IR 05000245/2009002: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams|number = ML091340064}}
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000336/2009002]]
 
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000245 | year = 2009 | report number = 002 }}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
[[Issue date::May 14, 2009]]
 
EA-09-044
 
Mr. David Christian Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
 
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2009002 AND 05000423/2009002 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
 
==Dear Mr. Christian:==
On March 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Millstone Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 9, 2009, with Mr. A. J. Jordan and other members of your staff.
 
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
 
This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in the report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the licensee identified violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone.
 
In addition, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report 50-423/2008-005, which described the details associated with the failure to maintain 3FWS*V861, "C" steam generator (SG) drain line isolation valve fully closed. This valve was relied on to meet technical specification (TS)
containment penetration requirements during fuel movement in the Unit 3 containment from November 1-3, 2008. This was a violation of TS Section 3.9.4.c., which requires each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the environment be closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve or be capable of being closed under administrative control during movement of fuel within the containment building. A risk evaluation was performed and the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance.
 
Although this issue constitutes a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC determined that the failure to completely close the valve was not within Dominion's ability to reasonably foresee and correct, and as a result, the NRC did not identify a performance deficiency associated with this condition. The NRC's assessment considered that the valve does not have position indication to provide an alternate means to verify valve position, there were no past condition reports (CR)
documenting difficulty in closing the valve, the work order (WO) documenting "like for like" valve replacement in 2007 did not indicate difficulty in operating the valve, and Dominion took corrective action to close the valve and enter the issue into their corrective action process.
 
Based on the results of the NRC's inspection and assessment, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement for this violation.
 
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 2.390 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,/RA by James W. Clifford Acting For/
David C. Lew, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-336, 50-423 License Nos. DPR-65, NPF-49
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report No. 05000336/2009002 and 05000423/2009002
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Information
 
cc w/encl: J. Price, Vice President, Engineering, Dominion Fleet A. Jordan, Site Vice President, Millstone Station C. Funderburk, Director, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support L. Morris, Plant Manager, Millstone Station W. Bartron, Supervisor, Station Licensing J. Spence, Manager Nuclear Training L. Cuoco, Senior Counsel C. Brinkman, Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company First Selectmen, Town of Waterford B. Sheehan, Chair, NEAC P. Rathbun, Vice-Chair, NEAC E. Wilds, Jr., Ph.D, Director, State of Connecticut SLO Designee
 
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
............................................................................................................3
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
.......................................................................................................................4
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
.................................................................................................................4 1R01  Adverse Weather Protection ..........................................................................................4 1R04  Equipment Alignment .....................................................................................................4 1R05  Fire Protection.................................................................................................................5 1R06  Flood Protection Measures ............................................................................................7 1R07  Heat Sink Performance ..................................................................................................7 1R11  Licensed Operator Requalification Program ..................................................................7 1R12  Maintenance Effectiveness ............................................................................................8 1R13  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .......................................9 1R15  Operability Evaluations ..................................................................................................9 1R18  Plant Modifications .......................................................................................................10 1R19  Post-Maintenance Testing  ..........................................................................................11 1R22  Surveillance Testing  ....................................................................................................12 1EP6  Drill Evaluation  ............................................................................................................12 
 
==RADIATION SAFETY==
.............................................................................................................13  2OS1  Access to Radiological Significant Areas....................................................................13  2OS2  ALARA Planning and Controls ...................................................................................15 
 
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
.............................................................................................................16
{{a|4OA1}}
==4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification ........................................................................16 4OA2==
Identification and Resolution of Problems....................................................................17
{{a|4OA3}}
==4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .......................................19 4OA5==
Other Activities.............................................................................................................22
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, including Exit................................................................................................22==
 
ATTACHMENT:
 
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
 
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
....................................................................................................A-1
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
........................................................A-1
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
........................................................................................A-2
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
...............................................................................................................A-9 
 
Enclosure
: [[SUMMAR]] [[Y]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[FINDIN]] [[]]
GS  IR 05000336/2009-002, 05000423/2009-002; January 1, 2009 - March 31, 2009; Millstone
Power Station Unit 2 and Unit 3.
 
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and region-based inspectors.
Two Green findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color
(Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance
Determination Process."  Findings for which the significance determination process (SDP) does
not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in
: [[NUR]] [[]]
: [[EG]] [[-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.]]
: [[A.]] [[]]
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings  Cornerstone:  Initiating Events  * Green. A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Dominion's failure to control Unit 3 Steam Generator (SG) levels while operating at
power. Specifically, Dominion's failure to control SG levels resulted in a reactor trip
while reducing power for a plant shutdown. Dominion entered this issue into their
corrective action program (CR113512), and corrective actions included conducting just-
in-time (JIT) training on low power feed station operation for licensed operators prior to
reactor start up. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance
Attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of
limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical
safety functions during power operations. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1
screening, in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and
determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not
contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation
equipment or functions would not be available. The inspectors determined that this
finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control,
because Dominion did not coordinate work activities, consistent with nuclear safety, by incorporating actions to address the operational impact on control room personnel
[H.3.(b)]. (Section 4OA3.1). B. Licensee-Identified Violations  One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and
corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Enclosure
: [[REPORT]] [[]]
DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Units 2 and 3 operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period. 1.
: [[REACTO]] [[R]]
SAFETY  Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)  .1 Seasonal Site Inspection  a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors reviewed Unit 3's readiness for seasonal cold weather. The inspectors
reviewed applicable procedures and performed walkdowns of the heat tracing, hot water
heating system, and space heaters to verify condition of the weather protection
equipment and determine if they were configured in accordance with Dominion=s procedures. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) and compared the analysis with procedure
requirements to ascertain that procedures were consistent with the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR. The
inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the Unit 3 intake structures, service water
(SW) systems, intake structure traveling screens, and condensate surge and storage tanks to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of seasonal
cold weather. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 
.2 External Flooding Inspection  a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors evaluated Dominion's protection from the effects of external flooding
conditions at Units 2 and 3. The inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) to identify the areas that could be affected by flooding. The inspectors reviewed
applicable procedures to verify that the actions required in the event of flooding could
reasonably be completed. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the intake
structures and flood doors to determine if the structures were as described in the
: [[FS]] [[]]
AR
and that the material condition of the structures and components was adequately
maintained. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
Enclosure  .1 Partial System Walkdowns  a. Inspection Scope (4 Samples)  The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns during this inspection period.
The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to determine the correct
system alignment. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of each system to determine if the critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned, in accordance with
the procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on
operability. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position checks, and
verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated
other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.
The following systems were reviewed based on their risk significance for the given plant
configuration:
Unit 2  * Train "A" motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW); * "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG);
Unit 3  * Train "A" Service Water (SW); and * "A" EDG.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.  .2 Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S)  a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 3
containment recirculation spray system. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the
"B" train of the system to assess critical equipment, such as breakers and valves, and were found in good condition and proper alignment in accordance with procedures. 
 
