ML21167A127: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:LICENSING MODERNIZATION PROJECT FOR OPERATING REACTORS Matt Humberstone June 2021
{{#Wiki_filter:LICENSING MODERNIZATION PROJECT FOR OPERATING REACTORS Matt Humberstone June 2021


PURPOSE 1PHASE FFR Scope 2
2 1
PHASE Regulatory Support Discussion        Discussion        Discussion Feasibility       Scope Overview          Path             Proposals Forward Results
Feasibility Overview Results Scope Path Forward Proposals Discussion Discussion Discussion Regulatory Support PHASE PHASE PURPOSE FFR Scope
 
FFR SCOPE
* Feasibility
* Feasibility
* Limited Scope Phase 1
* Limited Scope
* Level 3 PRA - Internal Events
* Level 3 PRA - Internal Events Phase 1
* Expanded Insights
* Expanded Insights
* More Event Sequences
* More Event Sequences
* Level 3 PRA - External Phase 2   Events
* Level 3 PRA - External Events Phase 2 FFR SCOPE


OBJECTIVES: LMP for Operating Reactors                                   1 Limited Resource                                                           2  4 project to support 3
3 2
future NRC needs                                                                 5 jumped over the lazy Yes, the LMP methodology is feasible for LWRs dog. LMP Feasibility Used the LMP methodology with the L3PRA Pilot LMP methodology    model results Identified LMP challenges (Centerline Identify Issues/Challenges dose, crediting evacuations, accident family limitations, etc.)
4 5
Use L3PRA results      LWR safety profile in-line with NLWR target Risk-Insights on LWRs Shared Progress/Results
1 OBJECTIVES: LMP for Operating Reactors Limited Resource project to support future NRC needs jumped over the lazy dog. LMP Feasibility Pilot LMP methodology Use L3PRA results Risk-Insights on LWRs Communicate Yes, the LMP methodology is feasible for LWRs Used the LMP methodology with the L3PRA model results Identified LMP challenges (Centerline dose, crediting evacuations, accident family limitations, etc.)
* RMT briefing
LWR safety profile in-line with NLWR target Shared Progress/Results Identify Issues/Challenges RMT briefing ACRS briefing PWROG RIC digital exhibit OEDO Final Report PSA paper Two-pager  
* OEDO Communicate
* ACRS briefing
* Final Report
* PWROG
* PSA paper
* RIC digital exhibit
* Two-pager


Communication: Slide 2 Technical Approach Risk-Informed and Severe Accident Research Performance-Based LWR Experience                                                                              Non-LWR licensing LMP Frequency - Consequence Curve Event Sequence Frequency 1.E+01 1.E+00 1.E-01 1.E-02 NRC Level 3                                          1.E-03                        NEI 18-04                       LMP PRA Model 1.E-04 Methodology 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 TEDE at EAB (rem)
Non-LWR licensing LWR Experience Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Severe Accident Research Communication: Slide 2 LMP Methodology NRC Level 3 PRA Model 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 Event Sequence Frequency TEDE at EAB (rem)
LMP Frequency - Consequence Curve NEI 18-04 Technical Approach


Level 3 PRA (L3PRA) Process Plant Damage      Release Cutsets ~50,000   States (PDS) -368 Categories -16 6
6 Level 3 PRA (L3PRA) Process Cutsets ~50,000 Plant Damage States (PDS) -368 Release Categories -16


Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants Risk and                01 Consequence Uncertainty Analysist 06 MELCOR           02 Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) 05                      03 Source Term Dosimetry and                                 and Health Effects                            Radionuclide 04 release Transport and Dispersion
01 03 MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) 02 06 Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants Consequence Analysist 04 Source Term and Radionuclide release Transport and Dispersion 05 Dosimetry and Health Effects Risk and Uncertainty


Communication: Slide 5 Release Categories                         5 Largest Dose Categories (orange) 6 16 Release Middle Dose B        Categories Categories (gray) 5 Lowest Dose Categories (blue)
16 Release Categories Communication: Slide 5 B
Release Categories 5
Largest Dose Categories (orange) 6 Middle Dose Categories (gray) 5 Lowest Dose Categories (blue)


Release Category Contributions Dose Contributions Frequency Contributions Largest Dose Middle Dose Low Dose 9
9 Release Category Contributions Dose Contributions Frequency Contributions Largest Dose Middle Dose Low Dose


