ML24099A146

Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club Corrected April 8, 2024

ML24099A146
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	04/08/2024
From:	Curran D Beyond Nuclear, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, Sierra Club
To:	NRC/SECY
SECY RAS
References
RAS 56985, 50-338-SLR-2, 50-339-SLR-2
Download: ML24099A146 (0)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50 -338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 ) March 28, 2024

___________________________________ _ ) Corrected April 8, 2024

HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, and the hearing notice published at 8 9 Fed. Reg. 960 (Jan.

8, 2024 ), Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra

Club) hereby request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to

grant a hearing on new information discussed in the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement (Draft SEIS) prepared by the NRC to inform its review of an application by Virginia

Electric Power Co. ( VE PCO ) f or subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the operating license for the North Anna Units 1 and 2 nuclear power station (NAPS).1 If VEPCO s application is

granted, it will be allowed to operate North Anna Units 1 and 2 for an additional twenty years

beyond its current renewed operating license term, or until 205 8 (Unit 1 ) and 20 60 (Unit 2 ), for

an aggregate of 80 years.2

1 The Draft North Anna EIS is entitled: Site -Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 7a, Subsequent License Renewal for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment (NUREG - 1437, Supplemen t 7a, Dec. 2023).

2 The NRC issued original operating licenses for North Anna in 1978 and 1980, with expiration dates of 2018 (Unit 1) and 2020 (Unit 2). In 2003, the NRC renewed both licenses for 20 years, with new expiration dates of 2038 and 2040. If renewed again, the No rth Anna licenses would expire in 2058 and 2060.

Petitioners contend that the NRC should not approve subsequent renewal of VEPCO s

operating license because the Draft SEIS fails to support its conclusion that the environmental

impacts of accidents are SMALL or insignificant. In particular, the Draft SEIS fails to address

environmental significance of 2011 M ineral E arthquake ; provides incomplete, inadequate,

incorrect or misleading data and analyses in support of its general conclusion that severe accident

impacts are small ; and fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk. Each of

these categories of deficiencies is significant in its own right. Taken together, they show a level

of inadequacy that is grossly unacceptable.

Petitioners contentions are supported by the expert declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman, a nuclear engineer with a significant level of expertise in risk analysis. 3

Th e remainder of this Hearing Request is organized as follows: Section II contains a

demonstration that Petitioners Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club each ha s organizational

standing to participate in this proceeding.Section III presents the legal framework for

Petitioners Hearing Request.Section IV presents Petitioners Contention s.Section V contains

Petitioners Conclusion.

II. PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), a request for a hearing must address: (1) the nature of

the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceed ing, and

(3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners

3 Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman (March 27, 2024) (Mitman Declaration). Mr. Mitmans Declaration is attached as Attachment 1.

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interest. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has summarized these standing

requirements as follows:

In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. C ontemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury -in -fact within the zone of interest arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged actions; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests. 4

As demonstrated below, each of the Petitioners has standing by virtue of organizational

interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act and the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA ). By intervening in this proceeding, Petitioners

seek to protect their members health and safety, as well as protection of the environment. They

wish to ensure that VEPCO s operating license is not approved for a second renewal term unless

and until VEPCO demonstrates full compliance with NEPAs requirements for protection of

public health and the environment.

In addition, as also demonstrated below, each Petitioner organization ha s members and /or

staff who live and/or work within 50 miles of North Anna Units 1 and 2, whose interests in

protecting their own health and the health of the environment would be adversely affected by

extended operation of North Anna Units 1 and 2 under an additional SLR term, and who have

authorize d Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioners have

4 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP -02 -23, 56 N.R.C. 413, 426 (2002) (petition for review denied, CLI -03 -12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003) ).

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presumptive standing by virtue of the location of their members residences and property within 50 miles of the North Anna reactors. 5

A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear

Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate

and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and

the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent enviro nmental harms, and

safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste

and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on -site storage until it can be permanently

disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable u nderground repository. For more than fifteen years,

Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing,

relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.

Beyond Nuclears representational standing to participate in this proceeding is

demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Declaration of Glen

Besa (March 23, 2024) (Attachment 2 A); Declaration of Erica Gray (March 23, 2024 )

(Attachment 2 B ); and Declaration of Jerry Rosenthal (March 24, 2024); (Attachment 2 C).

