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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000416/1986003]]
| number = ML20199G261
| issue date = 03/24/1986
| title = Insp Rept 50-416/86-03 on 860210-14.Violation Noted: Failure to Train Decontamination Workers Performing hydro-lazing & Strippable Coating,Per Tech Spec 6.8.1
| author name = Belisle G, Caldwell J, Moore L, Moorman J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000416
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-TM
| document report number = 50-416-86-03, 50-416-86-3, NUDOCS 8604090101
| package number = ML20199G235
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 11
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000416/1986003]]
 
=Text=
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                                            .
                        ,      u. M MCo                                      UNITE] STAT ES
                                f            fo                NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                                                REGION ll
                          .[                    o
                          . g-                  j                    108 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
                              *                *
,    .
                                                                        ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323
:.        .
                          . \,. ... .        /
                ,
                            Report No.: 50-416/86-03
                            Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
  L                                          -Jackson, MS 39205
                            Docket No.: 50-416-                                                License.No.: NPF-29
  ,-                          Facility Name: . Grand Gulf
                              Inspection Conducted:        February 10-14, 1986
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                              Inspectors: '          [  [5        a    I                                f    V$
                                              J. L. Caldwell -V-      /
                                                                                                          '
                                                                                                            Date Signed
                                                        l    yn r l  ,7  ~
                                                                                                          AbV  ~
                                                L. R. Moore    'V        /                                  Date Signed
                                                        8 l %Yr ?'
            ^
                                                                              W                              lb4!b
                      .
                                              T H. Moorman,'Iri            /                                Date/ Signed
                          ~ Approved by:                      - Ze  C:7                                      _T [ d //,?,
                                                G. A.'Belisle, Acfing Section Chief                        Date Signed
                                                Division of Reactor Safety
  ;
                  '
                                                                              SUPARY
        ., ,
                          -Scope: This ' routine, unannounced inspection entailed 85 inspector-hours on site
  - -
  .
              '
                              in the areas of design changes and modifications program and audit implementa-
                              tion.
      ~
                              Results: One violation was identified - Failure te train decontamination workers
. .c                      -in accordance with procedures.
                    .
P
                                        8604090101 860329
                                        PDR      ADOCK 05000416
                                        G                    PDH
  L
 
  m  _
                                      D.
            -
                        .
              ,
                                                  REPORT DETAILS
        1.        Persons Contacted
                  Licensee Employees
                  F. Adcock,' Principal Mechanical Engineer. Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)
                  C. Angle, Manager, Operational Analysis Section (OAS)
                      .
              *J. Bailey, Compliarce Coordinator
                    -
              .J.. Buller, Safety Evaluation Engineer, OAS
                ~D. Chieply, Quality Assurance (QA) Design P.eview Engineer
              *T. Cloninger,.Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support
  -
              *A Cross, Site Director
              *L. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
              ;*W. Edge, Manager. Nuclear Site QA
              *W.      Eiff, Principal Quality Engiaeer, NPE
              *S. Fieth, Director, QA'
              .J.      Hickman, Senior Quality Representative
              *C. Hutchinson, Site General Manager
                  D. Johnson, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
                  A. Khanifar, Electrical Engineering Supervisor
              *Q. Kingsley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
              *B.-Lee, QA Audits Superviror
                  L.'Loboda, OAS Engineer
                  B. McCall,. Senior Nuclear Plant Scheduler
              *R. Moomau, Acting Maintenance Manager
              *J. Parrish, Chemisty/ Health Physics Superintendent
                  L. Patterson, Engineer
                  R. Patterson, Systems Engineer
              *S. Tanner, Manager, Programs QA
              *F. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
'
                  D. Williams, Document Safety Review Coordinator
                  J. Wilson, Civil Engineer
                  M. Withrow, Instrumentation anf Controls (I&C) Supervisor
                  Other licensee employees contacted included office personnel.
