for RCW System components are given in Table 9.2-4d.
The Control and Service Building general arrangement drawings, Figures 1.2-14 through 1.2-17 (and companion Fire Protection drawings, Figure 9A.4-11 through 9A.4-13, and Radiation Protection drawings Figures 12.3-42, 43, 48 and 64) show the location of the RCW pumps and heat exchangers. (Note: the heat exchangers are depicted as shell-and-tube type; however, the alternate plate-type can be accomodated in the same area of the Control Building in a horizontal arrangement at elevation -8200mm, the same elevation as the pumps).
The RCW system serves the auxiliary equipment listed in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b, and 9.2-4c.
Some of the cooling loads are serviced by only one or two RCW divisions. These components may be reassigned to other RCW divisions if redundancy and divisional alignment of supported 9.2-20                                                                                        Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 and supporting systems is maintained and the design basis cooling capacity of the RCW divisions is assured.
The reactor decay heat at four hours after shutdown is approximately 133.1 GJ/h. Each division of the RCW System has the design heat removal capability of 107.6 GJ/h from the RHR System in addition to other cooling loads. If three divisions of RHR/RCW/RSW are used for heat removal, each division must remove one third of the decay heat, or 44.4 GJ/h. This means that each division will remove 107.6 minus 44.4, or 63.2 GJ/h of sensible heat, primarily by cooling the reactor water. If only two divisions of RHR/RCW/RSW are used for heat removal, each division must remove one half of the decay heat, or 66.6 GJ/h. This means the sensible heat removal will be 107.6 minus 66.6 or 41.0 GJ/h of sensible heat primarily from the reactor water.
Of course the decay heat will decrease with time.
The above analysis shows that there is sufficient heat removal capability to remove not only the decay heat but also sensible heat primarily from the reactor water. If a division of RHR/RCW/RSW is not available or if heat removal capability has been lost in any of the heat exchangers, only the rate of heat removal will decrease, but heat will still be removed.
Shutdown cooling times are discussed in Subsection 5.4.7.1.1.7.
The RCW System is designed to perform its required safe reactor shutdown cooling function following a postulated LOCA, assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical system. In order to meet this requirement, the RCW System provides three complete trains, which are mechanically and electrically separated. In case of a failure which disables any of the three divisions, the other two division meet plant safe shutdown requirements, including a LOCA or a loss of offsite power, or both. Each RCW division is supplied electrical power from a different division of the ESF power system.
During normal operation, RCW cooling water flows through all the equipment shown in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b, and 9.2-4c.
During all plant operating modes, a RCW water pump and two heat exchangers are normally operating in each division. Therefore, if a LOCA occurs, the RCW System required to shut down the plant safely are already in operation. The second pump and the third heat exchanger in each division are put in service if a LOCA occurs.
The non-safety-related parts of the RCW System are not required for safe shutdown and, hence, are not safety systems. Isolation valves separate the essential subsystems from the non-safety-related subsystems during a LOCA, in order to assure the integrity and safety functions of the safety-related parts of the system. Some non-safety-related parts of the system are operated during all other modes, including the emergency shutdown following an LOPP or LOCA, as shown in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b, and 9.2-4c.
Surge tank water level instrument is provided. Low water level signal in the surge tank opens the MUWP makeup water valve and low-low water level signal isolates the non-essential subsystems, thus assuring continued operability of the safety-related services.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Instruments, controls, and isolation valves are located in the safety-related part of the RCW System and designed to safety-grade requirements, as stated in design basis (3) of Subsection 9.2.11.1.1.
Makeup water is automatically added to the surge tanks from the MUWP System. If needed, the operator shall manually add makeup water from the suppression pool (Figure 7.3-7). The surge tanks have an upper part connected to both RCW and HECW Systems and containing 7,000 liters of waters (Figure 9.2-1). Periodically, the average steady-state (no RCW or HECW temperature changes or draining and filling of components) daily surge tank makeup rate shall be determined. When the average daily steady-state makeup exceed 70 liters per day continuously, the operators shall inspect the RCW and HECW Systems in that division and repair leaks until the average daily steady-state makeup rate is below 70 liters per day in that division.
A dedicated sump and sump pump are provided for each RCW division. Any system leakage or drainage may be collected, sampled and analyzed, and either returned to the RCW System or sent to the Liquid Radwaste System for treatment or to the HSD sample tank for discharge depending upon the radioactivity and impurities in the water.
There are cross connections between the divisions, shown in Figure 9.2-1, sheets 2, 5 and 8, which will be used to isolate portions of the RCW System during maintenance shutdowns.
Piping within the control building shall be fabricated and installed as all welded piping. Major components may have flange bolted or welded connections to the piping system. No expansion joints or bellows assemblies shall be used within the Control Building.
9.2.11.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2.11.3.1 Failure Analysis A system failure analysis of active and passive components of the RCW System is presented in Tables 9.2-5a and 9.2-5b. Any of the assumed failures of the RCW System are detected in the control room by variations of process variables and/or alarms from the various system instruments and also from the leak detection system sensing leakage in the ECCS pump and heat exchanger areas.
9.2.11.3.2 Safety Evaluation of Equipment Equipment served by the RCW System is listed in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b, and 9.2-4c. The tables contain five operating modes:
(1)  Normal operation (2)  Shutdown at 4 h (3)  Shutdown at 20 h 9.2-22                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Hot standby (No LOPP)
(5)  Hot standby (LOPP)
(6)  Post-LOCA The flow rates and heat loads are given for each equipment in each operating mode.
In the event of a LOCA, most of the nonessential cooling water uses are isolated by proper isolation valves. The fuel pool coolers, instrument air system, service air system, control rod drive pump oil cooler and the Reactor Water Cleanup (CUW) System pump coolers remain in service until the operator removes them from service. The non-safety-related portion of the system is automatically isolated in the event of a rupture in the non-safety-related subsystem.
The surge tank water level is monitored. A level switch is activated by a significant leak, sending an isolation signal to close two valves. One valve on the supply line and one valve on the discharge line are used, with suitable power and controls from divisional sources to assure isolation in the event of any single active failure. Single isolation valves are used on the basis that an active failure of one isolation valve disables only that system of which it was a part.
Water level sensors are located in the RCW surge tank standpipes. Low water level signals from both the surge tank and the standpipe stop any operating pumps in that division. A signal from LOCA, high suppression pool temperature or high RCW water temperature overrides the low water levels signals and puts all pumps in that division in operation.
The RCW System is designed to withstand a single active failure without losing its capability to participate in the safe shutdown of the reactor following a LOCA or DBA. Tables 9.2-5a and 9.2-5b gives the result of a system failure analysis of active and passive components.
Redundant trains of the RCW System are separated and protected to the extent necessary to assure that sufficient equipment remains operating to permit shutdown of the unit in the event of any of the following (separation is applied to electrical equipment and instrumentation and controls as well as to mechanical equipment and piping):
(1)  Flooding, spraying, or steam release due to pipe rupture or equipment failure (2)  Pipe whip and jet forces resulting from postulated pipe rupture of nearby high energy pipes (3)  Missiles which may result from equipment failure (4)  Fire (5)  Failures of any non-seismic Category I equipment (pertains to Seismic Category I equipment)
Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Radiation monitors are provided to sample the RCW cooling water. Upon detection of radiation leakage in one of the systems, that system is isolated by operator action from the control room, and the total cooling load can be met by the other two systems. Consequently, radioactive contamination released by the RCW System to the environment does not exceed allowable limits defined by 10CFR100.
The safety-related parts of the RCW System are designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Assurance B and Quality Group C requirements. The design also meets IEEE-279 and IEEE-308 requirements.
The non-essential portion of the RCW System is designed to the ANSI B31.1 Power Piping Code and the requirements of Quality Group D. The piping between the fuel pool coolers and the separation valves is Seismic Category I and non-safety-grade.
The design pressure and temperature of the RCW System and piping are 1.37 MPaG and 70&deg;C maximum.
System low point drains and high point vents are provided as required.
All divisions are maintained full of water when not in service except when undergoing maintenance.
System components and piping materials are selected where required to be compatible with the available site cooling water in order to minimize corrosion. Cathodic protection of the heat exchanger shall be provided. Adequate corrosion safety factors are used to assure the integrity of the system during the life of the plant.
During all plant operating modes, all divisions have at least one RCW cooling water pump operating. Therefore, if a LOCA occurs, the RCW cooling water system required to shut down the plant safely is already in operation. If a loss of offsite power occurs during a LOCA, the pumps momentarily stop until transfer to standby diesel generator power is completed. The pumps are restarted automatically according to the diesel loading sequence. If a LOCA occurs, most non-safety-related components are automatically isolated from the RCW System.
Consequently, no operator action is required, following a LOCA, to start the RCW System in its LOCA operating mode.
All heat exchangers and pumps will be required during the following plant operating conditions, in addition to LOCA: shutdown at 4 hours, shutdown at 20 hours and hot standby with loss of AC power.
Loss of either RCW Division A or B will result in loss of RCW cooling to every other RIP (five total) as shown on RRS P&ID (Figure 5.4-4) and will cause those five RIPs to runback to minimum speed and trip. The RIP M-G set in the same electrical division, which is cooled by the same RCW division which failed and powers three of the same five RIPS, would stop by M-G set cooling water protection. Assuming that the event began at full power on the 100%
9.2-24                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Control Rod Line, the resulting temporary reactor power would be approximately 60% power.
Assuming the RCW division loss did not cause a reactor scram or shutdown for other reasons, the five RIP runback and trip at full power would initiate runback of the other five RIPs to minimum speed and a SCRRI that further reduces reactor power from the 100% power rod line to the 80% power rod line. The operator would then correct the RCW problem or initiate a normal plant shutdown.
Complete failure of any RCW division will reduce drywell cooling, but not enough to require plant shutdown or power level reduction. Failure of RCW Division A would have only one drywell cooler using RCW cooling and the normal HVAC Normal Cooling Water (HNCW)
System cooling. Drywell temperatures would not increase enough to adversely affect any drywell components.
The drywell cooling system can perform its function after the loss of any RCW division. With only one RCW division and one drywell cooler operating, the drywell temperature will increase but not to a temperature that would damage equipment or require an immediate shutdown.
9.2.11.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements The RCW System is designed to permit periodic inservice inspection of all system components to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
The RCW System is designed for periodic pressure and functional testing to assure:
(1)  the structural and leaktight integrity by visible inspection of the components; (2)  the operability and the performance of the active components of the system; and (3)  the operability of the system as a whole.
The tests shall assure, under conditions as close to design as practical, the performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation for reactor shutdown and for LOCA, including operating of applicable portions of the Reactor Protection System and the transfer between normal and standby power sources. These tests shall include periodic testing of the heat removal capability of each RCW heat exchanger. Each of these heat exchangers has been designed to provide 20% margin above the heat removal capability required for LOCA in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b and 9.2-4c. The revised heat removal capacity of the heat exchangers is shown in Table 9.2-4d. This 20% margin is provided to compensate for the combined effects of fouling and leakage. When this margin is no longer present (i.e., zero margin), the heat exchanger heat removal capacity will be increased by either cleaning or refurbishing.
The RCW System is supplied with a chemical addition tank to add chemicals to each division.
The RCW System is initially filled with demineralized water. A corrosion inhibitor can be added if desired. These measures are adequate to protect the RCW System from the ill effects of corrosion or organic fouling.
Water Systems                                                                                          9.2-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The RCW System is designed to conform with the foregoing requirements. Initial tests shall be made as described in Subsection 14.2.12.
The heat removal capacities of the as-built RCW heat exchangers shall be estimated before sufficient heat is available for normal heat transfer tests using both test and analysis. The flow rates of RCW and RSW water through the RCW heat exchangers shall be measured using installed or test instruments. By analysis using heat transfer data, from tests performed under similar conditions, the heat removal capacities shall be estimated for the as-built RCW heat exchangers.
9.2.11.5 Instrumentation and Control Requirements All equipment is provided with either globe or butterfly valves to give the capability for manual control. These valves are accessible downstream of the equipment for regulation of flow through the equipment or for balancing the circuits. The isolation valves to the non-essential RCW System are automatically and remote-manually operated.
Pressure taps or indicators at equipment are provided to enable the operator to adjust the differential pressure across each heat exchanger or cooler and also to allow leak checking.
Locally mounted temperature indicators or test wells are furnished on the equipment cooling water discharge lines to enable verification of specified heat removal during plant operation.
The required heat removal and flow rates are shown in Tables 9.2-4a, 9.2-4b, and 9.2-4c.
The combination of pressure taps (or indicators) and temperature indicators allow correct system balancing with or without a system heat load. For purposes of system balancing, provisions for flow measurement are provided as required.
Connections to a radiation monitor are provided in each division to detect radioactive contamination resulting from leakage in one of the RHR exchangers, fuel pool exchangers, or other exchangers.
Isolation valves for RHR heat exchangers and non-essential cooling water subsystems are provided with remote manual switches and indication on the remote shutdown panel.
9.2.12 HVAC Normal Cooling Water System 9.2.12.1 Design Bases 9.2.12.1.1 Power Generation Design Bases The non-safety-related HVAC Normal Cooling Water (HNCW) System shall provide chilled water to the cooling coils of the drywell coolers, of each building supply unit and of local air conditioners to maintain design thermal environments during normal and upset conditions. The supply temperature is 7&deg;C. The return temperature is 12&deg;C.
9.2-26                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.12.1.2 Safety Design Bases The HNCW System does not perform any safety functions, except for the containment penetration and isolation valves.
9.2.12.2 System Description The HNCW System components are listed in Table 9.2-6 and shown in Figure 9.2-2.
System components consist of five 25% chillers, each with pumps, serving a common chilled water distribution system connected to the chilled water cooling coils in the drywell coolers, the cooling coils of each building supply unit and cooling coils of local air conditioners. Condenser cooling is from the Turbine Building Cooling Water (TCW) System. Each chiller evaporator is designed, fabricated and certified in accordance with the ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1.
A chemical feed tank is provided. Makeup water is from the surge tank, which is shared between the HNCW and TCW Systems, which receives water from the MUWP System.
Isolation valves and piping for primary containment penetrations are designed to Seismic Category I, ASME Code, Section III, Class 2, Quality Group B, Quality Assurance B requirements. The supply line penetration has a Division 1 isolation valve outside containment and Class 2 piping into the drywell. The return line penetration has divisional isolation valves inside and outside containment. These valves are motor-operated.
No diesel-generator power is available to this system during a LOPP or a LOCA.
9.2.12.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the HNCW System is not required to assure the following conditions:
(1)    Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)    Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition (3)    Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events which could result in potential offsite radiological exposures The HNCW System is not safety-related. However, it does incorporate features that assume reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations.
Portions of the chilled water system which penetrate the primary containment are provided with isolation valves and penetrations which are Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2. The valves may be manually-operated from the control room, except when a LOCA signal assumes control.
9.2.12.4 Tests and Inspections Initial testing of the system includes performance testing of the chillers, pumps and coils for conformance with design heat loads, water flows, and heat transfer capabilities. An integrity test is performed on the system upon completion.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Provision is made for periodic inspection of major components to ensure the capability and integrity of the system. Local display devices are provided to indicate all vital parameters required in testing and inspections.
The chillers are tested in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 30 (Methods of Testing for Rating Liquid Chilling Packages). The pumps are tested in accordance with standards of the Hydraulic Institute. ASME Section VIII and TEMA C standards apply to the ASHRAE Standard 33 (Methods of Testing for Rating Forced Circulation Air-Cooling and Heating Coils).
Samples of chilled water may be obtained for chemical analyses. Radioactivity is not expected to be in the chilled water.
9.2.12.5 Instrumentation Application A regulated supply of demineralized makeup water adds water to the TCW expansion tank by water level controls, and the chiller units are controlled individually by remote manual switches.
A temperature controller and flow switch continuously monitor the discharge of the evaporator.
If the temperature of the chilled water drops below a specified level, the control automatically adjusts the temperature control inlet guide vanes of the chiller compressor. Flow switches prohibit the chiller from operating unless there is water flow through both evaporator and condenser. (See Section 3.11 for temperature requirements.) In case of a chiller or pump trip, the standby units are automatically started.
Chilled water flow into and out of the containment is controlled by isolation valves which shall be automatically closed after a LOCA signal. Condenser water is provided from the TCW System. The thermocouples are located in each area being cooled. The control room operator can adjust the three-way valve position during startup and whenever high chilled water return temperatures are indicated and alarmed. Alternately, instead of the three-way valves, a flow control valve may be used.
Remote controlled valves permit isolation of any drywell cooling coil in the event of the coil developing a detectable leak.
9.2.13 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System 9.2.13.1 Design Basis 9.2.13.1.1 Power Generation Design Bases The safety-related HVAC Emergency Cooling Water (HECW) System shall provide chilled water under normal plant operating conditions to the Reactor Building safety-related electrical equipment HVAC system, Control Building safety-related equipment area HVAC System and 9.2-28                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 the control room habitability area HVAC System (Table 9.2-9). The supply temperature is 7&deg;C, the return temperature is 17&deg;C.
9.2.13.1.2 Safety Design Bases The HECW System performs a safety design function.
(1)  The HECW System shall deliver chilled water to the Reactor Building safety-related electrical equipment HVAC System and Control Building safety-related equipment area HVAC System and the control room habitability area HVAC System during shutdown of the reactor, operating modes and abnormal reactor conditions including LOCA.
(2)  Sufficient redundancy and electrical and mechanical separation shall be provided to ensure proper operations under all conditions.
(3)  The system shall be designed and constructed in accordance with Seismic Category I, ASME Code, Section III, Class 3 requirements.
(4)    The system shall be powered from Class 1E buses. Power shall be available from the Alternate AC (AAC) power source when required.
(5)    The HECW System shall be protected from missiles in accordance with Subsection 3.5.1.
(6)    Design features to preclude the adverse effects of water hammer are in accordance with the SRP section addressing the resolution of USI A-1 discussed in NUREG-0927.
These features shall include:
(a)    An elevated surge tank to keep the system filled.
(b)    Vents provided at all high points in the system.
(c)    After any system drainage, venting is assured by personnel training and procedures.
(d)    System valves are slow acting.
(7)    The HECW System shall be protected from failures of high and medium energy lines as discussed in Section 3.6.
(8)    The design operation of the HECW compressors will take into account power or operational perturbations which could result in a) frequent immediate or elongated restarts, b) in unacceptable compressor coolant and lubrication oil interactions, and c) compressor coolant leaks or releases.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  The system piping design will take into account unacceptable nil-ductility-temperature conditions associated with normal and transient operation.
9.2.13.2 System Description The HECW System consists of subsystems in three divisions. Divisions A, B and C have two refrigerator units, two pumps, instrumentation and distribution piping and valves to corresponding cooling coils. A chemical addition tank is shared by all HECW divisions. Each HECW division shares a surge tank with the corresponding division of the RCW System. The refrigerator capacity is designed to cool the Reactor Building safety-related electrical equipment HVAC Systems and Control Building safety-related equipment area HVAC Systems.
The system is shown in Figure 9.2-3. The refrigerators are located in the Control Building as shown in Figures 1.2-20 and 1.2-21. Each refrigerator unit consists of a evaporator, a compressor, refrigerant, piping, and package chiller controls. This system shares the RCW surge tanks which are in the Reactor Building (Figure 1.2-12). Equipment is listed in Table 9.2-8. Each cooling coil is controlled by a room thermostat. Alternately, flow may be controlled by a temperature control valve. Condenser cooling is from the corresponding division of the RCW System.
Piping and valves for the HECW System, as well as the cooling water lines from the RCW System, designed entirely to ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C, Quality Assurance B requirements. The extent of this classification is up to and including drainage block valves. There are no primary or secondary containment penetrations within the system.
The HECW System is not expected to contain radioactivity.
High temperature of the returned cooling water causes the standby refrigerator unit to start automatically. Makeup water is supplied from the MUWP System, at the surge tank. Each surge tank has the capacity to replace system water losses for more than 100 days during an emergency. The only non-safety-related portions of the HECW divisions are the chemical addition tank and the piping from the tank to the safety-related valves which isolate the safety-related portions of the system.
Also, see Subsection 9.2.17.1 for COL license information requirements.
9.2.13.3 Safety Evaluation The HECW System is a Seismic Category I system, protected from flooding and tornado/hurricane missiles. All components of the system are designed to be operable during a loss of normal power by connection to the ESF buses (Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2). Redundant components are provided to ensure that any single component failure does not preclude system operation. The system is designed to meet the requirements of Criterion 19 of 10CFR50. The refrigerators of each division are in separate rooms.
9.2-30                                                                                        Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 During a Station Blackout (SBO), the HECW refrigerators, pumps and instrumentation will be powered by the AAC System which will become available in ten minutes. Provisions will be made to ensure prompt and reliable restart of the chiller units. COL license information requirements are provided in Subsection 9.2.17.1.
The response to SBO is discussed in Chapter 1, Appendix 1C. During the SBO, little heat will be generated in the areas cooled by HECW because only battery powered equipment will be operating. These areas are the main control room, the Control Building essential electrical equipment rooms and the Reactor Building essential electrical equipment rooms. The HVAC fans in these areas are powered by Class 1E buses. When AAC power becomes available, these fans will be powered and will start supplying outside air and exhausting any hot air from these areas. When chilled water becomes available, cooled air will be circulated in these areas to restore normal temperature.
If a LOPP event occurs, there are provisions for a stop signal to the HECW pumps to trip the breakers or for sequencing the HECW pumps back onto the emergency bus during the allotted time frame (load block 3), which is 15 seconds after the emergency buses are picked up by the diesel generators. Once the pumps are reconnected to the emergency bus, they are prevented from cycling on and off until the remaining LOPP sequence loads are connected to the emergency bus. If a LOCA follows a LOPP, there are provisions for resetting the start timers and connecting the HECW pumps to the emergency busses at the proper time if they are not already connected when the LOCA appears.
Power is provided to the HECW refrigerators thirty seconds after it is provided to the HECW pumps. The HECW refrigerators will then begin a programmed startup process.
The HECW system air operated valves will upon loss of instrument air or power assume configurations or positions that assure continued system cooling service.
9.2.13.4 Tests and Inspection Initial testing of the system includes performance testing of the refrigerators, pumps and coils for conformance with design capacity water flows and heat transfer capabilities. An integrity test is performed on the system upon completion.
The HECW System is designed for periodic pressure and functional testing to assure:
(1)    the structural and leaktight integrity by visual inspection of the components; (2)    the operability and the performance of the active components of the system; and (3)    the operability of the system as a whole.
Water Systems                                                                                          9.2-31
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Local display devices are provided to indicate all vital parameters required in testing and inspections. Standby features are periodically tested by initiating the transfer sequence during normal operation.
The refrigerators are tested in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 30. The pumps are tested in accordance with standards of the Hydraulic Institute. ASME Section VIII and TEMA C standards apply to the heat exchangers. The cooling coils are tested in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 33.
9.2.13.5 Instrumentation and Alarms A regulated supply of makeup water is provided to add purified water to the surge tanks by water level controls.
The chilled water pumps are controlled from the main control panel. The standby refrigerator has an interlock which automatically starts the standby refrigerator and pump upon failure of the operating unit.
The refrigerator units can be controlled individually from the main control room by a remote manual switch. Chilled water temperature is controlled by inlet guide vanes on each chiller refrigerant circuit. Condenser water flow is controlled by a two-way valve based on refrigerant compressor discharge pressure.
A temperature controller and flow switch continuously monitor the discharge of each evaporator. If the temperature of the chilled water drops below a specified level, the controller automatically adjusts the position of the compressor inlet guide vanes. Flow switches prohibit the chiller from operating unless there is water flow through both evaporator and condenser.
9.2.14 Turbine Building Cooling Water System 9.2.14.1 Design Bases 9.2.14.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Turbine Building Cooling Water (TCW) System (Figure 9.2-6) serves no safety function and has no safety design basis.
There are no connections between the TCW System and any other safety-related systems.
9.2.14.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)  The TCW System provides corrosion-inhibited, demineralized cooling water to all Turbine Island auxiliary equipment listed in Table 9.2-11.
(2)  During power operation, the TCW System operates to provide a continuous supply of cooling water, at a maximum temperature of 41&deg;C, to the Turbine Island auxiliary equipment, with a service water inlet temperature not exceeding 37.8&deg;C.
9.2-32                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    The TCW System is designed to permit the maintenance of any single active component without interruption of the cooling function.
(4)    Makeup to the TCW System is designed to permit continuous system operation with design failure leakage and to permit expeditious post-maintenance system refill.
(5)    The TCW System is designed to have an atmospheric surge tank located at the highest point in the system.
(6)    The TCW System is designed to have a higher pressure than the power cycle heat sink water to ensure leakage is from the TCW System to the power cycle heat sink in the event a tube leak occurs in the TCW System heat exchanger.
9.2.14.2 System Description 9.2.14.2.1 General Description The TCW System is a single-loop system and consists of one surge tank, one chemical addition tank, three pumps with a capacity of 3405 m3/h each, three heat exchangers with heat removal capacity of 68.7 GJ/h each (connected in parallel), and associated coolers, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. Heat is removed from the TCW System and transferred to the non-safety-related Turbine Service Water (TSW) System (Subsection 9.2.16).
A TCW System sample is periodically taken for analysis to assure that the water quality meets the chemical specifications.
9.2.14.2.2 Component Description Codes and standards applicable to the TCW System are listed in Table 3.2-1. The system is designed in accordance with quality Group D specifications.
The chemical addition tank is located in the Turbine Building in close proximity to the TCW System surge tank.
The TCW pumps are 50% capacity each and are constant speed electric motor-driven, horizontal centrifugal pumps. The three pumps are connected in parallel with common suction and discharge lines. One 50% TCW pump is on standby.
The TCW heat exchangers are 50% capacity each and are designed to have the TCW water circulated on the shell side and the power cycle heat sink water circulated on the tube side. The surface area is based on normal heat load.
The surge tank, which is shared between the HNCW and TCW Systems, is an atmospheric carbon steel tank located at the highest point in the TCW System. The surge tank is provided with a level control valve that controls makeup water addition.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-33
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The surge tank is located above the TCW pumps and heat exchangers in the Turbine Building in a location away from any safety-related components. Failure of the surge tank will not affect any safety-related system.
Those parts of the TCW System in the Turbine Building are located in areas that do not contain any safety-related systems. Those parts of the TCW System outside the turbine building are located away from any safety-related system.
9.2.14.2.3 System Operation During normal operation, two of the three 50% capacity TCW System pumps circulate corrosion-inhibited demineralized water through the shell side of two of the three 50% capacity TCW heat exchangers in service. The heat from the TCW System is rejected to the TSW System, which circulates water on the tube side of the TCW System heat exchangers.
The standby TCW System pump is automatically started on detection of low TCW System pump discharge pressure. The standby TCW System heat exchanger is placed in service manually.
The cooling water flow rate to the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) coolers, the turbine lube oil coolers and aftercoolers, and generator exciter air cooler is regulated by control valves. Control valves in the cooling water outlet from these units are throttled in response to temperature signals from the fluid being cooled.
The flow rate of cooling water to all of the other coolers is manually regulated by individual throttling valves located on the cooling water outlet from each unit.
The minimum system cooling water temperature is maintained by adjusting the TCW System heat exchanger bypass valve.
The surge tank provides a reservoir for small amounts of leakage from the system and for the expansion and contraction of the cooling fluid with changes in the system temperature and is connected to the pump suction.
Demineralized makeup water to the TCW System is controlled automatically by a level control valve which is actuated by sensing surge tank level. A corrosion inhibitor is manually added to the system.
9.2.14.3 Safety Evaluation The TCW System has no safety design bases and serves no safety function.
9.2-34                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.14.4 Tests and Inspections All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation, and as an integrated system after installation to ensure design performance. The systems are preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
The components of the TCW System and associated instrumentation are accessible during plant operation for visual examination. Periodic inspections during normal operation are made to ensure operability and integrity of the system. Inspections include measurements of cooling water flows, temperatures, pressures, water quality, corrosion-erosion rate, control positions, and setpoints to verify the system condition.
9.2.14.5 Instrumentation and Alarms Pressure and temperature indicators are provided where required for testing and balancing the system. Flow indicator taps are provided at strategic points in the system for initial balancing of the flows and verifying flows during plant operation.
Surge tank high and low level and TCW pump discharge pressure alarms are retransmitted to the main control room from the TCW local control panels.
Makeup flow to the TCW System surge tank is initiated automatically by low surge tank water level and is continued until the normal level is reestablished.
Provisions for taking TCW System water samples are included.
9.2.15 Reactor Service Water System 9.2.15.1 Portions Within Scope of ABWR Standard Plant Those portions of the Reactor Service Water (RSW) System that are within the Control Building are in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant and are described in Subsections 9.2.15.1.1 through 9.2.15.1.6.
All portions of the RSW System which are outside the Control Building are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant.
9.2.15.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)  The RSW System shall be designed in three mechanically and electrically separated divisions to remove heat from the three divisions of the Reactor Cooling Water (RCW) System which is required for safe reactor shutdown, and which also cools those auxiliaries whose operation is desired following a LOCA, but not essential to safe shutdown.
The heat removal requirements from the RCW System and the UHS temperature are in Subsection 9.2.11.1.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-35
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  The RSW System shall be designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Assurance B, Quality Group C, IEEE-279 and IEEE-308 requirements.
(3)  Each RSW System division shall be mechanically and electrically separated from the other divisions. For any structures housing RSW System components, there shall be inter-divisional boundaries (including walls, floors, doors and penetrations) that have a three hour fire rating. In addition, each division shall be protected from flooding, spraying, steam impingement, pipe whip, jet forces, missiles, fire from the other divisions and the effect of failure of any non-Seismic Category I equipment, as required.
(4)  The RSW System shall be designed to meet the foregoing design bases during a loss of preferred power.
(5)  System low point drains and high point vents are provided as required. All divisions are maintained full of water (to prevent waterhammer) when not in service except when undergoing maintenance.
(6)  Piping within the Control Building shall be fabricated and installed as all welded piping. Major components may have flange bolted or welded connections to the piping system. No expansion joints or bellows assemblies shall be used within the Control Building.
9.2.15.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The RSW System (Figure 9.2-7) shall be designed to cool the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) as required during: (a) normal operation; (b) emergency shutdown; (c) normal shutdown; (d) testing; and (e) loss of preferred power.
9.2.15.1.3 System Description The RSW System (Figure 9.2-7) provides cooling water during various operating modes, during shutdown and post-LOCA operations. The system removes heat from the RCW System and transfers it to the ultimate heat sink. Component descriptions of the RSW System are provided in Table 9.2-13.
The RSW System response to high water level in the RCW/RSW heat exchanger room in the Control Building is discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.1.2.2 and Figure 7.3-7. The isolation valves shall close upon receipt of a high water level signal in the RCW/RSW heat exchanger room in that division.
9.2.15.1.4 Safety Evaluation The components of the RSW System are separated and protected to the extent necessary to assure that sufficient equipment remains operating to permit shutdown of the unit in the event 9.2-36                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 of any of the following (separation is applied to electrical equipment and instrumentation and controls as well as to mechanical equipment and piping):
(1)  Flooding, spraying or steam release due to pipe rupture or equipment failure (2)  Pipe whip and jet forces resulting from postulated pipe rupture of nearby high energy pipes (3)  Missiles which result from equipment failure (4)  Fire Liquid radiation monitors are provided in the RCW System. Upon detection of radiation leakage in a division of the RCW System, that system is isolated by operator action from the control room, and the cooling load is met by another division of the RCW System.
Consequently, radioactive contamination released by the RSW System to the environment does not exceed allowable limits defined by 10CFR100.
System low point drains and high point vents are provided as required.
During all plant operating modes, each division shall have at least one service water pump operating. Therefore, if a LOCA occurs, the system is already in operation and all standby pumps start and all standby valves open. If a loss of offsite power occurs during a LOCA, the pumps momentarily stop until transfer to standby diesel-generator power is completed. The pumps are restarted automatically according to the diesel loading sequence. No operator action is required, following a LOCA, to start the RSW System in its LOCA operating mode.
9.2.15.1.5 Instrumentation and Alarms Locally mounted temperature indicators or test wells are furnished on the equipment cooling water discharge lines to enable verification of specified heat removal during plant operation.
The Control Building basement has potential flooding from several sources with the RSW being the largest. Safety-related pipe break detection is required to take automatic protective action for breaks within the Control Building RCW individual areas.
Each RCW equipment divisional area will be provided with water level detection instrumentation. The instrumentation will be composed of two sets of water level detection devices. A set of four water detection devices will provide alarms locally and in the MCR. This set will detect initial abnormal water level. The second set of four diverse seafety-related water level devices will provide alarm, valve closure and pump trip actions. For further discussion see Subsection 3.4.1. The devices are shown in Figure 11.2-2a (Sheet 36). The four sensors in each set will be arranged in a 2/4 logic to provide redundant trip actuation signals. The instrumentation will utilize MUX devices and network interconnections.
Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.15.1.6 Tests and Inspections The RSW System is designed for periodic pressure and functional testing to assure:
(1)    The structural and leaktight integrity by visible inspection of the components (2)    The operability and the performance of active components of the system (3)    The operability of the system as a whole 9.2.15.2 Portions Outside the Scope of ABWR Standard Plant All portions of the RSW System which are outside the Control Building are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant. Subsections 9.2.15.2.1 through 9.2.15.2.6 provide conceptual design of these portions of the RSW System as required by 10CFR52. The interface requirements for this system are part of the design certification.
The site-dependent portions of the RSW System shall meet all requirements in Subsections 9.2.15.1.1 through 9.2.15.1.6 and all following requirements. This subsection provides a conceptual design and interface requirements for those portions of the RSW System which are site-dependent and are a part of the design certification.
9.2.15.2.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall provide the following system design features and additional information which are site dependent:
(1)    The temperature increase and pressure drop across the heat exchangers.
(2)    The required and available net positive suction head for the RSW pumps at pump suction locations considering anticipated low water levels.
(3)    The location of the RSW pump house.
(4)    The design features to assure that the requirements in Subsection 9.2.15.1.1(3) are met.
(5)    An analysis of an RSW pipeline break and a single active component failure shall show that maximum flooding will not exceed 5.0m in an individual RCW heat exchanger room.
(6)    System low point drains and high point vents are provided as required. All divisions are maintained full of water (to prevent waterhammer) when not in service except when undergoing maintenance.
9.2-38                                                                                        Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.15.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
(1)    The RSW system shall be able to function during abnormally high or low water levels and steps are taken to prevent organic fouling that may degrade system performance.
These steps include trash racks and provisions for biocide treatment (where discharge is allowed). Where discharge of biocide is not allowed, non-biocide treatment shall be provided. Thermal backwashing capability shall be provided at any site where infestations of macrobial growth can occur.
(2)    System components and piping materials shall be provided to be compatible with the site cooling water to minimize corrosion. Adequate corrosion and erosion safety factors shall be used to assure the integrity of the system during the life of the plant.
(3)    The heat removal requirements from the RCW system are in Table 9.2-4d.
(4)    Potable water shall be provided to flush the service water side of the RSW/RCW heat exchangers whenever they are put into a wet standby condition (Subsection 9.2.4.1.3).
9.2.15.2.3 System Description (Conceptual Design)
The RSW System is shown on Figure 9.2-7. components of the RSW System are provided as shown in Table 9.2-13.
The RSW pump house is located at the ultimate heat sink (UHS) which is described in Subsection 9.2.5. The site specific design of RSW demonstrates that at least one division has adequate cooling capacity following postulated aircraft impact strike locations on the RSW. At least one division of RSW is physically separated from the other two divisions by 50 meters or greater horizontal distance. The RSW pump houses are separated by 50 meters or greater horizontal distance from the R/B and C/B. A strike on one of the RSW pump houses does not prevent the operation of safe shutdown equipment located in the R/B and C/B.
The RSW pump house shall be located so that the main service water piping between it and the Control Building shall not exceed 2 km in length. The piping is the choice of the COL applicant.
The RSW System is able to function during abnormally high or low water levels, and steps are taken to prevent organic fouling that may degrade system performance. These steps include trash racks and provisions for biocide treatment (where discharge is allowed). Where discharge of biocide is not allowed, non-biocide treatment will be provided. Thermal backwashing capability will be provided at any site where infestations of microbial growth can occur.
9.2.15.2.4 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirement)
An analysis shall show that the requirements in Subsections 9.2.15.1.1(3) and 9.2.15.2.1(5) are met.
Water Systems                                                                                              9.2-39
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.15.2.5 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface Requirement)
All pumps shall stop and all automatic isolation valves outside the Control Building shall close upon receipt of a high water level signal in the RCW heat exchanger room in that division.
Normally the operators will periodically clean the strainers to maintain low differential pressure. High pressure difference across the service water strainers shall alarm in the control room.
9.2.15.2.6 Tests and Inspections (Interface Requirements)
The tests shall assure, under conditions as close to design as practical, the performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation for reactor shutdown and for LOCA, including operating of applicable portions of the reactor protection system and the transfer between normal and standby power sources.
9.2.16 Turbine Service Water System 9.2.16.1 Portions Within Scope of ABWR Standard Plant Those portions of the Turbine Service Water (TSW) System that are within the Turbine Building are in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant and are described in Subsections 9.2.16.1.1 through 9.2.16.1.6.
All portions of the TSW System that are outside the Turbine Building are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant.
9.2.16.1.1 Safety Design Bases The TSW System does not serve or support any safety function and has no safety design basis.
9.2.16.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)  The TSW System is designed to remove heat from the TCW System heat exchangers and reject this heat to the power cycle heat sink during normal and shutdown conditions.
(2)  During normal power operation, the TSW System supplies cooling water to the TCW System heat exchangers at a temperature not exceeding 37.8&deg;C.
(3)  The TSW System is designed to permit the maintenance of any single active component without interruption of the cooling function.
9.2-40                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.2.16.1.3 System Description 9.2.16.1.3.1 General Description The Turbine Service Water (TSW) System supplies cooling water to the Turbine Cooling Water (TCW) System heat exchangers to transfer heat from the TCW System to the power cycle heat sink.
The TSW system is illustrated on Figure 9.2-8.
9.2.16.1.3.2 Component Description The TSW heat exchangers are shown on Figure 9.2-6a and are described in Subsection 9.2.14.2.
9.2.16.1.3.3 System Operation The system is operated from the main control room.
9.2.16.1.4 Safety Evaluation The TSW System is not interconnected with any safety-related system.
9.2.16.1.5 Instrumentation Application Pressure and temperature indicators are provided where required for testing the system.
9.2.16.1.6 Tests and Inspections All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation, and as an integrated system after installation to ensure design performance. The systems are preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
The components of the TSW System and associated instrumentation are accessible during plant operation for visual examination. Periodic inspections during normal operation are made to ensure operability and integrity of the system. Inspections include measurement of the TSW System flow, temperatures, pressures, differential pressures and valve positions to verify the system condition.
9.2.16.2 Portions Outside Scope of ABWR Standard Plant All portions of the TSW System that are outside the Turbine Building are not in the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant. Subsections 9.2.16.2.1 and 9.2.16.2.2 provide a conceptual design of these portions of the TSW System as required by 10CFR52. The interface requirements for this system are part of the design certification.
The site-dependent portions of the TSW System shall meet all requirements in Subsections 9.2.16.1.1 through 9.2.16.1.5 and following requirements. This subsection Water Systems                                                                                          9.2-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 provides a conceptual design and interface requirements for those portions of the TSW System which are site dependent and are a part of the design certification.
9.2.16.2.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirement)
There are none.
9.2.16.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall provide the following system design features and additional information which are site dependent:
(1)    The temperature increase and pressure drop across the heat exchangers.
(2)    The required and available net positive suction head for the TSW pumps at pump suction locations considering anticipated low water levels.
(3)    The location of the TSW pump house.
(4)    The heat removal requirements from the TCW System are in Subsection 9.2.14.2.
(5)    System low point drains and high point vents are provided as required. All components are maintained full of water (to prevent waterhammer) when not in service except when undergoing maintenance.
9.2.16.2.3 System Description 9.2.16.2.3.1 General Description (Conceptual Design)
The TSW System consists of three 50% capacity vertical wet pit pumps located at the intake structure. Two pumps are in operation during normal operation with one pump in standby.
The TSW pumps supply cooling water to the three TCW heat exchangers (two are normally in service and one is on standby).
9.2.16.2.3.2 Component Description (Conceptual Design)
Three strainers are provided (one for each TSW pump). Debris collected in the strainer is sluiced to a disposal collection area.
Piping and valves in the TSW System are protected from interior corrosion with suitable corrosion resistant material as required by site specific soil and water conditions.
9.2.16.2.3.3 System Operation (Conceptual Design)
The system is operated from the main control room.
9.2-42                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The standby pump is started automatically in the event the normally operating pump trips or the discharge header pressure drops below a preset limit.
9.2.16.2.4 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirements)
The COL applicant shall demonstrate that all safety-related components, systems and structures are protected from flooding in the event of a pipeline break in the TSW System.
9.2.16.2.5 Instrumentation and Alarms (Interface Requirements)
TSW System pump status shall be indicated in the main control room.
TSW System trip shall be alarmed and the automatic startup of the standby pump shall be annunciated in the main control room.
High differential pressure across the duplex filters shall be alarmed in the main control room.
9.2.16.2.6 Tests and Inspections (Interface Requirements)
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation, and as an integrated system after installation to ensure design performance. The systems are preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
The components of the TSW System and associated instrumentation are accessible during plant operation for visual examination. Periodic inspections during normal operation are made to ensure operability and integrity of the system. Inspections include measurements of cooling water flows, temperatures, pressures, water quality, corrosion-erosion rate, control positions, and setpoints to verify the system condition.
9.2.17 COL License Information 9.2.17.1 HECW System Refrigerator Requirements The COL applicant shall provide for the following after refrigerators have been procured:
(1)    Means shall be provided for adjusting refrigerator capacity to chilled water outlet temperature.
(2)    Means shall be provided for starting and stopping the pump and refrigerator on proper sequence.
(3)    Means shall be provided for reacting to a loss of electrical power for periods up to two (2) hours and for automatic restarting of pumps and refrigerators, under the expected environmental conditions during station blackout when electrical power is restored.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-43
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Means shall be provided to minimize the potential for coolant leakage or release into system or surrounding equipment environs.
(5)  An evaluation of transient effects on starting and stopping or prolonged stoppage of the refrigeration/chiller units. Effects like high restart circuit draw downs on safety buses, coolant-oil interactions, degassing needs, coolant gas leakage or release in equipment areas along with flammability threats, synchronized refrigeration swapping.
9.2.17.2 Reactor Service Water System Requirements The COL applicant shall provide the following which apply on a plant specific basis:
(1)  Provisions for periodic analyses of samples of water and substrate and/or periodic visual inspection of intake structure for biofouling and removal of any fouling accumulations detected during such inspections.
(2)  Provisions for periodic full flow testing of redundant and infrequently used cooling loops.
(3)  Provisions for continuous biocide treatment of the RSW System for sites with a potential for macroscopic biofouling.
(4)  Provisions for filling RSW System cooling loops with biocide treated water before layup.
(5)  Provisions for biocide treatment before layup for other systems such as some fire protection system which use raw service water as a source for the systems.
(6)  Provisions for a EPG that backup the RSW System leak detection instrumentation automatice protective actions by manual operator actions including local and manual valve closure actions.
9.2-44                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-1 Users of Makeup Water-Condensate The MUWC transfer pumps provide condensate to the following systems and uses:
* Main condenser hotwell
* Liquid Radwaste System
* Residual Heat Removal System flushing
* High Pressure Core Flooder System charging and flushing
* Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System charging and flushing
* Fuel pool skimmer surge tanks
* Cleanup system phase separators and cleanup system filter demineralizer
* Condensate filter and demineralizer
* Other miscellaneous uses.
Table 9.2-2 Users of Makeup Water-Purified The MUWP transfer pumps provide purified water to the following systems and uses:
* Condensate storage tank makeup
* Reactor Building Cooling Water System makeup
* Turbine Building Cooling Water System makeup
* Diesel Generator Cooling Water System makeup
* Liquid radwaste system
* Standby liquid control tank
* Decontamination station
* Plant chilled water systems
* Plant laboratories
* Other miscellaneous uses Water Systems                                                                                  9.2-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-2a Water Quality Characteristics for the Makeup Water Purified System Water Quality Parameter                    Operating Target          System Design          Maximum Value Chloride (ppb)                                      10.0                    20.0                    100.0 Sulfate (ppb)                                      10.0                    20.0                    100.0 Conductivity at 25&deg;C (&#xb5;S/cm)                        0.2                      0.3                      1.0 Silica (ppb as SiO2)                                10.0                    20.0                    100.0 pH at 25&deg;C            Min                            6.4                      6.2                      5.6 Max                            7.8                      8.0                      8.6 Corrosion Product Metals (ppb)
Fe insoluble soluble Cu total                                      10.0                    20.0                    100.0 all other metals sum            10.0                    20.0                    100.0 Organic Impurities Equivalent K (S/cm)                            0.2                      0.4                      2.0
* Does not include an incremental conductivity value of 0.8 uS/cm at 25oC due to carbon dioxide from air in water stored in tanks open to the atmosphere.
Organic impurity values apply to fresh makeup water stored in any Demineralized Water Storage Tank.
9.2-46                                                                                                  Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-3 Capacity Requirements for Condensate Storage Tank Dead spacetop of pool                                                                            29,901L*
Normal operation variation and receiving volume for plant startup return water                  999,240L Minimum storage volume                                                                            247,500L Dead spacemiddle of pool                                                                        129,901L*
Water source for station blackout                                                                569,567L Dead spacebottom of pool                                                                        129,901L*
Total                                                                                          2,108,321L
* These values are based on a bottom area of 130m3.
Water for operation of RCIC is taken from the condensate storage tank and the suppression pool as described in the EPGs of Appendix 18A.
Water Systems                                                                                            9.2-47
 
ABWR 9.2-48 Table 9.2-4a Reactor Building Cooling Water Division A Emergency Normal                                                  Hot Standby                                (LOCA)
Operating      Shutdown at 4 Shutdown at 20              (No Loss of        Hot Standby          (Suppression Operating Mode/Components                      Conditions        Hours          Hours                      AC)            (Loss of AC)          Pool at 97&deg;C Heat*    Flow*    Heat      Flow      Heat      Flow      Heat      Flow      Heat      Flow      Heat      Flow Essential Emergency Diesel Generator A                                                                                    13.40    229        13.40      229 RHR Heat Exchanger A                                      108.02 1,199        34.75    1,199                      25.54    1,199      89.18      1,199 Others (essential)                    3.18      205      3.60      205      3.81      205      3.39      205      4.10      205        4.19      205 Non-Essential CUW Heat Exchanger                    20.10      159                159                159      20.10    159      20.93    159 f
FPC Heat Exchanger A                  7.12      279      7.12      279      7.12      279      7.12      279      7.12      279        9.63      279 25A5675AL Revision 7 Inside Drywell                        5.86      320      5.86      320      5.86      320      5.86      320      3.39      320 Others  (non-essential)            2.64      160      2.64      160      2.64      160      2.64      160      0.84      59        0.75      59 Total Load                            38.94      1,123    127.24 2,322        54.01    2,322    38.94    1,123    75.36    2,450      117.23    1,971
* Heat in GJ/h; flow in m3/h, sums may not be equal due to rounding.
HECW refrigerator, CAMS coolers, room coolers (RHR, RCIC, CAMS), RHR motor and seal coolers.
The heat transferred from the CUW heat exchanger at the start of cooldown is appreciable, but during the critical last part of a cooldown, the heat removed is very little because the temperature difference between the reactor water and the RCW System is small. Sometimes, the operators may remove the CUW heat exchangers from service during cooldown. Thus, the heat removed varies from about that during normal operation at the start of cooldown to Design Control Document/Tier 2 very little at the end of cooldown.
f Includes FPC room cooler.
                  ** Drywell (A & C) and RIP coolers.
Instruments and service air coolers; CUW pump cooler, CRD pump oil, and RIP MG sets.
Water Systems
 
ABWR Water Systems Table 9.2-4b Reactor Building Cooling Water Division B Emergency Normal                                                Hot Standby                              (LOCA)
Operating        Shutdown at 4 Shutdown at 20          (No Loss of        Hot Standby        (Suppression Operating Mode/Components                    Conditions          Hours          Hours                  AC)            (Loss of AC)        Pool at 97&deg;C Heat*    Flow*    Heat      Flow    Heat    Flow      Heat      Flow    Heat      Flow    Heat      Flow Essential Emergency Diesel Generator B                                                                              13.40      229      13.40    229 RHR Heat Exchanger B                                    108.02 1,199      34.75    1,199                      25.54      1,199    89.18    1,199 Others (essential)                    6.28      360      6.70      360    6.70    360      6.28      360      7.12      360      7.95      360 Non-Essential CUW Heat Exchanger                    20.10    159                159            159      20.10    159      20.93      159 f
FPC Heat Exchanger B                  7.12      279      7.12      279    7.12    279      7.12      279      7.12      279      9.63      279 25A5675AL Revision 7 Inside Drywell                        5.44      279      6.28      279    5.40    279      5.40      279      2.51      279 Others  (non-essential)            2.93      159      1.47      159    1.47    159      1.47      159      0.33      9.1              9.1 Total Load                            41.87    1,236    129.79 2,435      55.27    2,435    40.19    1,236    77.04      2,514    120.16 2,076
* Heat in GJ/h; flow in m3/h, sums may not be equal due to rounding.
HECW refrigerator, room coolers (RHR, HPCF, SGTS, FCS, CAMS), CAMS cooler, HPCF and RHR motor and mechanical seal coolers.
The heat transferred from the CUW heat exchanger at the start of cooldown is appreciable, but during the critical last part of a cooldown, the heat removed is very little because the temperature difference between the reactor water and the RCW System is small. Sometimes, the operators may remove the CUW heat exchangers from service during cooldown. Thus, the heat removed varies from about that during normal operation at the start of Design Control Document/Tier 2 cooldown to very little at the end of cooldown.
f Includes FPC room cooler.
                  ** Drywell (B) and RIP coolers.
Reactor Building sampling coolers; LCW sump coolers (in drywell and reactor building), RIP MG sets and CUW pump coolers.
9.2-49
 
ABWR 9.2-50 Table 9.2-4c Reactor Building Cooling Water Division C Emergency Normal                                              Hot Standby                                  (LOCA)
Operating        Shutdown at 4 Shutdown at 20        (No Loss of        Hot Standby          (Suppression Operating Mode/Components                    Conditions          Hours          Hours                AC)            (Loss of AC)          Pool at 97&deg;C Heat*    Flow*    Heat      Flow  Heat    Flow    Heat      Flow    Heat      Flow          Heat    Flow Essential Emergency Diesel Generator C                                                                            13.40    229          13.40  229 RHR Heat Exchanger C                                    108.02 1,199    34.75    1,199                    25.54    1,199        89.18  1199 Others (essential)                    6.28      360      6.70      360    6.70    360      6.28      360      6.70      360          7.12    360 Non-Essential Others (non-essential)                20.51    422      19.26    422    7.54    422      20.51    422      0.54      50            0.75    50 Total Load                            26.80    782      133.98 1,981    48.57    1,981    26.80    782      46.05    1838          110.53 1838 25A5675AL Revision 7
* Heat in GJ/h; flow in m3/h, sums may not be equal due to rounding.
HECW refrigerator, room coolers, motor coolers, and mechanical seal coolers for RHR and HPCF, FCS room cooler, SGTS room cooler.
Instrument and service air coolers, CRD pump oil cooler, radwaste components, HSCR condenser, and turbine building sampling coolers.
Design Control Document/Tier 2 Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-4d Design Characteristics for Reactor Building Cooling Water System Components RCW Pumps (Two per division)
RCW (A)/(B)                            RCW (C)
Discharge Flow Rate              1420  m3/h/pump                      1,237 m3/h/pump Pump Total Head                      0.57 MPa                              0.52 MPa Design Pressure                      1.37 MPa                              1.37 MPa Design Temperature                    71&deg;C                                  71&deg;C RCW Heat Exchangers (Three per division)
RCW (A)/(B)                            RCW (C)
Capacity (for each heat            47.73 GJ/h                            44.38 GJ/h exchanger)
RCW Surge Tanks Capacity                                          16 m3 (total, each)
Design Pressure                                        Static Head Design Temperature                                        71&deg;C RCW Chemical Addition Tanks Design Pressure                                        1.37 MPaG Design Temperature                                        71&deg;C RCW Piping Design Pressure                                        1.37 MPaG Design Temperature                                        71&deg;C Water Systems                                                                                9.2-51
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-5a Reactor Building Cooling Water Active Failure Analysis Single Active Failure                                        Analysis Failure of diesel generator to            The other RCW pumps are powered and start or failure of all power to a        controlled from other buses which are single Class 1E power system              energized from other independent diesel bus                                        generators and DC buses and, therefore, provide sufficient cooling for the essential equipment. The independent RCW Systems are mechanically and electrically separated to prevent damage to one system from other systems.
Failure of pump auto start signal          Same analysis as above.
Failure of ECCS pump area air cooler      Essential plant cooling requirements are met by the redundant ECCS, which have their own independently cooled pump areas.
Failure of a single RCW pump during        Essential plant cooling requirements are met normal plant operation                    by the remaining operable, redundant RCW pumps.
9.2-52                                                                                      Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-5b Reactor Building Cooling Water System Passive Failure Analysis Single Active Failure                                      Analysis Failure of any RCW System supply or      Essential plant cooling requirements are met return piping                            by the remaining intact RCW System, which includes their own independent supply and return service water headers. The redundant systems are mechanically and electrically separated to prevent damage to one system from the other systems.
Failure of RCW to RHR heat              Essential plant cooling requirements are met exchanger                                by the remaining intact redundant RHR System, which includes its own 100% capacity heat exchanger.
Failure of RCW piping to or from        Essential plant cooling requirements are met the air cooler for an ECCS pump        by the redundant ECCS which have their own area                                    independently cooled pump areas.
Failure of a single RCW heat exchanger  Essential plant cooling requirements are met during normal                            by the remaining operable, redundant heat operation                                exchanger.
Water Systems                                                                                  9.2-53
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-6 HVAC Normal Cooling Water System Component Description HNCW Chillers Quantity                              5 (including one standby unit)
Cooling Capacity                      9.42 GJ/h each Chilled water flow per unit          450 m3/h Supply temperature                7&deg;C Condenser water flow per unit        420 m3/h Supply temperature (max)          45&deg;C Control                              Inlet guide vane Condenser                            Shell and tube Evaporator                            Shell and tube HNCW Water Pumps Quantity                              5 (including one standby unit)
Type                                  Centrifugal, horizontal 3
Capacity m /hr each                  450 Total discharge head                  0.49 MPa 9.2-54                                                                                    Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-7 HVAC Normal Cooling Water Loads During Refueling During Normal Operation                        Shutdown Name of Area or Unit                      Capacity GJ/h        Flow m3/h        Capacity GJ/h      Flow m3/h Reactor Building Drywell Coolers                          0.96                69.5                0.80            69.5 RIP Coolers                              1.59                20.9                3.06            104 Others (Note 1)                          10.05                131                18.84            636 Turbine Building (Note 2)                      2.26                43.5                1.13              39 Radwaste Building                                5.69                81.2                6.70            232 (Note 4)
Service Building                                3.64                175                3.64            175 Others                                          4.61                151                3.56            151 (Note 5)
Total                                          28.89                672                37.68            1,407 (Note 6)
NOTES:
(1) Loads include reactor/turbine building supply units, HVH, FCU and room coolers.
(2) Loads are the offgas cooler condenser (normal operation only) and the electrical equipment supply unit.
(3) Deleted (4) Loads included are the radwaste building supply unit and the radwaste building electrical equipment room supply unit.
(5) Loads include HVH units not previously included.
(6) The HNCW chillers are 9.38 GJ/h each and the pumps 449m3/h each. Thus, four HNCW pumps have total capacity in excess of the amount required as shown in the last column of the table.
Water Systems                                                                                                  9.2-55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-8 HECW System Component Description*
HECW Chillers Quantity                                                    6 Capacity (Refrigerator)                six                  2.51 GJ/h Chilled water pump flow                six                  57 m3/h Supply temperature                                      7&deg;C Condenser water flow                  six                  128 m3/h Supply temperature (max.)                              45&deg;C Condenser                              Shell and tube Evaporator                            Shell and tube HECW Water Pumps Quantity                                                    6 (57 m3/h each)
Type                                                        Centrifugal, horizontal
* Each of Divisions A, B, and C have two parallel pump-refrigerator units.
9.2-56                                                                                        Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-9 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System Heat Loads Normal                Emergency Chilled                Chilled Water    Heat          Water Heat Load        Flow    Load          Flow Division          System        (GJ/h)      (m3/h)  (GJ/h)        (m3/h)
A    Reactor Building        0.88          14.3    0.88          14.3 Electrical Equipment Room (A)
Control Building        1.26          20.2    1.26          20.2 Electrical Equipment Room (A)
Total                  2.14          34.5    2.14          34.5 B    Main Control Room      1.42          26    1.30            24 Reactor Building        0.92          15    0.92            15 Electrical Equipment Room (B)
Control Building        1.26          20.2    1.26          20.2 Electrical Equipment Room (B)
Total                  3.60          61.2    3.48          59.2 C    Main Control Room      1.42          26    1.30            24 Reactor Building        0.92          15    0.92            15 Electrical Equipment Room (C)
Control Building        1.26          20.2    1.26          20.2 Electrical Equipment Room (C)
Total                    3.6          61.2    3.48          59.2 Water Systems                                                                        9.2-57
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-10 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System Active Failure Analysis Failure of diesel generator to start or failure of  Loss of one refrigerator and pump in Division B all power to a single Class 1E power system        or C would not permit sending chilled water to bus.                                                the Control Room Habitability Area HVAC System from the affected division. The other HECW division would send chilled water to the Control Room Habitability Area HVAC System which would maintain adequate cooling. In Division A, loss of both of the refrigerators or the pumps would result in loss of cooling water flow to Division A Control Building safety-related Equipment Area HVAC System and Reactor Building safety-related Electrical Equipment HVAC System. Cooling of Control Room Habitability Area HVAC System not affected.
Failure of auto pump or refrigerator signal.        Same analysis as above.
Failure of a single HECW refrigerator.              Same analysis as above.
Failure of a single HECW pump.                      Same analysis as above.
Failure of HECW pump and refrigerator room          Same analysis as above.
cooling.
Table 9.2-11 Turbine Island Auxiliary Equipment The TCW System removes heat from the following components:
* HVAC normal cooling water chillers
* Generator stator coolers, hydrogen coolers, seal oil coolers, exciter coolers and breaker coolers
* Turbine lube coolers
* Mechanical vacuum pump coolers
* Isophase bus coolers
* Electro-hydraulic control coolers
* Reactor feed pump and auxiliary coolers
* Standby reactor feed pump motor coolers
* Condensate pump motor coolers
* Heater drain pump motor coolers 9.2-58                                                                                              Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-12 Not Used Table 9.2-13 Reactor Service Water System (Interface Requirements)
RSW Pumps (Two per division)
Discharge flow rate, per pump            1,800 m3/h Pump total head                            0.34 MPa Design pressure                            0.79 MPa Design temperature                          50&deg;C RSW Piping and Valves Design pressure                            1.08 MPa Design temperature                          50&deg;C Water Systems                                                                          9.2-59
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-14 Potable and Sanitary Water System Components (Interface Requirements)
Component                                                Major Design Features All tanks are vertical, cylindrical type except where noted. All water pumps are horizontal, centrifugal and single stage. All chemical feed pumps are positive displacement diaphragm type.
Potable Water Storage Tank Capacity                                              23 m3 Potable Water Pump Quantity                                              2 Capacity                                              23 m3/h Head                                                  18 m Hypochlorinator Pump Capacity                                              0.6 m3/h Head                                                  9m Hypochlorite Tank Capacity                                              0.2 m3 Hydropneumatic Pressure Tank Type                                                  Horizontal, cylindrical Capacity                                              15 m3 Design pressure                                      1.03 MPaG Air Compressor Type                                                  Piston, single-stage Capacity                                              5 m3/min Discharge pressure                                    0.8 MPaG Comminutor Type                                                  Revolving vertically-slotted drum Aeration Tank Quantity                                              2 Volume                                                25 m3 each Clarifier Quantity                                              1 large, 2 small Volume                                              19m3, 7m3 Hypochlorite Contact Tank Volume                                                4.25 m3 9.2-60                                                                                          Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-14 Potable and Sanitary Water System Components (Interface Requirements) (Continued)
Component                                        Major Design Features Aerobic Digester Quantity                                      2 Volume                                        25 m3 each Air Blower Quantity                                      3 Capacity                                      0.34 m3/min each Froth Spray Pump Capacity                                      6 m3/h Head                                          30 m Hypochlorite Feed Pump Capacity                                      1.5 m3/h Head                                          30 m Hypochlorite Tank Capacity                                      0.4 m3 Water Systems                                                                            9.2-61
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-15 Makeup Water Preparation System Component (Interface Requirements)
Component                                                    Major Design Features All tanks are vertical, cylindrical type. All water pumps are horizontal, centrifugal and single-stage except the RO feed pumps. All chemical feed pumps are positive displacement, diaphragm type.
Well Capacity                                                At least 450 m3/h Well Water Tank Capacity                                                38 m3 Well Water Pumps Quantity                                                2 Capacity                                                230 m3/h Filters Quantity                                                2 Capacity                                                230 m3/h each Type                                                    Pressure type, dual media Filtered Water Storage Tank Capacity                                                150 m3 Backwash Pumps Quantity                                                2 Capacity                                                450 m3/h each Head                                                    27m RO Feed Pumps Quantity                                                4 Type                                                    Horizontal, multistage Capacity                                              45 m3/h Head                                                    2.75 to 3.43 MPaG RO First Pass Quantity                                                2 Type                                                    2-to-1 array of thin film composite membranes Capacity                                                68 m3/h permeate each with 25% rejection RO Second Pass Quantity                                                2 Type                                                    1-to-1 array of thin film composite membranes 9.2-62                                                                                            Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-15 Makeup Water Preparation System Component (Interface Requirements) (Continued)
Component                                          Major Design Features Capacity                                      45 m3/h permeate each with 33% rejection RO Permeate Storage Tank Capacity                                      20 m3 Demineralizer Feed Pumps Quantity                                      4 Capacity                                      23 m3/h each Head                                          16m Demineralizers Quantity                                      6 Capacity                                      23 m3/h each Resin                                        1.1m3 of 1:2 cation/anion resin each Demineralized Water Storage Tanks Quantity                                      2 Capacity                                      380 m3, each Demineralized Water Forwarding Pumps Quantity                                      3 Capacity                                      45 m3/h Chemical Feed Tank (NaHMP)
Capacity                                      0.8 m3 Chemical Feed Pump (NaHMP)
Quantity                                      2 Capacity                                      0.04 m3/h each Chemical Feed Tank (NaOH)
Capacity                                      1.5m3 Chemical Feed Pump (NaOH)
Quantity                                      4 (three normally operating with one spare)
Capacity                                      0.04 m3/h Water Systems                                                                                  9.2-63
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.2-16 Turbine Service Water System (Interface Requirement)
TSW Pumps (Three 50% pumps)
Discharge Flow Rate                3400 m3/h per pump Pump Total Head                    0.20 MPaG Design Pressure                    0.59 MPaG Design Temperature                  40&deg;C TSW Piping and Valves Design Pressure                    0.59 MPaG Design Temperature                  40&deg;C 9.2-64                                                                        Water Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.2-1 Reactor Building Cooling Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-9)
Figure 9.2-1a Not Used Figure 9.2-2 HVAC Normal Cooling Water System P&ID Figure 9.2-3 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-3)
Figure 9.2-4 Makeup Water System (Condensate) P&ID Figure 9.2-5 Makeup Water System (Purified) P&ID (Sheets 1-3)
Water Systems                                                                    9.2-65
 
ABWR 9.2-66 SURGE                                            RETURN FROM TANK
* FIG. 9.2-6B CHEMICAL ADDITION                                                                              RETURN FROM TANK                                LC FIG. 9.2-6C SUPPLY TO MAKE-UP WATER              FIG. 9.2-6B SUPPLY TO FIG. 9.2-6C ISO PHASE GEN. STATOR COOLERS              BUS COOLERS TCW PUMPS TCW HEAT EXCHANGERS GEN. H2 COOLERS                                                                      25A5675AL Revision 7 GEN. C/B COOLERS Design Control Document/Tier 2 TCV EXCITER COOLERS TCW HXS                                                                        TCV Water Systems
* The surge tank is shared with the HNCW system.
H2 SEAL OIL COOLERS Figure 9.2-6a Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram
 
ABWR Water Systems    RETURN TO FIG. 9.2-6A SUPPLY FROM FIG. 9.2-6A COND. PUMP MOTOR BEARING LUBE OIL COOLERS HVAC CHILLERS 25A5675AL Revision 7 HEATER DRAIN PUMP COOLERS Design Control Document/Tier 2 SAMPLE COOLERS COND. VACUUM PUMP SEAL COOLERS 9.2-67                          Figure 9.2-6b Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram
 
ABWR 9.2-68 RETURN TO FIG. 9.2-6A SUPPLY FROM FIG. 9.2-6A FROM LUBE OIL TEMP CONTROLLER TURBINE LUBE OIL COOLERS TCV                  REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP AND THYRISTOR COOLERS 25A5675AL Revision 7 TCV Design Control Document/Tier 2 TCV EHC FLUID COOLERS Water Systems Figure 9.2-6c Turbine Building Cooling Water System Diagram
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figure is located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.2-7 Reactor Service Water System P&ID (Sheets 1-3)
Water Systems                                                                    9.2-69
 
ABWR 9.2-70 TCW HEAT EXCHANGERS 25A5675AL Revision 7 TO POWER CYCLE HEAT SINK FROM POWER CYCLE HEAT SINK Design Control Document/Tier 2 STRAINERS TURBINE BUILDING                      TCW SYSTEM SERVICE WATER PUMPS Water Systems                        Figure 9.2-8 Turbine Building Service Water System
 
ABWR Water Systems HOT WATER SYSTEM FILTERED  POTABLE        POTABLE            HYDRO-                                SEWAGE WATER      WATER          WATER              PNEU.          USERS                DRAINAGE TANK      TANK          PUMP (2)            TANK                                  SYSTEM HYPO.                              AIR TANK &                            COMP-PUMP                            RESSOR MONITORING FACILITIES 25A5675AL Revision 7 AERATION                          HYPO.
COM-                    CLARIFIER TANK                          CONTACT        DISCHARGE MUNITOR                      (3)
(2)                            TANK AIR      FROTH        SLUDGE              HYPO.            NON-RADIOACTIVE BLOWER Design Control Document/Tier 2 SPRAY        DIGESTOR            TANK &            DRAIN SYSTEM (3)      PUMP            (2)                PUMP              DISCHARGE TREATED SEWAGE SLUDGE DISPOSAL Block Flow Diagram (Interface Requirements) 9.2-71 Figure 9.2-9 Potable and Sanitary Water System
 