The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders (WO)
to determine if any deficiencies could significantly affect system function. In addition, the
inspectors reviewed the system health reports and corrective action database to
determine whether equipment problems were being identified and appropriately
resolved. The inspectors also interviewed the system engineer. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Enclosure .1 Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns (71111.05Q)  a. Inspection Scope (7 Samples)  The inspectors performed walkdowns of seven fire protection areas. The inspectors
reviewed Dominion's fire protection program to determine the required fire protection
design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the
selected areas. The inspectors walked down these areas to assess Dominion's control
of transient combustible material and ignition sources. In addition, the inspectors
evaluated the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression
capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors
compared the existing conditions of the areas to the fire protection program
requirements to determine if all program requirements were being met. Documents
reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The fire protection areas
reviewed included:
Unit 2  * "A" and "B" EDG Cubicles 14'-6", Fire Areas A-15/A-16; * Auxiliary Building Elevation -25'-6" Fire Area A1, Zones B, E, F; * Intake Structure Fire Area I-1, Zones A, B, and C;
Unit 3  * Auxiliary Building East Floor Area Elevation 24'-6", Fire Area
: [[AB]] [[-1, Zone C; * Auxiliary Building West Floor Area Elevation 24'-6", Fire Area]]
: [[AB]] [[-1, Zone D; * Control Building West Switchgear Area, Elevation 4'-6", Fire Area]]
: [[CB]] [[-1; and * Auxiliary Building East and West]]
: [[MCC]] [[and Rod Control, Elevation 24'-6", Fire Areas]]
: [[AB]] [[-5 and]]
AB-6 Zone A. b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)  a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample) Unit 3  The inspectors observed personnel performance during an unannounced fire brigade
drill on March 16, 2009, to evaluate the readiness of station personnel to fight fires. The
drill simulated a fire in the Unit 3 generator exciter and bearing areas. The inspectors
observed the fire brigade members using protective clothing, turnout gear, self-contained
breathing apparatus and entering the fire area. The inspectors also observed the fire
fighting equipment brought to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment
was available to effectively control and extinguish the simulated fire. The inspectors
evaluated whether the permanent plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire
area and whether hose usage was adequately simulated. The inspectors observed the
fire fighting directions and communications between fire brigade members. The
inspectors observed the response of control room personnel during the drill. The
Enclosure inspectors also evaluated whether the pre-planned drill scenario was followed and observed the post drill critique to evaluate if the drill objectives were satisfied and that
any drill weaknesses were discussed.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified.
1R06  Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors reviewed the flood protection measures for equipment in the Unit 3
Recirculation Spray System (RSS) Rooms. The inspectors evaluated Dominion's
protection of safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors
performed a walkdown of the area, interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the
internal flooding evaluation, and verified that preventive maintenance was being
performed on critical flood protection detection equipment to ensure that equipment and
conditions remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis and flooding
evaluation documents. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
Attachment. b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A)
a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors observed the as-found condition of the Unit 3 "B" EDG jacket water
cooler and engine air cooler water heat exchangers after they were opened to verify that
any adverse fouling concerns were appropriately addressed. The inspectors reviewed
the results of the inspections against the acceptance criteria contained within the
procedure to determine whether all acceptance criteria had been satisfied. The
inspectors also reviewed the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR to ensure that heat exchanger inspection results
were consistent with the design basis. Documents reviewed during the inspection are
listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)  .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope (2 Samples) The inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training for
Unit 2 on January 21, 2009, and for Unit 3 on January 27, 2009. The inspectors
evaluated crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of communications,
Enclosure ability to take timely actions, prioritization, interpretation and verification of alarms, procedure use, control board manipulations, oversight and direction from supervisors,
and command and control. Crew performance in these areas was compared to
Dominion management expectations and guidelines as presented in
: [[OP]] [[-]]
MP-100-1000,
AMillstone Operations Guidance and Reference Document.@  The inspectors compared simulator configurations with actual control board configurations. The inspectors also observed Dominion evaluators discuss identified weaknesses with the crew and/or
individual crew members, as appropriate. Documents reviewed during the inspection
are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q)    a. Inspection Scope (5 Samples)  The inspectors reviewed five samples of Dominion's evaluation of degraded conditions,
involving safety-related structures, systems and/or components for maintenance
effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Dominion's
implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors reviewed Dominion=s ability to identify and address common cause failures, the applicable maintenance rule scoping document for each system, the current classification of these systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2), and the adequacy of the performance criteria and
goals established for each system, as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed recent
system health reports, Condition Reports (CR), apparent cause determinations,
functional failure determinations, operating logs, and discussed system performance
with the responsible system engineer. Documents reviewed during the inspection are
listed in the Attachment. The specific systems/components reviewed were:  Unit 2  * Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST); * EDG, "B"; * Pressurizer Heaters;
Unit 3  * Normal Power
: [[NSST]] [[/]]
RSST; and * Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Load Sequencer.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)    a. Inspection Scope (7 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated online risk management for emergent and planned activities.
The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, and control
room logs to determine if concurrent planned and emergent maintenance or surveillance
activities adversely affected the plant risk already incurred with out of service (OOS)
components. The inspectors evaluated whether Dominion took the necessary steps to
control work activities, minimize the probability of initiating events, and maintain the
functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspectors assessed Dominion=s risk management actions during plant walkdowns. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the conduct and
adequacy of risk assessments for the following maintenance and testing activities:
 
