NUREG-0880, Transcript of Commission 860220 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Safety Goal Evaluation Rept.Pp 1-73.Supporting Documentation Encl: Difference between revisions

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#REDIRECT [[NUREG-0880, Summary of ACRS Subcommittees on Safety Philosophy, Technology & Criteria & Reliability & Probabilistic Assessment 851204 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Continue Discussion on Revising 1983 Safety Goal Policy]]
| number = ML20141N103
| issue date = 02/20/1986
| title = Transcript of Commission 860220 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Safety Goal Evaluation Rept.Pp 1-73.Supporting Documentation Encl
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket =
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = REF-10CFR9.7, RTR-NUREG-0880, RTR-NUREG-880
| document report number = NUDOCS 8603030580
| document type = LEGAL TRANSCRIPTS & ORDERS & PLEADINGS, TRANSCRIPTS, DEPOSITIONS, NARRATIVE TESTIMONY
| page count = 84
}}
 
=Text=
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U T    SA          MERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Report on Safety Goal Evaluation (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
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                                                                          ~
Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Thursday, February 20, 1986          Pages: 1 - 73 8603030500 860220 PDR  10CFR      PDR PT9.7 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
 
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6                    Th i s is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on S  2/20/86              . In the Commission's office.at 1717 H Street, 9  N . tJ . , Washington,    D.C.        The meeting was open to public 10  attendance and observation.                    This transcript has not been 11  reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12  inaccuracies 13                  The transcript is intended solely for general                                        .
14  informational purposes.                    As provided by 10 CFR 9.103,    it is 15  not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the I
16  matters discussed.          Expressions of opinion in this transcript t
17  do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.                                          No 18  pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19  any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20  or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21  authorize.
23 24 25                                                                                                '
 
4    .*  J 4  A      _ .-  p      4-
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                                                                        'l          .
1                UNITED STATES.0F AMERICA 2-              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4            REPORT ON SAFETY GOAL EVALUATION 5                          ---
6                    Public Meeting 7                          ___
1 i          8                                Thursday, February 20, 1986 i
9                                Room 1130 10                                1717 M' Street, N.W.
11                                Washington, D.C.
;        12          The Commission met in open session, pursuant.to 13  notice, at 2:10 p.m.
L i        14                                                                      *  '
i 15  COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
1 q
16          NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission
!          17          JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member i
!          18          THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member 19          FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member 20          LANDO W. ZECH, JR., Member i          21  STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
;          22          S. Chilk            M. Malsch 23          V. Stallo            H. Denton 24          J. Sniezek          J.' Taylor 25          D. Ross              J. Davis
 
0 2
1  AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
2          M. Taylor 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14                                                                          .
15 16 17 18 19 20 e
21 22 23 24 25
 
i
* i                                                                                                                                                                                                                            I
~
l                                                                                                        PROCEEDINGS                                          ,
2                                                                                              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: ' Good afternoon, ladies and 3                                                      gentlemen.                                Today, members of the NRC Staff will brief the              :
4                                                      Commission on the Safety Goal Evaluation Report submitted to                                          ,
5                                                      the Commission by Acting EDO by memo dated February 14, 1986.
j                                                            6                                                                                            By way of background, on February 17, 1982, the                I 7                                                      Commission published NUREG-0880, a Proposed Policy Statement I
j                                                            8                                                      on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, and i                                                            9                                                      solicited commments on it.                                  On March 14, 1983, the Commission l                                                                                                                                                                                                                          r l                                                  10                                                              published the Revised Policy Statement and in May 1983,                                                ,
i 11                                                              published Revision 1 to NUREG-0880, which stated the purpose l                                                    12                                                              of the safety' goals, set forth the revised policy statement,
)
!                                                    13                                                              evaluated public comments and described the staff's safety I
14                                                              goal evaluation plan to be followed during the two-year                                            *
{                                                  15                                                              evaluation period.
1
!                                                  16                                                                                                      During the past couple of years we've had a number 17                                                              of Commission meetings on the subject, the most recent of 1
18                                                          -which was October 22, 1985, during which the Commission first 19                                                              discussed the integrated safety goal decision matrix.
20                                                                                                      The summary paper submitted on February 14 of this ,    ,
j                                                  21                                                              year expresses the current staff viewpoint on this subject and                                          -
1 t
22                                                                explains further the integrated safety goal decision matrix.
23                                                                I understand that this memorandum as well as'the meeting 4
24                                                                slides are available at the table at the back of the room.
:                                                25                                                                                                        The subject of today's meeting is indeed a complex 1
 
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1 one and one on which I know the staff has spent considerable 2 time. Unfortunately,  I, for one, didn't get a chance to read 3 the paper until last night. As a matter of fact, I'm not sure 4 that I've yet reached the stage of understanding where I know 5 what questions I want to ask. Therefore, I even considered 6 suggesting we postpone today's meeting until we've all had 7 more time to digest the paper, but on reflection I believe we 8 can profit from today's meeting by using it to better 9 understand the revised paper and the proposed decision matrix.
10          So with those comments, let me see if other 11 Commissioners have opening comments before I turn the meeting 12 over to staff.
13          COMMISSIONER ZECH:  Well, I had the same thoughts 14 that you did, Mr. Chairman, on perhaps needing a little more      -
15 time to reflect on the paper, but I think the meeting today 16 should be useful.
17          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  I agree, we all need more time 18 to reflect on the paper, but I do agree it's worth proceeding 19 and learning as much as we can today.
20          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:  Joe, I agree with that. I 21 think this is going to be useful to get a better understanding 22 for the staff's thinking on it. One of the things that I'd 23 like us to think about perhaps through this meeting and then 24 on into agenda planning is whether the next time we have a 25 chance to talk with the ACRS, which I guess is -- they asked
 
5 4
1 for a postponement from March to April -- whether we put this 2 proopsal on the agenda'as one that we'd like to meet with the 3 ACRS on, and give them enough notice so they can be ready by 4 April to talk about it.
5            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Well, a lot of thinking went 6 into this paper, and for that we're most appreciative to the 7  staff. But it also takes time on our part to absorb it all, 8  and so I hope you'll bear with us in needing more time to get 9  acquainted with all hspects.
10            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      I agree with what you're 11  saying. I probably would have been receptive to a 12  postponement, but for somewhat -- some additional reasons.
13  You know, the Commission has before it now your memorandum, I
l      14  two memoranda that I have written on this subject, and none of
* 15  those nor the response of other Commissioners to those three 16  memoranda are reflected in the staff paper.          And it ceems to j      17  me, while I think it's useful for us to sit down and talk 18  about this issue anytime, because I think we ought to think 19  carefully about many aspects of safety goal -- it isn't an 20  easy and a clearcut issue in many respects -- it just seems to      ,
21  me that if we're going to have staff come back in here next 22  time, they ought to reflect what they've had in their hands 23  now for sometime.
24            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Well, it was my impression they 25  were trying to reflect thinking on that point, but I haven't
 
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1 even had a chance to go back and see to what extent some of      1 2 these comments have been incorporated in the draft.
3            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:  And then I'd also point out 4 that we really don't have responses to the issues that I            -
5 raised in that memorandum, Sam, and I believe that our rules 6 require that there be some response to that. There are a 7 number of issues there that if staff gets guidance on, 8 whichever way they go they'll be able to come in with a paper 9 then that reflects the sense of the Commission.
10            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Well, I agree that there may be 11 merit in reviewing those memos. I wasn't being critical of 12 the staff; I was being critical more of the fact that I should      '
13 have anticipated the need for more time and didn't, and so I'm 14 not as prepared as I would like to be for today's meeting but  -
15 I think we still can go ahead and learn. And we may want to 16 reiterate some of the guidance points that we have set forth 17 before.
18            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:  Yes, but let's not -- what 19 I'm trying to say, Joe, is that we can talk ourselves blue in 20 the face on this, and it's time I think to respond to issues, 21 that you've raised, that I've raised, that others on the 22 Commission have raised, and find out if Commissioners agree or 23 disagree. And Sam ought to do that polling and then staff's 24 got something to go on. Right now they're trying to respond 25 to a Commission that although in your defense you've got
 
                                = - - . . . . .                  .                  .                  .                      -                      .
7 1      memoranda, but you haven't got any resolution of issues raised                                                                                            ,
i
!                  2        in those memoranda, and that's our fault.                                                                                        We haven't given 3        that to you yet, and we ought to do it.
4                              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                                                        Well, I didn't mean to start 5        this off on a critical note, but --
6                              MR, STELLO:                              Maybe it would help if I could say at i
7        least a few words to being with.                                                                                  First, in preparing the              &
L 8        paper for the Commission, it was with the belief that the i
9        Commission itself was having a difficult time trying to decide
$              10          where it wanted to come out on issues, and we had never t
j              11          written out what we had really proposed because it was 12          different than you'd seen in the past.                                                                                        And it was my belief    i t
+
;              13          that putting together this document where.you could see the 14          story all tied together would make it a lot easier for the                                                                                          -
i r
4 15          Conmission.
16                                  The only conclusion that we really have come to in j              17          reality is that there is really no debate anywhere in terms of i
t 18            the qualitative statements as a matter of policy, and those                                                                                            l 19          are the issues that appear from all points of view to have
{            20            been resolved.                          There are a lot of other issues which are not,
                                                                                                                                                                              ,    l i
21            and they needed to have, if you will, the story to be told                                                                                              '
22            from beginning to end to assist the Commission in trying to I'
t 23            decide where it comes out, i
i 24                                  COMMISSIONER BERHTHAL:                                                              Well, it's not clear to ne h
25            that the qualitative issues are resc1ved,                                                                                        I mean, Joe has i
 
s                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,
8                                y raised the issue of the' bifurcation of this rulemaking 1
a i
2            process.            That's as qualitative as you can get.                                                                                        And I guess i
j!                                  3            we may have agreed to that.                                                We haven't agreed or responded to 4            the details of how that is going to be bifurcated, just ~as a                                                                                                                              i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ?
j                                  5            procedural matter.                            That's an extremely qualitative element.                                                                                                    '
6                                And I appreciate what you're saying; you're trying l'
7            to give us your best thoughts on this matrix and nany other                                                                                                                                !
i 8            details of implementation that you've presented us with, but                                                                                                                                l 9            in the paper we ought to respond to it.                                                                                                                                                    [
10                                      MR. STELLO:                      And I recognize that I yet don't have 11                  the response that I asked for from the Commission.                                                                                                                                          .
l .
12                                      COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                            That's right, you don't.
13                                      MR. STELLO:                      And I understand that it was -- and it' I
5 14                  is clearly very difficult to do it.                                                                  And the paper was                                                                -
l
]                          15                  presented with the hope of trying to add some more information                                                                                                                              !
1 16                  so it would make it easier for the Commission to deliberate.                                                                                                                                '
j                          17                  And it's clear to me that this is not the final piece of paper                                                                                                                              !
l 18                  that is to be written on this subject.                                                                          I'm not even so sure j                          19                  that the next one is, in fact, the final one.                                                                                            And I don't i
20                  Know where the final one is.
21                                        But I do believe that this focused on a number of 22                  issues that I think there is no debate.                                                                          When I say there's                                                        '
23 no debate I meant in terms of all of the comments that we have
?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ;
j                          24                  had and the discussions with the ACRS, the Commissioners'
.i 25                  comments themselves, in terms of a lack of agreement in the                                                                                                                                I i
      ..,s...  , . , - . , . . -
                                      ,y, --  -w,-,- .-----+--,,--.g  -y,--,,, . . - - , -n-r-r,,---        ,+,, _ -,, ,,-e,  ~ , - . . , - - -  --
                                                                                                                                                            ,n~,  , . - - , , - - - , , , , . , , , -      -,,v-w..,  ~    s,e,.v-.,    .
 
9
    ,    1 qualitative safety goals thenselves.
2            CQMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:  Those two general 3  state.7ents.
4            MR. STELLO:  The two general statements in terms of 5  a Commission policy are completely free frca debate. The last 6 time that we came here there were comments from the senior 7  staff. They're with me here today, and as the paper reflects, 8  they're satisfied with the way we have come sut in terms of 9 bringing a paper to the Commission for consideration.
1C            We're not trying to get more than to help you.
11  That's our sole and only purpose in preparing this piece of 12  paper. We're not here to say we think now that this matter is 13  finished; you have enough, you can decide it and go away once J
14  and for all. I don't think that that's the issue at all.
* 15            We offered a suggestion that you could, in fact, 16  bifurcate the issue, make the two qualitative statements 17  final, final policy; take the rest of it and try to use it for 18  a while to gain more experience because I don't care what 19  final safety goals you come out with, you're going to be faced 20  with the issue of gaining some experience to truly understand  ,
21  the impact of what all this means. And it needs to be done 22  deliberately and carefully as we take this next step.
23            Now, I'm convinced that if we went with the general 24  framework the.t was in here, it would be very useful to have in 25  terms of getting some experience with it. Maybe that's the
 
      '4 10 t
1    way tc gc.      cr perhaps the way to go is for the Consission to                                                                                        ,
2    raf].ect some more and try to cone with a " final" statement.
4              3    That's the Con =1ssicn's decision.                                  The staff clearly
* 4    understands that, and the only reason we're sitting here today                                                                                          !
L 5    is to help you to the extent we can.                                    We raccgnize all the
;                                                                                                                                                                            {
E    concerns of the individual Comnissioners; it quite frankly is                                                                                            t
                ?    an impossible tack to satisfy all of the comments that have 1                                                                                                                                                                            '
8    baan made on the safety goal.                                  It cannot be done because there 9    are com=ents that say go left and there are other ccaments                                                                                              [
3.0    ttst say go right, and you can't do both.                                                So you clearly have li    got a lot of decisions to make, l
                                                                                                                                                                              \
12              CHAIRMAN PALLADItD:                                Let me ask one question on this                                                            ;
13    bifurcation.      On page 7 you make two statements and I'd like                                                                                        I i
14    to read them and then I'd like to ask you a question.                                                                                              -
15    " Attachment 1 is now structured to permit the Commission to i
l            16    adopt the qualitative s&fety goals as its final policy.                                                                                    These        i
!            17    remain unchanged and in the staff's view are now ready to be                                                                                            !
4 18    published in final forn."
19                If I were to agree with -- if tlle Ccamission were to                                                                                        ,
20    agree with that, what le it that we'd publish?
4 4            21                MR. STELLO:                The two qualitative safety goal 22      statements.
23                CHAIRMAN PALLADINCt                              Well, --
l 24                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTI!iE: But in the package that you                                                                                          t 25      have attached to the paper, there's a whole lot more than                                                                                                i f
        . - . _.  -  .  , -  , -    __ _ . . . _ _ _ ,    - _ , . , . . . ,              . _ , _ . . . . ~ , _ . . - _ , . _ , , . . . . , . - . . . . _ . , _ .      ,.
 