                  NRC Resident Inspectors
              *R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
              *J. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
              * Attended exit interview
      - 2.      Exit Interview
                  The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 14, 1986, with
                  those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
                  areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.        No
                  dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
 
7
                '
        .
                                                    2
                  Violation, Failure to take prompt corrective action for known
                  conditions adverse to quality, paragraph 5.
                  Violation,. Failure to train decontamination workers in accordance with
                  procedures, paragraph 6.
                                -
          Upon management review, the violation for failure-to take prompt corrective
          action for known conditions adverse to quality was determined to be
          inappropriate. Mr. S. Feith was notified of this position during a
  ~
          telephone conversation conducted on March 4, 1986.
          The licensee did not identify as proprietary ar.y of. the materials provided -
          -to or_ reviewed by the inspector      n'ing this inspection.
    -3.    Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
          This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
    4.    Unresolved Items
          Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
    5.    Design Program (37702)
          References:        (a)  10 CFR 50.54(a)(1), Conditions of Licenses
                              (b) Mississippi    Power and Light Operational      Quality
                                  Assurance Manual (MPL-TOP-1A), Revision 4
                              (c)  10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for
                                  Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants
                              (d) Regulatory Guide 1.64, Quality Assurance Requirements
                                    for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants
                              (e) ANSI N45.2.11 - 1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for
                                    the Design of Nuclear Power Plants
          The inspector interviewed engineers from the four disciplines of Nuclear
          Plant Engineering (NPE).        Subjects discussed were educational background,
          experience, training, familiarity with licensee commitments, and applica-
          bility of these commitments to the individual's work related responsibility
          and function. Those engineers interviewed appeared to be adequately trained
          and knowledgeable of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical
          Specification      requirements.    The  inspector particularly discussed
          disposition of Material Non-Conformance Reports (MNCRs),10 CFR 50.59 Safety
          Evaluations, and plant staff interface. The engineers referenced applicable
          procedures for disposition of MNCRs,10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations, and
 
C                      ,
            -
    .
                                          3
      appeared to employ these guidelines. The issue of escalation for resolution
      of differences at the interface between plant staff and NPE was unclear in
      the discussions. This area was not proceduralized at the time of the
      inspection, although the Principal Quality Engineer indicated that an
      escalation procedure would be drafted as the NPE procedure manual was
  .  reviewed and updated.
      The licensee periodically receives documents from such organization as
      Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), General Electric (GE), and NRC
      concerning problems experienced by other operating plants. These documents
      include CE Service Information Letters (SIL), NRC Inspection and Enforcement
      (IE) Bulletins, IE Notices, INP0 Significant Operating Experience Reports,
      and INPO Significant Event Reports (SER). These documents are evaluated by
      NPE as to their applicability and importance to the operation of Grand Gulf
      Nuclear Station. Other documents evaluated by NPE include Incident Reports,
      Operation and Maintenance Reports, and Potentially Reportable Deficiencies.
      Guidance for this activity is provided oy NPE AP 01-701, "Onsite and Offsite
      Document Review", Revision 5. Within NPE, document evaluations are the
      responsibility of 0AS. 0AS performs the function of the Independent Safety
      Engineering Group (ISEG) referred to in the          licensee's Technical
      Specifications.
