ML20199F233: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot change)
(StriderTol Bot change)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000483/1986014]]
| number = ML20199F233
| issue date = 06/16/1986
| title = Insp Rept 50-483/86-14 on 860512-29.Violation Noted: Failure to Perform Required Continuous Sampling of Effluent Releases
| author name = Gill C, Januska A, Schumacher M
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000483
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-483-86-14, NUDOCS 8606240234
| package number = ML20199F208
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 7
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000483/1986014]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:_-
    *
  .
                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                          REGION III
      Report No. 50-483/86014(DRSS)
      Docket No. 50-483                                  License No. NPF-30
      Licensee: Union Electric Company
                  Post Office Box 149
                  St. Louis, M0 63166
      Facility Name:    Callaway Plant, Unit 1
      Inspection At:    Callaway Site, Reform, M0
      Inspection Conducted: May 12-29, 1986
                    h.Y. Muult<v
      Inspectors:  A.G.danuska                                              / 66
                                                                        Date
                    C                                                      b~lb*C%
                                                                        Date
      Approved By:
                    Qf/kkMJmI"
                      M. C. Schumacher, Chief                                  ~D
                      Radiological Effluents and                        Date
                        Chemistry Section
      Inspection Summary
      Inspection durina the period May 12-29, 1986 (Report No. 50-483/86014(DRSS))
      Areas Inspected:    Routine, unannounced inspection of the confirmatory
      measurement program, including sampling, comparison of licensee analytical
      results with those obtained from the Region III Mobile Laboratory, and counting
      room quality control; a review of the 1985 Annual Environmental Operating
      Report; and review of two License Event Reports.
      Results: One violation (failure to perform required continuous sampling of
      effluent releases - Section 6) and no deviations were identified.
                    8606240234 860617
                    PDR    ADOCK 05000483
                    G                  PDR
m
 
r-
    *
  .
                                                          DETAILS
      1. Persons Contacted
          1G. Randolph, Manager, Callaway Plant
          1J. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services
          1V. Shanks, Superintendent Chemistry
          12R. Roselius, Superintendent Health Physics
          12C. Riggs, Supervisor, Primary Chemistry
          12C. Graham, Supervisor, Health Physics Technical Services
          IT. Stotlar, Supervising Engineer
          15. Growcock, QA Scientist
          1D. Widmer, Engineer
          10. Brownawell, QA Engineer
          1M. Trusty, Acting Counting Room Foreman
            G. Lewis, Rad Chem Technician, Counting Room
            T. Lohmann, Rad Chem Technician, Counting Room
          1B. Little, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
          1 Denotes those present at exit interview on May 16, 1986.
          20enotes subsequent telephone conversations between May 20-29, 1986.
      2. Management Controls and Organization
          No changes in management controls or the staffing structure of the
          Chemistry and the Health Physics Departments have occurred since a
          previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-483/86001) although
          promotions within the Health Physics Department, including the Supervisor
          Health Physics Technical Services and the Superintendent, Health Physics,
          have taken place. These promotions should increase the efficiency of the
          Department.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
      3. Confirmatory Measurements
          Containment air particulate, containment charcoal, degassed reactor coolant,
          gas stripped from reactor coolant, discharge monitor tank and a spent fuel
          pool sample were analyzed for gamma emitting isotopes by the licensee and
          by the inspector using the Region III mobile laboratory. Results of the
          sample comparisons are listed in Table 1; comparison criteria are given in
          Attachment 1.
          The containment samples, counted in lieu of unit vent samples which
          contained no particulate activity, yielded all agreements.
                                                                                              1
                                                                                              i
                                                                                              l
                                                                                              l
                                                                                          2
w--_                                    __- -_ _ _ _ _-_-________- _ _ _ __________- __ _
                                                                                            .
 
