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| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[IR 05000309/1997003]] |
| | number = ML20140C699
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| | issue date = 06/05/1997
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| | title = Insp Rept 50-309/97-03 on 970316-0426.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support
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| | author name =
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| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
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| | addressee name =
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| | addressee affiliation =
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| | docket = 05000309
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| | license number =
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| | contact person =
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| | document report number = 50-309-97-03, 50-309-97-3, NUDOCS 9706100030
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| | package number = ML20140C683
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| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
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| | page count = 26
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| }}
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| See also: [[see also::IR 05000309/1997003]]
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| =Text=
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| {{#Wiki_filter:. .. . . - . . . _ - - .. . . - . - . . . - - . - . ~ .
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| l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| REGION I
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| Docket No: 50-309
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| License No: DPR-36 ;
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| Report No: 50-309/97-03
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| ; Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC)
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| Facility: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station l
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| ;.
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| Location: Bailey Point
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| Wiscasset, Maine
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| 1
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| Dates: March 16, through April 26,1997
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| l Inspectors: Jimi Yerokun, Senior Resident !nspector ;
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| i Division of Reactor Projects
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| Richard Rasmussen, Resident inspector
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| Division of Reactor Projects
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| Randolph Ragland, Radiation Specialist ;
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| Division of Reactor Safety i
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| Approved by: Curtis J. Cowgill, Ill, Chief, Projects Branch No. 5
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| Division of Reactor Projects
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| "
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| 9706100030 970605
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| PDR ADOCK 05000309 te
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| O PDR
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| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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| Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
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| NRC Inspection Report 50-309/97-03
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| This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
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| maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six week period of resident
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| inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional
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| inspector in the area of radiation protection,
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| 1
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| Ooerstions
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| l
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| Plant personnel responded appropriately when it was determined that some safety-related
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| valves had not been tested as required by in-Service Test Program. Operability
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| determinations were timely and well documented and provided an adequate basis for
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| returning the residual heat removal (RHR) system to an operable condition. When an RHR ,
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| suction valve failed to open during this testing, operators were cautiously monitoring core I
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| temperatures, and were prepared to open the valve manually, if necessary. (Section 01.2)
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| During the RHR suction valve testing, an inadequate cross-disciplinary review and lack of
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| understanding of the impact of other ongoing surveillance activities, was considered an
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| example of inadequate control of activities resulting in a configuration control problem. A
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| prior example was documented in NRC inspection report 50-309/97-01, which involved a l
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| 1300 gallon spill of RWST water due to operations not understanding the effects of l
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| ongoing pump work on the pressure boundary. (Section 01.2)
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| Operators generally maintained good safety focus and properly operated the systems
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| needed to maintain the plant in a safe, shutdown condition. The " protected train" program
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| clearly identified components of concern and restricted access into these areas, providing
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| an additional level of control for this equipment. (Section 02.1)
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| Instances of weak operator performance continued to occur as demonstrated during the
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| baseline testing of a containment spray (CS) pump and during residual heat removal (RHR)
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| suction valve testing. As a result of inattention to detail, an operator started a low
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| pressure safety injection pump in lieu of a CS pump. Contributing to this event was
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| weakness in the control room command cnd control function and poor on-shift
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| communications. The Shift Operating Supervisor did not take the appropriate immediate
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| action to deal with the operator error, which would have been termination of the test, and
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| the Plant Shift Superintendent was not notified of the error in a timely manner. (Section
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| 04.1)
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| Progress was made in implementing the Learning Process; however, continued focus to
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| fully implement the process was noted as necessary. Approximately three months after
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| initiation, a back log had developed and the majority of learning bank issues with the
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| highest risk levels (one and two), had not been formally accepted by issue managers.
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| (Section 07)
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| ii
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| Maintenance
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| As the focus shifted to a refueling outage, the volume of maintenance work increased. l
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| Work was appropriately controlled in the field and performed in accordance with approved I
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| procedures. (Section M1)
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| Enaineerina
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| Good efforts were ongoing to address the problems with fire barrier penetration seals. j
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| Initiallicensee engineering inspection results indicated that about 90% of the '
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| approximately 2,600 penetrations inspected required replacement or repair. Some of the
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| discrepancies included: inadequate seal thickness; improper damming; defective seals (bad
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| structure, gaps or voids); inadequate material (cerafiber only); and presence of foreign
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| materials. (Section E8.3)
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| Plant Sucoort
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| in the area of plant support, we found that Maine Yankee continued to maintain adequate
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| programs in the areas of occupational radiation exposure. ALARA planning and health
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| physics oversight of steam generator work activities were excellent, and contamination
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| control initiatives were very good. Notwithstanding, the restricted area tool control
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| program was not fully developed; some contamination monitoring practices were found to
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| be inconsistent. The newly implemented learning process had distinct advantages over the
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| formerly used radiological incident reporting system, although some difficulties with
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| administrative use of the learning bank were encountered and a backlog appeared to be -
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| developing relative to high priority issues that remained to be assigned to an issue
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| manager. Finally, although learning bank corrective action tasks were generally sufficient
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| to prevent recurrence, an example was identified where the corrective action addressed the
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| symptom and not the listed apparent cause. (Section R1)
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| In the security area, activities continued to be conducted well as evidenced by the good
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| performance of two security officers on April 15,1997, when they diligently performed
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| their task and identified contraband during a vehicle search and thus prevented the item
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| from being brought into the protected area. (Section S4.1)
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| iii
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS -
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| TABLE O F CO NT ENT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
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| l . O pe r a tio n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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| O1 Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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| 02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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| 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. 3
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| 07' Quality Assurance in Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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| 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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| ll. Maintenance................................................... 7
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| M1 Conduct of Maintenance .................................. 7
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| M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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| 111. Engineering ................................................... 8
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| E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . ...................8
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| I V. Pl a nt Su p p o rt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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| R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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| R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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| R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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| R6- RP&C Organization and Administration ....................... 15
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| R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities ........................ 16
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| R8- Miscellaneous RP&C lssues ............................... 18
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| S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance ........ 19
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| V. Management Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.
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| X1 Exit Meeting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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| X2. April 3,1997, Public Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 20
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| INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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| ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-
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| LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ......................................... 22
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| Report Details
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| Summarv of Plant Status
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| Maine Yankee remained in the cold shutdown condition and officiaily entered a refueling
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| outage during this period. The spent fuel pool re-rack project was the critical path for the
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| i outage. Maine Yankee plans a full core off-load in conjunction with the replacement of the I
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| leaking fuel assemblies and similar, susceptible assemblies.
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| ; l. Operations
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| 01 Conduct of Operations
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| l 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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| Using Inspection procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted reviews of ongoing plant l
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| operations. Operations maintained good fccus on and control of the systems required for
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| chutdown cooling. They provided good support for ongoing outage activities, such as the
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| j spent fuel pool re-racking and the eddy current testing of the steam generators.
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| i 01.2 Residual Heat Removal System Declared inoperable
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| a. Insoection Scope
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| On April 11,1997, engineering personnel notified operations personnel of
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| deficiencies in the in-service test program (IST) that resulted in the technical
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| specification required boration flowpath and both trains of residual heat removal
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| (RHR) being declared inoperable. The inspector reviewed the testing and
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| verifications performed prior to declaring the boration flowpath and RHR operable.