        .  . .- -      . . . - -    .  .  - - . .    . -      -    .        -            . .~  -
    - -                                                                                              r
!'1 11 1    that.
t l-          2                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        Yes, that's right.
3                    COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:          In fact, the matrix is in 2
4      there and some of the other elements as well.
i, 5                    MR. STELLO:      That's because it says that there's
!          6    also a way in which you could use the rest of it in the 7    interim, if you choose to.
I          E                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        But if we wanted to follow your I
9    recommendation on that page, it would be helpful if maybe i
r 10      after this meeting you identified for us what you would                              .
i        11      suggest we publish if we were to approve that recommendation.
j        12      I just wanted to see if we could close that loop and then go                        '
1 J        13      on to --                                                                            t i
;        14                    MR. STEL10:      We'll highlight them.          ,
t
;        15                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        Okay.
;        16                    MR. STELLO:      Now what I was going to suggest is I
/-                                                                                                    i i        17      know there are a lot of detailed, specific areas that the i
)        18      Commissioners individually are interested in, and what I'd i
19      rather do with those is to deal with them with questions, and                        j l        20      if we could have Mr. Sniezek just take -- we think we could                          !
i
{
21      finish in about 15 minutes to give you a very brief overview,
                                                                                                        \
!        22      and then just go into the particular areas for each                                  '
l        23      Commissioner.        And to the extent we can, try to help                          i i
'        24      articulate the reasons and the understanding behind why we t
!        25    proposed what we did and why it's structured the way it is, i
e l                                                                                                      :
 
t 12
,                                          1                So if I could let Mr. Sniezek have just 15 minutes, l                                          2      I think he can go through with a quick thumbnail sketch.
!                                          3                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    All right, let's give it a try.
4                [ Slide.]
5                MR..SNIEZEK:    Basically, the Chairman stole a little 6      bit of my thunder on the history here in his opening remarks.
7                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    I'm sorry, I didn't mean to.
8                MR. SNIEZEK:    But I'll go through it quite quickly.
9                (Laughter.]
10                      Basically, the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, was I
11          really the first real good attempt to use PRA, quantitative 12            analysis and getting to the heart of reactor risk.                            Then in 13            response to the President's Commission on Three Mile Island, 14            the Commission indicated that it was prepared to move forward
* 15            with an explicit policy statement on safety philosophy and the 16            role of safety cost tradeoffs in NRC safety decisions.                          And 17            that's really what started the safety goal concept and 18            process.
19                      That was followed by two public workshops in 1981
)                                    20            which, to a large extent, were based on the work of the ACRS l
l 21            and OPE at that time.      The proposed Safety Goal Policy 22            Statement was then issued for public comment in February 1982, l
i 23            and that was followed by four public meetings in the spring of l                                  24            1982.
I l                                  25                      As a result of the public comments, the Commission
 
13 1                                          issued a revised policy statement in March 1983 and charged 2                                          the staff to launch into the two-year evaluation period of the 3                                            Safety Goal Policy Statement.
4                                                      The Steering Group Report was issued -- that was 5                                            chaired by Dr. Murley -- and received by the Commission for 6                                            information on May 1st, 1985.                At that time, the EDO said that 7                                            after he got staff comments he would come back to the 8                                            Commission with a proposal.
9                                                      After the Steering Group Report was iscued, there 10                                                      were numerous meetings with the ACRS and several meetings with 11                                                      the Commission to describe what was in the Steering Group 12                                                      Report. We got many diverse comments regarding which way the 13                                                      Steering Group should proceed.
i                                                            14                                                                As a result, the EDO took the initiative to develop
* 15                                                      a staff paper which was sent down on February 14th, which laid 16                                                      out the staff's best thinking in this area, taking into 17                                                      account the conments that were received and pointed out the
:                                                            18                                                        direction the way the staff thinks we should be going.
19                                                                  I will mention to the Commission now that on March 20                                                        12 and 13 we are also slated to meet with ACRS to discuss this 21                                                          paper.
22                                                                    (Slide.)
23                                                                    The basic staff conclusions, after reviewing all the 24                                                          comments assimilating the work that was done by the Steering 25                                                          Group are that first, we should issue in final form as the
 
14 1 Commission safety policy two qualitative statements regarding 2  individual and societal risk, and I'll mention those briefly, 3 what they are.
4          The second basic conclusion was that the 5 quantitative objectives and benefit-cost guideline should be 6 eliminated as individually discrete statements. Rather, they 7 should be combined into an integrated matrix which the staff 8 can use as a quantitative measurement of the Commission's 9 qualitative safety goals.
10            (slide.]
11            The two qualitative safety goal statements that the 12  staff has concluded should be issued in final form are the 13  same as they were in the 1983 policy statement as expressed in 14  !TUREG-0880. That is, the individual risk goal -- that        -
15  individual members of the public should be provided a level of 16  protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant 17  operation such that individuals bear no significant additional 18  risk to life and health.
19            The second one pertained to the societal risk goal, 20  that societal risks to life and health through nuclear power 21  plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks 22  of generating electricity by viable competing technologies, 23  and should not be a significant addition to other societal 24  risks.
25            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:  Could I stop you there and
 
15 1 ask a quick question on that broad second statement?    You 2 know, aside from the fact that I think others at this table 3 know that I feel that that really isn't the driving issue 4 before the public in the safety goal, I'm amazed that we can 5 come down with a societal risk goal that would put us, for 6 example, -- allow us to be, for example, -- on an even footing 7 with coal technology when we know that the annual risks, costs 8 and deaths from coal generation thus far appear to be very, 9 very much higher than exist from nuclear power generation or 10 that as far as I know, we imagine might exist from nuclear 11 power generation.
12            Now granted, we're hypothesizing because we've never 13 lost a life as a direct consequence of nuclear power 14  generation; at least not from the operation of commercial      -
15  power plants. How does that square with what we know about 16  the hazards of other technologies?    It seems to  e that we're 17  giving ourselves an awful lot of rope thoro that I'm not sure 18  that society is prepared to accept.
19            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Well, they also add, "and 20  should not be a significant additionto other societal risks."
21            MR. SNIEZEK:  And that is really the controlling 22  one.
23            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:  Well, but you are basically 24  saying that coal, for example, and nuclear -- I don't know, 25  dams are probabilistic, too, because we haven't had a major
 
16 1
1- dam accident, I suppose, at least power-generating dam, but it l
!        2  still sounds like you're putting them on equal footing.      And    .
3  while.that's appealing philosophically, I'm surprised -- it 4  seems to me if you actually worked out the numbers it would 5  come out to be numbers that none of us would be prepared to 6  accept. Is that wrong?
7            MR. STELLO:    Well, the difficulty is what numbers i
4        8  doyou have --
t 9            COMMISSIONER EERNTHAL:    You've got at least several i        10  hundred deaths per year as a direct result of coal electricity      I
.i                                                                                r
!        11  generation, and those are the direct results. Now we've got i
1        12  to talk about indirect.
t 13            MR. STELLO:    Okay. The difficult part of the i        14  equation is the health effects from operating coal-fired          -
[
1 l        15  plants.
16            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    That's the indirect, right.
)        17            MR. STELLO:    And as I recall, there's only one study    :
I
)
18  that I recall we did, it was at Oak Ridge -- Harold,'do you
!        19  remember? -- and the results of that showed that including
}        20  effects of accidents and everything at nuclear plants, that      -
4
;        21  goal plants were -- depending on how you did health effects --      ;
i 22  from 20 to 1000 times mere hazardous, depending on how you did
!        23  the health effects.
1 24            COMMISS.IONER BERNTHAL:  That's precisely my point, 25            MR. STELLO:    But that's only one study that's done,      '
i
 
                                      )-
17
                                  ~
1 and that's the point you're trying to make.
2            But you want to suggest that nuclear plants ought 3 to be safer, and the study that we have says that they're 4 already 20 to 1000 times more safer, then --
5            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    But we're talking about the 6 goal we're going to set.                                                                  '
7            MR. STELLO:    I understand that.                But they get into 1
8 the quantitative side of it, and how you calculate that, and 9 that's more difficult.      But do y'ou want to suggest that what 10  we ought to do is say an order of magnitude greater or 11  whatever -- the only other viable option to generating 12  electricity today is coal, and if you're looking at options 13  relative to them, should that option be comparable to, better 14  than, and how much better?                                                              -
15            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Let me put it in simpler 1C  terms. It's a matter of public perception.                    Leave the numbers 17  aside. I do net believe that the public will accept nuclear
;          18  generation that produces 3t0 deaths a year obviously, and in 19  the case of coal from mining and accidents involving 20  transportation, whatnot -- those are rough numbers;,they're ,                          ,
l          21  on the order of a few, one, two, three hundred, I don't know 22  what the latest numbers are -- plus all of the latent health 5                                              -
      . . 23  effects or indirect health' effects.
i 24            While it might seem reasonable that we should set a 25  similar.standardsincesocihtyacceptsthat, what I'm saying (r                      i  _
 
                                                                              -              18 1      is I do not believe that society today will accept that for 2      nuclear power.        And therefore, making a statement that puts 3      them on the same footing, while it sounds nice I think that 4      ain't gonna work, I don't think society will accept that l        -5      today.      And all you have to do is look at the numbers.                    You've 6      got to look at the numbers for other power generation sources.                                  '
7                    Now, if the Commission or you believe that we're 8      ready to stand up and say that yes, we're willing to accept 9      that general risk, that's something that we've never said 10      before.
11                      CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  But we have several caveats in 4      12      there, and then at least in the first step on the 13      quantification of these goals we talk about one-tenth of 1 14      percent of all the risks from other activities.                      I think we                -
15      do bound it eventually, although I see your point on the 16      comparability.
i 17                    COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        Yes, the tenth a percent is 18      arbitrary, though, I think.
19                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  I appreciate that, but.at least
: 20.      it's --
21                    COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        And it is at least a 1
22      perception, which I think is the right way to go.                      I think'--
23      I would be delighted if I honestly thought that we were~all so 24      rational that we would accept all risks based on numerology.
,      25      I don't think that we're all that rational yet; I think j
l l
w                w        a            - -  ,  -        , - ,      nn-+ e-e- ,    we v  - -  ,-      m
 
19 1 society is simply not prepared to accept exactly the same 2 risks as are today demonstrable from other power generation 3 sources, and apply those risks to nuclear --
4            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    But let me go back. In many of 5  the workshops, some of the early work particularly, there was 6 real debate as to whether or not we should require that the 7  risks be lower. After all, there were some people who felt 8 that we certainly ought not to work real hard to get lower 9 than what the comparable risks are from other forms of 10  generation. So this came out, well it should be comparable to 11  or less than, and I think that encompasses the scope of at 12  least some of the early thinking I remember on this subject.
13            Other people said, oh, well there's no sense trying 14  to get it better. This eventually led to "do it at least as
* 15  well, do it less, and in any event, don't make it a 16  significant addition to the other societal risks."
17            Now, if we want to start by saying well, we want to 18  now change it, and " eliminate" should be " comparable to" and 19  just say "should be less than," we can do it.        But I think 20 you're going to get a lot of people who will argue on that ,        ,
21  anyhow.
22            MR. DENTON:  I think I might add a little bit to the 1
23  history of this. We responded to the Jeanine Honiker petition 24  several years ago that raised the question about comparable
,    25  health effects, and I think we've always concluded in-those
 
20 4
1  studies that the risk of reactors are less than coal, even 2    including the uncertainties about reactor accidents.
4 3              However, you have to be aware that coal is 4    improving, and does the coal come from deep mines or strip 3
5  mines, and there's a difference in health effects for that.
6  There are the transportation risks from coal, train' accidents 4
7  and so forth. And then there was a lot of uncertainty over 8  the health effects from coal pollutants and what was EPA going 9  to ultimately require and what would those things be.
10                  But even taking all that into account, I think the 11      staff conclusion in most of its environmental impact i
12      statements was the health effects of nuclear. power were less 13      than coal, although it was very hard to quantify because we P
.,      14      couldn't say that much about coal.                                                                            -
15                  COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                            Well, I agree, Harold, and t
16      the question is then -- I don't think we have to work hard at 17      doing considerably better.          I think the term you used was work
.        18      hard at it, Joe. I don't think you have to, and I think that 19      setting a goal that is considerably better is what we're 20      already doing today, and we should say so.                                              ~
That's the problem
<        21      that I have --
22-                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                So you're suggesting that1we i
l        23      reconsider our qualitative statement and perhaps revise it.
24                  COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                            I'm troubled by saying in i
25      stark terms that this body has said as a matter of policy that f
k                                                                                                                              b
 