    *
  .
                                Filtered reactor coolant and gas stripped from the reactor coolant also
                                yielded all agreements. Dose equivalent iodine results from the primary
                                coolant sample compared very well. Procedure CTP-ZZ-02570 " Determination
                                of E-BAR in the RCS" was reviewed to determine the accuracy of E-BAR
                                _ determinations. The procedure appears to be technically sound and the
                                average beta and gamma energies used agreed with accepted values.
                                The licensee agreed to count a portion of the fuel pool sample for gross
                                beta, H-3, Sr-89 and Sr-90 and report the results to Region III.
                                (0 pen Item No. 483/86014-01)
                          4.    Quality Control of Analytical Measurements
                                An inspector reviewed the implementation of the counting room QC program.
l                                The program is described in Health Physics Departmental Procedure,
,
                                HDP-ZZ-04700, " Count Room Quality Control Program," February 20, 1986,    1
l                                Revision 0. Control charts for efficiency, background, blank, and
I                                resolution or peak position, depending on the instrument, were examined
                                for all counting room equipment and found to be complete and current.
                                The inspector noted that when an instrument was declared "Out of Control"
                                (00C) on the control chart, the specific data for that date was entered
                                on an attached " Control Chart Worksheet" designated for either outlying
                                data or control chart setup data. An instrument is declared 00C and so
                                marked when the average of shiftly QC results exceed three standard
                                deviations of the mean or when a single result exceeds five standard
                                deviations of the mean. The licensee has a method for using 00C instruments <
                                if necessary while still assuring a valid result. This method requires      !
                                additional QC measurements, the discretion of the count room foreman and
                                evaluation of analyses performed.
                                An inspector observed two RCTs (primary chemistry) preparing liquid and
                                gas samples for the confirmatory measurements split and reviewing spectral  l
                                data, and two RCTs (counting room) reviewing spectral data for the prepa-  l
                                ration of a release report and installing required electronic modules to
                                set up a replacement germanium detector. It appeared from discussions with
                                these individuals and observations that appropriate training had been
                                presented and that the RCTs were knowledgeable in their area.
l
                          5.    Environmental Protection
                                An inspector reviewed the radiological portion of the licensee's " Annual
                                Environmental Operating Report" for 1985. Interpretations and conclusions
<
                                regarding the samples analyzed during this report period indicate that the  ,
,                                radioactivity detected around the plant is consistent with previous data.  l
                        6.      Licensee Event Report Followup
                                Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
                                review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine  l
                                that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
                                action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had
                                been accomplished.
                                                                    3
      . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
r
    ~
  .
      (Closed) LER 86-011-00:    Sampling Not Performed With Rad Monitor Inoperable.
      On April 16 and 17, 1986, two incidents occurred which involved failures to
      perform continuous sampling of effluent releases from the Radwaste (RW)
      Building Vent System. The plant was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and Mode 2
      (Startup), respectively, during the events.
      On April 16, 1986, a gaseous radwaste release from a gas decay tank was
      authorized. In accordance with Procedure HTP-ZZ-02007, the automatic
      isolation of the release pathway was tested prior to the release. While
      testing the alert alarm of the RW noble gas radiation monitor, GH-RE-108,
      sample flow to the continuous sampling system, GH-RE-10A, was isolated by
      a signal from GH-RE-108. Since HTP-ZZ-02007 does not require the restor-
      ation of sample flow to GH-RE-10A, this system remained inoperable until
      after termination of the release (0541 to 1545) when this condition was
      discovered by an HP technician while obtaining the sampler's charcoal
      cartridge and filter.
      Upon discovery of the GH-RE-10A isolation on April 16, 1986, the immediate
      corrective action taken was to restore sample flow to the monitor. Also,
      a change to HTP-ZZ-02007 was issued on April 16, 1986, to delete testing of
      the alert alarm for GH-RE-10B, and a temporary modification was installed on
      April 17, 1986, on GH-RE-10A to provide an alarm to the Main Control Room
      when GH-RE-10A is isolated. To prevent recurrence, a Request for Resolution
      has been written to evaluate a permanent design change which provides an
      alarm to the Main Control Room when GH-RE-10A is isolated. Also, the
      incident has been discussed with the HP iechnical Support technicians and
      will be covered in the periodic requalification training.
      The inspectors' review of licensee documentation and interviews with
      licensee representatives revealed that Procedure HTP-ZZ-02007 had
      apparently been used on eight previous occasions in conjunction with
      releases from gas decay tanks. Presumably, the use of this procedure has
      always isolated GH-RE-10A and no procedural step required the restoration
      of this system; yet data indicates that required weekly samples have been
      properly obtained since initial criticality.      It appears that someone has
      restored the system on the eight previous eight occasions, even though the
      procedure does not specify such action. Although it is unknown whether
      system restoration occurred before or after gas decay tank releases, it
      appears that the licensee had eight opportunities to identify the problem
      with Procedure HTP-ZZ-02007 and take adequate corrective actions to
      prevent recurrence before the April 16, 1986 incident.
      Failure to continuously collect samples with auxiliary sampling equipment,
      as required by Technical Specification Table 4.11-2, while releasing the
      contents of a gas decay tank to the environs with the Radwaste Building
      Vent System iodine and particulate samplers inoperable, is a violation
      of Technical Specification 3.3.3.10. The corrective actions noted above
      appear adequate to prevent recurrence.    (Violation No. 483/86014-02)
      The second event on April 17, 1986, was a result of miscommunication
      between Instrumentation and Controls and Health Physics personnel when
      taking the radiation sampler out of service for calibration testing.
      The corrective actions specified in the LER appear adequate to prevent
      recurrence.
                                            4
w_
 