      The inspector reviewed evaluations of IE Bulletins, SERs, and SILs received
      by the licensee frem 1984 to the present. These documents are received into
      NPE by OAS. They are logged in a manual tracking system and then assigned a
      priority for review by the Document Safety Review Coordinator. A " Red"
      priority indicates that a document has a significant impact on plant safety
      or operation and requires immediate attention.          A " Yellow" oriority
      indicates that the document has a potential impact on plant safety or
      operatirn. A " Green" priority indicates a possible minor impact on plant
      safety or operation. Also, an estimated completion date for the evaluation
      is assigned. After priority assignment, the ducuments are either evaluated
      internally by OAS, or distributed to other sections within NPE as may be
      required for an appropriate evaluation. When documents are assigned to be
      reviewed by disciplines other than the OAS, the discipline Principal
      Engineer will assign a Responsible Engineer to do the evaluation according
      to current workload within the discipline.        After the evaluation is
      complete, recommendations are documented and appropriate action is taken to
      implement the recommendations.        Periodically,  document evaluations
      distributed to disciplines other than 0AS will not be completed by the
      assigned due date. In these cases, the Document Safety Review Coordinator
      sends a memo to the Principal Engineer responsible for action on the
      documents listing the late documents by title and the due date. Currently,
      the issuance of these memos is not required by an NPE orocedure, nor are the
      Principal Engineers required to respond to these memos. Additionally, when
      a conflict concerning evaluation timeliness or priority arises between OAS
      and another discipline per'orming a document evaluation, there is no
      prescribed path for escalation of the conflict in the management chain to
      assure its timely resolution.
 
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          -
    .
                                            4
  -
      For example, GE SIL 211, Supplement I was issued on January 14, 1985, and
      logged in the OAS tracking system on March 10, 1985. A " Yellow" priority
      was assigned to this SIL.      This SIL concerned possible drive mechanism
      malfunctions for the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) which causes the detector
      to be withdrawn beyond the shielded position into the drive housing.      If
      this occurs, general area radiation levels become excessively high around
      the drive housing. Supplement 1 to SIL 211 was sent to the Mechanical
      Section for evaluation. The Mechanical Section sent a memo to 0AS stating
      that corrective action had already been taken by issuing DCP 82/4154 on
      November 11, 1982, which provided corrective action for SIL 211. The memo
      also stated that actions suggested by SIL 211 and SIL 211, Supplement 1,
      were similar and that no further corrective action was required.        The
      licensee had access to information that indicated that corrective action for
      SIL 211 might not be adequate to completely cc rrect th problem and that
      action suggested by SIL 211, Supplement I would.
i
      SIL 211 and its supplement were discussed with the Principal Mechanical
      Engineer and the Mechanical I&C Engineering Supervisor and they stated that
      they were still in the process of determining the Supplement's applicability
      to Grand Galf.      The evaluation for SIL 211, Supplement 1, was still
      outstanding at the time of this inspection.
1
      The inspectors' offsite document review also identified a failure of the
,
      tracking system which caused the evaluation for SER 2-84 not being completed
'
      in a prompt manner.
      INPO SER 2-84 described a reaction of the zinc primer and/or phenolic liner
      of diesel fuel oil storage tanks and naphenate base fuel oil with potential
      application to licensee safety-related equipment. The reaction resulted in
      the formation of a gel which could plate out on the ejector nozzles and
      possibly cause the clogging of in-line strainers. This condition could
      eventually result in compromising the ability of the diesels to perform at
      design capacity. It is noted on the SER that this is a long term
      degeneration effect on the diesel as opposed to a sudden catastrophic
      failure.    The SER was received January 6, 1984. A memo from the OAS
      Principal Engineer to the NPE Mechanical Principal Engineer, dated
      October 31, 1984, requested verification of the applicability of the zinc
      primer-fuel oil reaction at Grand Gulf. On February 22, 1985, a memo from
      the OAS Principal Engineer informed the Plant Manager of the zinc primer
      applicability and recommended verification of onsite fuel oil as naphthenate
      based. The response priority given on this memo was " Green". The fuel oil
      was determined compatible with the zinc reaction and the Plant Manager
      requested NPE to evaluate continued operation of the diesel generators until
      the fall outage in 1985. A memo dated July 31, 1985, from NPE to the Plant
      Manager listed potential courses of action for evaluation and endorsed
      normal use and operation of diesel generators at least until the fall
      outage. The memo also stated that NPE would evaluate potential courses of
      action and advise plant staff at this time. Documentation was not available
      to verify that corrective actions or further evaluations were performed.