1  we'd like to be better than other power-generating sources but
* l 2  we don't have to be, in the fact of, for example, the MIT 3  study that was just finished -- I believe it was MIT if I'm 4  not mixing up my blue ribbon institutions here -- on the 5  hazards of coal generation, monetary and health.                  I may have 6  the wrong institution.
7              MR. DENTON:        The coal does have a lot; it has a 8  billion dollars in black lung disease.                  And when you add up a        9  those kind of health effects, I guess the point you're making 10  is do you want to say that they should be comparable, or are l      11  you saying should it be less than..                                                                                      '
12              COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                Or should they be what we 13  already believe that we do today.
14              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        But this doesn't say it should                                                  -
i j      15  be comparable to coal.
l 16              COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                That's the way I read it.
l 17              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        No, just read it.          It says, 18  "should be comparable to or less than the risk..." --
19              COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                That's the limit. It's the 20  limit that --
!      21              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        No.          In some cases we want it 22  less and in some cases we're willing to be comparable.                              I 23  don't know the risks of hydro, but let me assume that they're 24  less than the risks from coal, and maybe for those we'd be 25  satisfied with comparable, whereas for coal we would only be 4
 
22 1 satisfied with less.
2              But as soon as you start to say "only less than" 3 then you're going to get into how much less than.          And I think 4 in the end, what is controlling is that it should not be a 5 significant addition to other societal risks.      But if you want 4
6 to open it up for revision, I guess then we wouldn't even be 7 prepared to take the first step.
8            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    I have less trouble with the 9 last statement because that's essentially -- the "significant
<      10 addition to other societal risks" -- because that's 11 essentially the same statement as the first on the individual 12 risk goal.      I am troubled by this -- Joe, if you'say "less 13 than or equal to," as you know, then as a practical matter our 14 policy becomes equal to, because no one is going to say that            -
15 -- or no one will try to do better if we've said as a matter 16 of policy that just doing as well is good enough.          And that's 17 what we're saying there.
18            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Well nc, I wasn't trying to 19 draw any conclusion; I was trying to point out that this has 20 room for interpretation.      However, if you'd like to suggest
;      21 that we revise it, the Commission certainly ought to consider 22 that suggestion.
i      23            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Well,.I've beat the horse 24 long enough.
25            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Well no,-it is a very important
 
23 1  point,. Fred, and I don't want you necessarily to drop it.
2  Just saying okay, you've raised an important point; it might 3  be helpful if you suggested what you would put in place of it 4  and then have the Commission consider it.
5                    COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:          I agree with you, Fred, I 6  think it is a point worth considering, and I take it, Jim, 7  from what you said earlier, at least as far as the societal 8  risks goal,-the comparison to other technologies was not the
                .9  controlling element of that goal.
9 10                      MR. SNIEZEK:      And there's no quantification that' 1
l              11    we're using in the matrix or anyplace regarding that it's 12    relative to the other societal risks.
13                      COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:        What assumptions had you 14      made in terms of what were viable competing technologies?                                            Was  -
15      it just coal?
r 16                        MR. SNIEZEK:    There haven't been any studies done.
I            17      We went to the National Science Foundation several years ago 18      to ask them to do a study and they elected not to.                              Then it-19      came back to the Commission and the Commission directed us not 20      to do a study to compare, and so - -
a                                                                                                                          .  .
,            21                        COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:        And is $15 a barrel oil a i
22      viable competing technology?              I don't know.
23                        MR. DENTON:      We tend to do this in the environmental 4
24      impact statements, and at one time we considered a wide 25      variety of options, but it usually comes down the only ones
 
24 1      for central power station comparisons'was coal.        So if hydro 4
2      was cheaper they went ahead and built the hydro and you never 3      got a nuclear application.      So it only ended up where 4      applications came in where coal was the option.
5                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:    Yes. I'd be a little 6      leery about saying that we're going to ensure that the risks 7      are comparable, say, to low head hydro.        You may have a tough 8      time if you start comparing those kinds of risks.                        .
9                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    That's just not a viable --
10                MR. STELLO:    Yes, but there.are a lot of dams that 11      are hydro dams.      If you look at the study that I think 12      Dr. Okrent sponsored, the hazards for those are not 13      inconsequential, i
14                MR. MALSCH:    I think you're raising one issue that I      -
15      remember from reading all these environmental impact 16      statements and that is, to what extent you need to look at the 17      comparative costs or impacts of energy conservation.        This is 18      deliberately structured to compare nuclear power plants 19      against generating electricity, and not to compare it against
;    20      energy conservation.
21                I recall from the old NEPA impact studies, that 22      raised all kinds of interesting questions about how you do a 23      comparative evaluation of generating versus energy 24      conservation.
25                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      Well, with radon and
 
25 1 ultra-tight -- we definitely have a different picture today.
2          MR. STELLO:  Yes. There was a study done on 3 conservation and it turns out that it's one of the largest 4 health hazards the country faces. Yet they do, in fact, meet 5 the conservation standards for leak-tightness and insulation 6 in homes.
7          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Look, very broadly, -- I'll 8 stop talking in 30 seconds -- the point I'm trying to make is 9 not pro-nuclear, it's not anti-nuclear, and I want to make 10 that very clear. It is that we already are doing very well in 11 my judgment in overall safety of operation, so why as a matter 12 of policy pretend to set a standard that I believe we can 13 easily do considerably better when we c'ompare it with that 14 standard. That's the point I'm trying to make.                        - 1 15          MR. STELLO:  Well, let me first say that I thought 16 that we could safely say that these were areas for which there 17 was not a controversy.
18          [ Laughter.]
19          Let me retract that --
20          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:    This job is full of 21 surprises.
22          HR. SIELLO:  At least based on the public comment 23 and the comments we've had from everyone else, this has gone 24 down reasonably well.
25          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  But let me make a suggestion,
 
1 26      l 1 Fred. I really think you ought to pursue your point with the 2 Commission by making any suggestions you have so that we can 3 really reflect on it, as we reflect on other aspects of safety 4 goal.
5            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    The question to ask yourself 6 basically is how many TMIs can you permit in 10 years.      That's 7 really the bottom line question, and that's the thing the 8 public is going to understand.
9            COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:    What you may be talking 10 about is a third qualitative goal; a goal that truly is 11 controlling and that truly addresses the risk that the public 12 is concerned about. And I agree with you; that's the nail.
13            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    As I recall, I remember the 14 importance of that final statement, "and should not be a            -
15 significant addition to other societal risks."      But I do agree 16 we might be able to revise the statement to better capture 17 your point, and I suggest we try it.
18          . COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    You see, we think we're not 19 being quantitative, but believe me, when you make a~ statement 20 like that, there are folks who are going to run cut and get      ,
21 quantitative very quickly based on that statement and come 22 back with the numbers to show that we are proposing something 23 that I doubt very many people will be willing to accept.
24            MR. STELLO:  No, they can't do that because the next 25 page when we turn it gives you the quantitative approach to
 
27 1 your safety goal definition in that matrix. And if someone 2  wants to make any comparison in the quantitative sense, that 3 would be the Commission then saying they have taken these 4  goals and in fact -- the argument you're making is that they 5  are, in fact, less, significantly less, if you comply with 6 these goals as set forth in the next page. And that's really 7  where the controversy is; the extent to which you are 8  requiring safety of the facility in terms of setting specific 9  numbers -- that's the matrix.
10          This is -- I think the public generally understood 11  and accepted this as a reasonable policy of the Commission in 12  regulation. The controversy starts when we flip the page and 13  go to the matrix --
14          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:    How do you translate it.            '
15          MR. STELLO:  And that's where it really is. And I-16  don't really care what yea put here. You're not going to 17  change, in any way, shape or form, what you're going to deal 18  with in the next page. It's where the numbers come into 19  being.
20          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    But there are other numbers, 21  and I was going to ask you a question before you turn the 22  page. These qualitative safety goals are supplemented by 23  statements that said that the risk of prompt deaths shall not        .
24  be greater than one-tenth of 1 percent from all other sources, 25  and then the societal not being greater than one-tenth of 1 l    .
l
 
        ..                                                                                                              l 28                      I l
1  percent. And I was wondering where they fit in.              Are they-
.                  2  supplements to the qualitative?      Are they --
3            MR. STELLO:    We're going to get --
4            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Well, I would expect, unless 5-  you tell me differently, that those haven't changed, those two 6    goals haven't changed either.
7            COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:        Well, they've changed some 8    I think in terms of how you measure -- certain2y, the 4
9    distances, those things --
10            MR. SNIEZEK:    The next two slides will cover that.
11            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    No, just the two statements 12    where you talk about one-tenth of 1 percent.        I don't think 13    you've changed that.
14            MR. STELLO:    The next two slides cover it.              Again,          -
4 15    let me set a stage that I think is important.        What we have 16    the Commission -- or are suggesting that the Commission 17    consider is having qualitative goals and then rather than 4
18    having numbers appear anywhere else, that-the only suggestion 19    in a quantitative sense you have is the matrix itself. -And 20    that's.where you'll see the particular numbers come in again.
21    And not present them in any isolated form.
22            (slide.)
23            MR. SNIEZEK:    I want to reiterate'that-the second 24    staff conclusion was that the quantitative objects and l
25    benefit-cost gui'deline should be eliminated as individually C%
  ~ _      .-      -        ~          ,  ,,    _ _      -            , , - - .        --    --.
 
29 4
1        discrete statements or safety goals; rather, that they should 2      be combined into the matrix which the staff can use as a 3          quantitative measurement-of the Commission's qualitative 4          safety goals.
5                              Let's take a look'at that matrix.              And I will i          6        axplain it here briefly.                        Basically, this is how the staff 7      would measure whether or not the Commission's qualitative 8        safety goals are being met.                        There are three basic parameters 4
9      that are listed in this matrix.                            One is large-scale core melt 10          frequency, the health effects both prompt and latent, and 11        cost-benefit.
12                              If you take a look at the bottom of the matrix, we 13        have essentially established a limit below which we would not 14        expect plants to operate.                          And that is, if.you had a core melt              -
15        frequency greater than'10 to the minus 3 per year and you did
}        16        not meet one or more of the health effects, it would have to 17        be fixed and cost would be no linit.
.        18                              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:            Now, what is the health effects
,        19        that ycu're not meeting?                        Is that the one-tenth of 1 percent?
4                                                                                                                              1 20                              MR. SNIEZEK:        Yes, and they're on the next slide 21        which I will define very specifically.
22                              (Slide.]
4 i
23                              The specific parameters with respect to the matrix.
24        Health effects, you have the prompt fatality risk, and that 25        is,        "
The risk to an average individual in-the vicinity of a w                                  p p e %  -q --e  e tw'- t  w  = --
evwi' s-  -+re--+        y  - -
* m -  - aree    -m-      ,y-
 
30 1    nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result 2      from reactor accidents does not exceed one-tenth of 1 percent 3    of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other 4    accidents to which members of the U.S. population are 5    generally exposed."
6                That reads the same as it did previously, and that 7    is 5 times 10 to the minus 7,    is what that number would come 8    out to be.
9                Latent cancer factality risk.    "The-risk to the 10      population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer j      11      fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant 12      operation does not exceed one-tenth of 1 percent of the sum of 13      cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes."        And 14      that reads the way it did previously.                                  -
15                Commissioner Asselstine mentioned before it is being 16      calculated somewhat differently; it's being calculated i
17      somewhat more conservatively now than it was originally.        Went 18      from 50 miles to 10 miles for calculating the average.
19                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  But these are the two I was 20      thinking about.
21                MR. SNIEZEK:  Those are the two.
22                                                                              !
MR. STELLO:  And they remain unchanged.
23                . COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:  And there's a little 24      change on prompt. fatality, wasn't there?
25                MR. SNIEZEK:  Very little. Yes, you assume a person
 
31 1  lives within one mile if no one does exist there.
2            The large-scale core melt frequency is expressed 3  differently.    "The likelihood of a nuclear reactor accident 4  that results in a large-scale core melt is allowed to vary."
5  The impetus to improve the core melt frequency is dependent 4
6  upon how much the frequency is greater than 10 to the minus 5 7  per reactor year and the status of the health effects.
8            The benefit-cost guideline has changed. It is now, 9  "The benefit of an incremental reduction of mortality risks 10  and in the frequency of large-scale core melt accidents is 4
11  compared with the associated costs on the basis of $1000 per 12  person-rem averted, plus a percentage of the on-site, 13  including economic, costs averted."
14            [ Slide.]                                               -
i 15          Again, looking at the bottom of the matrix, "If the 16  core melt frequency is greater than 10 to the minus 3 and one 17  of the two health effects are not met, then it must be fixed 18  and cost is no limit."    So we could say that in the staff's 19 measurement of the Combission's qualitative safety goal, they 20 have set a limit below which a licensee would not be allowed.
21  to go.
22            Looking at the top of the matrix, you could call 23 that a de minimis level up there, and that is, if a 24  large-scale core melt frequency is less than 10 to the minus 5 25 per reactor year and you meet-both health effects, there are      -
 
