IR 05000245/2007004: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams|number = ML073050271}}
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000336/2007004]]
 
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000245 | year = 2007 | report number = 004 }}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
[[Issue date::October 31, 2007]]
 
Mr. David A. ChristianSr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glenn Allen, VA 23060-6711
 
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000336/2007004 AND 05000423/2007004
 
==Dear Mr. Christian:==
On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10, 2007, with Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,/RA/Raymond J. Powell, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-336, 50-423License Nos.:DPR-65, NPF-49
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000336/2007004 and 05000423/2007004
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:see next page Mr.
 
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
...................................................iii
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
..........................................................1
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
.........................................................11R01Adverse Weather Protection .......................................1
 
{{a|1R04}}
==1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................2==
 
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection .................................................3==
 
{{a|1R06}}
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures ........................................41R07Heat Sink Performance ...........................................5==
 
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ...........................6==
 
{{a|1R12}}
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ........................................61R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .............71R15Operability Evaluations ...........................................81R17Permanent Plant Modifications .....................................81R19Post-Maintenance Testing.........................................91R22Surveillance Testing ............................................11==
 
{{a|1R23}}
==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications ....................................12==
 
1EP2Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation .......................121EP3Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System ............................................................131EP4Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes ...........131EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses ..................131EP6Drill Evaluation
 
==RADIATION SAFETY==
.......................................................142OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
 
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
[OA]....................................................164OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification ..............................16 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................164OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................17ATTACHMENT: 
 
