ML20206M858: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[PLA-2553, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/85-28 & 50-388/85-23.Withdrawal of Notice of Violation Suggested Since Interpretation of Tech Specs 4.3.2.1 & 4.3.3.1 Valid.Related Info Encl]]
| number = ML20206M858
| issue date = 11/15/1985
| title = Responds to NRC 851017 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/85-28 & 50-388/85-23.Withdrawal of Notice of Violation Suggested Since Interpretation of Tech Specs 4.3.2.1 & 4.3.3.1 Valid.Related Info Encl
| author name = Keiser H
| author affiliation = PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name = Kister H
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| docket = 05000387, 05000388
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = IEIN-84-37, PLA-2553, NUDOCS 8607010303
| package number = ML20206M839
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 13
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.
      ~
E~na/n uce ?                                              &        f Q Pennsylvania Pow;r & Light Company Two North Ninth Street
* Allentown. PA 18101
* 2151770 5151 Harold W. Kaiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/770-7502 NOV 151985 Mr. Harry B. Kister, Chief Project Branch No. 1 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King cf Prussia, PA 19406                                                                                  !
  .SUSQUDIANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23 ER 100450                      FILE 841-04                                      Docket Nos. 50-387      .
PIl-2553                                                                                      50-388 -
 
==Dear Mr. Kister:==
 
This letter provides PP&L's res;fonse to your letter of October 17, 1985 which forsarded NRC Region I Combined Inspection Reports 50-387/85-28 and 50-388/Q-23 with Appendix A, Notice of Violation,                                                        m Your Notice advised that PP&L was to submit a written reply within thirty (30) days of the date of the letter. We trust'that the Comz::ission will find the attached response acceptable.
Very truly yours, b/    /      '
O, H. N. eiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations Attachment cc:    Mr. R. H. Jacobs - NRC Senior Resident Inspector Ma. M. J. Campagnone - FRC (NRR Project ManaRer) 8607010303 860625 PDR    ADOCK 05000387 G                      PDR
 
RESPONSE TU N0flCE OF VIOLATION Violation (337/85-28-03; 388/85--23-02)
Technical Specifications 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.3.1 require the performance of monthly Channel Functional Tests on the HPCI isolation and actuation channels.
Technical Specification Definition 1.6 specifies that the Channel Punctional Test uhall test the entire channel.                                                  !
Contrary to the above, surveillance procedures SI-152-203, SI-152-201, SI-152-211, and SI-180-205, which implement this requirement on the HPCI steam line delta pressure channels, HPCI steam supply pressure channels, HPCI turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure channels and the HPCI high reactor vessel level trip channals, respectively, fail to test the entire channel. 'The corresponding Unit 2 surveillance procedures also fail to test the entire channel.
 
===Response===
It is PP&L's p3sition that testing in accordance with the referenced surveillance procedures reprananta a valid inte.rpretation of Technical Specification requirements, rather than noncompliance. It is therefore requented that the Notice of Violation be withdrawn.                              , ,
                                                                                  . 1 The Technica' Specifications applicable to trip functions referenced in the Notice are as follows:
HPCI Stean Line Delta-Pressure-High      4.3.2.1, Table 4.3.2.1-1, function 6'."a HPCI Steam Supply Pressure-Low            4.3.2.1, Table 4.3.2.1-1, function 6.b HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragu            4.3.2.1, Table 4.3.2.1-1, function 6.c Pressure-High Reactor vessel Water Level-                4.3.3.1. Table 4.3.3.1-1, function 3.e High, Level 8 Each of these rec,uires performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST in accordance with Definition 1.6 on a frequency of at leaut once per 31 days. The SSES Technical Specifications provides the following definition for CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:
      "A CHANNEL FTNCTIONAL TEST shall be:
: e. Analog Channels - the injection    of a almulated eignal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPFRABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions and channel failure trips.
: t. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.
The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of esquential, overlapping or total channal aceps such that the entire channel is tested."
The Technical Specifications do not provide a definition of the term
" chancel".
l l
i
 
