ML20084E053

AO 50-237/75-19:on 750321,secondary Containment Integrity Violated for 3 Minutes.Caused by Misunderstanding Between Security Guard & Shift Foreman.Guard Staff to Be Informed of Problems

ML20084E053
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	03/31/1975
From:	Stephenson B COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
207-75, 3603, AO-50-237-75-19, NUDOCS 8304130575
Download: ML20084E053 (4)

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BB3 Ltr. #207-75 Dresden Nuclear Power Station R'. R. #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 March 31, 1975 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional' Director Directorate of Regulatory Operation-Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 799 Roosevelt Road s

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF AVRORMAL OCCURRE.'CE PER SETION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICNPIC::3 VIDIATION OF SEONDARY CC'EAIII'ENT

References:

1) Regulatory Guido 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A

2) Notification of Region III of U. S. Nuclear Reguletory Comission Telaphana' D. J0hren 1615 h:ure en ".rch 21,17;5 Telegram J. G. Keppler1355 hours on March 24, 1975 Report Number: 50-237/1975-19 4

b Report Date: March 31, 1975 Occurrence Date: March 21, 1975 Facility: Drcaden Nuclear Powei Station, Morris, Illinois IDD RIFICATION OF OCCURRE!CE On March 21, 1975 at approximately 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />, secondary containment integrity was violated for approximately threc minutes. Thio represents a limiting condition for operation as established in Section 3 of the technical specifications.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRD:CE Prior to the occurrence, Unit 2 reactor was locked in the shutdown mode with primary conte.inment broken. On th:.it 3, the reactor was in the run mode with steady power of 1270 IGt at a load of 400 ige.

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DR ADOCK 05000237 PDR COPY SENT REGION

Mr. Jame; G. K pplof March 31, 1973 j

t DESCRIPTION OF OCCU M ~

At 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br /> on March 21, 1975, Unit 2 was shutdown for its third refueling outage. During the time of the occurrence, an engine driven Pettibone Crane was supporting outage work in the reactor building trackway area.

In the same area, a personnel interlock door exists botween the Unit 2 reactor building, outside atmosphere and the U 2/3 Diesel Generator room. Due to the large number of off site personnel involved in the present refueling outage, a security guard is on duty at this interlock door at all times.

With the crano engine exhausting fumes into the trackway, the guard became concerned because his assigned station was in close proximity to the crane.

In accordance with proper procedures, the guard requested pomission to open the drywell doors for additional ventilation. Permission was granted by an operating shift foreman. The guard then proceeded to open the interlock doors between the reactor building and the outside, thus violating secondary contain-ment.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCL(Personnel Error)

In reviewing this situation, it appears there was a misunderstanding between the security guard and the shift foreman. The misunderotanding stems from two sources:

1) The security guard's lack of proper component identification and 2) the chift foreman not questioning the request considering the short span of time that the guards have been workirs at the station.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE The occurrence did not significantly jeopordize the safety of the general public, plant personnel nor the plant components. The doors were estimated to have been open between 3 to 5 minutes. In addition, the entrance was guarded from unauthorized entry at all times during this span of time.

CORRIITIVE ACTION The maintenance foreman, who was responsible for the work area returned to the area and immediately reclosed the interlock doors.

As a result of the above occurrence, it will be explained to the security force that proper identification of components is most important when t*ng to operating personnel. Efforts vill be made to make the guard force more familiar with the physical layout of the station. Due to the large size of the guard force this will be done on on informal bacio.

FAILURE DATA To date, no previous occurrences of this nature,have.been experienced.

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RO Inspection Report No.

Transmittal Date Distribution:

Distribution:

RO Chief, FS&EB R0 Chief, FS&EB RO:llQ (5)

RO: LIQ (4)

DR Central Files L:D/D for Fuels & Materials Regulatory Standards (3)

DR Central Files Licensing (13)

RO Files RO Files B.

RO Inquiry Report No.

Transmittal liste Distribution:

Distribution:

RO Chicf, FSLEB R0 Chicf, FS&EB RO: LIQ (5)

.RO:11Q DR Central Files DR Central Files j

Regulatory Standards (3)

RO Files Licensing (13)

RO Files C.

Incident Notification From: Coneonwealth Edison - Dresden Station, Unit 2 (Licensee & Docket No. (or License No.) 50-237 Transmittal Date

. April 2. 1975 Distribution:

Distribution:

IE Chief, FS&EB RO Chief, FS&EB IE:11Q (4)

RO:llQ (4)

Licensing (4)

L:D/D for Fucis & Materials DR Central Files DR Central Files

'IE Files RO Files a

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