TXX-9253, Final Deficiency Rept CP-89-015 Re Backleakage Through AFW Check Valves Supplied by Bw/Ip Intl,Inc.Initially Reported on 890519 & Documented in Insp Rept 50-446/92-25. Check Valves Will Be Inspected Prior to Fuel Load: Difference between revisions

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[ 7 d       Log # TXX-9?538
[ 7 d Log # TXX-9?538 m
                                                  ,    m -
file # 903.9, 910.4 10110 CP-89-015, 019 r
file # 903.9, 910.4 10110 CP-89-015, 019 r           10130 1R 89-30, 30 TUU ECTRIC November 25, 1992 WlHl.m J. cahllt, Jr.
10130 1R 89-30, 30 TUU ECTRIC November 25, 1992 WlHl.m J. cahllt, Jr.
Gwur nre brudeM U. S. tJclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Gwur nre brudeM U. S. tJclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555


Line 27: Line 27:
DOCKET NO. 50-446 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES SDAR CP-89-015 (FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 2)
DOCKET NO. 50-446 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES SDAR CP-89-015 (FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 2)
Gentlemen:
Gentlemen:
On May 19, 1989, TU Electric orally notified the NRC of a deficiency involving backleakage through Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System check valves supplied by BW/IP International, Inc., On June 19, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89424. On June 26, 1989, TV Electric oral'y notified the NRC of a deficiency involving the manufacturing of BW/IP supplied check valve swing arms. On July 25, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89517. On October 26, 1989, TV Electric submitted a final report for the swing arm deficiency and an interim report for the backleakage events via TXX-89778 and stated that the scope of SDAR-CP-89-015 vould be expanded to include the swing arm deficiency described in SDAR CP-39-019. On December 2 , 1989, TV Electric submitted TXX 39849, SDAR CP-89-015, Final Report for Unit 1 - Interim Report ror Unit 2. The Interim Report provided             _
On May 19, 1989, TU Electric orally notified the NRC of a deficiency involving backleakage through Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System check valves supplied by BW/IP International, Inc.,
the status of corrective actions for commitments identified in TXX-89849 concerning Unit 2.
On June 19, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89424. On June 26, 1989, TV Electric oral'y notified the NRC of a deficiency involving the manufacturing of BW/IP supplied check valve swing arms.
On July 25, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89517.
On October 26, 1989, TV Electric submitted a final report for the swing arm deficiency and an interim report for the backleakage events via TXX-89778 and stated that the scope of SDAR-CP-89-015 vould be expanded to include the swing arm deficiency described in SDAR CP-39-019.
On December 2, 1989, TV Electric submitted TXX 39849, SDAR CP-89-015, Final Report for Unit 1 - Interim Report ror Unit 2.
The Interim Report provided the status of corrective actions for commitments identified in TXX-89849 concerning Unit 2.
During the inspection period from June 14 through Auoust 1, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9225 dated August 26, 1992, the NRC monitored ano assessed CPSES actions pertaining to check valve test f ailures in the Unit 2 AFW System miniflow lines which occurred on June 17, 1992 and 2AF-0083 in the steam generator supply line on July 3, 1992.
During the inspection period from June 14 through Auoust 1, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9225 dated August 26, 1992, the NRC monitored ano assessed CPSES actions pertaining to check valve test f ailures in the Unit 2 AFW System miniflow lines which occurred on June 17, 1992 and 2AF-0083 in the steam generator supply line on July 3, 1992.
During the inspection period from September 13 through October 24, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9242; 446/9242 dated November 16, 1992, the NRC monitored and further assessed CPSES actions pertaining to the 2AF-0083 check valve failure.
During the inspection period from September 13 through October 24, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9242; 446/9242 dated November 16, 1992, the NRC monitored and further assessed CPSES actions pertaining to the 2AF-0083 check valve failure.
This is a Final Report and describes the status of corrective actions for the BW/IP check valves. This report also describes the status of other actions taken for the backflow events which occurred in Unit 1 in 1989 as they apply to Unit 2.
This is a Final Report and describes the status of corrective actions for the BW/IP check valves. This report also describes the status of other actions taken for the backflow events which occurred in Unit 1 in 1989 as they apply to Unit 2.
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TXX-92538                                                                                                                   1 Page 2 of 3 followun on PAF-0083 and Miniflow Line Chet.k Valve failure; 2AF-0057. Q.Qfd                             .
TXX-92538 1
Regarding 2AF-0083, on August 11, 1992, at the request of HRC, CPSES                                                       i submitted TXX-92384. This letter provided Engineering Repert PTR-032 as an attachment and described the failure mechanism and completed corrective actions for 2AF-0083. The report also described immediate corrective actions, investigative techniques such as metallurigal examination, t-alsient and stress analysis, system design review, operating nistory,                                                     i contributing factors and long term corrective actions.
Page 2 of 3 followun on PAF-0083 and Miniflow Line Chet.k Valve failure; 2AF-0057. Q.Qfd Regarding 2AF-0083, on August 11, 1992, at the request of HRC, CPSES i
submitted TXX-92384.
This letter provided Engineering Repert PTR-032 as an attachment and described the failure mechanism and completed corrective actions for 2AF-0083. The report also described immediate corrective actions, investigative techniques such as metallurigal examination, t-alsient and stress analysis, system design review, operating nistory, i
contributing factors and long term corrective actions.
Corrective actions which had not been completed at the time of issuance of PTR-032 included 1) removal of backstops in eight AFW check valves