ABWR 9.2-72 WASTE              POTABLE WATER SYSTEM WELL              WELL WATER                              FILTERED                RO FILTER WELL    WATER                PUMP                                  WATER                FEED PUMP (2)
TANK                  (2)                                  TANK                    (4)
BACKWASH                                    NaHMP PUMP                                      NaOH (2)                                      ADDN.
WASTE 25A5675AL Revision 7 RO                    RO                  RO                DEMIN.            DEMIN.
FIRST                SECOND            PERMEATE          FEED PUMP            (6)
PASS (2)              PASS (2)            TANK                (4)
NaOH ADDN.
(2)
Design Control Document/Tier 2 DEMIN.              DEMIN.              MUWP WATER              WATER              SYSTEM TANK (2)            PUMP (3)
NaOH (SODIUM HYDROXIDE)
NaHMP (SODIUM HEXAMETAPHOSPHATE)
Block Diagram Water Systems (Interface Requirements)
Figure 9.2-10 Makeup Water Preparation System
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3 Process Auxiliaries 9.3.1 Compressed Air Systems The Instrument Air System is discussed in Section 9.3.6 and the Service Air System is discussed in Section 9.3.7. Neither of these systems is safety-related. The Atmospheric Control System and the High Pressure Nitrogen System provide nitrogen gas for safety-related uses.
They are discussed in Subsection 6.2.5 and Section 6.7, respectively.
9.3.2 Process and Post-Accident Sampling System 9.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)  The seismic design and quality group classifications of sample lines and their components shall conform to the classification of the system into which they are connected, up to and including the block valve (or valves), or, in the case of the reactor water sampling lines, the second isolation valve.
(2)  Sampling points located inside the containment should, if possible, terminate at a sampling station within containment.
(3)  All sampling lines shall have the process isolation valves located as close as practicable to the process taps. These valves may be closed if sample line rupture occurs downstream of the valves. These valves are closed automatically if either a containment isolation or safety injection signal is received. All isolation valves fail closed on loss of pneumatic pressure.
(4)  The sampling panels are designed to minimize contamination and radiation at the sample stations. Appropriate shielding, where required, and area radiation monitors minimize radiation effects. Radiation exposure to the individual shall be limited as given in ITAAC 3.7.
(5)  A post-accident sampling station (PASS) is provided to obtain reactor coolant and other samples following an accident.
9.3.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)  The Process Sampling System (PSS) shall collect representative liquid samples for analysis and provide the analytical information required to monitor plant and equipment performance and changes to operating parameters.
(2)  The PSS is designed to function during all plant operational modes under individual system requirements. Design guidelines related to PSS capabilities, the attainment of representative samples and safety are described in the following paragraphs and in Table 9.3-2.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.2.2 System Description 9.3.2.2.1 General Description The PSS provides sampling of all principal fluid process streams associated with plant operation. The PSS consists of:
(1)  Permanently installed sampling nozzles and sample lines (2)  Sampling panels with analyzers and associated sampling equipment (3)  Provisions for local grab sampling (4)  Permanent shielding (5)  Casks for storing and transporting samples 9.3.2.2.2 Sampled Process Streams and Analyzed Parameters Table 9.3-2 provides a list of sample points, their locations and analyzed parameters.
9.3.2.2.3 Provisions for Obtaining Representative Samples (1)  Where practicable, a sample takeoff connection is located in a turbulent flow zone, where fluids are well mixed, after a minimum straight run of three pipe diameters of process pipe (when possible, a straight run of 10 diameters is preferred).
(2)  Connection to tap off is made on the side of horizontal process pipe runs.
(3)  Sampling nozzles designed for insertion into the streams are provided for process pipes 6.35 cm and larger, unless the process or fluid conditions dictate otherwise. See Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5 for general design features of the sampling probes.
(4)  Sampling lines are sized to maintain turbulent flow and to minimize purge time.
Routing is as short and as straight as possible. Large radius bends are used to avoid traps and dead legs.
(5)  Sampling nozzles, lines and associated valves and fittings are fabricated from stainless steel.
(6)  Heat tracing of sampling lines is provided where necessary to prevent crystallization or solidification of contents.
(7)  Sample coolers are provided for temperature control when required.
9.3-2                                                                                        Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Sampling equipment is designed for flushing and blowdown in order to remove sediment deposits, air and gas packets. Provisions are made to purge sample lines.
All flushings are either returned to process or sent to the radwaste system, except where noted.
(9)  Provisions are made to sample the bulk volume of tanks. The Standby Liquid Control System storage tank may be sampled from the top opening so that any low points and potential sediment traps can be avoided.
9.3.2.3 Sampling Panels Different process conditions, water quality and analyzing equipment require special treatment of individual sample streams.
9.3.2.3.1 Reactor Building Sample Station The Reactor Building Sample Station is located in the Reactor Building. Process samples from the following streams are routed to this panel for analysis:
Reactor water cleanup inlet (hi-temp)
Reactor water cleanup inlet (lo-temp)
Reactor water cleanup outlet A Reactor water cleanup outlet B Control Rod Drive System Isolation valves are provided for each reactor water sample line. These valves are operated from the main control room and close automatically upon a LOCA signal. These valves may be opened for sampling during an accident without removing the LOCA signal.
The Reactor Building Sample Station consists of a sample conditioning rack, constant temperature bath and a chemical fume hood. A continuous purge flow from the selected process stream enters the sample conditioning rack (>500 mL/min.) and through a cooler, if necessary, to reduce temperature to 41&deg;C or lower, then through one or two flow adjustment valves, depending on inlet pressure. The purge flow is then routed through a chemical fume hood where grab samples can be removed or special measurements made. A small, continuous sample
(>100 mL/min.) is diverted from the main purge flow line through a cooling coil located in a constant temperature bath, past a temperature gauge, a conductivity cell, flow switch, rotameter and a pressure regulating check valve. The constant temperature bath controls the sample temperature to 25&deg;C . A continuous conductivity recorder records the conductivity. Main purge flow and sample flow are in closed lines and are routed through closed drains to the reactor building equipment drain sump.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 The Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) consists of a sample holding rack, sampling rack, sample conditioning rack, local control panel and shielding casks. Samples from the sample conditioning rack, discussed above, are sent to the PASS sample holding rack. A portion of the sample flow is passed through an inline sample vessel. After adequate purging, the sample vessel is isolated and transported to the laboratory. All valves in this operation are operated remotely. The sampling system isolation valves are operated from the main control room and all other valves are operated from the local control panel. After the sample vessel has been isolated and removed, the piping is flushed with demineralized water. The water from purging and flushing is drained to the suppression pool.
The sample holding rack has an enclosure around the sample vessel to contain any leaks of liquids or gases. The liquids drain to the radwaste system and the gases go to the reactor building exhaust system.
The PASS isolation valves shall be connected to a reliable source of power that will be available starting at least one hour after a LOCA or ATWS event. The isolation valves shall have Class 1E power and the panels and other equipment shall be powered with two offsite power supplies and one onsite power supply.
Gas samples are obtained from a sample line connected to the Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS). A vacuum pump is provided to transfer the gas sample from a sample holding rack to a sampling rack. The sample is mixed uniformly. In the sampling rack, the gas is passed through and collected in a gas sample holder. After isolation, the gas sample holder is removed and transported to the laboratory for analysis.
The upper limits for activity levels in liquid and gas samples are:
Liquid samples        3.70E+10 Bq/cm3 Gas samples            3.70E+09 Bq/cm3 Means to reduce radiation exposure are provided such as, shielding, remotely operated valves, and sample transporting casks. The radiation exposure to any individual shall not be in excess of .05 and .50 Sv to the whole body or extremities, respectively.
Acceptance Criterion II.K.5 of SRP Section 9.3.2 requires the capability of sampling liquids of 37.0E+10 Bq/cm3. The ABWR design has the capability of sampling liquids of 3.70E+10 Bq/cm3. Sampling will be performed and area radiation measurement will be performed. If levels are above safe limits, handling samples will be delayed. The area radiation levels are safe when the sample radioactivity is about 3.70E+10 Bq/cm3 or less.
When the sample radioactivity level is higher than 3.70E+10 Bq/cm3, abnormal or emergency conditions will be used to assess the situation.
9.3-4                                                                                  Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 During abnormal or emergency conditions, the immediate responses of the control room personnel are as discussed in Subsection 18.4.2.11, Safety Parameter Display System, and Subsection 18A.13, Contingency #6, Primary Containment Flooding. Whenever core uncovering is suspected, the reactor vessel is depressurized. Thus, pressurized reactor water samples are not necessary.
Reactor water gross activity and radioisotopic analysis are obtained to aid in planning an accident recovery strategy.
9.3.2.3.2 Feedwater Corrosion Product Monitor The Feedwater Corrosion Product Monitoring System panel is used to monitor feedwater quality, measure metallic impurities and measure dissolved oxygen. The panel is located in the Turbine Building. The sample probe is located downstream of the feedwater heaters.
The monitoring system consists of feedwater sample conditioning equipment and metal impurity collection equipment. Valves and coolers reduce the pressure and temperature of the sample. A sample of the suspended solids is normally collected on inline membrane filters for 24-hr periods at a measured flow rate of 100 mL/min.
9.3.2.3.3 Residual Heat Removal, Fuel Pool and Suppression Pool Sampling Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System process samples are withdrawn for conductivity analysis. Conductivity monitoring is performed on a continuous basis. Grab samples are available at the station for purposes of instrument calibration and any special laboratory analysis desired during operation of the RHR System.
Fuel pool water can be continuously monitored for conductivity at both inlet and outlet of the fuel pool filter demineralizers. Grab sample facilities are also provided at each station.
Suppression pool monitoring is performed while monitoring the RHR System.
9.3.2.3.4 Turbine Building Condensate Sampling Required conductivity instrumentation for the Turbine Building Condensate System is outlined in Table 9.3-2 and contained in the Turbine Building Sample Station. The sample probe is shown in Figure 9.3-4.
9.3.2.3.5 Radwaste System Sampling The Radwaste System Sampling Station is located in the Radwaste Building. This station maintains continuous conductivity monitoring of radwaste samples drawn from selected locations in the Radwaste System. Facilities for obtaining grab samples with fume hood and exhaust fan are included.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                      9.3-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.2.4 Sample Probe Design Condensate and feedwater sample probes are constructed in accordance with Figure 9.3-4. All other probes are constructed in accordance with Figure 9.3-5.
9.3.2.5 Sample Piping Design The design conditions of the Sampling System shall be the same as the design conditions of the process piping with the following exceptions.
(1)  If a pressure reducing device is installed with a relief valve on its downstream side, the maximum pressure shall be the set value of the relief valve.
(2)  Sample piping downstream of a sample cooler shall have a maximum temperature which is the outlet temperature of the sample cooler.
Sample lines are routed to be as short as possible, avoiding traps, dead legs and dips upstream of the sample stations. Lines are sized to maintain turbulent flow with Reynolds Number > 4000 at the minimum required flow for each sample line. Minimum sample purge flow for any line is 500 mL/min at 38&deg;C.
9.3.2.6 Safety EvaluationOperator Safety The Reactor Building Sample Station, Radwaste System Sample Station, Post-Accident Sampling Station and the Feedwater Corrosion Product Monitor System are closed systems with grab samples taken under the safety of a chemical fume hood to preclude the exposure of operating personnel to contamination hazards. A constant air velocity of 0.75 m/s is maintained through the working face of the hood to ensure that airborne contamination does not escape to the room under operating conditions.
A safety feature is incorporated in the sampling systems to prevent high-temperature water flow through the lines in the event of loss of cooling water to the sample cooler or sample flow in excess of sample cooler capacity. This feature consists of an air-operating valve which is closed on a high-temperature signal from a temperature switch located upstream of the valve. This system is failsafe because the valve closes on a loss of air temperature signal.
Safety/relief valves, vented to the drain headers, are provided in the stations. In sampling at PASS, all operations are performed remotely; therefore, operators are not exposed to samples at high or service pressures.
All sample lines connected to Seismic Category I systems are analyzed as Seismic Category I lines, up to and including the second isolation valve. The code governing the process line applies to the sample line up through the block valve or second isolation valve. Sample lines downstream of the second isolation valve are in conformance with ANSI B31.1, Power Piping Code.
9.3-6                                                                                        Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.2.7 Tests and Inspections Most components are used regularly during power operation, yielding cumulative data which ensures the performance of the sampling system. Also, grab samples are used to periodically test, calibrate and check proper instrument response and calibration.
The PASS sample lines and components can be tested periodically to ensure that they are operable should an accident occur. The piping in the sample holding rack and the sampling rack can be filled, leak tested and proven operable using demineralized water or nitrogen. All valves, except the isolation valves, can be operated. After the test is completed, the demineralized water or nitrogen is sent to the radwaste system or the suppression pool.
Just prior to use, the PASS is given a confirmatory test to show that there are no leaks before sampling is begun.
9.3.2.8 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided for alarm functions, recording and analyzing the following parameters:
(1)    Sample Stations.
(a)  Provisions are made to stop sample flow upon detection of high-temperature sample flow leaving the sample cooler.
(b)  Conductivity is measured and recorded for each sample flow. A high-conductivity alarm is provided.
(c)  Provisions are made for sample flow to be indicated.
(2)    Feedwater Corrosion Product Monitor.
(a)  Provisions are made to stop sample flow upon detection of high-temperature sample flow leaving the sample cooler.
(b)  Provisions are made for sample flow to be indicated.
(3)    Additional monitoring equipment is listed in Table 9.3-2.
9.3.3 Non-Radioactive Drainage System The non-radioactive drains are discussed in this subsection. The non-radioactive drains consist of equipment inside the standard plant buildings and COL interface requirements for that portion outside the buildings. The drains release effluent to the site-specific discharge structure.
The potable and sanitary water systems (Subsection 9.2.4) includes the non-radioactive drains.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                            9.3-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.3.1 Non-Radioactive Drains 9.3.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)  There shall be no interconnection between any portion of the radioactive drain transfer system and any non-radioactive waste system which permit transfer of radioactive material to the non-radioactive system.
(2)  Effluent from non-radioactive systems shall be sampled prior to discharge to assure that there are no unacceptable discharges.
(3)  Non-radioactive drains piping shall be non-nuclear safety class and quality group D and shall not have any effect on the operation of safety-related equipment.
(4)  Any valves that are relied upon to prevent backflow shall be inspectable and testable and withstand SSE.
9.3.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)  The drains shall be designed to collect and remove effluent from their point of origin to the site discharge structure.
(2)  The sump level switches shall serve as leakage monitors for equipment or systems served by each sump. Leakage detection is also discussed in Subsection 5.2.5.
(3)  Open drainage lines from areas that are required to maintain an air pressure differential are provided with a water seal.
(4)  All drainage lines into each sump shall be turned down and terminated below the lowest fluid level to which the sump pump can draw.
9.3.3.1.3 System Description The non-radioactive drain system is designed to assure that waste liquids, valve and pump leakoffs and component drains and vents are directed to the proper area for processing. The process portion of the systems consists of sump pumps, valves and instrumentation. Sumps are provided as shown in the arrangement drawings in Section 1.2.
All drainage systems are essentially passive systems down to the sumps or yard pipe connections. That is, flow is by gravity with no valves, pumps, and the like in the lines such that failure could cause a system not to drain. All exposed drainage piping is seismically analyzed to remain intact following an SSE, and thus will drain the area as required (Subsection 3.4.1).
Unacceptable flooding consequences are precluded by the capacity of the drain and the placement of safety-related equipment on raised pads or grating. Also, check valves in sump pump discharge lines prevent reverse flow from other sumps that have piping to common collection tanks.
9.3-8                                                                                        Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The design of the drain system precludes release to the environs or radioactive liquid. As a backup, however, all non-radioactive drain systems are sampled for radioactivity prior to release to the environs.
9.3.3.1.4 System Operation and Component Description The drain system is similar in operation and component descriptions as discussed in Subsections 9.3.8.2.2 and 9.3.8.2.3 excepting radiation effects and the interfacing discharge process in lieu of discharge to radwaste.
9.3.3.1.5 Safety Evaluation The non-radioactive drains are not safety-related. The sumps may be instrumented and alarmed as required to assure there is no effect on safety-related equipment.
9.3.3.2 Non-Radioactive Drains (Interface Requirement)
The COL applicant shall provide the continuation of the drain system from the standard plant buildings to the site discharge structure. A conceptual design continuation is discussed in this subsection.
9.3.3.2.1 Safety Design Bases (Interface Requirement)
The safety design bases are the same as listed in Subsection 9.3.3.1.1.
9.3.3.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases (Interface Requirement)
The power generation design bases is the same as listed in Subsection 9.3.3.1.2.
9.3.3.2.3 System Description (Conceptual)
The non-radioactive drain system collects waste water from the following sources: plant buildings (reactor, turbine, radwaste, service and other buildings), precipitation and other surface runoff. A system composed of collection piping, curb and gutter inlets, manholes and pumps is provided. Waste water is sent to dual settling basins where suspended solids are settled and oil is collected on the surface. Means are provided to perform any required tests or analyses required by the discharge permit. Periodically, one of the basins is taken out of service and the suspended solids and oil are removed.
9.3.3.2.4 Safety Evaluation (Interface Requirement)
The safety evaluation is the same as Subsection 9.3.3.1.5.
9.3.3.2.5 Instrumentation (Interface Requirement)
Provisions for obtaining water samples from the non-radioactive drain system shall be provided. A sampling and analysis program shall be provided to show that radioactive liquids are not being discharged from the non-radioactive drain system.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                          9.3-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System (PWR)
(Not applicable to a BWR) 9.3.5 Standby Liquid Control System 9.3.5.1 Design Bases 9.3.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) has a safety-related function and is designed as a Seismic Category I system. It shall meet the following safety design bases:
(1)    Backup capability for reactivity control shall be provided, independent of normal reactivity control provisions in the nuclear reactor, to be able to shut down the reactor if normal control ever becomes inoperative.
(2)    The backup system shall have the capacity for controlling the reactivity difference between the steady-state rated operating condition of the reactor with voids and the cold shutdown condition, including shutdown margin, to assure complete shutdown from the most reactive conditions at any time in core life.
(3)    The time required for actuation and effectiveness of the backup control shall be consistent with the nuclear reactivity rate of change predicted between rated operating and cold shutdown conditions. A fast scram of the reactor or operational control of fast reactivity transients is not specified to be accomplished by this system.
(4)    Means shall be provided by which the functional performance capability of the backup control system components can be verified periodically under conditions approaching actual use requirements. Demineralized water, rather than the actual neutron absorber solution, can be injected into the reactor to test the operation of all components of the redundant control system.
(5)    The neutron absorber shall be dispersed within the reactor core in sufficient quantity to provide a reasonable margin for leakage or imperfect mixing.
(6)    The system shall be reliable to a degree consistent with its role as a special safety system; the possibility of unintentional or accidental shutdown of the reactor by this system shall be minimized.
9.3.5.2 System Description The SLCS (Figure 9.3-1) is automatically initiated or can be manually initiated through the keyboard switches in the main control room to pump a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor if the operator determines the reactor cannot be shut down or kept shut down with the control rods. Once the operator decision for initiation of the SLCS is made, the design intent is to simplify the manual process by providing dual keylocked switches. This prevents inadvertent 9.3-10                                                                                          Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 injection of neutron absorber by the SLCS. However, the insertion of the control rods is expected to assure prompt shutdown of the reactor should it be required.
The keylocked control room switch is provided to assure positive action from the main control room should the need arise. Procedural controls are applied to the operation of the keylocked control room switch.
The SLCS is required only to shut down the reactor and keep the reactor from going critical again as it cools.
The SLCS is needed only in the improbable event that not enough control rods can be inserted in the reactor core to accomplish shutdown and cooldown in the normal manner.
The boron solution tank, the test water tank, the two positive displacement pumps, the two motor-operated injection valves, the two motor-operated pump suction valves, and associated local valves, panel, and controls are located in the secondary containment outside the drywell and wetwell. The liquid is piped into the reactor vessel throughout the high pressure core flooder (HPCF) line downstream of the HPCF inboard check valve.
The boron absorbs thermal neutrons and thereby terminates the nuclear fission chain reaction in the uranium fuel.
The specified neutron absorber solution is sodium pentaborate (Na2B10O16. 10H2O). It is prepared by dissolving stoichiometric quantities of borax and boric acid in demineralized water.
An air sparger is provided in the tank for mixing. To prevent system plugging, the tank outlet is raised above the bottom of the tank.
At all times when it is possible to make the reactor critical, the SLCS shall be able to deliver enough sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor (Figure 9.3-2) to assure reactor shutdown.
This is accomplished by placing sodium pentaborate in the SLCS tank and filling it with demineralized water to at least the low level alarm point. The solution can be diluted with water to within 36 cm of the overflow level volume to allow for evaporation losses or to lower the saturation temperature.
The minimum temperature of the fluid in the tank and piping shall be consistent with that obtained from Figure 9.3-3 for the solution temperature. The saturation temperature of the recommended solution is 15&deg;C at the low level alarm volume and a lower temperature at 36 cm below the tank overflow volume (Figures 9.3-2 and 9.3-3). The equipment containing the solution is installed in a room in which the air temperature is to be maintained within the range of 15&deg;C to 38&deg;C. An electrical resistance heater system provides a backup heat source which maintains the solution temperature at 24&deg;C (automatic operation) to 30&deg;C (automatic shutoff) to prevent precipitation of the sodium pentaborate from the solution during storage. High or low temperature, or high or low liquid level, causes an alarm in the control room.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The pump and system design pressure between the injection valves and the pump and system design pressure between relief valves are approximately 10.79 MPaG. To prevent bypass flow from one pump in case of relief valve failure in the line from the other pump, a check valve is installed downstream of each relief valve line in the pump The SLCS is automatically initiated after receiving an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) signal or can be manually actuated by either of two keylocked, spring-return switches on the control room console. This assures that switching from the STOP position is a deliberate act. Changing either switch status to START starts an injection pump, opens one motor-operated injection valve, opens one pump suction motor-operated valve, and closes the Reactor Cleanup System isolation valves to prevent loss of boron.
An ATWS condition exists when either of the following occurs:
(a)    High RPV pressure (7.76 MPaG) and startup range neutron monitor (SRNM) not downscale for 3 minutes, or (b)    Low RPV level (Level 2) and SRNM not downscale for 3 minutes.
A light in the control room indicates that power is available to the pump motor contactor and that the contactor is deenergized (pump not running). Another light indicates that the contactor is energized (pump running).
Storage tank liquid level, tank outlet valve position, pump discharge pressure, and injection valve position indicate that the system is functioning. If any of these items indicates that the liquid may not be flowing, the operator shall immediately change the other switch to the START mode, thereby activating the redundant train of the SLCS. The local switch cannot prevent the operation of the pump from the control room. Pump discharge pressure and valve status are indicated in the control room.
Equipment drains and tank overflow are not piped to the Radwaste System but to separate containers (such as 208L drums) that can be removed and disposed of independently to prevent any trace of boron from inadvertently reaching the reactor.
Instrumentation consisting of solution temperature indication and control, solution level and heater system status is provided locally at the storage tank. Table 9.3-1 contains the process data for the various modes of operation of the SLCS. Seismic category and quality class are included in Table 3.2-1. Principals of system testing are discussed in Subsection 9.3.5.4.
9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation The SLCS is a reactivity control system and is maintained in an operable status whenever the reactor is critical. The system is never expected to be needed for safety reasons because of the large number of independent control rods available to shut down the reactor.
9.3-12                                                                                      Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 To assure the availability of the SLCS, two sets of the components required to actuate the system (pumps and injection valves) are provided in parallel redundancy.
The system is designed to bring the reactor from rated power to a cold shutdown at any time in core life. The reactivity compensation provided will reduce reactor power from rated to zero level and allow cooling of the nuclear system to room temperature, with the control rods remaining withdrawn in the rated power pattern. It includes the reactivity gains that result from complete decay of the rated power xenon inventory. It also includes the positive reactivity effects from eliminating steam voids, changing water density from hot to cold, reduced Doppler effect in uranium, reducing neutron leakage from boiling to cold, and decreasing control rod worth as the moderator cools.
To meet this objective, it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a minimum concentration of 850 parts per million (ppm) by weight of natural boron in the reactor core at 20&deg;C. To allow for potential leakage and imperfect mixing in the reactor system, an additional approximately 25% (220 ppm) is added to the above requirement, resulting in a total requirement of greater than or equal to 1070 ppm. The required concentration is thus achieved in a mass of water equal to the sum of the mass of water in the RPV at normal water level (equal to or less than 455 x 103 kg) plus the mass of water in the RPV shutdown cooling piping (equal to or less than 130 x 103 kg). The quantity of boron solution contained in the storage tank above the pump suction shutoff level provides the required concentration of 1070 ppm when injected into the reactor, and this concentration will be achieved if the solution is prepared as defined in Subsection 9.3.5.2 and maintained above saturation temperature.
Cooldown of the nuclear system will require a minimum of several hours to remove the thermal energy stored in the reactor, cooling water, and associated equipment. The controlled limit for the reactor vessel cooldown is 56&deg;C/hr, and normal operating temperature is approximately 288&deg;C. Use of the main condenser and various shutdown cooling systems requires 10 to 24 hours to lower the reactor vessel to room temperature (21&deg;C); this is the condition of maximum reactivity and, therefore, is the condition that requires the maximum concentration of boron.
The specified boron injection rate is limited to the range of 8 to 20 ppm/min. The lower rate assures that the boron is injected into the reactor in approximately two-and-one-half hours. This resulting reactivity insertion is considerably quicker than that covered by the cooldown. The upper limit injection rate assures that there is sufficient mixing so that boron does not recirculate through the core in uneven concentrations that could possibly cause reactor power to rise and fall cyclically.
The SLCS equipment essential for injection of neutron absorber solution into the reactor is designed as Seismic Category I for withstanding the specified earthquake loadings (Chapter 3).
The system piping and equipment are designed, installed, and tested in accordance with the requirements stated in Section 3.6.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                          9.3-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 The SLCS is required to be operable in the event of a plant offsite power failure; therefore, the pumps, heater, valves, and controls are powered from the standby AC power supply. The pumps and valves are powered and controlled from separate buses and circuits so that a single active failure will not prevent system operation.
The SLCS and pumps have sufficient pressure margin, up to the system relief valve setting of approximately 10.79 MPaG, to assure solution injection into the reactor above the normal pressure in the bottom of the reactor. The nuclear system safety/relief valves begin to relieve pressure above approximately 7.58 MPaG. Therefore, the SLCS positive displacement pumps cannot overpressurize the nuclear system.
Only one of the two SLC pumps is needed for system operation. However, if needed, both pumps can be operated at the same time. If a redundant component (e.g., one pump) is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to shutdown capability, and reactor operation can continue during repairs. The time during which one redundant component upstream of the injection valves may be out of operation should be consistent with (1) the probability of failure of both the control rod shutdown capability and the alternate component in the SLCS, and (2) the fact that nuclear system cooldown takes several hours while liquid control solution injection takes approximately two-and-one-half hours. Since this probability is small, considerable time is available for repairing and restoring the SLCS to an operable condition while reactor operation continues. Assurance that the system will still fulfill its function during repairs is obtained by demonstrating operation of the operable pump.
The SLCS is evaluated against the applicable General Design Criteria as follows:
Criterion 2The SLCS is located in the area inside the secondary containment, outside the drywell and below the refueling floor. In this location, it is protected by the containment and compartment barriers from external natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes and floods and internally from effects of postulated events (e.g., DBA-LOCA).
Criterion 4The SLCS is designed for the expected environment in the secondary containment and specifically for the area in which it is located. In this area, it is not subject to the more violent conditions postulated in this criterion such as missiles, whipping pipes, and discharging fluids.
Criterion 21Criterion 21 is applicable to protection systems only. The SLCS is a reactivity control system and should be evaluated against Criterion 29.
Criterion 26The SLCS is the second reactivity control system required by this criterion.
Criterion 27This criterion applies no specific requirements onto the SLCS and therefore is not applicable. See the General Design Criteria Section for discussion of combined capability.
Criterion 29The SLCS pumps and valves outboard of the outboard drywell check valve are redundant. Two suction valves, two pumps, and two injection valves are arranged and cross-9.3-14                                                                                    Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 tied such that operation of any one of each results in successful operation of the system. The SLCS also has test capability. A special test tank is supplied for providing test fluid for the yearly injection test. Pumping capability, injection valve operability and suction valve operability may be tested at any time.
The SLCS is evaluated against the applicable regulatory guides as follows:
Regulatory Guide 1.26Because the SLCS is a reactivity control system, all mechanical components are at least Quality Group B. Those portions which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Quality Group A (Table 3.2-1).
Regulatory Guide 1.29All components of the SLCS which are necessary for injection of neutron absorber into the reactor are Seismic Category I (Table 3.2-1).
ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1Since the SLCS is located within its own compartment inside the secondary containment, it is adequately protected from flooding, tornadoes, hurricanes, and internally/externally generated missiles. SLCS equipment is protected from pipe break by providing adequate distance between the seismic and nonseismic SLCS equipment, where such protection is necessary. In addition, appropriate distance is provided between the SLCS and other high-energy piping systems.
Barriers have been considered to assure SLCS protection from pipe break (Section 3.6).
It should be noted that the SLCS is not required to provide a safety function during any postulated pipe break event. This system is only required under an extremely low probability event, where all of the control rods are assumed to be inoperable while the reactor is at normal full power operation. Therefore, the protection provided is considered over and above that required to meet the intent of ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1.
This system is used in special plant capability demonstration events cited in Appendix A of Chapter 15; specifically, Events 54 and 56, which are extremely low probability non-design-basis postulated incidents. The analyses given there are to demonstrate additional plant safety considerations far beyond reasonable and conservative assumptions.
9.3.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements Operational testing of the SLCS is performed in at least two parts to avoid inadvertently injecting boron into the reactor.
With the valves to the reactor and from the storage tank closed, and the valves to and from the test tank opened, condensate water in the test tank can be recirculated by locally starting either pump.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 During a refueling or maintenance outage, the injection portion of the system can be functionally tested by valving the suction line to the test tank and actuating the system from the control room. System operation is indicated in the control room.
After functional tests, all the valves must be returned to their normal positions as indicated in Figure 9.3-1.
After closing a local locked-open valve to the reactor, leakage through the injection valves can be detected by opening valves at a test connection in the line between the drywell check valves.
Position indicator lights in the control room indicate that the local valve is closed for test or open and ready for operation. Leakage from the reactor through the first check valve can be detected by opening the same test connection in the line between the check valves when the reactor is pressurized.
The test tank contains condensate water for approximately 3 minutes of pump operation.
Condensate water from the Makeup System or the Condensate Storage System is available for refilling or flushing the system.
Should the boron solution ever be injected into the reactor, either intentionally or inadvertently, then after making certain that the normal reactivity controls will keep the reactor subcritical, the boron is removed from the Reactor Coolant System by flushing for gross dilution followed by operating the Reactor Cleanup System. There is practically no effect on reactor operations when the boron concentration has been reduced below approximately 50 ppm.
The concentration of the sodium pentaborate in the solution tank is determined periodically by chemical analysis.
Electrical supplies and relief valves are also subjected to periodic testing.
The SLCS preoperational test is described in Subsection 14.2.12.
See Subsection 9.3.12.2 for COL license information pertaining to SLCS storage tank discharge valve reliability.
9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements The instrumentation and control (I&C) System for the SLCS is designed to allow the injection of liquid poison into the reactor and the maintenance of the liquid poison solution well above the saturation temperature. A further discussion of the SLCS instrumentation may be found in Section 7.4.
9.3.6 Instrument Air System The plant compressed air systems include the Instrument and Service Air Systems.
9.3-16                                                                                        Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.6.1 Design Bases 9.3.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Instrument Air System is classified as non-safety-related with the exception of the primary containment isolation function. The primary containment penetration of the Instrument Air System (IAS) is of Seismic Category I design and is equipped with sufficient isolation valves to satisfy single-failure category.
9.3.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The function of the Instrument Air System is to provide clean, dry, and oil-free instrument air.
The IAS is also capable of supplying backup air to the nitrogen consumers located inside the PCV when nitrogen gas supply pressure drops below a set point.
9.3.6.2 System Description The IAS provides dry, oil-free, compressed air for valve actuators and for non-safety-related instrument control functions and for general instrumentation and valve services outside the containment. All I&C systems located inside the containment are supplied with nitrogen gas during normal plant operation.
The instrument air flow requirements are based on experience. Two 100% air compressors and dryers are provided to supply adequate instrument air. The air compressors are of the oil-less type.
Process quality requirements are listed below:
Instrument Air Pressure (MPaG) (design)                  0.87 Dewpoint (&deg;C)                      -40&deg; at 0.69 MPaG Maximum Allowed Particle            5 micrometer Size The IAS containment penetration and associated isolation valves are designed to Seismic Category I, ASME Code, Section III, Class 2, Quality Group B and Quality Assurance B requirements. An MSIV isolation signal from the Leak Detection and Isolation System shall close the Instrument Air System outboard isolation valve F276.
The IAS is backed by the combustion turbine generator to continue operation during loss of normal power supply.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                      9.3-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 One of the two air compressors and dryers is selected as the lead unit which shall be operated during normal operation. The standby compressor and dryer will automatically start when the compressed air pressure at the air receiver drops below the low pressure setpoint. As the air receiver pressure is returned to the normal range, the standby air compressor is stopped and the lead unit kept in operation. The assignment for lead unit and standby unit of air compressors and dryers shall be switched periodically. The pressure setpoints for these operational changes are adjustable, depending on air requirements that might exist.
During normal operation, the nonsafety-related nitrogen users within containment are downstream of P52-F277 and P54-F208. (The safety-related nitrogen users are downstream of P54-F008A and B.) Should the AC/HPIN Systems become unable to supply nitrogen to the non-safety-related users downstream of P52-F277, the operator may remote manually open P52-F257 to supply instrument air to these users (Figure 20.3.15-1).
During refueling, the IAS provides compressed air instead of nitrogen gas to the users located inside containment. The IAS P&ID is shown in Figure 9.3-6.
Acceptance Criterion II.1 of SRP Section 9.3.1 requires that the maximum particle size of 3 microns in the air stream at the instrument. The corresponding maximum particle size for the ABWR design is 5 micrometer. Experience to date for plants with a maximum filtered particle size of 5 micrometer in the compressed gases has been very satisfactory.
All equipment using instrument air shall be capable of operating with air of the quality listed above.
9.3.6.3 Safety Evaluation The operation of the IAS is not required to assure any of the following:
(1)    Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)    Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
(3)    Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which can result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10CFR100.
However, the IAS incorporates features that assure this operation over the full range of normal plant operations. If IAS pressure falls below a desired limit, air from the Service Air System (SAS) may be added from a tie-line. An air receiver is provided to maintain air supply pressure if all of the IAS and SAS compressors fail. Pneumatic-operated devices are designed for a failsafe mode and do not require continuous air supply under emergency or abnormal conditions.
The instrument air system does provide air service to a number of safety-related systems and components. The loss of air to these systems will result in current or new valve positions. These 9.3-18                                                                                      Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 positions have been evaluated. The subject system safety functions have been shown to be maintained despite a disruption of air or power service to the subject valves. The safety-related systems serviced in this manner include:
(a)  Reactor Building/Secondary Containment HVAC valves.
(b)  HECW system valves.
(c)  RCW isolation valves (to non-safety--related portions).
The MCR-HVAC System and the RB-EEE HVAC Systems do not use instrument air system sources.
9.3.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The IAS is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the systems normally closed to airflow can be tested to ensure operability and integrity of each system. Air quality shall be tested periodically to assure compliance with ISA S7.3.
The motor-operated isolation valve is capable of being tested to assure its operational integrity by manual actuation of a switch located in the control room and by observation of associated position indication lights.
9.3.6.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation for the IAS is primarily local, consisting of pressure, differential pressure and temperature indication and/or control. Pressure transmitters and pressure switches provide control room pressure indications and alarms. The system is maintained at constant pressure, with local pressure reduction provided as required.
Pressure-reducing valves are used, where required, for services requiring less pressure than exists in the respective receiver tanks.
A motor-operated isolation valve is provided for the compressed air piping penetration through containment. The valve is remote manually closed. A remote manual switch and open/closed position lights are provided in the control room for verification of proper valve operation.
9.3.7 Service Air System 9.3.7.1 Design Bases 9.3.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Service Air System is classified as non-safety-related with the exception of the primary containment isolation function. The primary containment penetration of the SAS is of Seismic Category I design and is equipped with sufficient isolation valves to satisfy single-failure criteria.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The functions of the SAS are to:
(1)  Provide a continuous supply of service air for general plant use.
(2)  Be capable of supplying backup air to the IAS on an as-needed basis.
9.3.7.2 System Description The SAS is designed to provide compressed air of suitable quality for non-safety-related functions.
The SAS provides compressed air for tank sparging, filter/demineralizer backwashing, air operated tools and other services requiring air of lower quality than that provided by the IAS.
Breathing air requirements are provided by the SAS.
The SAS has two air compressors each sized to provide 50% of the peak air consumption. The compressors are of the oil-less type. The major service air users are listed in Table 9.3-3. The SAS P&ID is shown in Figure 9.3-7.
The SAS process quality requirements are listed below.
Service Air Pressure (design)                      0.69 MPa Dewpoint (&deg;C)                      no requirement The SAS containment and penetration and associated isolation valves are designed to Seismic Category I, ASME Code, Section III, Class 2, Quality Group B and Quality Assurance B requirements.
One of the two air compressors is selected as the lead unit which shall be operated during normal operation. The standby compressor will automatically start when the air pressure at the air receiver drops below the low pressure setpoint. As the air receiver pressure is returned to the normal range, the standby compressor is stopped and the lead unit kept in operation. The assignment for lead and standby air compressors shall be switched periodically. The pressure setpoints for these operational changes are adjustable, depending on air requirements that might exist.
Outside primary containment a manually-operated valve is kept closed and locked during normal plant operation. During refueling, the valve is opened to provide air inside the containment. A check valve is provided inside the containment.
9.3-20                                                                                      Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.7.3 Safety Evaluation The operation of the SAS is not required to assure any of the following:
(1)    Integrity to the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)    Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
(3)    Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which can result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10CFR100.
However, the SAS incorporates features that assure this operation over the full range of normal plant operations. Pneumatic-operated devices are designed for a failsafe mode and do not require continuous air supply under emergency or abnormal conditions.
9.3.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The SAS is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the system normally closed to airflow can be tested to ensure operability and integrity of each system.
9.3.7.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation for the SAS is primarily local, consisting of pressure, differential pressure and temperature indication and/or control. Pressure transmitters and pressure switches provide control room pressure indications and alarms. The system is maintained at constant pressure, with local pressure reduction provided as required.
Pressure-reducing valves are used, where required, for services requiring less pressure than exists in the respective receiver tanks.
9.3.8 Radioactive Drain Transfer System 9.3.8.1 Design Bases This subsection describes the equipment and floor drain system which consists of collection fixtures and drainage piping from points of collection to sumps within the reactor, turbine and radwaste buildings. This subsection also discusses the sumps, sump pumps, sump coolers, piping, valves, instruments and controls used to transfer liquid wastes to the Radwaste Building (RW/B) collection tanks. This equipment is part of the Liquid Waste Management System (Subsection 11.2).
9.3.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)    The Drain Transfer System (DTS) drains equipment and floor areas where required for structural loading reasons and to protect systems required for a safe shutdown.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) All potentially radioactive drains are piped directly to the radwaste system and shall not affect safety-related equipment operation. Divisional separation zones piping and radwaste tunnel penetrations will have check valves to preclude back flow and local isolation at the individual sumps.
(3) Containment and drywell penetrations shall be designed and fabricated in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Class 2. These valves close automatically when they receive a LOCA signal. Secondary Containment penetrations shall be in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Class 3.
(4) Effluent from the radioactive drains shall be treated and monitored prior to discharge to assure that there are no unacceptable discharges.
(5) The radioactive drain transfer collection piping shall be provided with the following features:
(a)    These piping systems shall be non-nuclear safety class and quality Group D with the exception of the containment penetrations and piping within the drywell, which shall be Seismic Category I and quality Group B. Additional exceptions are the backflow check valves in the ECCS equipment room sumps, which shall be Seismic Category I and quality Group C.
(b)    The floor drain piping system in each divisional area of the ECCS pump rooms and the Control Building shall be arranged with a separate piping system for each quadrant or zone. The piping shall be arranged so that flooding or backflow in one quadrant cannot adversely affect all of the other quadrants.
(c)    The COL applicant will provide equipment and floor drain piping P&IDs for all parts of the radioactive drain transfer system. See Subsection 9.3.12.4 for COL license information requirements.
(d)    There shall be no interconnection between any portion of the radioactive drain transfer system and any non-radioactive waste system which will permit transfer of radioactive material to the non-radioactive system. Effluent from non-radioactive systems shall be monitored prior to discharge to assure that there are no unacceptable discharges.
(e)    Any valves that are relied upon to prevent backflow shall be inspectable and testable and designed to withstand SSE.
(f)    Reactor Building (primary, secondary and divisional separation zones) HCW sumps shall be headered prior to transfer into the radwaste tunnel. LCW sumps shall be likewise headered.
(g)    Control Building (RCW/RSW basement rooms) sumps shall be headered prior to transfer into the CB-radwaste tunnel.
9.3-22                                                                            Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  The Control Building water high high level sensors shall be safety-related (see Figure 11A.2-2, Sheet 36) 9.3.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)  The DTS shall be designed to collect and remove waste liquids from their point of origin to the Radwaste System for further processing.
(2)  The sump level switches shall serve as leakage monitors for equipment or systems served by each sump. Leakage detection is also discussed in Subsection 5.2.5.
(3)  Open drainage lines from areas that are required to maintain an air pressure differential, but drain to a radioactive sump, are provided with a water seal.
(4)  All drainage lines into each sump shall be turned down and terminated below the lowest fluid level to which the sump pump can draw.
9.3.8.2 System Description The DTS P&IDs showing the sumps with their pumps, piping, instruments and controls are provided in Section 11.2. See Figures 11A.2-1 and 11A.2-2.
9.3.8.2.1 General Description The DTS is designed to assure that waste liquids, valve and pump leakoffs and component drains and vents are directed to the proper area for processing. The process portion of the systems consists of sump pumps, sump coolers (if necessary) tanks, valves and instrumentation.
Sumps are provided as shown in the arrangement drawings in Section 1.2.
The following ECCS loops are located in separate watertight areas:
(1)  RHR A, RCIC (2)  RHR B and HPCF B (3)  RHR C and HPCF C Each area contains all of the power-operated valves and associated instrumentation outside the containment for the respective ECCS loop. Therefore, a pipe break or major leak in one area could not flood any adjoining area and, consequently, would not render the loops inoperable.
The consequences of internal flooding are discussed further in Subsection 3.4.1.
All drainage systems are essentially passive systems down to the sumps or yard pipe connections; that is, flow is by gravity with no valves, pumps, and the like in the lines such that failure could cause a system not to drain. All exposed drainage piping is seismically analyzed to remain intact following an SSE, and thus will drain the area as required (Subsection 3.4.1).
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                          9.3-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Unacceptable flooding consequences are precluded by the capacity of the DTS and the placement of safety-related equipment on raised pads or grating. Also, check valves in sump pump discharge lines prevent reverse flow from other sumps that have piping to the radwaste collection tank.
The design of the drain transfer system precludes release to the environs of radioactive liquid.
Potentially radioactive systems (equipment, floor, and detergent drains) are routed directly to the Radwaste System, with no cross connections to uncontrolled (storm drain, sanitary and normal waste) systems. As a backup, however, all nonradioactive drain systems are monitored for radiation prior to release to the environs.
9.3.8.2.2 System Operation Radioactive waste is directed into either one of two drainage systems, depending upon its source. Drainage from equipment goes to the Low Conductivity Waste (LCW) System.
Drainage from the floors in the various compartments goes to the High Conductivity Waste (HCW) System. The terms clean and dirty radwaste are also used to denote LCW and HCW, respectively.
The floor drains are more apt to exhibit higher conductivity because they contain suspended solids and other not necessarily radioactive contamination.
(1)  Equipment DrainsControlled drains from equipment carrying radioactive or potentially radioactive liquids is collected in equipment drain (LCW) sumps in each building and is automatically discharged to the Low Conductivity Collection Tank in the Radwaste System. The sumps and pumps are sized to handle all equipment they serve.
(2)  Floor DrainsFloor drains from each isolated area or building are collected in the lowest level of the area, and the waste is automatically transferred by means of sump pumps to the High Conductivity Collection Tank in the Radwaste System. As with the equipment drain sumps, the HCW sumps and pumps are sized to handle all anticipated normal or transient floor waste.
(3)  Provision of Spare PumpsAll sumps which process radioactive wastes are supplied with two pumps each. Each pump is sized to handle the maximum anticipated flow into the sump. Thus, each sump has one operating pump and one pump on standby.
(4)  Leak DetectionThe Reactor Building and drywell sumps have instrumentation which permits detection of excessive leakage and provides for an alarm upon high leakage rates.
9.3-24                                                                                      Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5) Sump CoolersThe Reactor Building drywell equipment drain sumps each have provisions for measuring their sump liquid temperature and automatically recirculating the sump contents through a drain cooler to cool the sump contents if the temperature exceeds 60&deg;C . In the event of a LOCA signal, all drywell sump pumps are automatically isolated, to preclude the possible uncontrolled release of primary coolant.
(6) Detergent DrainsThe detergent drain sump collects laundry and shower drains.
The detergent drains are transferred to the detergent drain tanks in the Radwaste System. These detergent wastes are kept separate from other wastes, since detergent wastes are processed in a separate process train in the Radwaste System.
9.3.8.2.3 Component Description Drain System components are as follows:
(1) Collection Piping In all area of potential radioactivity contamination, the collection system piping for the liquid system is of stainless steel for embedded and chemical drainage, and carbon steel for suspended drainage. Offsets in the piping are provided, where necessary, for radiation shielding. In general, the fabrication and installation of the piping provides for a uniform slope that causes gravity to flow to the appropriate sump. During construction, equipment drain piping is terminated not less than 5 cm above the finished floor or drain receiver at each location where the discharge from equipment is to be collected. The connections to the individual equipment are made after the equipment is installed in its proper location.
(2) Collection Sumps (potentially radioactive drains)These sumps are provided with a well-fitting, but not gastight, steel plate access cover for convenient maintenance access, as well as to minimize airborne contamination.
(3) Equipment DrainsEquipment that may be pressurized during drainage, and that drains via direct or indirect drain connection to the floor drain system, is designed so that the equipment discharge flow does not exceed the gravity flow capacity of the drainage header at atmospheric pressure.
(4) Floor DrainsAll floor drains are installed with rims flush with the low-point elevation of the finished floor. Floor drains in areas of potential radioactivity are welded directly to the collection piping and are provided with threaded, T-handle plugs of the same material. The T-handle plugs are used to seal the floor drains during hydrostatic testing of the drainage systems, system startup and during all required leakage rate testing. All drainage piping, except carbon steel and suspended stainless steel piping, is hydrostatically tested during system startup. It is also installed, as Process Auxiliaries                                                                                          9.3-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 required, to preserve the integrity of the drainage systems. Floor drains in areas not restricted because of potential radioactivity are provided with caulked or threaded connections.
(5)  CleanoutsIn collection system piping from areas of potential radioactivity, cleanouts are provided, when practicable, at the base of each vertical riser where the change of direction in horizontal runs is 90&deg;, at offsets where the aggregate change is 135&deg; or greater, and at maximum intervals of 15.2 m. Equipment hubs and floor drains are also used as cleanout points. Cleanouts are welded directly to the piping and located with their access covers flush with the finished floor or wall.
9.3.8.2.4 Safety Evaluation In the event of a LOCA signal, all drywell sumps are automatically isolated to preclude the uncontrolled release of primary coolant outside the primary containment.
The accumulation of water in one Reactor Building divisional separation zone does not result in the accumulation of water in other divisional zones. Failure of the discharge check valves has been postulated. The failed open check valve will result in a momentary flow from the flooded zone into the adjacent zone of the common header. The adjacent zone sump pump will be started on increasing water level and sends the water into the common header. The third unaffected divisional zone is also available for safe shutdown operation.
Failure of the radwaste tunnel and sump drain header seal are discussed in Subsection 3.4.1.
Such failures are expected to limit leakages failures with appropriate time for maintenance repair.
Failure of header piping outside the divisional zones and in the Reactor Building/Secondary Containment Corridor at -8,200 mm elevation is enveloped by Subsection 3.4.1 plant flooding analyses.
9.3.8.2.5 Tests and Inspections Drywell and Reactor Building floor and equipment drain sumps are provided with the following instruments and controls:
(1)  High and low level switches are provided on each sump pump to start and stop the sump pump automatically. A separate high-high level switch set at a higher level starts the second pump and simultaneously actuates an alarm in the main control room.
(2)  Leak detection is effected by monitoring the frequency and duration of pump runs.
9.3-26                                                                                        Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.9 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System 9.3.9.1 Design Bases 9.3.9.1.1 Safety Design Basis The Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) System is non-nuclear, non-safety-related and is required to be safe and reliable, consistent with the requirement of using hydrogen gas. The hydrogen piping in the Turbine Building shall be designed in accordance with the guidance Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classifications, Section C.2 to comply with modified BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Part C.5.d(5).
9.3.9.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis BWR reactor coolant is demineralized water, typically containing 100 to 200 parts per billion (ppb) dissolved oxygen from the radiolytic decomposition of water. To mitigate the potential for intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of sensitized austenitic stainless steels, the dissolved oxygen in the reactor water can be reduced to less than 20 ppb by the addition of hydrogen to the feedwater. The amount of hydrogen required is in the range of 1.0 to 1.5 ppm.
The exact amount required depends on many factors, including incore recirculation rates. The amount required will be determined by tests performed during the initial operation of the plant.
The concentration of hydrogen and oxygen in the main steamline, and eventually in the main condenser, is altered in this process. This leaves an excess of hydrogen in the main condenser that would not have equivalent oxygen to combine with in the Offgas System. To maintain the Offgas System near its normal operating characteristics, a flow rate of oxygen equal to approximately one-half the injected hydrogen flow rate is injected in the Offgas System upstream of the recombiner.
The HWC System utilizes the guidelines given in EPRI report NP-5283-SR-A, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installation and EPRI report NP-4947-SR, BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Guidelines; 1987 Revision, October 1988. Specifically, the HWC System piping and components will be located to reduce risk from their failures.
Equipment and controls used to mitigate the consequences of a hydrogen fire/explosion will be designed to be accessible and remain functional during the postulated post accident condition.
All threaded joints in the hydrogen distribution piping will be back welded. Additionally, design features and/or administrative controls shall be provided to ensure that the hydrogen supply is isolated when normal building ventilation is lost.
9.3.9.2 System Description The HWC System (Figure 9.3-8) is composed of hydrogen and oxygen supply systems, systems to inject hydrogen into the feedwater and oxygen into the offgas and subsystems to monitor the effectiveness of the HWC System. These systems monitor the oxygen levels in the Offgas System and the reactor water.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                        9.3-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The hydrogen supply system will be site dependent. Hydrogen can be supplied either as a high-pressure gas or as a cryogenic liquid. Hydrogen and oxygen can also be generated on site by the dissociation of water by electrolysis. The HWC hydrogen supply system may be integrated with the generator hydrogen supply system to save the cost of having separate gas storage facilities for both systems. However, bulk hydrogen storage will be located outside but near the Turbine Building as stated in Subsection 10.2.2.2.
The oxygen supply system will be site dependent. A single oxygen supply system could be provided to meet the requirements of the HWC System and the condensate Oxygen Injection System described in Subsection 9.3.10.
9.3.9.3 Safety Evaluation The operation of the HWC System is not necessary to assure:
(1)  The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)  The capability to shut down the reactor.
(3)  The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events which could result in potential offsite exposures.
The HWC System is used, along with other measures, to reduce the likelihood of corrosion failures which would adversely affect plant availability. The means of storing and handling hydrogen shall utilize the guidelines in EPRI NP-5283-SR-A, Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations.
9.3.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The HWC System is proved operable during the initial operation of the plant. During a refueling or maintenance outage, hydrogen injection is not required. System maintenance or testing can be performed during such periods.
9.3.9.5 Instrumentation and Controls Automatic control features in the HWC System minimize the need for operator attention and improve performance. These features include:
(1)  Automatic variation of hydrogen and oxygen flow rates with reactor power level.
(2)  Automatic oxygen injection rate change delay. This function is also augmented as a function of reactor power level.
(3)  Automatic shutdown on several alarms.
(4)  Isolation on system power loss, operator restart.
9.3-28                                                                                    Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The recommended trips of the oxygen and hydrogen injection systems include:
(1)  Reactor scram (2)  Low or high residual oxygen in the offgas (3)  High area hydrogen concentration (4)  Low oxygen injection system supply pressure (5)  High hydrogen flow The instrumentation provided includes:
(1)  Flow monitors for measurement of hydrogen and oxygen flow rates.
(2)  Hydrogen area monitor sensors to detect hydrogen to the atmosphere.
(3)  Pressure gauges for measurement of hydrogen and oxygen supply pressures and instrument air pressure.
(4)  An oxygen analyzer for measuring the percent oxygen leaving the offgas recombiner.
(5)  Sensors for measuring dissolved oxygen content in reactor water.
9.3.10 Oxygen Injection System 9.3.10.1 Design Bases The Oxygen Injection System is designed to add sufficient oxygen to the Condensate System to suppress corrosion and corrosion product release in the condensate and feedwater systems.
Experience has shown that the preferred feedwater oxygen concentration is 20 to 50 ppb.
During shutdown and startup operation, the feedwater oxygen concentration is usually much above the 20 to 50 ppb range. However, during power operation, deaeration in the main condenser may reduce the condensate oxygen concentration below 20 ppb, thus requiring that some oxygen be added. The amount required is up to approximately 0.15 m3/h.
9.3.10.2 System Description The oxygen supply consists of high-pressure gas cylinders. The Oxygen Injection System shall use the guidelines for gaseous oxygen injection systems in EPRI report NP`5283-SR-A, Guidelines for Permanent Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations1987 Revision, September 1987. A condensate oxygen injection module is provided with pressure regulators and associated piping, valves, and controls to depressurize the gaseous oxygen and route it to the condensate injection modules. There are check valves and isolation valves between the condensate injection modules and the condensate lines upstream of the filters.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                    9.3-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The flow regulating valves in this system are operated from the main control room. The oxygen concentration in the condensate/feedwater system is monitored by analyzers in the sampling system (Subsection 9.3.2). An operator will make changes in the oxygen injection rate in response to changes in the condensate/feedwater concentration. An automatic control system is not required because instantaneous changes in oxygen injection rate are not required.
9.3.10.3 Safety Evaluation The Oxygen Injection System is not required to assure any of the following conditions:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)  Capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
(3)  Ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events which could result in potential offsite exposures.
Consequently, the Oxygen Injection System itself is not safety-related. The high-pressure oxygen storage bottles are located in an area in which large amounts of burnable materials are not present. Usual safe practices for handling high-pressure gases are followed.
9.3.10.4 Tests and Inspections The Oxygen Injection System is proved operable by its use during normal operation. The system valves may be tested to ensure operability from the main control room.
9.3.10.5 Instrumentation Application The oxygen storage bottles have pressure gauges which will indicate to the operators when a new bottle is required. A flow element will indicate the oxygen gas flow rate at all times. The gas flow regulating valves will have position indication in the main control room.
The oxygen monitors are discussed in Subsection 9.3.2.
9.3.11 Zinc Injection System 9.3.11.1 Design Bases Provisions are made to permit installation of a system for adding a zinc solution to the feedwater. Piping connections (Figure 10.4-6) for a bypass loop around the feedwater pumps and space (Figure 1.2-25) for the zinc addition equipment are provided. If experience shows it to be necessary, a zinc injection system may be added later in plant life. The amount of zinc in the reactor water will be less than 10 ppb during normal operation.
9.3-30                                                                                      Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.3.11.2 Safety Evaluation The Zinc Injection System is not necessary to ensure:
(1)  The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)  The capability to shut down the reactor.
(3)  The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events which could result in potential offsite exposures.
9.3.11.3 Test and Inspections The Zinc Injection System, if proved necessary, will be installed at the provided connection point on Figure 10.4-6. Zinc injection would not be performed when the plant is in cold shutdown. During these periods, the system could have maintenance or testing performed.
9.3.11.4 Instrumentation Instrumentation would be provided so that the injection of zinc solution would be stopped automatically if feedwater flow stops. The zinc injection rate would be manually adjusted based on zinc concentration data in the reactor water.
9.3.12 COL License Information 9.3.12.1 Not Used 9.3.12.2 Not Used 9.3.12.3 Not Used 9.3.12.4 Radioactive Drain Transfer System The COL applicant shall provide equipment and floor drain P&IDs.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                      9.3-31
 
ABWR 9.3-32 Table 9.3-1 Standby Liquid Control System Operating Pressure/Temperature Conditions Test Modes*
Circulation Test                    Injection Test                    Standby Mode*                    Operating Mode*
Pressure      Temperature          Pressure      Temperature        Pressure      Temperature          Pressure      Temperature Piping              (MPaG)          (&deg;C)              (MPaG)          (&deg;C)            (MPaG)          (&deg;C)              (MPaG)          (&deg;C)
Pump Suction Inlet to      Test Tank        21/38**          Test Tank Static 21/38**          Makeup Water      21/38**          Storage Tank      21/43**
Tank Shutoff Valve        Static Headf                      Headf                            Pressure                            Static Head 0.392 - 0.833 Pump Discharge to          0/8.41          21/38            0.392-0.883      21/38          Makeup Water      21/38            (4-9 Plus          21/43 Injection Valve Inlet                                        Plus Reactor                      Pressure                            Reactor Static Static Head                                                          Head) to 8.41 Injection Valve Outlet    Reactor          21/38            < 0.392-0.883    21/38          Reactor            21/38            (<0.392-0.883 21/43 to but not including      Static Head                      Plus Reactor                      Static Head                        Plus Reactor 25A5675AL Revision 7 Outboard Drywell          to 8.62                        Static Head                      to 8.62                          Static Head) to Check Valve                                                                                                                        8.62 Outboard Drywell          Reactor          21/302        Reactor Static    52            Reactor            21/302        Reactor Static      21/302 Check Valve to the        Static Head                      Head                            Static Head                        Head to Reactor                    to 8.62                                                            to 8.62                          8.62
* The pump flow rate will be zero (pump not operating) during the standby mode and at rated (189L/min/pump) during the test and operating modes.
Reactor to be at 0 MPaG and 52&deg;C before changing from the standby mode to the injection test mode.
Pressures tabulated represent pressure at the points identified below. To obtain pressure at intermediate points in the system, the pressure tabulated must Design Control Document/Tier 2 be adjusted for elevation differences and pressure drop between such intermediate points and the pressure points identified below:
Piping                                                                                Pressure Point Pump Suction                                                                          Pump Suction Flange Inlet Pump discharge to Injection Valve Inlet                                                Pump Discharge Flange Outlet Injection Valve Outlet to, but not including, Drywell Check Valve                      Injection Valve Outlet Outboard Drywell Check Valve to the Reactor                                            Reactor Sparger Outlet f Pump suction piping will be subject to condensate water supply pressure during flushing and filling of the piping and during any testing where suction is Process Auxiliaries taken directly from the condensate water supply line rather than the test tank.
                        ** During chemical mixing, the liquid in the storage tank will be at a temperature of 66&deg;C maximum.
Maximum reactor operating pressure is 8.62 MPaG at reactor standby liquid control sparger outlet.
302&deg;C represents maximum sustained operating temperature.
 
ABWR Process Auxiliaries Table 9.3-2 Water Quality Instrumentation Recommended Alarm Setpoints Field                Instrument    Sensor          Indicator          Recorder      Instrument      Instrument System ID            Sensor        Location
* Location            Location      Range          Accuracy    High        High-High Condensate          Conductivity  Each process    Local panel        Control room  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      0.5  S/cm  2  S/cm hotwell outlet                      line                                                1  S/cm MS Condensate          Conductivity  Process line    Local panel        Control room  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      0.2  S/cm  1  S/cm condensate pump                                                                        1  S/cm MS discharge Conductivity  Sample line      Condensate        Sample station 0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      0.2  S/cm sample station      panel          1  S/cm MS panel Conductivity  Process line    Local panel        Control room  0 to 100 NL    +/-1% FS      10  S/cm 25A5675AL Revision 7 (seawater and                                      10  S/cm MS brackish water cooled plants)
Treated              Conductivity  Each process    Local panel        Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm condensate                          line (seawater                                      0.1  S/cm MS individual                          and brackish condensate                          water cooled demineralizer unit                  plants) outlet Design Control Document/Tier 2 Conductivity  Each sample      Condensate          Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm line            sample station                    0.1  S/cm MS panel Treated              Conductivity  Process line    Local panel        Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm  0.2  S/cm condensate                                                                              0.1  S/cm MS combined treatment outlet FS = Full Scale Range              MS = Midscale                    NL = Nonlinear 9.3-33
 
Table 9.3-2 Water Quality Instrumentation (Continued)
ABWR 9.3-34 Recommended Alarm Setpoints Field                Instrument    Sensor          Indicator          Recorder      Instrument      Instrument System ID            Sensor        Location
* Location            Location      Range          Accuracy    High        High-High Conductivity  Sample line    Condensate          Sample station 0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm sample station      panel          0.1  S/cm MS panel Treated              Oxygen        Sample line    Condensate          Control room  0 to 100 ppb  +/-5% FS condensate          analyzer                      sample station                    Oxygen combined                                            panel treatment unit outlet Feedwater            Oxygen        Sample line    Condensate          Control room  0 to 250 ppb    +/-5% FS      200 ppb O2 analyzer                      sample station                    Oxygen 25A5675AL Revision 7 Corrosion      Sample line    Feedwater          Control room  0 to 1 ppmf products                      sample station monitor Conductivity  Sample line    Condensate        Control room    0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm sample station or                  0.1  S/cm MS feedwater sample station Control rod drive    Oxygen        Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 1000 ppb  +/-5% FS      200 ppb O2 water                analyzer                      station panel                      Oxygen Design Control Document/Tier 2 Conductivity  Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.2  S/cm station panel                      0.1  S/cm MS Reactor water        Conductivity  Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      0.7  S/cm  3.5  S/cm cleanup system                                      station panel                      0.1  S/cm MS inlet (high temp)f Process Auxiliaries Oxygen        Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 10 ppm    +/-5% FS analyzer                      station panel                      Oxygen FS = Full Scale Range              MS = Midscale                    NL = Nonlinear
 
Table 9.3-2 Water Quality Instrumentation (Continued)
ABWR Process Auxiliaries Recommended Alarm Setpoints Field                Instrument    Sensor          Indicator          Recorder      Instrument      Instrument System ID            Sensor        Location
* Location            Location      Range          Accuracy    High        High-High Reactor Water        Conductivity  Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      0.7  S/cm  3.5  S/cm Cleanup System                                      station panel                      1  S/cm MS inlet (low temp)**
Reactor Water        Oxygen        Sample line Cleanup System      analyzer      (redundant inlet                              connection)
Treated reactor      Conductivity  Sample line    Reactor sample      Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm  0.2  S/cm water individual                                    station panel                      0.1  S/cm MS demineralizer outlet Fuel pool water      Conductivity  Process line or Local panel        Local panel    0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      2  S/cm    3  S/cm 25A5675AL Revision 7 cleanup system                      sample line                        and control    1  S/cm MS inlet                                                                  room alarm Fuel pool water      Conductivity  Process line or Local panel        Local panel    0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm  0.2  S/cm individual                          sample line                        and control    0.1  S/cm MS demineralizer outlet                                                    room alarm RHR System          Conductivity  Process line or Local panel        Control room  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      3  S/cm    10  S/cm pressure                            sample line                                        1  S/cm MS suppression pool water Design Control Document/Tier 2 Radwaste System- Conductivity      Process line or Local panel or      Radwaste      0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      1.0  S/cm return to plant                    sample line    radwaste control    control room  1  S/cm MS systems                                            room Auxiliary Boiler    Conductivity  Process or      Local panel        Control room  0 to 1 NL      +/-1% FS      0.1  S/cm  0.2  S/cm System                              sample line                                        0.1  S/cm MS RHR Heat            Conductivity  Sample Line    Local Panel        Main control  0 to 10 NL      +/-1% FS      3  S/cm    10  S/cm Exchanger Outlet                                                        Room          1  S/cm MS (3)
FS = Full Scale Range              MS = Midscale                    NL = Nonlinear 9.3-35
 
Table 9.3-2 Water Quality Instrumentation (Continued)
ABWR 9.3-36 Recommended Alarm Setpoints Field                  Instrument      Sensor            Indicator            Recorder          Instrument        Instrument System ID              Sensor          Location
* Location            Location          Range              Accuracy        High            High-High Condensate            Conductivity    Sample Line        Condensate          Sample Station 0 to 1 NL            +/-1% FS          0.1  S/cm Transfer Pump                                            Sample Station      Panel          0.1  S/cm MS Outlet                                                    Panel Suppression Pool      Conductivity    Sample Line        Local Panel          Main Control      0 to 1 NL          +/-1% FS          0.1  S/cm      0.2  S/cm Cleanup Outlet                                                                Room              0.1  S/cm MS LCW Process Line      Conductivity    Process Line      Local Panel          Radwaste          0 to 20 NL        +/-1% FS Control Room      0.1  S/cm MS HCW Process Line Conductivity          Process Line      Local Panel          Radwaste          0 to 200 NL        +/-1% FS Control Room      0.1  S/cm MS 25A5675AL Revision 7 Additional sample lines are in the footnote FS = Full Scale Range                  MS = Midscale                      NL = Nonlinear
* The following sampling lines are provided which do not have any instruments, grab sampling only: main stream, high pressure drains, gland steam evaporator drain, TCW heat exchanger outlet, standby liquid control tank, HECW (3), HNCW, LCW sump, HCW sump, HWH, condensate filter outlet (4),
condensate demineralizer outlet (6), RCW (12) and all tanks and major process streams in the liquid radwaste system. Sampling for the Offgas System is discussed in Section 11.3.
Sample location downstream of oxygen injection point.
ppb = Parts per billion Design Control Document/Tier 2 f ppm = Parts per million
                        ** One of the two CUW sampling lines (high temp.) takes the sample before the CUW heat exchangers, and the other (low temp.) takes the sample after the CUW heat exchangers.
Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.3-3 Service Air Consumption During Normal Plant Operation Consumption, Standard User                                        Use*                        m3/min Standby Liquid Control Tank                  Mixing                        2.3 CUW Filter/Demineralizer                    Backwashing                    3.5 FPC Filter/Demineralizer                    Backwashing                    4.4 Condensate Filter                            Backwashing                  12.0 Condensate Demineralizer                    Mixing                        7.5 Offgas Exhaust Gas Ejector                  Driving Force                  2.5 LCW Filter                                  Backwashing                    1.7 LCW Demineralizer                            Transfer                      2.0 HCW Demineralizer                            Transfer                      2.0 Instrument Air System                        Backup                        7.7
* All of these operations will not occur at the same time Table 9.3-4 Instrument Air Consumption During Normal Plant Operation*
(Response to Question 430.215)
Consumption, Standard Building          Users                                        m3/min Reactor            Instrumentation                              0.10 Control valves                                0.37 Air-operated solenoid valves                  0.09 Turbine            Instrumentation                              1.39 Control valves                                2.75 Air-operated solenoid valves                  0.16 Radwaste          Instrumentation                              0.05 Control valves                                0.36 Air-operated solenoid valves                  0.08 Total                                                            5.35
* These uses are continuous.
Process Auxiliaries                                                                                      9.3-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.3-1 Standby Liquid Control System P&ID Figure 9.3-1a Standby Liquid Control System PFD 9.3-38                                                                  Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 OVERFLOW VOLUME C-SOLUTION CONCENTRATION (% BY WEIGHT)
REGION OF APPROVED 13.4                  VOLUME-CONCENTRATION MARGIN (1)
LOW LEVEL ALARM MINIMUM REQUIRED CONCENTRATION LINE 10.5 23.1                                    25.7                28.7 V- NET TANK VOLUME (m3)
(1) RECOMMENDED 36 cm MARGIN BETWEEN MAXIMUM OPERATING AND OVERFLOW LEVELS Figure 9.3-2 Sodium Pentaborate Volume Concentration Requirements Process Auxiliaries                                                                                                        9.3-39
 
ABWR 9.3-40 150 60 130 50 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK OPERATING LIMIT 110 40 TEMPERATURE (&deg;C)                                                                                                          TEMPERATURE (&deg;F) 25A5675AL Revision 7 90 30 SODIUM PENTABORATE/WATER SOLUTION SATURATION CHARACTERISTIC 70 20 Design Control Document/Tier 2 10                                                                                              50 0                                                                                                30 5      10        15            20            25            30            35  40  45 Process Auxiliaries CONCENTRATION (% BY WEIGHT)
Figure 9.3-3 Saturation Temperature of Sodium Pentaborate Solution
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 SAMPLING OF PROCESS FLUIDS TUBING (SS)
ROOT VALVE (SS)
REDUCER (SS)
MACHINE PEMANENT WITNESS MARKS ON PIPE TO INDICATE PORT ORIENTATION 20.3 cm PIPE, SEAMLESS 1.9 cm STAINLESS STEEL DOUBLE EXTRA STRONG                                      D = PROCESS PIPE i,d.
(ASTM A312 GR TP316 OR 304) 5.1 cm 45o PIPE CL PROCESS FLOW Figure 9.3-4 Sample Probe Process Auxiliaries                                                                              9.3-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 SAMPLING OF PROCESS FLUIDS TUBING (SS)
ROOT VALVE (SS)
REDUCER (SS)
MACHINE PEMANENT WITNESS MARKS ON PIPE TO INDICATE PORT ORIENTATION 20.3 cm PIPE, SEAMLESS 1.9 cm STAINLESS STEEL DOUBLE EXTRA STRONG                                    D = PROCESS PIPE i,d.
(ASTM A312 GR TP316 OR 304) 3.8 cm 0.32 cm dia HOLE FACING UPSTREAM 1.3 cm PIPE C
L END OF PIPE WELDED CLOSED WITHOUT ENLARGING PIPE o.d.
PROCESS FLOW Figure 9.3-5 Sample Probe 9.3-42                                                                                    Process Auxiliaries
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Sample ProbeSample Probe The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.3-6 Instrument Air System P&ID (Sheets 1-2)
Figure 9.3-7 Station Service Air System P&ID (Sheets 1-2)
Process Auxiliaries                                                              9.3-43
 
