ML19341C473

Annual Operating Rept,1980. Covers Occupational Exposure, Changes,Tests & Experiments & Safety Valve & Relief Valve Failures & Challenges

ML19341C473
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	02/27/1981
From:	NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19341C470	List: ML19341C469 ML19341C473
References
NUDOCS 8103030575
Download: ML19341C473 (12)

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, e PRAIRIE ISIAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PIANT O NSP REPORT ON NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION

- 1980 I

NO. OF PERSONNEL TOTAL MAN-REM

(>100 MREM)

STATION UTILITY CONTRACT STATION UTILITY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES WORKERS WORK & JOB FUNCTION EMPLOYEES l EMPLOYEES WORKERS SPECIAL MAINTENANCE 139 36 28.092 84.309 55.325 M71ntenance Personnel 66 0 0 4.41 i 0 0.021 Operating Personnel 39 1 O 10.53 Health Physics Personnel 21 l 0 1 30 5.138 ! I Supervisory Personnel 3 1 1 t 6 l 0.542 1 0.311 l.331 4 i 56 l 3.539 l 1.113 25.237 Engineering Personnel 18 i 0.047 ,

14 0 l 0 1 3.406 } 0.064 I & C Personnel 1 IN SERVICE INSPECTION 26 26 4.627 2.269 15.844 M*intenance Personnel 28 0 l 0.026 1 0 0 i i Operating Personnel i 1 I O 0.948 i 5 0 i 9 0.64 I O Health Physics Personnel! 1 O 0 1 1 0 .007 t 0.457 Supervisory Personnel I .

2 29 0.216 .260 i 16.534 Engineering Personnel 1 6 I 0.294 Ili&CPersonnel i 5 0 1 1 0.092 6 0 1 OPERATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE 68 58 44 9.767 1.734 2.395 Maintenance Personnel I Operating Personnel I 42 1 0 0 l 9.963 l 0 1 0 l Health Physics Personnel 23 0 25 8.283 1 0 1.39_3_y Supervisory Personnel 3 3 0 .833 0.166 .006 i Engineering Personnel 15 3 8 .736 0.137 0.940 12 0 1 i .683 0.001 0.081_ .

I & C Personnel i 0 0 0.089 i Security i O O { 0 1 REFUELING 46 61 1 10.13 7.433 0.022 Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel i 33 1 0 1 0 8 1.436 1 0 1 0 (

Health Physics Personnell 4 l 0 2 1 0.173 1 0 1 0.093 .

4 0 0 0.190 0 0 I Supervisory Personnel t l Engineering Personnel  ! 10 t 1 0 , 0.403 0.147 I 0.039 _;

O 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 i 1 & C Personnel I l WASIE HANDLING 36 14 1 3.177 0.271 0.027 Maintenance Personnel e Operating Personnel i 2 l 0 I O I 0.062 l 0 1 0 l Health Physics Personnel. 11 1 0 1 2 1.442 _ 0 i 0.086 i Supervisory Personnel I O i 0 I 0 0.030 1 0  ! O 0 '

O O O i 0 Engineering Personnel I O { ,

0 0 O O i 0 0 ,

I & C Personnel 1 I 0.043 i Security i 0 l 0 1 0 0 1 0 ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 37 7 0 0.672 0.168 0 Maintenance Personnel 0 0 Operating Personnel I O ( 0 1 0 1 0  !

0 i Health Physics Personnel 2 i 0 1 0 1 0.052 0 0 0 0.009 1 0 0 l Supervisory Personnel 1 1 Engineering Personnel l 2 I O I O 0.039 i O O  !