32 l
1    no other safety improvements that must be made to that
          -  2    facility. The staff would be finished.
3              And again, on the top of the scale, that is the 4    standard that we would expect new plants to meet, new 5
standardized designs and new plants to meet.
6              In between the 10 to the minus 3 core melt level and 7    the 10 to the minus 5' core melt level we have-applied an ALARA 8    type approach to try to drive the core melt frequency, or give 9    an incentive to drive the gore melt frequency lower.
10              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      But Jim, one of the problems I 11  wanted to ask you about -- if you look at those two middle 12  boxes they have thc same answer regardless of whether_you are 13    10 to the minus 3 to 10 to the minus 4, or 10 to the minus 4                '
14    to 10 to the minus 5. At least it appears as though you're            -
15  using the same --
16              MR. SNIEZEK:    No, no, they would have the same 17    answer if you did meet one of the health effects.
18              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      I meant for one of the health 19  effects.
20              MR. SNIEZEK:    And tha- is putting the emphasis on i
21  the health effects.      If you don't meet a health effect, we put 22    that as a priority consideration and you have to take greater
      . 23    action to correct it.
24              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      But you've got to take just as 25    great an action with one core melt frequency as with the
              , --g              -
                                        ,      , , , y            ,
e - --,
 
33 1 ,
other.
2            MR. STELLO:  Yes. What that is saying is that our 3  philosophy of regulation is that we.are interested in the 4  health and safety of the public, which is the amount of 5  radiation that they're receiving.      And if they are not meeting 6  our goals with precluding the amount of regulation you get 7  out, albeit with different likelihood, that that ought to get 8  significantly more emphasis for creating an environment to 9  fix than for the case where they are still with that same 10    frequency, however they meet the health effects.      You want to 11    clearly see a difference.
12            That is to say, we're more concerned if a plant does 13    not meet the health effects at the same probability than we 14    are with a plant that meets the health effects.      You want a    -
15    difference; you want to articulate philosophically a 16    difference between the two plants.
      '17            Let's take a case. Plant A, 10 to the minus 4 core 18    melt frequency, does not meet health effects.      Plant B, 10 to 19    the minus 4 in frequency but meets health effects.      You want 20    the plant that does not meet it to have to do more than the 21    plant that doesn't meet.
22            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    I wasn't objecting to that.      I 1
23    was just looking that no matter how close I get, -- there's a 24    big step change in what I've got to spend.      That's what I was 25    trying to get at.
 
34 1              MR. STELLO: 'Not if.you don't meet the health 2      effects. The only time you'get a real big step change is when you go up to less than 10 to the minus 4. ^ That says now the 3
4      frequency is so low that even the health effects is not a E      major concern anymore, but still some impetus there if you did 6      meet them but far less because the frequency is now so low.
7      So it's saying that when I get up to that end, as regulators 8      we're really not getting too concerned anymore.
9                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        Just as a reference point, 10      what do we call TMI these days?        Is that called a large-scale 11      core melt?    Small-scale core melt?
12                MR. ROSS:    Core damage.
13                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        I see. So suppose I change 14      the heading on that lefthand column there, what would the                ,
15      nuncers look like?    Changed it to TMI event.
16                MR. STELLO:        Well, the way you do the calculations 17      today, it would come out to be one and the same.
18                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        They would.
19                MR. STELLO:        Yes, you can't make the distinction 20      today in technology beuteen --
21                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        Okay, that's what I wanted 22      to know.
23                MR. STELLO:        -- between one and the other.
24                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:        But the policy statement 25      says that as soon as you make that distinction, then you're
 
m 35~
1    going to go-to the large-scale core melt.                    That's what you're 2    looking at as opposed to more TMIs.
3                    MR. STELLO:- That's correct.          If they can develop 4    the technology to allow them to make that distinction,' it 5      invites the industry to try to develop the methodology.                                    And 6    if they did, we're back to the discussion we had that there's                                                  ;
7    at least an expectation that there's anywhere from a factor of                                                  '
8    I think 2 to 8, 2 to 10 expected difference between the two, 9    if you were able to make the distinction.                    But because we                                    I 10    can't we say you have to do the calculations today without 11    being able to take credit for them.
12                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Let me pursue my questien just 13    one more minute.        I heard your comments but I don't want to                                              -
14    buy them too quickly.                                                                                        .
15                    Let me look at 10 to the minus -- something between 16    10 to the minus 5 and 10 to the minus~4, and then look at                                                        .
17    something between 10 to the minus 3 and 10 to the minus 4.                                      If              .
18    I don't meet the health effects, it says I've got to spend a        19    just as much money in one case as if I had another case that a
!        20    had a better core melt frequency.          And I say even though in 21    both cases you might violate the health effects, still in one 22    case the probability of-violating those health effects is l        23    perhaps an order of magnitude less than the probability of 24    -violating it in the other case.          So why should-you have to                                              l 25    spend the same amount of money in either case?                                                                  -,
  - -        y            , - .            ,      ,  ,,      ,------...---w    -,-- ,, , -
                                                                                              --..,.-_-_,,y        ,..-,_.y 36      'I l
1          In other words, I was looking at 100 percent                  ,
l 2 averted on-site costs in both cases.
3          HR. SNIEZEK:    Let me show you that on the slide in 4 actual calculations that have been done, Mr. Chairman.
5          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      All right. Maybe I'll 6 understand. Well one of my questions that I will ask later is d
7 how do you calculated averted cn-site cocts, so if you're 8 going to that, that's consistent with both questions, 9          KR. SNIZZEK:    Please put up backup slide number 20.
10          [ Slide.]
11          What this was reant to do was to show the i
12  . sensitivity to sits population but will also show you the 13  difference in the melt frequency.        If you look on the lefthand 14  sido -- let's just take SST 1, and let's look at where the          .
15  health effects goals are not net.        That is the cross-hatched 16  area; the 3 times 10 to the ninus 5 probability of core melt,          ;
17  and look at the betten part of the cross-hatch for the SST 1,          ;
18            That happens --
19            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      SST always meant something 20  else to me. What does SST mean?
21            MR. SNIEZEK:    SST 1 is the worst case accident, i
22  That is for the same site there en the bottom of that, if you 23  look at 3 times 10 to the minus 4 at the bottom of the SST 1, 24  you will see that jumped up; there's going to be nore noney 25  available to make that fix.
 
                  "~
.p      .
1              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  I'm sorry, I haven't picked up 2    yet. Where's.10 to the minus-4?
3              MR. SNIEZEK:  Three times 10 to the'minus 4, that's 4    the middle group.
            .5              MR. STELLO:  The middle. group is 3 times 10 to the
,            6    minus 4.
7              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Okay. Now what.about it?
8              MR. SNIEZEK.: -If you look at the bottom part of the 9-    cross-hatched area for SST 1, at 3 times 10 to the minus 4, 10    and compare that to the bottom cross-hatch on SST 1 for'3 11    times 10 to the minus'S to the left, you'll see there is a.
12    difference in cost when you calculate it out.
13              CHAIRMIJT PALLADINO:  Well you see, the table didn't-14    seem to give any difference and that's what I was looking.for.    -
15              MR, SNIEZEK:  Right. And~then if you look at --
16              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Well, should'this table say' 17    times probability of occurrence?
18              MR. SNIEZEK:  That's in the calculations.
19              CHAIRMAN'PALLADINO:  All right. Well, that's one of    f 00    the problems I had. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to divert you; 21    you have answered my question. So there is a difference, but 22    it doesn't show up.on this. table because-of the way it's-23    calculated.
24              MR. SNIEZEK:  Put up slide number'18.
25              [ Slide.]
 
33 l
          'l                  That is the actual calculations, or the formula that' 2    was used for calculating the cost.                              For the total averted cost l                                                                                                                          [
i                                                                                                                          .
3    is equal to A F plus B; where A is equal to averted on-site i
j          4    costs we took~3.7 times 10 to the 9, and that's the dollars
[          5-    that the Steering Group projected for the TMI.
4                                                                                                                          :
6                  The 17.29 is the present' worth factor.                                                      ;
7                  CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        Yes, that's what I don't j          8    understand.              Why should I multiply the averted costs by 17 if 9    the cost is 3.7, because this plant, the. older it gets -- and                                            :
i                                                                                                                          :
l        10      you say you discount this over 40 years -- in principle, the
.                                                                                                                          r 11      older this plant gets the less valuable it is, and eventually 12      the averted cost goes to zero.                                                                            ,
13                  MR. SNIEZEK:                        That is correct.
I 14                    CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        But why do you multiply it by l                                                                                                                      .
l 1                                                                                                                          ,
i        15      17 to reflect 30 years of life?
I                                                                                                                          i 16                  MR. SNIEZEK:                        The 17.29 reflects 30 years remaining 17      lifetime at a 4 percent discount rate.                                                                    '
18                  CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        So what does that have to do-                    e i                                                                                                                          I 19      with-the price of apples here?                                                                            ;
t t
,        20                  MR. STELLO:                  Well, thatVs roughly where the plants                          ,
21    .are today; roughly with about 30 years on the average left to 22      go. If you're doing an individual plant, than it's whatever                                            l l        23      that. plant is.                                                                                          *
!                                                                                                                  ~
i        24                  CRAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        I still don't follow you.
I j-        25                  MR. STELLO:                  If the plant only has two years left,-                        ,
t e
              ,                , _ . _ _ _  .--..-y--.g *f - , --.                      y          , ,        <
 
c -      .
[
39 1        then you don't use 17.29; you'd use the actual number for the
{
2        plant.
I i
l            3                        MR. SNIEZEK:            If it has.two years left, the factor 4        would be 1.886.                                                                                                        #
F i
5                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                  Yes, but I don't know-when the i
,            6        accident is going to happen.                        It may never happen.
,            7                      MR. STELLO:            Yes, but if the plant is only gong to
            '8        operate two more years and then you're doing a calculation to i            9        decide whether it ought to be changed, then you use the actual                                                          ;
l          10        remaining lifetime and the factor is not 17.29 but roughly, 1
2 11          1.1, or whatever.
i 12                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                  So you're saying I've got to 4
13          put more money aside today --
t          14                        MR. STZLLO:          No, no, no.                                                                      .
i                                                                                                                                              ,
15                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                Well, that's --                                                      !
16
;                                    COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                  If you've got a plant 17          that's got a long remaining operating life and you see a lower li        18          -- or a higher accident risk, you're going to spend more for                                                            i j          .19        that plant than if you had the same risk but a plant that's                                                            !
i                                                                                                                                              '
20          only going.to run for two more years.
21                        MR. SIELID:          Right.        That's the difference.                    You-22          want to take into account the remaining lifetime of the plant 4
23          in deciding how much money ought to be spent.                                    For the average j          24          plant, typically 30 years, and if you're doing the calculation j          25          today you'd use 17.29.                  But if you took a plant that was going i
 
40 1              to cperate only five more, years, then you'd pick its 2              appropriate factor.
3                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Well, let me tell you my 4              simplistic view, and I'm not sure I'll get the numbers right.'
5              Let me use 4 instead of 3.7.      Let's assume it cost 4 times 10 6              to the 9. I'm going to assumo I have 30 years life, and I 7              have a core melt frequency of 10 to the minus 4, let me say.
8              So now that's 3 times 10 to the minus 3, times 4 times 10 to' 9              the 9, and that gives me $12 million I'can spend per year.
10                        COMMISSIONER ASSELETINE:            No.
11                        XR. STELLO:  No, no. Total.                                          '
12                        COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:          Total,  That's all you                ,
13              ever spend.
14                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    No, because my risk is 10 to                    .
15              the minus 4 per reactor year,                                                      1 16                        MR. STELLO:  But you multiplied it by number of 17              years; that's what 17 is.
18                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    I just did it myself; I did 30 19              times 4, times 10 to the minus 4.            And I said that comes out 20              that I can spend $12 million -- no, you're right.              $12 Dillion 21              total. Yes, thank you. I forgot I multiplied.
i 22                        COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:          nce you've spent the-$12                l 4                                                                                                              l 23              million that's it.
l 24                        CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Yes, but now this is going to                      I l
25              give me much bigger numbers, and that's what I don't                                ;
l i
I 1
 
41 i
1  understand.        The averted costs --
2              MR. SNIEZEK:    You also have the probability of core 3 melt in there.
4              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      What's that?
l      5              MR. SNIEZEK:      The probability of core melt goes in 6  there, also, which is 10 to the minus some number --
7              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      I just don't follow the 17.2, 8    and I understand present worth but I don't see what it has to 9  do with this calculation.
10            MR. SNIEZEK:      The 17.29 takes into account the 11  discount rate also.
12              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      But what's wrong with what I 13 did?    It doesn't have a 17.29, and it takes 30 years times the 14  probability of the core melt times the $4 billion plant, and                            ,
;    15  that gives I can spend $12 million.
16            Now, this is going to give me something bigger, I'm 17  sure, and it icoks like 17 timas bigger and I didn't l
18 understand that.
1                                                                                                  .
19            MR. SNIEZEK:      That8s    17, isn't it?                                    !
20            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        That's what I meant when I said 21  1 hadn't even understood this well enough to be sure of the 22 questions I wanted to ask.
23            COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL:        You know, one of the 24 problems it seems to me that is contiibuting to'this 25 successive complexity -- and frankly, I'm not sure that this I
l
 