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
 
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
................................................A-1
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
...........................A-1
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
..........................................A-2
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
.....................................................A-10
iiiSUMMARY
: [[OF]] [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000336/2007-004, 05000423/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Millstone PowerStation, Unit 2 and Unit 3; Post-Maintenance Testing.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by regional inspectors. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most
findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter
(IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not
apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in
: [[NUREG]] [[-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.]]
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone:  Initiating EventsGreen. A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water" during restoration of
the "B" turbine plant component cooling water (TPCCW) heat exchanger on
August 28, 2007. Specifically, following maintenance that left the heat exchanger shell
in a partially drained condition, Dominion did not fill and vent the heat exchanger in
accordance with
: [[OP]] [[3330B. This resulted in two of the three]]
TPCCW pumps receiving
an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Loss of the remaining
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pump
would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within three minutes per
plant procedures. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as
: [[CR]] [[-07-09057. Corrective actions included revising]]
OP 3330B to require the fill and vent
section be used following maintenance to ensure the
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW side of the heat
exchanger is completely full of water, and revising the work planning procedure to
request operations work planning provide restoration packages for all applicable work
orders. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the human performanceattribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of
limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical
safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's
failure to implement the fill and vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger
conditions, could potentially have led to the loss of all
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pumps and required
operators to manually trip the reactor. This finding was determined to be of very low
safety significance (Green) by performing a Phase 1 evaluation in accordance with NRC
IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for
At-Power Situations," because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip
and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The
finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work practices
component, because Dominion did not implement proper procedures for the restoration
of the "B"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW heat exchanger. [H.4(b)] (Section 1R19)B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone.
EnclosureREPORT
: [[DETAIL]] [[]]
: [[SS]] [[ummary of Plant StatusUnits 2 & 3 operated at or near 100 percent through out the inspection period.1.REACTOR]]
: [[SAFET]] [[]]
YCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01).1Seasonal Site Inspection  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors performed a review of severe weather preparations during the onset ofthe hurricane season to evaluate the site's readiness for seasonal susceptibilities. The
inspectors reviewed selected equipment, instrumentation, and supporting structures to
determine if they were configured in accordance with Dominion's procedures and that
adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors
reviewed the Unit 2 and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Technical
Specifications (TS) and compared the analysis with procedure requirements to ascertain
that procedures were consistent with the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR. The inspectors performed partial
walkdowns of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 intake structures, service water systems, intake
structure traveling screens and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to determine the
adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. Documents reviewed
during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2System Inspection  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the readiness of the Unit 2 service water system for extremeweather conditions, specifically, hurricanes, high winds, high tides, and other severe
weather events. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and walked down the
system to determine if the service water systems, including instrumentation and
supporting structures, were configured in accordance with Dominion procedures and
that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the system. Documents
reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Partial System Walkdowns  (Four Samples)  a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the
correct system alignment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of each system to
determine if the critical portions of selected systems were correctly aligned, in
accordance with these procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had
an effect on operability. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position
checks, and verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the
inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and
component labeling. The following systems were reviewed based on their risk
significance for the given plant configuration:Unit 2*"C" High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system while "B"
: [[HPSI]] [[out for plannedmaintenance on August 7, 2007; and*"B" Enclosure Building Filtration System (]]
: [[EBFS]] [[) while the "A" train was out forplanned maintenance on August 14,]]
: [[2007.U]] [[nit 3*"B"]]
: [[EDG]] [[while "A"]]
: [[EDG]] [[out for planned maintenance on July 18, 2007; and*"A" High Pressure Safety Injection (]]
: [[SIH]] [[) system while "B"]]
: [[SIH]] [[out for plannedmaintenance on August 28, 2007. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S)  a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2Safety Injection System (]]
SIS) and Unit 3 Containment Recirculation Spray System
(RSS). The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the systems to determine if critical
portions, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned, in
accordance with procedures, to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect
on operability.The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders todetermine if the deficiencies significantly affected the
: [[SIS]] [[and]]
RSS system functions. In
addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the system engineering staff and
reviewed the condition report (CR) database to determine if equipment alignment
3Enclosureproblems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed duringthe inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q)  a.Inspection Scope (Twelve Samples)The inspectors performed walkdowns of fire protection areas during the inspectionperiod. The inspectors reviewed Dominion's fire protection program to determine the
required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading
requirements for the selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to
assess Dominion's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In
addition, the inspectors evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire
detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory
measures. The inspectors then compared the existing conditions of the areas to the fire
protection program requirements to determine if all program requirements were being
met. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The fire
protection areas reviewed included:Unit 2*Auxiliary Building 480 Volt MCC B51 and B41A (Fire Area A-13);*Auxiliary Building Railroad Bay Area (Fire Area A-14B);
*Enclosure Building Filtration System
: [[EBF]] [[]]
AS Equipment Area (Fire Area A-14D);
*Diesel Generator Room A (Fire Area A-15);
*Diesel Generator Room B (Fire Area A-16); and
*Auxiliary Building Hallway/Storage Area/Hot Tool Crib (Fire Area A-19).Unit 3*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 24'-6"Elevation (Fire Area
: [[AB]] [[-6, Zone A);*Auxiliary Building, West Motor Control Center and Rod Control Area, 43'-6"Elevation (Fire Area]]
AB-6, Zone A);*West Service Water Cubicle, 14'-6" Elevation (Fire Area CSW-4);
*Control Building, Cable Spreading Area, 24'-6" (Fire Area CB-8);
*Control Building, East Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-2); and
*Control Building, West Switchgear Area, 4'-6" (Fire Area CB-1). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
4Enclosure.2Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)Unit 2The inspectors observed personnel performance during a fire brigade drill onSeptember 14, 2007, to evaluate the readiness of station personnel to fight fires. The