I & C Personnel I 9 l 0 1 0 l 0.344 1 0 1 0 i b 1 UijU U U g 1-1

O 9 TOTAL NO. OF PERSONNEL TOTAL MAN-REM

(>100 MREM)

STATION UTILITY CONTRACT STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTALS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES WORKERS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES WORKERS

i Maintenance Personnel 56.465 96.184 73.613 Operating Personnel 15.897 0 0.021 l

Health Physics Personnel 15.728 0 13.05 Supervisory Personnel 1.604 0.484 1.794 L 2

Engineering Personnel 4.933 1.653 42.75 I & C Personnel 4.525 0.065 0.422 Security 0 0 0.132 GRAND TOTAL 99.152 98.386 131.782 Total Man-REM for Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 for 1980 = 329.32 i

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PRAIRIE ISIAND NUCLEAR GENERL.' LNG PIANT ANNUAL REPORT OF CHANGES. TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS - 1980 Yhe following changes, tests and experiments have been completed under the provisions of 10CFR 50.59 (a) (1):

A. Unit 1 and Common Components

1. Unit 1 Cycle 5 Reload (DC80L597)

The Cycle 6 core reload design consists of replacing 40 spent Westinghouse fuel assemblies with 40 fresh Exxon assemblies with an average enrichment of 3.47 veight percent. The composition of the core during Cycle 6 will be 40 fresh Exxon assemblies, 40 once burned Exxon assemblies, 40 twice burned Westinghouse assemblies, and one thrice burned Westinghouse assembly. Included in Cycle 6 are 80 fuel pins containing 1 weight percent gadolinia, distributed among twenty assemblies. The fuel enrichment in the pins containing gadolinia is 3.1 weight percent. An enrichment of 3.47 weight percent is used in the balance of the reload.

At the beginning of Cycle 6, the poison worth of the gadolina is projected to be equivalent to 64 ppm soluble boron and is calculated to disappear neutronically by mid-cycle. The Cycle 6 loading pattern is projected to produce a full power cycle length of 10,750 1 300 MWD /MTU. The loading pattern for Cycle 6 satisfies plant Technical Specification criteria regarding power peaking factors. In assembly H-32 the gadolinia pin locations have been modified to allow detailed gadolinia performance monitoring. Otherwise, the mechanical design of the fuel is the same as the previous reload and is compatible to the resident fuel supplied by both Exxon and Westinghouse.

The analysis performed in support of Unit 1 - Cycle 6 operation is presented in References (1), (2), and (3), Fuel Management Analysis, Safety Analysis Report, and Startup and Operations Report. The following is a summary of these reports.

End of Cycle 5 Burnup and Cycle 6 Core Loading Pattern Unit I was operated past 0 ppm boron (i.e. , coasted down) . Reference (4) and (7) state that the Cycle 5 core could be safely operated out to a burnup of 12,600 MWDhfTU. The actual end of Cycle 5 burnup was 12,528 MWD /MTU. Due to the coast down of Unit 1 - Cycle 5 the core loading pattern for Cycle 6 was changed from that presented in the Safety Analysis Report (Ref 2) to that presented in the Startup and Operations Report (Ref 3) . The changes were made in order to improve predicted Cycle 6 power distribution as a result of the increased Cycle 4 burnup. Reference (6) gives the final core loading pattern. Reference (5) identifies the gadolinia bearing assemblies. The core will be loaded in accordance with references (5) and (6) . The characteristics of the fuel and of the reloaded core will result in conformance with existing Tech Specs limits regarding shutdown margin provisions and thermal limits.

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Accident and Transient Analyses The only transient specifically analyzed for Unit L - Cycle 6 was the control rod ejection accident. Other transients were not re-analyzed since the operating parameters in Cycle 6 are bounded by the parameters assumed when these analyses were performed for the equilibrium reload cycle. The control rod ejection analysis shows a limiting HFP-BOC pellet energy deposition of 150.0 cal /gm. The resulting energy deposition is less than the 280 cal /gm limit stated in Reg. Guide 1.77.

Startup and Operations Report This report shows all physics parameters to be within acceptable limits and consistent with previous data. The analysis performed supports safe operation of Unit i during Cycle 6 out to a burnup of 10750 + 300 MWD /MTU.

Burnup beyond this point will require additional analysis.

Conclusion The reload of Unit i for Cycle 6 operation does not involve an unreviewed safety question. It does not create the possibility or increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously analyzed or of a different type than previously analyzed. It does not increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed and it does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in Tech Specs.