B. Standing of the Sierra Club

Founded in 1892, t he Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with more than 3.8

million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy,

and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths

ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the

n atural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.

5 Diablo Canyon, 56 N.R.C. at 426 -27 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP -01 -06, 53 N.R.C. 138, 146, affd, CLI -01 -17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)).

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The Sierra Clubs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated

by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Barbara Crui ckshank ( March 23,

2024 ) (Attachment 2 D ); Declaration of John Crui c kshank ( March 22, 2024) (Attachment 2 E );

Declaration of Dian a Johnson (March 23, 2024) (Attachment 2 F); Declaration of William J.

Johnson ( March 23, 2024 ) (Attachment 2G).

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND NEPA

The NRCs regulation and licensing of reactors is governed by two statutes: the A tomic

Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq. ; and NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 -4370h. While the

substantive concerns of these statutes overlap, Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291,

1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975), they impose independent procedural obligations. Limerick Ecology Action

v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 729 -3 1 (3rd Cir. 1989). Even where the NRC purports to have resolved

safety issues through its Atomic Energy Act -based regulatory process, it must nevertheless

comply with NEPAs procedural obligations for addressing those issues in its decision -making processes.6

A. Atomic Energy Act and NRC Safety Regulations

Under § 103(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC may not issue an operating license

for a nuclear plant if it would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health

and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (d). Section 161 of t he Atomic Energy Act also

empowers the NRC to set standards to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property,

inter alia. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).

6 Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729 -31. See also State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 47 8 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (a finding that reasonable assurance exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available when necessary... does not describe a probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.).

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A mong the many regulatory standards promulgated by the NRC for the safe construction

and operation of nuclear power reactors, the General Design Criteria (GDCs) in Appendix A to

10 C.F.R. Part 50 are fundamentally important, because they establish minimum requirements

for the principal design criteria for water -cooled nuclear power plants. Id., Introduction. These

principal design criteria, in turn, establish:

the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be oper ated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Id. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural

Phenomena) requires that [s]tructures, systems, and components important to safety shall be

designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes,

hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perf orm their safety

functions. As the NRCs ASLB has recognized, SSCs must be able to withstand an earthquake

and other natural disasters within the design basis of the plant. 7 Design -basis s tructures that

must remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake are referred to as Category I

structures. 8 Category I safety structures and components (SSCs) encompass a broad array of

equipment and structures, including the pressure vessel internals, the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, the steam generators, and the emergency core cooling system.9

7 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP -17 -07, 86 N.R.C. 59, 79 (2017) (citing 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. A, GDC 2).

8 Regulatory Guide, 1.29, Rev. 5, Seismic Design Classification for Nuclear Power Plants at 5 (July 2016) (ML16118A148) (Reg. Guide 1.29).

9 Id. at 5 -6.

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B. NEPA General Requirements

NEPA implements a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental

quality. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI -98 -3, 47 N.R.C.

77, 87 (1998) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989)

and citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331). NEPA has two key purposes: to ensure that the agency will have

available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental

impacts before it makes a decision; and to gua rantee that the relevant information will be made

available to the larger audience that may also play a role in the decision -making process and

implementation of that decision. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. In fulfilling NEPAs second

purpose of public participation, the agencys environmental analysis must be published for

public comment to permit the public a role in the agencys decision -making process.

Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 -50; Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437,

443 (4th Cir. 1996).

In fulfilling NEPAs first purpose of evaluating the environmental impacts of its

decisions, NEPA requires a federal agency to take a hard look at potential environmental

consequences by preparing an EIS prior to any major Federal action [] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The

hallmarks of a hard look are thorough investigation into environmental impacts and forthright

acknowledgment of potential environmental harms. National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy,

422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005). The requirement to analyze environmental impacts in a draft

EIS is codified in NRC regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 (requiring that a draft EIS must include a

preliminary ana lysis that considers and weighs the environmental effects, including any

cumulative effects, of the proposed action; the environmental impacts of alternatives to the

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proposed action; and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental

effects.).