drill simulated a fire in the Unit 2 'A' DC Switchgear Room. The inspectors observed the
fire brigade members using protective clothing, turnout gear, and self-contained
breathing apparatus and entering the fire area. The inspectors also observed the fire
fighting equipment brought to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment
was available to effectively control and extinguish the simulated fire. The inspectors
evaluated whether the permanent plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire
area and whether hose usage was adequately simulated. The inspectors observed the
fire fighting directions and communications between fire brigade members. The
inspectors also evaluated whether the pre-planned drill scenario was followed and
observed the post drill critique to evaluate if the drill objectives were satisfied and that
any drill weaknesses were discussed. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06).1Internal Flooding Inspection  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the flood protection measures for Unit 3 equipment in thesafety-related "A" and "B" service water pump cubicles. This review was conducted to
evaluate Dominion's protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal
flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR, the internal flooding evaluation and related documents. The inspectors
examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained
consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation
documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection
are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
5Enclosure.2External Flooding Inspection  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors evaluated Dominion's preparation for, and protection from, the effects ofexternal flooding conditions for Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR and
applicable procedures to determine the readiness of protection for applicable safety-
related structures, systems, and components. The inspectors performed walkdowns of
the Unit 2 turbine, auxiliary, and EDG rooms to determine the adequacy of the
floodgates, flood doors, temporary equipment, and removable flood planks to perform
their design function. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed recent Dominion inspection
results, including floodgate inspections, to determine whether previously identified
deficiencies had been entered into Dominion's corrective action program for resolution.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.7A)Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 "B" EDG service water heat exchanger. Theinspectors observed the as-found condition of the heat exchanger once it was opened to
determine whether any adverse fouling concerns were appropriately addressed. The
inspectors reviewed the results of the inspections performed in accordance with
Dominion procedures. The inspectors reviewed the inspection results against the
acceptance criteria contained within the procedure to determine whether all acceptance
criteria had been satisfied. The inspectors also reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR to evaluate
whether heat exchanger inspection results were consistent with the design basis. The
inspectors determined whether adverse conditions identified by Dominion were
appropriately entered into Dominion's corrective action program. The inspectors also
reviewed Work Order (WO) M2 06 07171, "B EDG Clean service water heat exchanger
and inspect expansion joints," and
: [[WO]] [[M2 0510019 "B]]
EDG 18 Month 100 percent
eddy current testing tubing examination."  b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
6Enclosure1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q)Resident Inspector Quarterly Review  a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification trainingprovided to operators for Unit 2 on August 28, 2007, and Unit 3 on August 28, 2007.
The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of
communications; ability to take timely actions; prioritization, interpretation, and
verification of alarms; procedure use; control board manipulations; oversight and
direction from supervisors; and command and control. Crew performance in these
areas was compared to Dominion management expectations and guidelines as
presented in
: [[OP]] [[-]]
MP-100-1000, "Millstone Operations Guidance and Reference
Document."  The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control
board configurations. The inspectors also observed Millstone evaluators discuss
identified weaknesses with the crew and/or individual crew members, as appropriate. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (71111.12Q)  a.Inspection Scope (Three Samples)The inspectors reviewed three samples of Dominion's evaluation of degradedconditions, involving safety-related structures, systems and/or components for
maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed
licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors reviewed work
practices that may have contributed to degraded system performance, Millstone's ability
to identify and address common cause failures, the applicable maintenance rule scoping
document for each system, the current classification of these systems in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2), the applicable system (a)(1) performance evaluation,
and the adequacy of the performance criteria and goals established for each system, as
appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed recent system health reports and/or
discussed system performance with the responsible system engineer. The specific
samples are listed below:Unit 2*CRAC (a)1 Action Plan; and*DC Breakers Testing and Maintenance.
7EnclosureUnit 3*Emergency Safeguards Facility (ESF) Building Ventilation (HVQ) System (a)1Action Plan. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)  a.Inspection Scope (Nine Samples)The inspectors evaluated online risk management for emergent and planned activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control
room logs to determine if concurrent planned and emergent maintenance or surveillance
activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with out-of-service
components. The inspectors evaluated whether Dominion took the necessary steps to
control work activities, minimize the probability of initiating events, and maintain the
functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Dominion's risk
management actions during plant walkdowns. Documents reviewed during the
inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and
adequacy of scheduled and emergent maintenance risk assessments for the following
maintenance and testing activities:Unit 2*"A" instrument air compressor unavailable due to planned maintenance on July 19, 2007;*"B"
: [[EDG]] [[starting air tank unavailable due to planned maintenance for the doublecheck valve replacement on July 23, 2007;*Containment and enclosure building heating and ventilation maintenance during"A"]]
EDG maintenance on August 8, 2007;*Dominion's response to rising power operated relief valve (PORV) temperaturesduring the time period of August 15 -20, 2007;*Dominion's response to an unexpected indication during surveillance testing ofReactor Protection System (RPS) matrix logic circuitry on September 7, 2007;
and*Dominion's response to pressurizer back-up heater failures during the timeperiod of September 1-21, 2007. Unit 3*"A"
: [[EDG]] [[jacket water cooling heat exchanger unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on July 20, 2007;*]]
TDAFW system unavailable due to emergent maintenance on August 19, 2007;and*TDAFW and "B" quench spray system (QSS) unavailable due to plannedmaintenance on August 23, 2007.
8Enclosure  b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15)  a.Inspection Scope (Six Samples)The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations. The inspectors evaluated theoperability determinations against the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Issue
Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter
91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on
Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability."  The
inspectors also discussed the conditions with operators and system and design
engineers, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the following
evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions:Unit 2*CR-07-07926, Six tubes recommended for plugging in X53B,
: [[EDG]] [[lube oil heatexchanger on July 26, 2007;*]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-02246 B]]
: [[CRAC]] [[exhaust fan damper leaks by air causing fan to rotatebackwards on August 30, 2007; and*]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the pressurizer]]
: [[PORV]] [['s onSeptember 11, 2007.Unit 3*]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08539, Pressure test not performed after Class I valve replacement;*CR-07-08565, "C" component cooling water (CCP) heat exchanger coversuspended over "A"]]
: [[CCP]] [[pump; and*]]
CR-07-08599, Feedwater isolation trip valves closing capability degraded. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R17Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17A)  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors reviewed a permanent plant modification on Unit 2 B EDG outputbreaker 15G-13U-2 closing coil. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area and
reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR, licensing and design basis documents, and the engineering
disposition. These reviews were conducted to determine whether (1) the modified
components remained consistent with the assumptions indicated in the design basis
documents, (2) system availability, reliability, and functional capability were maintained,
and (3) any unrecognized conditions that significantly affected risk or could place the
plant in an unsafe condition were introduced as a result of the modifications.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
9Enclosure  b.FindingsNo findings of significance were determined.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)  a.Inspection Scope (Eight Samples)The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test (PMT) activities to determine whetherthe PMT adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was
satisfied, given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was
restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test acceptance criteria to
evaluate consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TSrequirements. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were
entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during
the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following maintenance activities and
their post-maintenance tests were evaluated:Unit 2*"B"
: [[EDG]] [[operability test following various preventive maintenance tasks and lubeoil heat exchanger tube plugging on July 24, 2007 (]]
WO M2-06-07171); *Doble Testing on the 4.16KV breaker for "C" service water (SW) Pump followinga design change to wiring involving the power switch on August 21, 2007 (WO's
M2 04-12276, 03-08727, 04-07956); and*Repair of "B"
: [[TPCCW]] [[heat exchanger tube leak.Unit 3*"B" service water strainer inspection and repairs on July 16, 2007(]]
: [[WO]] [[M3-07-10233);*"A"]]
: [[EDG]] [[jacket water cooling heat exchanger tube plugging on July 18, 2007(]]
: [[WO]] [[M3-07-09476);*Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil leak repairs on July 23, 2007(WO M3-07-08384);*High pressure safety injection (SIH) to cold leg check valve (WO M3-06-00145);and*"A"]]
: [[EDG]] [[testing following completion of an engine overhaul onSeptember 11, 2007 (]]
SP 3646A.1, "Emergency Diesel Generator A Operability
Test," Revision 17). b.FindingsIntroduction:  A self-revealing finding was identified for Dominion's failure to implementprocedure OP 3330B, "Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water," during restoration of
the "B"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW heat exchanger on August 28, 2007. Specifically, Dominion did not fill
and vent the heat exchanger in accordance with OP 3330B following maintenance that
left the heat exchanger shell in a partially drained condition. This resulted in two of the
three
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pumps receiving an automatic trip signal on low suction pressure. Plant
10Enclosureprocedures would have required the operators to manually trip the reactor within threeminutes had the third
: [[TPCCW]] [[pump tripped.Description:  On August 8, 2007, Dominion identified a tube leak originating from the "B"]]
TPCCW heat exchanger. Dominion prepared a work package to identify and repair the
source of the leak. On August 27, Dominion personnel began work on repairing the
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW heat exchanger. A leaking tube was identified near the bottom of the heat
exchanger, and the leak rate was estimated to be approximately one half gallon per
minute at that time. Dominion successfully completed the repairs to the heat exchanger
on August 28. During restoration of the heat exchanger, when operators opened the "B"
: [[TPCCW]] [[heatexchanger discharge isolation valve, the "C"]]
TPCCW pump immediately tripped on low
suction pressure. The "B"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pump, which was in standby, also received an
automatic trip signal on low suction pressure, preventing the pump from starting. The
"A" pump, which was running, did not receive a trip signal and remained in operation.
Heat loads on the
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW system at full power require at least two pumps to be in
service. The plant operated with only one
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pump running for approximately five
minutes, during which time lube oil temperatures increased and a generator bus duct
cooling system high temperature alarm was received. Operators were able to restart
the "B"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
: [[CW]] [[pump within five minutes, which provided sufficient cooling to the]]
: [[TPCCW]] [[system. Dominion's investigation determined that the]]
TPCCW side of the heat exchanger hadbeen slowly draining through the failed tube since August 8, when the heat exchanger
was first isolated. Restoring the "B"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW heat exchanger while in a substantially
drained condition resulted in two of the three
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pumps receiving automatic trip
signals on low suction pressure, and could have potentially also led to a trip signal beingsent to the only remaining
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pump. The performance deficiency is that Dominion
failed to implement procedure
: [[OP]] [[3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling]]
TPCCW Heat
Exchanger(s)", when required by heat exchanger conditions following maintenance to
repair a tube leak.Analysis:  As a result of not implementing
: [[OP]] [[3330B, Section 4.8, "Filling]]
: [[TPCCW]] [[HeatExchanger(s)," Dominion restored the "B"]]
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW heat exchanger while in a
substantially drained condition, which resulted in the "B" and "C"
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW pumps
receiving automatic trip signals on low suction pressure. This finding is more than minor
because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events
Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those
events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown
as well as power operations. Specifically, Dominion's failure to implement the fill and
vent procedure, when required by heat exchanger conditions, could potentially have led
to the loss of all
: [[TPCCW]] [[pumps and required operators to manually trip the reactor. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with]]
IMC0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for
At-Power Situations."  The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the
likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available.
11EnclosureThe performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of HumanPerformance, Work Practices, in that Dominion did not implement proper procedures for
the restoration of the "B"
: [[TPCCW]] [[heat exchanger. [H.4(b)]Enforcement:  Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiencydid not involve a violation of regulatory requirements because the]]
TPCCW system is not
safety-related equipment. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action
program (CR-07-09057). Corrective actions include revising the work planning
procedure to request Operations Work Planning provide restoration packages for all
applicable work orders, and revising OP 3330B to require the fill and vent section be
used following maintenance to ensure the
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW side of the heat exchanger is
completely full of water. Because this finding does not include a violation of regulatoryrequirements and is of very low safety significance (Green), it is identified as
: [[FIN]] [[05000336/2007004-01, Failure to Perform Fill and Vent of]]
: [[TPCCW]] [[Heat ExchangerResulted in Loss of Two]]
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW Pumps.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22)  a.Inspection Scope (Seven Samples)The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to determine whether the testingadequately demonstrated equipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the
intended safety-related function. The inspectors attended pre-job briefs, reviewed
selected prerequisites and precautions to determine if they were met, and observed the
tests to determine whether they were performed in accordance with the procedural
steps. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the applicable test acceptance criteria to
evaluate consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and TS
requirements and that the applicable acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors
also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective
action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in
the Attachment. The following surveillance activities were evaluated:Unit 2*On July 19, 2007, "A" containment spray pump and check valve
: [[IST]] [[;*On July 27, 2007, "C" high pressure core spray check valve]]
IST;
*On September 25, 2007, Diesel Fire Pump M7-7 monthly operabilitydemonstration; and*On September 28, 2007, "C" service water pump