ABWR 9.3-44 TO GENERATOR H2 FEEDWATER SUPPLY                                                  PUMPS H2              H2 ISOLATION      INJECTION VALVE          MODULE CONTROL ROOM 25A5675AL Revision 7 HWCS CONTROL PANEL CUW INLET HYDROGEN AREA                                                                      SAMPLE MONITORS                                                      CUW INLET ANALYZER O2, O2              O2 ISOLATION        INJECTION VALVE            MODULE
                      . O2                                                                    OFFGAS Design Control Document/Tier 2 SUPPLY                                                                O2 ANALYZER OFFGAS RECOMBINER TO FEEDWATER                    OFFGAS OXYGEN INJECTION SYSTEM Process Auxiliaries Figure 9.3-8 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 DIVISION A                DIVISION B                  DIVISION C ROOMS WITH                ROOMS WITH                  ROOMS WITH FLOOR DRAINS              FLOOR DRAINS                FLOOR DRAINS DIVISION A                DIVISION B                DIVISION C SUMP                      SUMP                        SUMP A601A                      A601B                      A601C CONTROL BUILDING DIVISION A                  DIVISION B                  DIVISION C ECCS PUMP                    ECCS PUMP                  ECCS PUMP ROOMS                        ROOMS                        ROOMS DIVISION A                  DIVISION B                  DIVISION C SUMP                        SUMP                        SUMP A102A                      A102B                        A102C SECONDARY CONTAINMENT  ECCS AREAS DIVISION A        NON-DIVISIONAL      DIVISION B          DIVISION C ROOMS WITH          ROOMS WITH        ROOMS WITH          ROOMS WITH FLOOR DRAINS        FLOOR DRAINS      FLOOR DRAINS        FLOOR DRAINS SUMP                                SUMP A102D                                A102E SECONDARY CONTAINMENT  OTHER AREAS Figure 9.3-9 Divisional Radioactive Floor Drains Process Auxiliaries                                                                                9.3-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4 Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems 9.4.1 Control Building HVAC The Control Building (C/B) Heating, Ventilating and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) System is divided into two separate systems: (1) an HVAC System for the main control area envelope within two floors, and (2) an HVAC System for safety-related electrical and RCW heat exchange equipment.
9.4.1.1 Control Room Habitability Area HVAC 9.4.1.1.1 Design Basis (1)    The control room habitability area (CRHA) HVAC System is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure operation under emergency conditions assuming the single failure of any one active component. Independence is provided between Class 1E divisions and also between Class 1E divisions and non-class 1E equipment.
(2)    Provisions are made in the system to detect and limit the introduction of airborne radioactive material in the main control area envelope (MCAE).
(3)    Provisions are made in the system to detect and remove smoke and radioactive material from the MCAE.
(4)    The control room habitability area HVAC System is designed to provide a controlled temperature environment to ensure the continued operation of safety-related equipment under accident conditions.
(5)    The control room habitability area HVAC System and components are located in the Seismic Category I Control Building, a structure that is tornado-missile, and flood protected.
(6)    Tornado/hurricane missile barriers and tornado dampers are provided at each intake and exhaust structure.
(7)    Protection from exterior smoke, toxic chemical and chlorine releases are discussed in Section 6.4.
9.4.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis (1)    The control room habitability area HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to ensure both the comfort and safety of the operators. The range of design conditions for the control room environment are 21&deg;C to 26&deg;C and 10% to 60% relative humidity.
(2)    The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of the principal system components.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  The outside design conditions for the control room habitability area HVAC System are 46&deg;C during the summer and -40&deg;C during the winter.
9.4.1.1.3 System Description The CRHA HVAC System consists of redundant divisions. Each division consists of an air conditioning unit (ACU) with two supply fans, two exhaust fans, and an emergency filtration unit with two circulating fans. The main control area envelope is heated, cooled and pressurized with filtered outdoor air mixed with recirculated air for ventilation and pressurization purposes.
Under normal conditions, sufficient air is supplied to pressurize the main control area envelope and the exfiltrate pressurizes the remainder of the Control Building.
The control room habitability area ACU consists of two independent divisions, each with a medium efficiency bag filter, an electric heating coil, chilled water cooling coil, and humidifier.
Two 100% capacity fans draw air from the instrument panel areas, corridors, main control room, computer room, office areas, and the switch and tag room. Modulating dampers in the exhaust duct to the exhaust fans are controlled by a pressure controller to maintain the required 3.2 mm of water gauge positive pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The controller is located in the instrument panel area of the main control room. Normally one air conditioning unit, one supply fan and one exhaust fan are in operation.
Redundant emergency air filtration divisions each consist of an electric heating coil, a prefilter, HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber, a HEPA filter, and two 100% capacity circulating fans treat mixed outdoor and return air before discharging it into the main control area envelope. The charcoal adsorber will be 100 mm deep as a minimum. The emergency filtration unit supply fans are normally on standby for use only during high radiation conditions. A Process Radiation Monitoring System monitors two CRHA air intakes for radiation. The radiation monitors allow the control room operator to select manually one of the air intakes which are 50m apart. On receipt of a high radiation signal from the radiation monitors, only the corresponding emergency filtration unit of the operating division starts. The makeup air for pressurization can be treated by the HEPA and charcoal adsorbing system before distribution in the main control area envelope.
The control room habitability area HVAC P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-1. Flow rates are given in Table 9.4-3, and the system component descriptions are given in Table 9.4-4.
Smoke detectors in the main control area envelope actuate an alarm on indication of smoke so the operators can place the system in the smoke removal mode manually. Air ducts and air intakes are sized for 100% outdoor airflow. Dual smoke detectors in each CRHA HVAC system air intake detect and alarm on smoke originating outside the air intake. The CRHA HVAC system automatically isolates and is placed in full recirculation mode.
Fire dampers with fusible links in the HVAC ductwork will close under air flow conditions after fusible link melts.
9.4-2                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.1.1.4 Safety Evaluation The control room habitability area HVAC System is designed to maintain a habitable environment and to ensure the operability of components in the control room. All CRHA HVAC equipment and surrounding structures are of Seismic Category I design and operable during loss of the offsite power supply.
The ductwork which serves these safety functions is termed ESF ductwork, and is of Seismic Category I design. ESF ducting is high-pressure safety grade ductwork designed to withstand the maximum positive and/or negative pressure to which it can be subjected under normal or abnormal conditions. Galvanized steel (ASTM A526 or ASTM A527) is used for outdoor air intake and exhaust ducts. All other ducts are welded black steel ASTM A570, Grade A or Grade D. Ductwork and hangers are Seismic Category I. Bolted flange and welded joints are qualified per ERDA 76-21. Divisions B and C equipment and ducts are separated except the common supply and common exhaust ducts serving the main control area envelope. Each emergency filtration division will utilize all welded construction for their charcoal trays and charcoal tray screen to preclude the possible loss of charcoal from absorber cells per IE Bulletin 80-03.
Redundant and independent components are provided where necessary to ensure that a single failure will not preclude adequate main control area envelope ventilation.
In the event of beyond design basis conditions from postulated aircraft impact strikes, Division C of the Control Room Habitability Area HVAC can be operated by cross-connecting Division I power and Division A HVAC Emergency Cooling Water (HECW) to support the core cooling function as defined under 10 CFR 50.150.
Manual operator action inside the Control Building may be credited for establishing MCR cooling and ventilation for this condition. No operator action is required within 30 minutes to reestablish MCR cooling and ventilation during a postulated impact from a large commercial aircraft. This mode of operation of the MCR Area HVAC can be maintained for 24 hours after which it is assumed that additional offsite support can be obtained.
Manual cross connections from Division I electrical power supply are provided for MCR Area HVAC Division C to maintain the cooling and ventilation function of the MCR Area HVAC.
Manual cross connections are provided for MCR Area HVAC Division C air conditioning unit from HVAC Emergency Cooling Water (HECW) Division A.
Divisional separation is maintained during normal operation for all SSC to be cross-connected during this beyond design basis condition. Design considerations such as closed manual isolation valves and manual transfer switches in conjunction with staged procedures preclude the possibility of adverse effects between divisions.
A four channel radiation monitoring system is provided to detect high radiation in the outside air intake ducts. A radiation monitor is provided in the control room to monitor control room Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                    9.4-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 area radiation levels. These monitors alarm in the control room upon detection of high radiation conditions. Isolation of the normal outdoor air intake serving the emergency habitability area HVAC system control room and initiation of outdoor air intake and the operating division emergency filtration unit and fan are accomplished by the following signals:
(1)    High radiation inside the air intake duct (2)    Manual isolation Under normal conditions, sufficient air is supplied to pressurize the main control area envelope and exfiltrate to pressurize the remaining areas of the Control Building.
The safety-related isolation valves at the outside air intakes are protected from becoming inoperable due to freezing, icing, or other environmental conditions.
Upon detection of smoke in the CRHA, the operating division of the HVAC System is put into smoke removal mode by the main control room operators. For smoke removal, both exhaust fans are started at high speed in conjunction with a supply fan, the recirculation damper is closed. Either division of the CRHA HVAC System can be used as a smoke removal system.
9.4.1.1.5 Inspection and Testing Requirements Provisions are made for periodic tests of the emergency filtration unit fans and filters. These tests include measurement of differential pressure across the filter and of filter efficiency.
Connections for testing, such as injection, sampling and monitoring, are properly located so that test results are indicative of performance.
The high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters of the CRHA HVAC System shall be tested periodically with dioctyl phthalate smoke (DOP). The charcoal filters will be periodically tested with an acceptable gas for bypasses. Removal efficiency shall be at least 99% for all forms of iodine (elemental, organic, particulate and HI, hydrogen iodide in the influent system).
Each emergency filtration division duct work outside MCAE shall be periodically tested for unfiltered inleakage in accordance with ASME N510.
Each emergency filtration division shall be periodically inspected for open maintenance access doors or deteriorated seals that could lead to charcoal filter bypass.
The balance of the system is proven operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure operability and integrity of the system.
9.4.1.1.6 Instrumentation Application One of two air conditioning unit supply fans is started manually.
9.4-4                                                        Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 A high radiation signal automatically starts the emergency air filtration fan, closes the normal CRHA HVAC System air inlet dampers and closes the exhaust air dampers and stops the exhaust fan.
A temperature indicating controller senses the temperature of the air leaving the emergency filtration system. The controller then modulates an electric heating coil to maintain the leaving air temperature at a preset limit. A limit switch will cause an alarm to be actuated on high air temperature. A moisture-sensing element, working in conjunction with the temperature controller, measures the relative humidity of the air entering the charcoal adsorber.
Differential pressure indicators show the pressure drop across the prefilters and the HEPA filters. The switch causes an alarm to be actuated if the pressure drop exceeds a preset limit. A flow switch in the emergency filtration system fan discharge duct automatically starts the standby system and initiates an alarm on low flow or operating fan failure.
The main control area envelope exhaust fans start automatically when the air-conditioning unit supply fan is started. Each fan inlet damper is opened automatically. The return air dampers to the air-conditioning unit are opened automatically.
Differential pressure-indicating controllers modulate dampers in the exhaust air ducts to maintain positive pressure of at least 3.2 mm water gauge.
Manual start of an air conditioning unit supply fan provides a start signal to the HECW pump and an interlock signal to open the cooling coil chilled water valve. A temperature indicating controller installed in the MCR modulates the chilled water valve to maintain space temperatures. A moisture sensor controls the operation of a humidifier. The exhaust fan starts automatically when the supply fan starts.
During winter, the electric unit heaters in the equipment rooms are cycled by temperature-indicating control switches, located within the filter rooms and the air-conditioner rooms.
The supply, return and exhaust air ducts have manual balancing dampers provided in the branch ducts for balancing purposes. The dampers are locked in place after the system is balanced.
9.4.1.1.7 Regulatory Guide 1.52 Compliance Status The control room habitability area emergency filter units comply with all applicable provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Section C, except as noted below.
The revisions of ANSI N509 and ANSI/ASME AG-1 listed in Table 1.8-21 are used for ABWR ESF filter train design; the Regulatory Guide references older revisions of these standards.
9.4.1.1.8 Standard Review Plan 6.5.1 Compliance Status The control room habitability area emergency filtration units comply with SRP 6.5.1, Table 6.5.1-1.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.1.2 C/B Safety-Related Equipment Area HVAC 9.4.1.2.1 Design Basis (1)  The C/B safety-related equipment area C/B SREA HVAC System is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure operation under emergency conditions, assuming the failure of any one active component.
(2)  The C/B SREA HVAC System is designed to provide a controlled temperature environment to ensure the continued operation of safety-related equipment under accident conditions.
(3)  The C/B SREA HVAC System and components are Seismic Category I and are located in a Seismic Category I control building structure that is tornado-missile, and flood protected.
(4)  Tornado/hurricane missile barriers and tornado dampers are provided at each intake and exhaust structure.
(5)  The rooms cooled by the C/B SREA HVAC System are maintained at positive pressure relative to atmosphere during normal and accident conditions. This is achieved by sizing intake fans larger than exhaust fans.
9.4.1.2.2 Power Generation Design Basis (1)  The C/B SREA HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature during normal operation to ensure the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of the safety-related electrical and RCW equipment.
(2)  The system is designed to facilitate periodic inspection of the principal system components.
(3)  Design outside air temperature for the C/B HVAC System are 46&deg;C during the summer and -40&deg;C during winter.
(4)  Design inside air temperatures for the C/B safety-related equipment areas are 40&deg;C maximum in the summer and a minimum of 10&deg;C in the winter. Battery rooms shall have sufficient air supply to keep the temperature between 10&deg;C and 40&deg;C.
9.4.1.2.3 System Description The C/B SREA HVAC System is divided into three independent subsystems with each subsystem serving a designated divisional area for Divisions A, B, and C. Non-safety-related equipment is cooled by non-safety-related FCUs.
9.4-6                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Each subsystem consists of an ACU, two 100% capacity supply fans, and two 100% capacity exhaust fans. The ACU contains a medium efficiency bag filter section, and a cooling coil section.
The exhaust fans discharge to the atmosphere.
The C/B SREA HVAC system flow rates are given in Table 9.4-3, and system component descriptions are given in Table 9.4-4.
9.4.1.2.3.1 Safety-Related Subsystem Division A Subsystem Division A specifically serves:
(1)    Safety-related battery Division I (2)    HECW chiller Division A (3)    RCW water pump and heat exchanger Division A (4)    HVAC equipment Division A (5)    Safety-related electrical equipment Division I (6)    Non-safety-related power supplies (7)    Non-safety-related electrical equipment 9.4.1.2.3.2 Safety-Related Subsystem Division B Subsystem Division B specifically serves:
(1)    Safety-related battery Division II and Division IV (2)    HECW chiller Division B (3)    RCW pump and heat exchanger Division B (4)    HVAC equipment Division B (5)    Safety-related electrical equipment Division II and Division IV Supply and exhaust ducts have fire dampers at firewall penetrations.
9.4.1.2.3.3 Safety-Related Subsystem Division C Subsystem Division 3 specifically serves:
(1)    Safety-related battery Division III Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                              9.4-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  HECW chiller Division C (3)  RCW water pump and heat exchanger DivisionC (4)  HVAC equipment Division C (5)  Safety-related electrical equipment Division III (6)  Non-safety-related MG sets 9.4.1.2.4 Safety Evaluation The safety-related equipment HVAC System is designed to ensure the operability of the safety-related equipment, and to limit the hydrogen concentration to less than 2% by volume in the battery rooms during system balancing to ensure the rooms exhaust the required air directly to the exhaust fans. All safety-related HVAC equipment and surrounding structures are of Seismic Category I design and are operable during loss of the offsite power supply.
The ductwork which serves these safety functions is termed ESF ductwork, and is of Seismic Category I design. ESF ducting is low-pressure safety grade ductwork designed to withstand the maximum positive and/or negative pressure to which it can be subjected under normal or abnormal conditions. Galvanized steel ASTM A526 or ASTM A527 is used for outdoor air intake and exhaust ducts. All other ducts are welded black steel ASTM A570, Grade A or Grade D. Ductwork and hangers are Seismic Category I. Bolted flange and welded joints are qualified per ERDA 76-21.
Redundant components are provided where necessary to ensure that a single failure will not preclude adequate environmental control.
9.4.1.2.5 Inspection and Testing Requirements Provisions are made for periodic operational tests of the fans and filters.
The balance of the system is proven operable by its use during normal plant operation. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure operability and integrity of the system.
9.4.1.2.6 Instrumentation Application One of the two air conditioning unit supply fans is started manually for normal operation.
On an alarm of exhaust fan or supply fan failure, the standby fan is automatically started, and an alarm is sounded in the main control room, indicating fan failure.
One of the safety-related electrical equipment area exhaust fans starts automatically when the air-conditioning unit supply fan is started.
9.4-8                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 On a smoke alarm in a division of the Control Building safety-related electrical equipment area HVAC System, that division of the HVAC System shall be put into smoke removal mode. No other division is affected by this action. For smoke removal, the recirculation duct damper is closed, and both exhaust fans are started in conjunction with a supply fan. Normal once through ventilation of the battery rooms also removes smoke from the battery rooms.
Fire dampers separating electrical divisions II and IV rooms that use fusible links in HVAC ductwork will close under airflow conditions after fusible link melts.
9.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool Area HVAC System The Spent Fuel Pool Area HVAC System is part of the Reactor Building secondary containment HVAC System described in Subsection 9.4.5.1.
9.4.3 Auxiliary Area HVAC System The Auxiliary Area HVAC System is also part of the Reactor Building Secondary Containment HVAC System described in Subsection 9.4.5.1.
9.4.4 Turbine Island HVAC System The Turbine Island heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system consists of the Turbine Building (T/B) HVAC System and the Electrical Building (E/B) HVAC System.
9.4.4.1 Design Bases 9.4.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases The T/B HVAC and E/B HVAC Systems do not serve or support any safety function and have no safety design bases.
9.4.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)    The T/B HVAC and E/B HVAC are designed to supply filtered and tempered air to all Turbine Island spaces during all modes of normal plant operation, including plant startup and shutdown. The systems are also designed to maintain inside air temperatures above 15&deg;C and below the following upper design limits:
General Turbine Building areas:              40&deg;C Condenser compartment:                        43&deg;C Resin tank room:                              43&deg;C Steam tunnel:                                49&deg;C Moisture separator compartments:              49&deg;C Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Electrical Building areas:                          40&deg;C (2)  The E/B HVAC is designed to provide independent supply and exhaust ventilation to the electrical switchgear, chillers and air compressor rooms, and independent exhaust for the combustion turbine generator and auxiliary boiler rooms. The ventilation exhaust for these areas is discharged directly to the atmosphere.
Recirculation from clean areas is provided.
(3)  The T/B HVAC is designed to direct airflow from areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of high potential radioactivity. The T/B HVAC design is based on supplying air from the Turbine Building periphery (outer walls) both above and below the operating floor and ventilating areas radially inwards towards the return/exhaust air inlet points located below the operating floor in equipment rooms, the condenser area and under the building roof. The main stairwells that are designed for personnel evacuation routes are pressurized to prevent infiltration of smoke from other Turbine Building areas, during a fire.
(4)  The T/B HVAC is designed to minimize exfiltration by maintaining a slightly negative pressure by exhausting 10% more air than is supplied to the Turbine Building.
(5)  Exhaust air from potentially high airborne concentrations in turbine building areas or component vents is collected, filtered and discharged to the atmosphere through the Turbine Building Compartment Exhaust (TBCE) System.
(6)  Exhaust air from other (low potential airborne concentrations) Turbine Building areas and component vents, except lube oil areas, is either exhausted to the atmosphere through a medium efficiency filter, or is returned to the supply air unit and mixed with outside air.
(7)  Exhaust air from the lube oil areas is exhausted to the atmosphere without filtration.
(8)  All Turbine Building exhaust air is directed to the plant stack, where it is monitored for radiation prior to being discharged to the atmosphere.
(9)  Upon high radiation alarm from the plant stack radiation monitoring system, the operator will investigate and take corrective action.
(10) T/B HVAC maintains the T/B contaminated areas at a negative pressure with respect to atmosphere.
(11) The T/B HVAC is designed to provide for local air recirculation and cooling in high heat load areas using local unit coolers. A minimum of 50% standby cooling capacity is provided in areas where a loss of cooling would interfere with plant power generation objectives.
9.4-10                                            Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.4.2 Description 9.4.4.2.1 T/B HVAC General Description The T/B HVAC airflow diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-2a; the system instruments and controls are illustrated on Figure 9.4-2b; equipment design parameters are listed in Table 9.4-5.
The Turbine Building supply air units, main exhaust fans, equipment compartment exhaust fans, filters, and control panels are located in the T/B HVAC equipment rooms at elevation 30,300mm, and the floor above. The lube oil area exhaust fans are located in the vicinity of lube oil reservoir room. Individual unit coolers and unit heaters are located in the areas that they serve.
Potentially high radioactive concentration exhaust air is filtered and discharged to the atmosphere. Exhaust air from clean and low potential airborne contamination areas is either discharged to the atmosphere or recirculated.
All Turbine Building ventilation systems and subsystems that are required to sustain normal plant operation are provided with redundant fans on automatic standby.
9.4.4.2.1.1 Turbine Building Supply (TBS) System The TBS System consists of (1) outside air intake louvers, (2) return and exhaust air modulating dampers with minimum outside air damper position, (3) low and high efficiency filters, (4) hot water heating coils, (5) chilled water cooling coils, and (6) three 50% capacity supply fans.
Two out of three fans are normally operated to supply filtered and, if required, temperature adjusted air to all levels of the Turbine Building. The third fan is a standby unit, which starts automatically upon failure of either operating fan. Each supply fan is provided with pneumatically-operated inlet vanes, which maintain a constant airflow rate and pneumatically-operated isolation shutoff dampers.
The TBS System runs with 100% outside air during normal plant operation whenever outside air temperature is moderate enough to contribute to maintaining suitable inside air conditions at the minimum operating cost. The T/B HVAC modulates the return, exhaust and outside air dampers to maximize inside air temperature control by outside air, and minimize the energy used for either cooling by the Chilled Water System or heating by the House Boiler System.
On extreme outside air temperature conditions (either high or low), the outside air intake dampers are at their minimum position. Maximum inside air, as available from the building clean and low potential airborne contamination areas only, is recirculated by the T/B HVAC exhaust/return fans to the supply air inlet plenum.
The TBS fans are started by handswitches located on local control panels. The supply fans are interlocked with the T/B HVAC exhaust fans and T/B HVAC compartment exhaust fans to ensure that the exhaust fans are running before a supply fan is started.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The TBS air heating and cooling coil performance is controlled by temperature controllers modulating hot water and chilled water flow control valves at the coil.
The TBS fans are started by handswitches located on a local control panel.
9.4.4.2.1.2 Turbine Building Exhaust (TBE) System The air drawn by TBE fans from the building clean and low potentially contaminated areas is filtered through medium efficiency particulate filters (bag type) and either exhausted through the monitored plant stack or returned to the T/B HVAC supply plenum and mixed with outside air.
The TBE System is provided with three 50% capacity fans downstream of the filter train. Two fans are normally in operation and one is on automatic standby.
A filter bypass is provided to allow smoke purging from the Turbine Building in case of fire.
All three TBE fans can be operated simultaneously to provide maximum smoke removal, as desired. Fire dampers with fusible links in HVAC ductwork will close under airflow conditions after fusible link melts.
The T/B HVAC exhaust fans are provided with inlet vanes and isolation dampers. A pressure differential controller automatically adjusts the blade pitch of the operating fans to maintain the desired negative pressure in the Turbine Building. Failure of one operating exhaust fan automatically starts the standby fan and associated controls. The T/B HVAC exhaust fans are interlocked with the T/B HVAC supply fans.
9.4.4.2.1.3 Turbine Building Compartment Exhaust (TBCE) System The TBCE System consists of two 100% capacity exhaust fans, one common medium efficiency filter unit and associated controls. One fan is normally in operation, and the other fan is on automatic standby. The system also includes a 100% capacity filter bypass duct for purging smoke in case of fire.
Except when smoke removal is required, air is exhausted from the potentially high airborne concentration compartments and equipment vents, filtered through a medium efficiency filter (bag type) before it is released to the atmosphere through the plant stack.
Two exhaust fans are provided with inlet vanes and isolation dampers. An airflow controller automatically adjusts the inlet vanes of the operating fan to maintain a constant system exhaust airflow rate. In the automatic mode, loss of flow from the operating fan starts the standby fan and its associated controls.
9.4.4.2.1.4 Turbine Building Lube Oil Area Exhaust (TBLOE) System The TBLOE System includes two 100% capacity exhaust fans, isolation dampers and exhaust ductwork. The TBLOE fans discharge the exhaust air directly to the atmosphere through the 9.4-12                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 plant stack. One fan is designed to continuously exhaust at a constant volumetric flow rate from the lube oil process and storage rooms and rooms having electrohydraulic fluids. Supply air to these rooms is delivered by the T/B HVAC supply fans. A bypass duct is provided around the lube oil exhaust fans for purging high temperature combustion products and limiting room pressurization in case of fire in one of the rooms.
9.4.4.2.1.5 T/B HVAC Unit Coolers and Electric Unit Heaters Local unit coolers and electric unit heaters are provided as required in the following rooms:
condenser compartments, condensate pump room, heater drain pump rooms, filter valve room, demineralizer pump and valve rooms, TCW heat exchanger areas, condensate control station, reactor feed pump power supply room, demineralizer room and filter maintenance area, TCW pump area, SJAE and recombiner rooms, upper level above the turbine operating floor.
The unit coolers are supplied with chilled water from the Chilled Water System.
Temperature controls for the unit coolers and electric unit heaters are located in the unit inlet air path or installed nearby in the room served.
9.4.4.2.2 E/B HVAC General Description The E/B HVAC schematic diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-2c.
9.4.4.2.2.1 Electrical Building HVAC System The Electrical Building HVAC System is provided with two 100% capacity air supply fans and two 100% capacity exhaust fans.
The air supply fan draws outside air through louvers, control dampers, low efficiency filters, and chilled water coils, and discharges air directly into the switchgear, chiller, combustion turbine generator, house boiler and air compressor rooms. Ductwork and bypass dampers are provided to allow recirculation of air from the switchgear and chiller rooms.
The E/B HVAC system maintains the Electrical Building at a positive pressure with respect to atmosphere.
The exhaust system discharges air directly to the atmosphere through shutoff dampers and outside louvers.
9.4.4.2.2.2 E/B HVAC Unit Coolers and Electric Unit Heaters Local unit coolers and/or electric unit heaters are provided as required in the chiller, air compressor and combustion turbine generator rooms. The unit coolers are supplied with chilled water from the Chilled Water System.
Temperature controls for the unit coolers and electric unit heaters are located in the unit inlet air path or installed nearby in the area served.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.4.3 Evaluation The TBS and E/B HVAC have no safety design bases and serve no safety function.
The T/B HVAC is designed to maintain airflows from potentially low airborne radioactivity areas to areas of higher potential radioactivity. Ventilation system releases are monitored at the plant stack in compliance with GDC 60 and 64. Where a system is provided with a redundant fan, failure of an operating fan automatically starts the standby fan to maintain continuity of ventilation.
The exhaust air from the T/B HVAC is monitored for radioactivity prior to discharge from the plant stack. Upon detection of high radiation, alarms are annunciated locally and in the main control room. Refer to Section 11.5 for a description of the Radiological Monitoring System.
Evaluation of the T/B HVAC and E/B HVAC with respect to fire protection is discussed in Subsection 9.5.1. Fire dampers with fusible links in HVAC ductwork will close under airflow conditions after fusible link melts.
9.4.4.4 Inspections and Test Requirements The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, belts, coils, filters, duct work dampers, piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system. Standby components can be tested periodically to ensure system availability.
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation, and as integrated systems after installation, to ensure design performance. The systems are preoperationally tested in accordance with requirements of Chapter 14.
Periodic inspections and measurements include airflows, water flows, air and water temperatures, filter pressure drops, controls positions, to verify the systems condition, and ensure operability and integrity of the systems for normal plant operation.
9.4.4.5 Instrumentation Application All control actuations, indicators, and alarms for normal plant operation are located in local control panels in the T/B HVAC and E/B HVAC equipment areas. Any one or more alarms at a local control panel will be retransmitted to the main control room as a single alarm.
Controls and instrumentation for the T/B HVAC and E/B HVAC include:
(1)  Heating and cooling temperature indicators and controls for the entering mixed air and recirculated air.
(2)  Local low and high temperature switches and alarms for heated and cooled air supply with summary panel trouble alarm to the control room computer.
9.4-14                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    Differential pressure indicators, differential pressure switches, and high alarm for the air filters.
(4)    Airflow indicator and control for each supply fan.
(5)    Airflow failure switch and alarm for each exhaust fan, with summary panel trouble alarm to the control room computer.
9.4.5 Reactor Building HVAC System The safety-related and non-safety-related equipment areas of the Reactor Building are served by the reactor building HVAC system and is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature to insure the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of equipment and components. The Reactor Building HVAC System is composed of the following subsystems:
(1)    R/B Secondary Containment HVAC System (2)    R/B Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System (3)    R/B Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System (4)    R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System (5)    R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System (6)    R/B Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System (7)    R/B Mainsteam Tunnel HVAC System (8)    R/B Reactor Internal Pump ASD HVAC System 9.4.5.1 R/B Secondary Containment HVAC System 9.4.5.1.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases Except for the secondary containment inboard and outboard isolation damper, the system is classified as non-safety-related.
The R/B Secondary Containment HVAC System is designed to isolate the secondary containment in a harsh environment with redundant Seismic Category I inboard and outboard safety-related dampers, but otherwise has no other safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related equipment or component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown. Provisions are incorporated to minimize release of radioactive substances to atmosphere and to prevent operator exposure.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                    9.4-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.5.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Secondary Containment HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and airflow patterns to insure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of equipment and components.
A negative pressure of 6.4mm water gauge is normally maintained in the secondary containment relative to the outside atmosphere.
The system design is based on outdoor summer conditions of 46&deg;C and outdoor winter conditions of -40&deg;C.
Design inside air temperatures for the secondary containment during normal operation is 40&deg;C maximum in the summer and 10&deg;C minimum in the winter.
9.4.5.1.2 System Description The Reactor Building secondary containment HVAC System P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-3.
The system flow rates are given in Table 9.4-3, and the system component thermal capacities are given in Table 9.4-4. The HVAC System is a once-through type. Outdoor air is filtered, tempered and delivered to the secondary containment. The supply air system consists of filters, heating coils, cooling coils, and three 50% supply fans located in the Turbine Building. Two are normally operating and the other is on standby. The supply fan delivers conditioned air through ductwork and registers to the secondary containment equipment rooms and passages.
The exhaust air system consists of 3 filters and 3-50% capacity fans to be located in the Turbine Building. The exhaust fans pull air from the secondary containment rooms through ductwork, and filters. Monitors measure radioactivity before it is exhausted from the plant stack. HVAC air supply and exhaust used by the ACS for primary containment deinerting is discussed in Subsection 6.2.5.2.1(14) and the shutdown mode of operation in Subsection 6.2.5.2(3). Electric unit heaters are located in the large component entrance building. Supply air is directed into the space when the interior doors are open.
9.4.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the Secondary Containment HVAC System is not a prerequisite to assurance of either of the following:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
(2)  Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition.
However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operation. The following signals automatically isolate the Secondary Containment HVAC System:
(1)  Secondary containment high radiation signal (LDS) 9.4-16                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)    Refueling floor high radiation signal (LDS)
(3)    Drywell pressure high signal (LDS)
(4)    Reactor water level low signal (LDS)
(5)    Secondary containment HVAC supply/exhaust fans stop On a smoke alarm in a division of the secondary containment HVAC System, the HVAC System shall be put into smoke removal mode. To remove smoke from the secondary containment, the exhaust filter by-pass dampers are opened, standby exhaust and supply fans are started to provide an increase in airflow through the secondary containment. The divisions that are not on fire shall have their exhaust dampers closed to a partially closed position. This position shall be set during system setup. When the exhaust dampers are partially closed, the non-fire divisions pressure will be maintained at a positive pressure. The division experiencing the fire will be maintained more negative with respect to the non-fire divisions.
Fire zone dampers can isolate the division with the fire until smoke removal is required. When fire doors are opened between divisions, the air pressure in the non-fire zones will limit smoke intrusion. Fire dampers with fusible links in HVAC ductwork will close under airflow conditions after fusible link melts.
9.4.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, belts, coils, filters, ductwork, dampers, piping and valves, to assure the integrity and capability of the system. Standby components can be tested periodically to ensure system availability.
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation and as integrated systems after installation, to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.1.5 Instrumentation Application The Secondary Containment HVAC System is started manually. Fan inlet dampers are interlocked to open before the fan is started. A flow switch installed in the operating fans discharge ductwork automatically starts the standby fan on indication of any operating fan failure due to a reduction in air.
The pneumatically-operated secondary containment inboard and outboard isolation dampers fail to the closed position in the event of loss of pneumatic pressure or loss of electrical power to the valve actuating solenoids. Upon receiving a leak detection system signal (Subsection 9.4.5.1.3), the isolation dampers automatically close, supply and exhaust fans stop, and a start Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 signal calls for automatic SGTS operation. The supply fans and exhaust fans are interlocked to prevent operation of the supply fans when the exhaust fans are shut down.
9.4.5.2 R/B Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System 9.4.5.2.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases The R/B Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System is designed to provide a controlled temperature environment to ensure the continued operation of safety-related equipment in harsh environment under accident conditions. The rooms cooled by the Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System are maintained at negative pressure relative to atmosphere by the secondary containment HVAC System during the normal operating mode, and by standby gas treatment system in isolation mode.
The systems and components are Seismic Category I and are located in the Reactor Building, separate and independent compartments of a Seismic Category I structure that is tornado/hurricane missile, and flood protected.
Fire protection has been evaluated and is described in Subsection 9.5.1.
9.4.5.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The system is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to ensure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of Reactor Building equipment. The systems are designed to facilitate periodic inspection of the principal system components.
9.4.5.2.2 System Description The R/B Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System consists of 12 safety-related fan coil units (FCU) of division A, B, or C. Each FCU has the responsibility to cool one safety-related equipment room in the secondary containment. The safety-related equipment HVAC (fan coil units) system P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-3. Space temperatures are maintained less than 40&deg;C normally and less than 66&deg;C during pump operation:
(1)    RHR(A) pump room (2)    RHR(B) pump room (3)    RHR(C) pump room (4)    HPCF(B) pump room (5)    HPCF(C) pump room (6)    RCIC pump room 9.4-18                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)    FCS(B) room (8)    FCS(C) room (9)    SGTS(B) room (10) SGTS(C) room (11) CAMS(A) room (12) CAMS(B) room 9.4.5.2.2.1 RHR, HPCF and RCIC Pump Room HVAC Systems The FCUs automatically start when RHR pumps, HPCF pumps, and RCIC turbine are started.
These rooms are normally cooled by the Secondary Containment HVAC System. The fan coil units are open ended and recirculate cooling air within the space served. Space heat is removed by cooling water passing through the coil section. Divisional Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) is used as the cooling medium. The units are fed from the same divisional power as that for the equipment being served. Drain pan discharge (condensate) is routed to a floor drain located within the room.
9.4.5.2.2.2 FCS Room HVAC Systems Cooling of the FCS rooms are automatically initiated upon receipt of a secondary containment isolation signal or a manual FCS start signal.
These rooms are cooled by the Secondary Containment HVAC System during normal conditions. The units are open ended and recirculate cooling air within the space served. Space heat is removed by cooling water passing through the coil section. Divisional RCW is used as the cooling medium. The units are fed from the same divisional power as that for the FCS being served. Humidity is not specifically maintained at a set range, but is automatically determined by the surface temperature of the cooling coil. Drain pan discharge (condensate) is routed to a floor drain located within the room.
9.4.5.2.2.3 SGTS and CAMS HVAC Systems Cooling of the SGTS and CAMS rooms are automatically initiated upon receipt of a secondary containment isolation signal.
These rooms are cooled by the Secondary Containment HVAC System during normal conditions. The units are open ended and recirculate cooling air within the space served. Space heat is removed by cooling water passing through the coil section. Divisional RCW is used as the cooling medium. The units are fed from the same divisional power as that for the equipment being served. Drain pan discharge (condensate) is routed to a floor drain located within the room.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.5.2.3 Safety Evaluation All equipment is located completely in a Seismic Category I structure that is tornado/hurricane missile and flood protected. All equipment is designed to Engineered Safety Feature requirements.
9.4.5.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
Each HVAC System is periodically tested to assure availability upon demand. Equipment layout provides easy access for inspection and testing.
9.4.5.2.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation and controls for the Secondary Containment Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System are designed for manual or automatic operation when safety-related equipment starts.
Also, manual override from pushbutton stations in the main control room or at the MCC serving the unit.
9.4.5.3 Reactor Building Non-Safety-Related Equipment HVAC System 9.4.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Non-safety-related Equipment HVAC System has no safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown.
9.4.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Non-safety-related Equipment HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to insure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of equipment and components.
9.4.5.3.2 System Description The R/B Non-Safety-Related HVAC System consists of six air handling units. The following rooms are cooled by the HVAC System:
(1)    ISI room (2)    CRD control room (3)    SPCU pump room 9.4-20                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)    Refueling machine control room (5)    R/B Fuel pool cooling unit A (6)    R/B Fuel pool cooling unit B These rooms are cooled by the Secondary Containment HVAC System during normal conditions. The units are open ended and recirculate cooling air within the space served. Space heat is removed by cooling water passing through the coil section. HVAC normal cooling water or divisional RCW is used as the cooling medium. The units are fed from the non-divisional power source. Humidity is not specifically maintained at a set range, but is automatically determined by the surface temperature of the cooling coil. Drain pan discharge (condensate) is routed to a drain sump located within the room.
9.4.5.3.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the R/B Non-safety-related Equipment HVAC System is not a prerequisite to assurance of either of the following:
(1)    Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)    Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operations.
9.4.5.3.4 Inspection The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, belts, coils, and valves, to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.3.5 Instrumentation Application The R/B Non-safety-related Equipment HVAC System starts manually.
9.4.5.4 R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System 9.4.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases The R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System is designed to provide a controlled temperature environment to ensure the continued operation of safety-related equipment under accident conditions. The rooms cooled by the R/B Safety-Related Electrical Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Equipment HVAC System are maintained at positive pressure relative to atmosphere during normal and accident conditions. This is achieved by sizing intake fans larger than exhaust fans.
The power supplies to the HVAC systems for the R/B safety-related electrical equipment rooms allow uninterrupted operation in the event of loss of normal offsite power.
The system and components are located in a Seismic Category I structure that are tornado/hurricane missile, and flood protected, including tornado missile barriers on intake and exhaust structures.
For compliance with code standards and regulatory guides, see Sections 3.2 and 1.8.
On a smoke alarm in a division of the Reactor Building Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System, that division of the HVAC System shall be put into smoke removal mode manually. No other division is affected by this action. For smoke removal, the recirculation damper is closed, the exhaust fan bypass damper opened, the exhaust fan is stopped, and the smoke removal fan is started in conjunction with the supply fan. Normal once through ventilation of the day tank rooms also removes smoke from the day tank rooms.
The intake louvers are located at 15.2m above grade. The exhaust louvers are located at 13.3m above grade. (See general arrangement layout, Figures 1.2-10 and 1.2-11.)
9.4.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The system is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to ensure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of safety-related electrical equipment. The system is designed to facilitate periodic inspection of the principal system components.
The system design is based on outdoor summer conditions of 46.1&deg;C and outdoor winter conditions of -40&deg;C. The indoor design temperature in the safety-related electrical equipment areas is 40&deg;C maximum in the summer and a minimum of 10&deg;C in the winter except 50&deg;C in the diesel generator (DG) engine rooms during DG operation. The system along with the DG supply fan maintain DG room temperature below 50&deg;C.
9.4.5.4.2 System Description Divisions A, B, and C Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC Systems are independent, physically separated, and functionally identical except for their power bus designations and divisional source of cooling water. The HVAC System for each division of safety-related electrical equipment consists of two 100% capacity supply fans, two 100% capacity exhaust fans, and one air conditioning unit. Each air conditioning unit consists of a medium grade filter and a cooling coil. (See Figure 9.4-4 for the system P&ID. See Table 9.4-4 for the component descriptions.) The following divisional rooms are cooled by the Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System :
(1)    Day tank room, Divisions A, B, C 9.4-22                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)    Diesel generator engine room, Divisions A, B, C (3)    Non-safety-related reactor internal pump ASD rooms (4)    Electrical equipment room, Divisions I, II, III, IV (5)    HVAC equipment room, Divisions A, B, C (6)    Remote shutdown panel room, Divisions A, B (7)    Diesel generator MCC area, Divisions A, B, C (8)    Non-Safety-Related FMCRD control panel rooms HVAC system Division A serves electrical Division I, Division B serves electrical Divisions II and IV, and Division C serves electrical Division III of the electrical equipment rooms. Also, non-safety-related reactor internal pumps ASD rooms are cooled by the Electrical Equipment HVAC system.
9.4.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation All safety-related equipment is located in a Seismic Category I structure that is tornado/hurricane missile and flood protected. All HVAC equipment is designed to Engineered Safety Feature requirements.
9.4.5.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The systems are designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, coils, filters, ductwork, dampers, piping, and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system. Standby components can be tested periodically to ensure system availability.
The medium-grade filter differential pressure instrumentation is provided to determine the appropriate filter change out period. All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.4.5 Instrumentation Application The R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC Systems of each division are started manually from a station located in the main control room. Air-flow failure is sensed by a flow switch which automatically starts the standby fan and activates an alarm in the control room to indicate the fan failure. The safety-related electrical equipment area exhaust fans start automatically when the air conditioning unit supply fan starts.
Temperature control is accomplished by monitoring the air temperature leaving the cooling coils. Temperature and flow are set for maximum operating loads. HECW flow is controlled by the temperature indicating controller.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Fire dampers separating electrical Divisions II and IV rooms that use fusible links in HVAC ductwork will close under airflow conditions after fusible links melt.
9.4.5.5 R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System 9.4.5.5.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-3. The R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System flow rates are given in Table 9.4-3 and the system component descriptions are given in Table 9.4-4. The R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System is designed to provide filtered outdoor cooling air to ensure the continued operation of safety-related diesels under accident conditions. The power supplies to the outdoor cooling air supply systems for the safety-related diesel generator allow uninterrupted operation in the event of loss of normal offsite power.
Each division of three HVAC system divisions and components are Seismic Category I and are located in separate and independent compartments of the Reactor Building, a Seismic Category I structure that is tornado/hurricane missile, and flood protected, including tornado/hurricane missile barriers on intake and exhaust structures.
For compliance with code standards and regulatory guides, see Sections 3.2 and 1.8.
For information on fire protection and smoke removal methods for the Safety-related Diesel Generator HVAC Systems, see Subsection 9.4.5.4.1.1.
9.4.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The system is designed to provide outdoor air to ensure the integrity of the safety-related diesel generators. The system is designed to facilitate periodic inspection of the principal system components.
9.4.5.5.2 System Description The R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generated HVAC System for each of three diesel generator divisions consists of a filter and two supply fans and associated ductwork. They both take air from the outside through a tornado damper and a fire damper and distribute it to the diesel generator room. The exhaust air is forced out the exhaust louvers and a tornado damper.
9.4.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation The diesel generator rooms are designed to the requirements specified in Section 3.2. The systems are connected to their corresponding division Class 1E bus, are independent, physically separated, and are operable after loss of offsite power supply.
9.4-24                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The diesel generator compartments ventilated by the R/B safety-related Diesel Generator HVAC System are maintained at positive pressure relative to atmosphere when the diesel generators are operating. This is achieved by only using supply fans. At other times the diesel generator compartments are maintained at positive pressure relative to atmosphere by the R/B SREE HVAC System.
The intake louvers are located at 11.5m above grade and exhaust louvers are at 8.5m above grade (see general arrangement drawing, Figures 1.2-9 and 1.2-10).
All HVAC equipment is designed to Engineered Safety Feature requirements.
9.4.5.5.4 Tests and Inspection The safety-related Diesel Generator HVAC Systems are periodically tested to assure availability upon demand. Equipment layout provides easy access for inspection and testing.
9.4.5.5.5 Instrumentation Application The safety-related Diesel Generator HVAC System is interlocked to automatically start the outdoor air cooling fans with the diesel generator starting system with which it serves. A space thermostat shuts one fan down if space temperature is low and restarts the fan if space temperature is high.
The medium-grade filter differential pressure instrumentation is provided to determine the appropriate filter change out period.
Remote-manual override is provided from the main control room so fans can be started or stopped at any time.
The safety-related D/G HVAC System together with R/B Safety-related Electrical Equipment HVAC System maintain DG engine room temperature below 50&deg;C.
9.4.5.6 R/B Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System 9.4.5.6.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System has no safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown. Provisions are incorporated to minimize release of radioactive substances to the atmosphere.
9.4.5.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System is capable of supplying filtered air to the drywell and wetwell penetrations of the Atmospheric Control System (ACS), and removing Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 air/nitrogen from the ACS system drywell and wetwell penetrations and discharge out the plant stack. Refer to Subsection 6.2.5.2(3) for deinerting procedures and 6.2.5.2(14) for inerting procedures.
9.4.5.6.2 System Description The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System consists of the supply fan, HEPA filter, an exhaust fan, ductwork, and controls. The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-3.
The system, when in use and if the air is not radioactive, discharges to the secondary containment HVAC System for filtering and discharge to the plant stack. If the air is radioactive, it is discharged through the SGTS system. During refueling, the airflow will be at least 3 air changes per hour of the drywell free air volume. Personnel entry into the drywell or wetwell shall not be permitted until a breathable oxygen level is obtained.
The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System takes its air supply from the Secondary Containment HVAC System air supply (Figure 9.4-3).
9.4.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System is not required to assure either of the following conditions:
(1)    Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)    Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operations.
9.4.5.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Primary Containment Supply/Exhaust System is designed to facilitate implementation of a program of periodic inspection to assure proper function and reliability of all equipment and controls.
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.6.5 Instrumentation The secondary containment exhaust radiation monitoring system detects high radiation in the primary containment exhaust. A high radiation signal actuates an alarm and closes the secondary containment isolation valve in the supply and exhaust ducts and automatically starts 9.4-26                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 the SGTS. The SGTS is started when the drywell or wetwell radiation monitor level is high and before purging is started.
9.4.5.7 R/B Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System 9.4.5.7.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.7.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System has no safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2.
Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown. Provisions are incorporated to minimize release of radioactive substances to the atmosphere and to prevent operator exposure.
9.4.5.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and airflow patterns to ensure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of equipment and components.
9.4.5.7.2 System Description See Figure 9.4-3 for the P&ID of the Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System. The HVAC System is a closed system. Two fan coil units provide cooling to the steam tunnel. Each fan coil unit consists of a cooling coil and two fans. One fan is normally operating, with one on standby. The fan furnishes cooled air through ductwork and registers to various locations within the steam tunnel.
9.4.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is not required to assure either of the following:
(1)    Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)    Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operation.
9.4.5.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is inspected periodically to assure that all operating equipment and controls are functioning properly. Standby components are periodically tested to ensure that the standby equipment is operational.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.7.5 Instrumentation Application The Main Steam Tunnel HVAC System is started manually. A flow switch installed in the operating fan discharge ductwork automatically starts the standby fan on indication of operating fan failure.
9.4.5.8 R/B Reactor Internal Pump ASD HVAC System 9.4.5.8.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Reactor Internal Pump ASD HVAC System has no safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown.
9.4.5.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Reactor Internal Pump ASD HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature to insure the integrity of the RIP ASD.
9.4.5.8.2 System Description Divisions 1 and 2 RIP ASD HVAC Systems are identical. The HVAC System for each division of the reactor internal pump ASD HVAC consists of two supply fans and a cooling coil. See Figure 9.4-5 for the system P&ID. The RIP ASD HVAC System flow rates are shown in Table 9.4-3, and the system component descriptions are given in Table 9.4-4.
9.4.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the RIP ASD HVAC System is not required to assure either of the following:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)  Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operation.
On an alarm of recirculation fan failure, the standby fan is automatically started, and an alarm is sounded inside the control room indicating fan failure.
9.4-28                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.5.8.4 Inspection The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, belts, coils, and valves, to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.5.8.5 Instrument Application The RIP ASD HVAC Systems are started manually from a station located in the main control room. Airflow failure sensed by the flow switch automatically starts the standby fan and activates an alarm in the control room to indicate the fan failure.
9.4.6 Radwaste Building HVAC System 9.4.6.1 Design Bases 9.4.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The Radwaste Building HVAC System has no safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2.
Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown. Provisions are incorporated to minimize release of radioactive substances to the atmosphere and to prevent operator exposure. The Radwaste Building HVAC System P&ID is shown in Figure 9.4-10.
9.4.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The Radwaste Building HVAC System is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and airflow patterns to insure both the comfort and safety of plant personnel and the integrity of equipment and components. The Radwaste Building is divided into two zones for air conditioning and ventilation purposes. These zones are the radwaste control room and the balance of the Radwaste Building.
A positive static pressure with respect to the balance of the building and to the atmosphere is maintained in the radwaste control room. The balance of the Radwaste Building is maintained at a negative static pressure with respect to the atmosphere.
The system design is based on an outdoor summer maximum of 46&deg;C. Summer indoor temperatures include 24&deg;C in the radwaste control room, 32&deg;C in operating areas and corridors, a maximum temperature of 40&deg;C in areas that may be occupied and 43&deg;C in the equipment cells.
Winter indoor design temperatures include 16&deg;C in occupied areas, 21&deg;C in the radwaste control room and 16&deg;C in the equipment cells, based on an outdoor design temperature of -
40&deg;C.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.6.2 System Description The COL applicant will provide an equipment list and system flow rates including RG 1.140 compliance for NRC review (Subsection 9.4.10.2).
9.4.6.2.1 Radwaste Building Control Room Heating, cooling and pressurization of the control room are accomplished by an air-conditioning system. The air-conditioning system is a unit air-conditioner consisting of a water-cooled condenser, compressor, cooling coil, heating coil, filters and fan. Outdoor air and recirculating air are mixed and drawn through a prefilter, a high efficiency filter, a heating coil, a cooling coil, and two 100% supply fans. One fan is normally operating and the other fan is on standby. A pressure differential controller regulates the exfiltration from the control room to maintain it at a positive static pressure, preventing airborne radioactive contamination from entering. No separate exhaust fan system is required.
The Radwaste Control Room HVAC Smoke Removal System consists of one 100% fan. This fan is operated manually. Smoke from the control room is released directly to the atmosphere.
An area radiation monitor is provided in the radwaste control room and will alarm on high radiation to alert personnel in the area.
9.4.6.2.2 Radwaste Building Process Area HVAC System The Radwaste Building Process Area HVAC System is a once-through type. Outdoor air is filtered, tempered and delivered to the non-contaminated areas of the building. The supply air system consists of a prefilter, a high efficiency filter, heating coil, cooling coil, and two 100%
supply fans. One fan is normally operating and the other fan is on standby. The supply fan furnishes conditioned air through ductwork and diffusers, or registers to the work areas of the building. Electric unit heaters are provided in the trailer bays and the sorting table area. Air from the work areas is exhausted through the tank and pump rooms. Thus, the overall airflow pattern is from the least potentially contaminated areas to the most contaminated areas.
The exhaust air system consists of three 50% exhaust fans, two normally operating and one on standby. Exhaust air from the Radwaste Building is filtered through a prefilter and a high efficiency filter before release to the plant stack and it is monitored for airborne radioactivity.
A high level of radioactivity activates an alarm in the main control room, simultaneously isolating the process area. The exhaust air is monitored before it is released to the main plant stack.
9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation Although the HVAC System is not safety-related as defined in Section 3.2, several features are provided to insure safe operation. A completely separate HVAC System is provided for the radwaste control room. Pressure control fans for radwaste areas are redundant, with provision 9.4-30                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 for automatic start of the standby unit. Area and process exhaust radiation detectors and isolation dampers are provided to permit isolation of the radwaste process areas.
9.4.6.4 Tests and Inspections The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, belts, coils, filters, ductwork, piping and valves, to assure the integrity and capability of the system. Local display and/or indicating devices are provided for periodic inspection of vital parameters such as room temperature, and test connections are provided in exhaust filter trains and piping for periodic checking of air and water flows for conformance to the design requirements. All major components are tested and inspected as separate components prior to installation to ensure design performance. The system is preoperationally tested in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 14.
9.4.6.5 Instrumentation Application 9.4.6.5.1 Radwaste Building Control Room The air-conditioning unit for the radwaste control room HVAC is started manually. A temperature indicating controller modulates the air-conditioning system via chilled water valves and an electric heating coil to maintain space conditions. A differential pressure indicating controller modulates inlet vanes in the supply fan air inlets to maintain the positive static room pressure. Differential pressure indicators measure the pressure drop across the filter bank.
9.4.6.5.2 Radwaste Building Process Area HVAC The air exhaust and supply fans for the Radwaste Building Process Area HVAC are started manually. The fan inlet dampers open when the fan is started. A flow switch installed in the exhaust fan discharge duct actuates an alarm on indication of fan failure in the main and radwaste control rooms and automatically starts the standby fan. The exhaust fan is interlocked with the supply fan to prevent the supply fan from operating if the exhaust fan is shut down.
Two pressure-indicating controllers modulate variable inlet vanes in the supply fan to maintain the area at a negative static pressure with respect to the atmosphere. The switch causes an alarm to be actuated if the negative pressure falls below the preset limit.
Differential pressure indicators measure the pressure drop across the filter section. The switch causes an alarm to be actuated if the pressure drop exceeds the preset limit.
Radiation monitors are installed in the radwaste process area exhaust duct to the main plant stack. A high radiation signal in the duct causes alarms to annunciate in the main control room and the radwaste control room.
If the radwaste process area exhaust radiation alarm continues to annunciate, the work area branch ducts are manually isolated selectively to locate the affected building area. Should this Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-31
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 technique fail, because the airborne radiation has generally spread throughout the building, control room air conditioning continues operating. However, the air conditioning for the balance of the building is shut down. The operators, using approved plant health physics procedures, then enter the work areas to locate and isolate the leakage source.
The supply and exhaust air ductwork have manual balancing dampers provided in the branch ducts for balancing purposes. The dampers are locked in place after the system is balanced.
9.4.6.5.3 Incinerator Exhaust Stack Radiation monitors are installed in the incinerator exhaust stack. A high radiation signal in the stack causes alarms to annunciate in the main control room and the radwaste control room. See Subsection 11.5.2.2.11 and Table 11.5-2.
9.4.7 R/B Safety-Related Diesel Generator HVAC System The safety-related Diesel Generator HVAC System is part of the Reactor Building HVAC System described in Subsection 9.4.5.5.
9.4.8 Service Building HVAC System This system serves all areas within the Service Building, including locker rooms, men and womens change rooms, laundry, lunch room, instrument repair room, HVAC equipment rooms, and the Technical Support Center (TSC). This system operates during all normal station conditions.
The Service Building HVAC System consists of two subsystems; the Clean Area HVAC System and the Controlled Area HVAC System.
9.4.8.1 Design Basis 9.4.8.1.1 Safety Design Basis The Service Building HVAC System is not required to function in any but the normal station operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety bases.
9.4.8.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases (1)    The Clean Area HVAC System is designed to maintain a quality environment suitable for personnel health and safety in the Service Building. It is designed to limit the maximum temperature in the Service Building to 29&deg;C. The temperature in each area conforms to the equipment requirements in that area.
(2)    The Clean Area HVAC System provides a quantity of filtered outdoor air to purge any possible contamination.
9.4-32                                                      Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    Both the Clean Area HVAC System and the Controlled Area HVAC System operate manually and continuously. Isolation dampers at each supply fan, each exhaust fan, and each filter package close when the respective equipment is not operating. There is an additional isolation damper at the supply air inlet which closes when the supply air system is not operating. An automatic damper in the supply system ductwork regulates the flow of air to maintain the Service Building clean areas at a positive pressure with respect to the atmosphere.
(4)    In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the Service Building HVAC System is shut down.
(5)    The clean areas served by the clean area HVAC system has an emergency filter train.
It is manually operated. In an emergency it supplies filtered air for the TSC, OSC, lunch room, offices, health physics lab, security offices, and other normally clean areas.
9.4.8.2 System Description (1)    The Clean Area HVAC System supplies filtered, heated or cooled air to both the clean and controlled areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, Air Conditioning Unit consisting of filters, heating coils, cooling coils, two 50% capacity supply air fans and supply air ductwork.
(2)    The Clean Area HVAC System has two 50% capacity exhaust air fans. They take air from the clean areas through the exhaust ducts and discharge the air on the Service Building roof.
(3)    The Controlled Area HVAC System routes potentially contaminated air to two 50%
capacity exhaust air fans to discharge the air to the common plant stack.
(4)    The potentially contaminated areas are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding clean areas and, therefore, the air flows from the clean areas to these potentially contaminated areas.
(5)    Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown.
(6)    The clean area HVAC system is provided with an emergency filter train consisting of a heater/demister, prefilter, HEPA filter, 5.1 cm charcoal filter bed, a second HEPA filter, and two fans.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                    9.4-33
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Controls and Instrumentation (a)    Each fan and each exhaust filter package is controlled by hand switches located on local control panels. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are also indicated on the local control panels. Trouble on local control panel is annunciated on the main control board.
(b)    Controls are pneumatic and electric.
(c)    Radiation monitors and provisions for toxic gas monitors at the supply air inlet with alarms to TSC.
(d)    On manual initiation, the clean area HVAC system can be put into high radiation mode. On switch over, exhaust fans stop and emergency filter train starts. System pressurizes clean areas of the service building.
(e)    Instrumentation is provided for the monitoring system operating variable during normal station operating conditions. The loss of airflow, high and low system temperature, and high differential pressure across various filters are annunciated on the local control panel. Trouble on the local panel is annunciated in the main control room.
(8)  All power and water is provided from non-safety-related sources.
(9)  The COL applicant will provide a detailed P&ID, system flow rates an equipment list, and compliance with RG 1.140 and toxic gas protection requirements and description of radiation monitors (if any) at the supply air inlet, for the Service Building HVAC system, including the TSC and the OSC, for NRC review. The COL applicant will perform TSC radiological consequence analyses, considering plant and site conditions, to ensure that TSC radiological habitability design features ensure that doses to an individual do not exceed 5 rem whole body or 30 rem thyroid over the 30-day post-accident period. These acceptance criteria are consistent with NUREG-0696, which references GDC-19 and SRP 6.4. These analyses will ensure that the equipment described in this section provides adequate TSC habitability. (See Subsection 9.4.10.1 for COL License Information.)
9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation (1)  The Service Building HVAC System is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown conditions.
(2)  Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown.
(3)  The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station conditions.
(4)  Clean areas are provided with emergency filtration system and a high radiation mode of operation.
9.4-34                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)    There are no sources (except health physics samples and calibration sources) of radioactivity inside the Service Building. However, the radiation levels inside the controlloed area of the Service Building can become to high due to leakage from the secondary containment or from the Turbine Building. If this happens, the controlled area HVAC system can be manually isolated to prevent releases to the environment via the subject HVAC system exhaust.
9.4.8.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air, and water flows and system operating pressures.
Controls, interlocks and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance.
Maintenance will be performed on a scheduled basis in accordance with the equipment manufacturers requirements.
The system is in operation during normal plant operation.
9.4.9 Drywell Cooling System 9.4.9.1 Design Bases The Drywell Cooling System shall have the capability to maintain the drywell temperature, during normal operation, at temperatures specified in Section 3.11.
The Drywell Cooling System shall be capable of controlling the temperature rise of the drywell during normal operational transients so that the average drywell temperature does not exceed 58&deg;C. The local temperature shall not exceed 75&deg;C in the CRD area or 66&deg;C elsewhere in the drywell.
The Drywell Cooling System is designed to provide sufficient air/nitrogen distribution so that proper temperature distribution can be achieved to prevent hot spots from occurring in any area of the drywell.
9.4.9.2 System Description See Figures 9.4-8 and 9.4-9 for flow diagrams illustrating the drywell cooling system, and Table 9.4-1 for a listing of its components.The Drywell Cooling System is a recirculating system consisting of three fan coil units. Normally, two of the three fan coil units are in operation. Each fan coil unit consists of cooling coils, a drain pan, and a centrifugal fan. Cooling water comes from the RCW and HNCW Systems. Two sets of cooling coils are arranged in series. The return air passes over the first coil, which is cooled by the RCW System. Part of the cooled air is then cooled by the second coil, which is cooled by the HNCW System. This twice-cooled air is mixed with the air that bypasses the second cooling coil. Condensate that drips Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                    9.4-35
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 from the coils is routed to the drain system via the Leak Detection System. Instrumentation is installed in front of the Leak Detection System connection that monitors cooler condensate flow.
The Drywell Cooling System supplies conditioned air to a common distribution header. The air/nitrogen is then ducted to areas within the drywell for equipment cooling. These areas consist of the drywell head area, upper drywell, lower drywell, and reactor shield wall annulus.
The Drywell Cooling System heat loads are provided in Table 9.4-2.
Gravity dampers and adjustable balancing dampers control distribution of the air/nitrogen to the various drywell spaces.
High drywell temperatures are alarmed in the main control room, alerting the operator to take appropriate corrective action. During normal plant operation, two fan coil units are operated.
During LOPP (when no LOCA signal exists), fan coil units shall restart automatically when power is available from the combustion turbine generator. During a LOPP, chilled water from the HNCW System may or may not be available, but cooling should always be available from the RCW coils. The drywell fan coil units are not operated during a LOCA.
9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation Operation of the Drywell Cooling System is not a prerequisite to assurance of either one of the following:
(1)  Integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (2)  Capability to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain a safe shutdown condition However, the system does incorporate features that provide reliability over the full range of normal plant operation. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components such as:
(1)  Electric power (2)  Fan coil units (3)  Redundant chillers (4)  Ductwork (5)  Controls (6)  Cross-connection of all fan coil units 9.4-36                                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.4.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Equipment design includes provisions for periodic testing of functional performance and inspection for system reliability. Standby components are fitted with test connections so that system effectiveness, except for airflow or static pressure, can be verified without the units being online. Test connections are provided in the discharge air ducts for verifying calibration of the operating controls.
9.4.9.5 Instrumentation Applications Drywell cooling unit function is manually controlled from the main control room. The instrumentation which monitors system performance is part of the Atmospheric Control System and the Leak Detection and Isolation Systems.
9.4.10 COL License Information 9.4.10.1 Service Building HVAC System The COL applicant shall provide a detailed P&ID, system flow rates and an equipment list, compliance with RG 1.140, toxic gas protection requirements, and description of radiation monitors at the supply air inlet (if any), for the Service Building HVAC system, including the TSC and OSC, for NRC review. The COL applicant will perform TSC radiological consequence analyses, considering plant and site conditions, to ensure that TSC radiological habitability design features ensure that doses to an individual do not exceed 5 rem whole body or 30 rem thyroid over the 30-day post-accident period. (Subsection 9.4.8.2) 9.4.10.2 Radwaste Building HVAC System The COL applicant shall supply detailed equipment lists and system flow rates and compliance with RG 1.140 for the Radwaste Building HVAC System (Subsection 9.4.6.2).
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-1 Drywell Cooling System Non-Safety-Related Components RCW Cooling Coils Number                                    3 Type                                      Plate Fin Airflow Rate                              1000 m3/min.
Cooling Capacity                          1023.42 MJ/h Air Temperature (Inlet/Outlet)            57&deg;C/42&deg;C Water Temperature (Inlet/Outlet)          35&deg;C/40&deg;C Water Flow Rate                          13.5 L/s HNCW Cooling Coils Number                                    2 Type                                      Plate Fin Air Flow Rate                            277 m3/min.
Cooling Capacity                          791.31 MJ/h Air Temperature (Inlet/Outlet)            44&deg;C/12&deg;C Water Temperature (Inlet/Outlet)          7&deg;C/12&deg;C Water Flow Rate                          10.5 L/s Fans Number                                    3 Type                                      Centrifugal Capacity                                  1000 m3/min.
Head                                      1.47E+03 Pa 9.4-38                                                Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-2 Drywell Cooling System Non-Safety-Related Heat Loads Normal Plant Operation Sensible Heat Load Heat Loads                                                                        MJ/h Sensible Heat Loads                Drywell Head Area                            146.5 Upper Drywell                                837.4 Lower Drywell                                180 Shield Wall Annulus                          782.9 Upper Drywell Piping Area                    1067.6 Equipment                          Fan Motors                                  33.5 Heatup Load of Fans                          293.1 Sensible Heat Load (Total)                                                      3341*
Latent Heat Load                                                                297.3 Design Heat Load                                                                3638.3
* The sensible heat load during plant maintenance mode is about 460.5 MJ/h.
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                9.4-39
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-3 HVAC Flow Rates (Response to Question 430.243)
Safety-Related HVAC System                    Flow Rates (m3/h)
R/B Electrical HVAC Division A                30,000 R/B Electrical HVAC Division B                30,000 R/B Electrical HVAC Division C                30,000 DG HVAC Division A                            160,000 DG HVAC Division B                            160,000 DG HVAC Division C                            160,000 C/B Electrical HVAC Division A                35,000 C/B Electrical HVAC Division B                35,000 C/B Electrical HVAC Division C                35,000 CRHA HVAC Division B                          80,000 CRHA HVAC Division C                          80,000 Non-Safety-Related HVAC Systems                Flow Rates (m3/h)
R/B Secondary Containment HVAC                168,500 T/B Ventilation System                        341,500 RIP ASD HVAC Division A                        50,000 RIP ASD HVAC Division B                        50,000 Radwaste Building HVAC Service Building HVAC*
* The COL applicant shall supply these flow rates. See COL Subsection 9.4.10.1 for the Service Building and 9.4.10.2 for the Radwaste Building.
9.4-40                                                Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4 HVAC System Component Descriptions - Safety-Related Heating/Cooling Coils (Response to Question 430.243)
Cooling      Heating Heating/Cooling Coils                                  Quantity      (MJ/h)      (MJ/h)
R/B Electrical HVAC Division A                            1        675.25      No Coil Required R/B Electrical HVAC Division B                            1        675.25      No Coil Required R/B Electrical HVAC Division C                            1        675.25      No Coil Required C/B Electrical HVAC Division A                            1        886.26      No Coil Required C/B Electrical HVAC Division B                            1        886.26      No Coil Required C/B Electrical HVAC Division C                            1        886.26      No Coil Required CRHA HVAC Division B                                      1        662.61      591.59 CRHA HVAC Division C                                      1        662.61      591.59 CRHA Emergency HVAC Division B                            1        -            252 CHRA Emergency HVAC Division C                            1        -            252 Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4a HVAC System Component Descriptions - Safety-Related Fans (Response to Question 430.243)
Capacity        Rated Power Fans                                          Quantity              (m3/h)            (kW)
R/B Electrical Div A Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          30,000              75 R/B Electrical Div B Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          30,000              75 R/B Electrical Div C Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          30,000              75 R/B Electrical Div A Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            6,000              4 R/B Electrical Div B Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            6,000              4 R/B Electrical Div C Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            6,000              4 DG Div A Supply Fans                                2                80,000              22 DG Div B Supply Fans                                2                80,000              22 DG Div C Supply Fans                                2                80,000              22 C/B Electrical Div A Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          35,000              75 C/B Electrical Div B Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          35,000              75 C/B Electrical Div C Supply Fans          2 (1 on standby)          35,000              75 C/B Electrical Div A Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            4,000              4 C/B Electrical Div B Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            4,000              4 C/B Electrical Div C Exhaust Fans          2 (1 on standby)            4,000              4 CRHA Div B Supply Fans                    2 (1 on standby)          80,000              22 CRHA Div C Supply Fans                    2 (1 on standby)          80,000              22 CRHA Div B Exhaust Fans                    2 (1 on standby)            5,000              4 CRHA Div C Exhaust Fans                    2 (1 on standby)            5,000              4 CRHA Emergency Div B Filter Supply Fan    2 (1 on standby)            5,100              7.5 CRHA Emergency Div C Filter Supply Fan    2 (1 on standby)            5,100              7.5 9.4-42                                                  Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4b HVAC System Component Descriptions - Safety-Related Filter (Response to Question 430.243)
Filters                                          Quantity Capacity (m3/h)
R/B Electrical Div A Filter                          1        35,000 R/B Electrical Div B Filter                          1        35,000 R/B Electrical Div C Filter                          1        35,000 DG Div A Filter                                      1        200,000 DG Div B Filter                                      1        200,000 DG Div C Filter                                      1        200,000 C/B Electrical Div A Filter                          1        40,000 C/B Electrical Div B Filter                          1        40,000 C/B Electrical Div C Filter                          1        40,000 CRHA Div B Filter                                    1          80,000 CRHA Div C Filter                                    1          80,000 Table 9.4-4c HVAC System Component Descriptions  Emergency Use Adsorption Units (Safety Related)
(Response to Question 430.243)
Emergency Use Adsorption Unit                    Quantity Capacity (m3/h)
CRHA Emergency Div B Filter                          1  5,100 CRHA Emergency Div C Filter                          1  5,100 Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                            9.4-43
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4d Not Used Table 9.4-4e HVAC System Component Descriptions  Safety-Related Fan Coil Units (Response to Question 430.243)
Safety-Related Fan Coil Units          Capacity (MJ/h)
HPCF Pump Room Div B                        460.55 HPCF Pump Room Div C                        460.55 RHR Pump Room Div A                          307.73 RHR Pump Room Div B                          307.73 RHR Pump Room Div C                          307.73 RCIC Pump Room Div A                          69.08 FCS Room Div B                                54.85 FCS Room Div C                                54.85 CAMS Room Div A                              83.74 CAMS Room Div B                              83.74 SGTS Room Div B                              16.75 SGTS Room Div C                              16.75 9.4-44                                            Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4f HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Heating Cooling Coils (Response to Question 430.243)
Cooling        Heating Heating/Cooling Coils                                  Quantity          (MJ/h)        (MJ/h)
R/B Secondary Containment HVAC                      3 (1 on standby)      6435.95        9601.17 RIP ASD HVAC Division A                                    1              2110.15 RIP ASD HVAC Division B                                    1              2110.15 Table 9.4-4g HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Fans (Response to Question 430.243)
Fans                                                                Quantity        Capacity (m3/h)
R/B Secondary Containment Supply Fans                          3 (1 on standby)    84,250 R/B Secondary Containment Exhaust Fans                          3 (1 on standby)    86,250 R/B Primary Containment Supply Fan                                      1          22,000 R/B Primary Containment Exhaust Fan                                    1          22,000 RIP ASD Division A Supply Fans                                  2 (1 on standby)    50,000 RIP ASD Division B Supply Fans                                  2 (1 on standby)    50,000 Table 9.4-4h HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Filters (Response to Question 430.243)
Filters                                                        Quantity      Capacity (m3/h)
R/B Secondary Containment HVAC                              3 (1 on standby)  86,250 R/B Primary Containment Intake HEPA Filter                          1        22,000 R/B Secondary Containment Exhaust Fans                              3        57,500 (each)
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                                  9.4-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.4-4i HVAC System Component DescriptionsNon-Safety-Related Air Handling Units (Response to Question 430.243)
* Non-Safety-Related Air Handling Units                  Quantity              Capacity (MJ/h)
Main Steam Tunnel                                          2                      628.02 Refueling Machine Control Room                              1                        83.74 ISI Room                                                    1                        54.43 MG Set Room                                                2                      1047.96 C/B Non-Safety-Related Electric Room                        1                      211.01 R/B FPC Room                                                2                        28.47 CRD Control Room                                            1                        18.42 SPCU Pump Room                                              1                        42.29
* The COL applicant shall supply equipment lists for the Service Building HVAC and the Radwaste Building HVAC System. See Subsection 9.4.10.1 for the Service Building, and 9.4.10.2 for the Radwaste Building.
9.4-46                                                        Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
Table 9.4-5 Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment*
ABWR Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems Turbine Building      T/B Clean Area          T/B Equipment      T/B Lube Oil  Condensate Pump Air Supply        Return/Exhaust      Compartment Exhaust      Exhaust      Room Recirc. Unit Item                            TRV-F-1A thru C      TBV-F-2A thru C        TBV-F-24A &-24B      TBV-F-4A & B    TBV-F-8A thru C Type                                  Builtup unit  Central station air        Builtup unit          Fan        Central station air handle                                                    handler Number of units                            1                3                      1                2            3-50% each Flow rate    (m3/h)                    341,500        168,000/unit              272,000            12,600          51,000 Fan:
Type                              Centrifugal      Centrifugal            Centrifugal        Centrifugal      Centrifugal No. of fans per unit                    3                1                      2                1                1 No. of running fans                    2                2                      1                1                2 25A5675AL Revision 7 Heating coils:                                              None                                      None              None No. of banks per unit                  1                -                      1                                  -
Capacity, each (MJ/h)              11,605.81              -                    369.28                                -
Cooling coils:                                              None                    None              None No. of banks per unit                  6                -                      -                -
Capacity, each (MJ/h)              1582.61              -                      -                -              949.57 Prefilters:                                                None                    None              None Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                              Glass, roll            -                      -                                  -
Capacity    (m3/h)                356,800              -                      -                                  -
ASHRAE 52 eff.                        35%                -                      -                                  -
Filters:                                                                                              None Type                                High eff.        Bag type,              Bag type,              -            Medium eff 3
Capacity (m /h)                    341,500        168,000/unit              272,000              -              51,000 ASHRAE 52 eff.                        85%                90%                    90%                -                85%
9.4-47
* Response to Question 430.242C.
 