References

1. XN-N F-79-90 (P ] Prairie Island, Unit 1 Cycle 6 Fuel Management Analysis, XN-I-Z Reload , October 1979

2. XN-NF-79-104 Prairie Island, Unit 1 Nuclear Plant Cycle 6 Safety Analysis Report, December,1979

3. XN-NF-80-41[P] Prairie Island Unit 1, Cycle 6 Startup and Operations Report, August, 1979

4. CDM:102:80 Letter CD May/DH Peterson, June 13, 1980

5. Letter JL Karalus/DH Petersnn, July 16, 1980

6. CDM:122:80 Letter CD May/MB Sellman, July 17, 1980

7. MRK:023:80 Letter MR Killgore/R0 Anderson, August 14, 1980 i

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2. Reroute Safety Injection Piping (DC80Y127)

Rerouting of Unit 1 safety injection piping from areas of the Auxiliary Building requiring personnel access in post-accident climate to the Shield Building / Reactor Building annulus was completed in 1980. Minor conservative changes in the hydraulic characteristics of the system occurred,i.e. , a decrease in piping j

resistance. This modification was necessary to meet post-accident access requirements to the Auxiliary Building.

3. Unit 1 RCS Vent (DC80Y117) i

' The Unit 1 RCS Vent Project is approximately 80% completed.

The piping, valves and electrical work in containment have been

' completed and most of the out-of-containment electrical work has been done.

What remains are the terminations of the Auxiliary Building electrical i

power cupply panels and the control board control installation.

i The projected completion date is 7-1-81 for all installation with a 1 full preop test during the following outage.

4. Unit 1 RCS Saturation Meter (DC79L560) 1-The Unit 1 Saturation Monitors have been installed and are operating.

The inputs to the saturation meters are being upgraded to meet en-i vironmental and seismic qualification criteria.

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5. Fire Protection System Modifications (DC79Y084)

Several modifications were completed as a result of the fire protection ,

review. The major modifications included:

(1) Installation of fire dampers in ventilation ducts.

4 (2) Extension of wet pipe sprinkler systems.

(3) Extension of fire detection systems.

l (4) Modification of fire barrier seals.

(5) Protection of cable trays and structures.

i (6) Cable rerouting in various fire areas.

(7) Fire enclosures and curbs around selected equipment.

(8) Addition of portable fire fighting equipment.

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6. Acoustical Monitoring of Safety and Relief Valves (DC79YO90)

The acoustical monitor of pressurizer safety and relief valve provides an additional indication if the valves are open. The system consists of an accelerometer mounted near the valve, a pre-amp and a signal conditioner. The accelerometer senses the increase in pipe or valve vibration caused by flow through the valve. This signal is amplified and evaluated by the pre-amp and signal conditioners. At about one-hundredth of the signal i from a full open valve the signal conditioners actuate a Control Room alarm and light a valve position light in the Control Room.

This system provides indication only. The correlation between valve 3'

vibration and flow through the valve is so inconsistent that the system can not be used to provide valve leakage information.

B. Unit 2 Components

1. Unit 2 Cycle 5 Reload (DC79L569)

. Prairie Island Unit 2 will operate in Cycle 5 wich one region of fuel supplied by Exxon Nuclear Company (ENC) . The composition of the core

will be 40 new ENC (3.45 w/o U-235) assemblies and 81 partially spent Westinghouse assemblies. Included in Cycle 5 is a continuation of the Gadolinia Demonstration Program with 96 fuel pins containing 1 w/o Gadolinia. The 96 pins containing Gadolinia are enriched to only j 3.1 w/o U-235 and these pins are uniformly dispersed among twenty-four fuel assemblies. Reference (4) lists the Gadolinia bearing assemblies.

The ENC fuel design is compatible with the resident fuel designed by Westinghouse.

The nuclear design basis for Cycle 5 assures operation within Technical i Specification limits, specifically peaking factors, shutdown margin

! and reactivity coefficient limits. The neutronics characteristics are

! calculated to be similar to Cycle 4 and the reactivity coefficients of j Cycle 5 are bounded by the coefficients used in the safety analysis.

The analysis for Cycle 5 is applicable for Cycle 4 burnups of 11,400

+ 1000 The actual end of Cycle 4 burnup was 12,211 MWD /MIU.

I 300 MWD /MTU.

Cycle 5 leagth is calculated to be 11,250 + 300 MWD /MTU (326 i 9 EFPD).