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| b. Observations and Findinas
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| Prior to the review of the IST issues on April 11,1997, RHR was in service and
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| both trains were considered operable. The IST program review was being
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| performed as outlined in Appendix G of the Maine Yankee Restart Readiness Plan.
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| identified deficiencies ranged from tests that were performed, but were not
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| adequately documented, to tests that were never performed, in total, thirty
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| deficiencies were identified that affected boration, RHR or RHR support systems.
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| Operations utilized the learning bank process and operability determinations to
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| address the various concerns. The operability determinations documented the
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| i resolutions to each of the specific problems. For some manually operated valves,
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| the IST test requirement was that the valve had operated properly within a specified
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| period of time. Several valves were declared operable based on records of having
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| been operated due to normal plant procedures. However, some corrective actions
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| ; included developing and implementing new test procedures to test the valves.
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| Other deficiencies such as relief valves that required testing were able to be
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| compensated for in the shutdown condition by administratively tagging open vent
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| paths to provide alternate over pressure protection.
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| 2
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| Maine Yankee worked this issue as urgent on a 24-hour-per-day basis until
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| operability of the boration flowpath and one RHR train was restored. The second
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| train of RHR was not restored because it was scheduled to be taken out of service
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| for outage work and only one train was required for the current plant condition.
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| Maine Yankee experienced one problem while performing a test of the RHR suction ;
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| valves. Procedure 3.1.20.4, IST Valve Testing at Cold Shutdown, was revised to l
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| incorporate the cycling of the RHR motor-operated suction valves, RH-M-1 and RH- i
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| M-2. The procedure required all RHR to be secured and the suction valves cycled. I
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| During the cycling of the first valve, RH-M-2, the valve shut and failed to reopen. l
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| The operators quickly determined that the failure was due to an open slide link
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| configured to support other ongoing instrumentation and control (l&C) work. The !
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| valve was reopened within approximately 35 minutes. During the time RHR was I
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| secured, operators were appropriately monitoring core temperatures and an operator
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| was stationed ready to manually open the suction valve if required. ;
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| !
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| The issue of RH-M-2 failing to open was entered into the learning process as a risk
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| level 2 issue, indicating that a root cause evaluation was required. The apparent
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| causes, initially identified by operations, inc!uded: an inadequate cross-disciplinary
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| review of the procedure change; and, inadequate understanding by operators of the
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| effects of other ongoing l&C surveillance activities.
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| c. po glusions
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| Maine Yankee responded appropriately to the determination that key valves had not
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| been tested as required by IST. Operability determinations were well documented
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| and provided an adequate basis for returning the system to operable. The response
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| to the failure of the RHR suction valve to open was appropriate. Operators were
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| prepared to open the valve manually and were cautiously monitoring core
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| temperatures.
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| However, this is another example of challenges to the operators caused by a Icck of
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| knowledge of configuration control during the outage. The inadequate cross-
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| disciplinary review and lack of understanding of the effects of ongoing surveillance
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| activities indicate a lack of focus in the area of procedure development and work
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| coordination. A prior example was documented in NRC inspection report 50-
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| 309/97-01, which involved a 1300 gallon spill of RWST water due to operations not
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| understanding the effects of ongoing pump work on the pressure boundary.
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| O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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| 02.1 Service Water and Primary Comoonent Coolina Water Systems
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| a. Insoection Scope (71707)
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| The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the service water (SW) and
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| primary component cooling (PCC) water systems to ascertain that the systems were
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| maintained operable for the plant condition.
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| b. Observations and Findinas
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| ] With the plant in cold shutdown and preparing for refueling, the inspectors focused
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| ,- on core and spent fuel pool cooling systems. The core was stillloaded, with RHR,
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| j train A, maintaining core cooling. The heat sink for RHR, train A is the primary
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| component cooling water system via the RHR heat exchangers. The spent fuel pool
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| is cooled by PCC via the spent fuel pool heat exchangers. The PCC is cooled by
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| ; SW, the ultimate heat-sink via the PCC heat exchangers.
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| l The inspector observed the material conditions in areas of the PCC pumps and heat
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| exchangers in the turbine building, the RHR pump and heat exchanger in the
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| containment spray (CS) building, and the service water pump house. There were no
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| significant discrepancies observed. The pumps, heat exchangers, valves and other
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| components were maintained well and showed no deficient conditions. The - )
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| systems were operating well and within the expected flow and temperature i
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| conditions. Control room switches and indications were as expected.
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| As a method for ensuring outage work did not impact the equipment required for
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| maintaining the plant in a safe condition, operations developed and implemented the
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| " protected train" concept. -This required compononts of the protected train to be -
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| roped off and labeled with a warning sign. Access to the affected areas was
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| restricted and controlled by the plant shift supervisor (PSS). Personnel were
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| permitted into the area (s) only after discussing their tasks with, and being briefed by
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| the PSS. Exceptions included personnel such as operators, security and fire
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| watches, who make frequent tours and observations in these areas.
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| c. Conclusion
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| Operators generally maintained good safety focus and properly operated systems
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| required to maintain the plant in a safe, shutdown condition. The " protected train"
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| program clearly identified components of concern, and as implemented, restricted
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| access to the areas containing these components providing an additional level of l
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| control for the equipment. !
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| 04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
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| 04.1 Containment Sorav (CS) Pumos Baseline Test
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| a. Inspection Scool
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| The inspector observed and reviewed portions of tests of the containment spray
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| pumps conducted in accordance with surveillance test procedure 3-1-15-3,
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| emergency core cooling system (ECCS) Operational Pump Flow and Check Valve !
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| Testing. l
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| b. Observations and Findinas
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| On April 9,1997, the inspector observed testing of CS pump, P-61 A. The test was
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| conducted to gather pump operating data as baseline information prior to the
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| proposed modification of the CS pumps. Pumps P-61B and P-61S were also
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| scheduled to be tested. The test involved operating the pump at various flow rates
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| and obtaining operating parameters (vibration, flow, and pressure). A temporary
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| procedure change (TPC 97-154) was incorporated into the test procedure to
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| accommodate the testing conditions.
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| The inspector reviewed the test instructions, observed testing activities and
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| discussed the test with the licensee. The test procedure and TPC were current and
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| had been properly approved. There was background information provided with the
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| TPC discussing the reason for the test. The pre-test brief in the control room was
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| detailed and well conducted. Test conduct, controls and expectations were clearly
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| discussed. Duties were clearly delineated. At the test locations, test instruments
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| were located well and properly calibrated. Test personnel were stationed at each
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| instrument location.
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| At the start of the test, the inspector observed that low pressure safety injection-
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| (LPSI) Pump, P-12A, started and stopped almost immediately. Subsequently, the
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| CS pump started and testing continued. After the test, when the inspector asked
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| the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) about the LPSI pump start, he was unaware -
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| that it had happened. Subsequently, he was informed by the reactor operator who
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| had made the error. He indicated that he had erroneously started the LPSI pump '
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| instead of the CS pump and upon realizing his error had immediately stopped the ;
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| LPSI pump and then started the CS pump. The controls for both pumps are located
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| on the ECCS portion of the control board in close proximity.