Unit 2  * January 9, 2009, Yellow risk due to "B"
: [[EDG]] [[, "B" High Pressure Safety Injection (]]
: [[HPSI]] [[)]]
: [[OOS]] [[, and high trip risk due to environmental factors; * February 16, 2009, Green risk with a high trip risk due to Reactor Protection System (]]
: [[RPS]] [[) matrix logic and trip path relay test, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump was]]
: [[OOS]] [[due to emergent work on 2]]
MS-440 (main steam
instrument isolation valve to
: [[PI]] [[-4191); * February 18, 2009, Green risk with a high trip risk due to switchyard work, the "A" essential switchgear]]
OOS, the station air compressor OOS and the "F" air
compressor
: [[OOS]] [[;  * March 26, 2009, Yellow risk due to North Bus Outage high grid risk;  Unit 3  * February 25, 2009, Green Risk impacting "A" Quench Spray System (]]
QSS), Safety Injection (SI), and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps due to maintenance on the
room air conditioning (AC) unit,
: [[ACUS]] [[1A;  * February 27, 2009 Emergent repair of 3]]
: [[CHS]] [[*CV8152, outboard letdown isolation valve; and * March 17 - 20, 2009, failure of normal level control valve]]
: [[3HDL]] [[-]]
LV37B1, resulting in a trip of the "B" heater drain pump and subsequent down power to 90 percent power.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)  a. Inspection Scope (6 Samples)  The inspectors reviewed operability determinations (OD). The inspectors evaluated the
: [[OD]] [[s against the guidance contained in]]
NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900, Technical
Guidance, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of
Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety."  The inspectors
Enclosure also discussed the conditions with operators and system and design engineers, as necessary. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The
inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the following evaluations of degraded or
non-conforming conditions:
 
Unit 2  *
: [[OD]] [[000253 Revision 1, pressurizer proportional heater failure and similar pressurizer back-up heater failures; *]]
: [[CR]] [[324869, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) cross-tied to non-safety related equipment; *]]
: [[CR]] [[326558, Floor Drain Covered in the East End of the "A"]]
EDG Room;
Unit 3  *
: [[OD]] [[000247 Rev. 0, 3]]
: [[SIH]] [[*V028 was replaced and field weld 43 (FW-43) did not have required Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) performed; *]]
: [[OD]] [[000248 Rev. 0, Air volume in "B"]]
: [[SIH]] [[discharge piping; and *]]
: [[CR]] [[319295, Past operability determination of "B"]]
SIH discharge line. b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
a. Inspection Scope (4 Samples)
To assess the adequacy of the modifications, the inspectors performed walk downs of
selected plant systems and components, interviewed plant staff, and reviewed
applicable documents, including procedures, calculations, modification packages,
engineering evaluations, drawings, corrective action program documents, the
: [[UFSAR]] [[, and]]
TS. For the modifications reviewed, the inspectors determined whether selected
attributes (component safety classification, energy requirements supplied by supporting systems, seismic qualification, instrument setpoints, uncertainty calculations, electrical coordination, electrical loads analysis, and equipment environmental qualification) were
consistent with the design and licensing bases. Design assumptions were reviewed to
verify that they were technically appropriate and consistent with the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR. For each
modification, the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or safety evaluations were reviewed, as
described in Section 1R02 of this report. The inspectors also verified that procedures,
calculations, and the
: [[UFS]] [[]]
AR were properly updated with revised design information. In
addition, the inspectors verified that the as-built configuration was accurately reflected in
the design documentation and that post-modification testing was adequate to ensure the
structures, systems, and components would function properly. A listing of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment. The following modifications were reviewed: 
(1) Unit 2 permanent modification, Removal of "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Service  Water Inlet Strainer.
Enclosure (2) Unit 2 temporary modification, re-termination of the power supply of two pressurizer heaters from the back-up electrical supply to the safety related power supply
(L106), done to restore the proportional pressurizer heater banks to full capacity
following the failure of two heaters.    (3) Unit 2 temporary modification, temporary leak encapsulation of body to bonnet  leak at M22-CN-543, "B" SG feed pump suction vent 
  (4)  Unit 3 temporary modification for Supplemental Heating of the Feedwater Isolation        Valve Room was reviewed.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)    a. Inspection Scope (7 Samples)  The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance test (PMT) activities to determine
whether the PMT adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the
equipment was satisfied, given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of
the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable test
acceptance criteria to evaluate consistency with the associated design and licensing
bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors also evaluated whether conditions
adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following
maintenance activities and PMTs were evaluated:
 
Unit 2  * "A" Emergency Building Filtration System filter replacement on January 30, 2009; * Encapsulation of the steam leak on 2-CN-543 condensate vent connection isolation valve on March 6, 2009;
Unit 3  * Control Building
: [[AC]] [[Booster Pump 3]]
: [[SWP]] [[*P2A motor replacement on January 24, 2009; * "A"]]
: [[SG]] [[Feed Line Isolation Valve 3]]
: [[FWS]] [[*CTV41A air line repair on February 3, 2009; * T/Tavg Channel 4 Calibration on February 6, 2009, following repairs due to channel failure; * Stepdown transformer replacement for 120V vital]]
: [[AC]] [[bus 3 on February 26, 2009; and * Station Black Out (]]
SBO) Diesel maintenance on 3/5/09. b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)    a. Inspection Scope (8 Samples)  The inspectors reviewed eight surveillance activities to determine whether the testing
adequately demonstrated equipment operational readiness and the ability to perform the
intended safety-related function. The inspectors attended pre-job briefings, reviewed
selected prerequisites and precautions to determine if they were met, and observed the
tests to determine whether they were performed in accordance with the procedural
steps. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the applicable test acceptance criteria to
evaluate consistency with associated design bases, licensing bases, and TS
requirements and that the applicable acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors
also evaluated whether conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective
action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in
the Attachment. The following surveillance activities were evaluated:
 