42 1  Commission should try and dig through all of these details.        I 2  would prefer to see ACRS either be the reviewing body on what 3  I basically see as the implementing details.
4            What the staff is talking about here is the standard 5  to which, as I understand it, an individual plant will be 6  held, and how they are going to go out and implement what 7  ought to be a broad Commission policy goal --
8            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    I agree.
9            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      -- for the universe of 10  plants. And you know, I think we're going to obfuscate this 11  issue to the point where we will never reach any decisions, 12  and what we ought to be looking at is what the few real issues t
13  are for the universe of plants out there,_and let them worry 14  about the --                                                        ,
15            CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    Excuse me. One of the reasons 16  I said I debated postponing this meeting was I don't want to 17  waste a lot of Commission time trying to understand this 18  issue. I could get a tutorial on this, but nevertheless, 19  since it came up I couldn't help but ask the question because 20  it's one of the places I was focusing on trying to understand 21  the implications of all the things we're doing.
i 22            So I'll come back to the staff and try to understand 23  it, and if I don't understand it then I will press my point i
24  further. But I've got to admit, I can't see why we're doing
;    25  it this way when the right way seems to me to be the way I
 
                          ~
                                                                                                                                                      '43 j
1    : described it..                                                                                                                                                    ,
t 2                  COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                                      I am pleased to have some                                                  .
: i.        3      company; you are close tx> wasting as much time as I did, Joe,                                                                                                    ,
4      so you make me feel better.                                                                                                                                        ;
a 5                  (Laughter.)                                                                                                                                          ,
6                  CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                                            If I get one glimmer of
!          7      understanding, it will not have been a waste of time.                                                                                                              ,
8                  COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                                    But can I ask a simple 9      question of either the Commission or the staff?                                                                      Can you give 10      me a list of what the fundamental policy issues are here?                                                                                I                        ,
1
]        11      mean, let me give you an example.                                                                                                                                  .
t 12                  It's~ clear that averted on-site cost is a 13      fundamental policy issue that the Commission needs to decida 14      something on.                  What else?                                                                                                                      .
15                MR. STELLO:                      How to implement the qualitative goals.
16                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                                      I don't agree with that.
?        17      Fundamental policy issuesLfor the universe of plants --
                                          ~
t 18                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                                                      How often are we prepared 19      to tolerate (a) accidents like TMI, and (b)-accidents that 1
20      have the potential to harm members of the public; kill them.
21                  CCMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                                      Okay, I'll buy that. . Any i
22      other fundamental policy issues?                                                                                                                                    !
23                COMMISSIONER ZECH:                                          The whole safety goal business, 24      as far as I'm concerned, is based on public health and safety                                                                                                        }
25      and societal risks.                        That's really what we ought to be l
l
    ..      , .    - , ,  .,                  ~ , , - . . -  , - , , . . . - , . _ _ _ _ - . , _ , , ,              , _ , _ _ ,      - . _ , . ~ .; 4  r _ . _ r .. . - . .
 
44 1 focusing on entirely, as far as I'm concerned.                  Even some of 2 these other things -- averted plant costs and core melt -- are 3 very important and certainly heavy considerations, but what 4 we're really talking about is public health and safety.                        How j        5 is.the public safety involved in nuclear power plant j        6 cperations,      And I think that's very important that we focus 7 on that.
8          That's why I think that the qualitative words they                                                -
9 have come up with are reasonably good, perhaps can be refinad, 10 but I'm ready to generally accept what they've come up with.
11 And it's been reviewed so many times.
12          And also, I do think, though, that even the                                                      '
13 quantitative, one-tenth of 1 percent numbers, make sense.
14 They'va also been reviewed.      And to me, we should focus on                                        .
15 what is the public -- what is the safety goal for the public.
16 And those to me are the policy issues that are so primary that 17 the others should be reviewed separately, as far as I'm -
18 concerned.
19          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      Yes, I basically agree with 20 vhat you're saying., and it sounds to me like you're saying 21  that if we set a health objective -- and that ultimately I t
      - 22 think means a number; we can talk qualitative if we like, but 23  it's going to nean a number somewhere --
l 24            COMMISSIONER ZECH:    Yes.                                                                      :
i 25            COMMISSIONER,BERUTEAL:      That's the essence of the t
            .,,c. s.      -    -,-          -    w  -  -a - +-,~.-, , , -      ,.v,-e      w- , - -- , - ,,..
 
I 45                      1 l
1- decision.                                                                                                                                  '
2              ~ COMMISSIONER ZECH:                      I,think so.                  That's the public 3  health and safety is what we're talking about.
4                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                          As you know, I feel rather 5  strongly there's at least one other one, and maybe averted 6  on-site cost isn't that fundEmental.                                    But I think there's an 7  importantissueandthat'sh$woftenyou'regoingtoleta.TMI 8  occur, as a matter of policy.
9                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: ^Even if it doesn't hurt 10  anybody offsite.
11                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                          Absolutely [                              EvenLif it 12  doesn't hurt anybody, that's right, because that's the 13  question then of whether you're going to fulfill, we're gcing 14  to fulfill the congressional mandate to preserve this option.                                                                          .
15              COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                          That's right.
16              COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                          And if you get a TMI every 17  10 years, we will not preserve the option.
18              COMMISSIONER ZECH:                      It's a very important question, 19  there's no question about it, but in a sense, it certainly, 20  although it's a great public interest and public concern,                                                                              i 21  public perception,-it could even be crucial to the viable
* L 22  industry, you're right. lOn the other hand, public health and
,    23  safety is what we ought to focus on, in my judgment, when-                                                                                ;
24  we're trying to establish a safety goal.                                          And I think that we 25  should try to focus on that very important point.
D                          i i                                          l 1
l
 
46 1          . COMMISSIONER ~BERNTHAL:      Well, there's no question 2 that as a matter of fundamental policy you're absolutely 3 right. I'm troubled by that other component.
4          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      But we started off with my 5 question and I'd like to stick to my question for a while.
,          6            [ Laughter.]
7          I don't understand what you're putting up there and 8 why you do what you do.      I'm not going to take your time to 9 try to get you to explain it today because sometimes I'm 10 thickheaded and need time to absorb it.          But can we-arrange 11 for you to do it in a smaller group, and I welcome anybody who 12 wants to sit in so that they can learn as much as I do.
13          MR. STELLO:      Fine.
14          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      Now go ahead -- and I agree              .
15 there are policy questions and the fact that we raise them 16 doesn't mean we necessarily solve them, but I think we ought 17 to identify the policy questions.
18          MR. STELLO:      Well, I haven't the vaguest notion 19 where we were in the presentation.
20            (Laughter.]
21          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:        I think you were on the 22 matrix.
23          MR. STELLO:      As I recall, we asked for 15 minutes to 24 go through it briefly to synopsize it, but --
25          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      You answered the question where
 
47
: 1. these two numbers seem to give'the same answer when in, truth, 2    you showed that they don't.      And I'm willing to buy it.                    l 3            MR. STELLO:      Could you put the matrix back up?
4            (Slide.].
5            MR.'SNIEZEK:      The only other point I wanted to make 6  on the matrix is that even when we meet both health effects, 7    there's some impetus to drive the core melt frequencies lower,.
l                  8  and that is through the percentage cost factors for averted 9    on-site costs. That's the one to zero percent and the 10 10      percent to 1 percent.      That does give some --
11                COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:        Where did you find those 12      numbers?  How did you arrive at those?        I'm talking about the 13      percentage range.
i            14                MR. SNIEZEK:      Those were just judgment based on                .
15        changing by a decade in core melt, changing by a decade in i
I 16        those numbers.
;            17                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        It's called pulling out of a 18        hat.
19                MR. SNIEZEK:      There was nothing real magic about l
20        those, and that's one of the reasons why we're recommending 21        that be a trial use by the staff and not --
22                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:        As a matter of fact, that's i
!            23        what led me to my question about why did the other part of it 24        have the 100 percent, but I'm satisfied on that.
25                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:        You see, that's what.I find
 
1 48            ,
1 1        ironic about the focus on public health and safety, because if 2        we really were going to have that as our sin 9le focus,-then I 3        think we ought to have an analytical basis for the health 4        objective.        And if we're talking about radiation exposure, 5        frankly, I would prefer rather than picking this 10 percent, 6        which is based on public perception just like the question of 7        how often you're going to let a TMI happen -- it's a tenth of                            ,
8        a percent; that seems good, everybody agrees that's something 9        that can be achieved.          But I frankly would prefer in this 10        matter of public health and safety to have a rational basis 11        where we base it on, for example, the standard deviation or 12        some fraction thereof and radiation exposure from all other 13        sources, or something like that.
14                    You know, there are rational ways you can go at this-                    .
15        as well as public perception ways.
16                    MR. STELLO:      Well, let me give you -- I'm almost 17        afraid the choice I have is -- an irrational way to go about 18        it. I hope it isn't.
s 19                    COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      But isn't that the tenth of 20        a percent?
;    21                    MR. STELLO:        No, not at all. Let me give you some i
22        background.        We've been regulating these nuclear plants for 23        quite some time.          We have added substantial cost to them.- You l    24        need to ask the question, how much safety did we get out~of 25        the money that they have spent in these plants.          I think the
 
~
49 1        public wants sensible regulation, which means take into 2        account how much I've got to pay for what you're doing.
1 i              3                                      And I think if you look at the total number of 4        dollars -- and now I'm just estimating or guessing -- my guess 5        is that we are probably in excess of $100 million per facility 6        that we have retrofited.                                                  That's a lot of money.                                          How much is 7        too much?                      What is the total amount of money that you want to 8        continue to spend an these facilities?                                                                                  It is a significant 9        major policy question for the Commission.
)            10                                      COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                      What does that have to do 11        with a tenth of a percent?
12                                      MR. STELLO:                        I'm coming to it.                                        If we're going to 13        demand more fixing on a facility, then I think'you have to 14        decide how.much more that turns out to be in dollars.                                                                                                        I think                  .
15        if there's a health effect problem, you need to take that 16        directly into account, and that's part of what $1000 a man rem i
17        does, but more significantly, if you don't meet the health 18        effects, how much more money do you spend in total for the-i            19        lifetime of the plant?                                                  And that's really where you combine l            20        the total of the averted on-site costs and the off-site 21        costs.                  And you need to come to grips with it.                                                                      How much is 3
22        enough?
23                                      Now, I say to you -- and I think we probably could 24        go back and add it up -- my guess is somewhere on the order of I
25        $100 or more million per plant.
i
      .-.,v+-                  , r -, , . . - - - - .    +c.m,.n- ,v-..,.- , , .~-. . _-.,,, , - -                                                                                ..m..*,    ,e  m            y. - -
                                                                                                            --,.y-.w,.,-~..-,v,_ . , - .              ..-,,y-  .o  -%, . - + ,                    y-y,    ,
 
t 50 1          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Are you telling me the tenth 2 of a percent had a monetary basis?
3          MR. STELLO:    No.
4          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Where did the tenth of a 5 percent for public health and safety --
6          MR. STELLO:    The tenth of a percent was strictly a 7 judgment.                                                              '
8          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    That's what I thought.
9 Based on public perception.
10          MR. STELLO:    Strictly a judgment, right. Now how do 11 you use it in tying it back?      You'd have to tie it back --
12          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Okay, I'm~not so concerned 13 about that.
14          MR. STELLO:    You'd have to tie it back to dollars.                              .
15 I mean, that's really the bottom line of what this is all 16 about. If you're going to continue to spend money retrofiting 17 these facilities, I think you need to be able to then stand up 18 and say here is the demonstrable safety and public benefit we 19 get out of that money.
. 20          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Yeah, but you're talking 21 implementation of the underlying fundamental policy that,        as 22 Commissioner Zech points out, is this tenth of a percent 23 figure.
24          MR. STELLO:  Yes, and I was trying to steer you back 25 that that's really a major issue for this Commission because
 
51 1  the bottom line number that this commission is going.to have 2  to deal with is when do you stop.
3          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    But my point is that your 4  implementation is rational; the policy issue was based on 5  perception, not on analytical judgment --
6          MR. STELLO:  I agree with that.
7          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Okay, that's the point I was 8  trying to make.
9          MR. STELLO:  And it -- you know, that debate we've 10 had over and over again, and it's been pretty well -- I might 11  add that that was also one of the areas that I thought had 12 pretty general acceptance, too.
13          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Yeah, I agree it did.
l      14          MR. STELLO:  I was surprised. It had fairly          .
15 widespread acceptance.
16          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    But the reason I raised the 17 issue then is if we're prepared to go with public perception 18 on the health effects issue, why shouldn't we look at what-19 clearly is a foremost issue in the minds of public -- public 20 perception again -- on how often they're going to r.: cept a TMI 21 where there most probably, shall we say, were no health 22 effects at all. And yet, if you had a TMI every few years, 4
23 this business is finished.
24          COMMISSIONER ZECH:  But we'ra talking safety goal, j        25 and even though cost is important and I think certainly it's a
 
52                  l l
1  factor-to consider in many different circumstances, when we're                                            l l
2  making a safety goal it seems to me the safety goal ought to                                              '
4 3  be just that, a safety goal.          And it should involve what are 4  the important things for the public as far as radiation is 5  concerned, or any significant impact on the public.                                And 6' that's a safety goal.
7            Now below the safety goal there's lots of other-4 8  things -- cost comes into it and many other things come into 9  it. But the safety goal -- and that's why I think it should 10  be rather broad and it should be devoted strictly to i
11  protecting the public.        Not perceptions or any of the other 12  things. It should be focusing on what is protecting the 13  public.
<        14            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:          It may be that the two                                        .
15  merge, and it may be that if we adopt, without getting
!        16  confused by implementation matrices, if we adopt one-thing,
[        17  the health safety goal, it might be that that will encompass 18  the thing that I'm concerned about.
19            COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:            I'm not sure it will.
20            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:          I don't know.
;        21            COMMISSIONER ZECH:          I think it should focus on f
22  safety. Safety is what we're talking about.                      It's a safety i
,        23  goal. It's not a cost goal, it's not another kind of goal; 1
24  it's a safety goal. That's important, I think.
        -25            MR. SNIEZEK:    Let me comment that in both the
 