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| The inspector expressed concern regarding several aspects of the evolution. First,
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| the operator had continued with the conduct of the test after starting the wrong
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| ECCS pump. Also, the Shift Operating Supervisor (SOS) who had direct supervision
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| of the operator had not directed that the test be terminated. The PSS was not
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| made aware of the error in a timely fashion.
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| l
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| This issue was entered into the learning bank, Maine Yankee's corrective action ;
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| process. The SOS and operator involved were counseled and removed from shift l
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| pending completion of the investigation of the event. Operations management I
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| initiated additional immediate corrective actions that included re-emphasizing the
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| responsibilities and authorities of the SOS as delineated in procedure 1-26-4,
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| Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel, to operators. The LPSI
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| pump was inspected to verify that the inadvertent start and stop had no detrimental
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| effect. The licensee also verified that there was no effect on any other related
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| components.
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| The inspectors assessed the safety consequence of this error and determined that it
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| was minimal. The pump operation was for a short period of time and caused no
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| detrimental effect on the pump. There was no effect on core cooling since the train
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| ; maintaining core cooling was unaffected. Nevertheless, the event was indicative of l
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| a lack of attention to detail on the part of the operators, in, addition, operators
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| failed to properly execute their responsibilities as expected. Specifically, plant '
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| procedure 1-26-4, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel, revision
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| 9, Section 3.2.3, required the SOS to ensure that his personnel stop evolutions
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| 4
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| when unexpected conditions arise. Section 3.3.3 of the same procedure required
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| the Control Room Operator to stop an evolution when unexpected conditions arise.
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| <
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| the inspectors considered that operators failing to properly execute the
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| responsibilities of their position as required by procedure 1-26-4 a violation of
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| Technical Specification (TS) 5.8.2. TS 5.8.2 required that written procedures shall
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| be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced in
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| Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, (Rev. 2), February 1978, which include
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| administrative procedures for authorities and responsibilities for safe operation and
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| shutdown. (VIO 50-309/97-03-01)
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| c. Conclusion
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| The inspector concluded that this incident was indicative of weakness in operator I
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| performance due to inattention to detail. There was also weakness in control room
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| 4 command and control, and shift communications. The SOS did not take the
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| appropriate immediate action to deal with the issue, which would have been test
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| termination, and the PSS was not notified of the error in a timely manner. I
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| , 07 Quality Assurance in Operations
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| , a. Inspection Scope (40500)
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| 4
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| The inspectors performed a review to evaluate the effectiveness of the station
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| problem identification / resolution program (learning process) for correcting
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| deficiencies. Information was gathered by a review of lists of learning bank issues,
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| a various learning bank reports, and through discussions with cognizant personnel. l
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| b. Observations and Findinas !
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| *
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| The inspectors reviewed a report generated from the learning bank entitled, I
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| " Learning Bank Acceptance Report." This report listed the learning bank issue (s), j
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| discovery date, data entry date, general status, issue manager by name, and j
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| whether the issue had been formally accepted by the issue manager. Learning bank
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| ; issues were assigned risk levels from one to four. Risk level one issues were j
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| considered urgent with an extremely high risk. These required a formal root cause
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| and normally involved a multi-disciplined team to evaluate the issue. Risk level four
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| issues were considered to have a low risk to the company. The inspectors noted l
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| that as of April 2,1997,42 risk level one issues had been entered into the learning
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| bank; however, only 20 had been accepted by an issue manager. Similarly,74 risk l
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| level two issues had been entered into the learning bank and only 21 had been
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| , accepted by an issue manager. The inspectors raised a concern to a learning
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| . process team member that the report indicated that the majority of urgent and very
| |
| urgent issues had not yet been accepted by issue managers. The learning bank
| |
| ,
| |
| .--
| |
| | |
| _ .. _ _ . , _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _
| |
| I
| |
| * \
| |
| .
| |
| #
| |
| 6
| |
| team member stated that many of the issues that had not been formally ;
| |
| (administratively) accepted were associated with cable separation issues, and were '
| |
| '
| |
| actually being handled by management teams that were in place to address cable
| |
| separation issues. The learning process team member also stated that although )
| |
| issues were being entered into the syster, at a higher rate than originally
| |
| anticipated, immediato actions were taken for such issues. Further, it was indicated
| |
| ; that management was aware of this concern and was considering additional
| |
| "
| |
| actions. !
| |
| l
| |
| c. Conclusions 1
| |
| The inspectors concluded that management attention and focus on the Learning
| |
| Bank continues to be warranted. Approximately three months after initiation of the
| |
| learning bank (problem identification / resolution system), a backlog had developed
| |
| and the majority of learning bank issues with the highest risk levels (one and two), l
| |
| had not been formally accepted for evaluation and resolution by issue managers.
| |
| 08 Miscellaneous Operations lasues
| |
| I.n.soection Scope (92901)-
| |
| The inspectors reviewed previously identified issues including Licensee Event )
| |
| Reports (LER), Inspector followup items, and unresolved items to determine if they j
| |
| could be closed.- The review included a review of documentation, and activities to '
| |
| ascertain that the issues had been properly addressed and that the appropriate ,
| |
| regulatory action is taken as required. The following previously identified issues
| |
| were reviewed:
| |
| ~
| |
| I
| |
| 08.1 Qosed. Licensee Event Reoort 96-001. Emeroency Core Coolina Pumos Declared
| |
| lnocerable Due to a Reduction of Ventilation Flow
| |
| On January 10,1996 Maine Yankee declared both trains of the LPSI and CS
| |
| systems inoperable due to less than design room ventilation flow rates. The
| |
| inadequate ventilation flow was caused by a partial blockage of the suction flow
| |
| path for the CS building HVAC unit, HV-7.
| |
| This issue was addressed in various NRC inspection reports and included in NRC i
| |
| Inspection Report 50-306/96-16 as an apparent violation of NRC requirements. The
| |
| inspectors reviewed the LER and verified that the information provided was
| |
| accurate. This item is closed.
| |
| 08.2 Closed. IFl 50-309/96-02-01. Containment Sorav Buildina Heatina Unit HV-7
| |
| in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-02, the inspectors expressed a concern
| |
| regarding conduct of maintenance on a non-safety related component causing both
| |
| trains of LPSI and CS to be declared inoperable. The problem was that a blockage
| |
| of the inlet plenum of CS building heating unit, HV-7, caused fans FN-44A and 44B
| |
| to be inoperable. The insufficient ventilation to the CS building resulting from the
| |
| l
| |
| | |
| . - - - _ . - = - .. .- .--
| |
| ,
| |
| . .
| |
| <
| |
| t
| |
| a
| |
| 7
| |
| inoperability of these fans caused both trains of LPSI and CS pumps to be
| |
| inoperable. HV-7 is a non-safety related component while fans, FN-44A and 44B,
| |
| and the LPSI and CS pumps are safety related. This issue was identified as an !