Corrective actions which had not been completed at the time of issuance of PTR-032 included 1) removal of backstops in eight AFW check valves
: 2) revision of operetional procedures (50Ps) 3) acoustic morsitoring of the-above eight valves and 4) a request to BW/IP to provide a redesigned disc-stud. All of these actions except 4) have been completed. BW/IP has provided a proposal for a new design. CPSES will evaluate this proposal and                                                 ;
: 2) revision of operetional procedures (50Ps) 3) acoustic morsitoring of the-above eight valves and 4) a request to BW/IP to provide a redesigned disc-stud.
may request others. Once design and production are complete CPSES will replace the installed studs if the valves are disassembled or if the studs require repair.
All of these actions except 4) have been completed.
Regarding the miniflow check valve failures, as noted in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9125 engineering evaluated this condition and the valves safety function. The cause was determined to be internal interference                                                       '
BW/IP has provided a proposal for a new design.
between the valve body and disc unique to three inch BW/IP pressure seal check valves. In addition, engineering determined the valves had no safety function. Therefore, a design modification was issued and the valve                                                         t internals were removed.
CPSES will evaluate this proposal and may request others. Once design and production are complete CPSES will replace the installed studs if the valves are disassembled or if the studs require repair.
Regarding the miniflow check valve failures, as noted in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9125 engineering evaluated this condition and the valves safety function.
The cause was determined to be internal interference between the valve body and disc unique to three inch BW/IP pressure seal check valves.
In addition, engineering determined the valves had no safety function.
Therefore, a design modification was issued and the valve t
internals were removed.
Followun on Previous Unit 2 Commitments As discussed in previous correspondence numerous commitments were made relative to the backflow events, operator errors and BW/IP check valves.
Followun on Previous Unit 2 Commitments As discussed in previous correspondence numerous commitments were made relative to the backflow events, operator errors and BW/IP check valves.
These commitments have been reviewed for splicability to Unit 2. Based on-a search of the Commitment Tracking System eighty three commitments were relevant to Unit 2. Of those, the commitments discussed below remain open.-
These commitments have been reviewed for splicability to Unit 2.
Based on-a search of the Commitment Tracking System eighty three commitments were relevant to Unit 2.
Of those, the commitments discussed below remain open.-
As discussed above the propossi for a new disc stud design is presently under review.
As discussed above the propossi for a new disc stud design is presently under review.
TXX-91076 stated that an external alignment device,'which prevents axial misalignment of the check-valw disc, would be installed after Hot functional Testing (HFT) but prior to fuel load. Six valves, as yet, do not have the devices installed. Ir addition, these valves plus a number-of other BW/IP check valves have not yet undergone tc: ting. -Testing of-all                                                   -
TXX-91076 stated that an external alignment device,'which prevents axial misalignment of the check-valw disc, would be installed after Hot functional Testing (HFT) but prior to fuel load.
remaining BW/IP check valvas and installation of external alignment devices will.be completed prior to fuel load.
Six valves, as yet, do not have the devices installed.
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Ir addition, these valves plus a number-of other BW/IP check valves have not yet undergone tc: ting. -Testing of-all remaining BW/IP check valvas and installation of external alignment devices will.be completed prior to fuel load.
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* e TXX-925Lo Page 3 of 3 IXX-89596 stated that reach rod operators for safety related valves would be evaluated for proper operability and human factors considerations. The letter also stated that information would be gathered on i9 mote operated valves concerning ease of operation access, adequate lighting, required number of turns and length of time to operate. These actions are in progress and will be completed prior to fuel load.
e TXX-925Lo Page 3 of 3 IXX-89596 stated that reach rod operators for safety related valves would be evaluated for proper operability and human factors considerations.
TXX-89744 stated that check valves other than the three inch miniflow valves (1AF-045, IAF-057 and 1AF-069) would be inspected in accordance with Kalsi recommendations. The program for implementing these recommendations is in place but not yet fully implemented.                                 Full implementation will occur coincident with development of the preventive maintenance program prior to fuel load.
The letter also stated that information would be gathered on i9 mote operated valves concerning ease of operation access, adequate lighting, required number of turns and length of time to operate.
Sincerely,                 /
These actions are in progress and will be completed prior to fuel load.
h         d--     ,  .
TXX-89744 stated that check valves other than the three inch miniflow valves (1AF-045, IAF-057 and 1AF-069) would be inspected in accordance with Kalsi recommendations.
The program for implementing these recommendations is in place but not yet fully implemented.
Full implementation will occur coincident with development of the preventive maintenance program prior to fuel load.
Sincerely,
/
h d--
William J. Cahill, Jr.
William J. Cahill, Jr.
ILH/ds c - Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV Resident inspectors, CPSES (2)
ILH/ds c - Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV Resident inspectors, CPSES (2)
Mr. T. A. Bergman, NRR Hr. B. E. Ho'ian, NRR
Mr. T. A. Bergman, NRR Hr. B. E. Ho'ian, NRR
_-_-__- _____ _ _____ _ _ _ ______ - -                                  -}}
-}}