ABWR 9.4-48 Table 9.4-5a Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued)
Heater Drain Pump  Heater Drain Pump  Filter Pump Recirc. Demineralizer  Reactor Feed Pump P1A Room Recirc. P1B Room Recirc. and Valve Room        Pump and Valve    Power Supply Unit          Unit TBV-F-9D      Unit TBV-F-10A      Room Recirc. Unit Room Recirc. Unit Item                        TBV-F-9A thru C          thru F                thru C        TBV-F-12A thru C TBV-F-13A thru C Type                          Central station    Central station    Central station      Central station  Central station air handler        air handler        air handler          air handler      air handler Number of units                3-50% each          3-50% each          3-50% each              3-50%            3-50%
Flow rate (m3/h)/unit            11,900              11,900              5,200                8,700            1,825 Fan:
Type                      Centrifugal        Centrifugal          Centrifugal          Centrifugal        Centrifugal No. of fans per unit            1                  1                  1                    1                1 25A5675AL Revision 7 No. of running fans            2                  2                  2                    2                2 Heating coils:                    None:              None:              None:                None:            None No. of banks per unit          -                  -                  -                    -                -
Capacity, each (MJ/h)          -                  -                  -                    -                -
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems Cooling coils:
Capacity, each (MJ/h)        221.57              221.57              97.13                335.36            34.33 Filters:
Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                      Medium eff          Medium eff          Medium eff          Medium eff        Medium eff Capacity (m3/h)              11,900              11,900              5,200                8,700            1,825 ASHRAE 52 eff.                85%                85%                85%                  85%              85%
 
ABWR Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems Table 9.4-5b Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued)
TCW Heat Exchanger    Condenser Compt.                                              Demineralizer Area Recirculation    Room Level 2        SJAE A Room          SJAE B Room      Room Recirculation Unit          Recirculation Unit  Recirculation Unit  Recirculation Unit  Unit TBV-F-18A Items                        TBV-F-14A thru C    TBV-F-15A thru C    TBV-F-17A thru C    TBV-F-17D thru F        thru C Type                          Central station      Central station      Central station      Central station    Central station air handler        air handler          air handler          air handler        air handler Number of units                3-50% each          3-50% each          3-50% each              3-50%              3-50%
Flow rate (m3/h)/unit              8,200                24,300              22,100              22,100              2,635 Fan:
Type                        Centrifugal          Centrifugal          Centrifugal        Centrifugal        Centrifugal No. of fans per unit            1                    1                    1                    1                  1 25A5675AL Revision 7 No. of running fans              2                    2                    2                    2                  2 Heating coils:                    None                None                None                None              None No. of banks per unit            -                    -                    -                    -                  -
Capacity, each (MJ/h)            -                    -                    -                    -                  -
Cooling coils:
Capacity, each (MJ/h)          154.07              454.69              417.84              417.84              48.99 Filters:
Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                        Medium eff            Medium eff          Medium eff          Medium eff          Medium eff Capacity (m3/h)                8,200                24,300              22,100              22,100              2,635 ASHRAE 52 eff.                  85%                  85%                  85%                  85%                85%
9.4-49
 
ABWR 9.4-50 Table 9.4-5c Turbine Building and Electrical Building HVAC SystemNon-Safety-Related Equipment (Continued)
Condenser Compt.
Room Level 3 Recir. TCW Pump Area        Turbine Area        Steam to Hot Water Unit            Recirculation Unit  Recirculation Unit  Heat Exchanger Area Item                            TRV-F-19A thru C    TRV-F-20A thru C    TRV-F-21A thru C      TBV-E-01A& 1B Type                              Central station      Central station      Central station      Heat exchanger air handler          air handler          air handler Number of units                    3-50% each          3-50% each              3-50%            2-100% each Flow rate (m3/h)/unit                23,800                11,900              28,900 Fan:
Type                            Centrifugal          Centrifugal          Centrifugal              -
No. of fans per unit                1                    1                    1                    -
25A5675AL Revision 7 No. of running fans                  2                    2                    2                    -
Heating coils:                        None                None                None                    -
No. of banks per unit                -                    -                    -                    -
Capacity, each (MJ/h)                -                    -                    -                    -
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems Cooling coils:
Capacity, each (MJ/h)            444.22                221.48              542.19                  -
Filters:
Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                            Medium eff          Medium eff          Medium eff                -
Capacity (m3/h)                  23,800                11,800              28,900                  -
ASHRAE 52 eff.                      85%                  85%                  85%                    -
Heat Exchanger:
Type                                                                                          Shell and Tube Capacity (MJ/h)                                                                                  22,156.55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.4-1 Control Building HVAC Flow Diagram (Sheets 1-5)
Figure 9.4-2a Turbine Building Ventilation System Air Flow Diagram Figure 9.4-2b Turbine Building Ventilation System Control Diagram (Sheets 1-2)
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                          9.4-51
 
