TXX-6955, Interim Deficiency Rept CP-87-100 Re Containment Piping Penetrations Which Lack Overpressure Protection.Initially Reported on 870910.Thermal Relief Valves Will Be Installed in Affected Piping.Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 880301: Difference between revisions

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    . ; .        o M                               Log # TXX-6955 L           4                     File # 10110 E
M Log # TXX-6955 L
                                                                            =                                   906.2 filELECTR/C                            Ref # 10CFR50.55(c)'
4 File # 10110 E
Wmiaa L. Counsil em
=
* we ernue,,,                                                                   December 1,1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk                                                                                 l Washington, D. C. 20555                                                                                     i
906.2 Ref # 10CFR50.55(c)'
filELECTR/C Wmiaa L. Counsil em
* we ernue,,,
December 1,1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk l
Washington, D. C.
20555 i


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)                                                     .
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446                                                               l CONTAINMENT PIPING PENETRATIONS SDAR: CP-87-100 (INTERIM REPORT)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 l
CONTAINMENT PIPING PENETRATIONS SDAR: CP-87-100 (INTERIM REPORT)
Gentlemen:
Gentlemen:
On September 10, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. I. Barnes.of a deficiency involving the lack of overpressure protection for three containment penetrations. Our latest interim report on this issue, logged TXX-6850, was submitted on October 8, 1987. After further evaluation we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). The required information follows.
On September 10, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. I. Barnes.of a deficiency involving the lack of overpressure protection for three containment penetrations. Our latest interim report on this issue, logged TXX-6850, was submitted on October 8, 1987.
Description of Prnblem                                                                                     ,
After further evaluation we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
The design validation review of containment penetrations has identified three piping penetrations (Safety Injection System Containment Penetration MIV-4 and Process Sampling System Containment penetrations MIV-1 and MIV-2) which lack overpressure protection. The piping through these penetrations are water solid and, following isolation, the heat generated inside containment during an accident could overpressurize the isolated volumes of water in the piping.
The required information follows.
The root cause of this issue is the failure by the design organization to incorporate overpressure protection for the three penetrations. This condition may extend to other containment penetrations. We are currently investigating this possibility.
Description of Prnblem The design validation review of containment penetrations has identified three piping penetrations (Safety Injection System Containment Penetration MIV-4 and Process Sampling System Containment penetrations MIV-1 and MIV-2) which lack overpressure protection.
Safety Implications Had this condition remained uncorrected, it could have led to the rupture of the affected piping and a breach of containment integrity. This represents a significant deficiency in final design which could have adversely affected the safety or operation of the plant.
The piping through these penetrations are water solid and, following isolation, the heat generated inside containment during an accident could overpressurize the isolated volumes of water in the piping.
                                                  ^
The root cause of this issue is the failure by the design organization to incorporate overpressure protection for the three penetrations.
8712070006 871201 PDR     ADOCK 05000445 S                     PDR a
This condition may extend to other containment penetrations. We are currently investigating this possibility.
400 North Olive Street LB 81           Dallas, Texas 75201                       j i
Safety Implications Had this condition remained uncorrected, it could have led to the rupture of the affected piping and a breach of containment integrity.
This represents a significant deficiency in final design which could have adversely affected the safety or operation of the plant.
8712070006 871201
^
PDR ADOCK 05000445 S
PDR
, a 400 North Olive Street LB 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 j
i


I
I
{
{
f TXX-6955                                                                                                                 1 December 1, 1987 Page 2 of 2 This condition will be corrected by the installation of Thermal relief valves in the affected piping. Our investigation of other containment penetrations will determine if any other deficiencies exist and the necessary corrective actions to resolve them. The schedule for completion of this action has not been determined, but will be provided in our next report on this issue which will be submitted no later than March 1, 1988.
f TXX-6955 1
December 1, 1987 Page 2 of 2 This condition will be corrected by the installation of Thermal relief valves in the affected piping. Our investigation of other containment penetrations will determine if any other deficiencies exist and the necessary corrective actions to resolve them.
The schedule for completion of this action has not been determined, but will be provided in our next report on this issue which will be submitted no later than March 1, 1988.
Very truly yours, (N. G.
Very truly yours, (N. G.
W. G. Counsil By:
W. G. Counsil By:
D. R. Woodlan Supervisor, Docket Licensing i'
D. R. Woodlan Supervisor, Docket Licensing i
JDS/grr c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)}}
JDS/grr c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)}}

Latest revision as of 20:05, 2 December 2024

Interim Deficiency Rept CP-87-100 Re Containment Piping Penetrations Which Lack Overpressure Protection.Initially Reported on 870910.Thermal Relief Valves Will Be Installed in Affected Piping.Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 880301
ML20236V688
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  
Issue date: 12/01/1987
From: Counsil W, Woodlan D
TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CP-87-100, TXX-6955, NUDOCS 8712070006
Download: ML20236V688 (2)


Text

- - - _ - _.

o r

M Log # TXX-6955 L

4 File # 10110 E

=

906.2 Ref # 10CFR50.55(c)'

filELECTR/C Wmiaa L. Counsil em

  • we ernue,,,

December 1,1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk l

Washington, D. C.

20555 i

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 l

CONTAINMENT PIPING PENETRATIONS SDAR: CP-87-100 (INTERIM REPORT)

Gentlemen:

On September 10, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. I. Barnes.of a deficiency involving the lack of overpressure protection for three containment penetrations. Our latest interim report on this issue, logged TXX-6850, was submitted on October 8, 1987.

After further evaluation we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

The required information follows.

Description of Prnblem The design validation review of containment penetrations has identified three piping penetrations (Safety Injection System Containment Penetration MIV-4 and Process Sampling System Containment penetrations MIV-1 and MIV-2) which lack overpressure protection.

The piping through these penetrations are water solid and, following isolation, the heat generated inside containment during an accident could overpressurize the isolated volumes of water in the piping.

The root cause of this issue is the failure by the design organization to incorporate overpressure protection for the three penetrations.

This condition may extend to other containment penetrations. We are currently investigating this possibility.

Safety Implications Had this condition remained uncorrected, it could have led to the rupture of the affected piping and a breach of containment integrity.

This represents a significant deficiency in final design which could have adversely affected the safety or operation of the plant.

8712070006 871201

^

PDR ADOCK 05000445 S

PDR

, a 400 North Olive Street LB 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 j

i

I

{

f TXX-6955 1

December 1, 1987 Page 2 of 2 This condition will be corrected by the installation of Thermal relief valves in the affected piping. Our investigation of other containment penetrations will determine if any other deficiencies exist and the necessary corrective actions to resolve them.

The schedule for completion of this action has not been determined, but will be provided in our next report on this issue which will be submitted no later than March 1, 1988.

Very truly yours, (N. G.

W. G. Counsil By:

D. R. Woodlan Supervisor, Docket Licensing i

JDS/grr c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)