| |
| inspector follow-up item pending completion of further review to determine the ;
| |
| regulatory significance. In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, this issue was
| |
| '
| |
| dispositioned as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. This item is ;
| |
| closed. ;
| |
| 11. Maintenance
| |
| .
| |
| '
| |
| M1 Conduct of Maintenance
| |
| M 1.1 General Comments
| |
| ,
| |
| 4
| |
| During the period, the volume of maintenance work greatly increased as Maine {
| |
| Yankee shifted focus to the refueling outage. The outage management presence
| |
| was increased with the adoption of daily outage meetings. The inspectors
| |
| monitored the daily shutdown safety ascessment and found no work activities
| |
| ,
| |
| compromising this assessment. Work observed in the field was appropriately .
| |
| I
| |
| controlled and performed in accordance with approved procedures. The following
| |
| maintenance and surveillance items were specifically observed. No discrepancies
| |
| were observed.
| |
| .
| |
| - WO 97-00629 Periodic maintenance of check valve SCC-7
| |
| 1 - WO 96-00064 Repair of valve CS-72 ;
| |
| , - WO 97-00787 Replacement of the spent fuel pool purification pump motor [
| |
| '
| |
| - WO 96-3140 Periodic maintenance of 6.9 kv breakers
| |
| - 3-1 -2 ECCS Routine Testing of Service Water Pumps ;
| |
| 4
| |
| M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
| |
| 4
| |
| :
| |
| M8.1 Closed, URI 50-309/96-06-01, and URI 50-309/96-13-02, Auxiliarv Feedwater
| |
| (AFW) Pumo
| |
| i in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-06, the inspectors identified a concern with
| |
| , maintenance activity on the AFW pump oil cooler. Specificaily, there appeared to
| |
| be a weakness in the repair effort of the oil cooler on June 12,1996. Following
| |
| that repair, the oil cooler failed again on June 16. In general, the inspectors were
| |
| concerned with the licensee's efforts to maintain the reliability of the AFW pump
| |
| since a review of the pump's availability records revealed that numerous corrective
| |
| '
| |
| maintenance activities had occurred. The issue was left unresolved pending a
| |
| review of licensee actions to ensure pump operability.
| |
| Also, in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-13, the inspectors identified an apparent
| |
| inadequacy during maintenance on the AFW pump. The maintenance was to
| |
| : enhance the pump's operation because of the pump's relatively poor past operating
| |
| history causing it's reliability to be declining over the past several years.
| |
| .
| |
| Subsequent post-maintenance testing revealed some inadequacy with the pump
| |
| ,
| |
| t
| |
| -
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 8
| |
| packing rings testing. In addition, the inspector noted apparent inadequate test
| |
| control and inattentiveness by a technician who adjusted the steam admission valve
| |
| controller contrary to test requirements. This item was left unresolved pending
| |
| completion of licensee action and further NRC staff review.
| |
| In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96 16, inadequate maintenance for the AFW
| |
| pump was identified as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. The
| |
| licensee's corrective actions and activities to ensure the improved reliability of this
| |
| pump will be reviewed and addressed as part of the NRC's review and followup of
| |
| the response to the violation.
| |
| Ill. Enaineerina
| |
| E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues
| |
| !
| |
| E8.1 Closed. URI 50-309/96-11-02, HPSI Cut Wire, Event Review Board - Root Cause
| |
| Analvsis
| |
| in late August,1996, Maine Yankee convened an Event Review Board to
| |
| investigate the circumstances surrounding the severed wire found in the control
| |
| circuitry of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, P-14A on August 17,1996.
| |
| In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/9611, this item was left unresolved pending the
| |
| NRC's review of the results of the board's investigation.
| |
| In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, the HPSI severed wire issue was identified
| |
| as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee's corrective
| |
| actions, including the root cause determination will be reviewed as part of that
| |
| violation.
| |
| E8.2 Closed, URI 50-309/96-16-04. HPSI Flow Testina and Throttle Valve Settinas
| |
| In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, the inspectors identified a concern with
| |
| the testing of the HPSI pumps at high flow conditions and the setting of the HPSI
| |
| system throttle valves. During previous pump test at full flow, it appeared that the
| |
| pumps could have been operating at close to runout conditions. In addition, the
| |
| setting of the position of the throttle valves needed a more precise tolerance to
| |
| ensure that required flow is met and pump runout conditions are not exceeded.
| |
| This issue was left unresolved pending review of further licensee testing of the HPSI
| |
| pumps and resetting of the throttle valves.
| |
| In response to this concern, Maine Yankee performed testing of the HPSI system to
| |
| verify adequate net positive suction head for all required modes of pump operation.
| |
| The test was witnessed and reviewed by the inspectors as documented in NRC
| |
| Inspection Report 50-309/96-14 (section E1.1). The issue was identified as an
| |
| unresolved item (50-309/96-14-02) pending completion of detailed review of the
| |
| test results by the NRC. This issue will be tracked via item 50-309/96-14-02, and
| |
| this item, URI 50-309/96-16-04, is closed.
| |
| | |
| q
| |
| l
| |
| 1
| |
| 1
| |
| '
| |
| 9
| |
| E8.3 Open,URi 50-309/96-08-05, Fire Protection Barrier Seals
| |
| a. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities involving the fire barrier I
| |
| penetration seal repair project.
| |
| Following the identification of several degraded 8-inch fire barrier penetration seals ;
| |
| in 1996, Maine Yankee embarked on a project to inspect all fire barrier penetrations
| |
| at the plant and restore each one to the qualified state. The NRC inspected this
| |
| issue and left it unresolved pending completion of NRC's reviews of the licensee's
| |
| actions to eddress the problem.
| |
| The inspectors reviewed on-going licensee actions to address this issue. In March
| |
| 1997, the inspectors discussed and assessed the status of the project with the
| |
| licensee. The purpose of the project was to conduct detailed walkdowns of the
| |
| seals to identify problems and implement any required repairs / upgrades, in addition,
| |
| the intent was to properly label and map the barriers and improve the detail in
| |
| existing documentation.
| |
| With the initial inspection of all seals completed, the licensee has identified that
| |
| about 90% of the approximately 2,600 penetrations inspected, required
| |
| replacement or repair. Some discrepancies identified include: inadequate seal
| |
| thickness; improper damming; defective seals (bad structure, gaps or voids);
| |
| inadequate material; and presence of foreign materials.
| |
| The licensee had just initiated repairs to address the identified discrepancies. Along .
| |
| with fire barrier consideration, the seal design requirements include: high energy
| |
| line break; flooding; current induced heat load; and cardox/halon retention. The
| |
| inspectors will continue to monitor licensee efforts in this area. This item remains
| |
| open pending completion of the repairs, the root cause analysis, and NRC review of
| |
| the licensee effort.
| |
| LV. Plant Suocort
| |
| R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
| |
| Reviews were performed of occupational radiation exposure. Specific areas
| |
| reviewed included radiological cor:trols for steam generator inspections; locked high
| |
| radiation area key control; contamination controls; status of f acilities and
| |
| equipment; staff training; organization and administration; and a review of the
| |
| effectiveness of the newly imp!emented problem identification / resolution system
| |
| (learning process). A review of facility conditions versus the requirements in the
| |
| Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was also performed.
| |
| | |
| _. . .
| |
| .
| |
| 1
| |
| .
| |
| 10
| |
| ^
| |
| R1.1 Steam Generator Work
| |
| a. Inspection Scoce (83750)
| |
| !
| |
| The inspector reviewed radiological control preparation and planning for steam
| |
| generator work. Information was gathered through reviews of ALARA pre-job and
| |
| work-in-progress reviews; graphs of average historical dose rates for steam
| |
| generator bowls; pre- and post- steam generator bowl decontamination efforts;
| |
| i inspections of health physics controls at the steam generator platforms and in the
| |
| steam generator monitoring trailer; and discussions with cognizant personnel.