Page 3 1
The standarda do not utilise the word " instrumentation" in the definition because their use of the channel concept is not limited to                                        l ins t rumentation. In the standards usage, the protection channel consists                        i of " components and modules".
While instrumentation is included.
                  " components and modules" also include wires, transietors, switches,                              !
motors, relays, solenoids, pipes, fittings, pumps. tanks. valves or other                          l identifiable devices or pieces of equipment. The channel as defined in the standards is a subset of a protection system which provides protective action signals to the protective action system. It is not limited to an
                  " instrumentation channel" as called out in Technical Specifications.
: 2. The inspection report notes that "the associated relays and contacts (i.e.
those that would be tested under the IEEE standards definition of
                " channel") are tested during the logic system functional test". The                                l Technical Specification definition of LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST (LSET) is as follows:
                "A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test of all logic conponents, i.e. all relays and contacts. all trip units, solid state logic elements.                  . .
etc.      of a logic circuit, from sensor through and including the actuated device. to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be
* l parformed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total system stspa such that the entire logic system is tested."
This requirement establishes the testing frequency at IS months for operation of hardware downstream of the " channel", such as relays, contacts, links, conductors, and final elements. The "associatad relays and contacts" called out in the inspection report are precisely the same type of hardware included in an LSFT. It is not reasonable to assume that by arbitrary definition the frequency requirement for a small group of thesa that logic components should be greater; therefore it is not apparent the ef fectiveness of the surveillance program is in any way degraded due to the scope of testing employed at SSES.
3.
IE Infornation Notice 84-37 discusses mitigation of the potentially adverse safety impact of using jumpers and lifting leads in support of survoillance testing.
                                                                                                      ~
Uhile the Susquehanna design does ensure that safety related instrumentation can be practically tested during plant operation, the same cannot be said for interposing relays which are part of the logic circuitry. To perfonn CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS in this case, some circuits would require disabling via measures such as lifted leads or booted contacts to prevent an actuation from occurring during testing of the interposing relay. An example of this situation is found with the HFCI Steam Line Delta-Pressure-High circuits. Actuation of the interposing relay along with the individual instrument would cause a                    -  5 system isolation.
l l
l l
I
 
g Page 4                :
4.
ANSI /IEEE Standard 338-1977 states that a functional test "... should not be lengthy nor require extensive test equipment or personnel."
In certain cases, while verification of relay actuation is possible, an unnecessary burden would be imposed on plant resources.        An additional individual would be required for each test to monitor components in a separate location. Civan the large number of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS required and the frequency at which they are performed, the additional resource commitmont is very significant.
The factors described above provided the reasoning for using the following definition for where a channel ends as opposed to the IEEE standards definition:
            "For the purpose of channel functional testing, the end of the channel is tha input node (s) of the coil of the actuated relay (a) which catcr into                          <
combinational logic with logic provided by other channels."
This definition requires testing of all alarm and/or trip functions of the                      ..
channel, i.e.,
it ensures that the sensor is intact and that the channel generates appropriate bistable action (s).      It therefore satisfies the        ~
requirements of the Technical Specifications. Furthermore, the definition minimi=es equipment, personnel and time in test status - souething that application of the IEEE definition vould fail to accomplish.
It sh'ould be noted that the position adopted by PP&L, while permitting limitations of testing scope for situations as described above, does not mean that testing is limited to verification of instrument actuation in all cases.
Rather, the policy states that instrumentation channel testing vill extend into logic circuitry as far as practical (typically to a point where                ~
annunciator actuation vill indicate a successful test). This approach provides a significant sample of logic components which are tested at CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST f requencies. Should generic problems be identified with a particular type cf co=ponent, corrective actions would address all applicabic devices.
(
PP&L telieves that this issue arises from the lack of a specific definition of the term " channel" in the Technical Specifications. We have adopted a definition of this term which is consistent with the Technical Specification application of " channel" to require testing of instrumentation channels. We recognize that several industry standarda utilize the same term " channel" in a                        i similar application. However, their usage also incorporates the concept of a logic channel and hence is not appropriate for this discussion. PP&L has extensively reviewed its definition in light of its relationship to Technical Specification requirements, and has determined it to be valid.
l In conclusion, PP&L requests that the Notice of Violation be withdrawn due to the lack of Technical Specification definition of the term " channel". Our interpretation did not degrade the safe operation of SSES (as mentioned
 