53 1                  individual risk and societal risk qualitative statement 5 it 2                  says, "no significant-additional."                                              One-tenth of 1 percent is 3                  no significant additional, and most people would agree with
                                                                                                                                                                                                -a 4                  that.
f                      5                                      You could argue that it could be 1 percent or
;                      6                  one-tenth of 1 percent.
7                                      CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                      But with regard to the point 8                  that Fred is raising, that's where we started until we got to j
9                  this core melt ' frequency, which was supposed to be a
.]                10                      subsidiary screening value, to now it becomes an important 11                      part of our implementation plan.                                      But that shouldn't cloud --
12                      the intent was to address the health effects.
i                13                                          MR. SNIEZEK:                  And the other point there, I                14                      Mr. Chairman, is also, there is no fixed number in that with                                                                                    .
15                        the exception of the greater than 10 to the minus 3, where if                                                                            ,
i 16                        you're having very frequent core melts you do have a good
;                17                        potential for affecting public health and safety.
18                                          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                                You know, I think, Joe, 19                        that one of the comments that has come out most strongly 20                        through this whole phase is whether we can just rely on the 21                        health effects indicators in all of this.                                                I think that's part 22                        of the ACRS comment.                          It was at least embedded in some of the 23                        views of the Steering Group.                                It was certainly a key part of 24                        what Harold and Bob Minogue said about this, what,the ACRS has 25                        been saying.
1
  , n,-,,      -. . , - . - , - , . - -          ,,.,+v...~,----.v.,.,,,nn.,-,,-n-n.            n,,,    ,----,..--.,,,.---,.---n
                                                                                                                                            ,--,---.._c,  . , , - , . . , . , , , , - , . - - , , . .
 
l 54              )
l 1              I think -- and it's reflected in this matrix 2    system. Now, the extent to which the matrix system deals with 3    it is the question. And that is, is there a level of these 4    accidents where, quite apart from the health effects that are 5    involved, we want to say, as a matter of the goal that we're 6    setting for' safety of the operation of these plants, that i
4 7    we're not prepared to tolerate the more frequent serious 1
8    events. That's really I think part of this.
9              And my difficulty, Lando, with your point about                ,
10    well, let's separate that out, is this in the place to deal 11    with it, it seems to me. When you look at the severe accident 12    policy statement and the backfit rule, this is the element 13    that pulls the three things together and really says what i
14    we're prepared to tolerate in terms of the continued operation              .
15    of the plant.
16              COMMISSIONER ZECH:  I understand that. The only 17    thing that concerns me is then what we need to do perhaps is 18    focus on what do we mean by safety. To me, safety is health 19    effects of the public. Damage to the innocent public.            That's 20    safety. And when you go beyond that, then I -- you know, I I                                                                                  -
:    21    understand the rationale and I understand the arguments that I    22    go along with it, too, the next layer, if you will.            But to
;    23    me, safety -- and perhaps we should try to define it -- but i
24    safety of the public means that; it means safety and it means                      !
25    health, and it means undamage to the health of the public.
l L                                                                .                          -)
 
3 55-s 1 .And if we're trying to make it broader than that, then I think 2  we should try to define it broader than that.
3                        COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:                  Then, Lando, if I understand 4  what you're saying, you're not interested in averted onsite
:                  5  costs.
6                        COMMISSIONER ZECH:                No, I don't think so.                                    I think 7  that's quite different from health of the public.                                                              Averted 8  onsite costs is a problem for the utility, I submit, it's a 9  problem for the taxpayers and so forth.                                            But as far as health 10      is concerned, I think that's an economic factor quite apart 11      from what I perceive should necessarily be in a safety goal.
12                            COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                            I guess, Lando, I see a i            13      connection because it does seem to me that when you get to the
:            14      point of TMI type accidents, you're getting beyond the design                                                                                  .
{
l 15      basis, beyond what these people at the plant are really                                                                                          .
16      trained to deal with.                              You're in a area that really is fraught i            17      with uncertainty, and I would suggest that even if the                                                                                            l j            18      accident ends up just like TMI, that the uncertainties of that 19      kind of situation, that kind of event where you've got                                                                                            f j            20      large-scale damage to the core, is such that you can say 21      because of those uncertainties, we really don't want to get 22      into that situation very often.
'                                                                                                                                                                      t 23                            COMMISSIONER ZECH:                Sure, and I understand that.                                                            !
24                            COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                              And I think that's part of                                          ;
i                                                                                                                                                                      I i            25      it.      You can draw a safety link even for those kinds of
      - - - - - ,    n-.. - , u.,--
                                        ,- -    ,--,,.---n,. -.,-,-,,-,,,n...--    .,..r~--..--.v.,e.                ,,n-., - - - - , , -      -
                                                                                                                                                      .,.n-,---.,,-,
 
56 1 accidents and reach the judgment that we're not prepared to 2 tolerate them very often.
3          Now what the staff I think has tried to do is say
                                                                              ~4 4 averted'onsite cost is one way to get to that kind of result.
5 Another way is to face it directly, as I think some others 1
6 have suggested.
7          COMMISSIONER ZECH:    Well I understand that, but 8 again, I think it's a matter of how broadly you want to define 9 safety. Now you're defining it, I believe, a little broader 10 than I'm ready to define it, and that's what they're 11 suggesting to us here. And I submit that it may be too                  ,
12 broad. Safety should be concerning public health and safety, 13 pericd, and not necessarily other things. But I understand 14 the argument to broaden it; it's just a matter of perhaps we 15 should define exactly what we're doing as the first step and 16 go from there.
i 17          But I just feel that it's rather fundamental when 18 we're talking safety that it be health and radiation harm to j
19 the public.
I 20          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:    But there is a point, Lando, 21 that has to do with how often you sort of challenge the 1      22 system, and that you have a system where the challenge is 23 reduced compared to a system where it isn't reduced. I think 24 you're talking about safety, and that's what core melt 25 frequency in a sense --
 
57 1                              ,
COMMISSIONER ZECH:                                  Well, we all know we don't want                                                      <
l 2              the system challenged.                                              We all know we don't ever want another 1
3              TMI.              On the other hand, you know, if we broaden our concept 4'            of safety then you and up with different conclusions.                                                                                      And I 5              submit that at least for starters, a safety goal should focus -
4 i
6              on the most important thing of all, the primary thing of all, 7              and that's protecting the public.                                                                And I think when we've done i              8              that we get into these other very rational and understandable 9              viewpoints, but it makes it much harder.                                                                    It's hard enough to 10              define it as it is, in my view.
11                                                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                    If I could make a comment 12              about averted onsite costs I think it sounds like it's a 13              significant policy issue.                                                          I am very open to the thought that 14              -- open to be persuaded that we might ignore averted onsite                                                                                                          .
15              cost.                  But I also think that consistent with this 16              responsibilihy, you know, I'm going to read what the original
;            17              Atomi: Energy Act says.                                                  It says, "It's the policy of the 18              Unitd Statas that the development, use and control of atomic 4
;            19              energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum 20              contribution to the general welfare, subject at all 21              times..." -- this is the second part now -                                                                          "... subject to 22              the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to i
23              the the common defense and security."                                                                    And health, of course, j            .24              -- that's not a quote, but health comes into it.
.            25                                                So if all we care about is the containment in the
    - - -      ------..-y.w,  . . - - , ~    ---r.,rm.--.m,.--    ,--.,- ,..,,,. r .w.._,mm._,,,-m,.y-,---~4.                          ,~..n-,      . , . ..-,---.~m-    - . -    ..-%,.--,.-    , -
 
58 l
1        end, because you could make the argument that as long as                                                                                                                  1 2        nothing gets out and we've got 100 percent confidence in the 3        containment, we don't care about how many meltdowns there are 4        inside, you could argue that we have fulfilled our public 5        health and safety responsibility.                                                        But we would surely 6        undercut the intent of the Congress that this technology 4
7        survive.              And we have the ability to influence the survival of 8        the technology.
9                            At least, it seems to me that if we' don't take                -
j            10          averted onsite costs into account in forcing a backfit, for 11          example, -- and I'm prepared to accept it that far -- at least 12          we ought to do the calcu.lation and present it to the public 4
13          utility commissions who are responsible for the economics of 14          these plants, and responsible to the ratepayers, and maybe                                                                                                            .
15          they ought to be the ones to decide ckay, the NRC says the 16          safety goals are met; now it's our job to decide whether the 17          economic interest of the public is met.
I 18                              In fact, I would like some comment from the staff on 19          that point; whether it's a practical matter to present our 20          analysis on averted onsite cost to the PUCs and let them make 21          the call on the economics.
22                              You don't have to do that today.
23                              MR. STELLO:                              Well, I don't know that I know the 24          answer today but at least I can give you the beginning.                                                                                    When 25          we make a finding to originally license a plant under NEPA, we s
4, .--s.  -y,,- , r,    -,,.--m--,,  - ,  ,.,---ys,y + , , , - --,--e--,,.-,.y.~,,-,,m.--    _,. y    m-m-3-.. ,,,,,--.-- . v -- ,----, 1_, ,-- s_,  .+ ,,,,p ,m.        y..., ,,_y..  ,
 
o 59 1            1 clearly do do that.
2                                      CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                                    I can't hear you, Vic.
3                                      MR. STELLO:                      When we make the finding under NEPA
                                                                                                                                                          .. vo    s 4              before we do it, the balancing, that the benefits outweightT                                                                            t 5              costs, that the benefit of this plant is that it, in fact, 6              will reliably produce electricity over its lifetime.. And'if 7              we thought the notion of that plant:-- or we believe if we're 8              go'ing to have a significantly great chance of not being able 9              to produce electricity, I don't know how we could make the 10                NEPA balancing.                            So we start by taking into account-that-11                consideration in the beginning.
12                                      Now, --                                                                                                          :
13        -
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                                            The cost-benefit analysis 14                for TMI Unit 2 wouldn't look too good.                                                                                              ,
15                                      MR' . STELLO:                    Well never mind about looking good; it 16                obviously isn't.                              You could never do the balancing under NEPA 17                and say --
18                                      COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                                            That's right.          You got i
19                less than one year's use out of the plant.
20                                        MR. STELLO:                        Let me get back to the point.                                I think 21                that the whole concept that I think is a major policy question 22                of the Commission, dealing with any attempt at dealing with                                                                              !
23                safety is, you know, when are you finished; you know, when are 24                you there.
l l            25                                        Implicit in that I think is a demand on behalf of I
 
1                  .                                                                                                                              ,
60 1                      the public to say, I think you ought to regulate and regulate 2                      sensibly and take into account the cost of your regulation.                                                        I 3                      think they demand that, they want that; I think they have a 4                      right to that.
5                                                          When you are trying to deal with this -- and one of
                              '6                        the major thrusts of the matrix was to find a way of how do 1
7                      you know when you've spent all the money it's useful to spend 1
8                      in the facility?                                                  Again, I'm going to repeat myself, I know, 9                      but these facilities we have caused them to spend $100 10                        million.                                The biggest number in that table, if you took a full 11                          100 percent and $1000, about $150, $175 million.                                                        And that 12                          says that's how much more you'll spend over the lifetime of                                                              '
)                            13                          the plant.
.                            14                                                            Now if in reality we had been using this philosophy                                  .
15                          or policy of regulation and we indeed spent $100 million, then 16                          there aren't any plants that need anymore, because hopefully l                            17                        we would have been done.                                                    But we're not.      We didn't get the 18                        real safety benefit out of that $100 million.                                                        If we don't 19                        change the way we regulate and we continue to regulate for the                                                            ,
20                        next 10 years, will we spend another $100 million?
21                                                            If you look at the items on the books that are j                          22                          coming down the pike, it clearly could easily amount to that i
d 23                          much again.                                        But when do you stop?                  So you have to somehow 1
24                          take into account, in making that safety judgment, when is l                          25                          enough.                            And that puts a cap on it.                              That says when there's i
 
1 61 1  enough. That says if you spent this amount of money over the 2  . lifetime of the plant, you're finished.          And if you would do 3  it retroactively, all the plants would be finished.
;          4                What I'm telling you is if we continue regulating 5    the way we are, are we really getting what we think we are for j            6    the money that we're requiring to be spent.
i j            7                COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:      Victor,.I don't disagree 8    with what you're saying.          I'm not sure what the relevance, i
9    though, is to issues like averted onsite cost and whether --
1
!          10    the only congressional mandate we have, the only one, is to j          11    protect public health and safety, whether or not the nuclear
;          12    industry collapses because of too many core melts.                  I think l'
13    that's really the issue.
j          14                COMMISSIONER ZECH:      Yeah, I think what we really                  .
t j          15    need to do -- I tell you the truth.          I really think what we
;          16    need is to go back to the basics and really define what we i
1 17    mean by safety goal.          Obviously, there is some degree of
;          18    uncertainty here. Perh'aps that would be useful and then we I          19    could decide for ourselves what we think it is, and then maybe                      '
j          20    we could certainly move ahead.          But it's obvious to me that
!          21  we're looking at it a little bit differently.
)          22                MR. DENTON:      I think we have certainly operated in 23    the past as though there's three elements to a safety goal.
l
!          24  We might not want to use them all in the future, but l
l 25  protection of health effects offsite.            That's obviously low I___.-___,_...____._.____._..__-_..___..._____..--_..___.._._
 