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| .
| |
| '
| |
| The inspector reviewed various ALARA reviews for steam generator primary side
| |
| testing and repair, including setup and decontamination activities. Total radiation
| |
| i dose for steam generator primary side testing and repair was estimated to be 62
| |
| person-rem. This included 2.5 person-rem for manway cover, diaphragm, and
| |
| ALARA shield door removal / installation; 4.5 person-rem for decontamination of the
| |
| steam generator bowls; 50 person-rem for primary side testing and repair; and 5 .
| |
| person-rem for radiological protection (RP) technician dose. Person-rem estimates
| |
| ; were based on anticipated work scope and historical data, and appeared reasonable.
| |
| In addition, ALARA reviews showed evidence of extensive planning; required -
| |
| coordination between multiple work groups (e.g., health physics, decontamination
| |
| crews, maintenance); and were comprehensive and very detailed. Information was
| |
| included on work schedules, job prerequisites, dose reduction initiatives,
| |
| engineering controls, training, contamination controls, and radwaste considerations.
| |
| One of the major ALARA measures implemented in preparation for steam generator
| |
| inspections was a high pressure wash (decontamination) of the steam generator
| |
| channel heads (bowls). The process involved installing a specialized
| |
| decontamination manway with a remotely operated 3-D water jet lance. The
| |
| system (Hennigan decontamination system) delivered a high pressure water spray to
| |
| exposed surfaces within the bowls. The effluent was removed through suction
| |
| lines from the bottom of the bowls and filtered, and the entire process took
| |
| approximately two days to complete.
| |
| A graph of average steam generator tube channel head dose rates versus time
| |
| indicated that average channel head dose rates in 1978,1980, and 1985 were
| |
| greater than 30 R/h. The chemical decontamination performed in 1995 reduced
| |
| channel head dose rates to an average of about 6 R/h, and the post chemical
| |
| decontamination bowl wash' reduced channel head dose rates to about 2 R/h.
| |
| Nineteen ninety-seven survey results indicated that channel head dose rates had
| |
| increased to about 2.5 R/h, and contamination levels were estimated to be on the
| |
| order of 500,000 - 3,000,000 dpm/100 cm'. Upon completion of the high pressure
| |
| bowl wash, survey results showed that loose contamination levels in the c.hannel
| |
| head were reduced by about a factor of five, down to about 100,000- 600,000
| |
| dpm/100 cm'. In addition, although overall gamma levels were only slightly
| |
| reduced, the dose rates at a single point at the plane of the manway were reduced
| |
| | |
| 1
| |
| I
| |
| <
| |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 11 ,
| |
| !
| |
| by 40 percent. The inspector noted that this decontamination had the potential to
| |
| result in significant dose savings due to decreased needs for use of respirators, hot
| |
| particle controls, platform decontaminations, and trash changeouts.
| |
| The inspector noted that the health physics staff maintained very close oversight of j
| |
| work on the steam generator platforms from a remote health physics control point !
| |
| located outside of the restricted area. Pan, tilt, zoom cameras, and audio head sets l
| |
| allowed health physics technicians to communicate directly with personnel on the
| |
| ~
| |
| steam generator platform, and observe essentially all activities. Remote reading
| |
| area radiation monitors allowed for dose rate monitoring, and remote readout
| |
| dosimetry (telemetry) allowed for continuous monitoring of personnel exposures and
| |
| exposure rates. Further, steam generator airborne radioactivity levels were also
| |
| remotely monitored by technicians in the remote control point. The inspector
| |
| questioned various health physics technicians concerning health physics monitoring ,
| |
| of steam generator work and found the technicians to be extremely knowledgeable j
| |
| of radiological controls and ongoing work. The inspector concluded that health
| |
| physics oversight, monitoring, and control of steam generator work was excellent.
| |
| c. Conclusion
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector concluded the following:
| |
| * ALARA planning for steam generator work was thorough, comprehensive, e
| |
| and detailed.
| |
| * Health physics oversight, monitoring, and control of steam generator work
| |
| was excellent.
| |
| R1.2 Hiah Radiation Area Kev Control
| |
| a. Inspection Scoce (83750)
| |
| i
| |
| A review was performed on the use of keys to control access to high radiation !
| |
| areas. Information was gathered by inspections of locked high radiation area doors,
| |
| inspections of the locked high radiation area key storage cabinet, review of the l
| |
| health physics shift log, review of procedural guidance, and by interviewing a shift )
| |
| health physics technician. i
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| During tours through the plant, the inspector checked the integrity of high radiation
| |
| area door locks. All doors to areas controlled as a locked high radiation area were ;
| |
| either locked or properly controlled to prevent inadvertent access. All doors and
| |
| locking devices inspected appeared to be in good physical condition.
| |
| The inspector examined the key storage locker located in the health physics office,
| |
| and noted that the keys were contained in a locked box, had encumbering devices, !
| |
| and were well controlled by the shift technician. The health physics shift log book
| |
| i
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 12
| |
| also showed evidence that keys were being properly inventoried on a shift-by-shift
| |
| basis.
| |
| The inspector reviewed procedural guidance contained in procedure 9-2-101,
| |
| " Control of Keys and Doors to High and Very High Radiation Areas," Rev. O.
| |
| Procedural guidance was good in that it was clear, specifically listed responsibilities
| |
| and methods for controlling access to locked high radiation areas, and keys were
| |
| only issued to health physics and operations personnel. The inspector did,
| |
| however, identify a program weakness in that high radiation area keys were generic
| |
| and each one could be used to unlock any Tech Spec 5.12 High Rad door in the
| |
| plant. The shift Health Physics technician explained that health physics supervision
| |
| had previously recognized this, and had initiated steps to eliminate the use of
| |
| generic keys, and use only specific keys for high radiation area doors.
| |
| c. Conclusion
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector concluded the following:
| |
| * The high radiation area key control program was generally good, and steps
| |
| were being taken to improve the program.
| |
| R1.3 Contamination Control
| |
| a. Inspection Scoce (83750)
| |
| A review was performed on ongoing efforts to improve contamination controls at
| |
| Maine Yankee. Information was gathered by a review of procedural guidance and
| |
| other documentation, discussions with cognizant personner, and tours through the
| |
| plant.
