ML20207D632

Responds to 871027 Request for Technical Assistance in Interpretation of Tech Spec 4.1.5.B.3.Any Standby Liquid Control Sys Valve Which Could Affect Amount of Flow Delivered to Reactor Should Be Considered in Flow Path

ML20207D632
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	08/11/1988
From:	Stevens J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Cooper R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
NUDOCS 8808150404
Download: ML20207D632 (5)

Text

f' August 11, 1988 DISTRIBUTION:

(D 3 oat < file i NRC & Local PDRs LLuther MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard W. Cooper, Chief ney Reactor Projects, Section 3B DCrutchfield Division of Reactor Projects GHolahan Region III PDIII-2 r/f PDIII-2 plant file FROM:

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - CLARIFICATION OF CLINTON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.1.5.B.3 (AITS F03036987)

Reference:

Memorandum from C. Norelius (RGN III) to D. Crutchfield (NRR) Dated October 27, 1987, same subject.

The referenced memorandum requested NRR assistance in the interpretation of the subject technical specification surveillance requirement. The wording of the specification is as follows:

"Both standby liquid control subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE

... at least once per 31 days by... verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."

4 We understand that the issue in question is the determination of which valves are "in the flow path."

It is our position that any SLC system valve which could affect the amount of flow delivered to the reactor should be considered in the flow path. This would therefore include (in addition to those valves directly in the design flow path) branch line isolation valves which, if open, could divert flow away from the reactor vessel.

Exclusion from this surveillance of valves which can affect the amount of liquid poison delivered to the reactor vessel must be reviewed and approved by the staff.

For further information or clarification, please contact Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, at 492-0897.

/s Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc Steven Ray, RIII gl Timothy Collins, SRXB Office:

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i Surname: LLuther JStevens WForney Date:

5'/u /88 1 / 1 /88 8/,4/88 8808150404 880s;j PDR ADOCK 05000461 P

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August 11, 1988

. DISTRIBUTION:

Docket file 8

NP.C & Local PDRs LLuther he((s MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard W. Cooper, Chief Reactor Projects, Section 3B DCrutchfield Division of Reactor Projects GHolahan Region III PDIII-2 r/f

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FROM:

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - CLARIFICATION OF CLINTON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.1.5.B.3 (AITS F03036987)

Reference:

Memorandum from C. Norelius (RGN III) to D. Crutchfield (NRR) Dated October 27, 1987, same subject.

The referenced memorandum requested NRR assistance in the interpretation of the subject technical specification surveillance requirement. The wording of the specification is as follows:

"Both standby liquid control subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE

... at least once per 31 days by... verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."

We understand that the issue in question is the determination of which valves are "in the flow path."

It is our position that any SLC system valve which could affect the amount of flow delivered to the reactor should be considered in the flow path. This would therefore include (in addition to those valves directly in the design flow path) branch line isolation valves which, if open, could divert flow away from the reactor vessel.

Exclusion from this surveillance of valves which can affect the amcunt of liquid poison' delivered to the reactor vessel must be reviewed and approved by the staff.

For further information or clarification, please contact Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, at 492-0897.

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Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc Steven Ray, RIII Timothy Collins, SRXB Office:

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PD/PDII-2, Surname: LLuther JStevens WForney O Date:

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Auqust 11, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard W. Cooper, Chief Reactor Projects, Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects Region III FROM:

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III.

IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - CLARIFICATION OF CLINTON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.1.5.B.3 (AITS F03036987)

Reference:

W;morandum from C. Norelius (RGN III) to D. Crutchfield (NRR) Dated October 27, 1987, same subject.

The referenced memorandum requested NRR assistance in the interpretation of the subject technical specification surveillance requirement. The wording of the specification is as follows:

"Both standby liquid control subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE

... at least once per 31 days by... verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."

We understand that the issue in question is the determination of which valves are "in the flow path."

It is our position that any SLC system valve which could affect the amount of flow delivered to the reactor should be considered in the flow path. This would therefore include (in addition to those valves directly in the design flow path) branch line isolation valves which, if open, could divert flow away from the reactor vessel.

Exclusion from this surveillance of valves which can affect the amount of liquid poison delivered to the reactor vessel must be reviewed and approved by the staff.

For further information or clarification, please contact Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, at 492-0897.

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc Steven Ray, RIII Timothy Collins, SRXB

. - _ _ =

August 11, 1988

. DISTRIBUTION:

Docket file

}.

NRC & Local PDRs LLuther MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard W. Cooper, Chief f'h' ey r

Reactor Projects, Seccion 3B DCrutchfield Division of Reactor Projects GHolahan Region III PDIII-2 r/f PDIII-2 plant file FROM:

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - CLARIFICATION OF CLINTON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.1.5.B.3 (AITS F03036987)

Reference:

Memorandum from C. Norelius (RGN III) to D. Crutchfield (NRR) Dated October 27, 1987, same subject.

The referenced memorandum requested NRR assistance in the interpretation of the subject technical specification surveillance requirement. The wording of the specification is as follows:

"Both standby liquid control subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE

... at least once per 31 days by... verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."

We understand that the issue in question is the determination of which valves are "in the flow path."

It is our position that any SLC system valve which could affect the amount of flow delivered to the reactor should be considered in the flow path. This would therefore include (in addition to those valves directly in the design flow path) branch line isolation valves which, if open, could divert flow away from the reactor vessel. Exclusion from this surveillance of valves which can affect the amount of liquid poison delivered to the reactor vessel must be reviewed and approved by the staff.

For further information or clarification, please contact Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, at 492-0897.

/s Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ec Steven Ray, RIII Timothy Collins, SRXB Office:

LA/PDII-2 PM/PDII-

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PD/PDII-k Surname:

LLuther JStevens WForney b Date:

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August 11, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard W. Cooper, Chief Reactor Projects, Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects Region III FROM:

Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

h: QUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - CLARIFICATION OF CLINTON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.1.5.B.3 (AITS F03036987)

Reference:

Memorandum from C. Norelius (RGN III) to D. Crutchfield (NRR) Dated October 27, 1987, same subject.

The referenced memorandum requested NRR assistance in the interpretation of the subject technical specification surveillance requirement. The wording of the specification is as follows:

"Both standby liquid control subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE

... at least once per 31 days by... verifying that each valve (manual, powar-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position."

We understand that the issue in question is the detennination of which valves are "in the flow path."

It is our position that any SLC system valve which could affect the amount of flow delivered to the reactor should be considered in the flow path. This would therefore include (in addition to those valves directly in the design flow path) branch line isolation valves which, if open, could divert flow away from the reactor vessel.

Exclusion from this surveillance of valves which can affect the amount of liquid poison delivered to the reactor vessel must be reviewed and approved by the staff.

For further information or clarification, please contact Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, at 492-0897.

p a.x Janice A. Stevens, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc Steven Ray, RIII Timothy Collins, SRXB