ABWR 9.4-52 TBV-F-6A                                                                  TBV-F-6B BD BD TBV-F-3A                            TBV-F-3B L    C                                                          C    L CH                                                        CH TC                                                                            TC CHILLED                          CHILLED WATER                            WATER 25A5675AL Revision 7 SWITCHGEAR B TBV-F-16B L  C CH ROOF ROOF EXHAUSTER            EXHAUSTER                              P Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems TBV-F-22A TBV-F-22B          TBV-F-23A TBV-F-23B                                          CHILLED WATER        TBV-F-5A AND 5B L  C TBV-F-16A CH L  C BD                BD                                            CH Design Control Document/Tier 2 TC CHILLED TC WATER CHILLED WATER HOUSE BOILER AREA                                                  SWITCHGEAR A                      AIR COMPRESSOR ROOM COMBUSTION TURBINE    CHILLER GENERATOR ROOM        AREA Figure 9.4-2c Electrical Building HVAC System Diagram
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.4-3 Secondary Containment HVAC System (Sheets 1-3)
Figure 9.4-4 R/B Safety-Related Electrical Equipment HVAC System (Sheets 1-3)
Figure 9.4-5 Reactor Internal Pump Control Panel Room HVAC System Figure 9.4-6 Not Used Figure 9.4-7 Not Used Figure 9.4-8 Drywell Cooling System P&ID Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                          9.4-53
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 AREA 1              DRYWELL HEAD AREA TP .23000 TP .21300 AREA 2 UPPER AREA 4 TP .17370 AREA 5 WETWELL AIR SPACE TP .12300 AREA 3 LOWER TP .-1100 TP .-6600 Figure 9.4-9 Drywell Heat Load Area Drawing 9.4-54                                    Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figure is located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.4-10 Radwaste Building HVAC (Sheets 1-3)
Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilating Systems                                          9.4-55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection System See Subsection 9.5.13.9 for COL license information pertaining to areas of the plant to be included in its fire protection program.
The ABWR Fire Protection Program follows the recommendations of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 except in the following cases:
(1)  The capacity of each of the 3 Diesel Day Tanks is 12.1 m3 (3200 gallons). This is enough fuel for 8 hours of operation of the diesel at the maximum LOCA load demand. The BTP recommends that the day tanks be limited to a capacity of 1100 gallons (BTP CMEB, Section 7j).
Justification: The day tanks are located in the reactor building outside secondary containment in a dedicated 3-hour fire rated compartment of masonry construction.
There is no other safety-related equipment located in the day tank rooms. The day tank rooms are located in the Emergency Diesel Generator compartments and are positioned such that the 3-hour fire rated walls, ceiling, and floor of the day tank room are not shared by any other division. The day tank rooms are protected by a foam water sprinkler system that can deliver foam to the room for a minimum of 30 minutes without operator intervention.
The day tank is seismically designed and supported. In the unlikely event the day tank were to fail the entire contents of the day tank can be contained in the sunken volume of the room. Potential ignition sources inside the day tank rooms with enough energy to ignite diesel fuel are limited. Furthermore the supply of fresh air to support combustion is limited. In the event of a fire the pre-action automatic foam sprinkler system is designed to extinguish a fire in this room in 10 minutes. The sunken volume of this room can contain the day tank contents and 30 minutes worth of foam. The additional foam capacity beyond 10 minutes provides added assurance that a postulated fire will be extinguished. In the unlikely event the fire can not be extinguished the room can be closed off and the fire allowed to burn out on its own without spreading to other areas.
In the event that the fuel oil transfer line from the day tank to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) were to fail the sunken floor around the diesel can accommodate the contents of the day tank plus 10 minutes worth of foam applied by the automatic sprinkler. The automatic sprinkler system is designed to extinguish a fire in this room in 10 minutes. In the unlikely event the fire was not extinguished the room can be closed off and the fire allowed to burn out on its own without spreading to other areas.
Alternatively, if the fire brigade is required to fight the fire manually the elevated entries into the room can accommodate approximately 30 minutes of additional Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 water/foam application from 2 hand held lines (0.47m3/min per hose) before reaching the lowest door opening. The lowest door opening to these rooms are the exterior equipment doors which could be opened if fire fighting activities necessitate so that any overflow from the sump area of the room excess water, foam, or diesel fuel would spill outside the building and not spread to other parts of the reactor building. Therefore any overflow from the sump area of the room will not affect any safe shutdown equipment or equipment needed for support of safe shutdown equipment.
(2) The Control Room Complex has a raised floor with a subfloor area which is used for routing of cables from the Control Room cabinets, panels, and the divisional electrical rooms. Divisional separation of the subfloor cabling is maintained per the requirements of IEEE 384. The subfloor area will include fire detection capability.
The subfloor area will not contain a fire suppression system as recommended by the BTP (BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section 7b).
Justification: Fire Hazard Analysis section 9A.4.2.4.1, item 12 describes why the subfloor area is considered to be low risk fire area. In addition, the effectiveness of a permanently installed fire suppression system in the subfloor area is limited due to the small vertical space and the physical separation between the subfloor and the Control Room. Since the Control Room is continuously manned, manual fire suppression activities can be started quickly once it has been determined that there is a fire in the subfloor area. There are no transient combustibles stored in this area during normal activities to increase the severity of a possible fire. The characteristics of the subfloor cables are such that the probability of a fire ignition are very low and any fire that were to occur would be self-extinguishing or very slow to spread. Since fire resistant cables are required the amount of water needed to extinguish fire in the subfloor is relatively small. Any water that is introduced into the subfloor area can be removed by floor drains in the subfloor area or through the use of temporary portable sump pumps. Accumulation of water in the subfloor area is limited in depth to less than the raised floor and will not adversely effect water sensitive safety-related equipment which is installed above the floor. In the event that a fire in the Control Room were to require evacuation, the Division I and II Remote Shutdown Panels enable the operators to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
(3) The office spaces contained in the Control Room Complex do not have automatic fire suppression systems installed. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section 7b recommends that these spaces have automatic suppression.
Justification: The Control Room Complex is continuously manned so that any fire will be quickly detected and manual suppression will be commenced without delay.
The amount of combustibles is limited. Papers within the Complex are stored in file cabinets, book cases, or other storage locations except when in use.
9.5-2                                                                          Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Should manual fire fighting in the Control Room Complex be necessary, the accumulation and/or drainage of fire water will not affect the ability to safely shutdown the reactor. Using 2 hand held hoses at 0.57 m3/m each (1.14 m3/m total) the subfloor area in the Control Room will accommodate a minimum of 1 hour accumulation of water with no drainage without affecting safety-related equipment.
If the fire water is assumed to transport immediately to the basement of the control building, the resulting accumulation of water will not affect safety-related equipment located in the basement. In either case the fire fighting activities will not prevent the reactor from being safely shutdown.
(4) Consoles and cabinets in the Control Room Complex do not have fire detectors installed inside them. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section 7b recommends that fire detectors be installed in these consoles and cabinets.
Justification: The Control Room Complex is continuously manned so that any fire will be quickly detected and manual suppression will be commenced without delay.
The cabinets and consoles contain limited combustibles and are air cooled so that smoke from a cabinet fire will exhaust to the Control Room Complex. A fire in any single cabinet or console will not disable the capability to safely shut down the plant.
(5) The automatic sprinkler system in the emergency diesel generator room is installed to extinguish any fire in that room and does not replace restrictions on the positioning and direction of the application of the fire suppressant. BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section 7b recommends that the sprinkler system be designed to permit the diesel generator to continue to run while the sprinkler system is operating.
Justification: The automatic sprinkler systems used in the emergency diesel generator rooms are designed to prevent the inadvertent actuation utilizing pre-action automatic sprinkler type. Actuation of these sprinklers requires the detection of a fire by infra-red and/or rate of heat detectors, and the opening of the fusible link sprinklers. Furthermore, each division has its own dedicated detection and actuation equipment for the control of the fire sprinklers in that divisional area. Two actuation signals are required to initiate the fire suppression system, the first of which will annunciate an alarm to alert the operator to any potential problems.
The ABWR design includes three independent and physically separated safety-related divisions, any of which is capable of bringing the plant to a safe shutdown in the event of a fire. For design purposes it is assumed that a fire anywhere in a division results in the immediate loss of function of all equipment associated with that division. Even with this conservative assumption, the two remaining independent safety-related divisions are available for full utilization by the operator.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.1.1 Plant Features Enhancing Fire Tolerance The basic layout of the plant and the choice of systems is such as to enhance the tolerance of the ABWR plant to fire. The systems are designed such that there are three independent safety-related divisions, any one of which is capable of providing safe shutdown of the reactor. In addition, there are non-safety-related systems such as the condensate and feedwater systems which can be used to achieve safe shutdown. The plant arrangement is such that points of possible common cause failure between these non-safety-related systems and the safety-related systems have been minimized.
Fire protection requirements beyond those for past designs were placed on future designs by Policy Issue SECY-89-013 (Reference 9.5-1). The Policy Issue requirements and the methods by which they have been met in the ABWR design are:
Requirement Therefore, the designers of standard plants have been informed that they must demonstrate that safe shutdown of their designs can be achieved, assuming that all equipment in any one fire area has been rendered inoperable by fire and that reentry to the fire area for repairs and for operator actions is not possible. The control room should be excluded from this approach, subject to the need for an independent alternate shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the control room.
Compliance Three divisions of safety-related safe shutdown equipment are provided. Each division has the capacity for safe shutdown of the plant. Exterior to the primary containment and the control room complex each division is separated from its two redundant counterparts by rated three hour fire barriers. The primary containment is inerted during operation, has the divisions separated as far as possible and does not contain anything other than check valves and piping which is required to operate for safe shutdown. A Remote Shutdown System provides safe shutdown capability which is independent physically and electrically from the control room.
Requirement Fire protection for redundant shutdown systems in the reactor containment building should ensure, to as great an extent as possible, that one shutdown division will be free of fire damage.
Compliance The Fire Barrier System assures that two safe shutdown divisions will be free of fire damage.
Requirement Consideration should be given for safety-grade provisions for the fire protection systems to ensure that the remaining shutdown capabilities are protected.
9.5-4                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Compliance Fire protection piping systems, the failure of which could affect safe shutdown systems, are seismically designed. The fire barrier system for safety-related areas of buildings is Seismic Category I.
Requirement In addition, it should be demonstrated that smoke, hot gases, or the fire suppressant will not migrate into other fire areas to the extent that safe shutdown capabilities, including operator actions, could be adversely affected.
Compliance The Fire Barrier System confines smoke, hot gases, fire suppressant to the division of the fire.
The smoke control system maintains the areas for the two redundant divisions at a positive pressure with respect to the area of the division experiencing the fire. Any leakage through the fire barrier system is to the fire.
In order to meet the stated requirements, the design objectives have been to assure that independence of the redundant systems required or available for safe shutdown is not compromised by fire, the consequences of fire or the failure of fire protection equipment or systems. This design priority was met by implementing a coordinated overall design including fire considerations for the following plant features:
(1)  Plant arrangement (2)  Divisional separation (3)  Fire containment system (4)  Combustible loading (5)  HVAC systems (6)  Smoke control system (7)  Spurious control actions (8)  Support systems (9)  Fire alarm system (10) Fire suppression system (11) Personnel access routes (12) Manual fire suppression activities Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The manner in which each of the above plant features is influenced by, and in turn affects the fire protection design considerations, is summarized as follows.
9.5.1.1.1 Plant Arrangement The plant is laid out with the Control Building between the Reactor and Turbine Buildings so that power and control signals from the Reactor and Turbine Buildings enter the Control Building on opposite sides of the Control Building. There are no safety-related services provided from or through the Turbine Buildings. Occurrences in the Turbine Building which may disable the Turbine Building non-safety-related systems which are capable of providing safe shutdown do not disable Reactor Building safety-related equipment which provides safe shutdown. Interactions between reactor and turbine building systems are minimized.
Normal and alternate preferred power is supplied through the Turbine Building to the Reactor Building for the safety-related loads. These non-safety-related power sources are backed up by the safety-related diesel generators. The diesel generators are not affected by events in the Turbine Building. For this reason, events in the Turbine Building can only cause a transfer to the diesel generators for the safety-related reactor building loads.
Normal safe shutdown functions of feedwater supply and steam flow to the condenser are provided through the steam tunnel. Overpressure in the Reactor Building is vented to atmosphere by blowout panels in the walls of the reactor building operating floor. Therefore, failures in the reactor building which could possibly affect the RCIC, RHR, HPCF or MSIV Systems would not affect the normal shutdown systems in the steam tunnel or turbine building.
The buildings are laid out internally so that fire areas of like divisions are grouped together in block form as much as possible. This grouping is coordinated from building to building so that the divisional fire areas line up adjacent of each other at the interface between the Reactor and Control Buildings. An arrangement of this fashion naturally groups piping, HVAC ducts and cable trays together in divisional arrangements and does not require routing of services of one division across space allotted to another division.
9.5.1.1.2 Divisional Separation As stated above, there are three complete divisions of safety-related cooling systems. Any one division is capable of safe or emergency shutdown of the plant so that a division may be out for maintenance, a single random failure occurs and the remaining functional division would still be able to provide safe plant shutdown.
In general, systems are grouped together by safety division so that, with the exceptions of the primary containment, the control room and the remote shutdown room (when operating from the remote shutdown panels), there is only one division of safe shutdown equipment in a fire area. Complete burnout of any fire area without recovery will not prevent safe shutdown of the plant; therefore, complete burnout of a fire area is acceptable.
9.5-6                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 The separation exception in the primary containment is made because it is not practical to divide the primary containment into three fire areas. The design is deemed acceptable because:
(1)  Primary containment is inerted during plant operation; therefore, a fire is not possible.
(2)  Sprinkler coverage is provided by the Containment Spray System.
(3)  Only check valves and ADS/SRV valves are required to operate within containment to provide safe shutdown. A fire could not prevent the operation of a check valve nor would it prevent a safety valve from being lifted on its spring by pressure. The high-pressure pumps are capable of providing sufficient head to lift the SRV valves against their spring settings so that a fire could not prevent injection of water to and relief of steam from the reactor vessel.
(4)  In addition, maximum separation is maintained between the divisional equipment within primary containment.
All divisions are present in the control room and this cannot be avoided. It is the purpose of the remote shutdown panel to provide redundant control of the safe shutdown function from outside of the control room. The controls on the remote shutdown panel are hard wired to the field devices and power supplies. The signals between the remote shutdown panel and the control room are multiplexed over fiber optic cables so that there are no power supply interactions between the control room and the remote shutdown panel.
During normal plant operation the remote shutdown room is divided into two rooms by a closed sliding fire door. A fire in one divisional section will not affect the other divisional section.
When the operator puts the remote shutdown panel into operation, the sliding door is manually slid open so that there is one remote shutdown room with two divisional sections of panels.
There are areas where there is equipment from more than one safety division in a fire area. Each of these cases is examined on an individual basis to determine that the encroachment is required and that failure in the worst conceivable fashion is acceptable. This analysis is documented in Subsection 9A.5.5.
Electrical Divisions 1, 2 and 3 supplies, Reactor Building cooling water pumps and heat exchangers, emergency chillers and emergency HVAC systems are located in the Control Building. Since these systems are required for safe shutdown of the plant if the function of the control room is lost, they are separated from the control room complex and its HVAC System by rated fire barriers. A fire resulting in the loss of function of the control room will not affect the operation of the remote shutdown or remote shutdown support systems.
With the existing separation and the tolerance to spurious signals (Subsection 9.5.1.1.7) that the plant systems have, evaluation of the impact of fire on safe shutdown is greatly simplified. The specific location of a fire within a fire area, fire growth rate and intensity is unimportant as long Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                          9.5-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 as the integrated intensity of the fire remains within the capability of the three-hour fire barrier system.
9.5.1.1.3 Fire Containment System The Fire Containment System is the structural system and appurtenances that work together to confine the direct effects of a fire to the fire area in which the fire originates. The Fire Containment System is required to contain a fire with a maximum severity as defined by the time-temperature curve defined in ASTM E119 for a fire with a duration of three hours. For this condition, the temperature in the room at the end of three hours would be 1052&deg;C. In addition, all structural walls, floors penetration seals, and hatches in the Reactor Building which are three hour barriers are required to withstand a 5 psid pressure differential. The Fire Containment System is comprised of the following elements:
(1)    Concrete fire barrier floors, ceilings and walls which must be at least six inches thick (Reference 9.5-2, Figure 7-8T, NFPA Handbook) if made from carbonate and siliceous aggregates. Other aggregates and thicknesses are acceptable if the type of construction has been tested and bears a UL (or equal) label for a three-hour rating.
(2)    Fire barrier walls which are of the special construction described in Subsection 9A.3.6 or of other approved construction types bearing a UL (or equal) label for a three-hour rating.
(3)    Fire doors, which are required to have a UL (or equal) label certifying that they have be&en tested for a three hour-rating per ASTM E152, including a hose stream test.
(4)    Both ends of all electrical and piping penetrations between the divisions and between a division and a non-division should be qualified to the same standard and tested to ASTM E119.
(5)    Not Used (6)    Fire dampers, which are required for any HVAC duct penetrating a fire barrier, must have a rating of three hours. The plant arrangement minimizes fire dampers.
(7)    Columns and support beams, which are required to be of reinforced concrete construction or enclosed or coated to provide a three-hour rating if of steel construction.
(8)    Backup of the fire barrier penetration seals by the HVAC Systems when the HVAC Systems are operating in the smoke removal mode. This backup feature is accomplished in the Reactor and Control Buildings by maintaining a positive static pressure for the redundant divisional fire areas with respect to the fire area with the 9.5-8                                                                                      Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 fire. Leakage is into the fire impacted area under sufficient static pressure to confine smoke and heat to the fire area experiencing the fire, even if there is a major mechanical failure of the penetration seal.
(9)    AC independent water addition (ACIWA) can be connected to the reactor building fire protection system header. Sufficient Fire Water pressure and flow should be available to perform the intended function. Refer to Subsection 5.4.7.1.1.10, AC-Independent Water Addition.
9.5.1.1.4 Combustible Loading Allowable combustible loadings for the plant were established as follows (see Appendix 9B, Subsection 9B.2.3 for additional details):
(1)    1454 MJ/m2 of room area, maximum allowable average exposed combustible loading without an automatic fire suppression system. This is termed the normal combustible loading limit (NCLL).
(2)    2908 MJ/m2 of room area, maximum average allowable exposed combustible loading (cable insulation) for electrical equipment rooms. This is termed the electrical room combustible loading limit (ECLL). Transient combustible loadings other than minor amounts required for maintenance of the equipment in the electrical equipment rooms are not allowed.
(3)    Not Used (4)    Not Used (5)    Not Used (6)    Transient combustibles such as lubricating oils and grease, cleaning solvent, etc. in small quantities and in approved containers are permitted.
(7)    Transient combustibles such as bags of protective clothing are permitted within the constraints of items (1) and (2). If it can be shown by analysis or testing that flames from the burning transient combustibles will not likely impinge directly on cables within trays or risers, the contribution from the cable insulation need not be considered in calculating the total combustibles in the area with the transient combustible load.
Combustible loading due to cable insulation has been minimized by locating the power sources adjacent to the loads served and multiplexing the control signals to and from the control room.
This has allowed the elimination of cable spreading rooms and most of the cables to and from the control room. Multiplexing is also used within the control room so that the cables between panels have been reduced to mostly power cables.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.1.1.5 HVAC Systems The HVAC Systems have been matched to the divisional areas which they serve. For example, there are three divisions of power supply outside of secondary containment in the Reactor Building. The divisions are in separate fire areas and each fire area is served by its corresponding division of the HVAC System. This same philosophy is carried into the Control Building, where there is a divisional HVAC System for each of the three divisions of core cooling systems and a fourth HVAC System for the control room complex which contains four divisions of control equipment.
Division 4 contains a battery as the source of power but there is not a Division 4 diesel generator. Division 4 loads are comprised of instrumentation and controls to provide two-out-of-four logic. Loss of Division 4 reverts the logic back to two-out-of-three, which is acceptable on a permanent basis from a safety standpoint. The main function served by the Division 4 control and logic is one of improving plant availability for power production. On this basis Division 4 is supplied cooling from Division 2 in both the reactor and control buildings.
A single non-safety-related HVAC System supplies normal cooling for secondary containment in the Reactor Building. Within the Reactor Building the system is branched into three separate systems with valves and fire dampers for each branch (Subsection 9.5.5). Required emergency cooling for safety-related systems is provided by room coolers on a divisional basis.
9.5.1.1.6 Smoke Control System The smoke control system for the plant provides major features as follows:
(1)  Venting of fire areas to prevent undue buildup of pressure due to a fire.
(2)  Pressure control across the fire barriers to assure that any leakage is into the fire area experiencing the fire.
(3)  Pressure control and purge air supply to prevent back-flow of smoke and hot gases when fire barrier doors are maintained open for access for manual fire suppression activities.
(4)  Augmented and directed clean air supply to provide a clean air path to the fire for fire suppression personnel.
(5)  Smoke control by fans and systems external to the fire area experiencing the fire.
(6)  Removal of smoke and heat from the fire by exhaust fans and operating supply fans to provide clean, cool air.
(7)  Manually reset position of fire dampers in the smoke removal path.
9.5-10                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 These features are provided by designing the HVAC Systems for the dual purpose of HVAC and smoke control. ASHRAEs Design of Smoke Control Systems for Buildings and NFPAs Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems (References 9.5-3 and 9.5-4) were used as the basis for the design of the smoke control features of the combined systems.
The normal operating modes of the HVAC Systems are shown in Figures 9.4-1 through 9.4-6.
The pressure at the input of an air handling unit is held at atmospheric pressure by a ducted, direct supply from outside through a bag type filter.
The systems are designed so the division of the air flow to the rooms within an HVAC/fire area is determined by the supply and exhaust ducting and the adjustable volume dampers.
The HVAC Systems in the fire areas not experiencing a fire continue to operate in their normal fashion so that the pressure in the other fire areas remains at a positive value. This assures that air leakage through any openings in the fire barriers surrounding the fire is to the fire.
The magnitude of the differential pressure which must be maintaianed across a fire barrier to provide aedquate smoke control varies with the intensity of the fire and the room height. For this reason, it is a COL license information requirement (Subsection 9.5.13.10) that the required differential pressure value for each barrier be calculated during the detailed design phase, the HVAC Systems be designed to provide the required pressure, and that the capability be confirmed during pre-operational testing. Normally the differential pressure would not have to be more than about 6.4 mm of water, and it most likely would be less.
Entry to a fire is gained from an adjacent fire area which by design is at a positive pressure with respect to the area experiencing the fire. The pressure differential is sufficient to provide adequate velocity through the open door to carry the combustion products back into the zone of the fire. The flow through the open door into the area of the fire and out the area of the fires exhaust duct system is maintained by the positive pressure of the non-fire area and by operation of smoke removal mode in the fire area. It gives the fire fighting squad a tenable environment from which to work.
There are fire dampers in the HVAC penetrations of building internal walls between safety-related fire areas.
Upon manual initiation of the smoke removal mode, the recirculation damper is closed, the exhaust fans are stopped, and the smoke removal fan is started in conjunction with the supply fan for 100% outside air purging. In the Control Building, the recirculation damper is closed and both the exhaust fans are operated in conjunction with the supply fan for smoke removal.
In order to maintain the objective of smoke and heat removal during a fire situation, the HVAC supply and exhaust duct openings in the exterior walls of the Reactor building do not have fire dampers. The walls are designated as three-hour fire barriers and would normally require fire Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 dampers for HVAC duct penetrations. Fire dampers could close due to heat from an internal fire, however. Internal fires are a more serious threat to the plant than external fires.
Omission of the fire dampers in the supply ducts is deemed acceptable because:
(1)  Each HVAC/fire area has a separate intake structure.
(2)  The intake structures are dispersed around the perimeters of the buildings.
(3)  Not Used (4)  Isolation valves are provided and could be manually closed should there be a challenge due to an external fire.
(5)  Each intake serves one fire area and, therefore, one division only except for the control room. The two redundant divisions are in separate fire areas. The control room fire area is separate from all other fire areas and the safe shutdown function is backed up by the remote shutdown panel.
Omission of the fire dampers in the exhaust ducts is deemed acceptable because:
(1)  Each HVAC/fire area has a separate exhaust.
(2)  Flow is normally out of the building so that external combustion products would not be drawn into the building.
(3)  Isolation valves are provided and could be manually closed if it becomes necessary to shut a HVAC System down during an external fire situation.
(4)  The run of metal duct from the exhaust structure to the isolation valves will contain stagnant air which will protect the isolation valves from high temperatures due to external fires if the valves are closed. The isolation valves will have far less leakage than normal fire dampers. It is an interface requirement that the exhaust duct between the exhaust structure and the isolation valves be insulated for high temperatures.
The combination of these three things assures that the equivalent of a three-hour fire damper is provided.
(5)  It is extremely important to be able to vent internal fires without interruption from a fire damper that has closed due to the temperature of the exhaust gases.
The HVAC/smoke control system for the Reactor Building secondary containment differs slightly from the other systems in the Reactor and Control Buildings, since because a common supply and exhaust system is used for all three divisional areas within secondary containment.
The systems for each division are branched from the common system. A dual purpose isolation/fire damper valve is provided for each supply and exhaust branch. A two-position 9.5-12                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 motor-operated volume damper is also provided in each exhaust branch. Upon detection of a fire, a normally non operating exhaust fan is started to increase the negative pressure of the exhaust system. The motor-operated dampers in the exhaust ducts for the divisional HVAC/fire areas without the fire reposition to their predetermined fire settings to maintain normal negative pressure in their zones. The pressure in the HVAC/fire area experiencing the fire moves negative with the change in exhaust pressure. This establishes a pressure differential to the adjacent fire areas to provide smoke control by the differential pressure across the fire barriers surrounding the fire.
See Subsection 9.4.4 for a description of the smoke control system for the Turbine Building.
9.5.1.1.7 Spurious Control Actions As stated above, the systems are separated by fire areas on a divisional basis. The multiplexing system is a dual channel system. Two simultaneous, identical digitized control signals that must match are required at the de-multiplexer for control action to be taken at the field device. The likelihood of two identical spurious signals, induced by physical damage (including fire damage) to the fiber-optic transmission cable sent simultaneously and matching, is minuscule.
Spurious operation of equipment controlled by Remote Multiplexing Units (RMU) in the field due to physical damage because of fire or smoke will be considered in cases where the connection between the RMU and the field devices is transmitting a command signal.
The significance of the two-channel operation of the multiplex system is that, if the ability to operate from the control room is lost, equipment will continue to run until manually shutdown in the field by the operators. Equipment may also be manually started at the switchgear or motor control centers during a control room fire situation without fear that failures in the control room would cause the equipment to be shutdown. The feature of being able to start equipment locally without fear of it being shut down by spurious signals from the control room makes it possible to utilize non- safety-related systems such as the feedwater and condensate pumps in the Turbine Building as backups to the safety-related safe shutdown system, if desired.
The likelihood of fire or smoke-induced spurious signals initiating in and propagating through the integrated digital instrumentation and control systems and the supporting Essential Multiplexing System (EMS) is miniscule due to the use of message authentication, which requires the message format and sequence to be correct to be recognized, and the use of optical fiber cabling, which cannot hot short to other cables. Nevertheless, spurious operation of plant equipment due to fire or smoke damage to the following digital instrumentation and control and EMS equipment is considered, regardless of its location:
Main Control Room (MCR) components or equipment that are connected via electrical wires to other equipment, both digital controller and EMS equipment, located in two (2) separate rooms in the C/B arranged adjacent to and on opposite sides of the MCR, and to other equipment in other plant locations.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Digital controller and EMS equipment connected via fiber-optic cable, arranged as Divisions 1 and 3 and Divisions 2 and 4, located in their own separate rooms in the C/B wherein each room is adjacent to and on opposite sides of the MCR.
EMS equipment located in the two (2) separate rooms in the C/B that is connected via fiberoptic cable to other EMS equipment in other plant locations.
Remote Multiplexing Units (RMUs) located in the field that are connected via electrical wires to plant process components (e.g., instruments and actuators).
The COL applicant shall provide an evaluation of the ABWRs susceptibility to Multiple Spurious Operations (MSOs) in accordance with the methodology contained in NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 2 and as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2. Spurious operation of equipment due to fire or smoke damage to the equipment listed above will be considered. The COL applicant will submit the results of this evaluation to the NRC for review. See Subsection 9.5.13.22 for COL license information.
The interlocks which prevent damage of equipment may be accomplished directly and by hard wiring in the field. For example, the protective relaying for the switchgear is located in the switchgear and the interlocks accomplished in switchgear. Signals for operational logic are multiplexed to the control room, but protective actions are not dependent on conditions in the control room.
Because of the nature of the design, there is no unacceptable failure that can occur due to fire induced failures within a division. This is independent of time or timing. This has been confirmed by the analysis performed as part of the plant evaluation for tolerance to sabotage.
The sabotage analysis was done with no time constraints on actions precipitated within a division.
9.5.1.1.8 Support Systems Support systems such as HVAC and Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Systems are designated as safety-related if they support safety-related systems. They are given divisional assignments and separated by fire barriers in the same fashion as the safety-related primary systems.
9.5.1.1.9 Fire Alarm Systems Fire alarm systems which control equipment which could affect the operation of safety-related systems are designated as safety-related. It is a requirement that fire alarm systems be zoned by division according to the divisional assignment of the area which each zone covers.
9.5-14                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.1.1.10 Fire Suppression System Automatically initiated fire suppression systems are initiated on a divisional basis so that there are no interactions between divisions. In general, fixed automatic suppression is provided in areas where the allowable limits of combustible loading, for no fixed suppression, as defined in Subsection 9.5.1.1.4, are exceeded. See Table 9.5-5 for a complete listing of automatic fire suppression systems.
9.5.1.1.11 Personnel Access Routes The personnel access routes for fire suppression activities have been reviewed to see that access compatible with the design of the fire barriers, HVAC and smoke control systems has been provided. A source of clean cool air is provided for access routes to fire areas. The air supply is by fans out of the fire area experiencing the fire.
9.5.1.1.12 Manual Fire Suppression Activities The plant is designed such that the divisional area in which a fire is occurring will be apparent to the operators at the time the fire is discovered. If the fire is significant, the operator can transfer operations to one of the two unaffected divisions and shut down the equipment in the affected division. All power supplies in the affected division can be deenergized and manual fire suppression activities commenced immediately without fear of damaging equipment in either of the two remaining operating divisions. Since the ventilation fans within the divisional fire area experiencing the fire aid in smoke removal, they should not be shut down unless necessary.
9.5.1.2 Design Bases The programs intent is to provide a defense-in-depth design resulting in an adequate balance in:
(1)    Preventing fires from starting.
(2)    Quickly detecting and extinguishing fires that occur, thus limiting fire damage.
(3)    Designing safety-related systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns out of control for a considerable length of time will not prevent safe shutdown.
In addition, fire protection systems are designed so that their inadvertent operation or the occurrence of a single failure in any of these systems will not prevent plant safe shutdown.
Possible fires that could affect safety-related systems and significant combustible loadings are presented in Appendix 9A on a room-by-room basis. Fire barriers and fire protection systems are discussed for each safety and non-safety-related area. Each room is also analyzed for its Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                          9.5-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 potential radioactive release due to a postulated fire. Noncombustible or smoke-evolved and fuel-contributed index of 25 or less are used wherever practicable.
SRP Acceptance Criterion II.2.a of SRP Section 9.5.1 requires adherence to BTP CMEB 9.5.1.
Paragraph C.5.f of the SRP requires that the means by which smoke will be removed from the plant be established early in the plant design. The ABWR meets this requirement, in that it is planned that smoke will be removed by normal HVAC System. In the Reactor Building, the normal supply and exhaust fans are located external to the building. Every room of the Reactor Building secondary containment receives supply air from and exhausts to the building normal HVAC. The emergency ventilation systems for the electrical equipment and diesel generator rooms provide additional smoke removal capability for those rooms.
There is a containment vent and supply system. Neither the supply or exhaust ducts are equipped with fire dampers. The isolation valves on these ducts are normally closed and would remain closed during plant operation so as to maintain the containment in an inerted condition.
If a fire occurred in containment during a plant outage, when the valves were open and the containment not inerted, the drywell or wetwell spray would be initiated to protect the containment at a temperature well below the threshold of damage to the ventilation duct. For these reasons, the ABWR design for the containment ventilation is considered proper and adequate. (Further discussed in Subsection 9.5.1.3.12).
The water suppression systems are designed on the basis that, following a safe shutdown earthquake, there will be two manual hose streams available in any area containing equipment required for safe shutdown and that there will be no uncontrolled release of fire suppression water in the areas.
Transformers located within fire areas containing safety-related equipment will be of the drytype only. For those areas utilizing liquid insulated transformers, the COL applicant shall provide features to prevent the insulating liquid from becoming an unacceptable health hazard to employees in the event of release of the material to the building environment.
The quality assurance (QA) program, in accordance with CMEB 9.5.1 for the design of fire protection systems, is presented in Chapter 17.
The consequences of inadvertent operation of a suppression system and of moderate energy line cracks are discussed in Appendix 9A.
Except for fuel and lubricating oil located in the diesel-generator rooms, there are no storage areas in the Reactor or Control Buildings for flammable liquids, oxidizing agents, flammable compressed gases, corrosive material or explosive or highly flammable materials.
Nonflammable compressed gases (e.g., air, nitrogen) do not represent a fire hazard.
Small quantities of chemicals may be stored in listed or approved cabinets and containers for immediate use. The CRD maintenance area is an example where such storage is permitted.
9.5-16                                                                              Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Identification of the type and location of these materials is a requirement of SRP Section 13.2.2, which is the responsibility of the COL applicant.
9.5.1.3 System Descriptions 9.5.1.3.1 General Description The Fire Protection System consists of:
(1)    Standpipe (2)    Hose stations (3)    Sprinklers (4)    AFFF sprinkler systems (5)    Automatic foam sprinkling systems (6)    Smoke detectors (7)    Alarms (8)    Fire barriers (9)    Fire stops (10) Portable fire extinguishers (11) Portable breathing apparatus (12) Smoke and heat ventilation systems (13) Associated controls and appurtenances The suppression systems for the buildings and the plant yard are shown in the following figures:
Area                          Figures Reactor Building              9A.4-1 thru 9A.4-10 Control Building              9A.4-11 thru 9A.4-16 Turbine Building              9A.4-17 thru 9A.4-21 Service Building              9A.4-22 thru 9A.4-27 Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Area                          Figures Radwaste Building            9A.4-28 thru 9A.4-32 Plant Yard                    9.5-5 9.5.1.3.2 Fire Suppression System Requirements The two firewater supply system pumps provide 5678 L/min flow from each pump at a differential pressure of 863 kPa. This requirement will meet the needs of NFPA 13 wet standpipe flow demand of 1893 L/min at a residual pressure of 448.2 kPa at the most hydraulically remote hose connection in plant buildings. The standpipe and sprinkler system are designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 13 and 14. In addition, the sprinkler systems and the portions of the wet standpipe system within the Control and Reactor Buildings and one train of the fire suppression water supply system analyzed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. They are also designed to meet the requirements of ANSI B31.1, Power Piping. The remainder of the fire suppression systems are designed to the appropriate fire protection codes as listed.
An automatic foam sprinkling system is provided for the diesel generator and day tank rooms.
9.5.1.3.3 Codes and Standards The following listed documents, codes, standards and guidelines are referred to in the Fire Protection System designs:
29CRD1910            Occupational Safety and Health Standards 29CRD1926            Safety and Health Regulations for Construction 10CFR50              Licensing of Production and Equipment UL                  Underwriters Laboratories Approved Equipment FM                  Factory Mutual Approved Materials and Equipment List ANI                  Basic Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, March 1976 ANSI B31.1          Power Piping ASTM D992-56        Classification of Flammability Standards ASTM E84            Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials NFPA 10              Portable Fire ExtinguishersInstallation 9.5-18                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 NFPA 10A  Portable Fire ExtinguishersMaintenance and Use NFPA 11  Foam Extinguishing System NFPA 13  Sprinkler System NFPA 14  Standpipe and Hose Systems NFPA 15  Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems NFPA 16  Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems NFPA 16A  Closed Head Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems NFPA 20  Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps NFPA 24  Outside Protection NFPA 26  Recommended Practice for the Supervision of Valves Controlling Water Supplies for Fire Protection NFPA 37  Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines NFPA 70  National Electric Code NFPA 72  Protective Signaling Systems NFPA 78  Lightning Protection NFPA 80  Fire Doors and Windows NFPA 80A  Protection from Exposure Fires NFPA 90A  Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems NFPA 91  Blower and Exhaust Systems NFPA92A  Smoke Control System NFPA 101  Life Safety Code NFPA 1963 Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Connections NFPA 1961 Fire Hose NFPA 251  Fire Test, Building Construction and Materials Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                    9.5-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 NFPA 252            Fire Tests of Door Assemblies NFPA 255            Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials NFPA 321            Classification of Flammable Liquids NFPA 801            Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials NFPA 802            Nuclear Reactors NFPA 803            File Protection for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants.
NRC Regulatory      Housekeeping Requirements for Water Cooled Nuclear Plants Guide 1.39 BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Appendix A IEEE-384            IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 9.5.1.3.4 Protection of Operating Units The protection of operating units during construction of additional units is out of the scope of the COL applicant.
9.5.1.3.5 General Description of Fire Protection System The sprinkler systems in the Reactor Building and the wet standpipe systems in the Reactor and Control Buildings are designed in compliance with ANSI B31.1 and analyzed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. A portion of the water supply system, including a tank, a pump and part of the yard supply main, is designed to these requirements also. The remainder of the water systems are designed to the appropriate fire protection standards. During normal operation, the seismically designed and non-seismically designed systems are separated by normally closed valves and a check valve such that a break in the non-seismically analyzed portion of the system cannot impair the operation of the seismically designed portion of the system. See the system requirements drawings (Figures 9.5-4 and 9.5-5) for more detailed requirements and information for these systems.
The water supply system is required to be a fresh water system, filtered if necessary, to remove silt and debris. Two sources with a minimum capacity of 1140 m3 for each source is provided.
If the primary source is a volume limited supply such as a tank, a minimum of 456 m3 must be passively reserved for use by the seismically designed portion of the suppression system. This reserve will supply two manual hose reels for two hours. The equivalent of one 100% capacity motor driven pump and one 100% capacity diesel driven pump shall be provided. The equivalent capacity of each type may be comprised of multiple pumps of that type. A diesel 9.5-20                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 driven pump is in the train designed to remain functional following the safe shutdown earthquake. A jockey pump to keep the system pressurized is provided.
The Turbine Building is provided with standpipes, hose reels and ABC portable extinguishers throughout the building. In addition, the following fire suppression systems provide primary fire suppression capability to the following areas:
(1)  Automatic closed head sprinkler systems are provided in the open grating area of the three floors under the turbine.
(2)  Deluge foam-water sprinkler systems are provided in the lube oil conditioning area and the lube oil reservoir area.
(3)  A deluge sprinkler system is provided in the hydrogen seal oil unit area.
(4)  A preaction sprinkler system is provided in the auxiliary boiler area.
The Turbine Building fire suppression systems receive water from the portion of the supply system which is not required to be seismically analyzed for safe shutdown earthquake. They comply with the appropriate fire protection standard listed in Subsection 9.5.1.3.3.
The main power, unit auxiliary and reserve transformers are provided with deluge water spray suppression systems. The systems are automatically actuated by flame or temperature detectors.
An oil and water collection pit is provided beneath each transformer. Drains away from buildings and transformers are provided for each pit. Shadow type fire barrier walls are provided between adjacent transformers.
Alarm systems, both manual and automatic, are provided in all areas of the plant as passive systems. They alarm without controlling an extinguishing function.
9.5.1.3.6 Protection and Extinguishing Equipment for Safety-Related Equipment Primary suppression coverage for all buildings is provided by wet standpipes and hose reels designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 14, Standpipe, Hose Systems. Water fog electrically safe nozzles are provided. Secondary coverage is provided by portable ABC extinguishers.
9.5.1.3.7 Design Features of Fire Detection and Suppression Systems Fire detection for all areas, except the diesel-generator rooms, is provided by the ionization-type product of combustion (POC) systems reporting to satellite panels, which, in turn, report to the master panel located in the control equipment room of the Control Building. Trouble and alarm signals are retransmitted to the control room. POC systems are designed to NFPA 72 Class A and NFPA 70 Class 1 requirements. Class A provides that the detector function with an open wire or a short to ground. These detection systems are not seismically qualified, as they are passive and have no control function.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The diesel-generator room fire detection systems utilize a cross-zoned combination rate of rise, rate-compensated heat detectors and infrared detectors to initiate an automatic foam sprinkler extinguishing system. This detection system is seismically qualified to protect against inadvertent actuation.
Fire detection and suppression alarm systems have four-hr battery packs located at each satellite panel and the control room panel and are also provided with power from an uninterruptible power supply.
Standpipe and hose reel systems are designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 14 and ANSI B31.1 (Power Piping Code). A 1.27 to 3.8 cm reducer is utilized on the 6.35 cm hose valve. The hose stations are equipped with 30.5-m neoprene-lined hose. Water fog electrically safe nozzles are supplied. The standpipe system is designed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. One train of the water supply system is designed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake; therefore, an alternate water supply is not required.
Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems piping is designed to meet the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and NFPA 13 (Sprinkler Systems). For pendant and upright sprinklers, the distance between the branch lines and between sprinklers on the branch lines does not exceed 3.7 m and the protection area per sprinkler does not exceed 12.1 m2. For sidewall sprinklers, the distance between sprinklers does not exceed 3m and the protection area per sprinkler does not exceed 9.3 m2. Water density is 6.1 lpm/m2 of floor area.
Automatic foam extinguishing systems are designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 11 (Foam Extinguishing Systems). The allocation rate is a minimum of 6.51 lpm/m2. The duration of foam discharge shall be a minimum of 10 minutes. Audible and visual alarms are provided.
Portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the buildings. Extinguishers are Class ABC multipurpose, 20-A, 80-B:C UL rated.
Distance from a hose reel and extinguishers is no more than 31.5 m from any location and, in most cases, is much less. Manual fire alarm stations are provided for each hose reel. Hose reels are located to provide double coverage for most areas of the plant.
All devices and equipment are for a make and type listed or approved by UL or FM. Where required, seismically qualified equipment is specified in lieu of nonqualified, listed or approved equipment.
9.5.1.3.8 Smoke Control Smoke, heat toxic gas removal systems are discussed in Sections 6.4, 9.4 and 9.5.1.1.6.
9.5-22                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.1.3.9 Fire Alarm System The fire alarm system is passive and it does not control the suppression systems. The thermal and infrared cross-zoned detection system are utilized in the emergency diesel-generator rooms. The automatic sprinkler systems used in these rooms require two actuation signals to initiate the fire suppression system. The first actuation signal will annunciate an alarm to alert the operator to any potential problems. Fire detection and alarm systems are supplied with power from a non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply.
Detection, utilizing the ionization product of combustion detectors, is provided in all areas of the plant. The detectors report to satellite panels, which, in turn, report to the main control room in the Control Building.
Detector location is selected to cover a maximum 46.5 m2.
Standpipe water/foam, sprinkler water flow, and manual alarm devices are integrated into the general alarm system.
Horns, flashing or rotating lights and bells are provided to alarm personnel in the fire zone.
Signals are unique and distinctive so as not be confused with other alarm systems.
9.5.1.3.10 Electrical Cable Fire Protection Electrical cables are specified to meet the requirements of IEEE-383. Cable tray penetrations are designed to meet the fire-resistive ratings of the barriers they penetrate. Fire barriers and separation for electrical cable trays are discussed in Section 8.3.
9.5.1.3.11 Fire Separation for Safe Shutdown The ABWR standard plant design systems, whose primary functions are to provide core cooling, to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition, have three independent mechanical and electrical safety-related divisions (mechanical divisions A, B, C) and (electrical divisions 1, 2, 3). Each division is capable of bringing the plant to a safe shutdown condition whether the system is initiated manually or automatically. The plant layout and design is such that the redundant portions of safety-related systems are located in different fire areas; therefore, if one division becomes disabled due to a fire (complete burnout without recovery is acceptable), there are still two independent redundant divisions available to provide core cooling. The system initiation logic is located in the control room, and is made up of four divisional logic; but if one division becomes disabled (e.g., due to a fire), the system initiation logic reverts to two-out-of-three logic. Safe shutdown following a fire is assured due to the fact the systems in any one of the three safety divisions are capable of accomplishing safe shutdown, and with the below listed exceptions, the safety divisions are separated by three-hour fire rated barriers.
(1)    Main Control Room (MCR)
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                          9.5-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 All four safety divisions of instrumentation and control are present in the main control room. Alternate safe shutdown capability is provided from the remote shutdown panel, which is located in a fire zone different from the MCR fire zone.
(2)    Primary Containment All four safety divisions are present in the primary containment. Primary containment is inerted during operation so that a fire in containment is not possible.
In spite of this, separation within containment is maintained by as much distance as possible. Also, there is no combination of active components within containment which could fail due to a fire and prevent safe shutdown.
(3)    Special Cases There are some instances where equipment from more than one safety division is purposely mounted in the same fire area. For example, in order to provide redundancy for leak detection initiation, leak detection thermocouples for two or more divisions are mounted in the same room to control the single division of equipment contained in the room. The acceptability of each of these cases is analyzed and reported in Subsection 9A.5.
Even with these limited exceptions for separation by fire barriers, the plant design is such that complete burnout of a given fire area may occur and there will still be two divisions of functionally available equipment (including cables), either division of which is capable of accomplishing plant shutdown. Compliance of the design to this objective is confirmed by the Fire Hazard Analysis. Item 8 of the Fire Hazard Analysis of each individual room points out that, for each related or safe shutdown equipment located in the room, redundant safety-related equipment is available in a different fire area to accomplish the function of the equipment assumed to be involved in the fire or fire suppression activities. An item-by-item listing of this equipment is given in Table 9A.6-1. In addition, major safety-related equipment which may be used to accomplish safe shutdown is summarized in Table 9A.2-1.
Since the operator will always have two divisions of safe shutdown equipment available for use, he may use either the normal or emergency operating procedures as he sees fit to safely shut the plant down. These procedures would probably lead him to use one of the multiple non-safety-related systems that would normally be available to him as the first choice for achieving safe shutdown, but no credit is taken in the analysis for the non-safety-related systems.
9.5.1.3.12 Shutdown Risk to Fire in Containment During normal operation the containment is protected from fire by nitrogen inerting. When the plant is shutdown, the containment is de-inerted to permit access by plant personnel for 9.5-24                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 maintenance activities. During these periods the following design features minimize the risk and adverse consequences if a fire in containment.
(1)    The large volume of the containment allows for spatial separation of the redundant divisional components. The redundant equipment for core cooling is separated to as large a degree as practically possible.
(2)    Once a flow path for RHR shutdown cooling is established a fire in the drywell will not result in the loss of the ability to remove decay heat from the reactor.
(3)    Removal of decay heat from the reactor can still be achieved even in the highly unlikely that a fire disables all of the active components inside the containment through a combination of high head injection systems (HPCF) and SRVs) and the suppression pool cooling mode of RHR.
(4)    The containment purge fans can be operated in a smoke removal mode to prevent the spread of smoke outside the containment.
(5)    The materials used inside the containment are non-flammable or flame resistant where ever practical resulting in low combustible loading.
(6)    The drywell spray system can be used as a sprinkler system to suppress a fire in the containment either by itself or in conjunction with manual fire fighting activities.
In addition to the design features of the ABWR the COL applicantss fire protection program will contain elements that minimize the risk of fire including control of transient combustibles, ignition source permits, and fire watches. The design features and administrative control programs ensure that a fire in the containment during shutdown will not result in a loss of the ability to keep the core cool.
9.5.1.4 Safety Evaluation (Fire Hazard AnalysisAppendix 9A)
The Fire Hazard Analysis is performed on a room-by-room, system-by-system basis and includes a set of drawings which reflect pertinent details of construction, location of rooms and location of fire suppression equipment (Appendix 9A).
Past practices in performing a Fire Hazard Analysis were based on evaluation of essentially complete plant designs. The ABWR design has not been completed to that level; therefore, the approach for the analysis was to review the system piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs),
and to prepare a database which listed every device that could be adversely affected by fire.
If the reviewers knew or became aware of something that would eventually be in the plant design but did not appear on any drawing at that time, it also was added to the list and assigned a special MPL number. This got the device into the database for tracking. If possible, each Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 device was given an electrical safety division assignment and the assigned division was entered into the database.
If a device appeared on the building arrangement drawings, its actual location by row, column and elevation was entered into the database. For all other identified devices, an estimate of location by row, column and elevation, based on experience and the known location of nearby devices, was entered into the database. The validity of the location information for each item was indicated as being determined by reference to a drawing or by estimation.
The Fire Hazards Analysis was then performed on the verified or assumed plant design as documented by the database. This made it possible for a Fire Hazards Analysis to be performed on a specific plant configuration. It makes a record of the configuration analyzed available for use as a guide in completing the plant design. Also, at some time near the end of the design phase, the assumed information in the database may be compared to the actual design to confirm that the original Fire Hazard Analysis conclusions are still valid for final plant design.
Any discrepancies may be analyzed and resolved at that time.
A compliance review will be conducted of the as-built design against the assumptions and requirements stated in the Fire Hazard Analysis as documented in Appendix 9B. This as-built reconciliation will include a comparison with Table 9A.6-1 (database) and Table 9A.5-2 (special cases). In addition, it will demonstrated that multiple high impedance faults of those circuits described in Table 9A.5-2 resulting from a fire within any one fire area will not negatively impact other equipment fed from the same power source. Any non-compliance shall be documented in a Fire Hazards Report as being required and acceptable on the basis of the Fire Hazard Analysis (Appendix 9A) and the Fire Protection Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Appendix 19M). The Fire Hazards Analyses (Appendix 9A) will be updated to include the as-built information. Any non-compliance must be documented as being required and acceptable.
The basis of the overall plant design with respect to the effects of fire is to assume that all functions are lost for equipment, including electrical cables, located within a fire area experiencing a fire. Redundant equipment is provided in other fire areas. A fire area by fire area treatment for the Fire Hazard Analysis evaluates the compliance of the design to this requirement for redundancy. Compliance was confirmed or the need for corrective action was identified and initiated to achieve compliance to the overall plant design basis. Therefore, the most serious consequence of a fire is that it may incapacitate one safety or safe shutdown division. This is consistent with the single failure design criteria used throughout the plant.
Regardless of the location of a fire, sufficient operable equipment is assured for use in safely shutting the plant down.
The Fire Hazard Analysis assumes that the function of a piece of equipment may be lost if the equipment is either involved in fire fighting activities or subjected to fire suppression agents and confirms that redundant equipment out of the fire area is available. This redundant equipment is capable of performing the required safety or shutdown function. The basis of the 9.5-26                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 design is not to assume a questionable limit on damage within a given fire area but to provide redundant equipment elsewhere.
As described in Appendix 9A, the fire detection systems are Class A and, therefore, are tolerant of single failures. The fire suppression systems are designed such that there are two suppression systems available to any given area. Areas covered by sprinklers or foam systems are also covered by the manual hose system. Areas covered by manual hose systems only may be reached from at least two hose stations. Standpipes are fed from two directions.
9.5.1.5 Inspection and Testing Requirements Preoperational inspection and testing requirements will be prepared for each fire protection system as described in Subsection 14.2.12.
9.5.1.6 Personnel Qualifications and Training 9.5.1.6.1 Fire Protection Engineer The qualification requirements of the fire protection engineer are as follows:
(1)  A graduate of an engineering curriculum of accepted standing.
(2)  Shall have completed not less than eight years of engineering practice of progressive importance indicative of growth in engineering competency and achievement, three of which shall have been in responsible charge of fire protection engineering work.
(3)  If not such a graduate, shall have completed not less than 12 years of engineering practice of progressive importance indicative of growth in engineering competency and achievement, three of which shall have been in responsible charge of fire protection engineering work.
9.5.1.6.2 Quality Assurance (QA) Program Quality assurance policies and procedures are described in Chapter 17. They provide compliance with the criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix B. The program defines the requirements and controls for activities affecting quality of structures, systems and components to an extent consistent with their importance to safety.
9.5.1.6.3 Emergency Response Plan Out of ABWR Standard Plant scope.
9.5.1.6.4 Administrative Controls The description of administrative controls that will be established to govern various details of operations of the plant will conform to guidelines of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. However, a detailed review and acceptance of the administrative controls by the NRC will be performed during the Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 plant-specific licensing. Items of interest under the administrative controls review will include but not be limited to:
(1)    Control of combustible materials such as combustible/flammable liquids and gases, fire retardant treated wood, plastic materials, and dry ion exchange resins (2)    Transient combustible materials and general housekeeping, including health physics materials (3)    Open-flame and hot-work permits and cutting and welding operations (4)    Quality assurance with respect to fire protection systems components, installation, maintenance, and operation (5)    Qualification of fire protection engineering personnel, fire brigade members, and fire protection systems maintenance and testing personnel (6)    Instruction, training, and drills provided to fire brigade members The COL applicant shall provide the description of these administrative controls to the NRC for review. See Subsection 9.5.13.18 for COL license information.
9.5.1.6.5 Deleted 9.5.2 Communication Systems The ABWR Standard Plant design provides a telephonic communication system consisting of a power-actuated paging facility and a separate network of cables and jacks to facilitate use of sound-powered telephones for maintenance, repair, and emergency conditions.
See Subsection 9.5.13.11 for COL applicant information pertaining to criteria for the design of the plant security system.
9.5.2.1 Design Bases 9.5.2.1.1 Power-Actuated Paging System The paging system is designed to provide facilities for mutual communication and simultaneous broadcasting in the related buildings of the plant.
9.5.2.1.2 Sound-Powered Telephone System The design basis for the sound-powered telephone system is to provide communication primarily for fuel transfer, testing, calibration, maintenance and emergency conditions.
9.5-28                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.2.2 Description 9.5.2.2.1 Paging Facilities This system provides communication means such as mutual telephonic communication and simultaneous broadcasting in various select buildings and areas, including outdoor locations of a nuclear power plant unit. The system also permits merging with paging facilities of other units of the nuclear power station. The system is a fixed-type (as opposed to wireless communication) and primarily used for intraplant communications during plant operations, testing, calibration, startup and limited emergencies.
The paging system is a non-safety system and, therefore, does not have seismic mounting requirements. Mounting of system components is such that it will not cause damage to safety-related equipment.
The paging facilities consist of handsets, speakers, branch boxes, main distribution board, a control board, amplifiers, amplifier boards, 48V battery, battery chargers, DC distribution board, cables-wiring materials, junction boxes and jacks. The system is a 3-channel, 3-branch split type design with a separate set of amplifiers and a distribution board for each branch. A general outline of the system is shown in Figure 9.5-2.
Handsets and speakers are installed in places which are important for plant operation and necessary for personnel safety including the rooms described below:
(1)  Main control room (2)  Electrical equipment room (3)  Fuel replacement area (4)  Turbine operation area (5)  Periphery of control rods hydraulic units (6)  Feedwater pump room (7)  Elevators (8)  Exteriors of plant buildings Each handset station can be used to communicate with any other handset station within the unit or the central station of another unit at the same nuclear station.
One circuit of the handset station is connected to a telephone line, thereby permitting a simultaneous broadcasting from a security telephone unit.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 The system is operated from a 48V battery source with a normal and a spare battery charger.
The chargers are fed from 3&#xf8;, 480 VAC station power supply, and a separate 1&#xf8;, 120VAC power source is used for panel lights and convenience receptacles.
Due to its importance to plant operation and safety, the paging equipment will have an exclusive DC power supply with a dedicated battery. The battery has capacity for 10 hours of operation following the loss of AC power. The charger is sized to recharge the battery from a fully discharged condition in 10 hours while supplying the normal DC loads.
A handset is located at the same relative position on each floor, at a conspicuous location in the patrol route, at uniform intervals in corridors and large rooms, close to panels where possible and at a location least affected by radioactivity within one area.
Paging equipment for outdoor facilities is designed to automatically limit the sound volume at night to a level manually set from the operators desk. The manual volume settings can be 10, 20, 30 or 40 dB.
The paging equipment produces an emergency signal (siren sound) upon actuation of an emergency signal pushbutton.
Speakers and handsets are installed at the best practical distance from noise sources. However, in rooms where noise level increases during equipment operation (such as feed water pump room, diesel generator room etc.), handsets are enclosed within a sound-proof booth.
The speakers are of two different types as described below. Their sound-to-noise (S/N) ratio is approximately 3 to 6 dB.
S = Output sound pressure of speaker.
N = Noise level at a place where the speaker is installed.
(1)    Horn-shaped (Trumpet shaped): Output of 5 to 15W (2)    Cone-shaped (box-type): Output of 3W. Box-type speakers are installed in small rooms where reverberations make hearing difficult.
Junction boxes installed outdoors are made of stainless plate in accordance with the outdoor specifications. Junction boxes installed within the building are constructed to prevent water damage from above.
The interconnecting cables consist of a standard pair of conductors with cross-linked polyethylene insulation, a static electricity shield and an overall flame and heat-resistant sheath.
The circuits from the main paging equipment to each junction box are wired by separate routes.
Wiring is routed in existing cable trays for control cables. Containment penetrations X-102 A 9.5-30                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 and B are used for communication cables which are routed to the communication circuits within containment.
9.5.2.2.2 Sound-Powered Telephone System for Plant Maintenance and Repair A separate communication system using portable sound-powered telephone units will be provided.
The communication facilities for use during plant maintenance and emergency conditions such as operation from RSS consists of local communication stations containing terminal jacks and boxes and a main patch panel with storage for patch cords. The patch panel is located outside the MCR. The portable sound-powered telephones themselves to be provided by the COL applicant. See Subsection 9.5.13.17 for COL license information.
The system provides communication capability between boards in the main control room, RSS and field station(s), or from field station to field stations.
An outline of the system is shown in Figure 9.5-2.
The communication between stations is by means of portable telephone units and patch cords at the main patch panel.
Terminal jacks are attached to the communication station at control panels and to local panels and racks where communication links are frequently required for testing, calibration, maintenance, and for operation from RSS.
The cable for the sound-powered communication facility is unshielded with a flame and heat resistant sheath and cross-linked polyethylene insulation. The cables are routed in existing control voltage level cable trays where available.
9.5.2.3 System Operation The telephonic communication systems are designed to assist the plant personnel during preoperational, startup, testing, maintenance and emergency conditions. The system provides easily accessible means of communications between various intraplant locations and simultaneous broadcasting in those locations.
The various equipment involved in system operation is designed to function in the environment where it is located. The power supply for the paging system is derived from the dedicated batteries, thus providing a reliable source of power and the communication system for up to 10 hours in the event of a loss of plant power supply. The sound-powered telephone system does not require any electrical power source to operate the system.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-31
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.2.4 Safety Evaluation The communication system has no safety-related function as discussed in Section 3.2.
However, see Subsection 9.5.13.2 for COL license information pertaining to use of the system in emergencies.
9.5.2.5 Inspection and testing Requirements The communication systems are conventional and have a history of successful operation.
Routine use of parts of the system during normal operation ensures availability. Measurements or tests required to guard against long-term deterioration shall be performed on a periodic basis.
See Subsection 9.5.13.3 for COL license information pertaining to communication equipment maintenance and testing procedures.
9.5.2.6 Portable and Fixed Emergency Communication Systems 9.5.2.6.1 Design Basis The design basis for the portable and fixed emergency voice communication systems is to provide communication facilities for normal and emergency plant operations and for plant security.
9.5.2.6.2 System Description A fixed emergency communication system shall provide reliable communications between operating areas in the plant and to offsite locations. The system shall be independent of the other communication systems and shall include, but not be limited to commercial telephone, emergency alarms, and/or private branch exchange (PBX) system. The system shall be compatible with the plant paging facilities (Subsection 9.5.2.2.1) such that it will permit a simultaneous broadcasting from a security telephone unit.
A portable communications system such as hand-held portable radio or equivalent shall be furnished independent of other communications systems, and be available for use by plant operations and security personnel during plant normal and emergency conditions.
Design of fixed emergency communication and portable communication systems shall comply with BTP CMEB 9.5.1, position C.5.g(3) and (4).
9.5.2.6.3 System Operation The system operation is the same as listed in Subsection 9.5.2.3 except for the discussion on the power supply requirements. The design and power supply requirements for these systems shall be specified by the COL applicant.
9.5.2.6.4 Safety Evaluation The system safety evaluation is same as listed in Subsection 9.5.2.4.
9.5-32                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.2.6.5 Inspection and Testing Requirements The system inspection and testing requirements are same as listed in Subsection 9.5.2.5.
9.5.3 Lighting and Servicing Power Supply System The plant lighting is comprised of four independent lighting systems: (1) normal AC lighting system, (2) standby AC lighting system, (3) emergency DC lighting system, and (4) guide lamp lighting system. The normal lighting system is non-Class 1E. The other three lighting systems are comprised of Class 1E (guide lamps only), associated, and Non-Class 1E subsystems.
All yard lighting (i.e., external to the buildings) except fixtures mounted on the buildings themselves are within the COL applicants scope.
All lighting systems are designed to provide intensities consistent with the lighting needs of the areas in which they are located, and with their intended purpose. The lighting design considers the effects of glare and shadows on control panels, video display devices, and other equipment, and the mirror effects on glass and pools. Lighting and other equipment maintenance, in addition to the safety of personnel, plant equipment, and plant operation, is considered in the design. Areas containing flammable materials (e.g., battery rooms, fuel tanks) have explosion proof lighting systems. Areas subject to high moisture have water-proof installations (e.g.,
drywell, washdown areas). Plant AC lighting systems are generally of the fluorescent type, with mercury lamps (or equivalent) provided for high ceiling, except where breakage could introduce mercury into the reactor coolant system. Incandescent lamps are used for DC lighting systems and above the reactor, fuel pools, and other areas where lamp breakage could introduce mercury into the reactor coolant.
Lighting systems and their distribution panels and cables are identified according to their essentiality and type. Associated and Class 1E lighting systems are located in Seismic Category I structures, and are electrically independent and physically separated in accordance with assigned divisions. Cables are routed in their respective divisional raceways. Normal lighting is separated from standby lighting. DC lighting cables are not routed with any other cables and are distinguished by DCL markings superimposed on the color markings at the same intervals.
Plant service buses supply power and heavy duty service outlets to equipment not generally used during normal plant power operation (e.g. Turbine Building and refueling floor cranes, welding equipment). Service outlets have grounded connections and the outlets in wet or moist areas are supplied from breakers with ground current detection.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-33
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.5.3.1.1 General Design Bases The general design bases for the Nuclear Island portion of the lighting systems are as follows:
(1)  The lighting guidelines shall be based on Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) recommended intensities. These shall be inservice values as shown on Table 9.5-1, Illumination Levels. Reflected glare will be minimized.
(2)  Control room lighting is designed with respect to reduction of glare and shadows on the control boards.
(3)  Lighting systems and components are in conformity with the electrical standards of NFPA and OSHA as applicable for safety of personnel, plant and equipment. Light fixtures in safety areas are seismically supported, and are designed with appropriate grids or diffusers, such that broken material will be contained and will not become a hazard to personnel or safety equipment during or following a seismic event.
(4)  Each of the normal, standby or emergency lighting systems has the following arrangement criteria:
(a)    Areas without doors and hatches (where access is impossible) have no lighting.
(b)    Rooms with normal (non-safety-related) lighting shall have on/off switches if the rooms are also used as passageways (e.g., patrol routes).
(c)    For high radiation areas, the on/off switches and lamps shall be arranged to facilitate maintenance and to obtain maximum service life from the lamps.
(d)    The switches shall be located at the entrance to the rooms, or the side of the passageway.
(e)    Normal lighting power for the small rooms with on/off switches shall be supplied from one power bus.
NOTE: A small room means a room with three or less lighting fixtures, except for instrument rack rooms and electrical panel rooms.
(f)    DC emergency lighting and associated lighting have no switch on their power supply lines.
(g)    Standby lighting shall have no switch on power supply lines, as a rule.
However, lighting for conference rooms etc., will have on/off switches.
(h)    Power of inner panel lighting and outlets are supplied from one power bus.
(i)    Each part of the 120V, 240V and 120/ 240V buses in lighting distribution panels shall have two or three spare circuits.
9.5-34                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (j) Installation of fixtures on a high ceiling shall be avoided as far as possible to minimize lamp replacement work.
(k) The fixtures shall be located with due consideration of maintenance and inspection for the equipment in the rooms (such as tank rooms) where a well balanced arrangement is difficult.
(l) For mercury lamps, ballasts can be installed separately for life extension under the defined environment.
(m) The standard installation interval of service power supply boxes should be 45.7
                            - 61.0 m.
(n) The standard installation interval of outlets should be 15.2 - 30.5 m; however, outlets shall be arranged around instrument racks. The outlet installation level in hazard control areas shall be above the top of dikes.
(o) As a rule, normal lighting power shall be supplied with two power buses.
However, a power supply with one power bus can be used for areas with high illumination lighting by standby lighting and in small rooms.
(p) Lighting shall be designed with due consideration of reflection on the CRT screens where CRTs are installed.
(q) Lighting fixtures in rooms with glass windows shall be arranged with due consideration of the mirror effect to keep the window clear.
(r) Power for staircase and passage lighting is from the standby system and shall be supplied from two power buses in the staircases and passages to prevent a total lighting loss. Each bus supplies power to 50% of the standby lighting of the passages and staircases. The two power buses for safety-related area passages and staircases shall consist of the following:
(i)    One Class 1E bus (the same division as the safety-related equipment in the area), which is backed by its respective divisional diesel generator.
A non-Class 1E bus, which is backed by the combustion turbine generator.
(ii)    Under annual inspection of the power supplies, 50% lighting is secured with one lighting power bus. The 50% lighting level shall be sufficient for access and egress of personnel to and from the areas.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                  9.5-35
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5) Lighting fixtures shall be selected in accordance with the following criteria:
(a)  Lighting fixtures inside the plant shall be the following type of fixtures:
(i)    Fluorescent lampsAs a rule, fluorescent lamps shall be selected as fixtures for the general area.
(ii)  Mercury lampsMercury lamps (or equivalent) shall be selected as fixtures for high ceiling areas (except in reactor building or other areas where lamp breakage could introduce mercury into the reactor coolant).
(iii) Incandescent lampsIncandescent lamps shall be selected as fixtures for DC emergency lighting and as fixtures above the reactors and fuel pool in R/B operating floor.
(b)  Standby lighting shall be the rapid start type.
(c)  Incandescent lamps shall have waterproof guards inside drywell.
(d)  The fixtures can be a general industry type; however, the fixtures for the part of service area in S/B and control rooms shall match the interior finish of the area.
(e)  Lighting fixtures above operator consoles, benchboards and RW operator consoles shall be dark green embedded louver lighting to reduce the reflection of fixtures on CRT screens. Illumination levels around the operator console and benchboards shall be adjustable.
(f)  Non-Class 1E battery pack lamps shall be self contained units suitable for the environment in which they are located.
(g)  The light fixtures for Class 1E battery packs may be located remote from the battery if the environment at the lamp is not within the qualified range of the battery. Alternatively, lamps powered from the station batteries may be provided.
(h)  Outlets shall have grounded connections and should be 120V-15A type or 240V-15A type.
(i)  Standard service power boxes shall be 3-phase 480V-100A type.
(j)  Lighting around the reactor and fuel pool on the R/B operating floor shall be designed with due consideration of the reflection on the water surface to keep from impeding pool work. Lamps located where they may drop in the reactor or fuel pool, shall have guards.
(k)  Outdoor lamps shall have automatic on/off switches.
9.5-36                                                                        Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (l)    Associated lighting equipment shall be selected for the following areas. Wiring shall be an explosion-proof type.
(i)    Batch oil tank room such as turbine oil tank room and lubrication oil tank room (ii)  EHC equipments room (iii) Battery rooms (iv)  Diesel generator rooms (v)    Day tank rooms (vi)  Hydrogen related panels and seal oil equipment area (m)    Lighting inside the cask cleaning pit shall be an embedded waterproof type fixture (n)    Feeder circuits for the lighting fixtures and outlets in the following areas shall have circuit breakers with ground current detection:
(i)    Decontamination pans (ii)  Decontamination rooms (iii) Inside drywell (outlets)
(iv)  R/B operating floor (service power supply boxes)
(v)    Service power supply boxes (6) Fixture installation levels shall be as follows with consideration for the arrangement of trays, HVAC ducts and equipment lifting space:
Equipment                                    2.4m (from floor surface)
Distribution panels                          2m to the top of the panels Suspended fixture                            2.4m to bottom of the fixtures Wall mounted fixtures                        2.4m to bottom of the fixtures Detailed installation levels will be coordinated at the construction site.
(7) Wiring Criteria (a)    Wiring from power buses to distribution panels shall be done with conduit or cable trays. Wiring from the distribution panels shall be done with conduits.
(b)    Normal non-Class 1E lighting power supply lines from the distribution panels with dual power bus configuration can share the same conduit.
(c)    Standby lighting circuits shall not share raceways with normal lighting circuits.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    To enhance lighting reliability, emergency DC lighting circuits shall not share raceways with any other circuits.
(e)    Physical identification of the safety-related equipment and cables is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.
(8)    Wires and Cables (a)    Wire size shall be 2.1mm, or larger as required.
(b)    The size of the neutral line shall be the same as the branched circuits.
(9)    Conduits (a)    Generally, embedded conduits shall be thick wall type, and exposed conduits may be thin wall type.
Exposed conduits in the drywell, the yard and the area where safety type fixtures or pressure resistant explosion-proof fixtures are required shall be thick wall type.
9.5.3.1.2 Safety-Related Design Bases Nuclear safety-related design bases for ABWR Standard Plant lighting systems are as follows:
(1)    Mercury vapor fixtures and mercury switches are not used where a broken fixture or switch may result in introduction of mercury into the reactor coolant system.
(2)    Adequate lighting for any safety-related areas, such as areas used during emergencies or reactor safe shutdown, including those along the appropriate access or exit routes, are provided from three different lighting circuits (standby AC; emergency 125VDC, or self-contained battery fixtures).
See Table 9.5-2 for the lighting subsystems and their normal and backup power sources and the switching sequence. This table shows that the lighting is provided from normal AC power and standby AC power, and is backed up by emergency DC power during normal operation. On the loss of normal and standby AC power, the lighting is provided by emergency DC powered lighting facilities or self-contained battery fixtures.
9.5.3.2 System Description Plant lighting is divided into four subsystems:
(1)    Normal lighting (AC)
(2)    Standby lighting (AC)
(a)    Associated 9.5-38                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Non-Class 1E (3)    Emergency lighting (DC)
(a)  Associated (b)  Non-Class 1E (4)    Guide lamps (a)  Class 1E (b)  Non-Class 1E Lighting fixtures that contain mercury are not used inside the Reactor Building or in any other location where broken fixtures may introduce mercury into the reactor coolant system.
9.5.3.2.1 Normal (Non-Class 1E) Lighting The normal lighting system is AC and non-Class 1E and provides up to 50% of the lighting needed for operation, inspection, and repairs during normal plant operation and is installed throughout the plant in non-safety-related equipment areas, except for the passageways and stairwells. Normal lighting is generally supplied from the non-safety-related power generation (PG) buses. In the non-safety-related equipment areas, the normal lighting is supplemented (a minimum of 50%) by the non-Class 1E lighting system. Lighting from a single load group is acceptable for localized high intensity lighting and lighting in small rooms where only a limited number of fixtures are needed. Non-Class 1E service outlets and internal lighting for panels is provided by the normal lighting system. In passageways and stairwells leading to non-safety-related equipment areas, the lighting is supplied from two different load groups of the non-Class 1E lighting system. With this configuration, non-safety-related equipment areas receive 100%
of their lighting from two different power sources.
9.5.3.2.2 Standby Lighting Standby lighting is provided for the operation and maintenance of equipment during the loss of normal power and is installed over the entire plant area. The AC lighting configuration permits retaining approximately 50% of the lighting illumination in all passageways, stairwells and safety-related equipment areas during lighting maintenance or loss of a load group. Illumination from 50% of the lighting is adequate to observe equipment and support personnel movement.
The standby lighting system is made of two subsystems: associated and non-Class 1E. The associated lighting subsystem serves the safety-related areas, and their associated passageways.
The non-Class 1E lighting subsystem serves the non-safety-related areas and their associated passageways.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-39
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.3.2.2.1 Associated Standby Lighting Subsystem (SSLS)
The associated AC Standby Lighting System is comprised of lighting from three Class 1E divisions. Each of the three Class 1E divisions is supplied power from the Class 1E divisional bus, which is connectable to the Class 1E standby power supply (emergency diesel generator (DG)) in its respective division. Each associated standby lighting system supplies a minimum of 50% of the lighting needs of the safety-related equipment areas in its respective division and of the passageways and stairwells leading to its respective equipment areas. The associated lighting in the battery room and other instrument and control areas of Division IV is supplied from the Division II associated standby lighting system. The main control room lighting is supplied from Division II and III associated standby lighting systems. The remainder of the lighting (up to 50%) in the safety-related equipment areas and the passageways and stairwells leading to them is supplied from the non-Class 1E standby lighting system in the same load group as the associated lighting system. With this configuration, essential equipment areas receive 100% of their lighting needs from two different standby lighting power supplies.
The associated standby lighting subsystem is fed from Class 1E buses through separate lighting panels. Fixtures are provided for all safety-related areas, areas where Division 1, 2, 3, and 4 systems equipment is located, and their associated access areas. The fixtures provide a reduced lighting level adequate to support personnel movement and observation of equipment after interruption of the normal lighting system. In the event of a LOPP, the SSLS is automatically fed from the diesel generator sets.
The lighting circuits are associated. The lighting fixtures themselves are not seismically qualified, but are seismically supported. This is acceptable to the Class 1E power supply because of overcurrent protective device coordination. The bulbs cannot be seismically qualified. However, the bulbs can only fail open and therefore do not represent a hazard to the Class 1E power sources.
9.5.3.2.2.2 Non-Class 1E Standby Lighting Subsystems (NSLS)
The non-Class 1E AC Standby Lighting System (NSLS) is comprised of lighting from three non-Class 1E load groups. Each load group is supplied from a different plant investment protection (PIP) bus which is connectable to the non-Class 1E standby power supply (combustion turbine generator (CTG)). The NSLS supplies a minimum of 50% of the lighting needs of the non-safety-related equipment areas and 100% of the lighting in passageways and stairwells leading to non-safety-related equipment areas (as described above). In addition, the NSLS supplies up to 50% of the lighting needs in safety-related equipment areas and in passageways and stairwells leading to safety-related equipment areas. The remainder of the lighting (a minimum of 50%) in the safety-related equipment areas and in passageways and stairwells leading to them is supplied from the SSLS.
The NSLS is fed from non-Class 1E buses through separate lighting panels. Fixtures are provided for all non-safety-related areas (areas where non-divisional equipment is located), and 9.5-40                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 their associated passageways. The fixtures provide a reduced lighting level adequate to support personnel movement and observation of equipment after interruption of the normal lighting system. In the event of a LOPP, the NSLS is automatically fed from the combustion turbine generator. The NSLS transformers and their associated panels are non-Class 1E and are routed in non-Class 1E raceways. The illumination levels and power sources are shown on Table 9.5-3.
9.5.3.2.3 DC Emergency Lighting The DC Emergency Lighting System consists of two subsystems: associated and non-Class 1E.
The associated subsystem serves the following safety-related areas:
Main control room Safety-related electric equipment rooms Diesel generator areas and associated control rooms DC electric equipment rooms (battery rooms are included)
Remote shutdown control rooms The non-Class 1E subsystem serves the non-safety-related radwaste control room.
The DC Emergency Lighting System provides backup illumination for periods after the loss of preferred power, until the combustion turbine generator energizes the standby lighting system, as well as in the event of loss of all the AC lighting sources.
The illumination levels and power sources of the DC Emergency Lighting System is shown in Table 9.5-4.
9.5.3.2.3.1 Associated Emergency Lighting Subsystem (SELS)
The Associated Emergency Lighting System (SELS) provides the emergency lighting needs to the main control room, the remote shutdown panel room, the emergency diesel generator areas and control rooms, and the safety-related electrical equipment rooms (both AC and DC).
Lighting power for the identified safety-related areas is supplied from the 125 VDC battery in the same divisions as the area. The lighting power to the main control room is supplied from Divisions 2 and 3 125 VDC batteries.
The power for the DC emergency lighting subsystem is fed from the Class 1E station DC power supply system through Class 1E distribution panels for the above safety-related areas. Fixtures are provided for all safety-related areas. The circuits are treated as Class 1E. The SELS circuits up to the lighting fixture are classified as associated and are routed in Seismic Category I raceways. This is acceptable to the Class 1E power supply because of overcurrent protective device coordination. The bulbs are not seismically qualified. However, the bulbs can only fail open and therefore do not represent a hazard to the Class 1E power sources.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.3.2.3.2 Non-Class 1E Emergency Lighting Subsystem (NELS)
The Non-Class 1E Emergency Lighting System (NELS) provides the emergency lighting needs to the Radwaste Building (RW/B) control room, the combustion turbine generator (CTG) area and control room, and the non-safety-related electrical equipment areas (both AC and DC).
Lighting power for the RW/B control room is supplied from a Non-Class 1E battery. Lighting power for the non-safety-related electrical equipment rooms is supplied from the 125 VDC battery in the same non-safety-related load group as the equipment in the room. Lighting power for the non-Class 1E CTG is supplied from one of the non-Class 1E 125 VDC batteries.
The power for the NELS is fed from the non-Class 1E station DC power supply system through the non-Class 1E distribution panel for the radwaste control room. The lighting panel and wiring are non-Class 1E and non-seismic. The circuits are classified as non-Class 1E and are routed in non-seismic raceways.
9.5.3.2.4 Guide Lamps With Self-Contained Battery Packs DC emergency guide lamp lighting fixtures are installed for stairways, exit routes and major control areas such as the main control room and remote shutdown panel areas. Each of the emergency lighting fixtures has two incandescent sealed-beam lamps, with an 8-hr minimum self-contained battery charger and an initiating switch which energizes the fixture from the battery in the event of loss of the AC power supply, and de-energizes the fixture upon return of AC power to the standby light, following a time delay of 15 minutes (Table 9.5-2). The power supply AC source is fed from the standby lighting system in the same area. The passageways are illuminated to a level of 1 foot candle on the floor per the Life Safety Code.
The self-contained emergency lighting sets are Class 1E qualified in safety-related areas. Class 1E equipment is classified as Seismic Category I.
9.5.3.2.5 Emergency Operation Failure Analysis Because of the redundancy provided by the systems described above, the complete loss of lighting in any of the critical areas is not credible. The standby lighting system on loss of the normal lighting system and the emergency lighting systems provide totally independent low level illumination in areas vital to safe shutdown of the reactor and evacuation or access by personnel should the need occur. This is specifically demonstrated by Tables 9.5-1 and 9.5-2.
Also, the safety-related control systems will automatically bring the plant to safe shutdown if lighting is not available.
9.5.3.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements Since the normal standby and emergency lighting circuits are energized and maintained continuously, they require no periodic testing. However, periodic inspection and bulb replacement will be performed (Subsection 8.3.4.2.5). The guide lamps are capable of being 9.5-42                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 tested and will be inspected and tested periodically to ensure operability of lights and switching circuits.
9.5.4 Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases (1)  Each engine is supplied by a separate safety-related diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system. All fuel oil transfer equipment is designed, fabricated and qualified to Seismic Category I requirements. Failure of any one component could result in loss of fuel supply to only one diesel-generator.
(2)  Minimum onsite storage capacity of the system is sufficient for operating each diesel-generator for a minimum of seven days while supplying post-LOCA maximum load demands.
(3)  Design and construction of the diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system and the connection for the diesel generator system piping from the day tank up to the first connection on the engine skid conforms to the IEEE Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE-308); and ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C. Miscellaneous equipment conforms to applicable standards of NEMA, DEMA, ASTM, IEEE, ANSI, API, NFPA. ANSI Standard N195 Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators is applied.
(4)  The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is of Seismic Category I design. In addition, the storage tanks are separately located underground and are protected from damage by flying missiles carried by tornados and hurricanes, from external floods, and other environmental factors. The fill connection is located at grade elevation. The vent and sample connection are located a little above the grade elevation. The fill and sample lines are capped and locked to prevent entry of moisture. Each vent is of fireproof goose-necked line with fine mesh screen to prevent access of debris.
Damage to these lines would have no adverse safety consequences, since they are not part of the fuel path from the storage tank to the diesel. In addition, each diesel has its own day tank, which is located inside the Reactor Building. This provides another level of protected fuel supply for each diesel generator. Also, there are three independent diesel-generator systems. Missile damage of such lines for more than one division is highly unlikely because each division is located in separated areas of the plant.
(5)  System components are selected to be corrosion resistant.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-43
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  System design also considers positive protection from damage caused by turbine missiles.
9.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The diesel-generator systems are standby power supply systems. The diesel fuel oil storage and transfer systems are capable of supporting the instant start requirements of the diesel-generators.
9.5.4.2 System Description Although specific suppliers may differ in the final design, a typical P&ID is provided as Figure 9.5-6. See Subsection 9.5.13.5 for COL license information.
There are three diesel-generators (DG-A, DG-B and DG-C), each one housed in its separate, respective divisional area within the Reactor Building. The units are identical and are held in reserve to furnish standby AC power in case of an emergency.
The Diesel-Generators DG-A and DG-C are located on one side of the Reactor Building, but are separated from each other. The diesel-generator DG-B is located in the opposite side of the Reactor Building.
Electrical and mechanical components of the fuel oil storage and transfer system in the Reactor Building are located in their respective divisional areas.
The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system for each engine consists of a yard 7-day storage tank, a fuel oil day tank, fuel oil transfer pump, suction strainer, duplex filter, instrumentation and controls, and the necessary interconnecting pipe and fittings. A bleed line returns excess fuel oil from the day tank for recirculation to the yard storage tank. Day tank elevation is such that the engine fuel oil pump operates with flooded suction. The bottom of the day tank will never be lower than the pump suction centerline.
Each diesel-generator set has its own day tank, which holds a capacity of fuel oil sufficient to operate its corresponding diesel-generator set for a minimum of eight hours while supplying its maximum LOCA load demand. Fuel oil is supplied by transfer pumps to each day tank from the yard storage system.
The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is capable of transferring fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank at a rate which exceeds the engine consumption rate while supplying its post-accident load requirements. Fuel oil transfer will not degrade diesel-generator operation.
Electrical power requirements for the fuel transfer system components is provided from the Class 1E electrical system in the same safety-related division.
9.5-44                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 A set of transfer pumps may be operated with manual control switches from the main control room and locally. However, they are normally operated automatically by level switches on the day tanks. A low level switch starts the first transfer pump, a low-low level switch starts the standby transfer pump and a high level switch stops both pumps.
Capability analyses will be performed in accordance with acceptable industry practice to assure the seven day and eight hour storage and day tank capacities, respectively.
An engine-driven fuel oil pump increases the fuel pressure to the diesel engine fuel manifold.
Fuel oil transfer system piping is ASME Code Section III, Class 3, Seismic Category I. A motor driven fuel oil booster pump is also provided for priming purpose, and for added reliability.
9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation The overall diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed so that failure of any one component may result in the loss of fuel supply to only one diesel-generator. The loss of one diesel-generator does not preclude adequate core cooling under accident conditions.
Day tank fuel oil feed to the fuel pump is by gravity. There are no powered components to fail.
A duplex suction strainer prevents foreign matter from entering the pump and causing malfunction. The system is safety-related and all piping and components up to the engine skid connection are designed and constructed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, Class 3, and Seismic Category I requirements.
The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed to withstand the adverse loadings imposed by earthquakes, tornadoes/hurricanes and severe winds. For extreme wind loads, the design basis tornado whose winds and missile loads bound the design basis hurricane are as specified in 3H.1.4.3.1. Earthquake protection is provided by the Seismic Category I construction. Tornado and wind protection is provided by locating system components either underground or within the reactor building. All underground piping is covered with protective coating and wrapping to guard against corrosion. The Seismic Category I portions of diesel-generator fuel oil piping will be routed in tunnels between the storage tanks and the Reactor Building. The system will be provided with a protection against external and internal corrosion.
The buried portion of the tanks and piping will be provided with waterproof protective coating and an impressed current-type cathodic protection, to control the external corrosion of underground piping system. The impressed current-type cathodic protection system will be designed to prevent the ignition of combustible vapors or fuel oil present in the fuel oil system, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137, Paragraph C.1.g.
All storage and day tanks are located at a sufficient distance away from the plant control room to preclude any danger to control room personnel or equipment resulting from an oil tank explosion and/or fire. The fuel oil day tank is located in a separate room with 3-hr fire rated concrete walls. The quality of the fuel oil used for diesel engine will be ensured per Appendix Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 B, of ANSI N195. The fuel oil stored will meet the requirements of the ASTM D975 standard specification for diesel fuel oils and the requirements of the diesel engine manufacturer. Fuel oil not meeting these requirements will be replaced within a one-week period.
9.5.4.4 Tests and Inspections The diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137, and to permit periodic testing and inspection. (See Responses 430.274 through 430.276 in Subsection 20.3.16.)
Diesel-generator fuel oil storage and transfer system operability is demonstrated during the regularly scheduled operational tests of the diesel generators (test frequency is given in Chapter 16). Periodic testing of instruments, controls, sensors and alarms is necessary to assure reliable operation.
ASTM standard fuel sample tests are conducted at regular intervals to ensure compliance with fuel composition limits recommended by the diesel engine manufacturer. The Standard Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils ANSI/ASTM D975 is the governing specification.
Fuel oil may be stored a minimum of six months without deterioration.
Each fuel oil storage tank will be emptied and accumulated sediments be removed every 10 years to perform the ASME Section XI, Article IWD-2000 examination requirements.
In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137, periodic surveillance of cathodic protection for underground piping system will be provided, not to exceed a 12-month interval, to make sure that adequate protection exists. At intervals not exceeding 2 months, each of the cathodic protection rectifiers shall be inspected.
New fuel oil will be tested for specific gravity, cloud point and viscosity and visually inspected for appearance prior to addition to ensure that the limits of ASTM D975 are not exceeded.
Analysis of other properties of the fuel oil will be completed within two weeks of the fuel transfer.
9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Application Fuel supply level in the storage and day tanks is indicated both locally and in the main control room. Also, alarms on the local diesel-generator panel annunciate low level and high level in the day tanks. The setting of the low level alarm shall provide fuel at least 60 minutes of DG operation at 100% load with 10% margin between the alarm and the suction line inlet. A group repeat trouble alarm is also provided in the main control room. Level switches in the day tank signal automatic start and stop of the fuel oil transfer pump.
9.5-46                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.5 Diesel-Generator Jacket Cooling Water System 9.5.5.1 Design Bases All essential components of the diesel-generator cooling water system shall be qualified to Seismic Category I requirements and to 10CFR50 Appendix B. All engine-skid mounted pumps, valves, tanks, piping and heat exchangers shall be designed in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C. Failure of the cooling system in any one engine shall not affect the readiness or operability of any other engine. Each cooling system rejects its heat to the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System of the corresponding division.
Diesel-generators DG-A, DG-B and DG-C are located in Seismic Category I structures, protected from tornado/hurricane missiles and flood waters. The jacket water cooling system shall be able to operate at full load for seven days without any makeup.
The diesel engine shall be capable of operating for two minutes without secondary cooling to ensure that the engine can operate at full load in excess of the time required to restore cooling water (RCW and RSW), which are sequenced onto the Class 1E power supply within one minute following a loss of preferred power (see Table 8.3-4).
9.5.5.2 System Description Although specific suppliers may differ in the final design, a typical P&ID is provided as Figure 9.5-7.(See Subsection 9.5.13.6 for COL license information).
Each diesel-generator unit is supplied with a complete closed loop cooling system mounted integrally with the engine generator package. Included in each cooling package are a jacket water heater and keep-warm pump, temperature-regulating valve, lube oil cooler, motor and/or engine-driven jacket water pumps, jacketed manifold and a jacket water cooler, which is furnished with RCW from the essential portion of the system. RCW supply is from the same division as that of the diesel generator served.
The jacket cooling water passes through a three-way temperature control valve which modulates the flow of water through or around the jacket water heat exchangers (coolers), as necessary, to maintain required water temperature. Jacket water cools the turbocharger, the governor, the air cooler, the exhaust manifold and the lube oil cooler. The three-way valve, whose service is crucial, is designed and qualified as stated in Subsection 9.5.5.1.
An electric heater is installed in each system for the purpose of keeping the engine jacket water at a temperature near the normal operating level during plant normal operation. The heater water is circulated (via the keep-warm pump) through the engine to assure temperature uniformity in the engine while in standby. Two jacket water circulating pumps are provided to circulate the cooling water through the system during diesel-generator operation. During the standby mode, the jacket water temperature is maintained at 48.9&deg;C based on 15.6&deg;C normal ambient temperature.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-47
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The system is vented by an expansion tank vent line. The physical mounting of the piping and pumps is lower than the tank elevation; thus a static head will keep the pumps and piping filled with water.
To prevent long-term deterioration of the system internal surfaces, the system is filled with high quality treated water from the Makeup Water Purified System. The RCW side of the system is designed with the appropriate corrosion allowances of piping, and a fouling factor of 0.002 for heat exchanger tubes. A long interval periodic cleaning of the heat exchanger tubes may be necessary to restore the heat transfer capacity of the system in case of excessive fouling rates.
The RCW System for the DG jacket cooling water system is designed for a total heat removal rate based on the maximum permissible overload output of each diesel generator. Prudent margins are incorporated into the design to assure reliable system operation. See Subsection 9.5.13.6 for COL license information pertaining to cooling water system flow and heat removal requirements.
9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation Each diesel-generator cooling water system is independent. Failure of the diesel-generator cooling water system does not affect the other diesel-generator cooling systems or their diesel-generators. The engine jacket cooling water heat exchanger is furnished in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3. Components of the diesel-generator cooling water systems are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Procurement of components is governed by the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B to ensure quality assurance in all places of manufacture and installation.
9.5.5.4 Tests and Inspection To ensure the availability of the diesel-generator cooling water system, scheduled inspection and testing of the equipment is performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, as part of the overall engine performance checks. Instrumentation is provided to monitor cooling water temperatures, pressure and head tank level. Instruments receive periodic calibration and inspection to verify their accuracy. During standby periods, the keep-warm feature of the engine water jacket cooling closed-loop system is checked at scheduled intervals to ensure that the water jackets are warm. This system facilitates quick starting of the engine; however, the engines are required to be capable of a cold start in 20 seconds. The cooling water in the engine water jacket cooling closed-loop system is analyzed at regular intervals and is treated, as necessary, to maintain the desired quality.
9.5.5.5 Instrument Application Pressure, temperature and level instrumentation is provided for monitoring of important system operating parameters. Alarms provide warning in case of system low or high water temperature, low pressure, or low water inventory. Except for post-LOCA operation, the diesel generators 9.5-48                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 will trip on high-high cooling water temperature. See Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.5 for complete alarms.
9.5.6 Diesel-Generator Starting Air System 9.5.6.1 Design Bases The Diesel-Generator Starting Air System provides a supply of compressed air for starting the emergency generator diesel engines without external power. In order to meet the single-failure criterion, each diesel-generator set is provided with two complete, redundant starting air systems. Each starting air system has enough air storage capacity for five consecutive starts of the engine, and performs its starting function in such a way that the time interval between signal to start and ready to load status will not exceed 20 sec. The air storage tanks, valves and piping between tank and up to first connection on the engine skid are designed to Seismic Category I requirements, and in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3. The system is located in a Seismic Category I structure, protected against tornado, external missiles and flood waters. For extreme wind loads, the design basis tornado whose winds and missile loads bound the design basis hurricane are as specified in 3H.1.4.3.1.
9.5.6.2 System Description Although specific suppliers may differ in the final design, a typical P&ID is provided as Figure 9.5-8 (see Subsection 9.5.13.5 for COL license information).
The diesel-generator starting air system provides a separate and independent starting facility for each of the diesel-generating units. Each facility includes two 100% capacity sections, each section consisting of an air compressor, after cooler, air dryer and air receiver. Two redundant starting air admission valves in each of two engine starting air manifolds are provided for each engine. Failure of an one starting system in no way affects the ability of any other system to perform its required safety-related function. Normally, the compressors are fully automatic in operation, controlled by pressure switches located on their respective air receivers. The pressure switches signal the start and stop of the compressors, as necessary to maintain the required system pressure. Manual override of the automatic sequence is provided for emergency situations.
To avoid depleting air start capability, following unsuccessful automatic starting of the diesel generator with and without AC external power, each diesel generators air receiver tanks will have sufficient air remaining for three more successful starts without recharging (i.e., a total of five starts). Each motor-driven compressor has sufficient capacity to recharge the storage system in 30 min, after five starts of the diesel engine. The compressors are electric motor-driven, and receive power from the Class 1E bus within the same division.
Each air receiver is also provided with a blowdown connection. A connection at the receiver bottom will be used to blow down any water accumulated in the tank. The starting air admission Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-49
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 valves are operated by solenoids supplied with uninterruptible DC power from 125 VDC.
Solenoids and power feeds are in the same division.
The diesel-generator air start system is provided with an air dryer to ensure clean dry air to engine starting. The dryer will be capable of controlling the dew point as recommended by the diesel engine manufacturer. The dryer will be equipped with pre- and after-filters to remove oil, waste, dust and any pipe scale from the air stream. (See Response 430.285 in Subsection 20.3.16.)
9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation The standby diesel-generator starting air system air compressors and tanks are designed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
The system is classified Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I. Starting air facilities for each of the diesel engines are completely redundant, with each redundant section capable of supplying enough air for a minimum of five normal engine starts. Because of the redundancy incorporated in the system design, the diesel-generator starting system provides its minimum required safety function under the following conditions.
(1)  Design basis loss of coolant condition with loss-of-offsite power, by putting into operation the standby diesel generator.
(2)  Maintenance, outage of failure of one of the two air starting systems associated with the diesel engine.
Components of the diesel generator starting system are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Procurement of components is governed by the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B to ensure quality assurance in all phases of manufacture and installation. The diesel generator support systems meet the NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations 2.a, 2.b, 2.d and 5 with regard to protection of these systems from the adverse effects of dust and dirt (Subsection 9.5.13.8).Filters just upstream of the starting air distributor protect the air injectors from airborne contaminants. Each independent starting system has two redundant solenoid air valves. Therefore, system capability is maintained in the unlikely event of blockage of one air valve.
9.5.6.4 Tests and Inspection Periodic tests and inspections are performed on the following:
(1)  System pressure control pressure switches for proper and reliable function.
(2)  Low pressure alarm signals for low receiver pressure and low pressure to the engine.
(3)  Engine air admission valves and the admission line vent to ensure proper function in response to engine start signal.
9.5-50                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)    Pressure gauges on the receivers to verify calibration.
(5)    Air receivers to clear accumulated moisture using the blowdown connection.
9.5.6.5 Instrument Application An air receiver low pressure alarm is provided to alert the control room operator in case of loss of starting air pressure. See Section 8.3.1.1.8.5 for complete alarms.
9.5.7 Diesel Generator Lubrication System 9.5.7.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Lubrication System is a self-contained system designed to supply clean, filtered oil to the engine and generator bearing surfaces at controlled pressure and temperature.
Built-in capability ensures adequate lubrication of wearing surfaces, and cooling as necessary.
An electric heater and a keep-warm circulating pump maintain sufficient circulation of warm oil to help keep the engine in standby readiness. The keep-warm pump also serves as a priming pump to provide prelubrication of engine components. (See Response 430.293 in Subsection 20.3.16.) The pumps, valves, tanks and heat exchangers shall be designed in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C.
The system is located in a Seismic Category I structure providing protection from tornado/hurricane generated missiles and flood waters, as well as the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement from high and moderate energy pipe failures.
9.5.7.2 System Description Although specific suppliers may differ in the final design, a typical P&ID is provided as Figure 9.5-9. See Subsection 9.5.13.5 for COL license information.
All components herein described are supplied as part of the diesel-generator package by the diesel-generator supplier. All three systems are nuclear safety-related except for the keep-warm heaters and pumps. In the event of the LOPP or other emergency requiring diesel generator operation, the lube oil keep-warm system is shut down.
Each of the three diesel-generator lubrication systems consists of an oil sump in the engine frame, an engine-driven positive displacement pump, an oil cooler, a main header, and oil strainer and a filter. The main engine-driven lube oil pump takes oil from the sump, passes it through the lube oil cooler and lube oil filter, through a strainer, through the main header and back to the sump. A second feed line from the strainer supplies oil to the turbos via the rocker lube system. Constant oil pressure to the main header is maintained by pressure-regulating valves, which bypasses excess oil back to the sump.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-51
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Each of the three lube oil coolers are shell and tube type, built to TEMA Class C, and conform in all respects to ASME Code, Section III, Class 3. Cooling water for the coolers comes from the jacket cooling water (Subsection 9.5.5).
The diesel-generator sets have lube oil heating systems to keep the oil warm during standby.
An electric lube oil heater heats the oil, which is circulated through the main header by a keep-warm oil circulating pump. The keep-warm circuit circulates oil through a filter to ensure oil cleanliness. The engine lube oil sump can be replenished by a lube oil supply pump actuated by the low level in the engine sump. The lube oil supply pump transfers lube oil from the lube oil supply tank to the engine sump. The supply tank is filled via pipe feed from a delivery tanker truck. The lube oil may be added to the engine oil sump during engine operation. The lube oil system is capable of operating for seven days at full load. All tanks, pumps, piping, and valves are built to ASME Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C or ANSI B31.1 and Seismic Category I.
9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation Each diesel-generator lubrication system is an integral part of the diesel generator. The system is not required to meet the single-failure criterion because a failure does not prevent the other two divisions of the emergency power system from providing adequate power to safely shut down the plant or to mitigate the consequences of any of the postulated accidents.
9.5.7.4 Tests and Inspection The operating ability of the Diesel-Generator Lubrication System is tested and inspected during scheduled testing of the overall engine. Instrumentation is provided to monitor the lube oil temperature, pressure and sump level, ensuring proper operation of the system. During standby periods, the keep-warm feature of the system is checked at scheduled intervals to ensure that the oil is warm. Warm oil assists quick starting of the engine. Periodic sampling and analyzing of the lube oil is required to ensure good quality of oil in the system.
Local gauge board-mounted alarms signal low oil pressure, high oil temperature and low oil level. A remote combine alarm, one for each division, located in the main control room, annunciates on signal of diesel generator trouble from any alarm source on the local panel.
Instruments receive periodic calibration and tests to verify their accuracy.
The lubrication systems are located in locked, controlled diesel-generator rooms, thus precluding unauthorized personnel from interfering with system operation. Also, any contamination of the lubricating oil by deleterious material is thereby prevented.
9.5.8 Diesel-Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System 9.5.8.1 Design Bases All components of the Diesel-Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System shall be designed and qualified to Seismic Category I requirements. All piping shall be designed in accordance with ASME Code, Section Ill, Class 3, Quality Group C. Failure of the intake and 9.5-52                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 exhaust system in any one diesel generator shall not compromise the readiness or operability of any other diesel generator. Except for the exhaust silencers, the system shall be housed in a Seismic Category I and tornado/hurricane missile-protected structure. The system shall also be protected from flooding and the effects of pipe breaks.
The exhaust silencers for the diesel generators shall be seismically mounted and bolted down in the horizontal position such that the likelihood of their sustaining significant damage, or becoming missiles during a tornado or hurricane event is extremely remote. However, the probability of the silencers themselves being damaged due to externally generated missiles is acceptable. This is because the silencer can be lost without affecting the operation of the diesel unless debris from the damaged silencer clogs the exhaust pipe. In this highly unlikely scenario, the diesel would be assumed lost and the plant shutdown could still be accomplished with either of the remaining two diesels.
The design basis for the Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System, regarding protection from the effects of contaminating substances related to the facility site, systems, and equipment is as follows:
(1)  There are no contaminating substances available within the ABWR buildings to the combustion air intake in quantities which could degrade the diesel engine performance.
(2)  Restriction or contaminating substances from the plant site, which may be available to the combustion air intake is COL license information requirement (Subsection 9.5.13.1).
(3)  The diesel engine exhaust system is capable of exhausting the products of combustion to the atmosphere.
9.5.8.2 System Description Although specific suppliers may differ in the final design, a typical P&ID is provided as the center portion of Figure 9.5-6. See Subsection 9.5.13.5 for COL license information.
Each engine DG-A, DG-B and DG-C takes combustion air from its own inlet air cubical above the diesel generator room. The air is filtered as it enters the cubical through the outside wall above. See Section 9.4.5.5 for a description of the diesel-generator HVAC system.
Engine exhaust gases are ducted out of the building. The exhaust is ducted up through the Reactor Building to the roof where the silencers are mounted. Each engine has its own exhaust system.
In order to protect the crank case from accumulation of fumes and possible consequent fire and explosion, the crank case is kept at negative pressure by vacuum blowers. The gases are exhausted to an outside vent via a 150 A pipe which passes through the Reactor Building wall Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-53
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (see Figure 9.5-6). Pressure sensors will detect unacceptable high pressure conditions in the crank case, and will annunciate this condition to the operator (Figure 9.5-6). This signal will also shut down the diesel unless a LOCA signal is present (Table 8.3-5).
9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation Both the intake and exhaust system components of all three engines are completely separate and independent. Failure in any one system has no effect on the readiness and/or operability of either of the others.
For all systems, the air intake is through the wall of the Reactor Building at approximately 11.5m above grade, while the exhaust gases are released to the atmosphere on the Reactor Building roof at approximately 26m above grade. Therefore, the possibility of products of combustion diluting the oxygen content of the intake air is essentially nil. Also, other gases will not be stored close enough to the diesel air intake that their release to the atmosphere would dilute the intake air and affect the performance of the diesel generators.
See the Reactor Building arrangement drawings in Section 1.2 for intake and exhaust locations, Subsection 3.8.4 for design of the Reactor Building, Section 3.4 for flood protection and Section 3.6 for pipe failure protection.
The combustion air intakes are protected by grills through which the air passes vertically upward. This minimizes plugging of the filters by gross debris picked up by events such as a tornado or a hurricane. Particulate matter small enough to pass through the grill can cause plugging of the inlet filters. To monitor this condition, a differential pressure gauge is installed across each filter (see Figure 9.5-6).
The effect of a local decrease in barometric pressure (e.g., due to a tornado or hurricane) is largely negated by the engine turbochargers.
All intake and exhaust ducting, as well as the ducting hangers, are designed and qualified to Seismic Category I requirements. The ducting also conforms to ASME Section III, Class 3, Quality Group C requirements.
9.5.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Visual inspection of the diesel-generator combustion air intake and exhaust system may be carried out concurrently with regularly scheduled diesel-generator testing and inspection.
Integrity of the ducting and joints, filter condition, intake and exhaust silencer condition inspection are included in the diesel-generator inspection procedure.
9.5-54                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.9 Suppression Pool Cleanup System 9.5.9.1 Power Generation Design Bases The primary function of the Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPCU) System is to provide a continuous purifying water treatment of the suppression pool. During normal plant operation, the SPCU is designed to recirculate approximately 250 m3/hr of suppression pool water through a Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System filter-demineralizer.
The SPCU System also fills the upper pools from the suppression pool during a refueling outage.
9.5.9.2 System Description Except for the primary containment penetrations, the SPCU is a non-safety-related system designed to provide a continuous purifying water treatment of the suppression pool. The system removes various impurities by filtration, adsorption, and ion exchange processes. The system maintains the water quality in the suppression pool at a quality equal to that of the fuel and equipment pools. Water quality limits for these upper pools are specified in Subsection 9.1.3.2.
The SPCU System can provide makeup to the fuel pool and the surge tanks of the RCW System as a backup to normal makeup supplied by the condensate system.
The SPCU System also provides water from the suppression pool to the upper pools before a refueling outage.
The system draws water from the suppression pool through a single 250 m3/hr pump, and directs flow to either the fuel pool seismic makeup line or to a connection to the filter demineralizer that is part of the FPC System. Water is returned from the filter-demineralizer and directed to the suppression pool or the upper pools via the dryer/separator (D/S) pit.
In the event of a LOCA, the SPCU System function is automatically terminated to accomplish containment isolation. Containment isolation valves are provided with Class 1E power.
The SPCU System, consisting of piping, valves, and instrumentation, is shown in Figure 9.5-1.
The system has no unique major components.
9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation The SPCU System has no safety-related function, except for the primary containment isolation, as previously defined. Failure of the system does not compromise any safety-related system or component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown.
However, the system does incorporate some features that assure reliable operations over the full range of normal plant operations. These features consist primarily of instrumentation that monitors and/or controls SPCU operation and performance.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Portions of the SPCU System that penetrate the containment are provided with isolation valves which are automatically closed by an isolation signal from leak detection system.
The containment isolation signal logic receives reactor low water-level signals and drywell high-pressure signals. These inputs isolate the SPCU System to prevent containment bypass leakage.
9.5.9.4 Tests and Inspections All systems piping and components shall be hydrostatically tested prior to plant startup. Non-destructive testing shall be performed in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2 and 3 requirements, where applicable. The system is designed to permit periodic inservice inspection of all system components to ensure the integrity and capability of the system.
The SPCU System is designed for periodic pressure and functional testing to assure.
(1)  Its structural and leaktight integrity, by visual inspection of its components.
(2)  The operability and the performance of the active components of the system.
(3)  The operability of the system as a whole.
Motor-operated isolation valves shall be tested periodically to assure that they are capable of opening or closing by manual switches in the control room and to confirm by observation that the valve position lights on the control panel correctly indicate valve position.
9.5.9.5 Instrumentation Requirements Operation of the SPCU System is controlled by the plant operator, who may select either of the operational modes of the system or turn it off from the control room.
The containment isolation valves are supplied with position indication in the control room and remote-manual as well as automatic operation.
9.5.10 Motor-Generator Set 9.5.10.1 Design Bases The primary function of the motor-generator (M-G) set equipment is to provide additional energy storage capacity for extending the coastdown time of the connected reactor internal pumps (RIPs) during a complete loss of AC power bus incident. In normal operation, the MG set converts the incoming electrical power to mechanical energy, then back to electrical power before using it to source the connected loads. By properly sizing the amount of inertia in the MG set for mechanical energy storage, the generators output can be made less sensitive to large 9.5-56                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 fluctuations in the input power bus voltage. The design bases of the equipment are the following performance criteria:
(1)  Following a complete loss of AC power bus input, the operating speed of the connected RIPs shall be maintained, up to the rated speed, for at least one second.
(2)  The subsequent speed reduction in the connected RIPs shall not be greater than -10%
per second for a minimum period of two seconds.
In addition to meeting the above equipment performance criteria, the MG set is designed to tolerate certain ranges of normal voltage and/or frequency variations in input power source with negligible effect on generator output. These ranges include the normal, continuous variations in bus voltage up to +/-10% of rated and in frequency of up to +/-5% of rated. Also, fluctuations in bus voltage as caused by the starting or tripping of other large AC machines connecting to the same bus shall be tolerated.
9.5.10.2 System Description Two MG sets are provided; each is connected to an independent 6.9 kV power bus. The individual power buses are separated from one another by unit auxiliary transformer and circuit breakers. Each MG set is designed to provide constant voltage and constant frequency power to three adjustable speed drives (ASDs). These ASDs are the static converter devices which generate the appropriate variable voltage, variable frequency power to the connected RIPs.
Each MG set consists of the following components:
(1)  An induction motor.
(2)  A generator and excitation system. The exciter design is of brushless type.
(3)  A flywheel of appropriate moment of inertia to satisfy the pump speed coastdown requirements as specified in Subsection 9.5.10.1.
(4)  Control and protective circuits. The control circuit is designed to maintain generator output at a fixed voltage-to-frequency (V/f) ratio for optimum RIP speed modulation.
Protective logic and circuits, monitoring instrument, annunciators, indicators, etc. are provided to protect the MG set components from being damaged by consequences of abnormal equipment operation.
The MG set does not interface directly with the ASD/RIP loads; it interfaces with the loads through three isolation transformers. These isolation transformers provide two functions in the RIP power supply systems. They step down the MG set voltage output to the level compatible with the rectifier circuit in the ASD. Also, by phase-shifting the output of the three transformers by +/-20 degrees among one another, a majority of the harmonic currents produced by the 6-Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-57
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 pulse ASD converter is canceled, thus preventing most of the negative-phase-sequence current from flowing back into the generator.
The MG set will be started with no load. This is accomplished by first leaving all connected ASD loads in their tripped position. The MG set motor is started by a control switch in the main control room, and accelerates directly to the rated speed. The connected ASD loads are then sequentially placed online by the control room operator through issuance of proper mode switch commands. The MG set output varies from no load to full load in accordance with the variable operating speed of the RIPs. Shutdown of the MG sets is the exact reverse of the startup.
9.5.10.3 Safety Evaluation The MG set equipment performs no safety-related function. Failure of the MG set equipment does not compromise any safety-related system or component and does not prevent safe reactor shutdown.
However, the equipment does include some inherent passive design features which help to alleviate the consequence of a complete loss of AC power bus or momentary voltage drop event. This feature involves automatic extension of electrical coastdown power to the connected RIPs during a bus failure event.
In normal operation, the consequence of having one MG set failure is no worse than that of a three-RIP trip event.
9.5.10.4 Tests and Inspection Each major component of the MG set, including the motor, generator, flywheel and control panel, will be tested in the vendors facility for verification of design and functional conformance. The motor and generator components will be measured for moment of inertia and inspected for mechanical integrity. The electrical properties and load characteristics of the individual motor and generator components will also be tested.
The complete, assembled MG set will be tested in the factory for control panel function, as well as for normal and transient performance response. The normal performance test will be repeated in the site during plant startup.
The MG set equipment is always in service during plant operation, hence its operability is continuously demonstrated. Its extended coastdown performance is a result of its inherent design that does not require special demonstration by periodic testing.
9.5.10.5 Instrumentation Requirements The operation of the MG set equipment is monitored by instrumentation for early detection of abnormal behavior. The motor input voltage, generator output voltage, current and speed signals are available for display in the control room. In addition, protective relays are supplied 9.5-58                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 with the equipment for automatic detection and alarm annunciation of control panel malfunction, unbalanced loads, breaker trip, and open or short circuit conditions.
9.5.11 Combustion Turbine/Generator 9.5.11.1 Design Basis The primary functions of the combustion turbine generator (CTG) are:
(1)  The alternative AC (AAC) power source during the station blackout (SBO) event as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.155 (see Appendix 1C).
(2)  A standby non-safety-related power source located on the site to energize non-safety-related plant investment protection (PIP) loads during loss-of-preferred-power (LOPP) events.
(3)  A standby power source during shutdown operations.
The design bases of the equipment shall meet the following performance criteria:
(1)  The CTG unit shall automatically start, accelerate to required speed, reach nominal voltage and frequency, and begin accepting load within two minutes of receipt of its start signal.
(2)  The CTG shall be capable of being manually connected to SBO shutdown loads (via any one of the Class 1E diesel generator buses) from the main control room within ten minutes from the beginning of the event. The CTG shall also be capable of being manually connected to the remaining Class 1E buses. However, the CTG shall not be normally connected to plant safety buses nor require any external AC power to operate. There shall be two circuit breakers (one Class 1E and one non-class 1E) in series between the CTG and each Class 1E bus.
(3)  The reliability of the CTG unit, based on successful starts and successful load runs, shall be  0.95, as calculated by methods defined in NSAC 108, The Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at US Nuclear Power Plants.
(4)  The CTG shall have an ISO rating (continuous rating at 15&deg;C and at sea level) of at least 9 MW, with nominal output voltage of 6.9 kV at 60 Hz.
(5)  The generator output shall have a steady-state voltage regulation within 0.5% of required voltage when the load is varied from no load to rated load and all transients have decayed to zero. As a minimum, the CTG shall have sufficient capacity to energize required shutdown loads.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-59
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  The transient response of the generator shall be capable of assuming sudden application of up to 20% of the generator NEMA rating when the generator, exciter, and regulator are operating at no load, with required voltage and frequency resulting in less than 25% excursion from required voltage. Recovery shall be within 5% of required voltage, with no more than one undershoot or one overshoot within one second.
(7)  With the generator initially operating at required voltage, and with a constant load between 0 and 100% at rated power factor, the change in the regulated output shall not exceed 1% of required voltage for any 30-minute period at a constant ambient temperature.
(8)  The bus tie arrangement, and the capacity and capability of the CTG, is designed such that the time to place the CTG on line to supply any one load group of safe shutdown loads (i.e., includes manual connection to any one Class 1E bus) shall be within 10 minutes.
(9)  The non-Class 1E CTG shall be physically and electrically independent from the Class 1E diesel generators such that weather-related failures, common cause failure, or single-point vulnerabilities are minimized or precluded.
(10) The CTG shall be capable of being periodically inspected, tested and maintained (see Subsection 9.5.13.19 for COL license information).
9.5.11.2 System Description The interconnections for the CTG are shown on the power distribution system single line diagram (SLD), Figure 8.3-1.
The CTG is designed to supply standby power to selected loads on any two of the three turbine building (Non-Class 1E) 6.9 kV buses which carry the plant investment protection (PIP) loads during LOPP events. The CTG automatically starts on detection of a voltage drop of 70% on its preselected PIP buses. When the CTG is ready to load, if the voltage level is still deficient, power is automatically transferred to the CTG.
The CTG fuel oil and transfer system is separate from those of the diesel generators.
Manually controlled breakers also provide the capability of connecting the combustion turbine generator to any of the 6.9 kV Class 1E buses if all other power sources are lost. The reconfiguration necessary to shed PIP and connect the CTG to a preselected bus for emergency shutdown loads can be accomplished from the main control room within 10 minutes of the onset of a postulated station blackout event. Thus, the CTG meets the requirements for alternate AC (AAC) source (per Regulatory Guide 1.155) such that a station blackout coping analysis is not required. The additional connection capability for the remaining Class 1E buses enable the operator to start and operate redundant shutdown loads and other equipment loads if necessary.
9.5-60                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 The CTG is provided with a fuel supply that is separate from the fuel supply from the Class 1E onsite AC power system. The fuel shall be sampled and analyzed to maintain quality consistent with standards recommended by the CTG manufacturer.
The CTG is completely independent, and located in a separate building, from the Class 1E AC power sources. Thus, no single-point vulnerability exists between them.
The CTG consists of a completely-packaged, fully-assembled and tested, skid-mounted unit with the following components:
(1)  A gas turbine with diesel hydraulic start system (i.e., capable of black start). The unit shall be operated with liquid fuel.
(2)  A generator with brushless excitation system and terminal box.
(3)  A reduction drive gear system between the turbine and generator.
(4)  Lubrication system.
(5)  An oil cooling system.
(6)  Accessory gearbox.
(7)  Air intake and exhaust equipment.
(8)  Microprocessor-based control system with control and protective circuits.
(9)  Panels, junction boxes and other accessories as required.
See Appendix 1C for requirements for the CTG oil storage and transfer.
9.5.11.3 Safety Evaluations The CTG is non-safety-related and its failure will not affect safe shutdown of the plant. The unit is not required for safe shutdown of the plant, but is provided as an alternative AC (ACC) source to mitigate the consequences of a station blackout (SBO) event. The CTG does not supply power to nuclear safety-related equipment except on condition of complete failure of the emergency diesel generators and all offsite power (SBO event). Under this condition, the CTG can provide emergency backup power through manually-actuated breakers in the same manner as the offsite power sources. This provides an alternate AC (AAC) power source in accordance with RG 1.155. Adequate protection of the CTG against sabotage is provided by locating the unit inside the security protected area.
Relative to its function as an AAC source, the CTG complies with Subsection 9.5.14, References 9.5-7, 9.5-8, and 9.5-9.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-61
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 For detailed assessment of the ABWR during station blackout, see Appendix 1C.
9.5.11.4 Tests and Inspections The initial test qualification requirements described in IEEE-387, IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, shall also be applied to the CTG in order to ensure adequate system reliability. However, the factory-test portion of this requirement may be waived if the identically designed unit has been shown capable of maintaining a reliability of 0.99 over a five-year period.
The reliability of the CTG shall meet or exceed 95% as determined in accordance with NSAC-108, or equivalent methodology.
Site acceptance testing, periodic surveillance testing and preventive maintenance, inspections, etc., shall be performed in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations, including time intervals for parts replacement, the plant maintenance program, and the operational reliability program (Subsection 9.5.13.19).
9.5.11.5 Instrumentation Requirements The CTG is provided with local instrumentation and control systems suitable for manual startup and shutdown, and for monitoring and control during operation. Automatic startup and subsequent loading is controlled via the control console located in the main control room.
Controls are also provided in the main control room for manual startup of the CTG, and to facilitate connections to the Class 1E buses, should a station blackout occur.
Control room displays are provided to monitor starting, lubricating and fuel supply systems, the combustion air intake and exhaust system, and the excitation, voltage regulation and synchronization systems. CTG start/stop capability is provided in the main control room.
Generator output voltage, current, kVA, power factor, Hz, etc., are also displayed in the control room. Annunciators and computer logs provide early detection of abnormal behavior.
9.5.12 Lower Drywell Flooder 9.5.12.1 Design Basis The function of the lower drywell flooder (LDF) is to flood the lower drywell with water from the suppression pool in the unlikely event of a severe accident where the core melts and causes a subsequent vessel failure to occur.
The equipment shall meet the following performance criteria:
(1)    The LDF shall provide a flow path from the suppression pool to the lower drywell when the drywell air space temperature reaches 260&deg;C.
9.5-62                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  The LDF shall pass sufficient flow from the suppression pool to the lower drywell to quench all of the postulated corium, cover the corium, remove the corium decay heat, and provide an overlying pool of water in the lower drywell as confirmed by severe accident analysis (Subsection 19E.2.8.2).
(3)  The LDF shall operate automatically in a passive manner.
(4)  The LDF outlet shall be at least one meter above the lower drywell floor.
(5)  The LDF inlet shall be located as far below the bottom of the first horizontal drywell-to-wetwell vent as possible while still meeting the requirements for the location of the LDF outlet.
(6)  The LDF shall not become a flow path from the suppression pool to the lower drywell during design basis accidents (DBAs) such as loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) or during normal plant operation.
(7)  The LDF shall distribute flow evenly around the circumference of the lower drywell.
9.5.12.2 System Description The LDF, shown schematically in Figure 9.5-3, provides a flow path for suppression pool water into the lower drywell area during a severe accident scenario that leads to core meltdown, vessel failure, and deposition of molten corium on the lower drywell floor. Molten corium is a molten mixture of fuel, reactor internals, the vessel bottom head and control rod drive components. The flow path is opened when the lower drywell airspace temperature reaches 260&deg;C.
The flow of suppression pool water to the lower drywell through the LDF forms a pool of water above the core debris. This pool cools the molten corium and subsequently removes the corium decay heat. This limits the drywell temperature to 260&deg;C and avoids degradation of non-metallic penetration seals in the upper and lower drywell. Interaction between corium and the concrete floor is also stopped. This delays the time of fission product releases for the severe accident, which allows for more decay of fission products and results in lower release fractions.
Any fission products released from the debris bed will be scrubbed by the overlying water pool.
The LDF consists of ten pipes that run from the vertical pedestal vents into the lower drywell.
Each pipe contains a fusible plug valve connected to the end of the pipe that extends into the lower drywell by a flange. The fusible plug valves open when the drywell air space (and subsequently the fusible plug valve) temperature reaches 260&deg;C. When the fusible plug valves open, a minimum of 10.5 L/s of suppression pool water will be supplied through each flooder pipe (105 L/s total) to the lower drywell to quench the corium, flood the lower drywell and remove corium decay heat, which is estimated at 1% of rated thermal power. The flow rate is based on a minimum hydrostatic head of 200 mm above the flooder pipe inlet centerline and takes the frictional losses through the flooder pipe and fusible plug valve into account.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-63
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 The minimum flow necessary to remove decay heat and the energy from zirconium reactions with the water and carbon dioxide released by concrete ablation is 18 L/s, which can be supplied by two of the ten lines. If nine lines are available (assuming single failure), the flow will be sufficient to fill the lower drywell within two hours.
The inlet centerlines of the drywell flooder pipes are located 10.2 meters below the bottom of the vessel, and the outlets of the fusible plug valves are located at least one meter above the lower drywell floor.
The fusible plug valves are made from flanges welded to the end of the vent inside the lower drywell area. The inner diameter of the pipe is slightly enlarged to accommodate a stainless steel separation disk, an insulating disk and fusible metal. The stainless steel disk prevents suppression pool water from corroding the plug material. The insulating disk thermally insulates the fusible metal from the wetwell water to assure that the fusible metal is not cooled by wetwell water and prevented from melting during the severe accident high lower drywell temperature conditions. Teflon was selected for the insulating disk because it has a softening temperature of 400&deg;C and a maximum continuous operating temperature of 288&deg;C, both of which are above the plug melting temperature. Furthermore, teflon has high chemical resistance and will not adhere to the stainless steel plug or the fusible plug. The end of the fusible plug valve is covered with a plastic cover that has a low melting point. The purpose of the cover is to avoid corrosion of the fusible metal material and to assure that any toxic components from the fusible metal material that might be released do not escape into the lower drywell area during normal plant operation.
The fusible plug valve is mounted in the vertical position, with the fusible metal facing downward, to facilitate the opening of the valve when the fusible metal melting temperature is reached. The opening time for the valve is found to be less than 10 minutes from the time the lower drywell gas space reaches 260&deg;C.
The drywell flooder pipes are welded to the stainless steel vertical vent pipes in the pedestal and to the steel liner in the lower drywell.
9.5.12.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5.12.3.1 General Evaluation The LDF is a passive injection system and is maintained in an operable state whenever the reactor is critical. The system is never expected to be needed for safety reasons because of the extensive array of water injection systems available to maintain core cooling.
The LDF is safety-related because it is a structural extension of the blowdown vent system. The LDF is Seismic Category I. The quality control classification of the LDF components is the same as the pedestal and the blowdown vents. Therefore, it meets the same structural design, materials, welding, fabrication, thermal and structural analysis, and quality assurance requirements as the reactor pedestal.
9.5-64                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 The LDF has sufficient redundancy that the failure of one fusible plug to open does not degrade the ability of the system to flood the drywell and quench the corium.
The design pressure of the LDF components is 0.108 MPaD.
The design temperature of the LDF components is 171&deg;C. This value is the primary containment design temperature and considers DBA events. If the LDF components lose pressure integrity at higher temperatures during a severe accident, then the LDF function (i.e.,
drywell flooding) is performed. Therefore, the design temperature does not need to be higher than the temperature based on DBA events.
The LDF components have zero leakage when subjected to design differential pressure of 0.108 MPa at a design temperature of 171&deg;C.
The portions of the flooder pipe that extend from the steel liner in the lower drywell meet the requirements of ASME Class 2 piping components.
An ANSI B16.5 stainless steel weld-neck flange (or equivalent) is used at the interface between the flooder pipe and the fusible plug valve. The flooder pipe is made of the same material as the blowdown vent pipe or of a stainless steel material that is compatible for welding to the blowdown vent pipe.
The fusible plug is required to open fully when the outer metal temperature of the valve reaches 260&deg;C during a severe accident and to pass a minimum of 10.5 L/s with 375 mm of water above the valve inlet.
A plastic cover on the valve outlet seals the valve from the intrusion of moisture that could cause corrosion of the fusible metal material. The plastic cover has a melting point below 130&deg;C and greater than 70&deg;C and is required to melt completely or offer minimal resistance to valve opening when the opening temperature is reached.
9.5.12.3.2 Consequences of One Flooder Line Opening First Core debris that enters the lower drywell will be distributed fairly uniformly. The lower drywell floor was designed so that debris spreading would not be hindered. The temperature of the lower drywell air space and structures should be even more uniform because of convective and radiative heat transfer from debris material. Cooler regions will tend to absorb more heat than warmer ones resulting in temperature equalization.
However, if highly non-uniform debris dispersal occurs, it has been postulated that one flooder line could open and its operation could delay or even prevent the other lines from activating. In the worst physical case, the initiation of one flooder line causes crust formation without completely quenching the debris. The crust limits heat transfer from the surface of the debris bed. Core-concrete interaction (CCI) will occur if surface heat transfer is reduced enough.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-65
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 CCI results in large quantities of gases being formed under the surface of the crust. The gases will increase in pressure due to continued generation until the crust ruptures or they escape from the edges of the bed. In either case, the gases will pass from the debris bed into the lower drywell airspace. The passage either will be unobstructed with gasses exiting the debris above the water elevation or through an overlying layer of water. Since only one flooder line is presumed active, the water layer, if it exists, will be thin and no significant amount of heat will be transferred from the gas to the liquid.
Concrete has an ablation temperature of approximately 1500 K. The released gases from core concrete interaction will be at least at this temperature. Higher temperatures may be reached by the gases as they interact with debris material in their exit. Thus, gases enter the lower drywell air space at very high temperature. The CCI gases will increase the temperature of the lower drywell air space. More flooder lines will become active as the lower drywell temperature increases. For this reason, the activation of a single flooder line is transient condition at worst and is not expected to adversely affect the operation of the other lines.
9.5.12.3.3 Estimation of Net Risk In order to assess the net risk of the lower drywell flooder system, a sensitivity study was performed in Subsection 19E.2.8.2.7 using three failure probabilities for the lower drywell flooder. In these cases, the failure probability of the lower drywell flooder was increased from its base case value to 1.0.
The overall performance of the ABWR design is not sensitive to the LDF failure probability.
Failure of the LDF leads to an increase in the probability of Dry CCI. Thus, the probability of Dry CCI increases by one, two and three orders of magnitude, respectively for the three sensitivity cases. However, the base case results for Dry CCI are so small that a three order of magnitude increase does not impact other results significantly.
The principal conclusions of the sensitivity studies are:
(1)  Pedestal failure does not increase since it is dominated by the sequences where core-concrete interaction persists even though the lower drywell is flooded.
(2)  The only probabilistic output which shows any significant variation is drywell head seal overtemperature leakage which exhibits a two fold increase for a two orders of magnitude increase in the passive flooder failure probability, and a ten fold increase for a three order of magnitude increase. The change in seal leakage is much less than the change in passive flooder failure probability since high RPV pressure sequences with entrainment of debris to the upper drywell and failure of the upper drywell sprays dominate the seal leakage sequences in the base analysis.
9.5-66                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    Even for the case where the passive flooder is assumed to be unavailable, the frequency associated with the Dry CCI is below the lower limit considered in the evaluation of offsite dose.
Thus, it is seen that the lower drywell flooder does not affect net risk for frequencies of interest.
Therefore, the value of the lower drywell flooder system is not measured as a direct impact on risk. Rather, it should be viewed as a passive system which serves to limit the impact of uncertainty in operator actions and allows the ABWR design to mitigate a severe accident in a purely passive manner.
9.5.12.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements The ability of the LDF to mitigate severe accidents by passing sufficient water to cover and quench the postulated corium in the drywell is confirmed by severe accident analysis (Appendix 19E).
No testing of the LDF system will be required during normal operation. During refueling outages, the following surveillance would be required:
(1)    During each refueling outage, verify that there is no leakage from the fusible plug valve flange or outlet when the suppression pool is at its maximum level.
(2)    Once every two refueling outages, lower suppression pool water level or plug the flooder pipe inlet and replace two fusible plug valves. Test the valves that were removed to confirm their function. This practice follows the precedent set for inservice testing of Standby-Liquid Control System (SLCS) explosive valves in earlier boiling water reactors.
9.5.12.5 Instrumentation Requirements The LDF operates automatically in a passive manner during a severe accident scenario that involves a core melt and vessel failure. No operator action is required; therefore, no instrumentation is placed upon the system. An inadvertent opening or leak would be detected by the lower drywell leak detection system and the suppression pool water level instrumentation which would result in plant shutdown.
During severe accidents, operation of the LDF is confirmed by other instrument readings in the containment. These instruments include those which would record the drywell temperature reduction and the lowering of suppression pool water level.
9.5.13 COL License Information 9.5.13.1 Contamination of the DG Combustion Air Intake The COL applicant shall take measures to restrict contaminating substances from the plant site which may be available to the diesel generator air intakes (Subsection 9.5.8.1).
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                        9.5-67
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9.5.13.2 Use of Communication System in Emergencies Procedure for use of the plant communication system in emergencies including operation from RSS in the event of a main control room fire shall be provided by the COL applicant (Subsection 9.5.2.4).
9.5.13.3 Maintenance and Testing Procedure for Communication Equipment Maintenance and testing procedures for the plant communication systems shall be provided by the COL applicant (Subsection 9.5.2.5).
9.5.13.4 Use of Portable Hand Light In Emergency The portable sealed-beam battery-powered hand light is used by the fire brigade and other personnel during an emergency to achieve a plant shutdown. The COL applicants design shall comply with the BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Position C.5.g(l) and (2) per Subsection 9.5.1.2.3. The COL applicant shall supplement this subsection accordingly as applicable.
9.5.13.5 Vendor Specific Design of Diesel Generator Auxiliaries The COL Applicants vendor-specific diesel generator support systems (i.e., the D/G Fuel Oil System, the D/G Cooling Water System, the D/G Starting Air System, the D/G Lubrication System, the D/G Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System) shall be reviewed for differences in design with those discussed in Subsections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8, respectively. A discussion of such differences shall be provided by the COL applicant.
Specific NRC requested information lists as follows:
(1)  Not Used (2)  Provision for stick gauges on fuel storage tanks.
(3)  Description of engine cranking devices.
(4)  Duration of cranking cycle and number of engine revolutions per start attempt.
(5)  Lubrication system design criteria (pump flows, operating pressure, temperature differentials, cooling system heat removal capabilities, electric heater characteristics).
(6)  Selection of a combustion air flow capacity sufficient to assure complete combustion.
(7)  Volume and design pressure of the air receivers (sufficient for 5 start cycles per receiver).
(8)  Compressor size (sufficient discharge flow to recharge the system in 30 minutes or less).
9.5-68                                                                                Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 See Subsections 9.5.4.2, 9.5.5.2, 9.5.6.2, 9.5.7.2 and 9.5.8.2.
9.5.13.6 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Design Flow and Heat Removal Requirements The COL applicant shall provide the table which identifies the design flow and heat removal requirements for the diesel generator cooling water system. It shall include the design heat removal capacities of all the coolers or heat exchangers in the system.
Specific NRC requested information lists as follows:
(1)  Type of jacket water circulating pumps (i.e., motor-driven or others).
(2)  Type of temperature sensors (use Amot brand or equal per NUREG.CR-0660, Page V-17, Recommendation under Item 4).
(3)  Expansion tank capacity.
(4)  NPSH of jacket water circulating pump.
(5)  Cooling water loss estimates.
See Subsection 9.5.5.2.
9.5.13.7 Fire Rating for Penetration Seals The COL applicant shall provide 3-hour fire rated penetration seals for all high energy piping or, as a minimum, state those conditions when such seals cannot be provided and what will be installed as a substitute. The detail design shall provide completely equivalent construction to tested wall assemblies or testing will be required (Subsection 9A.5.1).
9.5.13.8 Diesel Generator Requirements (1)  The diesel generator operating procedures for a particular diesel-engine make and model shall require loading of the engine up to a minimum of 40% of full load (or lower load per manufacturers recommendation) for 1 hour after up to 8 hours of continuous no-load or light load operation.
(2)  Diesel generator selection shall include prudent component design with dust tight enclosures. Construction guidelines shall include provisions for minimizing accumulation of dust and dirt into equipment. These shall be in accordance with recommendations 2.a, 2.b, 2.d and 5 of NUREG/CR-0660 (Subsection 9.5.6.3).
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                    9.5-69
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)    The diesel generator operating procedure shall include provisions to avoid as much as possible or otherwise restrict the no-load or low-load operation of the engine/generator for prolonged periods of time; or operate the engine at nearly full-load following every no-load or low-load (20% or less) operation lasting for a period of 30 minutes or more (Subsection 8.3.1.1.8).
9.5.13.9 Applicant Fire Protection Program The following areas are out of the ABWR Standard Plant design scope for the fire protection program, and shall be included in the COL applicants fire protection program:
(1)    Main transformer (2)    Equipment entry lock (3)    Fire protection pumphouse (4)    Ultimate heat sink The COL applicants fire protection program shall comply with the SRP Section 9.5.1, with ability to bring the plant to safe shutdown condition following a complete fire burnout of a fire area/division without a need for recovery (Subsection 9.5.1).
9.5.13.10 HVAC Pressure Calculations The COL applicant shall provide pressure calculations and confirm capability during preoperational testing of the smoke control mode of the HVAC systems as described is Subsection 9.5.1.1.6.
9.5.13.11 Plant Security Systems Criteria The COL applicants design of the security system (Subsection 9.5.2) shall include an evaluation of its impact on plant operation, testing, and maintenance. This evaluation shall assure that the security restrictions for access to equipment and plant regions is compatible with required operator actions during all operating and emergency modes of operation (i.e., loss of offsite power, access for fire protection, health physics, maintenance, testing and local operator). In addition, this evaluation shall assure that:
(1)    There are no areas within the Nuclear Island where communication with central and secondary alarm stations is not possible.
(2)    Portable security radios will not interfere with plant monitoring equipment.
(3)    Minimum isolation zone and protected area illumination capabilities cannot be defeated by sabotage actions outside of the protected area.
9.5-70                                                                                  Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Electromagnetic interference from plant equipment startups or power transfers will not create nuisance alarms or trip security access control systems.
9.5.13.12 Not Used 9.5.13.13 Diesel Fuel Refueling Procedures The COL applicant shall establish procedures to verify that the day tank is full prior to refilling the storage tank. This minimizes the likelihood of sediment obstruction of fuel lines and any deleterious impacts on diesel generator operation.
9.5.13.14 Portable and Fixed Emergency Communication Systems The COL applicants design of the portable radio communication system and the fixed emergency communication system shall comply with BTP CMEB 9.5-1, position C.5.g(3) and (4). The COL applicant will supplement Subsection 9.5.2.6 accordingly, as applicable.
9.5.13.15 Identification of Chemicals The COL applicant shall provide protection features for liquid insulated transformers and will identify the type and location of chemicals as required by SRP Section 13.2.2 (Subsection 9.5.1.2).
9.5.13.16 NUREG/CR-0660 Diesel Generator Reliability Recommendations Programs shall be developed to address NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations regarding training, preventive maintenance, and root-cause analysis of component and system failures.
9.5.13.17 Sound-Powered Telephone Units The COL applicant shall provide the sound-powered telephone units to be used in conjunction with the system described in Subsection 9.5.2.2.2.
9.5.13.18 Fire-Related Administrative Controls The COL applicant shall provide the description of the administrative controls outlined in Subsection 9.5.1.6.4.
9.5.13.19 Periodic Testing of Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG)
Appropriate plant operating procedures shall include periodic testing and/or analysis to verify the adequacy of the CTG to meet alternate AC (AAC) requirements for station blackout and to support its use in Section 3.8 of the Technical Specification. As a minimum, such procedures shall verify the following:
(1)  For each 6.9 Kv emergency bus (staggered among the three buses at 18-month intervals), verify the CTG starts and energizes the bus within 10 minutes and energizes all required loads (as defined in the LOCA-Loads section of Table 8.3-Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-71
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2
: 4) within 15 minutes. The steady-state CTG voltage and frequency shall be 6210 V and 7590 V, and 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz. All CTG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.
(2)    The operator can accomplish this from the main control room.
(3)    One Class 1E circuit breaker and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker exist and are functional between each of the Class 1E diesel generator buses and the CTG. (Note that only the circuit breakers for the preselected division are racked in. The remaining two divisions have their Class 1E breakers normally racked out, as shown in Figure 8.3.1.)
(4)    Each 92 days, verify the combustion turbine generator (CTG) starts and achieves steady state voltage (6210 V and 7590 V), and frequency (58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz) within 2 minutes. Load the CTG to 90% and 100% of its continuous rating and operate it with this load for at least 60 minutes. All CTG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.
(5)    The reliability of the CTG is at least 0.95 as calculated by methods defined in NSAC 108, The Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at US Nuclear Power Plants.
9.5.13.20 Operating Procedures for Station Blackout Appropriate operating procedures and personnel training shall be developed to:
(1)    Address the operation of the AAC-CTG during an SBO event (2)    Restore other plant offsite (preferred) and onsite emergency power sources as soon as possible (3)    Recover plant HVAC Systems as soon as possible to limit heat rises (4)    Provide additional core, containment, and vital equipment makeup and cooling services, as necessary (5)    Establish orderly plant safe shutdown conditions 9.5.13.21 Quality Assurance Requirements for CTG Quality assurance standards and practices shall be developed to assure continued operational reliability of the CTG as an AAC power source for SBO events, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.155 and 10CFR50.63.
9.5.13.22 Multiple Spurious Operations Evaluation The COL applicant shall provide an evaluation of the ABWRs susceptibility to Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) in accordance with the methodology contained in NEI 00-01, 9.5-72                                                                                    Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 Guidance for Post Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 2 and as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.189, Revision 2. The equipment listed in Subsection 9.5.1.1.7 will be considered in this evaluation. The COL applicant will submit the results of this evaluation to the NRC for review.
9.5.14 Reference 9.5-1    Stello, Victor, Jr., Design Requirements Related To The Evolutionary Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRS), Policy Issue, SECY-89-013, The Commissioners, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 19, 1989.
9.5-2    Cote, Arthur E., NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, National Fire Protection Association, Sixteenth Edition.
9.5-3    Design of Smoke Control Systems for Buildings, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc., September 1983.
9.5-4    Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems, NFPA 92A, National Fire Protection Association, 1988.
9.5-5    Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, National Fire Protection Association.
9.5-6    Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, Electric Power Research Institute, NSAC-108, September 1986.
9.5-7    Loss of All Alternating Current Power, 10CFR50.63.
9.5-8    Regulatory Guide 1.155Station Blackout.
9.5-9    Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors, NUMARC-87-00.
9.5-10    NEI 00-01, Guidance For Post Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Revision 2, May 2009.
9.5-11    Regulatory Guide 1.189Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                  9.5-73
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.5-1 Normal and/or Standby Lighting (Non-Class 1E AC Power Supply)
Illumination Location                                    Lux            Area
: 1.    (RW control room) Operation desk (console panel)                      538.2    Working level Instrument on the perpendicular surface                                538.2    Working level Others                                                                538.2    Floor level
: 2. Local control panels                                                  538.2    Working Level
: 3. Instrument rooms, maintenance rooms, hot laboratory                    538.2    Working level
: 4. Computer rooms, office, conference rooms, radiation administration    322.9    Working level rooms
: 5. Check points, FMCRD RIP maintenance room                              322.9    Working level
: 6. Machining rooms, valve wrapping rooms                                  322.9    Working level
: 7. R/B operating floor                                                    322.9    Floor level
: 8. Relay rooms, operator waiting room, dressing room, paging room        215.3    Working level
: 9. Sampling rack rooms                                                    215.3    Working level
: 10. Electrical panel rooms, instrument rack rooms, diesel generator          215.3    Working level rooms
: 11. General machine area                                                    215.3    Floor level
: 12. Equipment transfer area                                                  107.6    Floor level
: 13. Machine area under low radiation                                        107.6    Floor level
: 14. Tank rooms                                                              215.3    Floor level
: 15. Battery rooms, passages and stair cases with frequent access            215.3    Floor level
: 16. Inside drywell                                                          107.6    Floor level
: 17. Condenser area, SGTS rooms                                              107.6    Floor level
: 18. HVAC rooms and elevator machine rooms                                    107.6    Floor level
: 19. (RW filter rooms, enrichment rooms) MSIV room                            107.6    Floor level
: 20. Passages and staircases                                                  53.8    Floor level
: 21. Rooms isolated with hatches where access is restricted to annual          53.8    Floor level inspection
: 22. Piping space                                                            107.6    Floor level
: 23. The rooms where the access is very difficult                              0      Floor level 9.5-74                                                                              Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.5-2 Lighting and Power Sources Loss of All Loss of                      LOPP Plus      AC Plus Preferred                    Loss of CTG      Loss of Normal            Power      LOPP Plus Plus Loss of          Station Lighting                            Operation          (LOPP)      Loss of CTG          DGs        Batteries Normal Lighting                          X                -              -                -            -
Standby Lighting Non-Class 1E                        X                X              -                -            -
Class 1E Associated                X                X              X                -            -
Emergency Lighting Non-Class 1E                      X*                X              X              X              -
Class 1E Associated                X                X              X                X              -
Guide Lamps Non-Class 1E                      X*                X              X              X              X Class 1E Associated                X*                X            X              X              X
* Available, but off while AC power is available.
On only during the time required to energize the standby bus from the standby power source Table 9.5-3 Standby Lighting (Class 1E AC Power Supply)
Illumination Lux Area                                      Working Level                      Division of Power Main control room                        538.2                              Division II and III Safety-related electric                  215.3                              Division of power supply is the equipment room                                                                same as the equipments power DG control room,                                                              supply.
DG room, RSS room Safety equipment area                    21.5-53.8                          Division of power supply is the same as the equipments power supply.
Other areas of buildings                  5-10% of standard illumination Divisional (for safety-related level                              passage ways)
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                      9.5-75
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9.5-4 DC Emergency Lighting Illumination Lux Area                                                            Floor Level*      Division of Power Main Control Room                                                    75.4        Div. II, Ill DC power supply Div. I essential electric equipment room (RB)                        75.4        Div. I DC power supply Div. II essential electric equipment room (RB)                      75.4        Div. II DC power supply Div. III essential electric equipment room (RB)                      75.4        Div. Ill DC power supply Div. I diesel generator area and associated control                  75.4        Div. I DC power supply room (RB)
Div. II diesel generator area and associated control                75.4        Div. II DC power supply room (RB)
Div III diesel generator area and associated control                75.4        Div. III DC power supply room (RB)
Div. I DC electrical equipment room (CB)                            75.4        Div. I DC power supply Div. II DC electrical equipment room (CB)                            75.4        Div. II DC power supply Div. Ill DC electrical equipment room (CB)                          75.4        Div. III DC power supply Div. IV DC electrical equipment room (CB)                            75.4        Div. IV DC power supply Div. I Remote Shutdown System control area (RB)                      75.4        Div. I DC power supply Div. II Remote Shutdown System control area (RB)                    75.4        Div. II DC power supply Radwaste control room (RW/B)                                        75.4        Non-div. DC power supply Non-essential electric equipment rooms                              75.4        Non-div. DC power supply CTG room                                                            75.4        Non-div. DC power supply
* Working areas in front of Class 1E panels containing instruments or controls shall be a minimum of 107.6 Lux measured 1 meter up from the floor level.
9.5-76                                                                                            Other Auxiliary Systems
 