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| The assistant Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) stated that efforts to improve
| |
| contamination and radioactive material controls included increased tracking and
| |
| trending of the type, activity, and cause of personal contaminations; procedure
| |
| revisions to require radioactive material stickers to be applied to equipment being
| |
| released from a contaminated area until a determination could be made that the
| |
| material met the condition for release into clean areas; decontamination staffing
| |
| augmentations; initiation of an extensive hot machine shop clean-up; increased area
| |
| wipe-downs; increased use of sticky pads at area exits; investigations into the use
| |
| of a temporary radioactive material processing facility; and the development of a
| |
| tool control program.
| |
| The inspector noted that the licensee was effectively tracking and trending
| |
| contamination events, and was addressing the root causes of personnel
| |
| contaminations. Efforts to increase staffing of decontamination personnel, increase
| |
| plant decontaminations, improve material handling practices, and development of a
| |
| tool control program were very good initiatives. However, the inspector noted that
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 13
| |
| the tool control program was not fully developed, in that the maintenance
| |
| department had not yet taken the lead for this activity. The assistant RPM stated
| |
| that due to plant priorities, the maintenance department had not been able to
| |
| allocate the time necessary to meet preliminary goals for the development of the
| |
| tool control program.
| |
| The inspector also reviewed ALARA Review 96-01, " Spent Fuel Pool Reracking
| |
| '
| |
| Project Contamination Control Program," and discussed contamination controls
| |
| implemented during the fuel pool rerack project with a lead health physics
| |
| technician. The inspector noted that the rerack project required contaminated fuel
| |
| racks to be transported to outside areas (back yard of the restricted area) for
| |
| loading into transport containers. Contamination control measures included
| |
| requirements to rinse items down as they were removed from the fuel pool, wrap
| |
| items prior to transport to outside areas, and establishing contingencies in the case
| |
| of high winds or precipitation. The lead health physics technicians was able to
| |
| describe, in detail, contamination control measures implemented for each sequence
| |
| of work. The inspector concluded that although the fuel rerack project presented
| |
| significant contamination control challenges, the measures implemented were
| |
| reasonable and effective.
| |
| During tours of the facility, inspectors identified an inconsistency in the
| |
| contamination control program. An RP technician was observed transporting a cart
| |
| through the new fuel receiving area backyard door. The RP technician performed-
| |
| personnel contamination monitoring prior to exiting the door, but did not perform ,
| |
| '
| |
| contamination monitoring of the cart or wheels of the cart prior to transporting the
| |
| cart into the back yard. The inspectors questioned this practice, and the RP
| |
| technician and the shift RP technician explained that this was an accepted practice. l
| |
| The rationale expressed was that if an individual was contaminated, the hands and
| |
| feet would be the most likely indicators; therefore, additional surveys of equipment
| |
| and materials were not necessary; and the potential for offsite release was low
| |
| since the back yard was not used as a routine restricted area exit point. The ;
| |
| inspectors acknowledged that it was unlikely that this practice would result in a i
| |
| measurable offsite release (if contaminated equipment was inadvertently transported l
| |
| to the back yard of the restricted area). However, trends for personnel
| |
| contaminations produced by the radiological controls department showed that, of
| |
| the personnel contaminations documented from January 1,1997 to March 31,
| |
| 1997, only 35 of 94 of the contaminations occurred on hands or shoes. This issue
| |
| was raised to the RPM who stated that contamination monitoring practices would
| |
| be revised to require all cart wheels to be surveyed prior to transportation to
| |
| backyard areas, and that contamination monitoring practices at the new fuel '
| |
| receiving area back yard door would undergo further review.
| |
| c. Conclusions
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:
| |
| e The licensee was effectively tracking and trending contamination events, and
| |
| was addressing the root causes of personnel contaminations. )
| |
| | |
| _. _.._._ _._ _ _ _ .. _ _ . . . . _ _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . ,
| |
| *
| |
| !
| |
| ,
| |
| i
| |
| * !
| |
| 14 ,
| |
| I
| |
| *' Contamination control program improvement initiatives such as increased l
| |
| r plant decontaminations, procedure upgrades, and development of a tool :
| |
| control program were very good.
| |
| {
| |
| e' .The restricted area tool control program was not fully developed, and
| |
| preliminary milestones for program development were not being met. j
| |
| e Contamination monitoring practices were inconsistent in that contamination ;
| |
| monitoring was required for personnel, but not materials and equipment,
| |
| prior to movement through the new fuel receipt area door, to the back yard l
| |
| ,
| |
| of the restricted area.
| |
| 'R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
| |
| #
| |
| a. Insoection Scope (86750)
| |
| The inspector performed an evaluation of radiological control boundaries, !
| |
| radiological postings, housekeeping, and personnel use of an automated access
| |
| control / electronic dosimetry system. Information was gathered through tours of the
| |
| primary auxiliary building (PAB), the vapor containment (VC), and the hot machine l
| |
| shop, reviews of radiological survey data, and interviews with plant workers. !
| |
| !
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas !
| |
| 1
| |
| Radiological boundaries in the PAB, VC, and hot machine shop were clearly i
| |
| delineated and well maintained, and radiological postings met procedural and -
| |
| regulatory requirements, and were informative.
| |
| Overall housekeeping was good and showed improvement. Walkways and aisles in
| |
| the containment building and lower spray building were notably clear and free of
| |
| debris, and the boundary around the reactor cavity was wellidentified.
| |
| The inspector also observed personnel use of a newly installed automated access
| |
| control / electronic dosimetry system. The system was generally easy to use to
| |
| assign personnel to work-activity-numbers on radiation work permits, and to track
| |
| personnel radiation exposure. Training had been conducted prior to system
| |
| implementation, and personnel " greeters" were stationed at the restricted area
| |
| access point to assist personnel with use of the system. Based on this limited ,
| |
| review, the inspector concluded that the administrative implementation of the newly
| |
| installed automated access control system was good.
| |
| c. Conclusions
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:
| |
| *- Radiological boundaries including radiation areas, high radiation areas, and
| |
| contaminated areas were well defined and well maintained, and conditions of
| |
| housekeeping were good and showed improvement.
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 15 l
| |
| 1
| |
| 1
| |
| e The administrative implementation of a newly installed automated access j
| |
| control / electronic dosimetry system was good. i
| |
| i
| |
| R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C l
| |
| a. Insoection Scooe (83750)
| |
| The inspector performed a review of selected portions of the health physics
| |
| technician training program, information was gathered through discussions with ,
| |
| cognizant personnel, and a review of a syllabus for a three-week health physics i
| |
| systems course,
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| The training manager stated that in order to address a need for more systems
| |
| training for health physics personnel, a three-week course was developed that
| |
| included specific radiological / health physics concerns. All Maine Yankee health
| |
| physics technicians were scheduled to attend the class, and at the time of the
| |
| inspection, seven health physics technicians were attending the third week of the
| |
| course. The training manager added that feedback from participants in the course
| |
| was very good. The inspector noted that the course syllabus included classrocm
| |
| training, plant walkdowns, and appeared broad in scope.
| |
| c. Conclusion
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:
| |
| e Health physics systems training represented a commitment to improving
| |
| health physics technicians' knowledge of plant systems.
| |
| R6 RP&C Organization and Administration
| |
| a. Inspection Scooe (83522)
| |
| The inspector performed a review of the organization and administration of the
| |
| radiological controls organization. Information was gathered by a review of a
| |
| resume for the newly appointed RPM, reviews of current and proposed
| |
| organizational charts, and through discussions with cognizant personnel.