The core loading pattern has been chosen to achieve a desirable power i distribution while maximizing the benefit of the Gadolinia assemblies to j reduce beginning of cycle boron concentration. The BOC Gadolinia poison

worth is calculated to be equivalent to 94 ppm soluble boron. The ef fect of the Gadolinia is calculated to disappear by mid-cycle.

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The following is a summary of the analysis performed in support of operation for Unit 2, Cycle 5:

End of Cycle 4 Burnup and Cycle 5 Core Loadinr: Pattern Unit 2 was operated past 0 ppm boron (i.e. , coasted down) . References (7) and (8) state that the analysis shows the core could be safely operated out to a burnup of 12,400 FMD/MTU. The actual end of Cycle 4 burnup was 12,211 MRD/MTU. Due to the coastdown of Cycle 4 the core loading pattern for Cycle 5 was altered in the Startup and Operations Report (Ref. 3) from that presented in the Safety Analysis Report (Ref 2).

The changes were made in order to improve predicted Cycle 5 power distribut 'n as a result of the increased Cycle 4 burnup over that assumed in the Safety Analysis Report. Reference (6) states the results presented in the Safety Analysis Report are still applicable with the revised loading pattern and burnup. The desired Cycle 5 loading pattern was, therefore, confirmed in Reference 5 to be the same as the loading pattern presented in the Startup and Operations Report. Reference 4 The core will be loaded identifies the Gadolinia bearing assemblies.

in accordance with References 4 and 5.

Accident and Transient Analyais Two transients were reanalyzed for Unit 2, Cycle 5, ECCS heatup and rod ejection. Other transients were not specifically analyzed for Unit 2, Cycle 5 since the operating parameters in Cycle 5 are bounded by the parameters assumed when these analyses were performed for the equilibrium reload cycle for Prairie Island Units 1 and 2.

The ECCS analysis was done since reload 7 incorporated a high burnup fuel rod design having 31 mil clad thickness versus 30 mil clad thickness in the standard Exxon reload assembly. The increase in clad thickness leads to an increase in fuel rod outside diameters. This analysis (which would also apply to Unit 1) supports an ECCS allowable total peaking limit of 2.21. The cladding temperatures of the high burnup design are calculated to be slightly less than those of the standard design throughout the LOCA transient. This is attributed to the increase in heat transfer area (0.5%), a small improvement in core reflood rates, and a 3.3% increase in rod rupture pressure with the high burnup design. It is concluded that the ECCS heatup analysis results for the high burnup design are bounded by those for the standard design.

The rod ejection analysis performed for Unit 2, Cycle 3 shows a limiting HFP-BOC pellet energy deposition of 149.4 cal /gm. The resulting energy deposition is less than the 280 cal /gm stated in Regulatory Guide 1.77.

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Startup and Operations Report This report shows all physics parameters to be within acceptable limits and consistent with previous data. The analysis performed supports safe operation of Unit 2 during cycle 5 out to a burnup of 11,250 2; 300 MWD /MTU (326 + 9 EFPD's) . Burnup beyond thie point would require additional analysis.

Conclnsion The reload of Unit 2 for Cycle 5 operation does not involve an un-reviewed safety question. It does not create the possibility or increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction previously analyzed or of a different type then previously analyzed.

It does not increase the consequences of an accident previously analyted and ir. does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in Tech Specs.

References

1. XN-NF-79 Prairie Island Unit 2, Cycle 5, Fuel Management Analysis, June 1979

2. XN-N F-79-6 7 Prairie Island Unit 2, Nuclear Plant Cycle 5, Safety Analysis Report, August 1979

3. XN-NF-79-102 Prairie Island Unit 2, Cycle 5. Startup and Operations Report, November 1979

4. DCL:312:79 Prairie Island 2 Reload Batch, II-7 (XN-1), Letter DC Lehfeldt/DH Peterson,12-3-79

5. DCL:314:79 Letter DC Lehfeldt/MA Klee, 12-3-79

6. DCL:322:79 Prairie Island Unit 2, Cycle 5, Loading Pattern -

Letter DC L thfeldt/MB Sellman, 12-10-79

7. FP-NS-352 Unit 2 Cycle 4, Extension Physics Analysis - Letter AE Pauley/FP Tierney, 11-28-79

8. FP-NS-353 Unit 2, Cycle 4, Extension Analysis - Letter AE Pauley/FP Tierney, 12-7-79 2-6

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2. Unit 2 Turbine Life System (DC79L565) r This design change added the bearings 1 and 2 to the turbine oil j lift system. This fix was necessary to eliminate bearing wipe on  !

