ML20133C489: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000514/2006019]]
| number = ML20133C489
| issue date = 07/18/1985
| title = Notice of Violation from Insp on 850514-0619
| author name = Shafer W
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000373, 05000374
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-373-85-17, 50-374-85-17, NUDOCS 8508070061
| package number = ML20133C425
| document type = NOTICE OF VIOLATION OF A REGULATION, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 3
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000514/2006019]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:r-                                                              .
  .    -
                                                    Appendix
                                              NOTICE OF VIOLATION
                                                                                              ,
          Commonwealth Edison Company                                      Docket No. 50-373
                                                                            Docket No. 50-374
          As a result of the inspection conducted on May 14 through June 19, 1985, and
          in accordance with the General Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action
          (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), the following violations were identified:
          1.    10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion II, as implemented by Commonwealth Edison
                Company's Quality Assurance Program, Quality Requirement 2, commits to
                Regulatory Guide 1.28 which invokes the requirements of ANSI N45.2-1977
                for the control of activities affecting' quality.
                ANSI N45.2, Section 7 states, in part, that measures shall be established
                to assure that documents are reviewed for adequacy to preclude the possi-
                bility of the use of inappropriate documents. ANSI N45.~2, Sect 4on- 12
                states, in part, that test prerequisites include the condition of the item
                to be tested. ANSI N45.2, Section 15 states, in part, that measures shall
                be established to prevent inadvertent operation of systems and components.
                Contrary to the above:
                a.      Measures were not established to prevent inadvertent actuation of the
                        Unit 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) received on May 10, 1985 while
                        in cold shutdown. The B RPS channel had a 1/2 scram signal due to
                        troubleshooting the B Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor. Channel A
    ,.                of the RPS actuated due to lack of communication between the unit
        '              operator and the instrument mechanic on which Intermediate Range
                      Monitor (IRM) should have been left bypassed.
                b.    Testing prerequisites did not include the condition of the item to
                      be tested, to prevent an inadvertent Group I Primary Containment
                      Isolation System (PCIS) signal by Unit 2 on May 31, 1985. The            {
                      Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) logic indicated main steam turbine        j
                      speed of 1800 RPM, and the logic for the Group I isolation on low
                      condenser vacuum was no longer bypassed. Thus, when the turb'ine
                      reset button was pressed by the reactor operator, the Group I
                      isolation occurred.
                                                                                                !
                c.    Measures were not established to assure that documents were reviewed
                      for adequacy of the test prerequisites regarding the condition of
                      the item to be tested. This resulted in four inadvertent RPS scram
                      signals on Unit 2:
                      (1) On June 4, 1985, the Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron
                              Monitoring Systems were being tested and the Reactor Mode Switch
                              was placed in startup. The Control Rod Drive (CRD) System was
                              shutdown at the time and the low CRD header pressure scram
                              actuated.
                    8508070061 850718
                    PDR    ADOCK 05000373
                    G                    pm
 
                                                      -
                                                                                        1
                                                                                        i
.  .                                                                                    l
      Appendix                                  2                                        '
                (2) On June 16, 1985, the Reactor Mode Switch was placed in startup
                      with the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) level above the scram
                      setpoint.
                (3) On June 16, 1985, the Reactor Mode Switch was placed in run
                      with the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) closed.
                (4) On June 7, 1985, while testing the RPS logic (LES-RP-02) a
                      scram signal was received by lifting leads for testing of the
                      backup scram circuitry.
          This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
      2.  Technical Specification 6.2.A.7 states that detailed written procedures
          "shall be prepared, approved and adhered to" for surveillance and testing
          requirements.                                                          -
                                                                          ~
          Contrary to the above, the procedure for performing the calibratio'n of
          two Automatic Depressurization System actuation level switches on March
          31, 1985 was not " adhered to", which allowed returning the inoperable
          B Trip System to service.
          This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).                        .
      3.  Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B,
          Criterion III states, in part, " Measures shall be established for the
          identification and control of design interfaces, and for coordination
  "      among participating design organizations. These measures shall include
          the establishment of procedures among participating design organizations
    -
          for the review, approval, release, distribution, and revision of documents
          involving design interfaces." The licensee implemented this requirement
          by Quality Assurance Manual Procedure Q.P. No. 3-51. Step C.6.C of Q.P.
          No. 3-51 requires the Station Nuclear Engineering Manager (SNEM) to
          " Prepare required detailed engineering design documents' necessary drawings
          plus establir.h quality requirements and other supporting documentation
          requirements."
          Contrary to the above, drawings which were issued to the site for the
          environmentally qualified switch replacement were issued with incorrect
          wiring, making the system B for ADS be inoperable which resulted in the
          Technical Specification 3.3.3 Limiting Condition for Operation to be
          exceeded.
          This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
 
                                                    .
. -
    Appendix                                  3
    Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this
    office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or
    explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance: (1) corrective
    action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to
    avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be
    achieved.  Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good
    cause shown.
    JUL 181985
      T-l9 ?ts                                                    a    n
    Dat'ed                                                  . Shafer, Chief'
                                                      n(.[actorProjectsBranch2
                                                      Re
                                                                              ._
                                                                            O
                                                                                    w
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                                                                                      !
}}

Latest revision as of 23:13, 25 September 2020