Page 5 previously reliability of the componente in question is ensured by the 18-month LSFT). However. due to the level of concern generated on this issue, we vill submit our definition of the term instrumentation channel for NRC reytev and approval as a change to the SSES Technical Specifications.
b e *
                                                      *eA s A-4 1
 
  ~
7'. T JotouJ p)er L-YsW % & coq
            ...iiUTES PORC MEETING          No. 84-117            Date: May 25, 1984          F1#b
    ' e following eic  constituted  members a quorumwereat in allattendance times. at various times throughout the meeting Chairman:            H. W. Keiser                Member:    G. L. Merrill (A)
Member:              D. J. Thompson              Member:    C. M. McClain (A)
Member:              C. A. Smith                Member:    B. J. Veazie (A)
Secretary:          C. M. McClain              Member:    B. J. Rarig (A)
Guests:            F. T. Eisenhuth              R_. C. Collier        F. G. Butler F._S. Gruscavage            K. C. Lionarons Su_bject of Review 1.
Procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.8 and changes thereto, and any other proposed procedures or changes thereto, as determined by the Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna to af fect nuclear safety.
A.
The following procedures were recommended for approval and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question:
1.
AD-QA-406, Rev. I, Operating Experience Review Assessment a.
Add to action taken list " requires procedure revision" and
                            " requires-work authorization".
: 2. AD-QA-520, Rev. 2A, Station Welding Program 3.
EO_100-009, Rev._1, Plant Shutdown from Outside Control Room 4
E0-200-009, Rev. 1, Plant Shutdown from Outside Control Room 5.
EO-100-014, Rev. O, Anticipated Transient with Failure to Scram (ATWS)
: 6. GO-100-002, Rev. 1, Plant Startup and Heatup 7.
GO-200-002, Rev. O, Plant Startup and Heatup
: 8. GO-100-003, Rev. 1. Power Operation
: 9. GO-200-003, Rev. 1, Power Operation
: a. Correct the power flow map.
                                                                                      ~~
: 3.      Proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety A.        The following proposed tests were recommended for approval and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question:
: 1. ST 27.0, Rev. 5, Turbine Trip and Generator Load Rejection
: 2. ST 27.1, Rev. 4. Turbine Trip
: 3. ST 27.2, Rev. 5, High Power Generator load Rejection 8.
The following Startup Test Change Notices were recommended for approval and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question:
: 1. STCN 036
: 2. STCN 042 C.
The following Test Exception Reports were recommended for approval and do not constitute an unreviewed safety question:
: 1. TER 002
: 2. TER 003
: 3. TER 004 4    TER 005
: 5. TER 006
: 4.      Items of Significance:
A.        The POR:
reviewed a request to accept data taken from other tests and other W.A.'s in lieu of performing surveillances. Upon review of the data, PORC recommended that the data be accepted as meeting ~~the intent of tne following surveillance:
        ....              l. SI-288-204 B.
The PORC reviewed a position paper by F. G. Butler on Scope _ of Testing
                        - Cnannel Functional _ Tests. Discussion on the paper centered around                    j
                                                                                                                /
the definition of " Entire Channel". F. T. Eisenhuth refuted the position taken in the paper and presented excerpts from the
                                                                                                              +
  ,'                                                                                                        /
Surveillance Program Task Force Position Paper on Channel Functional                            ,
Tests. The committee voted 3 to 2 to accept Mr. Butler's position as j          l 1                      the official SSES position. Attached to these mirutes are copies of                f both the accepted postion paper and the dissenting opinion letter submitted by Messrs. Eisenhuth and McClain.
_                    ~
 