62 1                    probability of affecting the health of anybody offsite.
2                    That's long been our goal.
3                                          Low probability of pumping the containment up with 4                    fission products and having emergency planning put into place, 5                    as happened at TMI, and then safe and reliable operation.                                                          And
;                    6                    I think all three of those have kind of woven together in our i                    7                    past, and it's hard to talk about any one of them by itself.
8                                          COMMISSIONER ZECH:                Well, we don't want the second 9                    two, but for sure we don't want the first one.                                                  That's my 10                    view.
11                                          MR. DENTON:            That's right.                And I guess the first i                  12                    one is consequences, and then you ask how you make sure the l
13                    consequences don't occur.                            You go back to the --
1 i                  14                                          COMMISSIONER ZECH:                Sure, and you have to draw the                                        .
i                  15                    line somewhere.                    I appreciate that.
i, t                  16                                          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                          Well, it's a good point.
17                    Strictly speaking, some of the stuff we're talking about here
;                  18                    are not safety goals, they're implementers --
i                  19                                                                                That i s right.
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
!                  20                                          COMMISSIONER ZECH:                That's how I see it.
21                                          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                          However, I'd point out that l                  22                    in the Advance Reactor Policy Statement, in the -- I don't 23                    know, I can't remember about severe accident, but certainly in i
!                  24                    the Standardization Policy Statement, it was my impression 25                    that we were going to defer this broad issue of major core
  -p    y-  . .,            - . - , - -      .,,,-.,,,,*-,,-%    -
                                                                        , - . - - . ,      , <  w  , , , - - - ,    y.  - . - - - ~ -  y  ---.--,---+w  ~-  ,-.-vy- ,
 
63 1            damage; whether or not public health and safety is affected 3
2            that we were going to defer that issue until the safety goal 3            policy statement simply because core meltdown is generally
,        4            considered to be closely related to the real safety goal of 5            public health effects.
i 6                        We could do nothing but specify containment 7            integrity.          Very, very good containment, fellows, and we don't 8            care what you do inside'.                  But I think that if we did that, 1
;        9            we're missing half of the congressional mandate.                                              And maybe it 10              shouldn't be called just a safety goal, and I think that's 11              what you're saying.
i      12                          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                            But remember, this I don't i
j      13              think was proposed as the safety goal.                                            This is the
,      14              implementation plan.                                                                                                            .
15                          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                      Exactly.      That's for the i
j      16              plants. We've got to worry about the universe.
i 17                          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                            So one of the things I asked 18              early on -- if you think we're ready to propose the 19              qualitative safety goal and say they're final, then I'd like 20              to see what it is you would recommend we publish.
1 l
21                          Now there's a corollary to that.                                          Fred thinks we 4
                                                                                                                                                          )
4 22              ought to look at it again before we publish it, and I don't
;      23              disagree with him.                But then we have to follow up with an 24              implementation plan, or an interim implementation plan, and i      25              that's what we're working on here.                                          I don't think we should
        ,ys., -
                .~m.,y    -_w-. %- ,.,,.v..    , , , ..m,    e-._ . , - - - - . - , . - , - - , . .-.,#.  ,  -  y  -  + - - . - , , . , - . . , ~
 
64 1 lose sight of the fact that this is not a safety goal but 2 rather an implementation plan.
3          COMMISSIONER ZECH:- Well, I think that the matrix is 4 very useful and perhaps should be. evaluated for a period of 5 time. I don't think we should drcp it completely at all.
6          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:  Oh, I agree.
7          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  That's why I introduced the 8 word " interim."
9          COMMISSIONER ZECH:  Well, the goal itself, it seems 1
10 to me that we should have it elevated to a degree, but I 11 certainly think we should pursue and evaluate the-matrix and 12 other matters, too.
13          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:  Could I ask you a question 14 on the averted onsite cost?  Have you looked at the range of  .
15 dollars that that wculd translate to?    Say for the_ oldest, 16 cheapest plant with the shortest remaining life, to the 17 newest, most expensive plant with the longest --
18          MR. STELLO:  Well, the ranges I just gave to you a 19 moment ago. The biggest number is $175 million, roughly --
20          MR. SNIEZEK:  No, the biggest number for averted 21 onsite cost would be $72 million, but then'you add that.on to 22 the offsite cost, which could go, in a high population site, 23 up to about $80 million. So you're talking about $150, $160 24 million total.
25          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Did you have more questions, i
[_
 
l 65 1      Jim?
2                      COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                  And the lowest?
't 3                      MR. STELlo:    Nothing.
4                      COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                  Okay. Because I was i
5      thinking of current plants.
1 6                      MR. STELLO:    Mr. Chairman, let me just say that what j              7      I would hope that we were doing was helping you.                          I'm not so 8      sure I know that we did.
9                      CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                  Well, let me make a few 10      comments, 11                      COMMISSICNER BERNTHAL:                  The staff helps-those who 12      help themselves.
J 7              13                      CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                  I think it's been very q
14      helpful.        There's some questions that sometimes are more                                  .
15      detailed than we need to develop in a meeting like this, and 4
4 16      that's what I referred to as saying.I wasn't sure I was ready 4
17      to ask all the questions I want to ask.                        So on those details 16      I'll ask for a tutorial from the staff.                        Anybody else who's 19      interested can participate.
20                      I think you ought to identify what it is we would i                                                                                                            .
21      publish if we were going to follow your suggestion that we 22      publish the qualitative safety goal.                        I would ask Commissioner 23      Bernthal sincerely if -- it would be helpful if you suggested 24      some possible changes to the one he raised questions about.
25                      With regard to the implementation plan, I think all 6
 
l 66 i                                                                                                                                  '
1    'of us want to have a little more time to think-about it,
!              2    perhaps have questions and by consultation will determine what                                                '
4
,              3    more and when we want to do on the implementation plan.
.              4                          COMMISSIONER BE3NTHAL:                I have one question and one ~.
i              5    request.              You said that tenth of a percent health effects -- I
!              6    can't remember whether you said you didn't calculate it out or j.
              .7    whether you don't know how it translates in core melt -- can                                                  ,
i                                                                                                                                  '
8    you tell me that.if I accept this judgmental public-9    perception, saying it's'okay, tenth of a percent health                                                      l l                                                                                                                                a i            10-    effects, how does that calculate back to the core me?.t i                                                                                                                                  ;
i            11    . frequency?                                                                                                  i 12                          MR. STELLO:              As a rough, rough guide, if you were on                      i j            13      the order of somewhere between 10 to the minus 4 to 10 to the                                                !
!                                                                                                                                o l            14    minus 5 for just about all sites, you would meet a tenth of a                                              .
                                                                                                                                  ~
I
;            15    percent.
I 1
l            16                          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                For all sites.                                  ;
i                                                                                                                                  <
4                                                                                                                                  r
!            17                          MR. STELLO:              As I remember, the Steering report gave 1                                                                                                                                  '
:            18    the numbers, and as I recall -- Matthew, is that right?
,                                                                                                                                  t j            19                          M. TAYLOR:              For the. worst core melt, if you took                          t l            20      that to be SST 1, 10 to the minus 5, you'd meet -- at all                                                    i
!            21      sites -- you'd meet the health effects.                                                                      '
22                            COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                Tenth of a percent would be                      ,
'            23      met.              Well, that's very interesting because then I don't need 24      to worry about the TMI scenario if the Commission adopts that F
25      broad qualitative health objective this spring in what we're
          --        - . - . - . - -            . - . - - . . . - . - -      .      .,a..-_,.--.~.-.-,--.---
 
4 67 1 talking about -- to me, qualitative isn't gcod enough. I 2 think we need to get out a number, a broad guideline number 3 this spring on health effects. And it sounds like what you're 4 saying is that the concern I had gets folded in because this 5 tenth of a percent standard is at least as stringent as what 6 I've been talking about. Is that true?
7          MR. DENTON:  I think our perception in icoking at 8 present-day plants is that essentially all plants moot the 9 latent health effects offsite; there's not any real disputa 10 over that. Most, if not all, meet the early fatality, and 11 there may be some in a category that might not meet the early 12 fatality.
13          MR. SNIEZEK:  From the Steering Group report for the 14 early fatality it shows that about four of thus would not meet  .
15 the prompt fatality design objective.
16          CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:  Associated with one-tenth of 1 17 percent.
18          MR. SNIEZEK    Yes. And all would have met by a 19 large margin the latent.
20          COMMISSIONER DERNTHAL:  But I'm talking about the 21 broad objective that Commissioner Zech is worried about, the 22 health objective. And I am inclined to think we cught to say 23 something about that number. And if you can tell me that a 24 tenth of a percent, as the Commission safety goal, implies 25 What you've just told me it implies, then I'm comfortable with
 
68 1 that. I don't need to worry abcut this core molt frequency 2 stuff.
3          MR. STELLO:    I thiMk it's a fair conclusion that any 4 plant that moets a tonth of a percent would be in the range 10  -
5 to the minus 4 to 10 to the minus 5.
6          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Everybody agree with that?
7          MR..OENTON:    Well let8s take the Indian Scint case 8 which ue spent a 1ct of time on. I think there we had a core 9 melt probability on the order of two or three tiuns 10 to the 10 minus 4. And I think they were vary close to the off-site 11 early fatality goal, right around that. That's using the old 12 source term. If you use the new source term that clearly wa 13 being bandled around, they clearly drop below there. So 14 that's a plant that on the order of 10 to the minus 4 not the      .
15 latent clearly, like everycne else was, around the early, 1G using WASH-1400.
17          And if you nove up 10 to the ninus 4 toward 10 to 18 the minus 3, your chancos of exceeding the aarly fatality go 13 up.
20          C0KMIGSIONER ASSELSTINE:    And if all plants were in 21 general 3y that range, icn't that what leado you to the about a 22 50/50 chance Cf a THI in the next 20 yaars?
23          ttE. DENTON:  And that's just doing the probability.
24          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINEt    That's right. So it 25 doesn't solve the problom.
 
u:                                                                                                                                                                      69 1                          MR. STELLO:                                    Let me nake sure you understand 2              something else.                          A particular site, Big Rock;.small reactor,                                                                  ,
t                                                                                                                                                                                            -
J.                    3              big site, that's around 10 to the minus 3 and it meets the
                                                                                                                                                                                          .i
;                    4              health effects.                          So depending on the site, you could have a 5              higher frsquency and still meet it.
l                      6                          COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:                                    Yes, site is your matrix,                                        I 7              thibk the Commission ought to decide on the broad objective                                                                                          ,
O                for cll the new nuclear power plants in this country.                                                                            And if i
9              you're telling me tenth of a percent, individual and societal,                                                                                        i
{                  10                implies a broad objective on cora melt for the universe of-                                                                                          ;
i                                                                                                                                                                                          !
;                  11                plants, core melt frequency -- I guess --
12                            MR. STELLO:                                    Listen to ny point.                    That's the worst j
l 13                case -- worst sites, they'll still meet it.                                                                There are other
                                                                                                                                                                                          .i 14                sites far more favorably thet would still meet it with a much 1
15                higher frequency.                                It doesn't nean -- 10 to the minus 5 at 16                Palo Verde -- Palo Verde would be probably on the order of 10                                                                                        '
{                  17                to the minus 3 to 10 to the minus 4 and still mest it.
j                  18                            COXMISSIONER BERNIRAL:                                    Well let me ask a different
;                  19                question.          As you look at the universe of plants, if you took
)
20                that tenth of a percent safety goal, how often would you then 21                he expcching a TMI style event?
22                            MR. STELLO:                                    I dca't know how you can answer that I
23                because you have to go thrcugh every --
i
{                  24                            COMMISSIONER BERNTRALs                                    Well, I think you should                                                      ;
}
l                  25                answer that.
l
    . , . , .  .  , . - _ . , - . . -    _ -      . - _ _ , - ~ ~ _ , - ~ _ _ _ _ . . _ - . .                - . _ , _ _ - - . . - _ . . . _ , , - _ , , - , - -            . , . . .
 