      Two years af ter initial receipt of the SER relating to safety related
      equipment, the licensee had not completed evaluation and corrective action
      to close out the issue.
I
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r                    -
                                                                    ,
          ~
  .
                                                                            .
                                          5
    NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Section I.C.5, _
    Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience to Plant Staff.. requires
    that procedures be prepared to assure that operating information pertinent
    to plant safety originating both within and outside the utility organization  ,
                                                                                  '
    is continually supplied to operators and other personnel. Procedure NPE AP
    01-701 provides administrative guidance for reviewing operational feedback
    to plant personnel. The two examples previously discussed relating to GE
    SIL 211, Supplement 1, and INPO SER 2-84 are indic'ative that additional
    management attention is needed in this area to :ssure that evaluations arel
    performed and recommendations resulting from these evaluations are
    implemented in a timely manner.
    The inspector reviewed onsite generated documents, MNCRs, and Design Change
    Packages (DCPs) evaluated by.NPE. DCPs were reviewed for a period from 1982
    until the present.    Significant improvement was noted by the inspector in
    the quality of 10 CFR 50.59 safety reviews and safety review appli ability
    checklists performed over the last year. This improvement can be credited,
    in part, to the addition of a procedure providing guidance for reviews which
    was implemented in August 1985. The remaining credit would be on the
    increased emphasis on personnel to provide a more thorough basis for
    statements on safety reviews and safety review applicability checklists.
    Material Nonconformance Reports (MNCRs) may be generated at any plant
    organization level. After generation, the MNCR is directed to the QA Senior
    Quality Representative where the report is logged and tracking begins. The
    MNCR is then directed to the operations plant staff for initial evaluation.
    Following this evaluation, the MNCR is either returned to QA for
    implementation, tracking, and closure or to NPE for further evaluation.
    After NPE evaluation, the MNCR returns to QA for distribution and tracking.
    MNCRs concerning safety-related or important to safety issues received an
    additional Design Quality Review by the QA Review Group. This group
    utilized QA Procedure 3.10, " Review of Design Documents Generated or
    Approved by NPE", Revision 6, to provide guidance for this review.        The
    majority of errors identified by this design quality review were
    administrative in nature, i.e., drawing revision discrepancies, signatures
    missing from 50.59 reviews, or incomplete MNCR forms. QA was responsible
    for verification and final closecut of the MNCR.
    During the MNCR review, the inspector noted a discrepancy with MNCR 0142-85.
    This MNCR dealt with marginally acceptable results of a Technical
    Specification required surveillance of heaters in the Standby Gas Treatment
    System (SGTS).      Electrical surveillance 06-EL-1T48-R-0001, Standby Gr.s
    Treatment Heater Test, was being performed as a retest for DCP 84/3109.
    This DCP removed the 50 Kilowatt (kw) heaters originally installed in the
    SGTS and replaced them with 48 kw heaters which met 10 CFR 50.49 require-
    ments. Technical Specifications require these heaters to dissipatt 5015 kw
    for operability requirements.      The electrical surveillance performed on
 
      _ _ _ _ . . _ . . .
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.                            Train A of the SGTS on March 7, 1985, was performed twice before acceptable
                            results were recorded. The first test was performed using a TIF digital
                            clamp-on ammeter (r; accuracy) with the measured capacity at 44.02 kw.            An
_                            Amprobe RS3A clamp-on ammeter (3*a accuracy), listed as a required test
                            equipment in the surveillance procedure, resulted in a capacity of 45.6 kw.
                            Based on these marginally acceptable results, MNCR 0142-85 was generated.
                            An attachment to the MNCR stated that acceptable readings were obtained only
                            after the heaters were energized for one hour.              El.ctrical maintenance
-
"
                            personnel stated it was not unusual to employ additional test equipment in
                            such situations and, cue to satisfactory readings obtained with surveillance
                            procedure suggested equipment, a violation of Technical Specifications did
                            not occur.          Electrical maintenance personnel also stated that energizing
  .