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| The inspector interviewed the newly appointed RPM, and reviewed a copy of the
| |
| ! individual's resurne. The individual was determined to be capable and qualified for
| |
| the position of RPM in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Personnel
| |
| Selection and Training."
| |
| The RPM stated that the current focus of the radiological controls organization was
| |
| to support outage work. The assistant RPM duties had been limited to focus on
| |
| !
| |
| | |
| !
| |
| I
| |
| l
| |
| *
| |
| I
| |
| 16
| |
| oversight of health physics-operations, in order to support outage work. The
| |
| inspector interviewed the assistant RPM, various health physics technicians, and a
| |
| health physics planning supervisor. These individuals indicated that current staffing
| |
| levels were adequate to support ongoing work, but additional staffing would be
| |
| necessary to support future planned work. The RPM indicated that seven health
| |
| physics technicians would be available upon completion of systems training, and
| |
| additional staffing of contract health physics technicians was in progress.
| |
| I
| |
| c. Conclusions l
| |
| Based on this review the inspectors concluded the following:
| |
| l
| |
| * The newly appointed RPM was capable and qualified for the position of RPM !
| |
| in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Personnel Selection and ,
| |
| Training." l
| |
| .
| |
| * Current health physics technician staffing levels were adequate to support
| |
| ongoing work. ;
| |
| R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities
| |
| a. Insoection Scope (83750)
| |
| {
| |
| The inspector performed a review to evaluate the effectiveness of the station
| |
| problem identification / resolution program (learning process) for correcting
| |
| radiological deficiencies. Information was gathered by reviews of lists of learning
| |
| bank issues related to radiological controls, reviews of selected learning bank
| |
| issues, and discussions with cognizant personnel.
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| The inspector reviewed a list of radiological control issues entered into the learning
| |
| process during the first three months of 1997, and compared the list to the issues
| |
| entered into the former radiological incident reporting system in the first three
| |
| months of 1996. The inspector noted that during the first three months of 1997,
| |
| approximately 25 issues were entered into the learning process, which was greater
| |
| than five times the rate at which issues were entered into the former radiological
| |
| incident reporting system. The inspectors also noted that several of the issues
| |
| entered into the learning process would likely not have been entered into the
| |
| radiological incident reporting system (e.g., shortage of protective clothing hoods,
| |
| personnel contamination events, improper use of tool bags, and communications
| |
| breakdowns in health physics). As a result, the inspectors concluded that
| |
| radiological control issues were being entered into the learning process at a lower
| |
| threshold and at a higher volume than issues entered into the former radiological
| |
| incident reporting system. This was considered a positive observation.
| |
| The inspectors interviewed several members of the radiological controls staff
| |
| regarding their use of the learning process. The individuals had attended training
| |
| - -
| |
| | |
| _
| |
| -
| |
| ,
| |
| !
| |
| .
| |
| 17
| |
| and had access to the learning bank computer system. Although individuals could
| |
| easily enter the learning bank computer program and look at specific issues, some
| |
| difficulties were observed when individuals were requested to perform queries or l
| |
| print out reports: system queries took an extended time during periods of high
| |
| system use; some printouts could only be obtained on a page-by-page basis; and a
| |
| computer screen locked-up during a print request. Although these individuals were
| |
| able to obtain the requested information with persistence or assistance, this raised
| |
| the concern that if individuals were not fully familiar with the system, or if data
| |
| retrieval was difficult, personnel may not fully utilize the system to evaluate and
| |
| resolve radiological control issues. A learning process team member indicated that
| |
| a computer memory upgrade was in progress to speed processing time; that training
| |
| was being conducted; that individual skills would improve with increased system
| |
| use; and that system enhancements were being performed to make the program
| |
| more user friendly.
| |
| i
| |
| The inspector also reviewed procedure No. 0-16-1, " Learning Process
| |
| Implementation Procedure," Rev.10, and a Learning Bank " General Task Report" to
| |
| evaluate use of the learning process. The inspector noted that the learning process
| |
| did have strong advantages over previous problem identification / resolution systems.
| |
| For example, anyone could enter an issue into the learning process; multiple
| |
| personnel review, evaluate, and assess the significance of issues during the initial
| |
| review process (e.g., initial screening, team review, and management review
| |
| process); and accountability was designed into the system with the assignment of
| |
| issue and task " owners." The inspector noted that this was a significant
| |
| improvement over the former radiological incident reporting system. !
| |
| The inspectors reviewed lists of tasks (corrective actions) associated with various
| |
| radiological control learning bank issues, and noted that tasks addressed apparent
| |
| causes and were generally sufficient to prevent recurrence. However, an example
| |
| was identified where corrective action " tasks" did not address the apparent cause.
| |
| Learning bank issue No. 96-00055 was generated to address the discovery of a
| |
| discrete radioactive particle (DRP) found in the back yard of the restricted area
| |
| during the performance of a prejob survey in preparation for digging trenches. The
| |
| listed " apparent cause" was " contaminated particles have come loose from
| |
| contaminated tools and equipment." The corrective action was to " perform more
| |
| frequent surveys to keep the discovery of DRPs to a minimum." The inspectors
| |
| noted that the corrective action appeared to address the symptom, but did not
| |
| identify " apparent cause."
| |
| c. Conclusions
| |
| Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:
| |
| * Radiological control issues were being entered into the learning process at a
| |
| higher volume and lower threshold than issues entered into the former
| |
| radiological incident reporting system.
| |
| _
| |
| | |
| .
| |
| .
| |
| 18
| |
| e Difficulties were encountered with administrative use of the learning bank
| |
| including extended computer processing times, system user friendliness
| |
| concerns, personnel unfamilimity with the system, and sorne system
| |
| programming weaknesses.
| |
| * The learning process had distinct advantages over previously used
| |
| radiological control problem identification / resolution systems in that anyone
| |
| could enter an issue into the system, issues were reviewed by multiple
| |
| personnel, and accountability for resolving issues was designed into the
| |
| system.
| |
| e Learning bank corrective action tasks were generally sufficient to prevent
| |
| recurrence.
| |
| R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lssues
| |
| R8.1 UFSAR Review
| |
| A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
| |
| UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares
| |
| plant practices, and procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR description. While
| |
| performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the -
| |
| applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. I
| |
| 1
| |
| The inspector reviewed selected sections of Chapters 11, " Radiation Protection" of
| |
| the UFSAR pertaining to radiological controls to evaluate the accuracy of the UFSAR l
| |
| regarding existing plant conditions and practices. No UFSAR discrepancies were
| |
| identified during this review.