Latest revision as of 15:15, 12 December 2024

Final Deficiency Rept CP-89-015 Re Backleakage Through AFW Check Valves Supplied by Bw/Ip Intl,Inc.Initially Reported on 890519 & Documented in Insp Rept 50-446/92-25. Check Valves Will Be Inspected Prior to Fuel Load
ML20128A122
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak 
Issue date: 11/25/1992
From: William Cahill
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CP-89-015, CP-89-15, TXX-92538, NUDOCS 9212030189
Download: ML20128A122 (3)
v • d • e


Text

.

o.

[ 7 d Log # TXX-9?538 m

file # 903.9, 910.4 10110 CP-89-015, 019 r

10130 1R 89-30, 30 TUU ECTRIC November 25, 1992 WlHl.m J. cahllt, Jr.

Gwur nre brudeM U. S. tJclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NO. 50-446 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES SDAR CP-89-015 (FINAL REPORT FOR UNIT 2)

Gentlemen:

On May 19, 1989, TU Electric orally notified the NRC of a deficiency involving backleakage through Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) System check valves supplied by BW/IP International, Inc.,

On June 19, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89424. On June 26, 1989, TV Electric oral'y notified the NRC of a deficiency involving the manufacturing of BW/IP supplied check valve swing arms.

On July 25, 1989, an interim report was submitted via TXX-89517.

On October 26, 1989, TV Electric submitted a final report for the swing arm deficiency and an interim report for the backleakage events via TXX-89778 and stated that the scope of SDAR-CP-89-015 vould be expanded to include the swing arm deficiency described in SDAR CP-39-019.

On December 2, 1989, TV Electric submitted TXX 39849, SDAR CP-89-015, Final Report for Unit 1 - Interim Report ror Unit 2.

The Interim Report provided the status of corrective actions for commitments identified in TXX-89849 concerning Unit 2.