C. The PORC reviewed the following documents, but did not recommend their approval:
: 1. OP-TY-013, Rev. 0 - needs H. J. Palmer signature.
: 2. PMR 83-423 - PORC will not approve the Safety Evaluation to change the drawing.
: 3. PMR 83-424 - PORC will not approve the Safety Evaluation to change the drawing.
Submitted:
C. M. McClain Approved:                [D. [IJ. Thompion
                                    %.<l e t Approved:
                                                    ]&
H. W. Keiser          ' '
 
594L FIR 3 tl
        .                                                                      E3          .
Hay 23, 1984 PORC CHAIRMAN - SSES SUSQUZHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SCOPE OF TESTING - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS We have been requested to provide a position paper regarding our interpretation of the extent of testing necessary to fulfill Technical Specification requirements which involve " Channel                                                  -
Functional Tests" (CFT's). The issue which prompted this request deals with the interpretation of where the " entire channel" ends.
The definition must adequately address the Tech Spec definition for CPT's while being flexible enough to provide universal application to the many plant systems in a reasonable manner.
We propose to define the "end of the channel" 'or the purpose of channel functional testing to be the input node (s) of the coil of the actuated relay (s) which enter into combinational logic with logic provided by other channels. This definition sets a minimum requirement
* which provides adequate channel testing .nd, in several            ca'es,    s  fulfills requirements without      excessive personnel or testing apparatus.
Further testing involving operational m:1-                  .
fication of actuating relays and downstream combinational logic is accomplished by Logic System Functional Testing (LSFT) when re-
                                                                                                                                        .$E quired by Technical Specifications. We helieve this policy to be                                                              l in step with the intent of testing required by Tech Specs while complying with testing description of IEEE 338-1977 and meeting the recommendations of NRC IE Inf Notice No. 84-37.
I P E N N $ Y L VA NI A POWE 4 & LIG H T COMPANY                                '
  , . .            ._            _        . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _-          ,          y    ,,      , . _ , -      . . - . .    ..~,m-      . - -
 
ascinaal SCOPE OF TESTING -
May 23, 1984 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS Page 2 The minimum requirement, as stated above, tests all alarm and/or trip functions of the channel while requiring a minimum of personnel and equipment this minimizing the time required for the tested equipment to be in the abnormal "in test status".          The CFT's intent is to ensure that the sensor is in tact and the channel generates appropriate bistable action (s). The effect of imposing the minimum requirements proposed above is to employ the LSFT to verify operation of downstream hardware such as relays. links, conductors and final elements. However, of these devices are precisely the same type of hardware already included in existing LSFT's, thus no reduction in the effectiveness of the surveillance          program is apparent.
      .^
It shculd be noted that the effect of imposing the above requirecept is that in a few cases, where only " blind" bistables are utilized, the -CT u@end--at the -input nodas of these devices and actuation
          ~
t '
of devices downstream of the input nodes will not be checked by the CFT.                                                                                                  ,
In all other cases, it is our policy to check channel bistable action as far as practicable            i.e.,
if a plant response (annunciator, valve movement, etc.) results from the single channel action, this response is verified by the CFT.
It is recommended that the above definition be adopted as policy gi fo r CFT's .
If it is desirable to extend the scope of testing beyond                                    -
that proposed, it is suggested that in each case where blind bistables are in evidence, modifications be ende to achieve compliance with the
* general guidelines for functional tests (i.e. minimum equipment,                                  .'
* personnel, time in test status). To impose the mora " conservative"                              ~
{
                                                                                                            .o . .
P E N N 5 Y L VA NI A                                                                          ,
POWE R & tlGHT COMPANY                          '
i
                                                                                                      . . ,    ., y.
                                                          -                          -      m                            .
 