70 1          MR. STELLO:    I don't know if it's answerable.
2 Because it depends on every site.      I just gave you two 3 exampins. You take Big Rock and Palo Vorde, they could have 4 frequencies down, I'm sure, in that range of 10 to the minus 3 5 &nd stil.'. moot it.
6          CO:IMISSIONER BERNTHAL:    Maybe you've just got to 7 lcck at every sitc and add it up.
2          MR. DENION:    But you could get that answer just by 9 adding up the PRA results for the 20 sitos that are done --
10          COMMISGIQfER ASSELSTINE:    That's right. And thoso 11 tend to indicate that you've got about a 50/50 chance over the 12 next 20 years.
13          MR. RCSS:    Commissioner Bernthal f you asked what 14 Ruscarch thought. Cne thing that We thought when we sent in  .
15 comments, as I recall one sentenco is that wo viewed 16 concentration on the subject of hvorted onsite cost as a 17 distraction. And I guCac this afternoon certainly -- you la know, it can distract people.
19          Lut if there's no prevention aspect in tho safety 20 goal pclicy, then I think the Cor. mission would be making a big 21 mistake.
22          CHAIRMAN PAL'LADIllO:  I'* what?
23          liR. ROSS:  Mculd be making a big mista%e not to have 24 sone elemonen of accident prevention in the safety goal 25 policy,  I ucan if all you do is '.nast the quantitutive health
 
r 71 1 effects and you walk away, especially with the better sites 2 and the improved source tern, then you've walked away from 3 prevention. You just v;on't have it in there, and I think that 4 would be vreng.
5          MR. SHIEZEX:    Ihat was the Steering Group's point 6 when they came up with averted onsite cost.
7          HR. ROSE:  That's a nurrogata and I think it's 8 convenier.t, a sliding scale, and it avoids discontinuities as 9 you make progressions between stops in core malt frequency, so 10 that that formula I think is a vary convenient way to avoid 11 discontinuities and I think it's a good sovo.
12          COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:      It brings you face to faco 13 with the issuc of whether you're prepared to tolerata 14 accidents as long as they don 8t result in fatalities.      And    .
15 What you're saying is wo shouldn't ignore prevention.
16          MR. RCSS;  Yes, and that's what ue said in writing 17 and the policy you have today does not ignore it.      That's why 18 I think the matrix is a good one.
19          MR. DENTOM:    And the fact that we are not ignoring 20 the Dcvis-Besse's and the San Onofre's and the Rancho Se.co 21 type casos which cicarly do not have an offsite health 22 effect, but wo've put on a lot of attention to make sure it 23 doesn't happen again.      So I think that's why we were searching 24 for some way to work on the prevention side and not just the 25 consequonce side, or else we would be reduced to inspecting          l l                                                                                1 l
 
72 1 the containment.
2              CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:      Well, let me interrupt. I want i
4      3 to suggest that in reviewing the gitalitative safety goals that 4 we might publish, I think ycu ought to look again at the 5 quantitative objectives of this one-tenth of 1 percent because 6 I think they could probably be published along with the other 7 without having to wait for the irplementation plan.            But we811    j 8 see what you recommend.
!      9              Well, I think it's been a valuable discussion, as I 10 felt it was going to be, and I think I indicated earlier we 11 asked you the question of what might we publish if we go along 12 with your recommendation, and I think for thi rest of it I i
13 would suggest we continue our etudies and deliberations and 14 interactions and by consultation with Commissioners we might                .
1.
15 make a suggestion on what we do next when, 16              HR. STELLO:  The ACRS -- there is a meeting 17 scheduled with them.      That question came up about them looking 18 at this, and I think we're scheduled on the 12th and 13th, so 19 we are scheduled with the ACR$.
4 20              CHAIRMAN PALLADI!!Os    Yes, but you're going to go            )
i      21 ahead with that.
22              MR. STELLO:  We'll go ahead with that.
i 23              COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:      I think that's fine, and I 24 would make my suggestion that we ask the ACRS to talk to us                  f 25 about in April.
 
73 1                COMMISSIONER BERNTKAL:                              I agree.'
2                COMMISSIONER NSSELSTINE:
2 That makes me --
3                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        If they're ready.
4                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                              Well, I think we ought to i            5  tell them that they ought to be$ ready to talk about it.
6                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                        From my standpoint, that would 7  be very good because I don't have too many meetings lefb."
8                COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:                              Even if we don't have a
.              9  letter, at least talk about it and further our understanding i''
,            10  as well.                                                                        /;
11                CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:                      I'm accepting'your                                          !
                                                                                                  ,r 12  recommendation.                  Now let me do one house,kee. ping matter.                                      Ifr 13  all the participants in thejmeeting wo ld be willing tq' sit 14  still for two minutes, I could adjourn this meeting ar.d we
                                                                                .                                  e
                                                                              /
15  could have a prompt affirmation meeting and then adjourn and 16  save us quite a bit of time.                            So I will ask your indulgence.
17  I'm going to adjourn this meeting and'tben reconvene in an 18  affirmation meeting.                    We have one item on the agenda and then 19  we'll ad-journ both.                So this meeting is adjourned.
E.
,            20                [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m.,                            the Commission meeting wasi' 21  adjourned.]
22 23 24                                                                                      #
f.
r i
25                                                                            '
                                                                                      /
_ . - ___ .        . , _          - . . . , . . . _      - _ . . . .        - _ _ . . _ . - ~ .
 
1                CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5            This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7 matter of. COMMISSION MEETING e
9 Name of proceeding: Report on Safety Goal Evaluation (Public Meeting) 10 11 Docket No.
12 place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date:  Thursday, February eu, 1986                            .
14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13                                              ,
(Signature)_.    ,
(Typed Name ofj Reporter) Suzanne EC Young  ,
20 21 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
24 25 l
i
 
e COMMISSION BRIEFING ON SAFETY GOAL POLICY FEBRUARY 20, 1986 e
 
HISTORY OF PRA AND SAFETY GOALS e  REACTOP SAFETY STUDY (WASH-1400) e  KEMENY COMMISSION AND.NRC RESPONSE-e  PUBLIc WORKSHOPS 1981 e  PROPOSED SAFETY GOAL POLICY STATEMENT FOP PUBLIC COMMENT FEB. 1982 i
e  FOUR PUBLIC MEETINGS 1982 e REVISED POLICY STATEMENT MARCH 1983        .
e 2-YEAR EVALUATION PERIOD e  STEERING GROUP REPOPT e  ACRS AND STAFF COMMENTS / MEETINGS e  FEBPUARY 14, 1986 STAFF PAPEP DEDROGR /2/20/86
 
4 STAFF CONCLUSIONS e ISSUE IN FINAL FORM, AS THE COMMISSION'S SAFETY GOAL POLICY, Two QUALITATIVE STATEMENTS REGAPDING INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL RISK.
e ELIMINATE QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES AND BENEFIT-COST GUIDELINE AS INDIVIDUALLY DISCPETE STATEMENTS.                                COMBINE THEM INTO AN INTEGRATED MATPIX WHICH THE STAFF CAN USE AS A QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S QUALITATIVE SAFETY GOALS, DEDP0GR/2/20/86
 
QUALITATIVE SAFETY G0ALS 9  INDIVIDUAL RISK G0AL - INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC SHOULD BE PROVIDED A LEVEL OF PROTECTION FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.0PERATION SUCH THAT INDIVIDUALS BEAR N0 SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL RISK TO LIFE AFD HEALTH e  SOCIETAL RISK G0AL - SOCIETAL PISKS TO LIFE AND HEALTH FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION SHOULD BE COMPARABLE TO OR LESS THAN THE RISKS OF GENERATING ELECTRICITY BY VIABLE COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES AND SHOULD NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO OTHER SOCIETAL RISKS DEDR0GR/2/20/86
                              ..~
 
1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  \
                                                                                                                                                      ' e=.n
                                                                                                                -                                      U U                                      M M                                      C                                                                                        l C                                      -                                                                                        .
                                                                                                                .        a=.                          M-                                    a==
HW                                      -U                                    U                                                  {
c                                                          CM                                              M                            M w                                                                    C                                                                  C
                                                    -                                                          ^.                                      n C.                                  .
                                                    .                                                                                                          H w            _                                                il                                                                                                                            ,
_= . .
C s
J W                          m                                            . .                                    . .                                  .        _-
W            .,            m                      .                    . .                                    . .                                    ,
E
                                                    . _-                                    m
                                        >          %              e                        %
sa. :      -
E.
H.a.
: l. a.
E. -.g
                                                                                                                                                                                              -*u O
                            ._                                                        . _                    &E                                      EE                                    WL
                            >=                                                        Ew x                -
      .    -                1 E                IJ
            >=              Z
            <                W z                E, E                >-                    >.
M                      E
_C              C                    ~
M W
w                                        w                            W                                      W                                      W O                E                      d                e                      E                            E                                      E                                      5 m a                                      CD w l-                      >=                            >=                                      >=                                    >=
J          M                      . <                                Z w                      2W                                    TW                                    EW
            *                >=                      >=                  J            Fw                        >w                                    FW                                    > W i
C                U                        U N                              O E                      C E                                    O E                                    OE
>          c                W                      w              F-                a                        e                                      a                                    m                                              -
!                            w                      .              c.                      >=
                                                                                                                  >= .
                                                                                                                            >=
                                                                                                                                                        >= .
                                                                                                                                                                  >=                                    >=
,          >.              a.                      u.              t                  >= .                                                                                                    W
{                W                    W                O                  W    g                    W        g                            W        g                                      5 W                X                        X                                      e                              Q                                      G                                      G                                M
            -              >-                      ro                                                                                                                                                                                    W M                    J                                                                                                                                                                                                        D 4                      4                                                                                                                                                                                      d C                W                      W                                                                                                                                                                                    .
W                3                    M,                                                                                                                                                                                      >
            >-                    =                                                                                                                                                                                                        M 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                              6 E              >=
            @                    J                                                                                                                                                                                                        W W                W                                                                                                                                                                                                            E
            >=              E                                                                                                                                                                                                            M E                                                                                                                                                                                                                              4
            -=              W                                    a==
E                                    >=                                                                                                                                                                      E C                                    5 W g                                                                                                                                                                                  N.
                                                      = w                                                                                                                                                                                  >=
C &
W              '=*
W            >                                                                                                                                                                      E
                                                      .J            U                                                                                                                                                                    4 4            2                                      LA                                    M m W                                                      6                                      3                                                                                  M M 3                                                          C                                      C                                                                                  W I          O              I.A                        -                                      -                                  me                                            2 J
W W                              I                            B                                    I G E                            C                                                                                                      C                                          4 Cr,          W                  -                      M                                      M                                        -                                          >
3                -                V            -
                                                                                                                  'O
                                                                                                                                                        'O A                                          a J
a                                                                                                                                                                    4 W                                                                                                                                                                    e T=
 
PARAMETERS REFLECTED IN MATRIX
'I
;      e    HEALTH EFFECTS PROMPT FATALITY RISK - THE RISK TO AN AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL IN THE VICINITY OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OF PROMPT FATALITIES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM REACT 0P ACCIDENTS DOES NOT EXCEED ONE-TENTH OF ONE PERCENT (0.1%) 0F THE SUM OF PPOMPT FATALITY RISKS RESULTING FROM OTHER ACCIDENTS TO WHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. POPULATION ARE GENERALLY EXPOSED.
LATENT CANCER FATALITY RISK - THE RISK TO THE POPULATION IN THE AREA NEAR A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OF CANCER FATALITIES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPEPATION DOES NOT EXCEED ONE-TENTH OF ONE PEPCENT (0.1%) 0F THE SUM OF CANCEP FATALITY RISKS RESULTING FROM ALL OTHER CAUSES.
LARGE-SCALE CORE-MELT FREQUENCY - THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT THAT RESULTS IN A LARGE-SCALE CORE-MELT IS ALLOWED TO VARY. THE IMPETUS TO IMPROVE
:                THE CORE-MELT FREQUENCY IS DEPENDENT UPON HOW MUCH THE FREQUENCY IS GREATEP THAN 10-5/RY AND THE STATUS OF TH HEALTH EFFECTS.
BENEFIT-COST GUIDELINE - THE BENEFIT OF AN                '
INCPEMENTAL REDUCTION OF MORTALITY RISKS AND IN THE FREQUENCY OF LARGE-SCALE CORE-MELT ACCIDENTS IS COMPARED l
WITH THE ASSOCIATED COSTS ON THE BASIS OF $1,000 PER l                  PERSON-REM AVERTED PLUS A PEPCENTAGE OF THE ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL, INCLUDING ECONOMIC, COSTS AVERTED.
DEDROGR/2/20/86
 
    ~
* e STAFF PROPOSAL 9F FEBPUAPY 14, 1986 e    PURPOSE - ASSIST COMMISSION IN ITS DELIBEPATIONS REGARDING THE BEST COURSE OF AGENCY ACTION e    BELIEVE IT ACCOMMODATES ACRS COMMENTS AND ALL STAFF COMMENTS ON STEERING GROUP REPORT s    RECOMMEND ISSUANCE OF QUALITATIVE STATEMENTS IN FINAL FORM AS COMMISSION SAFETY GOAL POLICY e    RECOMMEND AUTHORIZING STAFF TO USE INTEGPATED MATPIX ON A TRIAL BASIS-AS A QUANTITATIVE MEASURE OF QUALITATIVE SAFETY GOALS e    ALL PP0GPAM OFFICE DIPECTORS (NRR, RES, IE, NMSS) FULLY SUPPORT THE FEBRUARY 14 PROPOSAL e    STAFF PPEPAPED TO IMPLEMENT COMMISSION DECISION DEDROGR/2/20/86 i
 
f                    (  {    (h Chth(hththh(k 1hhhhphhphthph[phgh(hphghphphphgh                                  __
S
* 9/35
+        TRANSMI' ITAL 'IO:    N        Document Cbntrol Desk, 016 Phillips                                                i R                                                                                                                        :
f        ADVANCED COPY 'IO: /      /    'Ihe Public Document Ibcrn N
2                                          cc: C&R FROM:                          SECY OPS BRANCH                                    ttac                      .
3
* papers)
Attached are copies of a (brmission meeting transcript (s) and related meeting docunent(s) . They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and placanent in the Public Document Pocrn. No other distribution is requested or required. Dcisting DCS identification numbers are listed on the individual doctments wherever known.
Meeting
 
==Title:==
he_ or\ m Skb, C%d                      Euclukb Meeting Date: a f sol%                            Open 4      Closed DCS Copies (1 of each checked)
Iten
 
== Description:==
Copies Advanced    Original        May                        Duplicate
                                                        'Ib PDR  ,  Docunent        be Dup
* Copy *
: 1. TFANSCRIPT                                    1    ,      1
          ..      When checked, DCS should send a                ,
copy of this transcript to the                .
LPDR for:                                      ,
u ) \) <u.2    g  M                              ,
: 2. wc~.sw                  s.sa ,s.a              i I
h a , , _tts h r_ .                                *
: 3.                                                        ,
: 4.                                                        ,
?
* l
* l
* I (PDR is advanced one copy of each document,              *
* Verify if in DCS, and                                l two of each SEEY paper.)
* Change to "PDR Available."                          l bbYbYb        b lYb b bb b$b b bYbYb                bNYbb$bYbh$lh                  $bb$b$lYbb}}

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