ABWR Other Auxiliary Systems Table 9.5-5 Summary of Automatic Fire Suppression Systems Room  Fire Bldg. Elev    No. Area      Area Name                            Div  Combustible                    Sprinkler System Type PY      7350    N/A    N/A      Unit Auxiliary Transformer          ND    Oil                            Deluge water PY      7350    N/A    N/A      Main Transformer Area                ND    Oil                            Deluge water PY      7350    N/A    N/A      Reserve Transformer                  ND    Oil                            Deluge water RB      -8200  133    F1300    CRD Pump Room                        ND    Class Ill B lube oil & cables  Dry pipe, closed head RB      12300  412    F4100    Diesel Generator A Room              D1    Fuel oil, Lube oil, & cables    Preaction foam-water RB      12300  423    F4200    Diesel Generator B Room              D2    Fuel oil, Lube oil, & cables    Preaction foam-water RB      12300  432    F4300    Diesel Generator C Room              D3    Fuel oil, Lube oil, & cables    Preaction foam-water 25A5675AL Revision 7 RB      23500  610    F6101    Diesel Generator Fuel Tank A Room    D1    Diesel fuel                    Deluge foam-water RB      23500  620    F6201    Diesel Generator Fuel Tank B Room    D2    Diesel fuel                    Deluge foam-water RB      23500  630    F6301    Diesel Generator Fuel Tank C Room    D3    Diesel fuel                    Deluge foam-water RW      1600    N/A    N/A      Dry Radioactive Waste Storage Area  ND    Radioactive material            Wet pipe sprinkler RW      7300    N/A    N/A      Dry Radioactive Waste Storage Area  ND    Radioactive material            Wet pipe sprinkler RW      -200    N/A    N/A      Dry Radioactive Waste Storage Area  ND    Radioactive material            Wet pipe sprinkler Design Control Document/Tier 2 RW      -6500  N/A    N/A      Dry Radioactive Waste Storage Area  ND    Radioactive material            Wet pipe sprinkler TB      350    120    FT1500    Beneath the Turbine surroundings    ND    Lubricants, charcoal & cables Wet pipe sprinkler TB      7350    222    FT1500    Beneath the Turbine Surroundings    ND    Lubricants, & cables            Wet pipe sprinkler TB      7350    230    FT2500    Lube Oil Conditioning Area          ND    Class III B lube oil            Deluge foam-water TB      7350    247    FT2503    House Boiler Area                    ND    Lubricants, Fuel oil & cables  Preaction sprinkler TB      15350  317    FT3500    Gas Turbine Generator                ND    Diesel fuel                    Deluge foam-water TB      15350  320    FT1500    TCW Pumps Area                      ND    Hydrogen seal oil              Deluge foam-water 9.5-77 TB      15350  321    FT1500    Beneath the Turbine Surroundings    ND    Lubricants, & cables            Wet pipe sprinkler
 
Table 9.5-5 Summary of Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (Continued)
ABWR 9.5-78 Room  Fire Bldg. Elev    No. Area    Area Name                    Div      Combustible            Sprinkler System Type TB      15350  330    FT3501  Lube Oil Reservoir Area      ND      Class III B lube oil    Deluge foam-water 25A5675AL Revision 7 Design Control Document/Tier 2 Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figure is located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.5-1 Suppression Pool Cleanup System P&ID Other Auxiliary Systems                                                          9.5-79
 
ABWR 9.5-80 MCC A SYSTEM      MCC B SYSTEM FOR NORMAL USE  FOR EMERGENCY USE BATTERY TELEPHONE SWITCH                                  RADIO EQUIPMENT BATTERY          CHARGER CHARGER TELEPHONE UNIT MAIN PAGING EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION BATTERY                                                        CONTROL CIRCUIT INDEPENDENCE AND MERGING BOARD SOUND-POWERED                          AMPLIFIER        AMPLIFIER                AMPLIFIER COMMUNICATION FACILITIES BOARD MDF              MDF                    MDF 25A5675AL Revision 7 JACK                  PATCHING CORD 2 routes        2 routes    2 routes TERMINAL BOX T/B                    R/B      C/B  S/B          RW/B JACK TERMINAL BRANCH          (including rad                                  OUTDOORS PLUG              BOX            area and control area)
(periphery SPEAKER                                                          of plant)
Design Control Document/Tier 2 HANDSET (Reduced sound PORTABLE          PORTABLE                                                                              during night TELEPHONE          TELEPHONE                                                                              time)
EQUIPMENT          EQUIPMENT Other Auxiliary Systems (NOTES) 1. MDF : MAIN DISTRIBUTING FRAME
: 2. SOLID LINES INDICATE THE EXTENT OF ABWR STANDARD PLANT SCOPE Figure 9.5-2 Outline  Telephonic Communication Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 VERTICAL STEEL LINER                      VENT PIPE LOWER DRYWELL FIRST VENT WELDNECK FLANGE SLIP-ON FLANGE SUPPRESSION (100)                                    POOL TOP OF CORIUM MAXIMUM)
FUSIBLE PLUG VALVE (TYPICAL 10 PLACES)
SECOND VENT ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS Figure 9.5-3 Lower Drywell Flooder System Arrangement/Configuration Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                9.5-81
 
ABWR 9.5-82 TO REACTOR AND CONTROL BUILDINGS ALTERNATE SUPPLY COMPONENTS WITHIN PHANTOM BOX REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING AN SSE 1140 m3 NOTE 8 NOTE 8                                DIESEL DRIVEN PUMP  NOTE 9 25A5675AL Revision 7 NOTE 10 NORMAL SUPPLY                  JOCKEY PUMP 1140 m3 Design Control Document/Tier 2 MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP TO TURBINE, POST INDICATOR VALVE                                                      RADWASTE, SERVICE Other Auxiliary Systems OR EQUIVALENT                                                              AND OTHER PLANT BUILDINGS Figure 9.5-4 Fire Protection Water Supply System
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Notes for Figure 9.5-4:
(1) The equivalent of one 100% capacity motor-driven pump and one 100% capacity diesel-driven pump shall be provided. the equivalent capacity of each type may be comprised of multiple pumps of that type.
(2) The motor-driven pumps shall be supplied power from the non-Class 1E busses.
(3) The following specific requirements apply to the components within the phantom box:
(a) They shall be designed to remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake.
(b) The piping and valves as a minimum shall satisfy the requirements of ANSI B31.1.
(4) Each 100% capacity pumping unit and its controls shall be separated from the other pumping unit/units by a fire wall with a minimum rating of 3 hours.
(5) Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, failure to start and low fire-main pressure shall be provided.
(6) The fire pump installation should conform to NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.
(7) The water supply shall meet the following requirements:
(a) Fresh water free of silt and debris shall be used. Filters for makeup supply are acceptable.
(b) Each supply shall have a minimum storage volume of 1140m3.
(c) If tanks or other limited volume storage means are used:
(i)  There shall be two storage devices.
(ii) One storage device shall contain a passively dedicated volume of 456m3 to supply two hose streams for two hours in areas required for safe shutdown.
(iii) The makeup supply shall be capable of providing 1140m3 for either storage device in 8 hours.
(8) Normally closed valve, opened only to pump from the alternate supply.
(9) Normally closed valve, opened only when motor driven pump is out of service.
(10) Normally closed valve, opened only when a section of the piping connected to normal water supply is valved out for maintenance.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                            9.5-83
 