                            heaters for one hour would have a tandency to reduce, rather than increase,
                            heater output. NPE disrositioned this MNCR by stating that a nonconformance
                            did not exist and justified this statement with calculations generated by an
                            NPE engineer, demonstrating that the heaters could perform their intended
                            function with only 21.5 kw generated. The disposition further stated that
                            50 5 kw value was based on the size of the originally installed heaters, not
                            supported by calculations, and that NPE would process a TS change based on
  . .
                            their calculations.          The current TS did not reflect this proposed change.
                              Investigation of the change processing revealed a March 14, 1985, memo
[                            transmitting the change from NPE to the Director of Licensing and Safety.
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_
                            The inspector verified the memo was transmitted but could not locate any
                            evidence to verify the change had been made or was still being processed.
                              Since a violation of TS has not occurred, this issue was not deemed a
-
                            violation; however, the inspector was concerned with the interface weakness
                            which permitted this proposed TS change to remain unprocessed.                After
                              investigation, the deficiency appeared to be the result ~ of a low priority
                              assignment and/or a failure of the tracking mechanism to verify corrective
_                            action completion on an MNCR.
~
                              Investigation of the TS change issue demonstrated an inconsistency between
                              the Licensing Group for TS changes and the procedure employed by NPE.
    ~
                              Nuclear Licensing and Safety procedure 3.5, " Control of Technical
~
"
                              Specifications", Revision 0, described the detailed method by which TS
__                          changes are submitted to the Licensing Section and how these submittals were
                              to be acknowledged and processed.          The NPE procedure, 01-319, " Changes to
                              GGNS Technical Specifications", Revision 2, did not provide a method for
                              receiving an acknowledgement from licensing and provided o r.1v general
                              guidelines for processing and submittal.          This inconsistency provides a
                              basis for discrepancies in the processing of TS changes by NPE. This issue
                              was discussed with the Principal Quality Engineer and will be reviewed in
r                            conjunction with the NPE procedures enhancement program recently instigated
{'                          by the Quality Engineering Group.
    '
[                          .
R
m
-
E
z
                                    _ ._ _ . ._ .
 
___
                                                                                                                  _
                                  .
                          -
                                                    ,
                                                                                                                  _
                                                                      7
                                                                                                                  _,
                            ,
                            .The Quality Engineering Section of NPE currently performs Quality                      .
                              Evaluations (internal audits) of NPE functions. The following evaluations
                              were reviewed by the inspector:
                                    QE 86/001        Specifications
                                    QE 85/005        Certification of Information
                                    QE 85/004        Document Control                                            '
                                    QE 85/002        Design Change Control
                                    QE 85/001        Performance of Design and Preparation of DCPs                      1
                              The Principal Quality Engineer (PQE) establishes a schedule for conducting
                              the evaluation and performs them accordingly. Evaluations ar: issued to the
                              Cognizant Principal Engineer (CPE) containing audit findings and recommended          g
                              correr+.ive actions after the evaluation and corrective actions, if any, have            I
                              been discussed between the PQE and CPE. Corrective action, if any, is then
                              taken by the CPE. Implementation of corrective action is then verified by
                              QE.
                              Procedure NPEAP 01-203, " Evaluation of NPE Activities", was first issued on          ;
                              August 21, 1985, to assist NPE managers in finding problems and assessing            -
                              root causes. All of the evaluations listed above, except 85/005, identified          )
                              discrepancies.    Discrepancies were generally for failure to include the
                              proper drawing and procedure rei:1sions in DCPs, failure to include Equipment
                              Qualification Control File change review questionnaires in Change Notice              _
                              packages, failure to provide complete control of design drawings, and
                              failure to re-file items properly. It appears that the evaluations will
                              provide NPE with a method of finding problems and assessing root causes in              e
                                                                                                                        '
                              dddition to that already provided by the plant Quality Assurance Department
                              audits.