Unit 2  *
: [[SP]] [[2664B and]]
: [[SP]] [[2664C, ""A" and "B" Charging Pump Pulsation Dampener Test," Revision 000-02 on February 2, 2009; *]]
: [[SP]] [[2605G-008 and]]
SP 2605G-012, "SG Blowdown and Sample Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Stroke and Timing In Service Testing (IST), Facilities 1 & 2,"
Revision 000-04;
Unit 3  *
: [[SP]] [[3616A.1-016, "Local Operation Test of 3]]
: [[MSS]] [[*MOV74A &]]
: [[3MSS]] [[*]]
: [[MOV]] [[74C," Rev. 000-03 on January 15, 2009; *]]
: [[SP]] [[3712B-001, "Pressurizer Heater Capacity Surveillance Testing," Rev. 006-03 on January 28, 2009; *]]
: [[SP]] [[]]
: [[3712NC]] [[-001, "Vital Battery Charger Surveillance Load Testing," Rev. 007-01 on January 28, 2009; *]]
: [[SP]] [[3622.3-001, "TDAFW Pump Operational Readiness Test," Rev. 014-02 (IST) on January 30, 2009; *]]
: [[SP]] [[3680.1-003, "Containment Leakage Trending," Rev. 002-01 (Reactor Coolant System (]]
: [[RCS]] [[) leakage detection) on February 17, 2009; and *]]
: [[SP]] [[31002, "Plant Calorimetric," Rev. 010-10 on March 12, 2009. b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness (]]
EP)  1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
Enclosure .1 Classification and Notification During Requalification Training
a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors reviewed the operator's emergency classification and notification
completed during Unit 3 requalification training on January 27, 2009. The inspectors
verified the classification and notification were accurate and timely.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 2.
: [[RADIAT]] [[]]
: [[ION]] [[]]
: [[SAFETY]] [[Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety  2]]
OS1 Access to Radiological Significant Areas (71121.01)  a.      Inspection Scope (10 Samples)  During the period February 23 - 26, 2009, the inspectors conducted the following
activities to verify that the licensee was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls for access to locked high radiation areas (LHRA), and other
radiological controlled areas (RCA) during normal power operations, and that workers
were adhering to these controls when working in these areas. Implementation of these
controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, relevant to Millstone
Unit 2 and Unit 3 TS and the licensee's procedures. This activity represents the completion of 10 samples relative to this inspection area,
which partially completes the annual inspection requirement of twenty one.
Plant Walkdown and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews 
(1) The inspectors toured accessible RCAs in Unit 2 and Unit 3, and with the assistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent radiation
surveys of selected areas and components, to confirm the accuracy of survey data, and the adequacy of postings. Plant areas inspected included the Auxiliary
Buildings, Waste Buildings, and Fuel Storage Buildings.  (2) The inspectors identified plant areas where radiological significant work activities were being performed. These activities included making preparations for a Unit 3
spent resin transfer and preparing for transferring high activity Tri-Nuke filters to
a shipping container from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The inspectors reviewed the
applicable RWPs and job history files for these activities, to determine if the
radiological controls were acceptable, discussed the status of preparations with
the Unit 3 Radiation Protection Supervisor, and reviewed the electronic
dosimeter dose/dose rate alarm set points to determine if the set points were
consistent with plant policy.  (3) The inspectors determined that there were no current RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures to
exceed 50 mrem. The inspectors reviewed the daily quality control checks
Enclosure performed on various airborne counting instruments (SAC-4, BC-4) to confirm that the instruments were operational. 
(4) The inspectors determined that during 2008, there were no internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposures that reached the reporting
threshold of greater than 10 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE).
The inspectors also reviewed data for the five highest exposed individuals for
2008, the dose/dose rate alarm reports, related CRs, and determined that no
exposure exceeded site administrative, regulatory, or performance indicator criteria. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no declared pregnant workers
were employed during 2008. Problem Identification and Resolution 
(5) A review of Nuclear Oversight assessment reports and field observation reports were conducted to determine if dose significant jobs were routinely monitored,
radiological protection programs were effectively evaluated, and problems related
to implementing radiological controls were entered into the corrective action
program for resolution. 
(6) CRs associated with radiation protection control access that were initiated between October 2008 and February 2009, were reviewed and discussed with
the licensee staff to determine if the follow-up activities were being conducted in
an effective and timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls  (7) Procedures for controlling access to High Radiation Areas (HRA) and Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA) were reviewed to determine if the administrative and
physical controls were adequate. The inspectors determined that a recently
implemented corporate procedure (RP-AA-201, Access Controls for High and
Very High Radiation Areas), provided additional controls over the replaced site
procedure RPM 5.1.3, that was previously implemented. The inspectors also
evaluated access controls for
: [[VHRA]] [[areas in Unit 3, by reviewing procedure]]
OP
3361A, "Personnel Access Control to the MID System Components Inside
Containment," and interviewing control room personnel.  (8)    Keys to
: [[VHRA]] [[s stored in the Unit 3 Control Room were inventoried and accessible.]]
LHRAs were verified to be properly secured and posted during plant
tours. Radiation Worker and Radiation Protection Technician Performance 
(9) Several radiological related CRs were reviewed to evaluate if the incidents resulted from repetitive worker errors and to determine if an observable pattern
traceable to a similar cause was evident. 
(10) The inspectors attended daily Unit 3 Radiation Protection department planning meetings to assess the timeliness of information and level of detail provided to
technicians for ongoing tasks. Radiation Protection Technicians and radworkers
Enclosure were questioned regarding their knowledge of plant radiological conditions and associated controls.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified.
: [[2OS]] [[2]]
ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope (8 Samples)  During the period February 23 - 26, 2009, the inspectors verified that the licensee was
properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) for past activities performed during 2008. Also reviewed were dose controls for current activities and
preparations for the Unit 2 fall (2R19) 2009 refueling outage. Implementation of these
controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry
standards, and the licensee's procedures. Radiological Work Planning  (1) The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing activities to assess past 2008
performance and dose challenges for 2009, including the Unit 2 fall refueling
outage (2R19). 
(2) The inspectors reviewed the exposure data for tasks performed during 2008 and compared actual exposure with forecasted estimates. Included in this review
were the tasks performed during the Unit 3 (3R12) refueling outage, on-line tasks
performed for both operating units, and Unit 2 dry cask loading/storage
operations. 
(3) The inspectors evaluated the departmental interfaces between radiation protection, operations, maintenance crafts, and engineering to identify missing
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA program elements and interface problems. The evaluation was
accomplished by reviewing recent
: [[ALARA]] [[Council meeting minutes,]]
: [[ALARA]] [[Evaluations, departmental dose summaries, attending an]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA Council
meeting, and interviewing the
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA coordinator. The inspectors also reviewed the Radiation Protection Department Continuous
Improvement Initiatives and the 5-year
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA Plan (2007-2011) that identifies
areas for further improving radiological controls. Verification of Dose Estimates 
(4) The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the annual 2008 site collective exposure projections for routine power operations and maintenance
activities, and compared the estimated dose with the actual dose received by
workers. The inspectors also reviewed the dose projections for the upcoming
2R19 refueling outage to determine the exposure challenges and preparations
being made for dose significant activities; e.g. thimble tube replacements.
Enclosure  (5) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures associated with monitoring and re-evaluating dose estimates when the forecasted cumulative exposure for
tasks differed from the actual dose received. The inspectors reviewed the
dose/dose rate alarm reports and exposure data for selected individuals
receiving the highest total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) exposures for 2008
to confirm that no individual exposure exceeded the regulatory limit, or met the
performance indicator reporting guideline. Jobs-In-Progress 
(6) The inspectors reviewed the
: [[RWP]] [[s, associated]]
ALARA Evaluations (AE) and observed various preparations for jobs-in-progress performed at Unit 3, including
transferring spent resin to a shipping cask (RWP3-09-17/AE3-09-02), and
transferring spent Tri-Nuke mechanical filters to a waste disposal container
(RWP 3-09-42/AE3-09-10). 
(7) The inspectors reviewed recent
: [[AE]] [[s developed for controlling low dose tasks. These]]
AEs addressed various Unit 2 maintenance tasks including cleaning tanks
T-20A/B (AE2-09-01), removal of fuel sipping equipment (AE2-09-09),
: [[RW]] [[]]
ST
header vent testing (AE2-09-02), and a Unit 3 containment entry at power to
perform a test on valve
: [[3SIH]] [[-V028 (]]
: [[AE]] [[3-09-01). Problem Identification and Resolution  (8)      The inspectors reviewed elements of the licensee's corrective action program related to implementing the]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA program to determine if problems were being
entered into the program for timely resolution. CRs related to controlling
individual personnel exposure and programmatic
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA challenges were
reviewed.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 4.
: [[OTHER]] [[]]
: [[ACTIVI]] [[TIES [OA]]]
: [[4OA]] [[1 Performance Indicator (]]
PI) Verification (71151)  .1 Cornerstone: Initiating Events  a. Inspection Scope (2 Samples) The inspectors reviewed Dominion submittals for the PIs listed below to verify the
accuracy of the data reported during that period. The PI definitions and guidance
contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02,
: [[AR]] [[egulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline,@ Revision 5, were used to verify the basis for reporting each data element. The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs, monthly operating reports, and Licensee Event Reports (]]
LER) and discussed the methods for compiling and reporting
the PIs with cognizant licensing and engineering personnel. Documents reviewed during
the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
Enclosure Unit 3  *
: [[RCS]] [[Leak Rate from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008; and *]]
RCS Specific Activity from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems  .1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program  a. Inspection Scope  As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into
Dominion's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the
description of each new CR and attending daily management review committee
meetings. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 
.2 Annual Sample Review of Corrective Actions Related to Simulator Testing and Fidelity
a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors performed a focused review of the actions taken and planned in
response to CR-108371 (Documentation of Simulator Testing Not Complete). The
review included a sample of simulator tests that occurred during the period of time from
2006 to 2009 on both units. The inspectors reviewed root cause evaluations, associated
CRs, corrective actions taken, technical evaluations, and planned corrective actions.
The inspectors also interviewed personnel and conducted a walkdown of the Unit 2 and
Unit 3 simulators. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations  No findings of significance were identified.
 