: [[IST]] [[test.Unit 3*Reactor protection set cabinet]]
: [[II]] [[operational surveillance test (SP 3443B21);*On August 8, 2007, Service water relief valve]]
: [[3SWP]] [[*]]
RV94A; and
*On August 24, 2007, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*P2 operational readinesstest. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)  a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications to evaluate if the temporarymodifications adversely affected the function of the associated safety systems. The
inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and their associated 10 CFR 50.59
screening against the
: [[UFSAR]] [[and]]
TS determine whether the modifications affected
system operability or availability. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in
the Attachment. Unit 2*Disconnect of faulted pressurizer back-up heaters in order to restore remainingheater on the breakers to operation on September 20, 2007
(DCN
: [[DM]] [[2-00-0185-07).Unit 3*Temporary removal of the 'A' control building air conditioning booster pumpcheck valve 3]]
SWP*V010 (DM3-00-0238-07). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Emergency Preparedness1EP2Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation (71114.02)  a.Inspection Scope  (One Sample)An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the licensee'sANS. During this inspection, the inspector interviewed site Emergency Preparedness
(EP) staff responsible for implementation of the
: [[ANS]] [[testing and maintenance.]]
CRs
pertaining to the ANS were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The
inspector reviewed the licensee's original ANS design report to ensure compliance with
those commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspector also interviewed
: [[EP]] [[staff to gain an understanding of the new]]
ANS plans for Millstone. Planning
standard,
: [[10 CFR]] [[50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10]]
CFR 50, Appendix E
were used as reference criteria. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
13Enclosure1EP3Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System(71114.03)  a. Inspection Scope (One Sample)A review of Millstone's
: [[ERO]] [[augmentation staffing requirements and the process fornotifying the]]
ERO was conducted. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key
staff for responding to an event and to ensure timely facility activation. The inspector
reviewed procedures,
: [[CR]] [[s, and call-in drills associated with the]]
ERO notification system
and drills. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO
augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the
training records for a sample of
: [[ERO]] [[members. The inspector also verified that the]]
EP
department staff were receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan.
Planning standard,
: [[10 CFR]] [[50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10]]
CFR 50,
Appendix E were used as reference criteria. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
: [[1EP]] [[4Emergency Action Level (]]
EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)  a.Inspection Scope  (One Sample)Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, the latest Emergency Plan Revisionwas implemented based on Dominion's determination, in accordance with
CFR 50.54(q), that the changes resulted in no decrease in effectiveness of the Plan,
and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and
Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. The inspector conducted a sampling review of the
Emergency Plan changes, and all changes to EALs, to evaluate for potential decreases
in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. However, this review was not documented in a
Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes.
Therefore, these changes remain subject to future
: [[NRC]] [[inspection in their entirety. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1]]
EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses (71114.05)  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports to assess the licensee'sability to evaluate their performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs
initiated from January 2006 to September 2007 from drills, self-assessments, and audits
for 2006 and 2007 required by 50.54(t). Planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
14Enclosure  b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06)Combined Functional Drill  a.Inspection Scope (One Sample)The inspectors observed the conduct of a Unit 2 licensed operator training emergencyplanning drill on August 29, 2007. The inspectors observed the operating crew
performance at the simulator and the emergency response organization performance at
the site emergency operations center. The inspectors evaluated the classification,
notification and protective action recommendations for accuracy and timeliness.
Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of Dominion's evaluators to adequately
address operator performance deficiencies identified during the exercise. Documents
reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION
: [[SAFETY]] [[Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (]]
OS)2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment  (71121.03)  a.Inspection Scope (Nine samples)During the period September 24-28, 2007, the inspectors conducted the followingactivities to evaluate the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring
instrumentation, and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program, relative to
maintaining and issuing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Implementation of
these programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable
industry standards, and Dominion's procedures. The inspectors reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR to identify area radiation monitors that are installedin Millstone Units 2 and 3 for the protection of workers, and reviewed the calibration
procedure and current calibration records for selected instrumentation, including the
Unit 2 spent fuel area monitors (RM-8139/8142/8156/8157), the Unit 3 spent fuel pool
area monitors (3RMS-RIY08/36) and the Unit 3 containment area monitors
(RE-01/02/03). The inspector discussed with the Instrument and Control (I&C)
supervisor the monitoring system health report and instrument reliability trends. The inspector reviewed the operating procedure and current source activities/dose ratecharacterizations for the Shepherd Model 89 instrument calibrators (Serial Nos. 9155 &
9068). The inspector observed a technician perform safety interlock testing on the
calibrator prior to using it.
15EnclosureThe inspector reviewed the calibration records for selected survey instruments andcontamination monitors including the small article contamination monitors (SAM 9 & 11),personnel contamination monitors (ARGOS-4A/B), electronic dosimeters (SeimensMk2), and various portable survey instruments (FH40TC,
: [[RO]] [[-2A,]]
RO-20).The inspector reviewed the relevant procedures and observed a technician performing acalibration validation on electronic dosimeters and calibrate portable radiation survey
instruments (RO-2A &
: [[RO]] [[-20).The inspector observed a technician performing daily functional checks on a variety ofcontamination monitors and survey instruments located in Units 2 and 3 including]]
: [[SAC]] [[-4,]]
: [[SAM]] [[-11,]]
: [[ARGOS]] [[4A/B,]]
: [[CM]] [[-11,]]
: [[RM]] [[-14, Ludlum 177,]]
BC-4, and Teleprobes.
The inspector reviewed the procedure and quality control records associated with
performing the instrument daily functional checks, including air sample counting
equipment and gamma spectrometers.The inspector reviewed recent contamination sampling (10 CFR 61 data) results forUnits 2 and 3 to determine if the instrument calibration sources used were
representative of the radioisotopes found in the plant source term.The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regardingthe maintenance and issuance of
: [[SC]] [[]]
BA to emergency response personnel. Training
and qualification records were reviewed for  licensed operators from each of the five
operating shifts at each unit and for selected response personnel who would wear
: [[SCBA]] [[s in the event of an emergency. The inspector, with the assistance of Fire Protection technicians, physically inspectedthree]]
: [[SCBA]] [[s staged for use in each control room, two]]
: [[SC]] [[]]
BAs staged for use in the
Unit 3 turbine building, and two
: [[SC]] [[]]
BAs staged in the Unit 2 Technical Services Area.
Maintenance and regulator test records were reviewed for selected
: [[SC]] [[]]
BAs. The
inspector also evaluated whether the air used to fill the
: [[SC]] [[]]
BAs met the Grade D quality
criteria of the Compressed Gas Association.The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for assuring quality in the radiationmonitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs by reviewing
self-assessments (MP-SA-06-56/69/74/79), Nuclear Oversight audits (Nos.05-06,
06-04/08, 07-06), and 21 CRs related to these program areas. The inspector
determined if problems were identified in a timely manner, that an extent of condition
and cause evaluation were performed, previous radiation surveys remained valid, and
corrective actions were appropriate to preclude repetitive problems. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