C. Reasonably Foreseeable Harms Covered by NEPA Include Clima te Change

A NEPA analysis must address harms that are reasonably foreseeable, even if they are

indirect or unlikely. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, 482. The analysis must address both

the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the consequences if those events come to

pass. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 482 (rejecting environmental analysis of spent fuel pool

fire risks because it did not consider consequences as well as probability of fires in spent fuel

storage pools ).

The Presidents Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has concluded that climate

change is a fundamental environmental issue, and its effects fall squarely within NEPAs purview. 10 Among the climate -related environmental impacts that CEQ advises agencies to

consider are the reasonably foreseeable effects of climate change on infrastructure investments. 11 As stated by the CEQ:

The effects of climate change observed to date and projected to occur in the future include more frequent and intense heat waves, longer fire seasons and more severe wildfires, degraded air quality, increased drought, greater sea -level rise, an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, harm to water resources, harm to agriculture, ocean acidification, and harm to wildlife and ecosystems. The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] Assessment Report reinforces these findings by providing scientific evidence of the impacts of climate change driven by human -induced GHG emissions, on our ecosystems, infrastructure, human health, and socioeconomic makeup. 12

10 National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, 88 Fe3d. Reg. 1,196, 1,197 (Jan. 9, 2023).

11 Id.

12 Id. at 1,200 (emphasis added).

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Consistent with this policy, multiple federal agencies have established programs for

assessing the effects of climate change on critical infrastructure such as power plants,

transmission systems, and dams. For instance, the Department of Defense has init iated a

Climate Risk Analysis to address the implications for U.S. national security and defense of

[i]ncreasing temperatures; changing precipitation patterns; and more frequent, intense, and

unpredictable extreme weather conditions caused by climate change. 13 The Federal Emergency

Management Agency has declared that the Changing Climate is a Priority for Emergency

Managers because the changing climate is a force multiplier - increasing the number of

storms, floods, fires, and extreme temperatures that threa ten the well -being of people across our nation. 14 The Critical Infrastructure Security Agency analyzes extreme weather and its impacts

to critical infrastructure to develop strategies for resilience. 15

IV. CONTENTIONS

Contention 1: Draft SEIS Fails to Address Environmental Significance of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake

A. Statement of Contention

The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51. 71

because it does not address the environmental significance of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake,

whose epicenter was a short distance from the two reactors and whose ground motion exceeded

the design basis levels for both reactors. By exceeding the reactors design basis, the earthquake

13 See https://www.defense.gov/spotlights/tackling -the -climate -crisis/. (last visited 3/27/24).

14 See https://www.fema.gov/fact -sheet/fema -and -changing -

climate#:~:text=The%20Changing%20Climate%20is%20a%20Priority%20for%20Emergency

%20Managers&text=When%20emergency%20managers%20plan%20for,recovery%20starts%2 0sooner%20for%20survivors. (last visited 3/27/24).

15 See https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical -infrastructure -security -and -resilience/extreme -

weather -and -climate -change. (last visited 3/27/24).

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disproved the assumption underlying the NRCs issuance of operating licenses in 1978 (for Unit

1) and 1980 (for Unit 2) and renewal of those licenses 2003, that the reactors could be operated

safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts bec ause their SSCs were built to a

design basis of sufficient rigor to protect against likely earthquakes. This assumption can also be

found in the 2013 License Renewal GEIS and the Draft SEIS for the North Anna SLR

application. 16

Because that assumption has been proven wrong, the NRC must explicitly address the

question of whether the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 in non -

compliance with its design basis for an additional twenty years will have significant impacts. As

discussed in the attached Mitman Declaration, the NRC fails to acknowledge it or explain the

fundamental difference between a finding of no significant or small impact that is based on a

deterministic analysis and a finding of no significan t impact that is based on a probabilistic

analysis. In Mr. Mitmans expert opinion, the deterministic analysis is more conservative

because it requires a robust design that provides reasonable assurance that an external event like

an earthquake will not ha rm necessary safety systems. A probabilistic analysis, in comparison,

does not assume safety related equipment will perform as designed and then calculates the

likelihood of an accident occurring. The NRC should explain the difference and how its

assessmen t of risk has changed as a result of the Mineral Earthquake. 17 As asserted by Mr.