There were some significant deviations between the Unit 2 and Unit 3 core neutronics
model and the reference plants. The licensee is currently taking credit for initial
licensing reactivity manipulations in the simulator.
 
The Unit 2 and Unit 3 simulator control banks at 100% power (Unit 2 control bank 7, Unit
control bank "D") differential rod worth coefficients were significantly less than the
reference plant values in the upper half of the core. These values did not meet the
requirements of
: [[ANS]] [[/]]
ANSI-3.5-1998 section 4.1.3.2(1) for normal evolutions. This
Enclosure deviation caused the simulator core temperature response to be less than the reference plant during a rapid downpower maneuver. This deviation could potentially affect operator response during a rapid plant downpower. This deviation was first identified in
2006 and again in 2008 during Licensed Operator Requalification Inspections. The
corrective action specified was to conduct a training needs assessment. The needs
assessment had not yet been completed as of this inspection cycle. In addition, on Unit
3, control bank "C" integral rod worth was 52% higher, and shutdown bank "A" integral
rod worth was 23% higher than the reference plant. These deviations from
: [[ANS]] [[/]]
ANSI
3.5-1998 were also documented but were neither corrected nor properly addressed in
the training program.
 
The Unit 2 simulator normal annual startup test had not been completed for refueling
cycle 2R18. This test was later accomplished for 2R19. Simulator core performance
tests had been completed for the beginning of cycle (BOC) conditions but not for middle
of cycle (MOC) or end of cycle (EOC) conditions for 2R19. When taking credit for
operator licensing reactivity manipulations in the simulator, the core performance fidelity
should be verified for the same or similar conditions under which the manipulations are
being credited. 
 