PTOL 80h# 25 e
SCOPE OF TESTING -
May 23, 1984 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS Page 3 requirement at this time would, in our opinion, create undue risk and exposure to plant safety and reliability by requiring unnec-essarily complicated testing on a frequent basis.
hb/
F. G. Butler I6C/C Supervisor FGB/ eat An exception is taken when interposing logic (i.e. mode switch) prevents the signal from going this far in the channel.
  ,      e.
P E NNS YL VA NI A POWE R & LIGHT COMPANY
                              .-r    -.    -    , . . . . - - - . . , , - - - - ,      -.  - . , - , ,  .
r-----    , . , - ~        -.
 
n.t ex*d Ma'y 29, 1984                                                      .
PORC CHAIPJfAN - SSES SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SCOPE OF TESTINC - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS In PORC Meeting No. 84-117, hald on May,25, 1984, the committee considered a position paper (attached) from F.G. Butler regarding required scope of
,          surveillance testing for Channel Functional Tests (CFT) . The committee l          recommended acceptance of this position, with dissenting opinions fr'om the undersigned, i
The basis for dissent involves the requirement contained in Technical Specifications. Definition 1.6 that a CFT must be conducted " . .            . such that the entire channel is tested." Technical Specifications do not provide a definition for a channel, but IEEE Std. 603-1980 and ANSI /IEEE Std.
279-1971 contain the following:
                    " Channel: An arrangement of components and modules as required to generate a single protective action signal when required by a gen-erating station condition. A channel loses 'its identity where single action signals are combined".
At issue is the application of this definition of Channel to specific circuitry installed at SSES.                      '
i In practical usage, the definition "end of the channel" adopted in the paper means that in some cases testing will extend only to the switch contact at the instrument rack. Since additional component (s) in the circuitry (nor= ally relays) actuate only in response to the " single protective action signal" genecated by the sensor associated with the instrument bistable, it is believed that these component (s) are part of the Channel in accord with the IEEE definition. Taking this interpretation. the testing des-i cribed will not meet Technical Specification requirements. Support for this interpretation can be found in a change being made to Specification 4.1.3.1.4 b (see Proposed Amendment No. 43 to the Unit I Licens9) calling out a check of switch actuation rather than a CFT. This change is being made to avoid having to test beyond the instrument switch contact in the specific case of the Scram Discharge Volume float level switches.
The committee heard discussion that testing which included verification of these additional components would violate the dictates 'of ANSI /IEEE Std. 338-1977. This standard states that a functional test " .              . . should not be lengthy nor require extensive test equipment or personnel." Problems arise due to lack of annunciation or status lights associated with the subject relays, necessitating introduction of test equipment or jumpers into relay cabinets. The undersigned agree that with present designs, this " keep it simple" test objective cannot be fully achieved. Measures taken in pursuit                                      l of this goal are strongly supported. However, the guidance of IEEE standards                                    I
                                                                    .                                                    I PENNSYLVANI A POWE A & tsGHT ' COMPANY                                                  j l
 
a . e does not supercede direct requirements of Technical Specifications and any conflicts must be resolved in favor of Technical Specifications.
The position taken by the undersigned is in conformance to that adopted by the Surveillance Program Task Force in their Issue No. 2 (see PLIS-13997 and expanded discussion in PLIS-13301) . It is also noted that this is perceived to be a regulatory compliance issue rather than a nuclear safety issue. The NRC, through its logic System Functional Test require-ments, has established that 18 months is the appropriate testing interval for traditional logic components such as relays, switches, etc. No evidence has been presented to suggest that.18 month testing is inappropriate, so the testing program adopted by Mr. Butler appears to satisfy reliability assurance aspects.
It is felt that proper resolution of this issue should take one of two courses. Either:
a.
Testing =cthods be revised to include verification of relay act-uation for those  e.oeponents which actuate response to a single Technical Specification required signal. To meet concerns re-        .
lating to ANSI /IEEE Std. 338-1977 guidance. it is recer, ended that design codification be expedited to provide approp ste status indicators which vill facilitate verifications. Or, b.
Submit a revision to Definition 1.6 to define a CFT as a verification of switch actuation to f or=alize the interpretation currently being accepted by PORC.
f h 6 $i F.T. Eisenhuth b
C.M. McClain
_ __}}

Latest revision as of 06:49, 6 December 2021

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20206M858&oldid=3323264"