                              Due to previous SALP ratings in the design control area, the inspector
                              reviewed changes in the NPE program and organization with potential for
                              improvement of licensee performance.          Personnel changes provide one
                              potential for improvement. The Principal Quality Engineer position was
                              filled by an apparently quality conscious individual actively attempting to
                              locate and correct problem areas.        The organization has raduced the number        '
                              of contractor personnel, replacing these with company personnel better
                        n      motivated to quality work and company goals. All professional staff members            -
                              are participating in formal Engineering Analysis Training.        In addition, the      -
                              Quality Engineering Group has initiated proceduralized internal evaluations
                          i to identify problems within NPE and provide corrective action. Due to the
                              short time these changes have been in effect, a determination cannot be made
                        +
                              as to the effectiveness of these measures.                                              -
                                                                                                                          .
                                1
                              Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
                                                                                                                      a
    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
 
                                                    --
                                                            .      -    .        .  ._            _-  ,
    r7
                          '
                  .
                                                            8
      -
            _ :6.    Audit Implementation (40704)
  L                                      .
                                                          .
                      References:      (4)  10 CFR 50.54(a)(1), Conditions of License
                                        (b) Mississippi    Power. and. Light Operational      Quality  -
  i                                          Assurance Manual (MPL-10P-1A), Revisian 4
                                        (c) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, . Quality Assurance Criteria for
                                              Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Processing Plants
        "
                                        (d) Regulatory Guide 1.144, Auditing of Quality Assurance
                                              Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
                                        (e) ANSI N45.2.12-1977, Requirements for Auditing of Quality
                                              Assurance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants
                                        (f) Technical: Specifications, Section 6
                      Several aspects of the QA audit program were inspected, especially in the
                      area of training audits. There were 15 training related audits and several
                      other, audits which included ' training activities performed by QA . audit
                      personnel in 1985. The. inspector reviewed the below listed eight training
                      related audits, three miscellaneous audits, and a Corrective Action Request
                      (CAR) which resulted from a 1 finding that was ' identified in one of the
                      audits. These audits for. the most part were record and program reviews to
                      verify that training and other activities were being conducted in accordance
                      with - Mi ssi ssippi Power and Light (MP&L) procedures and other applicable
                      requirements. A few audits included classroom participation =but very few            ;
                    . included. interviews with personnel to -determine their understanding of the
                      material and views on the adequacy of the training.
                              Audit Report No. 85/0009      Maintenance Training and Qualification
                                                            Program                                        l
'
          >
                              Audit Report No. 85/0037      Shift Technical Advisor Training
                              Audit Report'No. 85/0045      Operator License Instructor Qualification
                              Audit Report No. 85/0073      Radiation Worker Training Program
                              Audit Report No. 85/0127      Contractor Process Control                    ,
                              Audit Report No. 85/0153      Qualification of Contract Personnel
                            -Audit Report No. 85/0032        Fire Protection Implementation Procedures
                              Audit Report No.-85/0018        Fire Brigade Training
.                            Audit Report No. 85/0144        Environmental Qualification of Electrical
3
                                                              Equipment
                                                  ,
b-
    -
 
                o-
    .
                                    9
      Audit Report No. 85/0166      Transamerican Delaval Incorporated (TDI)
                                    Diesel Generator DQ/QR Reports and
                                    Summary of TDI Owners Group Recommenda-
                                    tions and MP&L Actions
      Audit Report No. 85/0064      Feedback of Operational Information
Several observations were discussed with QA management dealing with training
and miscellaneous other audits. One particular observation dealt with Audit
No. 85-0166. This audit reviewed 96 of 200 line item commitments to the NRC
to perform recommended activities on TDI diesel generators to ensure
operability. Of these 96 items, 2 were found to be deficient in that one
had not been incorporated into the surveillance activities and therefore was
not being performed, and the other involved the actual surveillance
periodicity being greater than that committed to in the letter to the NRC.