| |
| R8.2 Learnina BankJssue 97-01450
| |
| The inspector reviewed a licensee-identified learning bank issue, No. LB 97-01450-
| |
| 001. Technical Specification 5.2.2(d) states that, "an individual qualified in
| |
| radiation protection procedures shall be on-site when fuelis in the reactor" (this
| |
| includes training in emergency planning procedures). This Technical Specification
| |
| was violated on March 12,1997, from approximately 0230 to 0530 hours, when
| |
| an RP supervisor allowed the Radiological Controls (RC) shiit technician to leave the
| |
| site due to illness, without finding a replacement who was fully trained in
| |
| emergency plan procedures. Identified causes included the f ailure to notify the
| |
| Plant PSS that the on-shift qualified RC shift technician was leaving the site; the on-
| |
| shift RC Supervisor was pre-occupied with ongoing work; the posted schedule did
| |
| not specifically identify who was assigned to act as the "on-shift qualified RC shift
| |
| technician;" and the replacement technician did not understand his role with regard
| |
| to qualifications and training associated with being the qualified RC shift technician.
| |
| This issue was entered into the learning bank for evaluation and corrective action.
| |
| The inspector reviewed the recommended corrective actions and noted that they
| |
| would be sufficient to prevent recurrence. This licensee-identified and corrected
| |
| | |
| ,
| |
| , i
| |
| ,
| |
| . l
| |
| 19
| |
| violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 l
| |
| of the NRC Enforcement Poliev. l
| |
| l
| |
| S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
| |
| l
| |
| S4.1 Contraband Found in Vehicle Durina Search
| |
| a. inspection Scoce (717501
| |
| The inspector reviewed the circumstances involving the identification of marijuana
| |
| in a contractor's vehicle during a search of the vehicle in preparation for the
| |
| contractor's access into the protected area.
| |
| b. Observations and Findinas
| |
| On April 15,1997, two Maine Yankee Security Officers identified a small bag of
| |
| marijuana in a contractor's truck. This occurred when the officers were conducting
| |
| a search of the vehicle in preparation for the vehicle to be taken into the protected
| |
| area for delivery of some non-safety related material. Upon discovery, the security
| |
| force notified the Control Room and local law enforcement. Local law enforcement
| |
| personnel respondet, to the site and dealt with the issue.
| |
| l Maine Yankee reviewed the individual's previous access into the protected area. It
| |
| appeared that the individual had been on site on two occasions in the past. On
| |
| both occasions, the individual was escorted by, and under the supervision of a
| |
| badged employee. This person also had not been involved in any safety-related
| |
| activities. Based on this, the licensee was satisfied that the individual's prior on-site
| |
| activities had been monitored and considered acceptable.
| |
| The inspector noted that Maine Yankee handled the issue properly. The
| |
| notifications to the Control Room and the locallaw enforcement agency were
| |
| timely. The reviews to determine the potential impact of the individual's previous
| |
| site visits were thorough and revealed no adverse effect.
| |
| c. Conclusions
| |
| Security activities continued to be conducted well as evidenced by the good
| |
| performance during the April 15,1997 event.
| |
| V. Manaaement Meetinas
| |
| X1 Exit Meeting Summary
| |
| The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee on May 2,
| |
| 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
| |
| | |
| . . . _ . . . . . . - _ . _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
| |
| _
| |
| _
| |
| _
| |
| *
| |
| ,
| |
| ,
| |
| .
| |
| 20
| |
| X2 April 3,1997, Public Meeting :
| |
| !
| |
| On April 3,1997, the NRC held a' meeting with representatives of Maine Yankee at the l
| |
| Maine Yankee Media Center. The meeting was to discuss the Maine Yankee Restart
| |
| Readiness Plan as documented in the March 7,1997 letter to the NRC. The meeting was
| |
| limited to public observation only. Later on, the NRC held a meeting with members of the
| |
| public at the Wiscasset Middle School, Wiscasset, Maine. The meeting was to receive
| |
| public comment regarding the Maine Yankee Restart Readiness Plan.
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| ,
| |
| !
| |
| l
| |
| .
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| ,
| |
| t
| |
| 1
| |
| s
| |
| l
| |
| --. . .-
| |
| | |
| -- .- -.- . . - -. - -. _.
| |
| - - . . . _. _ _ . . . . - --
| |
| .
| |
| ;
| |
| .
| |
| ,
| |
| 21
| |
| INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
| |
| .
| |
| ; IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
| |
| 4 Problems
| |
| >
| |
| IP 62707: Maintenance Observation
| |
| ; IP 71707: Plant Operations
| |
| i
| |
| , IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor
| |
| 4
| |
| Facilities
| |
| , IP 92901: Followup - Operations
| |
| a
| |
| IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance
| |
| j IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
| |
| .
| |
| IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
| |
| i
| |
| IP 61726: Surveillance Observation
| |
| : IP 71750: Plant Support
| |
| IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure
| |
| i
| |
| IP 86750: Solid Radiation Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive
| |
| Materials
| |
| *
| |
| IP 83522: Radiation Protection, Plant Chemistry, Organization and Management
| |
| Controls
| |
| ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
| |
| ltems Opened:
| |
| VIO 50-309/97-03-01, Operators Failing to Perform Duties Required by TS 5.8.2 and plant
| |
| procedure,1-26-4, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel. (04.1)
| |
| ltems Closed:
| |
| LER 96-001, Emergency Core Cooling Pumps Declared Inoperable Due to a Reduction of j
| |
| Ventilation Flow. (08.1) i
| |
| IFl 50-309/96-02-01, Containment Spray Building Heating Unit, HV-7. (08.2)
| |
| URI 50-309/96-06-01, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. (M8.1)
| |
| URI 50-309/96-13-02, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. (M8.1)
| |
| URI 50-309/96-11-02, HPSI cut wire, Event Review Board. (E8.1)
| |
| URI 50-309/96-16-04, HPSI Flow Testing and Throttle Valve Settings. (E8.2)
| |
| !
| |
| ltems Discursed:
| |
| URI 50-309/96-08-05, Fire Protection Berrier Seals. (F2.1)
| |
| !
| |
| | |
| - -. . - - . _ _ _ . - - . . . - . - . . . - . . .. - _ . - .
| |
| f
| |
| , ,
| |
| ,
| |
| , i
| |
| * ,
| |
| 22
| |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l
| |
| !
| |
| AFW Auxiliary Feedwater
| |
| CFR Code of Federal Regulations
| |
| )
| |
| 1
| |
| CS Containment Spray {
| |
| CSB Containment Spray Building ;
| |
| DRP Discrete Radioactive Particle l
| |
| ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
| |
| HP Health Physics
| |
| HPSI High Pressure Safety injection
| |
| l&C Instrumentation and Control
| |
| IST In-Service Test Program
| |
| LER Licensee Event Report
| |
| LPSI Low Pressure Safety injection
| |
| MYAPC Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
| |
| NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
| |
| PAB Primary Auxiliary Building '
| |
| PCC Primary Component Cooling
| |
| PSS Plant Shift Supervisor
| |
| RC Radiological Controls
| |
| RHR Residual Heat Removal
| |
| RP Radiological Protection
| |
| RP&C Radiological Protection and Chemistry
| |
| RPM Radiation Protection Manager
| |
| RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank
| |
| SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
| |
| SOS Shift Operating Supervisor
| |
| SW Service Water
| |
| TPC Temporary Procedure Change
| |
| UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
| |
| {
| |
| VC Vapor Containment
| |
| I
| |
| !
| |
| l
| |
| l
| |
| j
| |
| }}
| |