During the inspection period from June 14 through Auoust 1, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9225 dated August 26, 1992, the NRC monitored ano assessed CPSES actions pertaining to check valve test f ailures in the Unit 2 AFW System miniflow lines which occurred on June 17, 1992 and 2AF-0083 in the steam generator supply line on July 3, 1992.

During the inspection period from September 13 through October 24, 1992, as documented in Inspection Report 445/9242; 446/9242 dated November 16, 1992, the NRC monitored and further assessed CPSES actions pertaining to the 2AF-0083 check valve failure.

This is a Final Report and describes the status of corrective actions for the BW/IP check valves. This report also describes the status of other actions taken for the backflow events which occurred in Unit 1 in 1989 as they apply to Unit 2.

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_u. s_ mi ma.a.m >m

TXX-92538 1

Page 2 of 3 followun on PAF-0083 and Miniflow Line Chet.k Valve failure; 2AF-0057. Q.Qfd Regarding 2AF-0083, on August 11, 1992, at the request of HRC, CPSES i

submitted TXX-92384.

This letter provided Engineering Repert PTR-032 as an attachment and described the failure mechanism and completed corrective actions for 2AF-0083. The report also described immediate corrective actions, investigative techniques such as metallurigal examination, t-alsient and stress analysis, system design review, operating nistory, i

contributing factors and long term corrective actions.

Corrective actions which had not been completed at the time of issuance of PTR-032 included 1) removal of backstops in eight AFW check valves

2) revision of operetional procedures (50Ps) 3) acoustic morsitoring of the-above eight valves and 4) a request to BW/IP to provide a redesigned disc-stud.

All of these actions except 4) have been completed.

BW/IP has provided a proposal for a new design.

CPSES will evaluate this proposal and may request others. Once design and production are complete CPSES will replace the installed studs if the valves are disassembled or if the studs require repair.

Regarding the miniflow check valve failures, as noted in Inspection Report 445/9225; 446/9125 engineering evaluated this condition and the valves safety function.

The cause was determined to be internal interference between the valve body and disc unique to three inch BW/IP pressure seal check valves.

In addition, engineering determined the valves had no safety function.

Therefore, a design modification was issued and the valve t

internals were removed.

Followun on Previous Unit 2 Commitments As discussed in previous correspondence numerous commitments were made relative to the backflow events, operator errors and BW/IP check valves.

These commitments have been reviewed for splicability to Unit 2.

Based on-a search of the Commitment Tracking System eighty three commitments were relevant to Unit 2.

Of those, the commitments discussed below remain open.-

As discussed above the propossi for a new disc stud design is presently under review.

TXX-91076 stated that an external alignment device,'which prevents axial misalignment of the check-valw disc, would be installed after Hot functional Testing (HFT) but prior to fuel load.

Six valves, as yet, do not have the devices installed.

Ir addition, these valves plus a number-of other BW/IP check valves have not yet undergone tc: ting. -Testing of-all remaining BW/IP check valvas and installation of external alignment devices will.be completed prior to fuel load.

v

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e

-w.

s*m,,-

x--4 m~ mar ='*

r e tw M

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4+ =

-L-

--Ww r=

M e'W3 Y

-e-

--mi-T ii yh14 u-s

~

e TXX-925Lo Page 3 of 3 IXX-89596 stated that reach rod operators for safety related valves would be evaluated for proper operability and human factors considerations.

The letter also stated that information would be gathered on i9 mote operated valves concerning ease of operation access, adequate lighting, required number of turns and length of time to operate.

These actions are in progress and will be completed prior to fuel load.

TXX-89744 stated that check valves other than the three inch miniflow valves (1AF-045, IAF-057 and 1AF-069) would be inspected in accordance with Kalsi recommendations.

The program for implementing these recommendations is in place but not yet fully implemented.

Full implementation will occur coincident with development of the preventive maintenance program prior to fuel load.

Sincerely,

/

h d--

William J. Cahill, Jr.

ILH/ds c - Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV Resident inspectors, CPSES (2)

Mr. T. A. Bergman, NRR Hr. B. E. Ho'ian, NRR

-

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