ENS 43083: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 11/10/2006 00:10 CST | | event date = 11/10/2006 00:10 CST | ||
| last update date = 03/13/2007 | | last update date = 03/13/2007 | ||
| title = Edg Actuation Due | | title = Edg Actuation Due to Accidental Switch Mispositioning | ||
| event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of any of the equipment specified in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). In this case, the equipment actuated was the four Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators (EDG) A, B, C, and D. These EDGs are common equipment for Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2. | | event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of any of the equipment specified in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). In this case, the equipment actuated was the four Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators (EDG) A, B, C, and D. These EDGs are common equipment for Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2. | ||
On November 10, 2006, personnel were performing surveillance requirement (SR) test 0-SR-3.8.1.6, Common Accident Signal Logic. At this time Browns Ferry Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled, and Unit 2 was operating at 100% thermal power. During conduct of this testing, at 0010 hours CST, all four of the common U1/2 EDGs were inadvertently started. This occurred when test personnel (non-licensed) inadvertently placed a keylock switch in the wrong position during the equipment restoration portion of the testing. The SR test step being performed was correct, but it was incorrectly implemented. | On November 10, 2006, personnel were performing surveillance requirement (SR) test 0-SR-3.8.1.6, Common Accident Signal Logic. At this time Browns Ferry Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled, and Unit 2 was operating at 100% thermal power. During conduct of this testing, at 0010 hours CST, all four of the common U1/2 EDGs were inadvertently started. This occurred when test personnel (non-licensed) inadvertently placed a keylock switch in the wrong position during the equipment restoration portion of the testing. The SR test step being performed was correct, but it was incorrectly implemented. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:17, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1425.62 h59.401 days <br />8.486 weeks <br />1.953 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | William Baker 15:47 Jan 8, 2007 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Mar 13, 2007 |
| 43083 - NRC Website
| |
| 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Actuation of a General Containment Isolation Signal Affecting More than One System | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Specified System Actuation [Table view] | ||