16Enclosure4.OTHER
: [[ACTIVI]] [[]]
: [[TIES]] [[[OA]4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151).1 Cornerstone: Initiating Events  a.Inspection Scope (Two Samples)The inspectors reviewed Dominion submittals for the]]
: [[PI]] [[s listed below to verify theaccuracy of the data reported during that period. The]]
PI definitions and guidance
contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator
Guideline," Revision 5, were used to verify the basis for reporting each data element.
The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs and monthly operating reports,
and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant licensing
and engineering personnel. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
Attachment.Unit 2Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours.Unit 3*Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 critical hours. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Emergency Planning Cornerstone (3 samples)  a.Inspection Scope (Three Samples)The inspector reviewed data for the
: [[EP]] [[]]
: [[PI]] [[s: Drill and Exercise Performance,]]
: [[ERO]] [[DrillParticipation; and]]
ANS Reliability. The inspector reviewed supporting documentation
from drills and tests from April 2006 to June 2007 to evaluate the accuracy of the
reported data. The acceptance criteria used for the review were
: [[NEI]] [[99-02. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4]]
OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program a. Inspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
17Enclosureissues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered intoDominion's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the
description of each new CR and attending daily management review committee
meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.  .2 Annual Sample: Safety Injection Tank (SIT) Leakage  (One Sample) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the actions taken by Dominion to evaluate and correct severalinstances of valve leakage that impacted SIT accumulator water levels and/or boron
concentration over the past several years of operation. The inspectors reviewed CRs
related to SIT accumulator leakage, the completed evaluations, and associated
corrective actions to assess the performance history and effectiveness of Dominion's
actions. The inspectors conducted interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors also
reviewed procedures, data and drawings. b.Assessments and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspectors concluded that Dominion hadadequately evaluated and corrected the various individual valve leakage issues.
However, the inspectors noted that engineers and operators were challenged by the
multiple system/valve leaks over the last several years. In particular, operator actions
were necessary to frequently fill the affected SIT accumulators or to depressurize an
associated accumulator fill header (via a temporary modification). Engineers and
operators also developed and executed troubleshooting plans to identify leaking
components. Although the past problems have not resulted in rendering the SIT
accumulator or related emergency cooling systems inoperable, continued leaks
represent challenges to plant equipment and staff. Dominion management
acknowledged the concerns related to the continuing challenges, and discussed some
of their ongoing and planned efforts to broadly address and evaluate additional
proactive measures to prevent further leakage problems, including an inter-discipline
review of the potential leakage paths and scenarios.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn September 14, 2007, the EP inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspector
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
inspection.On September 28, 2007, the radiation protection inspector presented the inspectionresults to Mr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The
inspector confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the
inspection.
18EnclosureOn October 10, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the overall inspection results toMr. J. Alan Price, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspectors
confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the
inspection.
: [[ATTACH]] [[]]
: [[MENT]] [[:]]
: [[SUPPLE]] [[]]
: [[MENTAL]] [[]]
: [[INFORM]] [[]]
: [[ATION]] [[AttachmentATTACHMENTSUPPLEMENTAL]]
: [[INFORM]] [[]]
: [[ATION]] [[]]
: [[KEY]] [[]]
: [[POINTS]] [[]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
CONTACTLicensee personnelA. PriceSite Vice PresidentA. Jordan Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance
R. Griffin Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
D. AtwoodFire Protection Instructor
M. BrooksSenior Radiation Protection Technician
T. ClearyLicensing Engineer
K. CollinsFire Protection Technician
C. DibiasiChemist
S. DubickiFire Protection Technician
J. FirmamRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility
T. Gilbert Emergency Preparedness
T. GleasonRadiation Protection Technician, Instrument Calibration Facility
W. GormanSupervisor Instrumentation & Control
J. HochdorferSupervisor, Water Treatment
N. HunterSenior Radiation Protection Technician
J. KunzeSupervisor Nuclear Operations Support
J. LaineManager Radiation Protection/Chemistry
P. Luckey Manager, Emergency Preparedness
S. Mazzola Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
: [[E.]] [[ReimanFire Protection Technician]]
: [[S.]] [[TurowskiSupervisor]]
: [[HP]] [[Technical ServicesLIST]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[ITEMS]] [[]]
: [[OPENED]] [[,]]
: [[CLOSED]] [[,]]
: [[AND]] [[]]
: [[DISCUS]] [[SEDOpened and Closed05000423/2007004-01FINFailure to Perform Fill and Vent of]]
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CW HeatExchanger (Section 1R19)
A-2AttachmentLIST
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[DOCUME]] [[NTS]]
: [[REVIEW]] [[]]
EDSection 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP 3215, Rev. 007-06, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"OP 2271B, Rev. 000-02, "Response to Intake Structure Degraded Conditions"
AOP 3579, Rev. 016-00, "Severe Weather Conditions"
AOP 2560, Rev. 010-03, "Storms, High Winds and High Tides"
SP 3665.2, Rev 008-02, "Intake Structure Condition Determination"
: [[SP]] [[2615, Rev. 006-01, "Flood Level Determination"]]
: [[COP]] [[200.6, Rev 002-01, "Storms and Other Hazardous Phenomena (Prep and Recovery)"Work OrdersM2 06 07806 Screen Wash Spool replacement Upstream of 2-]]
: [[TS]] [[-4Section 1R04:  Equipment AlignmentProceduresOP]]
: [[2308 HPSI]] [[System Valve Alignment, Facility 2]]
OP 2314 Enclosure Building Filtration System Alignment
: [[OP]] [[3306, Containment Recirculation Spray System]]
: [[OP]] [[3308, High Pressure Safety InjectionCondition Reports]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-02301, Two broken bolts found on]]
: [[3RSS]] [[*]]
: [[MOV]] [[23BCR-07-02946, Broken bolts on]]
: [[3RSS]] [[*]]
: [[MOV]] [[23C]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04382, Water discovered in "D"]]
RSS piping
: [[CR]] [[-06-05621, P43B Containment Spray pump exhibits Increased vibration]]
: [[CR]] [[-06-06690, A Containment Spray pump vibration measurement not in normal limitWork OrdersM2-05-05854 A Containment Spray pump seal leakage,]]
CR-05-05149
Drawings25203-26015 Piping & Instrument Diagram
: [[LP]] [[and]]
HP Safety Injection System and Pumps
Other DocumentsUFSAR Section 6.7 Enclosure Building Filtration SystemOperability Determination MP3-005-07, Rev. 2
2007 Qtr 1 System Health Report for Containment Recirculation Spray SystemSection 1R05:  Fire ProtectionOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 9Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area AB-6, March 1998
Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area CSW-4, March 1998
Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area AB-1, March 1998
Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area HR-1, March 1998
Millstone Unit 3 Fire Fighting Strategy, Fire Area MSV-1, March 1998
A-3AttachmentSection 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProceduresSP 2665 Building Flood Gate Inspections, Revision 005-01AOP-2560 Storms, High Winds, and High Tides, RevisionCondition ReportsCR 07-08486
: [[MP]] [[2 Gate 1 Gouge in Seal Gasket]]
: [[CR]] [[07-08487 MP2 Gate 2 Seal Gasket Coming Off Top Left of Door]]
: [[CR]] [[07-08488]]
: [[MP]] [[2 Gate 5 Seal Gasket Coming Off Angle Iron]]
: [[CR]] [[07-08489]]
: [[MP]] [[2 Gate 6 Seal Gasket has Gouge]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08571, A]]
: [[SWP]] [[cubicle west floor drain plugging]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08385, A Service Water pump cubicle floodingOther DocumentsUnit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Change 8]]
: [[MP]] [[3 Service Water Pump Cubicle Internal Flooding Evaluation, Calculation 01-ENG-01884M3Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramOther DocumentsCycle 07-5 Simulator Progress Review Exam #1LORTS E55, Rev 000-02, Operational Exam 55Section 1R12:  Maintenance EffectivenessCondition ReportsCR-04-07801,]]
: [[3HVQ]] [[*]]
: [[ACUS]] [[1B did not auto start as expectedCR-05-00143,]]
: [[HVQ]] [[*]]
: [[ACUS]] [[1A tripped due to compressor pressure high]]
