ML20147B797: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML20147B797
| number = ML20147B797
| issue date = 01/17/1997
| issue date = 01/17/1997
| title = Responds to 960903 Ltr Expressing Dissatisfaction W/Nrc 960822 Ltr Re on-line Maint
| title = Responds to Expressing Dissatisfaction W/Nrc Re on-line Maint
| author name = De Agazio A
| author name = De Agazio A
| author affiliation = NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
| author affiliation = NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
Line 11: Line 11:
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = NUDOCS 9702030232
| document report number = NUDOCS 9702030232
| title reference date = 09-03-1996
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
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impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is  i intended to ensure that the plant is not placed in safety-significant (or risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit  i on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will  '
impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is  i intended to ensure that the plant is not placed in safety-significant (or risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit  i on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will  '
remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule.
remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule.
I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your September 3,1996, letter regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final    ;
I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your {{letter dated|date=September 3, 1996|text=September 3,1996, letter}} regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final    ;
paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred  l in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers  l
paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred  l in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers  l
;      the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for      l concern, we cannot agree with your characterization of the events themselves.
;      the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for      l concern, we cannot agree with your characterization of the events themselves.
Line 84: Line 85:
         .o 1
         .o 1
J. Doughty                                                                January 17, 1997 impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is intended to ensure that the plar.t is not placed in safety-significant (or                          l risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit l
J. Doughty                                                                January 17, 1997 impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is intended to ensure that the plar.t is not placed in safety-significant (or                          l risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit l
on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule.                                                                              l I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your September 3, 1996, letter regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final i              paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred
on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule.                                                                              l I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your {{letter dated|date=September 3, 1996|text=September 3, 1996, letter}} regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final i              paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred
             - in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers                          l the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for
             - in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers                          l the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for
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Latest revision as of 04:21, 12 December 2021

Responds to Expressing Dissatisfaction W/Nrc Re on-line Maint
ML20147B797
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/17/1997
From: De Agazio A
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Doughty J
SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
References
NUDOCS 9702030232
Download: ML20147B797 (4)


Text

- -. . - -_- -. .. . . , . .- .- -

1

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  • 4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, { WASHINGTON, D.C. 20086-0001 l

'% * * * * * / January 17, 1997 3

Ms. Jane Doughty The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League P.O. Box 1136 Portsmouth, NH 03802

SUBJECT:

ON-LINE MAINTEN! ACE

Dear Ms. Doughty:

I

, Tnis is in response to your letter of September 3,1996, in which you express

, your dissatisfaction with our letter of August 22, 1995. Our letter was in

response to several questions you asked in your letter of July 1,1996,
relating to on-line maintenance. Specifically, your dissatisfaction centers
upon our response to your question regarding the NRC's legal justification for allowing plant safety systems to be taken out of service to perform preventive ,
maintenance. l In our August 22 letter, we directed your attention to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(1) which relate
to limiting conditions for operation and identifies what a '

licensee must do if a limiting condition for operation is not met. However, l you disagree with our application of this part of the regulations to include situations where the licensee has deliberately removed equipment from service I to perform maintenance and, instead, you choose to interpret it as being applicable only when a failure has occurred. You stated that: i "Until relatively recently, the interpretation [of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(1)] has been properly and lawfully, that the time

, limits for corrective action provided for in the Technical Specifications were for remediating events that happened on their

own. It has only been relatively recently that utilities have berit the meaning of the Technical Specifications to allow the deliberate taking of equipment out of service during power

, operation."

, You do not state the basis for your assertion that the time limits for corrective action provided for in the technical specifications are for

remediating events that happen on their own. The Commission has long l considered that an adequate maintenance program includes both corrective and i preventive maintenance, both of which may be perfor.2ed on-line. On-line maintenance activities that are directed to preserving and promptly restoring operability, reliability, and availability of, or to preventing failure of, plant structures, systems, and components are endorsed. Such maintenance should not be confused with on-line maintenance performed solely for economic raasons, e.g. maintenance performed just prict to shutdown for refueling to shorten the outage, which the Commission does not encourage.

In your September 3 letter, you, quite correctly, noted that the cormlete wording of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(1) requires that when a liciting condition for  !

operation is not met, the licensee shall shutdown the reactor or follow any '

y remedial action permitted by the technical specification until the condition OS qm EC mf CENTE CBPV 030062 9702030232 970117 L

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a A J. Doughty can.be met. Our August 22 letter omitted the phrase shutdown the reactor (the omission was clearly indicated by ellipsis) to emphasize that technical specification action statements may r.llow continued operation of the reactor for a period of time even though the limiting condition for operation is not met, as could be the case when a licensee removes equipment from service to perform on-line maintenance.

