PNO-III-87-127, on 870904,manipulation of Controls by non- Licensed Engineer Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Licensee Met W/Licensed Operators & Nuclear Engineers to Review Requirement Policy: Difference between revisions

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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PiiO-lll-87-127 Date October 1, 1987
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PiiO-lll-87-127 Date October 1, 1987
  .This-preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety                                                                     bd or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.
.This-preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety bd or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.
Facility:     Commonwealth Edison Company           Licensee Emergency Classification:
Facility:
Dresden 2 & 3                               Notification of an Unusual Event Morris, IL 60450                           Alert Site Area Emergency Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249                 General Emergency X Not Applicable
Commonwealth Edison Company Licensee Emergency Classification:
Dresden 2 & 3 Notification of an Unusual Event Morris, IL 60450 Alert Site Area Emergency Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 General Emergency X Not Applicable


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
MANIPULATION OF CONTROLS BY NON-LICENSED INDIVIDUAL On September 4, 1987, during startup activities for Unit 3 the NRC resident inspector observed a non-licensed nuclear engineer manipulate the controls for the control rod drive system to increase the drive pressure to facilitate movement of a control rod drive. The engineer's actions were at the direction of a licensed reactor operator. This action was discussed with plant mantgement and with Region III (Chicago) management. It was determined ' hat while the engineer's action did not directly affect the power level or reactivity of the ,aactor, it was not generally allowed by NRC regulations or by licensee policy.
MANIPULATION OF CONTROLS BY NON-LICENSED INDIVIDUAL On September 4, 1987, during startup activities for Unit 3 the NRC resident inspector observed a non-licensed nuclear engineer manipulate the controls for the control rod drive system to increase the drive pressure to facilitate movement of a control rod drive. The engineer's actions were at the direction of a licensed reactor operator. This action was discussed with plant mantgement and with Region III (Chicago) management.
It was determined ' hat while the engineer's action did not directly affect the power level or reactivity of the,aactor, it was not generally allowed by NRC regulations or by licensee policy.
As corrective action, the licensee met with licensed operators and nuclear engineers to review requirement policy that manipulation of control room panels was to be performed by licensed operators and supervised trainees.
As corrective action, the licensee met with licensed operators and nuclear engineers to review requirement policy that manipulation of control room panels was to be performed by licensed operators and supervised trainees.
On September 30, 1987, the resident inspectors reviewed the incident again when they learned of the September 13, 1987, incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station in which a non-licensed individual manipulated controls affecting the power level and reactivity of the
On September 30, 1987, the resident inspectors reviewed the incident again when they learned of the September 13, 1987, incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station in which a non-licensed individual manipulated controls affecting the power level and reactivity of the
; plant.     (Reference PNO-II-87-62, issued September 29,1987.) Although the circumstances were
; plant.
(Reference PNO-II-87-62, issued September 29,1987.) Although the circumstances were
' different, the further review at Dresden led to the issuance of a directive by licensee management to assure that only licensed operators and trainees would manipulate controls in the control room. The licensee is planning to issue this directive on October 1, 1987, to all its operating nuclear units.
' different, the further review at Dresden led to the issuance of a directive by licensee management to assure that only licensed operators and trainees would manipulate controls in the control room. The licensee is planning to issue this directive on October 1, 1987, to all its operating nuclear units.
The resident inspectors, who had maintained 24-hour inspection coverage during startup and testing activities at both Unit 2 and Unit 3, have expanded the coverage to focus on control room activities. No additional instances of manipulation of controls by non-licensed individuals have been observed.
The resident inspectors, who had maintained 24-hour inspection coverage during startup and testing activities at both Unit 2 and Unit 3, have expanded the coverage to focus on control room activities.
No additional instances of manipulation of controls by non-licensed individuals have been observed.
The State of Illinois will be informed.
The State of Illinois will be informed.
Region III was notified of the original incident by the resident inspector on September 8, 1987. This information, with subsequent additions, is current as of }0 a.m. , October 1,1987.
Region III was notified of the original incident by the resident inspector on September 8, 1987. This information, with subsequent additions, is current as of }0 a.m., October 1,1987.
4%7                              dic Aqy         Icbm 7 CONTACT:   . M.
. M m*FTS 388-5602) dic Aqy Icbm 7 4%7 CONTACT:
MRing m*FTS y     388-5602)            W. Forney (FTS 388-5590)
M. Ring y W. Forney (FTS 388-5590)
DISTRIBUTION:
DISTRIBUTION:
H. St.                     EDO       NRR         E/W         Willste     Mail: ADM:DMB Chairman Zech               PA                   IE         NMSS                                     DOT:Trans only Comm. Roberts               ELD                   OIA         RES Comm. Bernthal                                   AEOD                     NRC Ops Ctr Coag. Carr t6h"h.%oW M ACRS                       SP             Regional Offices SECY CA                         INP0                 NSAC PDR                       RIII ResTcTent Office Licensee:                   (Corp. Office - Reactor Lic. Only) e710090034 B71001 PDR   I&E                                                     Region III                                                         M{1 !
H. St.
L_____--_--------_       PNO-III-87-127 PDR                                           Rev. August 1987 1 8 N}}
EDO NRR E/W Willste Mail: ADM:DMB Chairman Zech PA IE NMSS DOT:Trans only Comm. Roberts ELD OIA RES Comm. Bernthal AEOD NRC Ops Ctr Coag. Carr t6h"h.%oW M ACRS SP Regional Offices SECY CA INP0 NSAC PDR RIII ResTcTent Office Licensee:
(Corp. Office - Reactor Lic. Only)
M{1 e710090034 B71001 PDR I&E Region III L_____--_--------_
PNO-III-87-127 PDR Rev. August 1987 1 8 N}}