Mitman, the NRC should also explain what it has done to evaluate the potential that safety

16 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 25 and Draft SEIS as cited therein.

17 See Mitman Declaration, ¶ 27.

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systems, which are assumed to survive a beyond -design -basis earthquake only once will be able to perform their safety functions when the next earthquake occurs. 18

Further, the Draft SEIS does not address, let alone reconcile, the significant disparity

between the results of the seismic risk analyses for Unit 3 and Units 1 and 2. In both cases, the

NRC and VEPCO were responding to the very same earthquake. Yet, while the NRC required

seismic upgrades for Unit 3, it required no seismic upgrades for Units 1 and 2 which required

only a set of nonpedigree commercial -grade FLEX components with significantly lower

reliability. The NRC should explain the reason for this disparate result. If the NRC consid ered

significant safety grade improvements necessary for adequate protection of Unit 3, the obvious

conclusion is that it thought the safety and environmental impacts of an earthquake were

significant. Why did it make a different finding for Units 1 and 2? 19

B. Basis Statement

Petitioners rely for this C ontention on Sections B and C.1 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration.

Petitioners also rely on the legal authorities cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners

rely on Citizens for Safe Power, 524 F.2d at 1299 (substantive concerns of Atomic Energy Act

and NEPA overlap); Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729 -31 (despite overlap, the Atomic

Energy Act and NEPA impose independent procedural obligations); and State of New York v.

NRC, 681 F.3d at 478 (reasonable assurance findi ngs do not excuse NEPA compliance unless

probability of impacts is so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.).

Even where the NRC purports to have resolved safety issues through its Atomic Energy Act -

18 Id.

19 See Mitman Declaration, ¶ 28.

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based regulatory process, it must nevertheless comply with NEPAs procedural obligations for

addressing those issues in its decision -making processes.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

T his C ontention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2

because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs

implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention fall s within the scope of new information as described in the hearing notice 20 because it concerns a new reactor -specific

accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for

which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 Licens e Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 21

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the F indings NRC Must Make to R enew VEPCO s O perating L icense

T his C ontention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental

impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it

challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed findings that the

environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The fact s support ing Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the

attached Mitman Declaration.

20 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.

21 See Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and e), CLI -22 -3, 95 N.R.C. 40 (2022) (CLI -22 -03). See also Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP -24 -03, slip op. at 13 -16 (March 7, 2024) (LBP -24 -03)

(allowing petitioners to submit arguments that pre -date the draft SEIS for Turkey Point if they were based on the draft SEIS).

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CONTENTION 2: Draft SEIS does not contain a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of accident risks.

A. Statement of Contention

The Draft SEIS does not contain a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of accident

risks because essential data are missing and important analytical assertions are erroneous or

misleading. Therefore, the NRC lacks an adequate basis for concluding that the environmental impa cts of accidents during a license renewal term are SMALL. 22 In particular, and as set forth

in detail in Section C.2 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration :

• T he Draft SEIS is inadequate as a general matter for making broad generalizations about

external event core damage frequency ( CDF ) based on extrapolations from internal

event CDF values and limited actual plant -specific values for external event CDF.

• In finding that the environmental impacts of severe accidents are SMALL, the NRC

ignores its own data regarding seismic and fire core damage frequency (CDF) that

indicate these impacts are significant. The NRC also disregards the fact that the

occurrence of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake, by itself, increased the risk of an earthquake

severe enough to damage safety equipment.

• The Draft SEIS assertion at page F -26 that there has been a substantial decrease in

internal event CDF is erroneous. This error affects other estimates such as the estimate

of population dose risk.

• T he Draft SEIS fails to demonstrate consideration of external flooding risk with

subsequent ingress of water into the turbine building. As demonstrated by Mr. Mitmans

22 Id. at 3 -169 - 3 -170.

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Declaration, flooding poses a significant accident risk that has not bee n addressed in the

Draft SEIS.

• The Draft SEIS makes misleading statements about the NRCs review of Fukushima -

related information relevant to North Anna and risk improvements obtained by NRC and

license efforts after September 20 01.

• The Draft SEIS takes inappropriate credit for reductions in environmental risk that are

not reflected in the PRA for NAPS.