The discrepancies were corrected and verified by the auditor during the
course of the audit. The inspector questioned QA supervision on why the
remaining 104 line items were not audited following the discovery of the two
discrepancies and was told that a much greater percentage of deficiencies
must be found to warrant a 100% audit even considering the significance of
the TDI diesel generator operability question.
Another observation involved Audit 85-0037. During the course of this
audit, the QA auditor identified a new requirement to have STA's fill out
qualification cards. But since the requirement for the qualification cards
was not in effect during the period being audited, the cards were not
reviewed. The qualification card requirement became effective December 1,
1985. The audit was conducted February 1985, but audited a period in late
1984. The inspector asked QA supervisicn if this new requirements for STA
qualification cards had now been audited in light of past training
qualification card problems, the inspector was told that the next STA
training audit was not scheduled until March 1986.
The final observation deals with Audit 85/0144 which looked at the
Environmental Qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment.        The audit
provided some very good recommendations to the EQ program.          These
recommendations consisted of NPE reviewing and revising ES-19, " Engineering
Standard for Environmental Equipment Qualification Maintenance," due to its
lack of adequate detail and minor inconsistencies.      More important, the
audit recommended that NPE perform plant walkdowns to support the
development of this new revision.      Finally, the audit recommended that
personnel associated with environmentally- qualified equipment should receive
training in order to understand the significance of the EQ program.
                                                                              -
 
      '
.
                                      10
  Within this area, one violation was identified.        The training audits
  reviewed did not identify any major deficiencies with the exception of one
  that was identified in Audit 85/0073. This deficiency involved the training
  of decontamination workers. The QA auditor identified that decontamination
  training had nnt been received by any MP&L permanent or contract employees.
  Through discussions with plant maintenance supervision, the QA auditor was
  informed that decontamination work was being performed even though the
  decontamination training had not been completed. QA initiated CAR 2157,
  documenting the findings and requesting resolution. The plant and training
  department responded by providing decontamination training to the
  Labor /Decon Section. During the CAR review and discussions with the
  training department, the Labor /Decon Section supervisor, and the painters
  supervisor, the inspector was informed that decontamination work such as
  hydrolazing and use of strippable coatings was being performed by Bechtel
  contract employees and MP&L painters, respectively. These workers did not
  fall under the Labor /Decon Section that had received decontamination
  training and therefore, were performing specific decontamination activities
  without the required training.      The inspector discussed this apparent
  discrepancy with the Chemical / Radiation Superintendent, Manager of Plant
  Maintenance, and the painters' supervisor and was assured the decontamination
  activities, even though performed by workers without the benefit of
  decontamination training, were performed under the monitoring of Health
  Physics (HP) personnel. The inspector was informed that these workers had
  also received radiation training such as Rad Worker I and Rad Worker II
  prior to the performance of decontamination work. The reason given as to
  why decontamination training had not been provided to the Bechtel
  hydro-lazers or the MP&L painters was because they were not in the
  Labor /Decon Section and plant personnel failed to recognize that the work
  performed by these personnel required them, by procedure, to have completed
  the decontamination training.    QA also closed out CAR 2157 with the
  completion of training of the Labor /Decon Section, failing to followup to
  ensure that all personnel who performed specific decontamination activities
  had received the required training.
  Technical  Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be
  established, implemented, and maintained covering activities in Appendix A
  of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 7.e(6) requires,
  radiation protection procedures.      Administrative Procedure 01-S-04-25,
  " Decontamination Training Program", requires that all personnel performing
  decontamination work receive decontamination training.      The failure to
  ensure that personnel performing hydro-lazing and strippable coating
  decontamination activities had received required training is identified as
  Violation 50-416/86-03-01.
                      /
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