{{PNO-Nav|region=III}}
{{PNO-Nav|region=III}}

Latest revision as of 04:23, 3 December 2024

PNO-III-87-127:on 870904,manipulation of Controls by non- Licensed Engineer Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error. Licensee Met W/Licensed Operators & Nuclear Engineers to Review Requirement Policy
ML20235S539
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  
Issue date: 10/01/1987
From: Forney W, Ring M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
References
PNO-III-87-127, NUDOCS 8710090034
Download: ML20235S539 (1)


_

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PiiO-lll-87-127 Date October 1, 1987

.This-preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety bd or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region III staff on this date.

Facility:

Commonwealth Edison Company Licensee Emergency Classification:

Dresden 2 & 3 Notification of an Unusual Event Morris, IL 60450 Alert Site Area Emergency Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 General Emergency X Not Applicable

Subject:

MANIPULATION OF CONTROLS BY NON-LICENSED INDIVIDUAL On September 4, 1987, during startup activities for Unit 3 the NRC resident inspector observed a non-licensed nuclear engineer manipulate the controls for the control rod drive system to increase the drive pressure to facilitate movement of a control rod drive. The engineer's actions were at the direction of a licensed reactor operator. This action was discussed with plant mantgement and with Region III (Chicago) management.

It was determined ' hat while the engineer's action did not directly affect the power level or reactivity of the,aactor, it was not generally allowed by NRC regulations or by licensee policy.

As corrective action, the licensee met with licensed operators and nuclear engineers to review requirement policy that manipulation of control room panels was to be performed by licensed operators and supervised trainees.

On September 30, 1987, the resident inspectors reviewed the incident again when they learned of the September 13, 1987, incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station in which a non-licensed individual manipulated controls affecting the power level and reactivity of the

plant.

(Reference PNO-II-87-62, issued September 29,1987.) Although the circumstances were

' different, the further review at Dresden led to the issuance of a directive by licensee management to assure that only licensed operators and trainees would manipulate controls in the control room. The licensee is planning to issue this directive on October 1, 1987, to all its operating nuclear units.

The resident inspectors, who had maintained 24-hour inspection coverage during startup and testing activities at both Unit 2 and Unit 3, have expanded the coverage to focus on control room activities.

No additional instances of manipulation of controls by non-licensed individuals have been observed.

The State of Illinois will be informed.

Region III was notified of the original incident by the resident inspector on September 8, 1987. This information, with subsequent additions, is current as of }0 a.m., October 1,1987.

. M m*FTS 388-5602) dic Aqy Icbm 7 4%7 CONTACT:

M. Ring y W. Forney (FTS 388-5590)

DISTRIBUTION:

H. St.

EDO NRR E/W Willste Mail: ADM:DMB Chairman Zech PA IE NMSS DOT:Trans only Comm. Roberts ELD OIA RES Comm. Bernthal AEOD NRC Ops Ctr Coag. Carr t6h"h.%oW M ACRS SP Regional Offices SECY CA INP0 NSAC PDR RIII ResTcTent Office Licensee:

(Corp. Office - Reactor Lic. Only)

M{1 e710090034 B71001 PDR I&E Region III L_____--_--------_

PNO-III-87-127 PDR Rev. August 1987 1 8 N