ABWR 9.5-84 10 No.        FACILITY 1      REACTOR CONTAINMENT 2      REACTOR BUILDING 3      CONTROL BUILDING 4      MAIN STEAM/FEEDWATER TUNNEL 9                                8            17  5      TURBINE BUILDING 6      SERVICE BUILDING 7      RADWASTE BUILDING 5                                8      HOUSE BOILER 9      CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 10    UNIT AUX. TRANSFORMER (3) 11    NORMAL SWITCHGEAR 12    DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK (3) 25A5675AL Revision 7 13    STACK 14    EQUIPMENT ENTRY LOCK 11                  15    FIRE PROTECTION WATER STORAGE TANK (2) 16    FIRE PROTECTION PUMPHOUSE 17    BUNKER FUEL TANK 7            SA                                            18    COMBUSTION TURBINE GENERATOR 3                3                  19    RADWASTE TUNNELS RB, CB, TB 4            6 LEGEND:
15                                        12 Design Control Document/Tier 2 13                                                    Post Indicator Valve 1
16                                                                  Fire Hydrant & Shutoff NOTE 7                Valve SA      15                  2 12  SA              SA  Seismic Analysis for 12                                                          Safe Shutdown Other Auxiliary Systems 14                                  Earthquake Figure 9.5-5 Fire Protection Yard Main Piping
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Notes for Figure 9.5-5:
(1) NFPA 24. Standard for Outside Protection, shall be used as guidance in designing and installing the yard fire main loop.
(2) The main loop shall be sectionalized with post-indicator valves, or their equivalent, such that any single section may be taken out of service for maintenance without disrupting the supply to any safety-related building.
(3) An individual isolation valve shall be provided for each outside hydrant so that it may be taken out of service for maintenance without interrupting the supply to any other load.
(4) The maximum spacing between outside hydrants shall be 76m.
(5) Hose houses, if used, shall have a maximum spacing of 228m.
(6) Threads compatible with those used by the local fire department should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers.
(7) Normally closed valve, opened only when a section of the non-seismically analyzed yard main is valved out for maintenance.
(8) Siamese fire department connections and backflow check valves are required at each building supply but are not shown.
Other Auxiliary Systems                                                                                            9.5-85
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9.5-6 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil and Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust Systems Figure 9.5-7 Standby Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water System Figure 9.5-8 Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air System Figure 9.5-9 Standby Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil System 9.5-86                                                              Other Auxiliary Systems
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A Fire Hazard Analysis 9A.1 Introduction This appendix supplements Subsection 9.5.1.3 (Safety Evaluation).
This appendix identifies distinct fire areas for all buildings through the use of plan and elevation views of the plant. Except for the Service Building, it defines equipment, both safety-related and non-safety-related, contained within each fire area. Further, it identifies and quantifies all materials capable of supporting combustion in each of the designated fire areas in the Reactor, Control and Turbine buildings.
Primary requirements for a nuclear facility are that the design provides a means for the safe shutdown of the facility, that it maintains the condition of safe shutdown, while not posing a hazard to personnel, and that it mitigates the consequences of accidents which may occur.
The analysis addresses the hazard of fire relative to maintaining the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
Introduction                                                                                                9A.1-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.2 Analysis Criteria 9A.2.1 References 9A.2.1.1 Codes and Standards The following applicable codes and standards are incorporated in the design of the ABWR Standard Plant, including the fire detection and suppression systems designs:
29CFR1910              Occupational Safety and Health Standards 29CFR1926              Safety and Health Regulations for Construction 10CFR50                Licensing of Production/Utilization Facilities UL                    Underwriters Laboratories Approved Equipment Lists FM                    Factory Mutual Approved Materials and Equipment Lists ANI                    Basic Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants ANSI B31.1            Power Piping ASTM D992-56          Classification of Flammability Standards ASTM-E84              Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials NFPA 10                Portable Fire ExtinguishersInstallation NFPA 10A              Portable Fire ExtinguishersMaintenance and Use NFPA 11                Foam Extinguishing Systems NFPA 13                Sprinkler Systems NFPA 14                Standpipe and Hose Systems NFPA 15                Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems NFPA 16                Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems NFPA 16A              Closed Head Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems NFPA 20                Centrifugal Fire Pump-Installation NFPA 24                Outside Protection Analysis Criteria                                                                                    9A.2-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 NFPA 26          Recommended Practice for the Supervision of Valves Controlling Water Supplies for Fire Protection NFPA 37          Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines NFPA 70          National Electric Code NFPA 72          Protective Signaling Systems NFPA 78          Lightning Protection Code NFPA 80          Fire Doors and Windows NFPA 80A        Protection from Exposure Fires NFPA 90A        Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems NFPA 91          Blower and Exhaust Systems NFPA 92A        Smoke Control System NFPA 101        Life Safety Code NFPA 1963        Screw Threads and Gaskets for Fire Hose Connections NFPA 1961        Fire Hose NFPA 251        Fire Test, Building Construction and Materials NFPA 252        Fire Tests of Door Assemblies NFPA 255        Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials NFPA 321        Classification of Flammable Liquids NFPA 801        Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials NFPA 802        Nuclear Reactors NFPA 803        Fire Protection for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 1.39 Regulatory Guide Physical Independence of Electrical Systems 1.75 9A.2-2                                                                          Analysis Criteria
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 BTP-CMEB 9.5-1          Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Appendix A IEEE-384                Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 9A.2.2 Drawings 9A.2.2.1 Fire Area Separation and Fire Equipment Drawings Drawings showing the fire area separation and fire equipment for the Reactor Building, Control Building, Turbine Building, Service Building and the Radwaste Building are included in Section 9A.4.
The fire protection yard main piping arrangement and fire protection water supply system drawings are in Section 9.5.
9A.2.3 Terminology (1)  Fire Areaportion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by fire barriers.
(2)  Fire Barriercomponents of construction (i.e., walls, floors and their supports, including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors and fire dampers) that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of potential fire.
(3)  Fire Suppressioncontrol and extinguishing of fires (Manual fire suppression includes the use of hoses, portable extinguishers or fixed systems by plant personnel.
Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated, fixed systems such as water or foam systems.).
(4)  Noncombustible Materialmaterials having the characteristics listed below:
(a)    Material which, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat.
(b)    Materials having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in (a) with a surfacing not over 3.2 mm thick which has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 when measured in accordance with ASTM E-84.
There is an exception to this definition that allows the use of combustible interior finishes when listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated, for a flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration.
Analysis Criteria                                                                                            9A.2-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)    Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, Systems and Componentsplant features necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and the capability either to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a cold safe shutdown condition or to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents.
(6)    Water Spray Systema special fixed pipe system connected to a reliable source of fire protection water supply and equipped with water spray nozzles for specific water discharge and distribution over surface or area to be protected (The piping system is connected to the water supply through an automatic or manually actuated valve which initiates the flow of water.).
(7)    Wet Standpipe SystemThe ABWR design utilizes a ANSI B31.1 standpipe system in all Seismic Category I buildings.
9A.2.4 Acceptance Criteria The following basic guidelines have been used as criteria for the fire hazard analysis:
(1)    The analysis is based on the design as it now exists and on the equipment as currently specified, but not yet purchased. The analysis provides a basis for evaluating the fire protection characteristics and features of equipment as it is purchased.
(2)    Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided in the ABWR design for areas in which a transient fire loading is most likely to occur as a result of combustibles introduced by normal maintenance operations.
The fire hazard analysis is based on the introduction of combustibles to any area of the plant, subject to the owners administrative control.
(3)    The buildings are generally of reinforced concrete construction. The walls, floors, and ceilings have 3-hour fire resistive rating where required by a high combustible loading (lubrication oil tank, for example) in the room or where adjacent room contains equipment or systems from a different safety division. Stair towers which do not communicate between areas of different divisions may have walls and doors with a 1-hour fire rating for personnel protection during egress from the areas. Non-concrete interior walls are constructed of metal studs and gypsum wallboard to the required fire resistive rating.
9A.2-4                                                                                      Analysis Criteria
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Doors, in general, are 3-hour rated, complying with NFPA ratings. There are also doors, not labeled, which provide building separation. Typical of these are the doors for the personnel air lock into the reactor containment and the missile/tornado/hurricane protected doors at the equipment access entrance to the reactor building. The term doors, where used in the analysis, shall mean doors, frames and hardware.
(5)  The fireproofing of structural steel members is accomplished by application of a UL-listed or FM-approved cementicious or ablative material, or by a UL- or FM-approved boxing design. Steel Roof Trusses supporting the Reactor Building roof (el. 49700mm) are fireproofed and encased with a 3 hr, 5 psid fire retardant material/system that will not be dislodged by the postulated aircraft impact overpressure. The required fire rating, utilizing gypsum board, determines the fireproofing material thickness.
(6)  Surface finishes are specified to have a flame spread, fuel-contributed and smoke-evolved index of 25 or less (Class A), as determined by ASTM-E84 (NFPA 255).
(7)  The use of plastic materials, including electrical cable insulation, has been minimized in the ABWR design.
(8)  Suspended ceilings are used in some areas of the plant. The ceilings, including the lighting fixtures, are of noncombustible construction.
(9)  The electrical cable fire-stops are tested to demonstrate a fire rating equal to the rating of the barrier they penetrate. As a minimum, the penetrations meet the requirements of ANI. The tests are performed or witnessed by a representative of a qualified, independent testing laboratory. The documented test results for the acceptable fire-stops are made a part of the plant design records.
(10) Not Used (11) Control, power or instrument cables of redundant systems that are used for bringing the reactor to safe, cold shutdown, or of any other divisional system, are separated by 3-hour fire barriers.
(12) Certain areas of the plant have trays in stacked array. Where stacking of trays occurs, power cable, which is the most susceptible to internally generated fires, is routed in the uppermost tray to the greatest extent possible to provide maximum isolation from other trays in the stack.
The fire loadings of electrical cable in trays is based on flame-retardant, cross-linked polyethylene insulation (XLPE-FR) having a calorific value of 32.56x103 J/g.
Analysis Criteria                                                                                          9A.2-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 The cable trays have been estimated at the maximum design fill to contain between 11.91 and 15.63 kg of insulation per running meter of tray.
The analysis uses 13.77 kg of insulation per meter of tray. The combustible loading is based on maximum loading. The loading reduces as cables drop out of (exits) trays and the fire loading decreases. No attempt has been made to translate the fire loading to a kilojoule value per square meter for any of the fire areas as a result of cable insulation.
(13) Certain compartments contain instruments in safety-related systems with only local indicating capability. They do not initiate any signal for remote indicators, recorders or alarms, nor actuate any devices for the safe, cold shutdown of the reactor.
Therefore, local indicating instruments have not been considered in the fire hazard analysis.
(14) Total reliance is not placed on a single fire suppression system. A minimum of two fire suppression means is available to each fire area. The plant design provides the following types of suppression and utilizes them in suitable combination for the fire hazard considered:
(a)    Automatic wet pipe sprinkler (b)    Standpipe and hose reels (c)    Class ABC hand extinguishers (15) The design includes requirements for delivering water to the standpipe and hose reel systems through any single failure mode, including the SSE. The standpipe system is ANSI B31.1 in all Seismic Category I buildings. The standpipes are contained within the buildings and thus are also protected from other phenomena of less severity and greater frequency.
The effects of pipe breaks in fire suppression systems and protection methods for the effects of pipe breaks meet the criteria specified in Section 3.6.
(16) Piping penetrations are provided with fire-stops when penetrating fire-resistive walls.
(17) HVAC penetrations are provided with fire dampers equal in rating to the fire barrier penetrated.
(18) The ABWR design provides ventilating systems which minimize the release of radioactive materials through the use of HEPA, high efficiency and charcoal filtration systems.
9A.2-6                                                                                Analysis Criteria
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.2.5 Core Cooling System The core cooling systems are required when the NSSS is isolated from the main condenser during shutdown or accident conditions.
The main steamlines and feedwater lines provide the core cooling path to and from the main condenser during normal operation at power and during startup and shutdown transients when the reactor is not isolated.
The core cooling function is accomplished through interaction of various systems. The core cooling systems provide one or more of the following functions:
(1)  Maintenance of reactor vessel water level (2)  Depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (3)  Heat removal (4)  Heat sink (5)  Electrical power (6)  Control In addition, electrical power is required for pump motors and valve operation. Instrumentation automatically activates the core cooling system or provides signals to the control room operators to activate the appropriate system manually.
Table 9A.2-1 shows the core cooling systems that provide one or more of the core cooling functions.
The table includes the operating mode for multimode systems, the functions performed, reactor conditions that require system operation, the divisional assignment, the backup system and Tier 2 reference for system description.
Analysis Criteria                                                                                        9A.2-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9A.2-1 Core Cooling Reactor                  Backup3      Tier 2 1                        2 System/Mode            Function    Condition      Division  System        Ref      Remarks 4,5,6 RHR A/Decay Heat            3      Normal              1  RHR B RHR C 5.4.7 Removal                            shutdown 4,5,6 RHR B/Decay Heat            3      Normal              2  RHR A RHR C 5.4.7 Removal                            shutdown 4,5,6 RHR C/Decay Heat            3      Normal              3  RHR A RHR B 5.4.7 Removal                            shutdown 4,6 RHR A/Suppression          3      Hot standby,        1  RHR B RHR C 6.2.2 Pool Cooling                      LOCA 4,6 RHR B/Suppression          3      Hot standby,        1  RHR A RHR C 6.2.2 Pool Cooling                      LOCA 4,6 RHR C/Suppression          3      Hot standby,        1  RHR A RHR B 6.2.2 Pool Cooling                      LOCA RHR C/Wetwell              3/1    LOCA, SBE7          1  RHR B        6.2.2    4,6,8 Drywell Spray                                                            6.3.2 RHR B/Wetwell Drywell      3/1    LOCA, SBE7          1  RHR C        6.2.2    4,6,8 Spray                                                                    6.3.2 4,9 RCIC                        1      Isolation,          1  HPCF B        5.4.6 LOCA                    HPCF C 4
HPCF B                      1      Isolation,          2  ADS/RHR A    6.3.2 LOCA 4
HPCF C                      1      Isolation,          3  ADS/RHR B    6.3.2 LOCA 10,11 ADS                        2      LOCA                2  HPCF          6.3.2 RCW A                      4      All                  1  RCW B RCW    9.2.11 C
RCW B                      4      All                  2  RCW A RCW    9.2.11 C
RCW C                      4      All                  3  RCW A RCW    9.2.11 B
12,13 CUW                        4      Shutdown                            5.4.8 CRD                        1      Shutdown                            4.6 Div 1 electrical power      5      All                  2  8.3 Div 3 Div 2 electrical power      5      All                  2  Div 1        8.3 Div 3 Div 3 electrical power      5      All                  3  Div 1        8.3 Div 2 9A.2-8                                                                            Analysis Criteria
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Table 9A.2-1 Core Cooling (Continued)
Reactor                        Backup3          Tier 2 1                                2 System/Mode                    Function        Condition      Division        System          Ref    Remarks Control Room                          6        All                  All        Remote          7.4.1.4 shutdown panel and system Div 1 instrument power                6        All                  1        2, 3 and/        7.2,
& signals                                                                      or 4            7.3 Div 2 instrument power                6        All                  2        1, 3 and/        7.2,
& signals                                                                      or 4            7.3 Div 3 instrument power                6        All                  3        1, 2 and/        7.2,
& signals                                                                      or 4            7.3 Div 4 instrument power                6        All                  4        1, 2 and/        7.2,
& signals                                                                      or 3            7.3 1      Functions: 1 - maintain reactor water level 2 - depressurize the reactor vessel 3 - heat removal 4 - heat sink 5 - electrical power 6 - control (includes logic systems power for initiation of RPS and core cooling systems) 2      Divisionelectrical power divisional assignment 3      Backup Systemsee Subsection 6.3.2 for required number of ECCS systems.
4      Room coolers needed for pump operation 5      Closed loop to and from reactor vessel 6      RCW provides coolant to heat exchangers.
7      SBEsmall break event 8      Not a core cooling mode 9      Water supply for RCIC is condensate storage pool primary or suppression pool (secondary).
10    Pneumatic valves 11    Depressurizes the reactor to allow LP systems to function 12    Not a safety system 13    Tier 2 does not describe this mode but system could be used to cool core.
Analysis Criteria                                                                                            9A.2-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.3 Analysis Approach 9A.3.1 Review Data The analysis is based on a review of every room or area, on a floor-by-floor basis, for each building of design. The following data have been gathered for each room or area being reviewed:
(1)  Identification of the safety-related and non-safety-related systems, and associated cabling within each fire area, which could provide cooling to the core to safely shut down the reactor, and removal of decay heat.
(2)  Identification of fire areas containing radioactive material which could be released to the exclusion area or beyond should a fire occur in that area.
(3)  Identification of safety and non-safety-related equipment contained within the boundaries of each fire area, which do not provide cooling to the core to safely shut down the reactor.
(4)  Definition of the fire barriers surrounding a specific room or area which qualify rating the room or area as a separate fire area.
(5)  A specific listing of types, quantities and characteristics of all combustibles within a fire area which could constitute a fire load.
(6)  Quantitative listing of fire loadings which represent the combustibles identified for each fire area.
(7)  Listing of all the fire detection and suppression capabilities provided and their accessibility for each fire area.
(8)  An analysis of each fire area identifies the design criteria employed in providing fire protection for the equipment within the fire area. Divisional safety-related equipment is separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers, except equipment mounted in the Control Building, and primary containment, and the special cases which are discussed in Subsection 9A.5 (for more information on safety-related equipment fire separation and safe shutdown see Subsection 9.5.1.2.11). Fire detection, fire suppression, and fire stops capabilities are also discussed in the analysis.
(9)  An analysis defining the consequences of the fire for each fire area [This is stated as loss of function and identifies the divisional backup capability available for safety-related systems. The loss of function that would not impair the capability of safe, cold shutdown is identified where non-safety-related systems are involved.].
Analysis Approach                                                                                          9A.3-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) An analysis of each fire area addressing the consequences of fire, if the fire protection system functions as designed. The fire protection system is defined as having the capability to detect, contain and extinguish the fire. The ability to restrict the fire to a discrete area, the result of the introduction of water to the fire area and the capability of extinguishing the fire by various means of suppression are stated. See Section 3.6 for a discussion of pipe break consequences.
(11) Design provisions for protecting the functional capability or safety-related systems and associated cabling from the results of inadvertent operation, careless operation or rupture of the extinguishing systems for each fire area are stated.
(12) The means of containing the inhibiting the progress of a fire in each fire area [This is defined as the use of a fire-resisting enclosure or barrier, fire-stops at wall penetrations, dust dampers, curbs or fire doors into the area.].
(13) Room numbers are shown on the analysis pages which conform to those shown on the fire area separation drawings.
9A.3.2 Not Used 9A.3.3 Separation A specific analysis has been prepared for each fire area where redundant systems of safety-related equipment or electrical cables are contained in a common fire area to confirm that adequate protection has been provided by means of separation by distance, physical barriers, electrical isolation, electrical circuit characteristics or adequate backup systems. The analyses appear in Section 9A.5 (Special Cases).
9A.3.4 Insulation Fire Hazard Electrical cable insulation which is contained in either solid-bottom, solid-cover metal trays or in conduits is not considered to represent an exposed, combustible fire hazard.
9A.3.5 Exceptions to Penetrations Requirements (1)    Four 550 mm Atmospheric Control System supply and exhaust lines for the wetwell and the drywell, do not have fire dampers. There are 2 containment isolation valves for each supply and exhaust. The valves are normally closed except during plant outage periods, at which time smoke removal should be accomplished without interruption, if a fire occurs. The drywell or wetwell sprays would be initiated to save the containment at a temperature well below the threshold of damage for the duct, assuming the fire was not suppressed quickly.
9A.3-2                                                                                            Analysis Approach
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.3.6 Wall Deviations The wall descriptions below represent a tested and approved 3-hour fire-resistive assembly and an anticipated possible deviation. Though specific applications for these walls have not been identified at this time, it is anticipated that applications will develop as the detail design of the plant is completed.
The Type 1 wall design is the UL tested and approved design U463. The type 2 assembly will require a UL test.
(1)    Type 1 wall is UL tested and approved 3-hour fire barrier wall with three layers of fire code Gypsum wallboard on each side of the studs.
(2)    Type 2 wall is a variation of type 1 wall with three layers of gypsum wall board on one side and a 1.25 cm thick steel plate for bullet resistance and two layers of fire code gypsum wall board on the other side.
9A.3.7 Door Deviations Certain doors throughout the facility have a multipurpose function such as fire, tornado, hurricane, pressure, missile, seismic, watertight and airlocks. Where possible, these doors are specified to rated and labeled criteria and are then identified as rated doors.
When other criteria require the manufacturer to delete the label, the door is identified as equivalent. These doors, except for the Reactor Building equipment access door are required to have a UL or FM label.
Where the door is not constructed as a fire door, such as a containment personnel airlock, it is identified by its main function.
Analysis Approach                                                                                            9A.3-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4 Analysis 9A.4.1 Reactor Building 9A.4.1.1 Reactor Bldg El -8200 mm 9A.4.1.1.1 Lower Drywell (Rm No. 191)
(1)  Fire AreaF1901 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 for this elevation. Devices within the lower drywell are also listed at floor elevations -1700 and 4800, as appropriate.
Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2, D3, & D4                    Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNormally, none that can be released as a result of fire.
Depending on operating history, low levels of contamination could be present. Also, any radiation release from the drywell sumps is contained within the containment.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1 through 9A.4-3. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room. The walls, floor and ceiling are concrete, which is approximately 1-meter thick as a minimum. Risers lead from the lower drywell up through diaphragm floor to the upper drywell. The primary purpose of the risers is to equalize the pressure between the upper and lower drywell. The risers are also used for the routing of cables and piping between the upper and lower drywells. A personnel lock provides access to the drywell at zero degrees and an elevation of -180 mm. Access and egress to the drywell is through this personnel lock. An equipment removal lock is provided at the 180 degree location. The drywell atmosphere is inerted with nitrogen during plant operation.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays                  727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of XLPE-FR          maximum average) applies.
cable insulation.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the containment purge system and manual pull alarms when the containment is purged.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                      Location/Actuation Inerted during plant operation.            General Manual Drywell spray is ultimate line of defense during plant outage.
Standpipe and hose reel.                  Personnel lock entrance/Manual ABC hand extinguishers during              Temporary as conditions significant outage work.                  warrant/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Credit is taken for the fact that the drywell is inerted during plant operation.
(b)    Quantities of combustibles are minimized.
(c)    The spacing between redundant equipment and cabling is kept to a maximum.
(d)    Smoke removal is provided by the drywell purge and exhaust system.
(9)  Consequences of FireA fire during plant operation is not possible due to the drywell being inerted. A fire in the lower drywell would not prevent the continuation of core cooling.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the drywell (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe, external to the drywell (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Inerted atmosphere.
(b)    Quantities of combustibles minimized.
(13) Remarks:
9A.4-2                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    There are no containment electrical penetrations in the lower drywell.
(b)    The reactor internal pump (RIP) motors are water lubricated so that there is no lubricating oil in the lower drywell.
9A.4.1.1.2 Wet Well (Rm No. 190)
(1)  Fire AreaF1900 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, 2, D3, & D4                    Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1 through 9A.4-3. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room. The wetwell is a concrete annular tank partially filled with water. It has a nitrogen blanket during plant operation. There is nothing to burn. The concrete walls are not fire rated but their construction provides an equivalent fire rating of more than 3 hours.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None (6)  Detection ProvidedNone.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  External to personnel access lock/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Carry in if maintenance operation warrants additional fire suppression/Manual Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Normally inaccessible (b)  Normally inerted (c)  No exposed combustible materials (d)  Manual suppression available during outages when maintenance activities may be undertaken (e)  Wetwell spray is ultimate suppression system (9)  Consequences of FireIt is possible for a fire to occur only during plant outages.
Fire would be extinguished without core cooling being disturbed.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer toSection 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Location of the manual suppression system external to the wetwell (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
No exposed combustibles (13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.1.3 RHR Pump Room A (Rm No. 110)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2, D3 & D4                  Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-4                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14kg/m of                    maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR Cable Insulation 106 liters of Class III B lube oil      4.6 x 103 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and                          Col. 6.8-D.0./Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-D.0./Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
(c)  There are no HVAC duct penetrations through the fire barriers for this room.
(d)  Temperature elements E31-TE008A, B, C, D of the leak detection system are mounted in this room. See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.4 RCIC Room A (Rm No. 112)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3, D4                    Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-6                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 106 liters of Class III B              4.6 x 103 lube oil.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-D.0, 5.8-A.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
(c)  Temperature elements E31-TE005A, B,C,D of the leak detection system are mounted in this room. See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.5 Corridor C (Rm No. 131)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-8                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the corridor and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5, 6.9-D.0, and 6.9-F.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-D.0, 6.9-F.9 & 5.8-A.5/
Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-D.0, 6.9-F.9 & 5.8-A.5/
Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor where there is a minimum of safety-related equipment Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
(b)  The room is cooled by the Reactor Building HVAC System, which is not redundant or safety grade.
9A.4.1.1.6 Quadrant 1 Corridor (Rm No. 115)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. The quadrant 4 corridor contains division 2 RCWS piping.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
9A.4-10                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the corridor and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor where there is a minimum of safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
9A.4.1.1.7 CRD HCU Quadrant I/IV (Rm No. 117)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3 & D4                    Yes, D1, D2, D3 & D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 15.25 m of divisional cable trays      727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-12                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. The scram function is fail safe and would therefore scram as a result of a fire.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)    The safety-related function has a remote backup system and is fail safe (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe hydraulic control lines for divisions 2 and 3 from the scram bank are routed up to elevation 4000 mm where they enter containment through the top of the personnel lock. Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides a discussion as to how the division I and IV pressure transmitters which monitor charging header pressure are mounted in this room, and why it is acceptable to mount this equipment in the same room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.1.8 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.9 Quadrant A Sump Room (Rm No. 119)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire. Normally the sumps would not be contaminated. If they did become slightly contaminated prior to a fire, any contamination released as a result of boiling initiated by the heat of the fire would be contained within secondary containment.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 15.25 m of divisional cable trays      727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.8-A.5/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-14                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)    Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe sumps in this room serve only areas external to the safety-related pump rooms.
9A.4.1.1.10 Stair # 1 (Rm No. 195)
(1)    Fire AreaF1510 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1 through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations external to the stair tower and adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Adjacent to the stair tower at each building floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke-removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-16                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.1.11 Elevator # 1 (Rm No. 192)
(1)  Fire AreaF1520 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1.through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Adjacent to the stair entry at each building floor stair door/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The elevator shaft is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stairs located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the elevator.
Access to the adjacent stair tower and other stair/elevator towers is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the tower; (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system; (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d)  Alternate access route provided.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.1.12 HPCF Room C (Rm No. 130)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-18                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 51.1 liters of Class III B              1.84x103 lube oil.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-F.9 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col 6.9-F.9/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-F.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-19
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
9A.4.1.1.13 RHR Pump Room C (Rm No. 132)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3 & D4                  Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-20                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 106 liters of Class III B              4.6 x 103 lube oil.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-F.9 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-F.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-F.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-21
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detections, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
(c)  Temperature elements E31-TE008J, K, L, M, E31-TE031J, and E31-TE032J of the leak detection system are mounted in this room. See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.14 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.15 CRD Pump Room (Rm No.133)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 9A.4-22                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                              Provides Core Cooling No                                          Yes*
* As a secondary effect of the control rod drive water and the reactor internal pump flushing water supplied to the reactor vessel.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                                    Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 11.3 m of divisional cable trays                727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                          maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 151.4 liters of Class III B                    6.57 x 103 lube oil.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-F.9 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                            Location/Actuation Ordinary hazard, dry pipe, closed head All/Automatic sprinklers, having a water density of 6.1 L/min/m2 per head.
Standpipe and hose reel                          Col. 6.9-F.9/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                          Col. 6.9-F.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-23
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function which results in a plant scram and continuance of core cooling by the appropriate systems located in other fire areas.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The function is located remotely from other equipment of other systems within the same fire area.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)    The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir but there is externally exposed piping, therefore, sprinklers are provided.
(c)    The pumps are powered from the divisions 1 and 2 emergency buses and are sitting in a division 3 area. Justification for this exception is given in Section 9A.3.
9A.4-24                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.1.16 CRD HCU Quadrant II/III Room (Rm No. 126)
(1) Fire AreaF1200 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2 & D3                          Yes (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 15.25 m of divisional cable trays      727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.5-F.8 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-25
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. The scram function is fail safe and would therefore scram as a result of a fire.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)    The safety-related function has a remote backup system and is fail safe (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe hydraulic control lines from the scram bank are routed up to elevation 4000 where they enter containment through the top of the personnel lock.
9A.4.1.1.17 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.18 Corridor B (Rm No. 123)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 9A.4-26                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the corridor and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.5-F.8 and 1.1-D.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.5-F.8 & 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.5-F.8 & 1.1-D.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-27
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Section 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor where there is a minimum of safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
9A.4.1.1.19 Quadrant B Sump Room (Rm No. 124)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire. Normally the sumps would not be contaminated. If they did become slightly contaminated prior to a fire, any contamination release as a result of boiling initiated by the heat of the fire would be contained within secondary containment.
9A.4-28                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 15.25 m of divisional cable trays      727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.5 and F.8 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-29
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe sumps in this room serve only areas external to the safety-related pump rooms.
9A.4.1.1.20 Stair # 3 (Rm No. 193)
(1)    Fire AreaF1530 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1.through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)    Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations external to the stair tower and adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
9A.4-30                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Adjacent to the stair tower at each building floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-31
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.1.21 Elevator # 2 (Rm No. 194)
(1)  Fire AreaF1540 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-1.through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Adjacent to the stair tower at each building floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stairs located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the elevator.
Access to the adjacent stair tower and other stair/elevator towers is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-32                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the tower (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.1.22 RHR Pump Room B (Rm No. 121)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3, D4                  Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-33
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 106 liters of Class III B              4.6 x 103 lube oil.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room 9A.4-34                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
(c)  Temperature elements E31-TE008E, F, G, H of the leak detection system are mounted in this room.
The G51-F001 (MO division 2 isolation valve) of the SPCS is mounted in this room. See Subsection 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.23 HPCF Pump Room B (Rm No. 122)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-35
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays          727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation 51.1 liters of Class III B              4.6 x 103 lube oil.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room 9A.4-36                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  The safety-related function has a remote backup system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
(b)  It is assumed that the pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and that there is no exposed piping.
9A.4.1.1.24 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.25 CUW Nonregen Hx (Rm No. 141)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-37
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
9A.4-38                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The CUW System is capable of removing a small amount of decay heat from the reactor vessel during certain conditions.
(b)    Leak Detection system temperature elements E31-TE009E, F, G and H are located in this room.
(c)    See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.26 SPCU Pump Room (Rm No. 140)
(1) Fire AreaF1200 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety--Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2                              No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-39
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and its loss is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe G51-F001 (MO division 2 isolation valve) of the SPCS is mounted in this room. See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.27 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.28 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.29 CUW Pump B Room (Rm No. 146)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D3                            Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-40                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-41
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The CUW System is capable of removing a small amount of decay heat from the reactor vessel during certain conditions.
(b)    Temperature elements E31-TE010A and C E31-TE011A and C, and E31-TE012A and C of the Leak Detection System are mounted in this room.
(c)    See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.30 CUW Pump A Room (Rm No. 147)
(1)  Fire Area1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3, & D4                  Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual 9A.4-42                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The CUW System is capable of removing a small amount of decay heat from the reactor vessel during certain conditions.
(b)  Leak detection system temperature elements E31-TE009J, K, L, and M are located in this room.
(c)  See Section 9A.5, Special Cases, for an explanation of why this is required and why it is deemed to be acceptable.
9A.4.1.1.31 CUW Pump Maintenance Area (Rm No. 148)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-43
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: None, other than when maintenance of a CUW pump is being performed.
Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Temporary loss of this system which is not safety-related is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
9A.4-44                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The room contains no exposed electrical cables.
(b)    The room is cooled by the Reactor Building HVAC System, which is not redundant or safety grade. A safety-grade system is not required.
9A.4.1.1.32 RWCU/SPDS Instrument Room (Rm No. 142)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the corridor and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-45
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor where there is a minimum of safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-46                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) Remarks:
(a)    The corridor contains piping and cable trays for division 2 safety systems in its upper elevation.
(b)    The CUW System is capable of removing a small amount of decay heat from the reactor vessel during certain conditions.
9A.4.1.1.33 Backwash Transfer Pump Room (Rm No. 149)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of a fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-47
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, and does not have a core cooling function. Therefore, the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.1.34 CUW Backwash Tank Room (Rm No. 144)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-48                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-49
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksThe room is cooled by the Reactor Building HVAC System, which is not redundant or safety grade. A safety-grade system is not required.
9A.4.1.1.35 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.36 Not Used 9A.4.1.1.37 Instrument Rack Room, Division 4 (Rm No. 111)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 17 m of divisional cable trays        727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 containing 14 kg/m of                  maximum average) applies.
XLPE-FR cable insulation (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-A5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.8-A5/Manual 9A.4-50                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separated from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksCore Flow Instrument Rack H22-P001D (Div. 4), HCU Scram Solenoids (Div. 2,3) are mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.1.38 Instrument Rack Room, Division 1 (Rm No. 118)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-51
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present: Combustion (Btu)
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.8-A.5 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-A.5/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separated from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for equipment in the fire area.
9A.4-52                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksCore Flow Instrument Rack H22-P001D (Div. 4), HCU Scram Solenoids (Div. 2,3) are mounted in this room. Subsection 9A.5, Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.1.39 Division II Instrument Rack Room (Rm No. 125)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-53
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.5-F.8 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.5-F.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. The scram function is fail safe and would therefore scram as a result of a fire.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely) 9A.4-54                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (e)    The safety-related function has a remote backup system and is fail safe (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The hydraulic control lines from the scram bank are routed up to elevation 4000 where they enter containment through the top of the personnel lock.
(b)    Pressure transmitters C12-PT011C are mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.1.40 Division III Instrument Rack Room (Rm No. 129)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3                        Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.9-F.8 in the corridor.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-55
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.9-F.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.9-F.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. The scram function is fail safe and would therefore scram as a result of a fire.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)    The safety-related function has a remote backup system and is fail safe (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
9A.4-56                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The hydraulic control lines from the scram bank are routed up to elevation 4000 where they enter containment through the top of the personnel lock.
(b)    Pressure transmitter C12-PT011C is mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.1.41 CUW Valve and Pipe Space (Rm No. 143)
(1) Fire AreaF1200 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    Yes (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-1. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-57
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)    Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room is cooled by the Reactor Building HVAC System, which is not redundant or safety grade. A safety-grade system is not required.
9A.4.1.2 BuildingReactor Bldg El -1700 mm 9A.4.1.2.1 Lower Drywell (Rm No. 291)
(1)    Fire AreaF1901 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 for this elevation. Devices within the lower drywell are also listed at floor elevations -8200 mm and 4800 mm, as appropriate.
Note: Section 9A.4.1.01 applies for the remainder of the information for the drywell. See that section for additional information.
9A.4.1.2.2 Wetwell (Rm No. 290)
(1)    Fire AreaF9001 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 9A.4-58                                                                                                Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Note: Section 9A.4.1.02 applies for the remainder of the information for the wetwell. See that section for additional information.
9A.4.1.2.3 Corridor A (Rm No. 210)
(1)    Fire AreaF1100 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2 & D4                        Yes, D1, D2,& D4 (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)    Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)    Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.1-B.1 (7)    Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.1-B.1. & 6.9-D.3/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.1-B.1/Manual (8)    Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                              9A.4-59
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
9A.4.1.2.4 RHR (A)/RCIC Pipe Space (Rm No. 212)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety--Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-60                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.1-B.1 and 6.9-D.3.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.1-B.1 & 6.9-D.3/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.1-B.1 & 6.9-D.3/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-61
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.5 Lower Drywell Personnel Access (Rm No. 211)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 4.2-A.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 4.2-A.9 & 6.1-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 4.2-A.9 & 6.1-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-62                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Alternate entry to the lower cavity is provided by the material access lock located directly across the containment.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.2.6 HCU Pipe Space A (Rm No. 213)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, N/A*                              No Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-63
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2
* See paragraph (13)
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                              Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                      727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 3.6-A.6.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                      Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 3.6-A.6/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                    Col. 3.6-A.6/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireA fire could initiate a scram but could not prevent one.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-64                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe HCU piping is routed through this room to the primary containment via the upper portion of the personnel lock.
9A.4.1.2.7 HCU Pipe Space D (Rm No. 214)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2*                                No
* See paragraph (13)
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. Open pipe chases for the control rod hydraulic lines enter the room from the floor and pass through this room to enter containment via the upper area of the personnel lock. A metal grating installed at elevation 1500 mm provides access to the upper portion of the room, and is accessed by a ladder within the room.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-65
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 3.6-A.6.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 3.6-A.6/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 3.6-A.6/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireA fire could initiate a scram but could not prevent one.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely) 9A.4-66                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe HCU piping is routed through this room to the primary containment via the upper portion of the personnel lock.
MO valve of SPCU system G51-F006 is mounted in this room. Section 9A.5 Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from a different safety division in this room.
9A.4.1.2.8 TIP Room (Rm No. 215)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material Present-None that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-67
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.8-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is not safety-related and its loss as result of a fire is acceptable.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4-68                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.2.9 TIP Shield Room (Rm No. 216)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is not safety-related and its loss as a result of fire is acceptable.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                              9A.4-69
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.2.10 SPCU Pipe Space (Rm No. 217)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-70                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9 and 6.1-B.1 at -1700.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and                          Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 hose reel                              at -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-71
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.11 TIP Area Landing (Rm No. 218)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9 and 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm.
9A.4-72                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.5-A.9 & 6.1-B.1 at -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and its temporary loss is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-73
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.2.12 HPCF (C)/RHR (C) Pipe Space (Rm No. 230)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.9-D.3.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-D.3 & 6.1-E8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.9-D.3 & 6.1-E8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
9A.4-74                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.2.13 Maintenance Area C (Rm No. 231)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2 & D3                          Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. Three hour fire rated rollup doors provide equipment removal access between maintenance areas A and B. There are three floor hatches for removal of equipment from the rooms on the floor below.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-75
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.9-D.3. and 6.1-E.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-D.3 & 6.1-E8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-D.3/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-76                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
(b)    The Reactor Protection System scram solenoid fuse panels H22-P055C,F,G,H are all mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in the room.
9A.4.1.2.14 FMCRD Panel Room (Rm No. 220)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: Control panels for the FMCRD handling machine.
Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-E.9 and 1.1-D.01.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-77
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.4-E.9 and 1.1-D.01/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.4-E.9 and 1.1-D.01/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is not safety-related and its loss due to a fire is acceptable.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.15 FMCRD Maintenance Room (Rm No. 225/233)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 9A.4-78                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3) Radioactive Material PresentMinor amounts of contamination on the FMCRD drives during maintenance periods. Any radiation release is contained within the secondary containment.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Variable                                727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.1-E.8.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col.6.1-E.8 & 2.4-F.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col.6.0-E.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-79
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.16 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.17 Lower Drywell Equipment Access (Rm No. 223)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-80                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 3.8-F.0 and 6.1-E.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 3.8-F.0 & 6.1-E8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 3.8-F.0 & 6.1-E9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room which is separate from rooms containing other equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Alternate entry to the lower cavity is provided by the personnel access lock located directly across the containment.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-81
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    The room contains cable in conduit only.
(b)    A hose reel and portable extinguisher has been provided in the room for possible use in the lower drywell if needed during a maintenance outage.
9A.4.1.2.18 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.19 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.20 Corridor B/C (Rm No. 224)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.1-E.8.
9A.4-82                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.1-E.8 & 2.4-F.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.1-E.8 & 2.4-F.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Alternate routes are provided for access to areas served by the corridor.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and its temporary loss is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.2.21 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.22 Corridor and Maintenance Area B (Rm No. 221)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-83
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-E.9.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
9A.4-84                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(c)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe corridor contains piping and cable trays in its upper elevation.
9A.4.1.2.23 HPCF (B) /RHR (B) Pipe Space (Rm No. 222)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-85
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-E.9 and 1.1-D.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate concrete enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-86                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.24 (Rm No. 242)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-87
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and its loss is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.25 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.26 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.27 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.28 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.29 CUW Regen Hx, Valve and Pipe Room (Rm No. 241)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2, D3 & D4                    Yes, D1, D2, D3 & D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-88                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-D.0 and 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-D.0 & 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-D.0 & 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-89
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksTemperature Elements E31-009A, B, D, T, U, V, W of Leak Detection System, solenoid valves T31-F739D, T31-F741, and Level Transmitter T31-LT058D of the Atmospheric Control System are all mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.2.30 Not Used 9A.4.1.2.31 Radioactive Drain Valve Room (Rm No. 251)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 4.2-A.9 and 6.1-B.1.
9A.4-90                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 4.2-A.9 & 6.1-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 4.2-A.9 & 6.1-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the lose of function is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.32 Corridor D (Rm No. 244)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-91
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Section 9A.2.5.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
9A.4-92                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.33 Vacuum Cleaning Room (Rm No. 219)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.1-B.1 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-93
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.1-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.1-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the lose of function is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.34 FPC Holding Pump and F/D Valve Room (Rm No. 248)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 9A.4-94                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-95
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and acceptable.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.2.35 CUW Holding Pump Rooms A and B (Rm No. 243)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-2. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.1-A.1 in the corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.1-A.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-96                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)    Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related, therefore the loss of the function is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3 BuildingReactor Bldg El 4800 mm 9A.4.1.3.1 Lower Drywell (Rm No. 391)
(1)    Fire AreaF1901 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 for this elevation. Devices within the lower drywell are also listed at floor elevations -8200 mm and -1700 mm as appropriate.
Note: Section 9A.4.1.01 applies for the remainder of the information for the drywell. See that section for additional information.
9A.4.1.3.2 Wet Well (Rm No. 390)
(1)    Fire AreaF1900 Analysis                                                                                                9A.4-97
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Note: Section 9A.4.1.02 applies for the remainder of the information for the wetwell. See that section for additional information.
9A.4.1.3.3 Emergency Electric Room A (Rm No. 310)
(1)    Fire AreaF3100 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)    Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station outside the room in the reactor building clean area leading to the control building corridor.
(7)    Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Outside the room in the reactor electrically safe nozzle              building clean area leading to the control building corridor/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Outside the room in the reactor building clean area leading to the control building corridor/ Manual 9A.4-98                                                                                              Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the Electrical HVAC (EHVAC)(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.4 Corridor A (Rm No. 311)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-99
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-B.2 and 6.2-C.8.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-100                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.5 Suppression Pool Personnel Entry Hatch (Rm No. 312)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-101
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-B.2 and 6.2-C.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-B.1 & 6.2-C.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col.5.5-B.1 & 6.2-C.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)    Provision of raised supports for equipment (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-102                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.6 Pipe Space A (Rm No. 313)
(1) Fire AreaF1100 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2                              Yes, D1, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-B.2 and 6.2-C.8.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col.5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection on suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-103
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksMO valve E51-F039 of the RCIC, and solenoid valves T31-720A,B of the Atmospheric Control System are all mounted in this room. Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.3.7 Instrument Rack (I) (Rm No. 314)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-104                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.2-C.8 and 5.5-B.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.2-C.8 & 5.5-B.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.2-C.8 & 5.5-B.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-105
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksPressure Transmitter E22-PT007B (Div. 2) of the High Pressure Core Flooder System is mounted in this room (Div. 1). Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.3.8 RIP Panel Room (Rm No. 315)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.6-C.4.
9A.4-106                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.6-C.4/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.6-C.4/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-107
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.9 Stair #2 (Rm No. 316)
(1)  Fire AreaF3310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-3.through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations external to the stair tower and adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Adjacent to the stair tower at each building floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stair tower/elevator located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the adjacent elevator and other stair tower/elevator is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-108                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.10 Elevator #2 (Rm No. 317)
(1)  Fire AreaF3311 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-3.through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations adjacent to the access door of stair tower at each building floor elevation.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-109
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Adjacent to the stair entry at each building floor stair door/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The elevator shaft is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stairs/elevator located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the elevator.
Access to the adjacent stair tower and other stair/elevator towers is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the tower (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-110                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.11 Instrument Rack (III) Room (Rm No. 332)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D3                            Yes, D1, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.2-C.8 and 5.4-E.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.2-C.8 & 5.4-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.2-C.8 & 5.4-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternative means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-111
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksSolenoid valve T31-F805A (Div. 1) of the Atmospheric Control System is mounted in this room (Div. 3). Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.3.12 Pipe Space C (Rm No. 333)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-112                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.9-C4 at elevation -1700.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-C4 at elevation
                                                    -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.9-C4 at elevation
                                                    -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-113
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.13 Corridor C (Rm No. 335)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D3                            Yes, D1, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.4-E.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.4-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.4-E.9/Manual 9A.4-114                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety as shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksMO valves D23-F006A, D23-F007A, and D23-F008A (Div. 1) of the Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System are mounted in this room (Div. 3).
Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-115
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.14 Quadrant A Storm Drain Sump Room (Rm No. 336)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None.                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.9-E.8 in the corridor C.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.9-E.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.9-E.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. Loss of Function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
9A.4-116                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.15 RIP Panel Room (Rm No. 331)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-117
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.6-C.4 and 6.9-E.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.6-C.4 & 6.9-E8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.6-C.4 & 6.9-E8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely) 9A.4-118                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.16 Emergency Electrical Room C (Rm No. 337)
(1)  Fire AreaF3301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.9-E.8 and 1.9-F.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Col. 6.9-E.8 & 1.9-F.5/Manual electrically safe nozzle.
ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.9-E.8 & 1.9-F.5/Manual Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-119
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.17 Corridor B (Rm No. 321)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 9A.4-120                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-F.1 and 1.8-B.5.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Col. 2.4-F-1 & 1.8-B.5/Manual electrically safe nozzle.
ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.4-F-1 & 1.8-B.5/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-121
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.18 Sump Room (Rm No. 322)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-122                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.9-F.5 in the Room 320.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Col. 1.9-F.5 & 1.6-C.9/Manual electrically safe nozzle.
ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.9-F.5 & 1.6-C.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room, separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function for the equipment in the fire area. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-123
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.19 Pipe Space B (Rm No. 324)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                  Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-E.9 and 1.1-D.0 at elevation -1700 mm.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0 at elevation
                                                          -1700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.4-E.9 & 1.1-D.0 at elevation
                                                          -1700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-124                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.20 RPV Instrument Rack (II) Room (Rm No. 323)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2                          Yes, D1, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-125
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.4 and 2.4-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.4 & 2.4-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.8-B.4 & 2.4-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
9A.4-126                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.21 Emergency Electrical Room B (Rm No. 326)
(1)  Fire AreaF3201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.9-E.2 and 1.9-F.5.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-127
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Col. 6.9-E.2 & 1.9-F.5/Manual electrically safe nozzle.
ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.9-E.2 & 1.9-F.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4-128                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.22 RIP Panel Room (Rm No. 320)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.9-F.5 and 1.6-C.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.9-F.5 & 1.6-C.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.9-F.5 & 1.6-C.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-129
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe division 2 cabling from the emergency electrical room (Rm 321) is routed through floor of this room.
9A.4.1.3.23 Stair #4 (Rm No. 329)
(1)  Fire AreaF3210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-3 through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-130                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations external to the stair tower and adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Adjacent to the stair tower at each building floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire.Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-131
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.24 Elevator #4 (Rm No. 328)
(1)  Fire AreaF3211 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-3 through 9A.4-8. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull stations adjacent to the access door at each building floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Adjacent to the stair entry at each building floor stair door/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Adjacent to the hose reels/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The elevator shaft is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stairs located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-132                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the elevator.
Access to the adjacent stair tower and other stair/elevator towers is maintained.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the tower (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.25 RPV Instrument Rack (IV) Room (Rm No. 345)
(1)  Fire AreaF3400 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                              Yes, D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-133
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.5 and 2.4-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.5 & 2.4-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.8-B.5 & 2.4-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-134                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.26 Not Used 9A.4.1.3.27 Corridor D (Rm No. 344)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.5.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-135
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.8-B.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Alternate access routes are provided.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4-136                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.28 RIP Panel A Room (Rm No. 340)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-C.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-C.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-C.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-137
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.29 Remote Shutdown Panel Room B. (Rm No. 383)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel 9A.4-138                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 entry and egress for this room. A 3 h fire-resistive sliding door provides access to this room from the remote shutdown panel room A (Rm 341). The normally closed sliding door will be open when operating from the remote shutdown panel.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station outside the room in the corridor (R/B clean area) leading to control building, and Col. 1.6-D.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Outside the room in the corridor (R/B clean area) leading to the control building, and col. 1.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Outside the room in the corridor (R/B clean area) leading to the control building, and col. 1.6-D.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-139
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.30 Remote Shutdown Panel Room A. (Rm No. 341)
(1)  Fire AreaF3101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. The normally closed siding door would be open during operation from the remote shutdown panel.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
9A.4-140                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station outside the room in the corridor (R/B clean area) leading to control building, and col. 1.6-D.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Outside the room in the corridor electrically safe nozzle.              (R/B clean area) leading to the control building, col. 1.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Outside the room in the corridor (R/B clean area) leading to the control building, col. 1.6-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-141
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.31 Corridor A Extension (Rm No. 342)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-B.2 and 1.8-B.5.
9A.4-142                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Col. 5.5-B.2 & 1.8-B.5/Manual electrically safe nozzle ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.5-B.2 & 1.8-B.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision for drainage of water into the sumps (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-143
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.32 Pipe Space (Rm No. 318)
(1) Fire AreaF1100 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2                            Yes, D1, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.5-B.2.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8 at El 4800 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.5-B.2 & 6.2-C.8 at El 4800 mm/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-144                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAO valves T31-F003, E31-F004 (Div. 2) of the Atmospheric Control System, and Leak Detection System respectively are mounted in this room (Div. 1).
Section 9A.5, Special Cases provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions in this room.
9A.4.1.3.33 Pipe Space Room (Rm No. 330)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-145
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.4-E.9 at El 4800 mm.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.4.-E.9 at EL 4800 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.4.-E.9 at EL 4800 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-146                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.34 Penetration Room (Rm No. 325)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.4-F.1 at El 4800 mm.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-147
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.4-F.1 at EL 4800 mm/
Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.4-F.1 at EL 4800 mm/
Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-148                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.35 Valve Room B, and Pipe Space B (Rm No. 327)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.5-F.0 at El 4800 mm, and Col. 5.5-B.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-B.2, and Col. 2.5-F.0 at El 4800 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.5-B.2, and Col. 2.5-F.0 at El 4800 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-149
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Alternate functions are provided in other fire areas.
Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System, if it is not isolated. If the normal HVAC System is isolated, smoke removal is by the SGTS system.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the corridor, external to the rooms containing the majority of the safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.36 Reactor Water Sampling Rack Room (Rm No. 349)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-150                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.5 at El. 4800 mm.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.5 at El 4800 mm/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.8-B.5 at El 4800 mm/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate concrete enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-151
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.3.37 Filter Demineralizer Area (Rm No. 347)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4.1.3.38 Division 4 Remote Multiplexing Room (Rm No. 381)
(1)  Fire AreaF3401 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-152                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station outside the room in the R/B clean area leading to the control building corridor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel with an        Outside the room in the R/B clean electrically safe nozzle.              area leading to the control building corridor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Outside the room in the R/B clean area leading to the control building corridor/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-153
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.3.39 Reactor Water Sampling Rack Room (Rm 380)
(1)  Fire AreaF3400 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                                Yes, D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.5 at EL. 4800.
9A.4-154                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.5 at El.4800 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.8-B.5 at El.4800 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-155
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.3.40 FPC FD Rack Room (Rm No. 346)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-3. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Tray                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.5 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.8-B.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate concrete enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-156                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of function, which is not safety-related, is acceptable.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4 BuildingReactor Bldg El 12300 mm 9A.4.1.4.1 Upper Drywell (Rm No. 491)
(1)  Fire AreaF1900 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 for this elevation. Devices within the upper drywell are also listed at floor elevation 18100.
Safety-Related                              Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2, D3,& D4                                  Yes (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNormally, none that can be released as a result of fire.
Depending on operating history, low levels of contamination could be present and is contained within containment.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-157
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Divisional cable trays containing 14 727 MJ/m2, NCLL (727 MJ/m2 kg/m of XLPE-FR cable insulation maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection Provided: None - Primary Containment is inerted during the normal plant operation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Inerted during plant operation.          General/Manual Drywell spray is ultimate line of defense during plant outage.
Standpipe and hose reel.                Personnel lock entrance/Manual ABC hand extinguishers during            Temporary as conditions warrant/
significant outage work.                Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Credit is taken for the fact that the drywell is inerted during plant operation.
(b)  Quantities of combustibles are minimized.
(c)  The spacing between redundant equipment and cabling is kept to a maximum.
(d)  Smoke removal is provided by the drywell purge and exhaust system.
(9)  Consequences of FireA fire during plant operation is not possible due to the drywell being inerted. A fire in the upper drywell would not prevent the continuation of core cooling.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-158                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the drywell (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe, external to the drywell (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  Inerted atmosphere.
(b)  Quantities of combustibles minimized.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  There are containment electrical penetrations in the upper drywell.
(b)  The valve and HVAC motors will have small quantities of lubricating grease for their bearings. These minor amounts of grease do not present a fire hazard.
9A.4.1.4.2 North Controlled Entry and Corridor A (Rm No. 410)
(1)  Fire AreaF4101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-159
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 5.4-B.1 and 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.4-B.1& 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.4-B.1& 5.9-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Alternate access is provided by South Controlled Access Entry (Rm No. 193) Access is provided to the corridor from either end.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-160                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAlthough the areas surrounding the diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
9A.4.1.4.3 E and I Penetration Room (Div 1)(Rm No. 411)
(1)  Fire AreaF4101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.4-B.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.4-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.4-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-161
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.4 Diesel Generator A Room (Rm No. 412)
(1)  Fire AreaF4100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-162                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            Could be variable due to possible oil Lubricating Oil                        leaks. Foam sprinkler system Fuel Oil                              provided.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one of each in each zone. Each detector initiates a local alarm upon sensing fire. The second detector alarm provides fire confirmation, which opens the preaction valve and initiates the system alarm in the control room. There are manual pull stations at Col. 6.5-C.9.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Preaction foam-water sprinkler        Initiates by individual discharge system. Audible alarms are            head opening (when fusible link provided.                            melts) and simultaneous receipt of any one of the following signals:
(a) Both detector alarm signals (one of each in each zone) or, (b) Either detector alarm signal in combination with loss of pressure in the dry pipe/Automatic Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 6.5-C.9/Manual Foam hose real                        Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.5-C.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-163
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (A) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)    Provision of cross zone detector alarms (e)    Provision of low pressure alarm in dry pipe (f)    Provision of preaction valve (g)    Provision of close head sprinkler system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAlthough the areas surrounding the adjacent diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
9A.4.1.4.5 Clean Area Access A/C (Rm No. 413)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 9A.4-164                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. There is a floor hatch for removal of equipment from the floor below. A removable panel is provided in the exterior wall for moving equipment in and out of the reactor building.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at Col. 6.5-C.9.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              6.5-C.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers              6.5-C.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room and, consequently, temporary loss of access to the A and C diesel generator rooms.
Continuous access to the diesel generator rooms is not required. Access to diesel generator room B is unaffected.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-165
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to this non-safety-related room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access routes to other areas of the reactor building are provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.4.6 ECCS Valve A Room (Rm No. 414)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-166                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.4-B.1 and 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 5.4-B.1 & 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.4-B.1 & 5.9-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-167
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.4.7 ECCS Valve C Room (Rm No. 431)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.4-B.1 and 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 5.4-B.1 & 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.4-B.1 & 5.9-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
9A.4-168                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.4.8 Corridor C (Equipment Entry) (Rm No. 430, 434, and 437)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301, F4303, F4304 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Room 434 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-169
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Qualification of Room 430 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Qualification of Room 437 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Lubricant Fuel Oil                    Could be a variable due to possible lubricant, and fuel oil leaks in transient. Deluge sprinkler system provided.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 5.9-F.2 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                          Location/Actuation Ordinary hazard deluge sprinkler having a Hatch Area/Manual water density of 6.1 L/min/m2 and a coverage of 9.3 m2 per head Standpipe and hose                            Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual reel ABC hand extinguishers                        Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-170                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(d)  Sprinkler system provided as extra protection for the temporary higher fire loadings due to bringing trucks and equipment into the area and to compensate for the large open hatch.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. Access is provided to the corridor from either end.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  Although the areas surrounding the diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
(b)  The common wall between the corridor and valve room (C) was specified to have a 3 h fire rating to protect the ESF equipment in the valve room during periods of increased fire loading in the corridor during maintenance periods.
9A.4.1.4.9 E and I Penetration Room (Div 3)(Rm No. 433)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-171
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.9-F.2 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers              Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-172                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.10 Diesel Generator C Room (Rm No. 432)
(1)  Fire AreaF4300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                  Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Lubricant Fuel Oil            Could be variable due to possible oil Fuel Oil                      leaks. Foam sprinkler system provided.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-173
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one of each in each zone. Each detector initiates a local alarm upon sensing fire. The second detector alarm provides fire confirmation, which opens the preaction valve and initiates the system alarm in the control room. There are manual pull stations at Col. 6.5-C.9.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Preaction foam-water sprinkler          Initiates by individual discharge head system. Audible alarms are            opening (when fusible link melts) and provided.                              simultaneous receipt of any one of the following signals:
(a) both detector alarm signals (one of each in each zone) or, (b) either detector alarm signal in combination with loss of pressure in the dry pipe./Automatic Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.5-C.9/Manual Foam hose reel                        Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.5-C.9/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (C) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
9A.4-174                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Provision of cross zone detector alarms (e)  Provision of low pressure alarm in dry pipe (f)  Provision of preaction valve (g)  Provision of close head sprinkler system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAlthough the areas surrounding the adjacent diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
9A.4.1.4.11 Flammability Control System Room (Div. 3) (Rm No. 436)
(1)  Fire AreaF4320 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, and D2                        No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-175
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.9-F.2 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-176                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.12 Corridor B (Rm No. 420)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 5.9-F.2 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-177
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. Access is provided to the corridor from either end.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAlthough the areas surrounding the diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
9A.4.1.4.13 E and I Penetration Room (Rm No. 424)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-178                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.9-F.2 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 2.1-F.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of the non-safety-related function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-179
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.14 Not Used 9A.4.1.4.15 Diesel Generator B Room (Rm No. 423)
(1)  Fire AreaF4200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                        Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                          Could be variable due to possible oil Lubricating Oil                    leaks. Foam sprinkler system Fuel Oil                            provided.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one of each in each zone. Each detector initiates a local alarm upon sensing fire. The second detector alarm provides fire confirmation, which opens the preaction valve and initiates the system alarm in the control room. There is a manual pull stations at Col. 1.4-C.8.
9A.4-180                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Preaction foam-water sprinkler system. Initiates by individual discharge head Audible alarms are provided.                opening (when fusible link melts) and simultaneous receipt of any one of the following signals:
(a) both detector alarm signals (one of each in each zone) or, (b) either detector alarm signal in combination with loss of pressure in the dry pipe./Automatic Standpipe and hose reel                      Col. 1.4-C.8/Manual Foam hose real                              Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      Col. 1.4-C.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provide alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (B) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-181
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Provision of cross zone detector alarms (e)  Provision of low pressure alarm in dry pipe (f)  Provision of preaction valve (g)  Provision of close head sprinkler system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksAlthough the areas surrounding the adjacent diesel generator room are of the same safety division, the diesel generator room is designated as a separate fire area due to the relatively large amounts of lubricating and fuel oil present.
9A.4.1.4.16 ECCS Valve B Room (Rm No. 421)
(1)  Fire AreaF1200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                      Total Heat Combustion (MJ)
None                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies 9A.4-182                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-B.5 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.5 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.6-B.5 & 2.1-F.1 /Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-183
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.4.17 Clean Area Access B/D (Rm No. 426)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull station in Col. 1.5-C.7 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                      Col. 1.5-C.7/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      Col. 1.5-C.7/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room and, consequently, temporary loss of access to the B diesel generator room. Continuous access to the diesel generator room is not required. Access to diesel generator room A and C is unaffected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-184                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to this non-safety-related room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access routes to other areas of the reactor building are provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.4.18 E and I Penetration Room (Div 4)(Rm 444)
(1)  Fire AreaF3400 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                              Yes, D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-185
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-B.8 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-186                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksCabling to the room is routed in embedded conduit to give an equivalent of a 3 h fire-rating for the separation between the Division 4 cables and other plant cabling.
9A.4.1.4.19 South Controlled Entry and Corridor (Rm No. 445)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-B.8 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-187
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Alternate entry is provided by Controlled Entry and Corridor A (Rm 410) Access to the corridor is from either end.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in this non-safety-related room, external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.20 CUW valve room (Rm No. 443)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-188                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-B.8 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.6-B.8 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Inboard isolation valves provide alternate means of isolation.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-189
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.21 Not Used 9A.4.1.4.22 PASS Rack Room (Rm No. 441)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.9-A.0.
9A.4-190                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Control building 4.0-K.9/
El. 12300/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Control building 4.0-K.9/
El. 12300/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system is in the control building on the 12300 elevation in a passageway (Rm 506) near the PASS room (Rm 441)
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-191
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.4.23 Filter/Demineralizer Access Room (Rm No. 447)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.6-B.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-B.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-192                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.24 Filter/Demineralizer Pre Coat Room (Rm No. 446)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-193
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.5-B.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-B.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-B.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function, which is not safety-related. Loss of this non-safety-related function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in rooms external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely) 9A.4-194                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.4.25 Not Used 9A.4.1.4.26 Steam Tunnel (Rm No. 440)
(1)  Fire AreaF4900 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D2                            Yes, D1, D2, D33 & ND (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                  Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the tunnel and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.3-B.0, floor elevation 18100 mm.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-195
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Control building 5.3-B.0/
El. 18100 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Control building 5.3-B.0/
El. 18100 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The valves are spatially separated and are designed to fail closed on loss of actuation power. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are discussed in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in rooms external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-196                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.4.27 Flammability Control System Room (Rm No 425)
(1)  Fire AreaF4230 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                  Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-197
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.4.28 E and I Electrical Penetration Room (Rm No. 435)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-4. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-198                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            Col. 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers              Col. 5.9-F.2/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system for this safety-related room is external (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-199
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5 BuildingReactor Bldg El 18100 mm 9A.4.1.5.1 Corridor A (Rm No. 510)
(1)  Fire AreaF4101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                        Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                          727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 5.5-A.9 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                      Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 5.5-A.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                    Col. 5.3-A.9/ Manual 9A.4-200                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(d)  All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.2 D/G Fan and HVAC Room (Rm No. 514)
(1)  Fire AreaF4100 Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-201
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                      Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                    Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                      727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Fuel Oil                        Could be variable due to possible fuel oil leaks in lines passing through this room.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-C.2.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.3-C.1 & 6.3-D.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.3-C.1 & 6.3-D.2/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-202                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (A) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.5.3 Exhaust Duct A (Room 515)
(1)  Fire Area F4100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                  Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-203
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Providedmanual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-C.2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.3-C.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.3-C.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
The emergency supply fan (A) will remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually. The room is also vented directly outside of the building by the large ventilation opening in the wall.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-204                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below. There is a damper for confining the carbon dioxide to the diesel generator room during fire suppression activities.
9A.4.1.5.4 DG Control Panel A (Room 516)
(1)  Fire AreaF4102 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull station at 6.3-C.2 and 6.3-D.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              6.3-C.2, 6.3-D.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                6.3-C.2, 6.3-D.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-205
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room and, consequently, temporary loss of access to the A diesel generator HVAC room.
Continuous access to the diesel generator HVAC room is not required. Functional backup is provided by diesel generators B and C.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to this non-safety-related room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access routes to other areas of the reactor building are provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.5 Steam Tunnel Entry Room (Rm No. 512)
(1)  Fire AreaF4101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No 9A.4-206                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 5.5-A.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                          Col. 5.5-A.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                          Col. 5.5-A.9/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(d)    All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the temporary loss of the function. Temporary loss of access to the steam tunnel is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-207
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.6 Corridor C (Rm No. 530, 535, 537)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301, F4303, and F4305 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Room 537 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Qualification of Room 530 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Qualification of Room 535 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-208                                                                                              Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)    Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                        Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Lubricating Oil and Fuel Oil        Could be variable due to possible lubricant, and fuel oil leaks in transient. Deluge sprinkler system provided.
(6)    Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9 and 5.9-F.2.
(7)    Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                      Col. 5.5-A.9 & 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      Col. 5.5-A.9 & 5.9-F.2/ Manual (8)    Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)    Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-209
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksSprinklers have been provided on the basis that the fire loading in this area could be highly variable as equipment and material are moved in and out of the upper drywell during maintenance.
9A.4.1.5.7 U/D Equipment Hatch (Rm No. 531)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. A nonrated sliding shielding door is provided for the transfer of large equipment through the room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.9-F.2 and 5.5-A.9.
9A.4-210                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 5.9-F.2 & 5.5-A.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.9-F.2 & 5.5-A.9/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-211
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.5.8 DG Control Panel C Room (Rm No. 536)
(1) Fire AreaF4302 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull stations at 6.3-D.2 and 6.3-C.2.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  6.3-D.2 6.3-C.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  6.3-D.2 6.3-C.2/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room and, consequently, temporary loss of access to the C diesel generator HVAC room.
Continuous access to the diesel generator HVAC room is not required. Functional backup is provided by diesel generators A and B.
9A.4-212                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.9 D/G Fan and HVAC Room (Rm No. 533)
(1)  Fire AreaF4300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-213
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Fuel Oil                                Could be variable due to possible fuel oil leaks in lines passing through this room.
(6)  Detection Provided-Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-C.2 and 6.3-D.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                        Col. 6.3-C.2 6.3-D.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                          6.4-C.2 6.4-D.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (C) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-214                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.5.10 Exhaust Duct C Room (Rm No. 534)
(1)  Fire AreaF4300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection Providedmanual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-D.2 and 6.3-C.2.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-215
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                6.3-D.2, 6.3-C.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                6.4-D.2, 6.4-C.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
The emergency supply fan (C) will remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4-216                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.5.11 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.12 Corridor B (Rm No. 520)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.1-F.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-217
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing main safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.13 U/D Personnel Hatch (Rm No. 521)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-218                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-219
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.5.14 D/G Fan and HVAC Room B (Rm No. 522)
(1)  Fire AreaF4200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Fuel Oil                              Could be variable due to possible fuel oil leaks in lines passing through this room.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-D.5.
9A.4-220                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                  Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-D.5/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode. The emergency supply fan (B) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-221
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.5.15 Exhaust Duct B Room (Rm No. 523)
(1)  Fire AreaF4200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection Providedmanual alarm pull station at Col. 1.6-D.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.6-D.5/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-222                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
The emergency supply fan (B) will also remove smoke from the room if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-223
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.5.16 DG Control Panel B (Rm No. 524)
(1) Fire AreaF4202 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull station in the room.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                1.6-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  1.6-D.5/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room and, consequently, temporary loss of access to the B diesel generator HVAC room.
Continuous access to the diesel generator HVAC room is not required. Functional backup is provided by diesel generators A and C.
9A.4-224                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to this non-safety-related room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Alternate access routes to other areas of the reactor building are provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.5.17 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.18 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.19 Electrical Penetration Room (Rm 543)
(1)  Fire AreaF3400 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D                                Yes, D (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-225
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.1 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.8-B.1 & 2.1-F.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-226                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksCabling to the room is routed in embedded conduit to give an equivalent of a 3 h fire-rating for the separation between the Division 4 cables and other plant cabling.
9A.4.1.5.20 FPC Valve Room (Rm No. 542)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-227
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Inboard isolation valves provide alternate means of isolation.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.21 FPC Pump Room (Rm No. 546)
(1)  Fire Area F4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, and 2                        No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-228                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.1-F.1& 1.8-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. A redundant means of providing cooling to the spent fuel pool is through the RHR system.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-229
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.22 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.23 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.24 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.25 Not Used 9A.4.1.5.26 FPC Heat Exchanger Room (Rm No. 544)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1 & D2                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1.
9A.4-230                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.8-B.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function, which is not safety-related.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-231
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.5.27 Instrument Piping Penetration Room (Rm No. 511)
(1)  Fire AreaF4101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading Total                      Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.5-A.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-A.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.5-A.9/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(d)    All penetrations are within a single fire area.
9A.4-232                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function. Three divisions of redundant penetrations are provided in other fire areas.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.28 Clean Area Access Room (Rm No. 517)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-233
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-C.2 and 6.3-D.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.3-C.2 & 6.3-D.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.3-C.2 & 6.3-D.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-234                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.29 Division 1 Electrical Penetration Room (Rm No. 518)
(1)  Fire AreaF1100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.5-A.9 and 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.5-A.9 & 5.9-F.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.5-A.9 & 5.9-F.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-235
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. A redundant means of providing cooling to the spent fuel pool is through the RHR System.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.30 Service Corridor B (Rm No. 527)
(1)  Fire AreaF3200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-236                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 1.6-D.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function. Temporary loss of access to the adjacent rooms is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor with a backup from the floor below (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-237
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.31 Division 2 Electrical Penetration Room (Rm No. 528)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col.2.1-F.1 and 1.8-B.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.9-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.1-G.1 & 1.8-B.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-238                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  All penetrations are within a single fire area.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe room contains cable in conduit only.
9A.4.1.5.32 Division 3 Electrical Penetration Room (Rm No. 532)
(1)  Fire AreaF1300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-239
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.9-F.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Ordinary hazard wet pipe sprinklers, Hatch Area/Manual having a water density of 6.1 L/min/m2 and a coverage of 9 m2 per head Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.9-F.2 & 5.5-A.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.9-F.2 & 5.5-A.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-240                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.33 Pits and Pools (Rm No. 538, 539)
Rooms 538 and 539 are extensions of the pits and pools described for floor six. They are not open to this floor. See the floor six section on pits and pools for a discussion of these rooms.
9A.4.1.5.34 RIP Transformer Room (Rm No. 541)
(1)    Fire AreaF3200 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)    Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                              9A.4-241
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.6-D.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.6-D.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function. There are 8 other RIP transformers located elsewhere.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor with a backup from the floor below (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely) 9A.4-242                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.35 FPC Heat Exchanger Room (Rm No. 545)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.1-F.1 & 1.8-B.1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-243
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.36 Corridor D (Rm No. 547)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-244                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-5. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-B.1 and 2.1-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-B.1 & 2.1-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.8-B.1 & 2.1-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Access to the corridor is from one end only. The corridor does not provide access to any area containing equipment required for save shutdown of the plant.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-245
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.5.37 Upper Drywell (Rm No.591)
(1)  Fire AreaF4901 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 for this elevation. Devices within the upper drywell are also listed at floor elevation 12300 mm.
Note: Section 9A.4.1.4.1 applies for the remainder of the information for the upper drywell. See that section for additional information.
9A.4.1.6 BuildingReactor Bldg El 23500 mm and 27200 mm 9A.4.1.6.1 Cross Corridor A (Rm No. 614, 644)
(1)  Fire AreaF4100, F6102 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Room 614 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Qualifications of Room 644 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour 9A.4-246                                                                                                Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.0-B.2 and 6.2-B.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.0-B.2 & 6.2-B.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.0-B.2 & 6.2-B.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireAlternate routes to the areas interconnected by the corridor are provided.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in rooms adjacent to the corridor (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-247
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.2 D/G Fuel Day Tank A Room (Rm No. 610)
(1)  Fire AreaF6101 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 12,113 liters of Diesel fuel          5.28E+04 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the deluge foam-water sprinkler system. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. Manual alarm pull stations are provided at Col. 6.2-B.0 and 6.6-D.0.
9A.4-248                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Deluge from water sprinkler system. Initiated by Class A cross zone Audible alarms are provided.          (thermal infrared) detectors/Automatic Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators B and C would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the D/G (A) fuel day tank room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  Cross-zone detectors to initiate deluge foam-water sprinkler system (f)  Provision of rate-compensated thermal detectors (less susceptible to dust and combustion products which may be in the D/G room), and infrared detectors initiating system alarm Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-249
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe sunken volume of the room is adequate to hold the entire contents of the day tank if an uncontrolled leak should occur.
9A.4.1.6.3 AC Filter/Fan Area (Rm No. 615)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 5.2-B.6 and 5.2-D.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 5.2-B.6 & 5.2-D.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.2-B.2 & 5.2-D.8/Manual 9A.4-250                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. There are no emergency core cooling or safe shutdown system components in the area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to this non safety-related room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.4 D/G (A) Equipment Room (Rm No. 613)
(1)  Fire AreaF4102 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-251
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.2-B.0 and 6.6-D.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators B and C would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-252                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.5 D/G (A)/Z HVAC Room (Rm No. 612)
(1)  Fire AreaF4100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-253
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Bag Filters                            Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.2-B.0 and 6.6-D.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.2-B.0 & 6.6-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the Emergency supply fan (A) if the diesel is running or if manually initiated.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room 9A.4-254                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.6.6 SRV/MSIV Maintenance Room (Rm No. 616)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone, normally. Low level contamination may be present during maintenance operations on safety relief valves, any radiation release is contained within containment.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None, normally small amounts          727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 of cleaning fluid during SRV          maximum average) applies.
maintenance periods (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col.5.2-B.6 and 5.2-D.8.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-255
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.2-B.6 & 5.2-D.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The function is not safety-related.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.7 ISI Test Room (Rm No. 617)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 9A.4-256                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant amount of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at Col. 5.2-B.6 and 5.2-D.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.2-B.6 & 5.2-D.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 5.2-B.6 & 5.2-D.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related systems.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. There are no emergency core cooling or safe shutdown system components in the area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-257
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe rupture unlikely (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.8 D/G (C) Equipment Room (Rm 633)
(1)  Fire AreaF4302 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Small amounts of lubricants.
9A.4-258                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 6.6-D.0. and 6.5-E.8.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.6-D.0& 6.5-E.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col.6.6-D.0 & 6.5-E.8/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and B would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of manual suppression system external to the room containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-259
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.9 D/G (C)/Z HVAC Room (Rm No. 632)
(1)  Fire AreaF4300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Bag Filters                            Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.5-E.8 and 6.6-D.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.5-E.8 & 6.6-D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.5-E.8 & 6.6-D.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and B would not be affected.
9A.4-260                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The Provisions for core cooling systems backup. are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the emergency supply fan (C) if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.6.10 D/G Fuel Day Tank C Room (Rm No. 630)
(1)  Fire AreaF6301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-261
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 12,113 liters of Diesel fuel            5.28E+04 (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the deluge foam-water sprinkler system. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. Manual alarm pull stations are provided at Col. 6.5-E.8 and 6.6-D.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Deluge foam-water sprinkler            Initiated by Class A cross zone system. Audible alarms are              (thermal and infrared) provided.                              detectors/Automatic Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.5-E.8 & 6.6-D.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers during          Col. 6.5-E.8 & 6.6-D.8/Manual significant outage work.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and B would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-262                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room containing the D/G (C) fuel day tank (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)    Cross-zone detectors to initiate deluge foam-water sprinkler system (f)    Provision of rate-compensated thermal detectors (less susceptible to dust and combustion products which may be in the D/G room), and infrared detectors initiating system alarms (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe sunken volume of the room is adequate to hold the entire contents of the day tank if an uncontrolled leak should occur.
9A.4.1.6.11 Hatch and Corridor B/C Room (Room 634, 631)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301, F4305 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Room 634 Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-263
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Qualifications of Room 631 Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.2-D.8 and 2.8-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.2-D.8 & 2.8-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.2-D.8 & 2.8-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireAlternate routes to the areas interconnected by the corridor are provided.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in rooms adjacent to the corridor 9A.4-264                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.12 Corridor B SLC Area (Rm No. 622)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, and D2                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col.2.8-F.1 and 2.7-C.0.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-265
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and                          Col. 2.7-C.0& 2.8-F.1/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F 1/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function of equipment in the room. The systems in the room are not required to be single failure proof against fire.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe SLC injection pumps and tanks are located in a curbed pit in the corridor and are vulnerable to loss by a single fire.
9A.4-266                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.6.13 D/G Fuel Day Tank Room B (Rm No. 620)
(1)  Fire AreaF6201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 12,113 liters of Diesel fuel          5.28E+04 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the deluge foam-water sprinkler system. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. Manual alarm pull stations are provided at Col.1.4-D.7.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Deluge foam-water sprinkler          Initiated by Class A cross zone system. Audible alarms are            (thermal and infrared provided.                            detectors/Automatic Standpipe and hose reel.              Col. 1.4-D.7/Manual ABC hand extinguishers.              Col. 1.4-D.6/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-267
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and C would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC (B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the main safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(e)  Cross-zone detectors to initiate deluge foam-water sprinkler system (f)  Provision of rate-compensated thermal detectors (less susceptible to dust and combustion products which may be in the D/G room), and infrared detectors initiating system alarms (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe sunken volume of the room is adequate to hold the entire contents of the day tank if an uncontrolled leak should occur.
9A.4.1.6.14 D/G (B) Equipment Room (Rm No. 625)
(1)  Fire AreaF4202 9A.4-268                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 1.4 D.7, 1.0-B.2.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.4-D.7, and 1.0-B.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.4-D.7,and 1.0-B.2/ Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and C would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC (B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-269
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.15 D/G (B)/Z HVAC Room (Rm No. 624)
(1)  Fire AreaF4200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Bag Filters                          Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected.
9A.4-270                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.4-D.7 and 1.0-B.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel.                Col. 1.4-D.7 & 1.0-B.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers.                  Col. 1.4-D.6 & 1.0-B.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the emergency supply fan (B) if the diesel is running or if initiated manually.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-271
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksDue to the large ventilation openings in the floor, this room must be considered as an extension of the diesel generator room below.
9A.4.1.6.16 ISI Inspection (Rm No. 639)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant amount of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at 5.2-D.8 and 5.2-B.6.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
9A.4-272                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.17 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.18 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.19 Corridor D (Rm No. 643)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  EquipmentSee Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Room 643 Fire Barriers - The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-273
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.7-C.0,& 2.8-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.7-C.0,& 2.8-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of the SGTS by an exposure fire is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-274                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.20 SGTS B Division 2 Room (Rm No. 641)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentFilters within their housing may become contaminated with use. Releases up the stack could occur as a result of fire. However, the system is capable of being isolated in case of any fire, and burn itself out by cutting the oxygen to the fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.2/Manual Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-275
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function. The complete loss of the SGTS B as a consequence of a single fire is acceptable. Functional backup is provided by SGTS C (Div. III).
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.21 SGTS C Division 3 Room (Rm No. 642)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 9A.4-276                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                No (3) Radioactive Material PresentFilters within their housings may become contaminated with use. Releases up the stack could occur as a result of fire. However, the system is capable to be isolated in case of any fire, and burn itself out by cutting off the oxygen to the fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F1.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F2/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-277
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function. The complete loss of the SGTS C as a consequence of a single fire is acceptable. Functional backup is provided by SGTS B (Div. II).
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.22 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.23 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.24 Upper D/G A HVAC Room (Rm No. 653)
(1)  Fire AreaF4102 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-278                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. One exterior wall has ventilation openings to the outside and therefore is not fire rated. One corner of the floor has a 1.75 meter step up in it to provide more space for the day tank in the room below.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Bag Filters                            Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 6.8 C.0, 6.4-E.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.8-C.0 and 6.4-E.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.8-C.0 and 6.4-E.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators B and C would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC (A) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-279
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.25 FMCRD A/C Panel Room (Rm No. 654)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D3                            Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 6.8 C.0 and 6.4-E.5.
9A.4-280                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel 1.1-          Col. 6.8-C.0, and 6.4-E.5/ Manual D.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.8-C.0, and 6.4-E.5/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. See Section 9A.5 for explanation of consequences of fire on the FMRCD system.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-281
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.6.26 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.27 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.28 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.29 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.30 Upper D/G C HVAC Room (Rm No. 673)
(1)  Fire AreaF4302 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                              Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Bag Filters                          Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 6.8-C.0 and 6.4-E.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 6.8-C.0, 6.4-E.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.8-C.0, 6.4-E.5/Manual 9A.4-282                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Diesel generators A and B would not be affected.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of two manual suppression systems external to the room containing the main safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.31 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.32 Upper D/G B HVAC Room (Rm No. 663)
(1)  Fire AreaF4202 Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-283
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies Bag Filters                            Variable, depending on the amount of dust and debris collected.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.4-E.0 and 1.7-C.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.4-E.0 & 1.7-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.4-E.0 & 1.7-C.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-284                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The Provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operation in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.33 Upper Corridor B (Rm No. 626)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-285
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 1.4-D.7.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.4-D.7/ Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.4-D.7/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function of the corridor. Alternate access routes are available.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-286                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Provision of curbs for doorways.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.34 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.35 FMCRD D/B Panel Room (Rm No. 681)
(1)  Fire AreaF7200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2 & D3                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 1.4-E.0, 1.7-C.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.4-E.0, and 1.7-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.4-E.0, and 1.7-C.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-287
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The effects of fire on the FMCRD system are discussed in Section 9A.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.36 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.37 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.38 MS Tunnel HVH Room (Rm No. 685)
(1)  Fire AreaF4203 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
9A.4-288                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.7-C.0. (El. 23500 mm).
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col.2.7-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col.2.7-C.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function. There are no emergency core cooling or safe shutdown system components in the area.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-289
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.39 Pits and Pools (1)  Fire AreaSee individual pits and pools location.
The following pits and pools occupy space at this elevation of the building:
(a)  Deleted (b)  Cask Washdown Pit (c)  D/S Transfer Canal (d)  D/S Pit (e)  Drywell Head Annulus (f)  Upper Drywell Head (g)  Fuel Transfer Canal (h)  Fuel Handling Pool (i)  Fuel Storage Pool (j)  Cask Pit (k)  New Fuel Inspection Pit (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                  No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as the result of a fire.
9A.4-290                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4) The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-6 and 9A.4-7. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room. All of the listed pits and pools are accessed from the operating floor and are not accessible at this elevation. For this reason, there is no effect on the fire protection features at this elevation. See the discussion for the operating floor for applicable fire protection feature. No further comments will be made in the analysis for this elevation.
9A.4.1.6.40 PVC Purge Exhaust Fan (Rm No. 623)
(1) Fire AreaF4201 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as the result of a fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarrierThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles PresentNo significant amount of exposed combustibles.
(6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at Col. 2.8-F.1 and 2.7-C.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.8-F.1 & 2.7-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.8-F.1 & 2.7-C.0/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and acceptable.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-291
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.41 D/G C Corridor Room (Rm No. 635, 637)
(1)  Fire AreaF4306, F4307 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualifications of Room 635 Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-6 and 9A.4-7. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
Qualifications of Room 637 Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-6 and 9A.4-7. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-292                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.5-E.8 and 1.4-D.7.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.5-E.8 & 1.4-D.7/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.5-E.8 & 1.4-D.7/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capabilities provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through fire rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-293
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.42 RIP Power Supply Room (Rm No. 638)
(1)  Fire AreaF3300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant amount of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at 6.2-B.0, 6.6-D.0 and 6.5-E.8 El 23500.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                6.2-B.0, 6.6-D.0 & 6.5-E.8 El 23500/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                6.2-B.0, 6.6-D.0 & 6.5-E.8 El 23500/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-294                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.43 Electrical Equipment Room (Rm No. 640)
(1)  Fire AreaF6200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-295
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 1.0-B.2 and 1.4-D.7.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.0-B.2 & 1.4-D.7/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.0-B.2 & 1.4-D.7/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-296                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.44 Fission Product Monitoring (Rm No. 657)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as the result of a fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant amount of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at 5.2-D.8 and 5.2-B.6, elevation 23500 mm.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual ABC hand extinguishers                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-297
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.6.45 Room No. 658 (1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material Present: None (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-298                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at 5.2-D.8 and 5.2-B.6, El 23500.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual ABC hand extinguishers                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-299
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.46 Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS) Rack A (Rm No. 659)
(1)  Fire AreaF6100 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                No (3)  Radioactive Material Present (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull station at 5.2-D.8 and 5.2-B.6, El 23500 mm.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual ABC hand extinguishers                5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 El 23500/
Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-300                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.47 Electrical Room (Rm No. 680)
(1)  Fire AreaF6200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-301
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-7. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at 1.7-C.0 and 1.4-E.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.7-C.0 & 1.4-E.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 1.7-C.0 & 1.4-E.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a room separate from the rooms which contain safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to this non safety-related room 9A.4-302                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.6.48 Not Used 9A.4.1.6.49 Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS) Rack B (Rm No 621)
(1)  Fire AreaF4201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-6. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable in conduit                      727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
Pre-filters (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F.1.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-303
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.7-C.0 and 2.8-F.1/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function. The complete loss of the CAM Monitoring Rack B as a consequence of a single fire is acceptable.
Functional backup is provided by CAM Monitoring Rack A Div. I (Rm 659).
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms containing the main safety-related equipment (b)    provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-304                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.6.50 Not Used 9A.4.1.7 BuildingReactor Building El 31700 mm 9A.4.1.7.1 Reactor Building Operating Deck (Rm No. 716)