    *
  .
            (Closed) LER 86-012-00: Containment Atmosphere Rad Monitors Inoperable
          During Containment Purge. On April 16, 1986, while the plant was in-        ,
          Mode 2 (Startup), Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors were placed
            in bypass while a containment mini purge was in progress. The monitors
          were placed in bypass prior to replacing filters to prevent spurious
            Engineered Safety Features Actuations which had previously been
          experienced.    Since the mini purge had been in progress for an extended
          period of time and since the filters are routinely replaced, Operations
          personnel failed to recognize the need to secure the mini purge prior to
          placing the monitors in bypass. The corrective actions specified in the
            LER appear adequate to prevent recurrence.
          One violation and no deviations were identified.
      7.  Open Items
          Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
          will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on
            the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the
            inspection is discussed in Section 3.
      8.    Exit Interview
          The inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection with        i
            licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the
            inspection on May 16, 1986, and by telephone through May 29, 1986.
          The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the
            inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
            inspectors during the inspection. Licensee representatives did not
            identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
                                                                                        I
      Attachments:
                                                                                        !
      1.  Table 1, Confirmatory Measurements                                          l
              Program Results, 2nd Quarter 1985                                        j
      2.  Attachment 1, Criteria for Comparing
              Analytical Measurements
                                                                                      ;
,
                                                                                        1
1
                                                                                        1
i
i
                                                5
 
