ML20076N025: Difference between revisions

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#REDIRECT [[LIC-91-0011, Special Rept:On 910211,both Barrier Penetrations 19-E-39 Between Room 19 & Turbine Bldg & Concrete Block Wall at East End of Corridor 4 Breached to Support Long Term Maint on HX AC-1A.Appropriate Compensatory Measures in Place]]
| number = ML20076N025
| issue date = 03/20/1991
| title = Special Rept:On 910211,both Barrier Penetrations 19-E-39 Between Room 19 & Turbine Bldg & Concrete Block Wall at East End of Corridor 4 Breached to Support Long Term Maint on HX AC-1A.Appropriate Compensatory Measures in Place
| author name = Gates W
| author affiliation = OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000285
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = LIC-91-0011S, LIC-91-11S, NUDOCS 9103270109
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
}}
 
=Text=
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    .?                        .
Oraaha Public Power District l                                            444 South 16th Street Mall Anaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 402/63G2000 March 20, 1991 LIC-91-00115 V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, CC 2055S
 
==Reference:==
Docket No. 50-285 Gentimnen
 
==SUBJECT:==
Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment The Omaha Public Power District, holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this special report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specification 2.19, " Fire Protection Systems".
FortCalhounStationUnitNo.1Techr.icalSpecification2.19(7)requiresthat all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. The non-functional penetration must be restored to functional status within seven days, or, failing that, prepare and submit within an additional 30 days a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to Technical Specification 5.9.3.
On February 11, 1991, both barrier penetration 19-E-39, between Room 19 and the Turbine Building, and the concrete block wall at the east end of Corridor 4 were breached to support long term maintenance on heat exchanger AC-1A. A decision was made to maintain the breaches for tne duratioa of the maintenance activities as,ociated with AC-1A due to the considerable amount of time (aparoximately one man-day) required to restore the barriers at the end of a wor ( week and remove them at the beginning of the subsequent work week.                              As a result, these barriers were not restored to functional status until March 6, 1991. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by Technical Specification 2.19(7),wereinplaceforthedurationoftheimpairments.
9103270109 910320 POR ADOCK 05000285 6M 24                                    Empkament        opsxtun:ty
 
i
                                                                    )
V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission                        !
LIC-91-0011S                                                l Page 2                                                      J I
If you have any que d ions, please contact me.            I Sincerely, AV, S . 55 W. G. Gates Division Manager Nuclear Operations WGG/jb c:      LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae W. C. Walker, NRC Project Manager R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident inspector
                                            . . _ .  . - - . . . ..}}

Latest revision as of 10:54, 27 September 2022