In your September 3 letter, you asked, "Where precisely, in any document you have heretofore cited to us or elsewhere, is the legal authority for allowing licensees to deliberately remove plant safety systems from service during operation?"

Part 50 to Title 10 of the Code of Federai Regrilations provides for the licensing of production and utilization facilities and includes general design

, and operating requirements for assuring adequate protection of public health and safety. The facility operating license and technical specifications provide specific requirements and conditions for operation. There is no NRC ,

regulation that specifically authorizes licensees to deliberately remove l equipment from service during operation. Conversely, there is no regulation that specifically prohi'oits licensees from deliberately removing equipment i systems from service temporarily during operation. Thus, a licensee may take actions that make structures, systems, or components inoperable for a period of time while the licensee performs maintenance, provided that no specific

regulation is violated and all requirements and conditions of the operating l license (including technical specifications) are met.

In our August 22 letter, the response to Question 2 referred to the maintenance rule. You stated in your September 3 letter that, " Regulatory  ;

Guides and maintenance rules are not substitutes for regulations." Our letter  !

failed to clarify that our reference to the raintenance rule was to the final l

ruie,10 CFR 65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, which was published on July 10, 1991, in the Eederal Reaister at 56 FR 31324. (On June 23, 1993, paragraph (a)(3) was revised.) ,

The final rule as it now stands requires licensees, in part, to accomplish the l following- l 1

  • Establish performance goals for those structures, systems, ;nd components (SSC1) included in the scope of the rule >

+ Monitor the performance or condition of SSCs against these goals  ;

  • Take corrective activr. when goals for an SSC are not met a Periodically evaluate the goals and monitoring activities and make appropriate adjustments biennially at the least.

The scope of the rule includes safety-related and certain non-safety-related

< SSCs. Licensees are required to assess the total effect on plant safety before taking plant equipment out of service for monitoring equipment performance or preventive maintenance. The assessment of the cumulative i

\

1 J. Doughty  !

impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is i intended to ensure that the plant is not placed in safety-significant (or risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit i on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will '

remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule.

I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your September 3,1996, letter regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final  ;

paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred l in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers l

the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for l concern, we cannot agree with your characterization of the events themselves.

The amounts of overpower in these events were small and did not cause a safety concern. Because they were small, control room indications could not easily alert the operators to the improper conditions. In fact, the overpower events could only be confirmed through detailed calculations. Had the overpowers been larger and more threatening to the integrity of the fuel, plant I

, parameters displayed in the control room and associated alarms could have alerted the operators to the inappropriate conditions. Even then, if the operators failed to take corrective action on large overpowers, the reactor l protection system would have automatically tripped the reactor to prevent fuel 1 damage.

Sincerely,

$ d4 .

Albert W. e Agazio, Sen oject Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

i l l

I 1

l l

l l

l l

.o 1

J. Doughty January 17, 1997 impact of out-of-service equipment on the performance of safety functions is intended to ensure that the plar.t is not placed in safety-significant (or l risk-significant) configurations. This rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not prohibit l

on-line maintenance, and in fact, recognizes that licensees periodically will remove equipment from service while the reactor is operating to meet the objectives of the rule. l I believe the preceding paragraphs address your comments and questions in your September 3, 1996, letter regarding on-line maintenance. However, the final i paragraph of your letter characterized the two overpower events that occurred

- in October 1995 as "potentially devastating errors." While the NRC considers l the programmatic weaknesses that allowed the events to occur a cause for

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concern, we cannot agree with your characterization of the events l themselves. The amounts of overpower in these events were small and did not i

cause a safety concern. Because they were small, control room indications could not easily alert the operators ~to the improper conditions. In fact, the overpower events could only be confirmed through detailed calculations. Had the overpowers been larger and more threatening to the integrity'of the fuel, plant parameters displayed in the control room and associated alarms could have alerted the operators te the inappropriate conditions. Even then, if the i operators failed to take ce rective action on large overpowers, the reactor '

protection system would have automatically tripped the reactor to prevent fuel damage. >

Sincerely,i r

(Original Signed By) S

~ ~

lbert W. De Agazio, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-3' Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Rea'ctor Regulation t

DISTRIBUTION: -

Docket File S. Varga S. Little ACRS PUBLIC J. Zwolinski A. De Agazio J. Rogge, Region I PDI-1 R/F S. Bajwa 0GC DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEAGAZIO\SALP0903.V3 To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" - Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" - No copy 0FFICE PM:P01 1 d/ l E 1 LA: POI-1 M,4f ,, l l D:Pbl 1 L l l OGC fl0 f M g M Q lf, l__

NANE ADeAgarid/Mt SLittle M/5/7 V tA PMIlano V U ' " Q3 /%4, .

DATE 01//y /97 01/ /97 'M[7C 01/p,/97 '

31/\"4/97 Official Record Copy

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