d coast-down and turbine startup. The replacement pump required a i larger motor (15 H.P. to 30 H.P.). The effect of this increase 1 on the emergency diesel generator was analyzed.

The proposed inading on MCC 1AA2 is as follows:

MOTOR # LOAD g FLA

! 222-1 2 Turning Gear Oil Pmp 50 59

.i 222-2 2 Turning Gear 40 53.6

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I 222-3 21 Turbine Gear Air Side

! Seal Oil Backup Pmp 20 26 222-20 21 Turbine Oil Lif t Pmp 30 36.5 100% FLA + 25% Largest FLA = (59 + 53.6 + 26 + 36.5) + .25(59)

- = 189.85 < 225A bus capacity i

) The worst case load (189.85) is less than bus capacity (225A) . Therefore, l there is no additional hazard to equipment or personnel resulting from this design change.

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3. Unit 2 RCS Saturation Monitor (DC79L561) l The Unit 2 Saturation Monitors have been installed and are operating.

The inputs to the saturation annitors are being upgraded to meet environmental and seismic qualification criteria.

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O REPORT OF CllANGES TO THE NSP OPERATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN Revision 5 to the NSP Operational Quality Assurance Plan was internally reviewed and approved on July 16, 1980. We have' concluded that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of NSP's Operational Quality Assurance Program. A summary of the changes is listed below. Copies of the Operational Quality Assurance Plan, Rev 5, are available at the Monticello and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plants and at the NSP corporate ' office for review by IE-III personnel.

Summary of Changes

1. Page 1; 10CFR21 " Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance" has been added to Section 1.0.

2. Section 3; Numerous changes were made to this section due primarily ,

to re-organization of Power Production.

3. Page 20; Minor change to Section 4.5 for clarification.

4. Page 22; Minor change to Section 4.9 for clarification.

5. Page 25; Monticello Diesel Fuel Oil was added since it is important to safety.

6. Page 31; Prairie Island Manipulator Crane was added since it is important to safety.

7. Page 33; Prairie Island Diesel Fuel Oil was added since it is important to safety.

8. Page -40; Minor change to Section 5.2.1 for clarification.

9. Page 40; Section 5.2.2 changed to permit PE&C to perform maintenance.

10. Page 41; Correction of error in Item 4.

11. Page 42; Procurement of. Fire Protection Related Items was added to Sections 6.2 and 6.3.

12. Page 44; Fire Protection was added to Section 7.3.

13. Page 45; Fire Protection was added to Section 7.4.

14. Page 46; Added provisions requiring approval of revised Instruction to Section 8.3.

15. Page 47; Added Section 8.8 requiring updating FSAR's.

16. Page 49; Clarified Receipt Inspection requirements in Section 9.4.

17. Page 51; Brazing added to Section 11.3.

18. Page 51; Heat Treating procedure control requirements added to Section 11.4.

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19. . Page 52; Maintenance was added to Section 12.4.

2'O . Page 52; Modification was added to Section 12.5.

21. Page 55; Clarified Inspection requirements in Section 12.6.

22. Page 57; Added fire protection to Sections 13.2 and 13.3.

a- 23. Page 66; Added fire protection to Section 17.4..

24. Page 66; Added Section 17.6 " Deficiency Reporting" as a result of including Part-21 in Section 1.0.

25. Page 67; Clarified Section 18.3.

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, 26. Page 72; Clarified Section 20.3.

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PRAIRIE ISIRiD NUCLEAR GENERATING PIMIT ANNUAL REPORT OF SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE FAILURES AND CHALIENGES - 1980

.i Date No. Valves Description of Failure or Cha11enne NO FAILURES OR CHALLENGES IN 1980 l

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