Basic LMP Frequency-Consequence Curve 1.E+01 Increasing Risk Event Sequence Frequency 1.E+00                          10 CFR 20 Selection of Licensing                                                                                                      Significance Iso-Risk Line ANTICIPATED Basis Events (LBEs)                                1.E-01    OPERATIONAL OCCURANCE                                      10 CFR 50.34 Dose Limit (AOO) REGION 1.E-02 DESIGN 1.E-03  BASIS EVENT Safety Classification                                          (DBE)
10 Basic LMP Frequency-Consequence Curve 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 Event Sequence Frequency TEDE(rem) at the Exclusion Area Boundary ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURANCE (AOO) REGION 10 CFR 50.34 Dose Limit EPA PAG Dose Limit Individual Risk QHO (Prompt)
REGION of Structures,                                  1.E-04 Systems, and                                                                                                              Individual Risk 1.E-05                            Design BEYOND DESIGN Components (SSCs)                                            BASIS EVENT            Objective                              QHO (Prompt)
DESIGN BASIS EVENT (DBE)
(BDBE) REGION 1.E-06 1.E-07 Determination of                                            Decreasing Risk                  EPA PAG Significance                    Dose Limit Defense-in-depth                                  1.E-08 (DID) Adequacy                                      1.E-02       1.E-01     1.E+00       1.E+01       1.E+02       1.E+03       1.E+04 TEDE(rem) at the Exclusion Area Boundary 10
REGION BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT (BDBE) REGION Increasing Risk Significance Decreasing Risk Significance 10 CFR 20 Iso-Risk Line Design Objective Selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs)
Safety Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)
Determination of Defense-in-depth (DID) Adequacy


LMP Frequency - Consequence Comparison Lowest Dose Middle Dose Largest Dose 11
11 LMP Frequency - Consequence Comparison Lowest Dose Middle Dose Largest Dose


Reports/Papers                      LMP Methodology
Opportunities
* Final Report                      can be used beyond  Insights for
* NLWR Licensing
* PSA paper                          the original intent  NLWR licensing
* Risk-Informing CH 15 Accident Analysis
* Two pager Operating Communication                                                            Reactor Safety
* RMT briefing                                                          Insights
* ACRS briefing
* PWROG briefing
* OEDO
* RIC digital exhibit NWLR Licensing Insight
* Understand LMP upfront                                                  Opportunities
* 30-day TEDE, EAB, etc.
* NLWR Licensing LMP Challenges
* Risk-Informing CH 15
* Is TEDE the centerline maximum dose? (averaged???)                                                      Accident Analysis
* Is evacuation ignored?
* Licensing
* Licensing
* Limitations on accident families?
* Oversight Operating Reactor Safety Insights LMP Methodology can be used beyond the original intent Insights for NLWR licensing PHASE 1 CONCLUSIONS Reports/Papers Final Report PSA paper Two pager Communication RMT briefing ACRS briefing PWROG briefing OEDO RIC digital exhibit NWLR Licensing Insight Understand LMP upfront 30-day TEDE, EAB, etc.
* Oversight Operating Reactors
LMP Challenges Is TEDE the centerline maximum dose? (averaged???)
* In-line with NLWR guidance
Is evacuation ignored?
* Consistent with historical                 PHASE 1 CONCLUSIONS perspective
Limitations on accident families?
Operating Reactors In-line with NLWR guidance Consistent with historical perspective


Communication: Slide 5 PHASE 2 L3PRA A         EXPANDED INSIGHTS External Events FLEX ACCIDENT    Sequence Review B          SEQUENCES    Deeper Understanding Uncertainty
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES EXPANDED INSIGHTS Communication: Slide 5 A
B Sequence Review Deeper Understanding Uncertainty L3PRA External Events FLEX PHASE 2


RES SUPPORT (LMP use in regulatory framework)
14 Now
Risk-Informed Now                                                           Regulator
* Rely on deterministic approaches
* Rely on deterministic PROPOSALS
* May not explicitly rely on risk-insights
* Develop tools to better focus on risk-significant aspects PROPOSALS
* Risk-Inform CH 15 analysis
* Risk-Inform CH 15 analysis
* Rely on risk-insights approaches
* 2 Approaches
* 2 Approaches
* NLWR Licensing Support Risk-Informed Regulator RES SUPPORT (LMP use in regulatory framework)
* Rely on risk-insights
* More efficient reviews
* More efficient reviews
* May not explicitly rely on
* Focus on risk-significant accidents
* NLWR Licensing Support
* Focus on risk-significant risk-insights accidents
* Develop tools to better focus on risk-significant 14aspects
 
CH 15 Accident Analysis Research Options
* Use LMP F-C chart
* Use LMP F-C chart
* Categorize accidents
* Categorize accidents
* Distance from the F-C Approach 1             target
* Distance from the F-C target Approach 1
* Map consequences to Level 1/LERF risk metrics
* Map consequences to Level 1/LERF risk metrics
* Find Correlations Approach 2
* Find Correlations
* Use Level 1/LERF risk metrics to categorize
* Use Level 1/LERF risk metrics to categorize Approach 2 CH 15 Accident Analysis Research Options


NEXT STEPS/QUESTIONS PHASE 2 of the LMP for Operating Reactors           A B          Program Office Engagement Continue Communication Effort
B A
* Briefings
C Program Office Engagement PHASE 2 of the LMP for Operating Reactors Continue Communication Effort Briefings Conferences NEXT STEPS/QUESTIONS}}
* Conferences                 C}}