                                                    -
n-                                                                                  1
                                                .            .
          ,
  .
                                        TABLE 1
                          U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                        OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
                          CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS PROGRAM
                                FACILITY: CALLAWAY
                              FOR THE 2 QUARTER OF 1986
                      ------NRC-------      ----LICENSEE----  ---LICENSEE:NRC----
    SAMPLE    ISOTOPE RESULT    ERROR      RESULT    ERROR    RATIO    RES    T
    P FILTER NA-24    7.3E-11    1.5E-12    7.7E-11  9.7E-13  1.1E 00  4.7E 01  A
              MN-54'  1.7E-12    3.9E-13    2.5E-12  2.4E-13  1.5E 00  4.2E  00 A
              CO-58  2.4E-12    3.4E-13    2.OE-12  2.OE-13  8.3E-01  7.OE  00 A
              CS-134  1.3E-11    4.7E-13    1.1E-11  3.1E-13  8.5E-01  2.8E 01  A
              CS-137  1.6E-11    5.3E-13    1.6E-11  3.OE-13  9.8E-01  3.OE 01  A
              CE-144  2.6E-12    7.9E-13    2.7E-12  5.1E-13  1.OE 00  3.3E  00 A
    C FILTER BR-82    5.6E-11    1.5E-12    4.6E-11  7.5E-13  8.2E-01  3.9E 01  A
                I-131  5.8E-10    2.7E-12    5.6E-10  1.5E-12  9.8E-01  2.1E O2  A
                I-133  1.3E-10    2.OE-12    1.3E-10  1.1E-12  9.SE-01  6.5E 01  A
    PRIMARY  NA-24  2.1E-02    3.6E-04    2.2E-02  1.9E-04  1.OE 00  5.8E 01  A
                I-131  2.5E-03    1.SE-04    2.4E-03  7.3E-05  9.8E-01  1.4E 01  A
              I-132  6.6E-03    3.OE-04    6.SE-03  1.1E-04  9.9E-01  2.2E 01  A
              I-133  6.OE-03    1.7E-04    6.2E-03  7.2E-05  1,OE 00  3.5E 01  A
              I-134  1.1E-02    7.8E-04    9.5E-03  4.3E-04  8.8E-01  1.4E 01  A
              I-135  8.7E-03    7.OE-04    9.OE-03  3.SE-04  1.OE 00  1.2E 01  A
              CS-137  2.1E-04    1.3E-04    2.2E-04  4.5E-05  1.OE 00  1.7E  00 N
              CS-138  2.SE-02    2.6E-03    2.6E-02  8.SE-04  1.OE 00  9.8E  00 A
    OFF GAS  KR-85M  4.9E-02    4.6E-04    4.9E-02  1.8E-04  1.OE 00  1.1E O2  A
              XE-133 8.7E-01    2.1E-03    8.9E-01  8.7E-04  1.OE 00  4.2E O2  A
              XE-133M 2.6E-02    1.9E-03    2.9E-02  8.5E-04  1.1E 00  1.4E 01  A
              XE-135 2.2E-01    7.6E-04    2.1E-01  3.OE-04  9.8E-01  2.OE O2  A
              KR-88  9.4E-02    1.5E-03    8.4E-02  4.7E-04  8.9E-01  6.3E 01  A
              XE-138 3.6E-02    3.3E-03    3.1E-02  1.1E-03  8.7E-01  1.1E 01  A
    F POOL    CR-51  3.5E-05    6.2E-06    2.9E-05  3.OE-06  8.1E-01  5.7E 00  A
              MN-54  4.4E-06    7.8E-07    3.7E-06  4.3E-07  8.3E-01  5.7E 00  A
              CO-57  3.6E-06    4.6E-07    2.9E-06  2.6E-07  7.9E-01  7.SE 00  A
              CO-58  9.2E-04    3.2E-06    9.1E- 04  1.7E-06  9.9E-01  2.9E O2  A
              CO-60  2.7E-04    1.9E-06    2.7E-04  1.1E-06  1.OE 00  1.4E O2  A
    T TEST RESULTS:                                                                )
    A= AGREEMENT
    D= DISAGREEMENT
    o= CRITERIA RELAXED
    N=NO COMPARISON
t                                                -
 
                                                                          _    - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
                                                .    .
    -
  ..
                                          ATTACHMENT 1
                        CRITERIA FOR COMPARING ANALYTICAL MEASUREMENTS
      .This attachment provides criteria for comparing results of capability tests
        and verification measurements. The criteria are based on an empirical
        relationship which combines prior experience and the accuracy needs of this
        program.
        In these criteria, the judgment limits are variable in relation to the com-
        parison of the NRC's value to its associated one sigma uncertainty. As that
        ratio, referred to in this program as " Resolution", in::reases, the acceptability
        of a licensee's measurement should be more selective. Conversely, poorer
        agreement should be considered acceptable as the resolution decreases. The
        values in the ratio criteria may be rounded to fewer significant figures to
        maintain statistical consistency with the number of significant figures reported
        by the NRC Reference Laboratory, unless such rounding will result in a narrowed
        category of acceptance.
                  RESOLUTION            RATIO = LICENSEE VALUE/NRC REFERENCE VALUE
                                                      Agreement
                  <3                                  No Comparison
                23 and      <4                      0.4  -
                                                              2.5
                ,2.4 and    <8                      0.5  -
                                                              2.0
                .2E and    <16                      0.6  -
                                                              1.67
                2,16 and    <51                      0.75 - 1.33
                251 and    <200                    0.80 - 1.25
                2200                                0.85 - 1.18
        Some discrepancies may result from the use of different equipment, techniques,
        and for some specific nuclides. These may be factored into the acceptance
        criteria and identified on the data sheet.
                                                                                                                        l
l
                                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                                        {
}}

Revision as of 07:49, 10 December 2024

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20199F233&oldid=4088589"