• The Draft SEIS fails to demonstrate consideration of uncertainties with respect to the

conclusion that severe accident impacts are SMALL.

• The Draft SEIS does not address the environmental impacts of concurrent multi -unit

accidents.

• The Draft SEIS severe accident mitigation alternatives ( SAMA ) analysis is deficient

in multiple respects, including failure to consider SAMAs that meet criteria for

consideration, and failure to provide documentation of an NRC audit relied on to

conclude that VEPCOs approach to its SAMA analysis was methodical and reasonable.

B. Basis Statement

Petitioners rely for this Contention on Section C.2 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration. Petitioners

also rely on the legal authorities cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners rely on

Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 (requiring hard look at potential environmental consequences) and

National Audubon Society, 422 F.3d at 185 (hallmarks of a hard look are thorough

investigation into environmental impacts and forthright acknowledgment of potential

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environmental harms.). In addition, Petitioners rely on the NRC guidance for preparation and use of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) in both safety and environmental documents. 23

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

This Contention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2

because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs

implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention falls within the scope o f new information as described in the hearing notice 24 because it concerns a new reactor -specific

accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for

which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 25

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew VEPCOs Operating License

This Contention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental

impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it

challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed fin dings that the

environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The facts supporting Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the

attached Mitman Declaration.

23 See Mitman Declaration, § C.2, pars. 43 - 44 and notes 43 -49.

24 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.

25 See CLI -22 -03; LBP -24 -03.

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CONTENTION 3: Draft SEIS fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk.

A. Statement of Contention

The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71

because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. No such discussion

can be found in Section 3.11.6.9 or Appendix F. To the contrary, the NRC asserts that the effects of climate change are outside the scope of the NRC staffs SLR review. 26 In support of

this assertion, the NRC claims to consider climate -related information in its licensing reviews

and ongoing oversight. 27 But this is exactly the kind of blindered reasoning that was rejected in

State of New York. The fact that NRC plans to address climate change risks in the future does not

excuse the agency from addressing the risks as they are understood at this time. Only if the NRC

can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be remote and speculative can it

avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review. 28 And the Executive Branch of the

U.S. government, including CEQ and other federal agencies, ha s stated in no uncertain terms that

climate change poses a current and future threat to critical infrastructure that should be addressed

now in NEPA reviews and all other decision -making processes.29

Further, as set forth in Mr. Mitmans Declaration, the Draft SEIS failure to address climate

change impacts on accident risk constitutes a significant deficiency because climate change

demonstrably affects the frequency and intensity of some external events and therefore has the

26 Id. at 3 -194.

27 Id.

28 681 F.3d at 478.

29 See discussion above in Section III.C.

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potential to significantly increase accident risks. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of climate change effects are increasing over time. 30

Mr. Mitman also presents an illustration of how the reasonably foreseeable increase in the

frequency and volume of flooding could significantly increase the risk of a serious accident at NAPS. 31 This is just one example of the increased accident risk that can be reasonably expected

due to climate change and that should be addressed in the Draft SEIS.

B. Basis Statement

Petitioners rely for this contention on Mr. Mitmans Declaration and the legal authorities

cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners rely on State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at

478 (reasonable assurance findings do not excuse NEPA compliance unless probability of

impacts is so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.). In addition,

Petitioners rely on the CEQ guidance discussed above in Section III.C. While this guidance is

not binding on the NRC, it should be given substantial deference. State of New York v. NRC, 681

F.3d at 476 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) ).

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

This Contention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2

because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs

implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention falls within the scope of new information as described in the hearing notice 32 because it concerns a new reactor -specific

accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for

30 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 48.

31 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 51.

32 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.

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which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 33

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew VEPCOs Operating License

This Contention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental

impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it

challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed fin dings that the

environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The facts supporting Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the

attached Mitman Declaration.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Hearing Request should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

__/signed electronically by/___

Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.

1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240 -393 -9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com

March 28, 2024 Correct ed April 8, 2024

33 See CLI -22 -03; LBP -24 -03.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50 -338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 )

___________________________________ )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on April 8, 2024, I posted a corrected HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB, not including Attachment 1 and Attachments 2 A -2G, on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange.

___/signed electronically by/__

Paul Gunter

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