The Unit 2 simulator response for 4160 VAC breaker closure when synchronizing
between two power sources did not closely match the reference plant response. For
example, while conducting an
: [[NRC]] [[Job Performance Measure (]]
JPM) in the simulator
(paralleling the Unit
: [[2 RSST]] [[to the "A"]]
EDG per EOP-2541 "Restoring Electrical Power"
23-H step 9), the operator was required to close breaker A302. Breaker
A302 would not close in the simulator until after the sychroscope pointer was aligned at
the 12:00 position. The procedure explicitly requires the operator to close the breaker
when the sychroscope pointer passes the 11:00 position. If the operator performs the
procedure as written, and releases the breaker prior to reaching the 12:00 position
(because the pointer is moving slowly), the breaker will not close. The breaker in the
reference plant will close between the 11:00 and 1:00 positions during the time when the
check relay is activated. The same deviation was identified during previous initial
license training (ILT) and licensed operator requalification training (LORT) exams. The
problem had been the subject of a simulator Discrepancy Report (DR) after the 2005
Unit 2 initial licensing exam but the DR was closed without taking any corrective action
or conducting a training needs assessment. 
.3 Annual Sample Unit 3 Radiation Monitors
a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)
The inspectors performed a focused review of the Unit 3 radiation monitors in response
to a number of issues associated with the monitors. The review included equipment
issues from 2007 to 2009. The inspectors interviewed the system engineer, reviewed
system health reports, CRs, associated maintenance rule evaluations and apparent
cause evaluations, the (a)(1) action plan for RE16B, and planned corrective actions.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
 
Enclosure The inspectors identified that failures of maintenance rule performance criteria 105b for radiation monitors that are used to detect a SG tube event were not being tracked.
Specifically, there had been two failures in a 24 month period (criteria is less than four),
neither of which had been recorded. The inspectors also identified that unavailability
hours for performance criteria 1.07 had not been adequately tracked. Specifically, the
system engineer knew that even though the unavailability hours associated with the loss of both PDP computers did not exceed the performance criteria, the engineer had not
recorded the hours.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) 
.1 (Closed) LER 05000423/2008002-00, Failure of Four Main Steam Safety Valves to Lift Within the Acceptance Criteria  On October 9 and 10, 2008, with the plant at 100% power, four main steam safety
valves failed to lift within the acceptance criteria (+/-3%) of TS 3.7.1.1. Dominion
attributed the failures to corrosive oxide locking action between surface layer materials
of the disk-seat interface, referred to as "oxide locking". After testing, the safety valves
were adjusted within +/-1% of the TS acceptance criteria. Dominion entered this issue
into their corrective action process
: [[CR]] [[113238. The inspectors reviewed this]]
LER and
associated
: [[CR]] [[s. No findings were identified. This failure to comply with]]
TS 3.7.1.1
constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in
accordance with the
: [[NRC]] [['s Enforcement Policy. This]]
LER is closed.
.2 (Closed)
: [[LER]] [[05000423/2008005-00, Containment Penetration Not Fully Closed During Fuel Movement  On November 5, 2008, with the plant in Mode 6, operators discovered that 3]]
FWS*V861,
"C"
: [[SG]] [[drain line isolation valve, which was relied on to meet]]
TS containment
penetration requirements during fuel movement in containment, was not fully closed. TS
3.9.4.c requires that each penetration providing direct access from the containment
atmosphere to the environment be closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve or be capable of being closed under administrative control during movement of fuel
within the containment building. Dominion's investigation subsequently determined that
the valve had been in this condition during fuel movements inside containment from
0430 on November 1, 2008 until 0915 on November 3, 2008. Operators identified that
the valve was leaking while filling the "C" SG on November 5, 2008. They attempted to
close the valve and were not successful until mechanical leverage was applied.
 
The inspectors reviewed the LER and Dominion's apparent cause evaluation of the
event. The inspectors determined that the failure to completely close valve 3FWS*V861
was not within Dominion's ability to foresee and correct and was not a performance
deficiency. Valve 3FWS*V861 does not have position indication. The operator who
closed the valve and the operator who performed the independent verification did not
have an alternate means to verify that the valve was completely closed. Additionally, when the valve was identified to be leaking while filling the SG, it was only able to be
completely closed when mechanical leverage was applied. A review of previous work
orders (WOs) revealed that the valve was replaced "like for like" in 2007 due to seat
leakage. A different packing was used which required more force to consolidate. Also,
the packing gland was torqued per procedure when, previously, the packing was
tightened using "good mechanical practices."  Because of these changes, more force
Enclosure would be required to operate the valve; however, there was no indication in the
: [[2007 WO]] [[that the valve was difficult to operate. A review of the]]
CRs associated with this
valve did not indicate any previous problems in operating the valve. Because of these details, the inspectors concluded that the inability to fully close valve 3FWS*V861 could
not have reasonably been avoided or detected by Dominion's quality assurance program
or other related control measures. The inspectors also performed a Phase1 SDP
analysis and determined the violation to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Dominion's corrective actions included closing the valve, entering the issue into their
corrective action process (CR 117527), changing the position verification procedure to
specify physical verification versus visual, and plans to modify the valve during the next refueling outage to improve the stroking function. Therefore, in accordance with Section
: [[VII.B.]] [[6 of the Enforcement Policy, the]]
NRC has chosen to exercise enforcement
discretion and not issue a violation for this issue. This
: [[LER]] [[is closed.  .3 (Closed)]]
LER 05000423/2008003-00, Automatic Reactor Trip During Shutdown for Refueling Outage 3R12  On October 11, 2008, Unit 3 received an automatic reactor trip at approximately 30%
power, while the unit was reducing power in preparation for a refueling outage. The
control room operators were in manual control of the feedwater system. The plant was
experiencing
: [[SG]] [[level oscillations as a result of removing feedwater system components from service. Oscillations increased and the "A"]]
SG reached its high-high setpoint,
resulting in an automatic turbine trip and feedwater isolation.  "C" and "D" SG levels
shrank to their low-low level setpoint which caused an automatic reactor trip. The inspectors witnessed Unit 3's reactor trip and observed plant response and operator
actions in order to evaluate the performance of the mitigating systems and the control
room operators. The inspectors also reviewed the post trip review report and root cause
evaluation. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. Introduction:  A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Dominion's failure to control Unit 3 SG levels while operating at power.
Specifically, Dominion's failure to control SG levels resulted in a reactor trip while
reducing power in preparation for a plant shutdown. Description:  On October 11, 2008, Millstone Unit 3 was reducing power in preparation for its 12th refueling outage. An operator was stationed at main board 5 to remove the "A" Turbine Driven Feedwater Pump (TDFWP) from service when power was less than
50%. The operator remained in place and responded to numerous
: [[SG]] [[level oscillations.]]
: [[TDFWP]] [[speed was raised out of the normal range to increase differential pressure (]]
DP)
across the feedwater regulating valves (FRVs) because the operator believed this would
assist in controlling the level oscillations. Another operator noticed the high DP and brought it to the attention of the unit
supervisor. The unit supervisor stationed this operator at the feed station to restore feed
to steam
: [[DP]] [[to normal. The operator lowered feed pump speed which caused the]]
FRVs
to open in order to maintain the same flow. As the FRVs opened, feed header pressure
dropped and the operator increased feed pump speed to recover DP. This sent a large
amount of relatively cold water to the
: [[SG]] [[s before the]]
FRVs could be closed. As the
water in the
: [[SG]] [[s expanded due to heating, levels in the "A" and "B"]]
SGs reached the
high-high setpoint. This caused a turbine trip and feedwater isolation.  "C" and "D" SGs
shrank to the low-low level setpoint, resulting in an automatic reactor trip.
Enclosure Dominion's root cause evaluation determined that the organization, with respect to monitoring and measuring crew performance, was not effective in implementing programs designed to manage challenges to the operators during a plant shutdown.
While the organization was aware of the challenges in manually operating the feed
station, it did not identify the need to improve the feed station's overall performance via
the corrective action process. Additionally, a decrease in proficiency in manual feed
station operation at low power levels was not identified, lower power feed station
operation was not covered in JIT training, and the feed station operator had not received
JIT training. The root cause evaluation also determined that inadequate rigor for outage
preparation expectations resulted in Operations being challenged prior to and during the
shutdown. Also, the control room operators were distracted by numerous tagging-
related shutdown activities during the shutdown.
 