: [[CR]] [[-05-07540, Low freon charge on 3]]
: [[HVQ]] [[*ACUS1B]]
: [[CR]] [[-05-10244, During leak checks on 3]]
: [[HVQ]] [[*ACUS1B an additional 30 lbs of freon were added]]
: [[CR]] [[-05-11408, 3]]
: [[HVQ]] [[*ACUS1A tripped unplanned LCO entry]]
: [[CR]] [[-05-11752, Freon leaking from]]
: [[SWP]] [[*PV113B2]]
: [[CR]] [[-05-11760, Configuration management lost on 3]]
: [[SWP]] [[*PV113B1 and]]
: [[3SWP]] [[*]]
: [[PV]] [[113B2]]
: [[CR]] [[-06-06088, Unplanned]]
: [[LCO]] [[refrigerant leak found at threaded joint on]]
: [[3HVQ]] [[*]]
: [[ACUS]] [[2B]]
: [[CR]] [[-06-08651, Performing running checks on 3]]
: [[HVQ]] [[*ACUS2B found refrigerant leak]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04036, Investigation of 125]]
VDC EC Breaker trip devices
CR-06-00443, Blown Fuse,
: [[CR]] [[-06-07115, Positive pressure in control room]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-01620,]]
: [[MRFF]] [[on Interface Board]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-01659, As found Program did not match]]
VTM or DM2S-0265-96
: [[CR]] [[-06-03722, Charcoal Filter Failed Efficiency Testing]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-07929, 2-]]
HV-207 Damper Failure
: [[CR]] [[-06-10614, 1-2" gap below fan discharge damper 206B]]
: [[CR]] [[01-009042 New]]
: [[EC]] [[-1 Devices failed]]
: [[CR]] [[03-10390 New]]
EC-1 Device failed as found testing
CR 03-07156 Left pole failed short time testing
: [[CR]] [[03-10929 Breaker failed testing]]
: [[CR]] [[05-13883 High failure rates of]]
: [[EC]] [[-1 devices]]
: [[CR]] [[06-07999 Breaker Failed all but 1]]
LTA, device leaking oil
A-4AttachmentCR 06 10100 Breaker Failed Testing
: [[CR]] [[07-04801 All]]
: [[DC]] [[]]
: [[AKR]] [[Breakers]]
: [[PM]] [['d during 3R11 Failed as Found over current testing.Drawings25203-30023 Single Line Diagram]]
: [[125 VDC]] [[System- Turbine Battery25203-30024 Single Line Diagram 125]]
VDC Emergency and 120 VAC Vital System
212-30076 One Line Diagram
: [[125VDC]] [[and 120]]
: [[VAC]] [[Distribution System-CMPSTOther DocumentsMaintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation for the]]
: [[ESF]] [[Building Ventilation (]]
HVQ) SystemSP-M3-EE-269 Revision 3, Electrical Design Criteria Unit 3 Electrical Distribution System
Calculation
: [[PA]] [[-085-082-00812]]
: [[GE]] [[]]
: [[MP]] [[2 125V]]
: [[DC]] [[Coordination Study Revision 3]]
: [[DM]] [[2-02-0444-05 Modification for the Control Room Ambient TemperatureSection 1R13:  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProcedures]]
: [[MP]] [[-13-PRA-FAP01.1, "Performing (a)(4) Risk Assessments"DNAP-2000, "Dominion Work Management Process"]]
: [[MP]] [[-14-]]
OPS-GLD600, "Plant Status and Configuration Control"
OP 23332B, "Unit 2 Instrument Air System"
M2-05-00069, "Unit 2 'A' Instrument Air Compressor"
M2-05-04047, "Containment and Enclosure Building
: [[H&V]] [[Unit Fan Discharge Damper"]]
: [[OP]] [[3322, Auxiliary Feedwater SystemCondition Reports]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08729, Unplanned]]
: [[LCO]] [[, failure of stroke time test of 3]]
: [[FWA]] [[*HV32A during performanceof SP 3622.8-012]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08730, Unplanned]]
: [[LCO]] [[, failure of stroke time test of]]
: [[3FWA]] [[*]]
HV32B during performance
of
: [[SP]] [[3622.8-012]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08731, Unplanned]]
: [[LCO]] [[, failure of stroke time test of]]
: [[3FWA]] [[*]]
HV32C during performance
of
: [[SP]] [[3622.8-012]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08732, Unplanned]]
: [[LCO]] [[, failure of stroke time test of]]
: [[3FWA]] [[*]]
HV32D during performance
of
: [[SP]] [[3622.8-012]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08793, Air pockets identified in]]
: [[FWA]] [[system pipingOther DocumentsPlan of the Day and]]
: [[EOS]] [[Risk evaluation for 'A']]
: [[EDG]] [[maintenance(Work Week 0729)MNPS-3-UFSAR, Millstone Unit]]
: [[3 UFSARS]] [[ection 1R15:  Operability EvaluationsCondition Reports]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08599,]]
: [[3FWS]] [[*]]
: [[CTV]] [[41's closing capability against main feedwater pump shutoff pressuremay be degradedCR-07-08565, The "C"]]
: [[CCP]] [[]]
: [[HX]] [[end cover is suspended over the operable "A" CCP pump]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-08359, 0 Section]]
: [[XI]] [[pressure test not performed after replacement of]]
: [[CL]] [[1 valve3]]
RCS*V106 for upstream weldCR-07-02246 2-HY-206B, The exhaust fan discharge damper, appears to be leaking by air,causing Fan 31B to rotate backwards.
A-5AttachmentCR-07-09015, Potential failure scenario for the new
: [[MP]] [[2 presssurizer]]
: [[PORV]] [[sOther DocumentsOperability Determination]]
: [[MP]] [[3-014-07, 3]]
: [[FWS]] [[*CTV41's closing capability against mainfeedwater pump shutoff pressure may be degradedOperability Determination]]
: [[MP]] [[3-013-07,]]
: [[ASME]] [[Section]]
: [[XI]] [[Pressure Test not Performed afterReplacement of]]
: [[CL]] [[1 ValveOperability Determination]]
: [[MP]] [[2-014-07, Potential failure scenario for the new]]
: [[MP]] [[2 presssurizerPORVsDM2-01-0146-06]]
: [[RC]] [[-404 Tailpipe temperature indicator]]
TI-114 High Temperature Alarm
Setpoint ChangeSection 1R17:  Permanent Plant ModificationsCondition ReportsCR-07-09362 White light on breaker A407 "C" Service Water Pump" is DimCR-03-02501
: [[CR]] [[-07-09572Work OrdersM2-07-07133M2-04-12270 4.16]]
: [[KV]] [[& 6.9]]
: [[KV]] [[Circuit breaker Closing Coil ModificationDrawings25203-32013 Sheet 6, Service Water Pump]]
MP5B25203-32007 Sheet 32, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters
203-32007 Sheet 33, Pressurizer Back-up Heaters
203-32007 Sheet 34, Pressurizer Back-up HeatersOther DocumentsDesign Change Notice
: [[DM]] [[2-00-0283-04, 4.16]]
KV & 6.9 KV Circuit breaker Closing CoilModification
Design Change Notice DM2-00-0185-07, Temporary plant change required to disconnect failed
pressurizer back-up heatersSection 1R19:  Post-Maintenance TestingProceduresSP 3626.13, "Service Water Heat Exchangers Fouling Determination"SP 3622.1, "Auxiliary Feed Pump
: [[3FWA]] [[*P1A Operational Readiness Test"]]
: [[MP]] [[3750]]
AA, "Service Water Strainer Maintenance"
CMP 795, "Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging"Condition Reports07-05627, 07-07655, 06-11755
Work OrdersM3-07-08384, M3-06-12743, M3-03-06351, M3-05-11224, M3-07-10233, M3-07-09476
A-6AttachmentDrawingsEM-130B, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System
: [[P&ID]] [["2275.002-014-016, "]]
MDAFW Oil Piping"
2179-EM-133D, "Service Water System"
2179-EM-116A, "Emergency Diesel Generator 'A" Lube Oil & Cooling System"Other DocumentsClearance # 3C12-FWA01-0001Clearance # 3C12-EGS01-0007"
03-5006289, "Areva Tubesheet Sleeving Data Sheet for 'A'
: [[EDG]] [[Jacket Water Cooling HeatExchanger"Section 1R22:  Surveillance TestingProcedures]]
: [[SP]] [[3443B21-0041, "Protection Set Cabinet]]
: [[II]] [[Operational Test Data Sheet"]]
SP 2612B, "C" Service Water Pump Tests, Rev. 010-02
SP 2606A, Containment Spray Pump Operability and Inservice Testing, Facility 1, Revision
013-02
: [[SP]] [[-2604]]
: [[BO]] [[-001, "C"]]
: [[HPSI]] [[Pump and Check Valve]]
: [[IST]] [[, Rev 000-00Condition Reports07-07602, 07-07630, 07-07627CR-07-08350,]]
: [[3SWP]] [[*]]
: [[RV]] [[94A failed as found lift testWork OrdersM3-06-11784, M3-07-10123,M3-06-12681, A]]
: [[RSS]] [[Heat Exchanger Relief Valve 3 year]]
: [[PMD]] [[rawingsMillstone Unit 2 Inservice Test Program for Pumps and Valves, Rev. 7, Change 16Section 1R23:  Temporary Plant ModificationsDrawings25212-26933, "Service Water System"Other DocumentsDM3-00-0238-07, "Temporary Removal of the Control Building Air Conditioning Booster PumpCheck Valve]]
: [[3SWP]] [[*V010"50.59 Screening for Check Valve 3]]
: [[SWP]] [[*V010]]
: [[TM]] [[]]
: [[OD]] [[]]
: [[PROTO]] [[-]]
: [[FLOW]] [[computer model for service flow with Check Valve]]
: [[3SWP]] [[*V010]]
TMOD1
Service Water Pump 2A Discharge Check Valve Design Bases DocumentSection
: [[1EP]] [[2: Alert and Notification System (]]
: [[ANS]] [[) Evaluation"Alert and Notification Systems, Millstone Nuclear Power Station and Haddam Neck Plant," April1984MP-26-EPA-FAP08, "Public Alerting System Administration," Rev. 002-02, 8/30/06]]
: [[MP]] [[-26-]]
: [[EPA]] [[-FAP09, "Public Alerting System Test and Maintenance," Rev. 002-03, 8/1/07]]
: [[MP]] [[-26-]]
EPA-FAP10, "Public Alerting System Test and Repair," Rev.000
A-7AttachmentLetter from Dominion to Connecticut DEP, "2006 Siren System Changes," February 7, 2007Maintenance Logs 2006 & 2007
Sample of Corrective Actions related to the sirensSection
: [[1EP]] [[3: Emergency Response Organization (]]
: [[ERO]] [[) Staffing and AugmentationSystemCall in Drill Records for 2006 &]]
: [[2007SE]] [[]]
: [[RO]] [[Position List and Personnel]]
: [[TPD]] [[-7.2.12 "Emergency plan Training (]]
EPLAN) Training Program Description," Rev. 21
: [[TQ]] [[1 "Personnel Qualification and Training," Rev. 007-02]]
: [[MP]] [[-26-]]
: [[EPI]] [[-FAP07 "Notifications and Communications," Rev. 005]]
: [[MP]] [[-26-]]
: [[EPA]] [[-FAP01 "Management Program for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness,"Rev.002-03Sample of Student Qualification MatrixSection]]
: [[1EP]] [[4: Emergency Action Level (]]
: [[EAL]] [[) and Emergency Plan ChangesMP-26-EPA-FAP02, "Decrease in Effectiveness]]