(Rm 716 includes rooms 721, 733, 734 and 742 on the 31700 mm level)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,D2                              D3,& D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire. Spent fuel will be stored in the spent fuel storage pool at times. Since the fuel is under water and a fire would not result in draining the pool, a fire would not cause a release of radioactive material. Also during refueling, any radiation release from the Reactor head, Drywell head, Reactor well, or Refueling pool exposed concrete surface is contained within the secondary containment.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the HVAC Systems and manual alarm pull stations at Col. 2.0-A.3, 1.8-D.2, 5.8-B.0, 6.0-E.1 and 2.0-E.9.
Analysis                                                                                              9A.4-305
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.0-A.3 & 1.8-D.2, 5.8-B.0, 6.0-E.1 & 2.0-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 2.0-A.4 & 1.8-D.2, 5.8-B.0, 6.0-E.1 & 2.0-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function in the fire affected zone. There are radiation monitors located in the area. See Subsection 9A.4.5.5.13 for further discussion of the consequences of fire to these systems.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system at the perimeter of the area (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
9A.4-306                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 The control of the permanent and transitory combustible loads introduced through normal and maintenance operations is the responsibility of the applicant.
9A.4.1.7.2 RIP (A) Supply Fan (Rm No. 715)
(1)  Fire AreaF7300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.6-C.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.6-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.6-C.0/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-307
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksFire area F3300 includes the stair and elevator towers from the 4800 mm elevation and extends to the top of the Reactor Building. In its entirety it forms a service area for personnel access and egress. The floor hatches may be opened at each floor as requires without increasing the fire hazard to the other areas of the building.
9A.4.1.7.3 RCW (C) Surge Tank (Rm No. 735)
(1)  Fire AreaF7301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
9A.4-308                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-E.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.3-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.3-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-309
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.7.4 DG (C) Exhaust Fan Room (Rm No. 730)
(1)  Fire AreaF4302 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                                Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 6.3-E.9 and 6.6-C.0.
9A.4-310                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.3-E.9& 6.6-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 6.3-E.9& 6.6-C.0/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThere is a large ventilation opening in the floor. The floor below is in the same fire area.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-311
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.7.5 Not Used 9A.4.1.7.6 RIP (B) Supply Fan and RCW (B) Surge Tank (Room No. 740)
(1)  Fire AreaF7201 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                                Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.8-A.3 and 1.4-D.6.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.8-A.3 & 1.4-D.6/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.8-A.3 & 1.4-D.6/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provided alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-312                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(B) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.7.7 Access Service Area (Rm No. 764)
(1)  Fire AreaF7200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-313
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull station at Col. 1.3-E.0.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.3-E.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.3-E.0/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the room. The room does not contain equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant and the loss of function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the EHVAC(C) system operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-314                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.7.8 Refueling Machine Control Room (Rm No. 760)
(1)    Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.2-E.1.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.2-E.1/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.3-E.1 & 1.9-F.7/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure. The equipment is not safety-related.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and loss of the function is acceptable.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-315
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.7.9 Viewing Gallery (Rm No. 763)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies 9A.4-316                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.3-E.0 and 2.0-F.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.3-E.0 & 2.0-F.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.3-E.0 & 2.0-F.5/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    The equipment is not safety-related.
(c)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-317
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.7.10 Not Used 9A.4.1.7.11 Roof A/C Area (Rm No. 810 and 830)
(1)  Fire AreaF9300 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1, D3                            No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedAlarm pull station on the stair tower at Col. 6.8-C.5.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                6.8-C.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                None (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in on the roof, away from any safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of function of the diesel generator division 1 and 3 silencers. Loss of diesel generator division 1 and 3 silencers is acceptable, because the function can be replaced by the redundant portion of the system which is located in the different portion of the building.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-318                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the stair tower (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate isolated area.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Provision of doorway curbs.
(13) RemarksThe hose reel is located inside of the stair tower to protect the hose reel from extremes in weather.
9A.4.1.7.12 Roof B/D Area (Rm No. 820 and 840)
(1)  Fire AreaF9200 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                              No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedAlarm pull station on the stair tower at Col. 1.3-D.5.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-319
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                1.3-D.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                None (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The non-safety-related function is located in on the roof, away from any safety-related equipment.
(b)    Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of function of the stack radiation monitors at the base of the stack, and the diesel generator division 2 silencer. Loss of the stack radiation monitors is acceptable. Loss of diesel generator division 2 silencer is acceptable, because the function can be replaced by the redundant divisions of the system which are located in different locations of the building.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system internal to the stair tower (b)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate isolated area.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe hose reel is located inside the stair tower to protect it from extremes in weather.
9A.4.1.7.13 RCW (A) Surge Tank (Rm No. 710)
(1)  Fire AreaF7100 9A.4-320                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                                Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles. 727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system and alarm pull stations room at 6.6-C.0 and 6.3-E.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 6.6-C.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 6.3-E.9 /Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from the fire areas containing equipment which provides alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-321
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.7.14 Periodic Inspection Room (Rm No. 720)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable Tray                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.0-E.9.
9A.4-322                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The equipment is not safety-related.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of the function which is not safety-related is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.1.7.15 RIP Repair Room (Rm No. 723)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-323
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone (4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.0-E.9.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of the function which is not safety-related is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-324                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed (a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(b)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.1.7.16 Refuel Machine Control Room HVH (Rm No. 722)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.0-E.9.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-325
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 2.0-E.9/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate enclosure. The equipment is not safety-related.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and loss of the function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(b)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.1.7.17 Standby Gas Treatment System Pipe Space Room (Rm No. 741)
(1)  Fire AreaF4301 9A.4-326                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, N/A                              No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 1.7-D.2.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 1.7-D.2/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                Col. 1.7-D.2/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-327
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of manual hose suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports of the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(b)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(13) RemarksThere are no divisional safety-related electrical equipment mounted in this room.
9A.4.1.7.18 Not Used 9A.4.1.7.19 Elevator Equipment Room (Rm No. 811)
(1)  Fire AreaF1520 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None 9A.4-328                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700 mm/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700 mm/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and the loss of function is acceptable.
Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(c)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks: None Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-329
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.1.7.20 Elevator Equipment Room (Rm No. 821)
(1)  Fire AreaF1540 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.2-6 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-8. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
None                                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  Col. 5.8-B.0, El 31700/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a separate enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and the loss of function is acceptable.
9A.4-330                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke from a fire will be removed by the normal HVAC System operating in its smoke removal mode.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(c)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks: None 9A.4.2 Control Building 9A.4.2.1 Floor One El -8200 mm and -2150 mm 9A.4.2.1.1 RCW A (Rm No. 111)
(Consists of Rm No. 111 on both the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level and Rm Nos. 212 and 217 on the -2150 mm level). Note: The space around the RCW heat exchangers is open to both levels of the (Rm No. 111).
(1)  Fire Area FC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                              Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material Present:
None that can be released as a result of a fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-331
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-12 and 9A.4-13. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present: (NCLL applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                                  Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays, small amount of pump motor lubricants (6) Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 4.05-J.05 on the -8200 level and -2150 level in Rm Nos. 211 respectively.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                4.00-J.05 on the -8200 mm level
                                                    & -2150 mm level/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  4.05-J.05 on the -2150 mm level, 4.00-J.60 on the -8200 mm level
                                                    & 4,07-J.65 on the -150 mm level/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of Fire: The postulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW A function and the consequential loss of division 1. RCW Systems B and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
9A.4-332                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.1.2 Passageway (Rm No. 112)
(1)  Fire Area FC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material Present None.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-12. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-333
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                                  Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays (6)  Detection Provided: Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.05.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              4.05-J.05/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                4.05-J.05/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW A function and the consequential loss of division 1, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems B and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
9A.4-334                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.1.3 RCW B (Rm No. 121)
(Consists of Rm No. 121 on both the -8200 level and -2150 level and Rm Nos. 224 and 227 on the -2150 level). Note: The space around the RCW heat exchangers is open to Rm No. 121 on both levels.
(1)  Fire Area FC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                            Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material Present:
None that can be released as a result of a fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-12 and 9A.4-13. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays pump motor          727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 lubricants                        maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 1.41-J.60 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level in Rm Nos. 122 and 221 Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-335
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (also in fire area 1210) which serve as equipment access and passageways to Rm No.
121.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            1.41-J.53 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.41-J.60 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level 2.07-J.60 on the -8200 mm level.
2.12-J.65 on the -2150 mm level/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW B function and the consequential loss of division 2. RCW Systems A and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
9A.4-336                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-337
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.1.4 Passageway (Rm No. 122)
(1)  Fire Area FC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material Present: None.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-12.
This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 pump motor lubricants              maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.41-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            1.41-J.53/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.41-J.60/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
9A.4-338                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of Fire:
The postulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW B function and the consequential loss of division 2, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems A and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.1.5 RCW C, (Rm No. 131)
(Consists of Rm No 131 on both the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level, and Rm Nos. 232 and 237 on the -2150 level). Note: The space around the RCW heat exchangers is open to room 131 on both levels.
(1)  Fire Area FC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                            Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material Present:
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-339
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 None that can be released as a result of a fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire Barriers:
The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-12 and 9A.4-13. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 pump motor lubricants            maximum average) applies (6) Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 6.55-J.60 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            6.55-J.53 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.55-J.60 on the -8200 mm level and -2150 mm level 5.93-J.60 on the -8200 mm level and 5.85-J.63 on the -2150 mm level/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
9A.4-340                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the RCW C function and the consequential loss of division 3. RCW Systems A and B would not be affected and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.1.6 Passageway (Rm No. 132)
(1)  Fire Area FC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-341
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-12.
This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.55-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            6.55-J.53/
ABC hand extinguishers            6.55-J.60/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW C function and the consequential loss of division 3, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems A and B would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
9A.4-342                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.2 Floor Two El -2150 mm 9A.4.2.2.1 Passageway (Rm No. 211)
(1)  Fire Area FC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material Present: None.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-13.
This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Provided:
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-343
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.05.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-J.05/
ABC hand extinguishers            4.05-J.05/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW A function and the consequential loss of division 1, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems B and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-344                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.2.2 Passageway (Rm No. 221)
(1)  Fire Area FC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material Present: None.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-13.
This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present: (NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection Provided:
Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.41-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            1.41-J.53/
ABC hand extinguishers            1.41-J.53/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-345
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW B function and the consequential loss of division 2, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems A and C would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarks: None.
9A.4.2.2.3 Passageway (Rm No.231)
(1)  Fire Area FC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material Present: None.
(4)  Qualification of Fire Barriers:
9A.4-346                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-13.
This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.55-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            6.55-J.53/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.55-J.60/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the RCW C function and the consequential loss of division C, although that most likely would not be the case. RCW Systems A and B would not be affected, and provide an alternate means of safe shutdown.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10)  Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11)  Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-347
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3 Floor Three El 3500 mm 9A.4.2.3.1 250 VDC Battery Room (Rm No. 313)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays. HVAC will        1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maintain the hydrogen            maximum average) applies concentration below 2 vol-%.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.05, Rm No. 312.
9A.4-348                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-J.05, and 4.00-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.05-J.05 & 4.00-K.39/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the functions. Non-divisional CVCF and possibly division 1 power would be lost as the area is served by the division 1 HVAC System. Power for divisions 2, 3, and 4 would remain available.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in a room external to the room containing the batteries and cable (b)  Provision of raised supports for the batteries (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-349
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.2 Passageway (Rm No. 312)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 4.05-J.05.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-J.05/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.05-J.05/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-350                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the functions. Non-divisional CVCF and division 1 power would possibly be lost, however, power for divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain available. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(c)  Location of the manual suppression system internal to the room (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.3 Non-Divisional Electrical Equipment Room (Rm No. 311)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-351
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
The floor is common to fire area FC1110 below and is not a fire barrier.
(5) Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 Electrical Panels                maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.00-J.05 in Rm No. 312.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-J.05, Rm No. 312 4.00-K.95 Rm No. 314/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.00-K.39/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through designated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the non-divisional CVCF and DC power and possibly, the division 1 power. Power for divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain available.
Room cooling is provided by coolers which receive chilled water from the turbine building chilled water system. Room purge (supply and exhaust) is provided by the division 1 HVAC which would be switched to the smoke removal mode upon detection of smoke. The combustion products would then be exhausted directly to the 9A.4-352                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 atmosphere without being returned to the division 1 areas. Smoke detection is provided in the branch exhaust duct for the non-safety-related rooms in this fire area (Rm Nos. 311,312, 313 and 314). This is an aid to determining that a fire is in the non-safety-related rooms and not in the division 1 rooms served by the common purge system. See Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 Standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.4 Passageway (Rm No. 314)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-353
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 4.00-K.95.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.1--K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the room.
(b)  Fire suppression and detection capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the functions. Non-divisional CVCF and possibly division 1 power would be lost as the area is served by the division 1 HVAC System. Power for divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain available.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10)  Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-354                                                                                  Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.5 Battery Room Div 2 (Rm No. 322)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays. Battery cases    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 HVAC will maintain the            maximum average) applies hydrogen concentration below 2 vol-%.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.45-J.60, room 321.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-355
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.45-J.53/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.45-J.60 & 2.05-J.68/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing an alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Division 2 power may be lost. Division 4 power may also be lost due to the shared ventilation system, Division 1 and 3 power would remain available. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in a room external to the room containing the batteries and cable (b)  Provision of raised supports for the batteries (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-356                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.6 Division 2 Electrical Equipment Room (Rm No. 323)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                  Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                            Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                  1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 Electrical Panels                maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.45- J.53 in Rm No. 321.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.45-J.53/Manual ABC hand extinguishers          2.05-J.68 & 1.8-K.83/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from Fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-357
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of division 2 electrical power, and possibly division 4 power also due to the shared HVAC System. Power for divisions 1 and 3 would remain available. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(c)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.7 Division 4 Electrical Equipment Room (Rm No. 342)
(1)  Fire AreaFC3410 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                            Yes, D4 (Indirectly by Sensors)
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
9A.4-358                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 Electrical Panels                  maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.45-J.53 in Rm No. 321.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            1.45-J.53, and 4.00-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            2.52-K.10/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety and shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the division 4 electrical power and possibly division 2 power also due to the shared HVAC System. Power for divisions 1 and 3 would remain available. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-359
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.8 Battery Room Division 4 (Rm No. 341)
(1)  Fire AreaFC3410 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                          Yes, D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays. HVAC will        727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maintain the hydrogen            maximum average) applies concentration below 2 vol-%.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.45-J.60 (Rm No. 321) and 4.00-J.05 (Rm No. 312).
9A.4-360                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.45-J.53 & 4.00-J.05/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.45-J.53 and 4.00-J.05/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the division 4 electrical power and possibly division 2 power due to the shared HVAC System. Power for divisions 1 and 3 would remain available.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10)  Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in a room external to the room containing the batteries and cable (b)  Provision of raised supports for the batteries (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-361
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.9 Passageway (Rm No. 343)
(1)  Fire Area3410 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D4                          Yes, D4 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 2.72-K.95.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Hose reel                        3.30-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            2.72-K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
9A.4-362                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of the division 4 electrical power and possibly division 2 power also due to the shared HVAC System. Power for divisions 1 and 3 power would remain available. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1, Standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.10 Passageway (Rm No. 321)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                            Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-363
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 1.45-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.45-J.53/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.80-K.95 & 1.45-J60/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of division 2. Electrical divisions 1, 3 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11)  Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
9A.4-364                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1, Standpipe and hose reel (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.11 Division 2 HVAC Chase (Rm No. 324)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-365
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.0-K.95, 1.4 - J.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.0-K.95, 1.4-J.5, 1.85-K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Therefore, it is assumed that loss of the division 2 HVAC would result in the necessity of shutting down the RCW B System and consequently the loss of all of division 2. RCW divisions A and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of the sprinkler system external to the chase (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksQuantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable trays.
9A.4-366                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.3.12 Battery Room Division 1 (Rm No. 316)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays. HVAC will        1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 maintain the hydrogen            maximum average) applies concentration below 2 vol-%.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 4.05-J.05 and 6.53-J.57.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.53-J.57 & 4.00-J.05/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            5.55-J.66/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-367
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the division 1 Battery Room and Electrical Equipment Room and consequently all of division 1. Divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Provision of raised supports for the batteries (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.13 Division 1 Electrical Equipment Room (Rm No. 317)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
9A.4-368                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 Electrical Equipment Panels      maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.05 and 6.53-J.62.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-J.05, 6.53-J.57, and 4.00-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            5.55-J.66 & 5.62-K.83/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetration through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of division 1 Electrical Power. Divisions 2, 3 and 4 power would remain operational. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-369
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.14 Division 1 HVAC Chase (Rm No. 319)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room.
9A.4-370                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.0 - K.95 & 6.7 - K.85/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.0 - K.95, 6.7 - K.85 &
5.5 - K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Therefore, it is assumed that loss of the division 1 HVAC would result in the necessity of shutting down the RCW A System, however, RCW divisions B and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of the suppression system external to the chase (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-371
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksQuantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
9A.4.2.3.15 Battery Room Division 3 (Rm No. 332)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays. HVAC will        727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maintain the hydrogen            maximum average) applies concentration below 2 vol-%.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 4.05-J.05 and 6.53-J.58.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.53-J.53 & 4.00-J.05/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.02-K.14/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing safety or shutdown functions.
9A.4-372                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the division 3 Battery Room and Electrical Equipment Room. Divisions 1, 2 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in a room external to the room containing the batteries and cable (b)  Provision of raised supports for the batteries (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(d)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.16 Division 3 Elect. Equipment Room (Rm No. 331)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-373
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(ECLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Com-Type                              bustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    1454 MJ/m2 NCLL (1454 MJ/m2 Electrical panels                maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.53-J.58.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    4.05-J.05 & 6.53-K.75/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.02-K.14 & 6.10-K.83/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetration through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes the loss of division 3 Electrical Power. Divisions 1, 2 and 4 power would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
9A.4-374                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.17 Division 3 HVAC Chase (Rm No. 335)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNo (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-375
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-K.95 & 6.7 - K.85/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.0 - K.95, 6.7 - K.85 &
5.5 - K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Therefore, it is assumed that loss of the division 3 HVAC would result in the necessity of shutting down the RCW C System, however, RCW divisions A and B would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of the sprinkler suppression system external to the room (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-376                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksQuantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
9A.4.2.3.18 Passageway (Rm No. 333)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm stations at 6.53-J.58.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.53-J.53 and 6.53-K.75/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.53-J.58 & 6.53-K.70/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-377
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Electrical divisions 1, 2 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1, Standpipe and hose reel (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.19 Passageway (Rm No. 318)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
9A.4-378                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                            Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                  727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.53-J.58.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                            Location/Actuation Hose reel                        3.30-K.95 & 6.53-K.75/Manual ABC Hand Extinguisher            5.62-K.83/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Electrical divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-379
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.20 Passageway (Rm No. 315)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-14. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.05.
9A.4-380                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    4.00-J.05/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            4.00-J.05/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Electrical divisions 2, 3 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (c)  ANSI B31.1 Standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-381
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.3.21 Stairwell (Rm No. 325)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-14, 9A.4-15, 9A.4-16 and 9A.4-16a. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
None                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and pull alarm stations near the stairwell landing on each elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                      1.45-J.53El.3500, El.7900 and hose reel                          El.12300 1.37-J.67 El.17150/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.80-K.83 El.3500 1.30-K65 El.7900 1.45-J.55 El.12300 & 1.30-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-382                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stairwell located on the opposite side of the building.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of division 2, and the stairwell.
Electrical divisions 1, 3 and 4 would remain operational. Access to the other stairwell is maintained.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke removal mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1, Standpipe and hose reel (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.3.22 Stairwell (Rm No. 336)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-14, 9A.4-15, 9A.4-16 and 9A.4-16a. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-383
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
None (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection system in the room and pull alarm stations near the stairwell landing at each elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                      6.53-K.75 El.3500 & El.7900 hose reel                          660-J.75 El.12300 6.60-J.67 El.17150/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.53-K.75 El.3500 6.53-J.55 &
6.70-K.65 El.7900 660-J.75 &
6.70-K.55 El.12300 6.60-J.67 El.17150/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stairwell located on the opposite side of the building.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of division 3, and stairwell.
Electrical divisions 1, 2 and 4 would remain operational. Access to the other stairwell is maintained.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke removal mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
9A.4-384                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  ANSI B31.1, Standpipe and hose reel (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone 9A.4.2.3.23 Elevator (Rm No. 337)
(1)  Fire Area1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figures 9A.4-14, 9A.4-15, 9A.4-16 and 9A.4-16a. These fire protection figures also show personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Electrical Cables                727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Small amount of elevator          maximum average) applies motor lubricants (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC detection in the elevator shaft and pull alarm stations near the elevator door on each elevation.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-385
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.53-J.58 & 6.53-J.70El.3500 hose reel                        6.53-J.58 El.7900 6.60-J.75 El.12300 6.60-J.67 El.17150/Manual ABC hand extinguishers          6.53-J.58 & 6.53-J.70 El.3500 6.53-J.58 El.7900 6.70-K.55 El.12300 6.70-K.55 El.17150/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Electrical divisions 1, 2 and 4 would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1, Standpipe and hose reel (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-386                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.4 Floor Four El 7900 mm 9A.4.2.4.1 Control Room Complex The Control Room Complex consists of the following rooms, all of which are all located in the same fire area: 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, and 499.
Division 2 and 4 panels are located in Rm No. 495. Division 1 and 3 panels are located in Rm No. 497 and the main operator control panels are located in Rm No. 496. The remaining rooms are offices and passageways.
(1)    Fire AreaFC4910 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                  Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1,2,3,4                    Yes, D1,2,3,4 (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-15. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                            Combustion (MJ)
Cable in conduit                727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Electrical Panels                maximum average) applies Paper See item (13), Remarks.
(6)    Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and in the subfloor area and manual pull alarm stations at 1.45-J.60, 4.05-J.07 and 6.53-J.60 and 4.05-K.95.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-387
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    1.45-J.53, 4.00-J.07, 6.53-J.53 &
hose reel                        4.05-K.95/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.53-J.60, 4.05-J.07, 6.53-J.60, 2.02-J.65, 2.02-K.35 4.00-K.70, 4.00-K.28, 5.99-J.65 5.99-K.35, 4.89-J.45, 6.70-K.65 &
1.30-K.65/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the fire area which is separate from the Remote Shutdown Rooms.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Therefore it is assumed that the Control Room and Computer Room would not remain functional and habitable. Equipment (not in FC4910) on all elevations would remain functional.
Shutdown and core cooling would be accomplished from the Remote Shutdown Rooms in the Reactor Building. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 Standpipes (rupture unlikely)
(c)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in separate, but non fire-resistive enclosures.
9A.4-388                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThe Main Control Room includes a raised floor which is considered part of the room. The raised floor area will be used to route cable to and from the Safety System and Logic Control (SSLC) cabinets, the operator bench boards and displays, and the divisional electrical equipment rooms.
The control room area are raised floor are considered to be non-hazard areas per IEEE 384. Section 8.3.3.6.2.2.3 discusses at length the separation criteria applies to divisional electrical cabling in the control room. It was determined that fire suppression equipment is not needed in the raised floor area. The justification for this position is based on the following:
(a)    The amount of cabling in this area is substantially reduced over current designs.
(b)    The control room is continuously manned so that the presence of a fire will be quickly detected.
(c)    The types of cables located in the raised floor area smolder for a long time and are usually self extinguishing.
(d)    There has never been a fire in the operating plant that has required the evacuation of the control room.
(e)    In the unlikely event that the control room were to require evacuation the Remote Shutdown Panels provide the necessary controls to bring the plant to cold shutdown.
The cabling that will be located in the raised floor area will be one of three types:
(a)    Fiber Optic Cables (b)    Control and Signal Cables (c)    Low Voltage Power Cables (<480 Volts)
Divisional separation of these cables will maintained per requirements of IEEE 384, Reg Guide 1.75, and GDC 17 (SSAR 8.3.3.1). For the raised floor area this effectively means that divisional cable trays will be separated by a minimum of 0.91 m horizontal or will be enclosed with at least 3 cm clearance. Furthermore, all low voltage power cables will be contained in flexible or rigid conduit in the raised floor areas. Cable contained in conduit or enclosed trays are not considered to contribute to the combustible loading for the room.
Analysis                                                                                      9A.4-389
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 The divisional panels are physically separated as much as practical and located above the divisional electrical equipment rooms. The cabling from the divisional electrical equipment rooms will be routed to the Safety System Logic Control (SSLC) cabinets with Divisions I and III on one side of the operator area and Divisions II and IV located on the opposite side of the operator area.
There is a suspended ceiling but only cables associated with lighting and the fire alarm system are routed above the false ceiling. The cables are in conduit.
Paper within the control room complex is required to be stored in approved containers (file cabinets, cabinets, waste baskets) except when in use.
9A.4.2.5 Floor Five El 12300 mm 9A.4.2.5.1 Control Room HVAC B Exhaust Duct Chase (Rm No. 522)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4220 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.62-J.60.
9A.4-390                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-K.95 & 1.6 - J.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            4.0 - K.95 & 1.6 - J.5/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Alternate means is provided by control room HVAC "C".
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksQuantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-391
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.5.2 HVAC A Supply (Rm No. 511)
(1) Fire AreaFC1110 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 See Remarks (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies))
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Bag filters                      maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J75.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.60 - J.75 & 4.0 - J.2/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.50-J.75 and 5.45-J.50/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
9A.4-392                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the loss of HVAC Supply A would necessitate shutting down the RCW A System with the consequential loss of division 1, however, RCW divisions B and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThis equipment is required to function to support equipment required for remote shutdown and therefore must be and is in a fire area separate from the control room.
9A.4.2.5.3 HVAC C Supply (Rm No. 531)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-393
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Bag filters                      maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J.75.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.60 - J.75 & 4.0 - J.1/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.50-J.75 and 5.45-J.50/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the loss of HVAC Supply C would necessitate shutting down the RCW C System and the consequential loss of division 3, however, RCW divisions A and B would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
9A.4-394                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.5.4 Stairwell Landing (Rm No. 505)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-395
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
None                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J.75.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.60-J.75/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.70-K.55 and 6.50-J.75/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. An alternate means of access and egress is provided by an up/down stairwell which opens into Rm No. 521. The route to this stairwell is via passageway Rm No. 593.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the stairwell (c)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-396                                                                                  Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.5.5 Chiller Unit C, (Rm No. 533)
(1)    Fire AreaFC1310 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 See Remarks.
(3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Small amounts of lubricants      maximum average) applies (6)    Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J.75.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-397
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    6.60-J.75 and 4.00-J.07/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            6.50-J.75 and 5.45-J.50/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety and shutdown functions.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the loss of Chiller Unit C would necessitate shutting down the RCW C System and control room (CR) HVAC C system with the consequential loss of division 3. RCW divisions A and B and the CR HVAC B would remain operational. Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-398                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksChiller Unit C provides cooling for the control room HVAC C System which serves the safety-related multi-divisional equipment in the control room and RCW C.
9A.4.2.5.6 Control Panels (Rm No. 501)
(1)  Fire AreaFC5010 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Electrical Panels                maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.62-J.60.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    1.62-J.53/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            1.62-J.60, 2.02-J.65 and 2.02-K.35/Manual Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-399
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in the fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Room purge (supply and exhaust) is provided by the division 2 HVAC which would be switched to the smoke removal mode upon detection of smoke. The combustion products would then be exhausted directly to the atmosphere without being returned to the division 2 areas. Smoke detection is provided in the branch exhaust duct for the non-safety-related rooms in this fire area (Rm Nos. 501, 502, 503, and 504). This is an aid to determining that a fire is in the non-safety-related rooms and not in the division 2 rooms served by the common purge system. Refer to Subsection 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksRoom exhaust and makeup air capability is provided by the division 2 control building HVAC System.
9A.4.2.5.7 Computer Room (Rm No. 591)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4910 9A.4-400                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Paper (See paragraph              maximum average) applies 13 remarks)
Electrical panels (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.07.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    4.00-J.07/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            4.05-J.07, 3.92-J.65 and 3.92-K.35/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations through designated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-401
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Therefore, it is assumed that the computer room and control room would not remain habitable and/or functional (both are in FC4910). Equipment, not in fire area FC4910, on all elevations, would remain operational. Shutdown and core cooling would be accomplished from the remote shutdown rooms in the reactor building.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksA computer floor is provided for routing of the power cables, a few hard wired cables and fiber optic cables from the cable chases. Conduit, flexible and rigid is used.
Paper in the computer room is required to be stored in approved containers (file cabinets, cabinets, waste baskets) except when in use.
9A.4.2.5.8 Passageway (Rm No. 505)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No 9A.4-402                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.62-J.60.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and                      1.62-J.53/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers            1.62-J.53/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in the fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the RCW B function and the consequential loss of division 2. RCW Systems A and C would remain operational. Alternate means of access and egress from Rm No. 521 is provided by the stairwell defined as Rm No. 336 which is accessible from Rm No. 521 via passageway Rm Nos. 592 and 593.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-403
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.5.9 Not Used 9A.4.2.5.10 Passageway (Rm No. 592)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4910 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, D2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies 9A.4-404                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 4.05-J.07.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and                    4.00-J.07/Manual hose reel ABC hand extinguishers          4.05-J.07/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the computer room and control rooms (also in FC4910) would not remain habitable and/or functional. Equipment (not in FC4910) on all elevations would remain operational. Shutdown and core cooling would be accomplished from the Remote Shutdown Rooms in the Reactor Building (See para. 13 remarks).
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-405
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksAlthough it is assumed that the control room would become uninhabitable, it would most likely remain habitable if the HVAC System is placed in the smoke removal mode.
9A.4.2.5.11 Passageways (Rm No. 593)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                            Yes, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J.75.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            6.60-J.75/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.50-J.75 and 5.45-J.50/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
9A.4-406                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Equipment (not in FC1310) on all elevations would remain operational. HVAC A and B remain operational and will not be affected by the fire.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.2.5.12 Control Room HVAC C, Exhaust Duct Chase (Rm No. 595)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          No, See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-407
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                            Combustion (MJ)
None                            727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 6.50-J.75.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                            Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.0 - J.1 & 6.60-J.67 on the 17150 level/Manual ABC hand extinguishers          4.0 - J.1 & 6.60 - J.67/ Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. alternate means is provided by control room HVAC "B".
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System.
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment 9A.4-408                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksQuantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
9A.4.2.5.13 Passageway (Rm No. 506)
(1)  Fire AreaFC5110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling No                                No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
None                              727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 4.00-K.95 Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-409
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          4.00-K.95/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection capability is provided. Fire suppression capability is provided.
A backup manual hose is provided from the service building.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FireAll systems would continue to function normally. Access between the service building and reactor building would not be possible while a fire was in progress.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-410                                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.6 Floor Six El 17150 mm 9A.4.2.6.1 Control Room HVAC Supply B (Rm No. 621)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4220 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Bag filters                      maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station at 1.42-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.30 - K.52 & 1.37-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.42-J.67 and 1.30-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-411
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the CR HVAC supply B function. Alternate means is provided by CRHVAC "C" supply.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarkssafety-related cooling for multiple divisional equipment is provided by the equipment in this room which is associated with division 2 power.
9A.4.2.6.2 Passageway and Room (Rm No. 601)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4220 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, D2 See remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
9A.4-412                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in tray                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 1.42-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.37-J.67/Manual ABC Hand Extinguishers            1.42-J.67 and 1.30-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable trays and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Even though access to the rooms 623, 624, 625, 629, and 325 are not possible, the equipment in these rooms are functional (they are in different fire area). Alternate means is provided by CRHVAC "C".
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-413
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarkssafety-related cooling for multiple divisions is provided by redundant systems. Equipment on this level in this fire area provides one division of cooling for the multi-divisional control room.
9A.4.2.6.3 Chiller Unit B (Rm No.623)
(1)    Fire AreaFC1210 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                            Yes, D2 See remarks.
(3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)    Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Small amounts of lubricants        maximum average) applies (6)    Detection Provided:
Class A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 1.42-J.67.
9A.4-414                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.37-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.42-J.67 and 1.30-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the loss of Chiller Unit B would necessitate shutting down the RCW B and CR HVAC B Systems with consequential loss of division 2. RCW divisions A and C and CR HVAC System A would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-415
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThe chiller unit B provides cooling for the control room HVAC B system which serves the safety-related multidivisional equipment in the control room and the RCW B. This equipment is also required to function to support equipment required for remote shutdown and therefore is in a fire area separate from the control room and its HVAC equipment.
9A.4.2.6.4 HVAC B Supply and Exhaust (Rm No. 621)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1210 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          Yes, See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Bag filters                      maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 1.42-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          1.30 - K.52 & 1.37-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.42-J.67 and 1.30-K.55/Manual 9A.4-416                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations though designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function and possibly the shutdown of RCW B and consequential loss of division 2 due to fire generated smoke and heat. HVAC Supplies and Exhaust A and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThis equipment is required to function to support equipment required for remote shutdown and therefore is in a fire area separate from the control room and its HVAC System.
The exhaust fans do nor provide any cooling function. They only serve a purge function which is not necessary to the cooling function of the HVAC System.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-417
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.2.6.5 HVAC A Intake Duct and Exhaust (Rm No. 614)
(1) Fire AreaFC1110 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, See Remarks.
(3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 6.70-J.67.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
9A.4-418                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function and possibly the shutdown of RCW A and consequential loss of division 1 due to fire generated smoke and heat. HVAC Supplies and Exhaust B and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated-fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThis equipment is also required to function to support equipment required for remote shutdown and therefore is in a fire area separate from the control room and its HVAC equipment.
The exhaust fans do not provide any cooling function. They only serve a purge function which is not necessary to the cooling function of the HVAC System.
9A.4.2.6.6 Control Room HVAC Exhaust B (Rm No. 626)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4220 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D2                          No Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-419
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6) Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 1.42-J.67.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            1.37-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            1.42-J.67 and 1.30-K.55/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9) Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function, but continued operation of the exhaust fans are not required for the equipment and systems served.
If the CR HVAC B or C are placed in the smoke removal mode the control room should remain habitable.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
9A.4-420                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer toSection 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design", for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThe exhaust fans do not provide any cooling function. They only serve a purge function which is not necessary to the cooling function of the HVAC System.
Quantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
9A.4.2.6.7 Chiller Unit A (Rm No. 613)
(1)    Fire AreaFC1110 (2)    Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D1                          Yes, D1 (3)    Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)    Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-421
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Small quantities                maximum average) applies of lubricants (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 6.70-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function: Therefore it is assumed that the loss of chiller unit A would necessitate shutting down the RCW A system, which consequentially results in the loss of Division 1. RCW divisions B and C would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
9A.4-422                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThis equipment is required to function to support equipment required for remote shutdown and therefore must be in a fire area separate from the control room.
9A.4.2.6.8 Control Room HVAC Supply C (Rm No. 694)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 Bag filters                      maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 6.70-J.67.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-423
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.70 - K.52 & 6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function CR HVAC supply C function. Alternate means is provided by CRHVAC "B" supply.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-424                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) Remarkssafety-related cooling for multiple divisional equipment is provided by the equipment in this room which is associated with division 3 power.
9A.4.2.6.9 Passageway and Room (Rm No. 602)
(1)  Fire AreaFC4310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          Yes, D3 See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 6.70-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-425
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Even though access to rooms 612, 636, 631, 634 and 651 are not possible, the equipment in these rooms are functional (they are in a different fire area). Alternate means is provided by CRHVAC "B".
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) Remarkssafety-related cooling for multiple divisions is provided by redundant systems. The equipment on level 17150 in this fire area provides one division of cooling for the multi-divisional control room.
9A.4.2.6.10 Control Room HVAC Exhaust C (Rm No. 614)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1110 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                            No, See Remarks.
(3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
9A.4-426                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable in trays                    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 6.70-J.67.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel            6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function, but continued operation of the exhaust fans is not required for the equipment and systems served.
If the control room HVAC is manually switched to the smoke removal mode the control room should remain habitable.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-427
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThe exhaust fans do not provide any cooling function. They only serve a purge function which is not necessary to the cooling function of the HVAC System.
Quantities of cable may be so small that they will be in conduit rather than cable tray.
9A.4.2.6.11 HVAC C Intake Duct and Exhaust (Rm No. 634)
(1)  Fire AreaFC1310 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-3 Safety-Related                    Provides Core Cooling Yes, D3                          No, D3 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16a. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Type                              Combustion (MJ)
Cable trays                      727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the fire area and manual pull alarm station at 670-J.67.
9A.4-428                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                              Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel          6.60-J.67/Manual ABC hand extinguishers            6.60-J.67 and 6.70-K.55/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire area which is separate from fire areas providing alternate means of performing the safety or shutdown function.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function, and possibly the shutdown of RCW C and consequential loss of division 3 due to fire generated smoke and heat. HVAC Supplies and Exhausts A and B would remain operational.
Smoke control is by the normal HVAC System functioning in the smoke control mode. Refer to 9.5.1.1.6 for additional information.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(b)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)  Location of manual suppression system in an area external to the room containing the safety-related equipment (d)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely)
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-429
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (c)    Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(13) RemarksThe exhaust fans do not provide any cooling function. They only serve a purge function which is not necessary to the cooling function of the HVAC System.
9A.4.3 Turbine Building 9A.4.3.1 Floor One El 5.3 m 9A.4.3.1.1 Floor One (Except Fire Areas FT1501FT1503)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1500 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-18. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit, and less than Acceptable the equivalent of 0.61m cable trays (b) Limited quantities of lubricants Negligible in pumps (c) Charcoal in offgas charcoal bed Does not contribute to fire loading (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC, and manual alarm pull stations at ColumnsRows (C-R) D.4-3.1, C.6-6.8, G.5-6.8, and G.5-2.5.
9A.4-430                                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Modified Class III standpipes and      C-R D.4-3.1, C-R C.6-6.8, hose reel                              C-R G.5-6.8, C-R G.5-2.4./Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  C-R D.5-3.1, C-R C.6-6.7, C-R G.6-6.8, C-R G.3-2.5./Manual Closed head sprinkler system, 8.13 Room 120/Automatic liters/m2 coverage (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible; (b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System except for the following rooms:
(a)    Rooms 110 and 142 by normal HVAC and process exhaust (b)    Rooms 112 and 144 by process exhaust (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, "Water Level (Flood) Design," for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)    Smoke detectors, and temperature controllers are mounted in the exhaust duct of the offgas system to detect any fire in the charcoal beds. The fire is contained Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-431
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 by isolating the charcoal absorber vessel and purging the vessel with nitrogen gas.
(b) Electrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
(c) The total flow of the closed head sprinkler system is estimated to be 600 gpm.
9A.4-432                                                                            Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.3.1.2 Air Compressors and Dryer Area (Rm No. 111)
(1) Fire AreaFT1501 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-18. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit, and dispersed Acceptable in cable trays (b) Limited quantities of lubricants Negligible in pumps (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC, and manual alarm pull station at C-R, K.8-0.5.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipes                            C-R K.8-0.5/Manual and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers                C-R K.8-0.5/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-433
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksElectrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.3.1.3 Stair Tower # 1 (Rm No. 114)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1502 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-18. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull station external to the stair tower at each floor (except the roof).
9A.4-434                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipes                            C-R K.5-0.5 at first floor, K.4-0.6 at and hose reel                          second & third floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R K.9-0.5 at first floor, K.5-0.5 at second & third floor/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The stair tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.3.1.4 Stair Tower # 2 (Rm No. 122)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1503 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-435
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-18. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull station external to the stair tower at each floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                              C-R K.5-6.9 at first floor, C.8-6.7 at and hose reel                          second & third floors C.9-6.6 at fourth floor/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R K.5-6.9 at first floor, C.7-6.7 at second & third floors C.9-6.7 at fourth floor/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The stair tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
9A.4-436                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.3.2 Floor Two El 12.3m 9A.4.3.2.1 Floor Two (Except Fire Areas FT-1501, FT-1502, FT-1503, FT2500FT2505)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1500 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4.
Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit, any dispersed Acceptable cable trays. (Any single stack assumed less than the equivalent of four 60-cm wide cable trays.)
(b) Limited quantities of lubricants Negligible in pumps (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC on the floor and manual alarm pull stations at C-R. A.9-2.2, E.0-1.9, J.8-1.9, E.2-3.1, A.9-4.2, C.8-6.8, G.4-7.0, K.7-5.9 Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-437
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                            C-R A.9-2.2, C-R E.0-1.9, and hose reel                        C-R J.8-1.9, C-R E.2-3.1, C-R A.9-4.2, C-R C.8-6.8, C-R G.4-7.0,C-R K.7-5.9
                                                    /Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R A.9-2.5, C-R D.8-1.9, C-R J.4-1.8, C-R A.9-4.5, C-R E 2-3.1, C-R C.7-6.6, C-R G.6-7.0, C-R K.3-5.9
                                                    /Manual Closed head sprinkler system,        Room 222/Automatic 6.1 L/m2 coverage (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System, except in rooms 216, 218, and 245 by process exhaust.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-438                                                                                  Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) Remarks:
(a)    The following safety-related equipment representing all four safety divisions is mounted on this floor: B21-PT301 A-D, C71-PS002 A-D (b)    Section 9A.5. Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions on this floor of the turbine building.
(c)    Electrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
(d)    The maximum flow of the closed head sprinkler system is estimated to be 63.09 L/s.
9A.4.3.2.2 Switchgear A Area (Rm No. 210), and Chillers Area (Rm No. 248)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1501 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Cable in conduit                      Acceptable Cable trays                            1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC on the floor and manual alarm pull stations at C-R. E.1-0.3, K.5-0.5.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-439
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                              C-R E.1-0.3, C-R K.5-0.5/Manual and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers                C-R E.1-0.1, C-R K.7-0.4/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksElectrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.3.2.3 Lube Oil Conditioning Area (Rm No. 230)
(1)  Fire AreaFT2500 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No 9A.4-440                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of the fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. The high curb of the door forms a tub for the room which will contain 100% of the volume of oil from the conditioning unit in the event of a leak.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ) 3785.4 liters of Class III B lube oil 158,261 MJ (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone to sense fire before initiating the suppression system. Manual alarm pull station at C-R K.7-5.9 in the RFP power supply room.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                C-R K.7-5.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R K.7-5.9/Manual Deluge foam water sprinkler            Initiated by two detectors, one in system, 6.1 L/min/m2 coverage          each zone/Automatic (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the process exhaust system.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-441
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe lube oil conditioning room tank is approximately 3785 liters, therefore the deluge foam water sprinkler system is capable of suppressing any fire in this room.
9A.4.3.2.4 Stair Tower # 5 (Rm No. 236)
(1)  Fire AreaFT2501 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull station external to the stair tower at each floor elevation.
9A.4-442                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                              C-R K.7-5.8 at El.12.3m and hose reel                          C-R K.3-5.8 at El.20.3m C-R H.1-6.5 at El.30.3m
                                                    /Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R K.9-5.9 at El.12.3m C-R K.0-5.7 at El.20.3m C-R H.1-6.6 at El.30.3m
                                                    /Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The stair tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by a separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained.
Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-443
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.3.2.5 Stair Tower # 3 (Rm No. 212)
(1)  Fire AreaFT2502 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
(6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull station external to the stair tower at each floor elevation.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel at each floor C-R J.8-1.9/Manual elevation ABC hand extinguishers on each        C-R J.7-1.9/Manual floor (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The stair tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  Alternate access and egress are provided by separate stair tower located at a remote location.
(c)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Access to the other stair tower is maintained. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
9A.4-444                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)  Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.3.2.6 House Boiler Area (Rm No. 247)
(1)  Fire AreaFT2503 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of the fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-445
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit and dispersed Very limited quantities cable trays (b) Limited quantities of            Negligible lubricants in pumps (c) Limited quantities of No. 2 Normally negligible, see (d) below fuel oil with min. flash point of 37.8&deg;C (class II combustible liquid) in the room (d) Significant quantities of oil    Normally none, could be significant stored external to the room      from a leak could be pumped into the room by a broken line and uncontrolled pump (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the suppression system.
Manual alarm pull stations at C-R E.1-0.3 on the second floor in room 248 and C-R G.1-0.5 on the third floor in room 310.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                    C-R E.1-0.3/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      C-R E.1-0.2/Manual Preaction sprinkler system                  Initiated by two detectors, one per zone/Automatic (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-446                                                                                  Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function of the auxiliary boiler. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the process exhaust system.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of the preaction sprinkler system (c)    Provision of raised supports for the equipments (d)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksElectrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.3.2.7 Stair Tower # 4 (Rm No. 249)
(1)  Fire AreaFT2504 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles PresentNo significant quantities of exposed combustibles.
Analysis                                                                                          9A.4-447
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC at each building floor elevation and alarm pull station external to the stair tower at each floor.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                    Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                C-R A.9-2.2 at El. 12.3m C-R A.8-1.9 at El. 20.3m C-R C.9-2.2 at El. 30.3m/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                  C-R A.9-2.3 at El. 12.3m C-R A.9-1.9 at El. 20.3m C-R C.9-2.1 at El. 30.3m/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    The stair tower is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of function of the stair tower. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
The doorways at all floors are curbed so that the water would be contained within the stair well.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(c)    Alternate access route provided (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4-448                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.3.2.8 Steam Tunnel Area (Rm No. 219)
(1) Fire AreaFT2505 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                    No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of the fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. This room is extended to the third floor, and the ceiling is at elevation 30.25m.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit and dispersed Acceptable cable trays (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone to sense fire before initiating the suppression system.
Manual alarm pull station at C-R J.8-1.9 at elevation 12.3m and K.4-4.0 at elevation 20.3m.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                      Location/Actuation Standpipe                                C-R J.8-1.9 at El. 12.3m and and hose reel                            K.4-4.0 at El. 20.3m/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                    C-R J.8-1.8 at El. 12.3m and K.4-3.9 at El. 20.3m/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-449
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)  No floor mounted equipment (c)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The following safety-related equipment representing all four safety divisions are mounted in the steam tunnel:
(i)    E31-TE021-029 A-D (b)  Section 9A.5. Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions on this floor of the turbine building.
(c)  Electrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.3.3 Floor Three El 20.3m 9A.4.3.3.1 Floor Three (Except Fire Areas FT1501, FT1502, FT1503 FT2501, FT2502, FT2503, FT2504, FT3500 and FT3501)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1500 9A.4-450                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                  No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-20. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit and dispersed Acceptable cable trays (b) Limited quantities of lubricants Negligible in pumps (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC on the floor and manual alarm pull stations at C-R A.7-1.9, C.7-6.9, E.3-1.9, G.5-6.9, J.8-1.9, K.4-5.8, K.1-4.0.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel              C-R A.7-1.9, C-R C.7-6.9.
C-R E.3-1.9, C-R G.5-6.9 C-R J.8-1.9, C-R K.4-5.8 C-R K.1-4.0/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R A.9-1.9, C-R C.6-6.9.
C-R E.4-1.9, C-R G.9-6.9 C-R J.5-1.9, C-R K.0-5.7 C-R K.1-3.8/Manual Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-451
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                                  Location/Actuation Closed head water sprinkler system, Rm 321/Automatic 6.1 L/min/m2 coverage Deluge sprinkler system,              Portion of Rm 320 (over the 7.625 liters/m2 coverage              Hydrogen seal oil area)/Automatic (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System, except for the following rooms:
(a)  Rooms 314, 315, and 344 by normal HVAC and process exhaust.
(b)  Rooms 311, 333, and 345 by process exhaust.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The following safety-related equipment representing all four safety divisions is mounted on this floor:
B21-PT028 A-D C71-PS001 A-D C71-PS004 A-D.
9A.4-452                                                                                  Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (b)    Section 9A.5. Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions on this floor of the turbine building.
(c)    Electrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
(d)    The total flow of the deluge sprinkler system which provides coverage over the Hydrogen seal oil area is estimated to be 20.19 L/s.
9A.4.3.3.2 Switchgear B Area (Rm No. 310)
(1)  Fire AreaFT1501 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-19. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit                  Acceptable (b) Cable trays                        1454 MJ/m2 ECLL (1454 MJ/m2 maximum average) applies (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC on the floor and manual alarm pull stations at C-R G.1-0.5, K.5-0.5.
Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-453
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                              C-R G.1-0.5, C-R K.5-0.5/Manual and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers                C-R G.1-0.4, C-R K.7-0.4/Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksElectrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.3.3.3 Gas Turbine Generator Area (Rm No. 317)
(1)  Fire AreaFT3500 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No 9A.4-454                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of the fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-20. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
Diesel fuel contained in system        None (without leaks) piping (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the suppression system.
Manual alarm pull station at C-R G.1-0.5 in Rm 310.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                    C-R G.1-0.5/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      C-R G.1-0.4/Manual Deluge foam water sprinkler                Initiated by two detectors, one system, 6.1 L/min/m2 coverage              per zone/Automatic (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the process exhaust system.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-455
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    Cross zoned detectors for initiation of deluge system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.3.3.4 Oil Reservoir Area (Rm No. 330)
(1)  Fire AreaFT3501 (2)  Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                          Provides Core Cooling No                                      No (3)  Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of the fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-20. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room. The room is a tub type room designed to contain spillage of the entire oil content of the equipment in the room.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 3785 liters of Class III B lube oil    158,261 MJ (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A supervised rate compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before initiating the suppression system.
Manual alarm pull station at C-R K.4-5.8 in the corridor (Rm 332) 9A.4-456                                                                                          Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 (7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                        Location/Actuation Standpipe and hose reel                    C-R K.4-5.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                      C-R K.0-5.7/Manual Deluge foam water sprinkler system, 6.1 Initiated by two detectors, one L/m2 coverage                              per zone/Automatic (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the process exhaust system.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)    Location of the manual suppression system external to the room (b)    Provision of raised supports for the equipment (c)    Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(d)    Cross zoned detectors for initiation of deluge system (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)    The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) RemarksThe deluge foam water sprinkler system is designed to suppress any fire in this room.
9A.4.3.4 Floor Four El 30.3m (1)  Fire AreaFT1500 Analysis                                                                                        9A.4-457
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-4 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling Yes                                    No (3) Radioactive Material PresentNone that can be released as a result of fire.
(4) Qualification of Fire BarriersThe fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-21. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                          Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Cable in conduit and dispersed Acceptable cable trays (b) Limited quantities of lubricants Negligible in pumps (6) Detection ProvidedClass A supervised POC on the floor and manual alarm pull stations at C-R D.9-2.4, C.8-3.9, C.9-6.4, H.1-3.7, H.1-6.4, J.5-2.8.
(7) Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Standpipe                              C-R D.9-2.4, C-R C.8-3.9 and hose reel                          C-R C.9-6.4, C-R H.1-3.7 C-R H.1-6.4, C-R J.5-2.8/Manual ABC hand extinguishers                C-R D.9-2.5, C-R C.8-4.1 C-R C.9-6.6, C-R H.1-3.5 C-R H.1-6.5, C-R J.2-2.8/Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)    Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)    Fire stops are provided for penetrations through rated fire barriers.
9A.4-458                                                                                    Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 (9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of function. Smoke from a fire would be removed by the normal HVAC System.
(10) Consequences of Fire SuppressionSuppression extinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  Provision of raised supports for the equipment (b)  Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  Fire stops are provided for penetrations through fire rated barriers.
(b)  The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(13) Remarks:
(a)  The following safety-related equipment representing all four safety divisions is mounted on this floor:
(i)    C71-PS003 A-D.
(b)  Section 9A.5. Special Cases, provides justification for locating equipment from multiple safety divisions on this floor of the turbine building.
(c)  Electrical cable insulation in conduit does not represent a combustible fire load.
9A.4.4 Service Building 9A.4.4.1 General The service building does not contain any system or function that could affect the safe, cold shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, a detailed, room-by-room fire hazard analysis is not performed. The basic fire protection features are presented in a method similar to that used in a room-by-room analysis.
9A.4.4.2 Facility Features The service building is a completely separate non-seismic structure, but since it houses the main security entrance to the facility, it has controlled access tunnels to the Control Building, the Turbine building and the Reactor Building. The exterior wall facing these buildings is constructed of 3-h fire-resistive concrete. The controlled access doors on this wall are 3 h fire-Analysis                                                                                            9A.4-459
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 resistive, A-label doors. Other exterior walls are constructed of concrete, or of gypsum board mounted on metal studs. The four-story stairwell between ground grade (El. 7350m) and El. -
7100m, which resides near the center of the building, is considered a separate fire area and is bounded by 2 h rated barrier walls in accordance with NFPA-101.
Due to possible variations of the fire loading with time within the building the facility is fully equipped with an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system combined with standpipes, hose systems and portable extinguishers throughout its interior.
9A.4.4.3 Fire Detection Fire detection is provided throughout the facility with the use of Class A supervised POC detection systems. Alarms, both trouble and fire, annunciate in the main security center. Fire alarms sound throughout the service building. Manual fire alarm pull boxes are located at each fire hose and at extinguisher stations.
9A.4.4.4 Fire Suppression Systems Fire Suppression systems include:
(1)  NFPA 13, automatic wet pipe sprinklers provided in all areas within the building.
The design criteria for the systems are a minimum water density of 6.1 L/m2, with a maximum coverage of 9.29 m2 per sprinkler head. Water flow alarms are provided.
(2)  NFPA 14, Standpipes (6.35 cm pipe with 3.81 cm adapter) with 30.48 m of 3.81 cm woven-jacket lined fire hose nozzle located so that each room is less than 30.48 m from a hose station. Standpipe/hose stations are also provided adjacent to the stairwell of every other floor.
(3)  ABC hand extinguishers provided on each floor of the facility, located at or near the hose stations and alarm pull boxes. Additional hand extinguishers are provided in various locations for convenience, or where increased human activity is anticipated.
9A.4.4.5 Penetrations Wall, floor and ceiling penetrations for piping, HVAC and cable trays are sealed, as needed, for HVAC control. However, fire dampers or stops are not provided as the nature of the activities within the building, coupled with the complete sprinkler coverage, precludes the need to provide multiple fire areas within the building.
9A.4.4.6 Consequences of Suppression Floor drains are provided. Passage to other buildings is via controlled access chambers having normally closed doors. Minor leakage under the doors will be well within the capacity of the floor drain systems of the other buildings. Also, in the adjoining buildings, additional water-tight boundaries (i.e., the 3-hour fire rated walls and doors) separate the nuclear safety-related 9A.4-460                                                                                              Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 equipment from the hallways common to the service building access chambers. Raised pads for equipment and curbs are provided to control and confine water to specific areas.
9A.4.5 Radwaste Building 9A.4.5.1 General The radwaste building does not contain any system or function that could affect the safe, cold shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, a detailed, room-by-room fire hazard analysis is not required. The basic fire protection features are presented in a method similar to that used in a room-by-room analysis.
9A.4.5.2 Facility Features The radwaste building has 2-h fire-resistive concrete and metal stud/gypsum interior walls.
Ceilings above areas where dry radioactive materials (or other burnable materials) are stored or processed are also constructed of 2 h (minimum) fire-restrictive concrete. Interior doors have fire-restrictive ratings of 1-1/2 hr, some of which are fitted with 1-1/2 h fire dampers for room ventilation intake. Exterior doors are 2 h fire-restrictive doors, or, they are required to be of special design, analyzed to have a fire resistance equivalent, to a 2 h rating. The radwaste building is not contiguous with any other structure.
9A.4.5.3 Fire Detection Fire detection is provided throughout the facility with the use of Class A supervised product-of-combustion (POC) detection systems. Alarms, both trouble and fire, report to the radwaste control room. Fire alarms are sounded throughout the building. Manual fire alarm pull boxes are located at each fire hose and at extinguisher stations.
9A.4.5.4 Fire Suppression Systems Fire suppression systems include:
(1)    NFPA 13, automatic wet pipe sprinklers provided in areas where dry radioactive waste, or other flammable material, is processed or stored. The design criteria for the systems are a minimum water density of 6.1 L/m2, with a maximum coverage of 9.29 m2 per sprinkler head. Water flow alarms are provided.
(2)    NFPA 14, Standpipes (6.35 cm pipe with 3.81 cm adapter) with 30.48 m of 3.81 cm woven-jacket lined fire hose and nozzle located so that each room is less than 30.48 m from a hose station. Water flow alarms are provided.
(3)    ABC hand extinguishers provided on each floor of the facility, located at or near the hose stations and alarm pull boxes.
Analysis                                                                                              9A.4-461
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.4.5.5 Penetrations Wall, floor and ceiling penetrations for piping, HVAC and cable trays are fitted with fire-stops or fire dampers with the same fire-resistance rating as the wall, floor and ceiling. Since radioactive materials are processed, many of the walls are much thicker than an equivalent fire wall thickness for shielding purposes.
9A.4.5.6 Consequences of Suppression Floor drains are provided with sufficient capacity for fire-water run-off. Raised pads for equipment and curbs are provided to control and confine water to specific areas.
9A.4.6 Plant Yard (1)  SpacePlant Site External to the Buildings Fire Areayard (2)  Equipment: See Figure 9.5-4 (3)  Radioactive Material Present:
None that can be released as a result of fire.
(4)  Qualification of Fire BarriersThe exterior walls of the safety-related buildings are required to have a fire resistance rating of 3 hours. The diesel oil storage tanks are buried. The dirty and clean turbine lubrication oil tanks are located next to the turbine building, away from the reactor building. Shadow type fire walls are provided between the unit auxiliary transformers and main transformer. These transformers are located more than 15.2 m away from the turbine building walls.
(5)  Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(a) Clean lube oil (7568 liters)        3.2x106 (b) Dirty lube oil (7568 liters)        3.2x106 (c) Main transformer oil                Unknown quantity (d) Unit auxiliary transformer oil      Unknown quantity 9A.4-462                                                                                                Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                            Design Control Document/Tier 2 Fire Loading                            Total Heat of Combustion (MJ)
(e) Reserve transformer oil            Unknown quantity (f) Three buried D/G oil tanks          Buried tanks fuel are not contributor to fuel loading (6)  Detection ProvidedTemperature and flame detectors as part of the suppression system for the outdoor transformers. Flame detectors for the turbine lubrication oil tanks. Manual alarm pull stations adjacent to the main power, unit auxiliary and reserve transformers.
(7)  Suppression Available:
Type                                  Location/Actuation Outdoor hydrants                      See Figure 9.5-5/Manual Deluge water spray systems            For the main power, unit auxiliary and reserve transformers/Automatic (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
(b)  Redundant equipment is separated by distance or shadow fire barrier walls.
(9)  Consequences of FireThe postulated fire assumes loss of the function in the fire affected zone. Exposed equipment is not safety-related. Loss of some equipment could cause initiation of a plant shutdown.
(10) Consequences of Fire Suppressionextinguishes the fire. Refer to Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design, for the drain system.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  No exposed safety-related equipment; and (b)  Fire protection water from a ruptured storage tank would drain away from the safety-related buildings via the normal storm drainage system.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
Analysis                                                                                    9A.4-463
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                Design Control Document/Tier 2 (13) RemarksNone.
9A.4.7 Control Building Annex El 12300 mm (1)  Fire AreaFA1110 (2)  EquipmentRefer to Table 9A.6-5 Safety-Related                        Provides Core Cooling No                                    No (3)  Radioactive Material Present-None.
(4)  Qualifications of Fire BarriersThis room constitutes the entire Control Building Annex. The fire barriers (3-hour rated, 3-hour rated 5 psid) or unrated including doors, walls and floors associated with this room are illustrated on Fire Protection Figure 9A.4-16. This fire protection figure also shows personnel entry and egress for this room.
(5)  Combustibles Present(NCLL Applies)
Fire Loading Total heat of Type                                  Combustion (MJ)
Lubricating oil internal to the MG    727 MJ/m2 NCLL (727MJ/m2 Sets                                  maximum average applies)
Cables in trays Electrical panels (6)  Detection ProvidedClass A Supervised POC detection system in the room and manual pull alarm station.
(7)  Suppression Available 9A.4-464                                                                                        Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                              Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type                                  Location / Actuation Standpipe and Hose reel              Manual ABS hand extinguishers                Manual (8)  Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed:
(a)  The function is located in the fire resistive enclosure (b)  Fire detection and suppression is provided and accessible (c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
(9)  Consequences of FirePostulated fire assumes loss of the function. Loss of RIP MG Sets will either necessitate a manual scram or initiate an automatic scram. Building cooling is provided by coolers, which receive chilled water from the turbine chilled water system. Building air supply is provided by the roof top ventilators, with Building exhaust provided by side vents located in the walls.
(10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extinguishes the fire. Fire suppression water is contained within the building.
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a)  ANSI B31.1 standpipe (rupture unlikely).
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed:
(a)  The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure (b)  The means of detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
(c)  Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations through designated fire barriers.
Analysis                                                                                  9A.4-465
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following figures are located in Chapter 21:
Figure 9A.4-1 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation -8200 mm Figure 9A.4-2 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation -1700 mm Figure 9A.4-3 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 4800/8500 mm Figure 9A.4-4 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm Figure 9A.4-5 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 18100 mm Figure 9A.4-6 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 23500 mm Figure 9A.4-7 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 27200 mm Figure 9A.4-8 Reactor Building Fire Protection at Elevation 31700/38200 mm Figure 9A.4-9 Reactor Building Fire Protection, Section A-A Figure 9A.4-10 Reactor Building Fire Protection, Section B-B Figure 9A.4-11 Control Building Fire Protection, Section B-B Figure 9A.4-12 Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation -8200 mm Figure 9A.4-13 Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation -2150 mm Figure 9A.4-14 Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 3500 mm Figure 9A.4-15 Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 7900 mm Figure 9A.4-16 Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm Figure 9A.4-16a Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 17150 mm Figure 9A.4-16b Control Building Fire Protection at Elevation 22200 mm Figure 9A.4-17 Turbine Building Fire Protection, Section A-A Figure 9A.4-18 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 5300 mm Figure 9A.4-19 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm Figure 9A.4-20 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 20300 mm Figure 9A.4-21 Turbine Building Fire Protection at Elevation 30300 mm 9A.4-466                                                                      Analysis
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Figure 9A.4-22 Service Building Fire Protection, Section B-B (See Figure 9A.4-11)
Figure 9A.4-23 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation -2150 mm (See Figure 9A.4-13)
Figure 9A.4-24 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 3500 mm (See Figure 9A.4-14)
Figure 9A.4-25 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 7900 mm (See Figure 9A.4-15)
Figure 9A.4-26 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm (See Figure 9A.4-16)
Figure 9A.4-27 Service Building Fire Protection at Elevation 17150 mm (See Figure 9A.4-16a)
Figure 9A.4-28 Radwaste Building Fire Protection, Section A-A Figure 9A.4-29 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation -1500 mm Figure 9A.4-30 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 4800 mm Figure 9A.4-31 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 12300 mm Figure 9A.4-32 Radwaste Building Fire Protection at Elevation 21000 mm Analysis                                                                    9A.4-467
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.5 Special Cases 9A.5.1 Piping Penetrations, Reactor Building Piping penetrations through the drywell shell have unique design considerations. The stress and containment requirements along with the temperature inputs to the concrete walls leave little design latitude. Experience has shown that some of these penetrations for high energy piping may not contain a 3-hr fire-resistive barrier such as have provided throughout the other ABWR buildings. Penetration details are not available at this stage of the plant design. It is a COL license information requirement that the detailed design provide completely equivalent construction to tested wall assemblies or testing will be required.
9A.5.2 Fire Door Deviations The design of the nuclear facility must meet many criteria, including fire resistivity. Fire doors are an example of compromise with other overriding design criteria that must also be met.
Some, such as the airlock doors between the lock and the Reactor Building, form part of a pressure vessel and are of special construction. Such doors generally have a backup fire door.
9A.5.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain Sumps Several tanks and sumps are fitted with small charcoal canister-type filters to adsorb radioactive halogens and particulates that may be in the gases vented from the tank during filling or draining operations. Vents from the individual filters and tanks with low level radioactivity are ducted to the HVAC exhaust system.
Temperature monitoring and automatic or manually actuated fixed fire suppression systems have not been provided for these filters. Valves cannot be installed in the lines to isolate the filters as valve closure would result in pressure gradients that could cause tank or sump failure.
Manual fire suppression systems are available at or nearby each filter.
9A.5.4 Pipe Break Analyses Per the criteria in Section 3.6, the high pressure fire water systems require analysis for high energy and moderate lines, respectively.
9A.5.5 Fire Separation for Divisional Electrical Systems There are some cases where cables of more than one division are in relatively close proximity and require special justification. These areas are listed below and justification of each is evaluated in the discussion.
9A.5.5.1 RPS Scram Circuits Wiring to each of the four groups of scram solenoids is run in separate rigid steel conduits for the purpose of preventing any possibility of the scram solenoid circuits being exposed to a hot Special Cases                                                                                              9A.5-1
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 short (i.e., two energized switch legs of different group circuits shorted together that could negate the scram command to more than one group of control rods). The conduits do not require other special separation. Overheating of the conductors, as by fire, cannot cause an unsafe failure because solenoids can be de-energized by shorts to ground or between conductors without creating an unsafe condition.
The AO Scram Solenoid valves are part of the HCU assemblies (two solenoids per valve). They are safety related and receive their divisional power (Division 2 or 3) from RPS via the Scram Solenoid Fuse Panels (H22-PO55 A-H). The fuse panels are located in rooms 111, and 118 (Div. I), 125, and 129 (Div. II). The Div. I rooms are located in separate fire zones from the Div.
II rooms, which zones are separated by 3-hour fire barriers. Fire in any of these rooms could cause a short on the cables feeding power to the scram solenoids and cause the associated fuse in the scram solenoid fuse panel to blow. The fault will be limited to the loss of power to the associated solenoid and will not propagate upstream.
Divisions I and IV pressure transmitters which monitor control rod drive charging header pressure are located in the HCU unit room which contains the HCUs for Divisions I and IV.
Corresponding Divisions II and III transmitters are located in the Divisions II and III HCU unit room. Each divisional cable is individually contained in steel conduit. Shorts or grounds postulated to occur on these cable will not affect the upstream power division because of the current limiting capability inherent in the low voltage power supplies which feed the transmitters. Therefore, postulated multi-divisional shorts or grounds on these cables, due to fire in one of the HCU rooms, will not cause an unsafe condition.
The air header dump valves act as a diverse backup to the scram logic and are not essential to safety. The two air header dump valves are energized by separate divisions of 125 VDC power.
Power wiring to each solenoid is individually circuit-protected and run in separate steel conduit.
Therefore, loss of these solenoids, due to fire, will not cause an unsafe condition.
Sensors from the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
System (via leak detection system) are located in the turbine building.
Due to the nature of the design and construction of the turbine building (not a seismic category or a Class 1E safety-related area) it is possible for all of the sensors and their leads to be damaged during seismic or fire events in the turbine building. This has the potential for affecting the operation of the RPS and MSIV systems and, also, for simultaneously introducing faults and their attendant threats to the power supplies in multiple divisions.
9A.5-2                                                                                        Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 The sensors, type, and system served are:
Description                                            Type      System Turbine First Stage Press.      Transmitter            RPS        C71-PT003A-D Hydraulic Trip Sys. Oil        Transmitter            RPS        C71-PS302A-D Press.
Turbine Stop Valve Pos.        Position Switch        RPS        C71-POS301A-D Condenser Press.                Transmitter            MSIV      B21-PT301A-D Main Steam Line Press.          Transmitter            MSIV      B21-PT028A-D In considering the effect of multiple failures in the turbine building on the operation of the systems, the lack of an RPS trip is acceptable because an RPS backup trip would be generated by high reactor vessel pressure or high flux. Backup trips for MSIV isolation, either direct or indirectly through the RPS, would be generated by the turbine control system, turbine building high temperature, and turbine building high radiation. The turbine building trips are anticipatory but are not absolutely required. Initial tripping by the backups is acceptable.
Tripping of the RPS or MSIV systems as a result of multiple failures in the turbine building is also acceptable. If a turbine building event is so wide ranging that it affects multiple divisions, the reactor should be shut down. The two out of four logic of the systems eliminates trips from minor events.
The manner in which the RPS, MSIV, and power supply systems are designed and installed assures that any combination of electrical failures as a result of occurrences in the turbine building are acceptable. This is true for the position switch circuits because they are hard wired to the solid state logic control (SSLC) cabinet in the control room. Each wire is routed in a separate grounded conduit from the control building to the turbine building as shown in Figure 9A.5-1. The power source is ungrounded 125 VDC with safety grade ground detection. A single ground in the turbine building does not produce any fault current, cause any RPS action, nor prevent tripping if a position switch contact opens. A double ground with one ground on the supply lead and the other ground on the return lead does not produce any fault current or cause any RPS action, but it does prevent sensing of the opening of the switch contact, which is acceptable as explained above.
There must be a ground on the ground fault monitored negative side of the battery in the safety related buildings for fault current to flow due to grounds in the turbine building. The negative side of the safety-related batteries does not enter the turbine building where it would be exposed to possible simultaneous multiple failures.
Special Cases                                                                                              9A.5-3
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 In addition, for the effects of the double failure of a fault in the turbine building concurrent with a ground on the negative side of the safety-related battery (first random failure) to precipitate back into the 125 VDC system, the safety related fuse in the SSLC cabinet must fail to clear the fault (second random failure). Thus, the initiating event in the turbine building plus two random failures of safety-related equipment in the reactor or control buildings must occur to spread the consequence of the failure in the turbine building beyond the faulted RPS position switch circuit. This double random failure of safety-related equipment must occur in all three safe shutdown divisions to possibly prevent safe shutdown of the plant. Six simultaneous random failures is not credible.
For the pressure transmitters, the signals are low level analog current signals which are transmitted over a shielded twisted pair of conductors per transmitter. The cables are routed in separate grounded conduits on a divisional basis. Shorting together, shorting to ground, or opening a conductor in a current loop cable will only affect the instrument associated with the cable. No damage will occur or propagate as a result of these possible failures. The equivalent internal impedance of the trip unit power supply is sufficient to isolate any electrical condition in the current loop.
In summary, failure of the turbine building sensors and their cables in any fashion is acceptable from the standpoint of both the operation of the systems and disturbances and threats to the power supply systems.
9A.5.5.2 Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Detectors These detectors are physically located in the steam tunnel near the main steamlines, just downstream of the outboard main steamline isolation valves.
By design, this area has no exposed combustibles. Additionally, the conduit and the detectors have some physical protection from the steam lines and hangers in the area making it improbable that fire from below could damage the redundant detectors or cable.
The radiation monitor trip devices have a downscale trip such that a downscale reading from the detectors will provide a trip. This trip is in addition to the normal upscale trip so that a failure in either direction will result in trip.
Leak detection temperature detectors of the main steamline LDS measure ambient temperature around the main steamlines and will provide a main steamline valve isolation signal at fire-induced temperatures well below the threshold of damage to the radiation monitor cable.
Furthermore, a common failure to all of the radiation monitor divisional cables can only affect the radiation monitors and not the remainder of the divisional equipment.
9A.5.5.3 Main Steamline ADS Relief Valves The main steamline ADS relief valves each have three solenoid valve pilots in close proximity at the valve operator. Two of these are used by the ADS. One of the two ADS solenoids is 9A.5-4                                                                                              Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Division 1. The other is Division 2. A third solenoid is used for the non-ADS high pressure relief function. This solenoid is powered by one of the four divisions, depending on the valve.
If any solenoid becomes energized, the associated relief valve will open.
The Division 1 and 2 signal cables are run in separate conduit from their location on the valve to the appropriate divisional penetration and, from there, via divisional raceways to their multiplex interfaces.
These valves are located in a low fire loading area and are inaccessible during plant operation so that a transient fire loading cannot be introduced. Also, the containment is inerted during operation.
The conduit is arranged so that Division 1 and Division 2 cables leave the relief valve area in opposite directions.
The solenoid valve coils are located inside metallic enclosures on each valve so that a fire inside the coil compartment of one pilot would not influence the coil or cable of the redundant pilot.
The ADS valves are arranged in two groups of four valves each with adequate spatial separation to ensure that disturbances (i.e., fire, pipe rupture phenomena, falling objects) affecting one group will not affect the other group. For line breaks, requiring ADS for depressurization, the design assures that at least three of the eight valves are available. During operation, sustained fire is not possible in the inerted containment (drywell) area.
Electrically, the ADS logic system load drivers isolate the divisional signals from other components, in their respective division, so that any damage to the cable at the valves would be limited to that particular cable. Electrical arcing damage to a cable or solenoid coil cannot result in inadvertent opening of the main valve because shorts, opens or grounds at the solenoid cannot cause the solenoid to be energized. Short circuits at this location cannot jeopardize 1E power supplies because circuit resistance is sufficient to permit appropriate circuit protection coordination.
With this degree of redundancy, attention to design, electrical isolation, and primary containment inerting, plant safety will not be compromised by having the Division 1 and 2 cables in close proximity at the ADS valves.
9A.5.5.4 Main Steamline Isolation Valve Control and Limit Switch Interfaces There are eight MSIVs utilized for isolating the main steamlines, two in each of four main steamlines. The outboard MSIV on each main steamline is located outside the primary containment in the main steam tunnel to the turbine building. The inboard MSIV on each line is located inside the inerted drywell.
The steamlines are arranged so that none of the valves is located vertically above any other MSIV. The electrical connections to each valve are made in two junction boxes (A, B).
Special Cases                                                                                                9A.5-5
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Valve limit switch junction box Alocated on one side of the valve operating mechanism and oriented across the valve operator below box Bprovides interlocking connections from valve limit switches to the RPS control logic for reactor scram, to the LDS MSIV control logic used during MSIV closure tests and to valve position indicating lights at the control room panel.
Pneumatic control junction box B, which is located on the control cylinder at the top of the valve operating mechanism, terminates the 120 VAC control voltage to the coils of the operating and test solenoid pilot valves. Two divisions of power terminate on the same device within the junction box. However, barriers are provided between the device terminations to assure circuit separation. In addition the cables for each division are individually fused, and have another level of circuit breaker protection before connection with the divisional power supply bus. These barriers and two levels of circuit protection assure the essential power busses are not jeopardized should shorts or grounds occur.
The MSIVs are designed to fail safe in that loss of power to both solenoids causes closure isolation. For both the inboard and outboard valves, Division II power actuates Solenoid 2 and Division I power actuates Solenoid 3. Solenoid 1 is the test solenoid and is powered By Division 1 (outboard) and Division II (inboard).
The appropriate division of power enters Box A of each valve for connection to limit switches which open when the MSIV closes to initiate a reactor scram trip signal to the divisional scram logic, and to stop MSIV closure during MSIV exciter tests.
In the case of the scram initiation function, the outboard valve limit switches provide redundant trip signals to the signals provided by the inboard valves on each logic.
The MSIVs and the 90% open (10% closure test) contacts and the 92% open (scram) contacts are classified as safety grade components and comply the with the separation and isolation requirements of IEEE-279. The 4% open limit switch contact of each MSIV has no safety function and is used to provide position indication to the process computer and to indicator lights. Non-divisional power is utilized by this switch. A metallic barrier is provided between the Class 1E and the Non-Class 1E terminals.
The inboard MSIVs are contained within the inerted environment during reactor operation.
Failure of the MSIV or its control and interlocking circuits that might occur by a postulated fire outside the primary containment cannot prevent closure of at least one of the MSIVs in each line.
The closure of one MSIV will not result in a reactor scram. Since the outboard valve scram signals are redundant to the inboard valves on each line, a fire outside the primary containment will not affect the redundant capability to cause scram.
9A.5-6                                                                                      Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.5.5.5 Under the Reactor Vessel This area contains the following electrical cables: rod control and information system (RCIS) cabling, FMCRD separation switch cables, neutron monitor system cabling, and other cables, as required. During reactor operation, the area cannot sustain fire because it is inerted. All cables from the lower drywell are routed up to the upper drywell via interconnecting risers.
Conduit, rigid and flexible is used within the risers.
(1)  RCIS Cables The RCIS cables are routed under the vessel through pull boxes inside the pedestal; then through cable boxes and raceways to electrical containment (RCCV) penetrations. RCIS hardwired cables are also routed from these containment penetrations to the RCIS reactor building panels, which are located in clean areas of the reactor building.
All RCIS cables (i.e., synchro cables, FMCRD brake and motor cables, reed switch rod position status cables) are contained in flexible metallic conduit under the vessel, arranged in the pull boxes mounted just above the CRD restraint structure. All of these RCIS cables are classified as non-safety.
(2)  FMCRD Separation Switch Cables The FMCRD cables for the Class 1E separation switches of each FMCRD are classified as safety related and separated into two groups (A and B) for routing out of the undervessel area to two separate divisions of the essential multiplexing system.
The cables are routed under the vessel through pull boxes inside the pedestal; then through cable boxes and raceways to electrical containment (RCCV) penetrations.
The separation switch cables are then routed from the containment penetrations to essential multiplexing system panels in the reactor building. The installation of these Class 1E cables is arranged so that A and B cables travel in opposite directions from under the vessel and pass through penetrations on the opposite side of the reactor building.
The cables receive low-voltage (approx. 48 volts) power from the essential multiplex system power supplies. This provides natural circuit protection in event of shorts or grounds on the system. Such events would not jeopardize the integrity or independence of the higher voltage divisional power busses which are upstream of the power supplies.
(3)  LPRM Cables The LPRM cables are individually contained in flexible metallic conduit under the vessel.
Special Cases                                                                                              9A.5-7
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 These cables are divided into four divisions of cabling, corresponding to the four divisions of the reactor protection system.
The cabling is also supported on the control rod drive housing flanges. The cabling is routed along particular rows of housing flanges. The Division 1 and 3 cables are routed undervessel to the 0&deg; to 180&deg; half of the core, whereas Division 2 and 4 cables are routed undervessel to the 180&deg; to 360&deg; half of the core. The cabling is then routed through the pedestal and drywell in enclosed solid bottom cable tray in a manner which brings the Division 1 LPRM cables into the 0&deg; to 90&deg; quadrant of the lower drywell; Division 2 into the 180&deg; to 270&deg; quadrant; Division 3 into 90&deg; to 180&deg; quadrant; and Division 4 into the 270&deg; and 360&deg; quadrant. Once in the upper drywell, the cables continue in separated divisional cable raceways and penetrations.
(4) SRNM Cables The cables for the SRNM/IRM detectors are individually contained in flexible metallic conduit. These cables are routed along with, and pass through, the same divisional penetrations with the LPRM cables.
(5) Other Cables All other cables under the pedestal are classed as nondivisional. These cables are routed in rigid or flexible metallic conduit through nondivisional conduit openings in the pedestal wall to nondivisional cable raceways in the containment.
(6) Fire Damage Analysis The containment is inerted during operation so that a fire would not be possible.
Additionally the following things also tend to reduce the risk from a fire.
The cabling inside the flexible conduit for the RCIS system and for the neutron monitoring system are all low level signal cables and not likely to be involved in an electrically generated fire internal to the conduit. Even though such a fire is postulated, it would be contained in the individual conduit without damage to the surrounding conduit.
The nondivisional cabling in the conduit is low voltage, fault-protected cable and not likely to be involved in an electrically generated fire internal to the conduit.
The space under the reactor vessel is devoid of combustible material except for the cable insulation inside the various conduit.
It is an interface requirement that administrative procedures to control combustible materials be provided. These procedures will require that combustibles not be stored in areas with divisional cable or within electrical equipment areas.
9A.5-8                                                                                Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 Maintenance during reactor downtime might involve welding in the area under the vessel. It is an interface requirement that administrative procedures which will require special fire protection during the welding or other maintenance operations and housekeeping procedures be provided.
It is concluded that design features in the area under the vessel are adequate for protecting the redundant trains against damage by fire.
9A.5.5.6 Local Instrumentation and Control Equipment Safety-related panels are generally designed and located to serve a single division. However, some local panels or instrumentation contain equipment of more than one division where operational considerations or instrument piping considerations dictate against location or separated structures. In such cases, spatially diverse equipment allows for the disabling of all equipment on a single panel or rack.
These multidivisional panels and racks are either divided internally into compartments, with barriers between the divisional equipment for separation, or the divisional components have separate metal enclosures and separate enclosed metallic raceways (conduit) to obtain effective physical isolation and low probability of disabling damage to the equipment from a fire generated internally or externally.
The incoming cables for each division are in separate conduit and, where possible, the conduit is embedded in concrete or separated by greater than 0.91 m horizontally, 1.52 m vertically.
Some room areas contain more than one division of instrumentation or other equipment which is needed to isolate redundant sets of isolation values, HVAC or for some other purpose requiring redundancy. Such instrumentation or equipment is identified in Table 9A.5-1.
9A.5.5.7 Leak Detection System Ambient temperature or excessive process flow is measured to detect leakage of primary coolant into or within the below tabulated spaces.
Temperature sensors of redundant divisions are used in the spaces to detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and to generate signals that are ultimately used to provide isolation closure signals to the containment isolation valves.
Special Cases                                                                                            9A.5-9
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 The following table indicates areas where redundant divisions of leak detection equipment are located:
Area Monitored                                        Division MSL Pipe Tunnel                                        1,2,3,4 RHR Equipment Pump Room A                              1,2 RHR Equipment Pump Room B                              1,2 RHR Equipment Pump Room C                              1,3 RCIC Equipment Area                                    1,2 CUW Heat Exchanger Rooms                              1,2 CUW Pump Room 1                                        1,2 CUW Pump Room 2                                        1,2 CUW Valve Room                                        1,2 CUW Local Panels and Racks Area                        1,2 Turbine Building (MSL area)                            1,2,3,4 The Division 1 and 2 elements are located in separate temperature detector assemblies and the signal lead cables are brought out in separate rigid (or flexible) conduit. The sensors are located to sense ambient temperature within the listed areas.
Differential pressure detectors of redundant divisions are used to sense excessive flow (i.e.,
leakage) in process lines of the reactor water clean-up system.
The transmitters are located in separate enclosures and their connecting cables are housed in separate metal conduit. Shorting and/or grounding of these cables due to postulated fire would not jeopardize the emergency power busses because the low-voltage power supplies which feed the transmitters are current-limiting devices.
In event of fire in the spaces protected by temperature detection, it is expected that a signal will be generated by the ambient sensors at compartment temperatures well below the threshold of damage to equipment of either division. This signal would appear to the leak detection temperature sensor as a leak in the process piping or equipment within the compartment.
9A.5-10                                                                                        Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                        Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.5.5.8 Standby Liquid Control The following SLC equipment is located in the same general area of the reactor building at the 11,582 mm level, azimuth (approximately) 250&deg; (Division 2 general area) on a concrete slab outside the drywell:
Divisional Equipment                                                Designated Division Pump C41-C001A                                                                1 Pump C41-C001B                                                                2 Injection Valve (MO) C41-F006A                                                1 Injection Valve (MO) C41-F006B                                                2 Suction Valve (MO) C41-F00l-A                                                1 Suction Valve (MO) C41-F001B                                                  2 Control and Power Cabling to A Equipment                                    1 Control and Power Cabling to B Equipment                                    2 Nondivisional Equipment Boron Storage Tank Storage Tank Heating elements Power Cabling for Storage Tank Heaters The cabling is routed in separate conduit or trays for each division, separated from each other, to meet IEEE-384. Conduit will be embedded in concrete where feasible.
The electric drive motor and cabling for the redundant pumps are located more than 1.52 m apart. The injection valves and cabling are located more than 0.91 m apart centerline to centerline.
The control cables for Division 1 and 2 equipment are in separate conduit and separate from the power cables. The Division 1 power and control cabling is routed out of the Division 2 area to the Division 1 area by conduit embedded in the floor and wails.
Postulated fire damage to the electrical equipment in the SLC area could not inadvertently result in injection of boron because this can only be done by activation of a switch on the control room panel. Fire could damage the power cabling to the pump suction valves or to the pump motors Special Cases                                                                                            9A.5-11
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 preventing opening of valves or start of pump motors on command from the control room.
However, the SLC equipment is not required for safe shutdown of the reactor, since it is redundant to the RPS.
9A.5.5.9 Flammability Control System The flammability control system equipment is located in a large enclosed area at grade level at approximately 180 degrees azimuth. The rooms have a fire barrier floor and is completely surrounded by fire barrier walls and doors. There are large access doors to the outside at the centerline of the room.
The FCS is made up of two independent redundant divisions (Divisions 2 and 3), and each division is located in the fire area division 2 and 3 respectively. Each division has two suction isolation valves (inboard and outboard) and two return isolation valves (inboard and outboard).
The inboard isolation valves are motor operated (MO) valves, and the outboard isolation valves are fail close (FC) air operated (AO) solenoid valves (two solenoids per valve). They are powered from division 1 and 4. Fire in either division may cause the inboard valves (Div. 2 or
: 3) to fail to operate, but the outboard isolation valves are still capable to isolate because they are powered from different divisions (Div. 1 and 4). Loss of a complete division is acceptable because FCS is made up of two independent redundant divisions mounted in two separated fire areas.
9A.5.5.10 Emergency Core Cooling System For performing the aircraft impact assessment, fire damage is identified by fire area and by division for each elevation. All core cooling equipment is assumed lost within a division if there is any fire damage within a divisional fire area. The exception to this is where it has been determined from the Fire Hazards Analysis that a fire area does not contain any equipment necessary for core cooling. Such fire areas and their associated rooms are identified in the table below (note the special exceptions for F4301). Divisional equipment (including cabling and HVAC ducts) may not be added in or routed through these areas without an assessment under 10 CFR 50.150. See Section 19G.4.3 and Reference 19G-3.
Detailed cable routing is not provided in the DCD. In general divisional power, instrumentation and control cabling is routed within its own divisional area. In the event that cabling needs to be routed outside its assigned divisional area it must be protected from fire with a 3-hour fire rating and if necessary a 5-psid rating. Any divisional power, instrumentation and control cabling routed in any of the rooms described below must be assessed under 10 CFR 50.150.
9A.5-12                                                                                          Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                  Design Control Document/Tier 2 Fire Area    Room No.                      Comment F1510        195                            Northeast Stairwell F1520        192                            Northeast Elevator F1530        193                            Southwest Stairwell F1540        194                            Southwest Elevator F3101        341                            RSS not required as MCR is available for all strikes F3210        329                            West Stairwell F3211        328                            West Elevator F3300        315, 331, 336, 413, 517, 638,  FMCRD Equipment and non-1E power supplies 654 F3310        316                            East Stairwell F3311        317                            East Elevator F3400        345, 380, 444, 543            Division 4 F4203        611, 685                      HVAC for Main Steam Tunnel F4301        430, 433, 435, 438, 530, 531,  Instrumentation penetrations and instrument lines 615, 616, 617, 639, 657, 658,  associated with reactor water level and pressure and 674, 711, 716, 720, 721, 722,  drywell pressure are required to be wrapped with secure, 723, 733, 734, 741, 742        3-hour fire barrier material and, if necessary, 5-psid rated.
F4303        434, 537                      Fire buffer zone created between divisions 1 and 3 at elevation 1F and 2F F4304        437                            Fire buffer zone created between divisions 2 and 3 at elevation 1F F4305        535, 631                      Fire buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 2 and 3 at elevation 2F and 3F F4306        635                            Fire buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 2 and 3 at elevation 3F and 3.5F F4307        637                            Fire buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 2 and 3 at elevation 3F and 3.5F F6100        659                            Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System Rack A F6102        614, 644                      Fire buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 1 and 2 at elevation 3F F6200        640, 680                      Non-1E power supplies for FMCRD F7202        744                            Fire buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 1 and 2 at elevation 4F F7203        743                            Fire Buffer zone created in crossover corridor between divisions 1 and 2 at elevation 4F F7300        715                            RIP and ASD equipment Special Cases                                                                                        9A.5-13
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.5.5.11 Standby Gas Treatment System The Standby Gas Treatment System consists of two totally independent and redundant divisional trains (Div. II and Div.III). Each divisional train has a filter train (consisting of the demister, an electronic process heater, prefilter, pre-HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber, a post-HEPA filter and space heaters), an exhaust fan and cooling fan. The two divisional trains occupy two separate rooms separated by a 3-hour fire barrier. Each divisional train exhaust is connected to the R/A exhaust duct and they are isolated by fire dampers.
9A.5.5.12 Fine Motion Control Rod Drive Motors The power distribution for the FMCRD motors has been redesigned such that they are all powered from Division I, with a non-Class 1E backup power source. Therefore, a special case analysis is not required.
9A.5.5.13 Reactor Building Operating Deck Radiation Monitors Radiation monitoring within this area is facilitated by two independent systems. The area radiation monitoring system and the process radiation monitoring system.
The area radiation monitoring (ARM) system is non-safety related and uses two radiation channels in the fuel storage and handling areas. It has no system actuation function, but is used for monitoring of background radiation and radiation resulting from accidental fuel drops. The sensors are mounted on the walls within the fire zone area. These detectors are designed to annunciate local and control room alarms for both high and low radiation conditions. The low condition is an indication of an inoperative radiation monitor. Loss of these detectors, due to fire, does not impact plant safety.
The process radiation monitoring (PRM) channels that are utilized in this area are safety related, and are used to perform isolation functions. The Geiger Mueller detectors are mounted in the reactor building ventilation system exhaust duct (Rm 643). They are safety related, and receive their power from a dual auctioneered class 1E divisional high voltage power supplies of the digital ARM (D11-Z602A-D Div, 1-4). Each divisional digital ARM output voltage is hard wired to its associated detector and it is limited to 700 VDC, and 3 ma current. Each divisional power cable is routed separately in separate metal conduit. A fire in the room can develop a short on any detector power cable/or all the detectors power cables. A series resistor has been placed in each channel of the auctioneer power supplies, therefore, current drain on the high voltage supply will be limited and the fault will not propagate any further. A short on a power cable shall generate a down scale inop trip alarm to the ARM control logic in the control room.
The ARM control logic requires 2 out of 4 trip to initiate isolation of the reactor building ventilation exhaust duct automatically. Although a fire could cause the system to issue an isolation signal due to its effect on the radiation detectors, the containment isolation valves can be manually reopened from the control room by the operator.
9A.5-14                                                                                          Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 The Geiger Mueller detectors are mounted in the fuel handling exhaust radiation monitor area (Rms 716, 721, 733 and 742 respectively). They are safety related, and receive their power from a dual auctioneered class 1E divisional high voltage power supplies of the digital ARM (D11-Z602A-D Div. 1-4). Each divisional digital ARM output voltage is hard wired to its associated detector and it is limited to 700 VDC, and 3 ma current. Each divisional power cable is routed separately in separate metal conduit. A fire in any of the rooms can develop a short on a detector power cable. A series resistor has been placed in each channel of the auctioneered power supplies, the current drain on the high voltage supply will be limited and the fault will not propagate further. A short on power cable will generate a down scale inop trip alarm to the ARM control logic in the control room. The ARM control logic requires 2 out of 4 trip to initiate isolation of the fuel handling exhaust duct automatically. Therefore loss of one or all four divisional detectors in the area due to the fire is acceptable.
The PRM channels are designed such that any two-out-of-four signals, based on very high or very low radiation conditions within the HVAC duct, will initiate the standby gas treatment system (SGTS), isolate the HVAC for the reactor building secondary containment, and initiate closure of the containment vent and purge ducts. The very low radiation trip assures the safety action will be initiated in spite of sensor failure.
The four divisions of PRM sensors are located within close proximity to each other in order to provide true two-out-of-four actuation logic. The arrangement is justified by the automatic actuation of the systems safety function should two or more sensors fail and by the fact that the secondary containment isolation valves can be reopened from the control room by the operator.
9A.5.5.14 RHR Shutdown Cooling Outboard Isolation Valves These motor operated valves are safety related. The valves from divisions 2, 3, and 1 are located in valve rooms 414, 421 and 431 (fire area divisions 1, 2 and 3), respectively. This divisionally pairs inboard to outboard valve pairs 2 to 1, 3 to 2, and 1 to 3. The inboard valves which are inaccessible during plant operation match the division of the line in which they are installed. If a division fails, the outboard valve of that division can be manually opened to place the non failed division in operation. For example, if division 3 fails, the division 3 outboard valve which is paired with the division 1 inboard valve can be manually opened to put the division 1 system into service.
From the standpoint of fire, a fire at the location of either an inboard or outboard valve would not prevent closure of the other valve of the pair. If the fire occurred in the valve room, the inboard valve could be closed. If the fire occurred outside the valve room but inside of the secondary containment, it is possible that the power feeds to the outboard valve and the system which the valve was mounted in could both be disabled by the fire. Since the fire is not in the valve room, personnel could enter the valve room and manually close the valve.
Special Cases                                                                                              9A.5-15
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                      Design Control Document/Tier 2 9A.5.5.15 RCIC System The RCIC main steam supply outboard isolation valve is a division 2 valve to provide redundancy to the inboard isolation valve. The division 2 outboard valve is located in the division 1 valve room. A fire in the valve room would not prevent closure of the inboard valve which is inside of the containment.
There are 4 safety related turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure transmitters (division 1 and 2) located in the division 1 RCIC room. The transmitters only serve a purpose when the turbine is operating. If a fire occurs the turbine would be shut down and loss of all 4 sensors would be acceptable.
9A.5.5.16 Containment Isolation Valves The primary function of each isolation valve is to close to isolate primary containment when isolation is required. In general, outboard isolation valves are assigned to division 1 and inboard isolation valves to division 2. In some cases this results in division 1 outboard isolation valves being located in division 2 or 3 areas. This is acceptable from a functional standpoint because a fire in an area outside of containment and involving the penetration must be assumed to disable the system anyway, without regard to whether or not the outboard isolation valve is disabled. If the valve is open at the time of the fire it could fail in the open position and remain open but the inboard valve would not be involved in the fire and would close on demand. It is a requirement that cables for outboard valves located in fire areas of a division different than the division of the valve not be routed through fire areas containing any circuitry associated with the inboard valve of the isolation pair. See Table 9A.5-2 for identification of specific valves which fall in this category.
9A.5.5.17 Division 4 Sensors There are a few cases of division 4 instruments being mounted in division 2 fire and HVAC area. It is possible that both the division 2 and 4 sensors could be lost due to a single fire. This would either cause the two channels to trip high or alarm down scale. A high trip would cause the protective action to be taken as a result of the two-out-of-four logic. For a down scale trip, the operator would know that a failure had occurred and automatic action would still be initiated by divisions 1 or 3. For these reasons, simultaneous loss of both the divisions 2 and 4 instruments is acceptable.
9A.5.6 Not Used 9A.5.7 Typical Circuits Analysis of Special Cases This analysis is for those cases where a device from one division is located in an area of another division. Only typical cases are analyzed here. Each case type is assigned an electrical separation type code for unique identification. An analysis and a typical electrical connection block diagram (Figure 9A.5-2) are presented for each typical case. Table 9A.5-2 provides a 9A.5-16                                                                                            Special Cases
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                          Design Control Document/Tier 2 summary of the special cases of the equipment in the reactor building discussed in Appendix 9A.5 Special Cases. It provides the justification and their acceptability from the standpoint of the consequences on the electrical circuits only. The table also references analyses to confirm the acceptability of the loss of function.
In all cases Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE-384 are met. The justification is for the acceptability of complete burnout of the fire area in which the device is located.
Cases with special situations which do not lend themselves to a typical analysis are discussed individually in Appendix 9A, Section 9A.5.
Type 1A, Large 460V Motor This type is for a 460V Class 1E motor which is fed from a 480V Class 1E power center and is located in a divisional area different than the division of the motor. A current limiting fuse is added downstream of the breaker in the power center to provide Class 1E redundant protection for the motor feed circuit to assure that a motor or cable fault does not propagate back to the bus and cause the bus supply breaker to open. A fault in the motor circuit will cause a momentary voltage drop on the bus but the 480V loads are required to be designed to accommodate momentary voltage dips while a load breaker is clearing a downstream fault.
Tables referencing this typical circuit analysis should have a column which gives the justification for the acceptability of the loss of function of the device.
Type 1B, Small 460V Motor Type 1B is the same as Type 1A except that the source of power is a 480V motor control center.
Otherwise, the discussion for Type 1A applies.
Type 1C, 460V Motor Operated Valve Type 1C is the same as Type 1B except that the load is a 460V valve motor and therefore has a cable for position switches as well as a power cable. The power for the position switches is required to be provided by a control power transformer in the MCC cubicle so that faults in the position switch circuits affect only the power source for the one valve. The motor power circuit protection is the same as Type 1B.
Type 2A, Thermocouple Cables are routed in low level signal cable trays with covers or in conduit so that there are no voltage sources within the raceways which could short to the thermocouples leads to create overvoltage situations in the thermocouple circuits. Loss of signal is all that could occur as a result of failures in the thermocouple circuits. Transfer of voltage disturbances upstream is blocked by the millivolt readout circuits of the signal multiplexer. Tables referencing this typical circuit analysis should have a column which gives the justification for the acceptability of the loss of function of the device.
Special Cases                                                                                            9A.5-17
 
25A5675AL Revision 7 ABWR                                                                    Design Control Document/Tier 2 Type 2B, Process Instrument Transmitters Cables for transmitters for process instruments are routed in low level signal cable trays with covers or in conduit so that there are no voltage sources within the raceways which could short and create overvoltage situations in the instrument circuits. Loss of signal could occur as a result of failures in the transmitter circuits. Upscale and/or downscale trips and/or alarms are provided. The current power supply in the signal multiplexer blocks upstream transfer of voltage and current disturbances which may occur in the cable or transmitter. Tables referencing this typical circuit analysis should have a column which gives the justification for the acceptability of the loss of function of the device.
Type 3B, AC Solenoid Valves The pow}}

Latest revision as of 03:08, 23 December 2024

GE-Hitachi ABWR Design Control Document Tier 1 & 2, Rev. 7 - Chapter 09 - Auxiliary Systems
ML20007E338
Person / Time
Site: 05200001, 05200045
Issue date: 12/20/2019
From: Michelle Catts
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shea J
References
GEHITACHIABWR, GEHITACHIABWR.SUBMISSION.8, 25A5675.P, 25A5675.P.7
Download: ML20007E338 (995)
v • d • e


Text

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20007E338&oldid=4661185"