Latest revision as of 08:29, 29 November 2024

2 - Lmp for Operating Reactors
ML21167A127
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/16/2021
From: Matthew Humberstone
NRC/RES/DRA
To:
Vasavada S
Shared Package
ML21167A163 List:
References
Download: ML21167A127 (16)
v • d • e


Text

LICENSING MODERNIZATION PROJECT FOR OPERATING REACTORS Matt Humberstone June 2021

2 1

Feasibility Overview Results Scope Path Forward Proposals Discussion Discussion Discussion Regulatory Support PHASE PHASE PURPOSE FFR Scope

  • Feasibility
  • Limited Scope
  • Level 3 PRA - Internal Events Phase 1
  • Expanded Insights
  • More Event Sequences
  • Level 3 PRA - External Events Phase 2 FFR SCOPE

3 2

4 5

1 OBJECTIVES: LMP for Operating Reactors Limited Resource project to support future NRC needs jumped over the lazy dog. LMP Feasibility Pilot LMP methodology Use L3PRA results Risk-Insights on LWRs Communicate Yes, the LMP methodology is feasible for LWRs Used the LMP methodology with the L3PRA model results Identified LMP challenges (Centerline dose, crediting evacuations, accident family limitations, etc.)

LWR safety profile in-line with NLWR target Shared Progress/Results Identify Issues/Challenges RMT briefing ACRS briefing PWROG RIC digital exhibit OEDO Final Report PSA paper Two-pager

Non-LWR licensing LWR Experience Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Severe Accident Research Communication: Slide 2 LMP Methodology NRC Level 3 PRA Model 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 Event Sequence Frequency TEDE at EAB (rem)

LMP Frequency - Consequence Curve NEI 18-04 Technical Approach

6 Level 3 PRA (L3PRA) Process Cutsets ~50,000 Plant Damage States (PDS) -368 Release Categories -16

01 03 MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) 02 06 Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants Consequence Analysist 04 Source Term and Radionuclide release Transport and Dispersion 05 Dosimetry and Health Effects Risk and Uncertainty

16 Release Categories Communication: Slide 5 B

Release Categories 5

Largest Dose Categories (orange) 6 Middle Dose Categories (gray) 5 Lowest Dose Categories (blue)

9 Release Category Contributions Dose Contributions Frequency Contributions Largest Dose Middle Dose Low Dose

10 Basic LMP Frequency-Consequence Curve 1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E-02 1.E-01 1.E+00 1.E+01 1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 Event Sequence Frequency TEDE(rem) at the Exclusion Area Boundary ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURANCE (AOO) REGION 10 CFR 50.34 Dose Limit EPA PAG Dose Limit Individual Risk QHO (Prompt)

DESIGN BASIS EVENT (DBE)

REGION BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT (BDBE) REGION Increasing Risk Significance Decreasing Risk Significance 10 CFR 20 Iso-Risk Line Design Objective Selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs)

Safety Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)

Determination of Defense-in-depth (DID) Adequacy

11 LMP Frequency - Consequence Comparison Lowest Dose Middle Dose Largest Dose

Opportunities

  • NLWR Licensing
  • Risk-Informing CH 15 Accident Analysis
  • Licensing
  • Oversight Operating Reactor Safety Insights LMP Methodology can be used beyond the original intent Insights for NLWR licensing PHASE 1 CONCLUSIONS Reports/Papers Final Report PSA paper Two pager Communication RMT briefing ACRS briefing PWROG briefing OEDO RIC digital exhibit NWLR Licensing Insight Understand LMP upfront 30-day TEDE, EAB, etc.

LMP Challenges Is TEDE the centerline maximum dose? (averaged???)

Is evacuation ignored?

Limitations on accident families?

Operating Reactors In-line with NLWR guidance Consistent with historical perspective

ACCIDENT SEQUENCES EXPANDED INSIGHTS Communication: Slide 5 A

B Sequence Review Deeper Understanding Uncertainty L3PRA External Events FLEX PHASE 2

14 Now

  • Rely on deterministic approaches
  • May not explicitly rely on risk-insights
  • Develop tools to better focus on risk-significant aspects PROPOSALS
  • Risk-Inform CH 15 analysis
  • 2 Approaches
  • NLWR Licensing Support Risk-Informed Regulator RES SUPPORT (LMP use in regulatory framework)
  • Rely on risk-insights
  • More efficient reviews
  • Focus on risk-significant accidents
  • Use LMP F-C chart
  • Categorize accidents
  • Distance from the F-C target Approach 1
  • Map consequences to Level 1/LERF risk metrics
  • Find Correlations
  • Use Level 1/LERF risk metrics to categorize Approach 2 CH 15 Accident Analysis Research Options

B A

C Program Office Engagement PHASE 2 of the LMP for Operating Reactors Continue Communication Effort Briefings Conferences NEXT STEPS/QUESTIONS

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