: [[10CFR]] [[50.54(q) Determination," Rev. 001]]
: [[MP]] [[-26-EPA-FAP06, "Emergency Plan Change Process," Rev. 002Review NumbersMP-07-28MP-07-10MP-07-04MP-07-08]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-01]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-25]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-60]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-23]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-53]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-22]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-48]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-21]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-47]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-21]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-46]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-15]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-41]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-12]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-38]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-14]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-30]]
: [[MP]] [[-07-13]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-15]]
: [[MP]] [[-06-01Section]]
: [[1EP]] [[5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness WeaknessesSample of]]
: [[EP]] [[Related]]
: [[CR]] [[s from January 2006 - September 2007"]]
EP Assessment of 04/25/07 Unusual Event"
All CRs related to the 04/25/07 Unusual Event
50.54(t) Audits from 2006 and 2007
Sample of
: [[EP]] [[self-assessments from 2006 and 2007Drill Reports:]]
: [[CFD]] [[07-01,]]
: [[CFD]] [[07-02,]]
: [[CFD]] [[07-03,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-01,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-02,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-03,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-04,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-05,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-06,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-07,]]
: [[CFD]] [[06-08Section]]
: [[1EP]] [[6: Drill EvaluationOther DocumentsMillstone Unit 2 Training Drills]]
CFD 07-04
A-8AttachmentSection
: [[2OS]] [[3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective EquipmentProcedures:]]
RPM 1.3.7, Rev 7Lost, Off-Scale, or Questionable DosimetryRPM 1.3.14, Rev 7Personnel Dose Calculations and Assessments
: [[RPM]] [[1.6.4, Rev 4Siemens Electronic Dosimetry System]]
: [[RPM]] [[4.1.6, Rev 4]]
: [[HD]] [[-29A,]]
: [[HD]] [[-66A, and]]
: [[AVS]] [[-28A Air Sampler Calibration]]
: [[RPM]] [[4.3.7, Rev 4]]
RO-20 Dose Rate Meter Calibration
: [[RPM]] [[4.6.6, Rev 4Electronic Dosimeter Calibration Verification & Response Check]]
: [[RPM]] [[4.6.12, Rev 2]]
PCM-1B Contamination Monitor Calibration
: [[RPM]] [[4.6.24, Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Calibration]]
: [[RPM]] [[4.6.26, Rev 0Eberline Personnel Monitor]]
PM-7 Calibration
RPM 4.7.3 Rev 6Small Articles Monitor Operation
RPM 4.7.8, Rev 7Whole Body Counting System Operation
CP 2801/3801Rev 0Abacos Plus Whole Body Counting System Maintenance
RPM 4.8.1, Rev 6Measuring the Radiation Intensity of the J. L. Shepard Calibrator
RPM 4.8.11, Rev 7Response Checking Whole Body Contamination Monitors
RPM 4.8.14, Rev 5Instrumentation Quality Assurance Program
RPM 4.8.9, Rev 9Source Checking Health Physics Instruments
: [[SFP]] [[24, Rev 3Inspection & Inventory of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus]]
: [[FPI]] [[18, Rev 8Site Fire Protection Emergency Response Vehicle EquipmentInspection]]
IC 3490B10, Rev 6Calibration and Functional Test for Kaman Science AreaRadiation MonitorCondition Reports:04-08430, 04-08493, 04-09221, 04-10790, 04-01095, 05-01957, 05-02974, 05-06283,
05-06941, 05-09428, 05-13711, 06-00894, 06-02421, 06-03004, 06-07494, 06-09584,
06-10204, 06-11210, 06-12054, 06-12096, 06-12121Department Self-AssessmentsMP-SA-06-56, Portal Monitor and Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration ChecksMP-SA-06-69, Respiratory Protection Equipment for Emergency Response
: [[MP]] [[-]]
: [[SA]] [[-06-74, Review of Portable]]
: [[HP]] [[Instrument Calibration ProceduresNuclear Oversight Audits05-06,]]
RP/PCP/ Chem Programs06-04, Fire Protection Program
06-08, Radiological Protection and Process Control Program
07-06, Radiological Protection, Process Control Program, and ChemistrySCBA's Inspected:Pack Nos. 077,110, 021, 112, 084, 035, 434, 032, 039
Instrument Calibration Verification & Response Checks:Electronic Dosimeters: Nos. 64745, 66620, 63693, 15501,
: [[7051ARG]] [[]]
OS 4A/B: Nos. 121, 123, 095
SAM-11 Nos. 498, 493, 494, 495, 135
A-9AttachmentBC-4: Nos. 804, 805, 800, 1022Gamma Spectrometers: Nos. 07, 08, 15, 16SAC-4: Nos. 879
Ludlum 177: Nos, 208754, 208750, 208766
Ludlum 2241: Nos. 195206, 21374
Teleprobes: Nos. 454, 169
: [[RO]] [[-2 Nos. 1206, 2870, 2885, 350Other:Unit 2 and Unit 3 Student Qualification/Training Status Records for]]
SCBA training2007 2nd Quarter Radiation Monitoring System Health ReportsARGOS-4AB & SAM-11 Response to Unit 3 Plant Mix Evaluation
2007 Annual Validation of
: [[J.]] [[L. Shepherd Calibrators Nos. 9068, 9155Section 4]]
: [[OA]] [[1 - Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationOther DocumentsMP2 Cycle 17 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007MP3 Cycle 10 Power History, August 2005 - August 2007]]
: [[ERO]] [[Drill Participation]]
PI data, April 2006 - June 2007
Public Notification System
: [[PI]] [[data, April 2006 - June 2007]]
: [[DEP]] [[]]
: [[PI]] [[data, April 2006 - June 2007Section]]
: [[4OA]] [[2 -  Identification and Resolution of ProblemsProcedures]]
: [[SP]] [[3608.4, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 005-01SP]]
: [[3610A.]] [[3,]]
: [[RHR]] [[System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 007-01]]
: [[MP]] [[-16-]]
: [[CAP]] [[-FAP01.1, Condition Report Screening and Review, Rev. 008-04Completed TestsSP]]
: [[3610A.]] [[3-001,]]
: [[RHR]] [[System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train A, 7/13/07, 7/27/07SP]]
: [[3610A.]] [[3-003,]]
: [[RHR]] [[System Venting and Valve Lineup - Train B, 7/27/07]]
: [[SP]] [[3608.4-001, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train A and Common Header, 7/13/07, 8/10/07]]
SP 3608.4-003, High Pressure Injection System Vent and Valve Lineup Verification - Train B,  7/27/07, 8/27/07Drawings12179-EM-113A, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 2612179-EM-113B, High Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 32
2179-EM-112A, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 1, Rev. 44
2179-EM-112B, Low Pressure Safety Injection, Sh. 2, Rev. 21
2179-EM-102A, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 1, Rev. 26
2179-EM-102B, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 2, Rev. 21
2179-EM-102D, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 4, Rev. 18
2179-EM-102E, Reactor Coolant System, Sh. 5, Rev. 21
A-10AttachmentOther DocumentsSystem Health Report, Safety Injection Accumulators, 2nd Quarter 2007Condition Reports05-14026, 06-01813, 06-03781, 06-04097, 06-08164, 06-09518, 07-00792, 07-05639, 07-08553LIST
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[ACRONY]] [[MS3R11Unit 3 refueling outageADAMSAgencywide Documents Access and Management System]]
: [[AN]] [[]]
SAlert and Notification System
: [[AOP]] [[abnormal operating procedure]]
: [[ASM]] [[]]
EAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers
: [[CCP]] [[component cooling water]]
: [[CF]] [[]]
RCode of Federal Regulations
: [[CR]] [[condition report]]
: [[CR]] [[]]
: [[AC]] [[control room air conditioning]]
: [[DE]] [[]]
: [[PD]] [[rill and Exercise Performance]]
: [[DR]] [[]]
: [[PD]] [[ivision of Reactor Projects]]
: [[DR]] [[]]
: [[SD]] [[ivision of Reactor Safety]]
: [[EA]] [[]]
: [[LE]] [[mergency Action Level]]
: [[EB]] [[]]
FSenclosure building filtration system
EDGemergency diesel generator
: [[EP]] [[Emergency Preparedness]]
: [[ER]] [[]]
OEmergency Response Organization
: [[ESF]] [[engineered safety features]]
: [[HPS]] [[]]
: [[IH]] [[igh Pressure Safety Injection]]
: [[I&]] [[]]
CInstrumentation and Control
IMCinspection manual chapter
: [[MR]] [[maintenance rule]]
: [[NE]] [[]]
: [[IN]] [[uclear Energy Institute]]
: [[NR]] [[]]
CNuclear Regulatory Commission
: [[OAO]] [[ther Activities]]
: [[PAR]] [[]]
SPublicly Available Records System
PIperformance indicator
PMSpreventive maintenance tasks
: [[PMT]] [[post maintenance testing]]
: [[PO]] [[]]
RVpower operated relief valve
: [[QSS]] [[quench spray system]]
: [[RE]] [[]]
COreasonable expectation of confirmed operability
RPSreactor protection system
RSSrecirculation spray system
: [[SAM]] [[small articles monitor]]
: [[SC]] [[]]
BAself-contained breathing apparatus
SDPsignificance determination process
SIHhigh pressure safety injection system
A-11AttachmentSISsafety injection systemSITsafety injection tank
: [[SO]] [[]]
RCsite operations review committee
: [[SW]] [[service water]]
: [[TDA]] [[]]
: [[FW]] [[turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater]]
: [[TPC]] [[]]
CWturbine plant component cooling water
: [[TS]] [[technical specification]]
: [[UFS]] [[]]
ARupdated final safety analysis report
: [[WO]] [[work order]]
}}

Latest revision as of 07:30, 10 February 2019

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