Analysis:  The inspectors determined that Dominion's failure to maintain control of Unit
: [[3 SG]] [[levels was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the failure to control]]
SG levels
resulted in a reactor trip while reducing power in preparation for a plant shutdown.
Traditional enforcement does not apply because there were no actual safety
consequences, impacts on the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, or willful
aspects of the finding. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance
Attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of
limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical
safety functions during power operations. Specifically, Dominion's failure to control SG
levels resulted in an automatic reactor trip while reducing power in preparation for a
plant shutdown. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening, in accordance with
IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and determined that the finding is of
very low safety significance (Green) because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of
a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be
available. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of
Human Performance, Work Control, because Dominion did not coordinate work
activities, consistent with nuclear safety, by incorporating actions to address the
operational impact on control room personnel [H.3.(b)]. Enforcement:  No violation of regulatory requirements occurred, because the main feed pumps, feed regulating and bypass valves, and SG level control system are not safety-related. Because this finding does not involve a violation of regulatory requirements and
has very low safety significance, it is identified as a finding. Dominion entered this issue
into their corrective action program (CR113512) and corrective actions included
conducting training in low power feed station operation for licensed operators prior to reactor start up.  (FIN 05000423/2009002-01, Failure to Control Steam Generator Water Levels Results in Automatic Reactor Trip)  .4 (Closed) LER 05000423/2008006-00, Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Trap Isolation Valves Found Closed  On November 24, 2008, Dominion determined that at 0025, with the plant at 18% power,
Unit 3 control room operators identified that the
: [[TDA]] [[]]
FW pump steam trap isolation
valves were closed. The
: [[TDA]] [[]]
FW pump was declared inoperable and Technical
Enclosure Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.7.1.2.c was entered. The valves were promptly opened, steam traps blown down, the
: [[TDA]] [[]]
: [[FW]] [[pump restored to operable status and the]]
: [[TS]] [[]]
AS exited at 0346. Dominion's investigation determined that the valves were
inoperable since November 22, 2008 at 1746, a total of 34 hours. During this 34 hour
period, the unit went through two mode changes (Mode 3 to Mode 1). This licensee-
identified finding is a violation of
: [[TS]] [[3.0.4 which in part requires that the]]
TDAFW pump
be operable prior to changing operational modes. The enforcement aspects of this
finding are discussed in Section
: [[4OA]] [[7. This]]
: [[LER]] [[is closed.]]
: [[4OA]] [[5 Other Activities  .1 World Association of Nuclear Operators (]]
: [[WANO]] [[) Peer Review Report. a. Inspection Scope (1 Sample)  The inspectors reviewed the report for the]]
: [[WA]] [[]]
NO plant assessment of Millstone Nuclear
Generating Station conducted June 2008. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure
that issues identified were consistent with the NRC perspectives of Millstone
performance and to verify that the
: [[WANO]] [[team did not identify any safety significant issues requiring further]]
NRC follow-up.
b. Findings  No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, including Exit  Exit Meeting Summary  On April 9, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the overall inspection results to Mr. A. J. Jordan, and members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary
information was provided or examined during the inspection. 4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) or Severity Level IV was
identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria
of the
: [[NRC]] [[Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (]]
NCV). TS 3.0.4 states, in part, that entry into an operational mode shall not be made when the
conditions for the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated action
requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Contrary to this,
from November 22, 2008 at 17:46 until November 24, 2008 at 03:46, Unit 3 did not meet
the conditions for
: [[TS]] [[3.7.1.2,]]
AFW system due to an isolated steam trap, and
transitioned from mode 3 to mode 1. Dominion restored the AFW system to operability
and entered the issue into their corrective action process, CR120030. This finding is of
very low safety significance because the finding does not involve a loss of system safety function or a loss of safety functions of a single train for greater than its TS allowed
outage time.
Enclosure
: [[ATTACH]] [[]]
: [[MENT]] [[:]]
: [[SUPPLE]] [[]]
: [[MENTAL]] [[]]
: [[INFORM]] [[]]
: [[ATION]] [[Attachment]]
: [[SUPPLE]] [[]]
: [[MENTAL]] [[]]
: [[INFORM]] [[]]
: [[ATION]] [[]]
: [[KEY]] [[]]
: [[POINTS]] [[]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
CONTACT  Licensee personnel
G. Auria  Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor
B. Bartron  Supervisor, Licensing
P. Baumann  Manager, Security
: [[C.]] [[Chapin  Supervisor, Nuclear Shift Operations Unit 2]]
: [[A.]] [[Chyra  Nuclear Engineer,]]
PRA
T. Cleary  Licensing Engineer
G. Closius  Licensing Engineer
: [[L.]] [[Crone  Supervisor, Nuclear Chemistry]]
: [[J.]] [[Dorosky  Health Physicist]]
: [[III]] [[]]
: [[M.]] [[Finnegan  Supervisor, Health Physics,]]
ISFSI
R. Griffin  Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
W. Gorman  Supervisor, Instrumentation & Control
J. Grogan  Assistant Operations Manager
C. Houska  I&C Technician
A. Jordan  Site Vice President
J. Kunze  Supervisor, Nuclear Operations Support
B. Krauth  Licensing, Nuclear Technology Specialist
J. Laine  Manager, Radiation Protection/Chemistry
B. Barron  Manager, Nuclear Oversight
P. Luckey  Manager, Emergency Preparedness
R. MacManus  Director, Engineering
M. O'Connor  Manager, Engineering
L. Morris  Plant Manager
M. Roche  Senior Nuclear Chemistry Technician
J. Semancik  Manager, Operations
A. Smith  Asset Management
S. Smith  Supervisor, Nuclear Shift Operations Unit 3
J. Spence  Manager, Training
: [[S.]] [[Turowski  Supervisor, Health Physics Technical Services]]
: [[C.]] [[Vournazos]]
: [[IT]] [[Specialist, Meteorological Data]]
: [[LIST]] [[]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[ITEMS]] [[]]
: [[OPENED]] [[,]]
: [[CLOSED]] [[,]]
: [[AND]] [[]]
: [[DISCUS]] [[]]
SED  Opened and Closed
Closed 05000423/2008002-00
: [[LER]] [[Failure of Four Main Steam Safety Valves to Lift Within the Acceptance Criteria (Section 4]]
OA3). 05000423/2008003-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip During Shutdown for Refueling
Attachment Outage 3R12 (Section
: [[4OA]] [[3). 05000423/2008005-00]]
: [[LER]] [[Containment Penetration Not Fully Closed During Fuel Movement (Section]]
: [[4OA]] [[3). 05000423/2008006-00]]
: [[LER]] [[Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Trap Isolation Valves Found Closed (Section 4OA3).]]
: [[BASELI]] [[]]
: [[NE]] [[]]
: [[INSPEC]] [[]]
: [[TION]] [[]]
: [[PROCED]] [[]]
: [[URE]] [[]]
: [[PERFOR]] [[]]
MED  71121.01    Access Controls to Radiological Significant Areas  2OS1
71121.02
: [[ALARA]] [[Planning and Controls  2]]
: [[OS]] [[2]]
: [[LIST]] [[]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[DOCUME]] [[]]
: [[NTS]] [[]]
: [[REVIEW]] [[]]
: [[ED]] [[Section 1R01:  Adverse Weather Protection]]
: [[AOP]] [[2560,"Storms, High Winds and High Tides," Rev. 010-04]]
AOP 3569, "Severe Weather Conditions'" Rev. 016-00
C
: [[OP]] [[200.13, "Cold Weather Preparations," Rev. 002-02]]
: [[DM]] [[2-00-0389-06, "Modification to]]
: [[MP]] [[2 EDG Security Gate and Flood Door Sill Installation"]]
: [[MP]] [[2721C, "Protection and Restoration of Service Water Pump Motor During a]]
PMH," Rev.
007-02
OP 3314G, "Intake Structure Ventilation," Rev. 009-06
OP 3331B, "Plant Heating," Rev. 011-04
OP 3352, "Heat Tracing," Rev. 013-03
SP 2665, "Building Flood Gate Inspections," Rev. 005-05
2341A - Fire Doors and Barriers System Health Report 4th Quarter 2008 M2 07 03237
CR121295
CR318618
CR318654
CR326339
Section 1R04:  Equipment Alignment
: [[OP]] [[3322, "Auxiliary Feedwater Train A," Revision 006]]
DWG No. 25212-26390 sheet 2
OP 3326-01, "Train A Service Water System," Rev. 009-03
: [[OP]] [[3326-02, "Train B Service Water System," Rev. 009-03]]
: [[OP]] [[3326-03, "]]
RPCCW A Service Water System Supply," Rev. 004-01
: [[OP]] [[3326-09, "Service Water System - Control Building Air Cond "A" Supply," Rev. 007]]
: [[OP]] [[3326-18, "]]
MCC and Rod Control Area A/C A Service Water System Supply," Rev. 007-01
: [[OP]] [[3326-23, "Service Water Electrical Checklist," Rev. 007-03]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-001, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[A - Cooling Water Valve Lineup," Rev. 007]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-002, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[B - Cooling Water Valve Lineup," Rev. 007]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-003, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[A - Lube Oil Valve Lineup," Rev. 006-01]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-004, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[B - Lube Oil Valve Lineup," Rev. 006-01]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-005, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[A - Starting Air Valve Lineup," Rev. 008-02]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-006, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[B - Starting Air Valve Lineup," Rev. 009-02]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-007, "]]
EDG A - Crankcase Vacuum Valve Lineup," Rev. 005
Attachment
: [[OP]] [[3346A-008, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[B - Crankcase Vacuum Valve Lineup," Rev.]]
: [[005 OP]] [[3346A-009, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[A - Instrument Valve Lineup," Rev. 006-01]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-010, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[B - Instrument Valve Lineup," Rev. 007-01]]
: [[OP]] [[3346A-011, "]]
: [[EDG]] [[A - Electrical Lineup," Rev. 009]]
: [[MP]] [[-20-]]
: [[WP]] [[-GDL20 Attachment 15.1, "Scaffold Evaluation for]]
: [[WO]] [[53102186740 Unit 2 "B"]]
EDG  Section 1R05:  Fire Protection Millstone Unit 2 Firefighting Strategies, April 2002 Millstone Unit 3 Firefighting Strategies, April 2002
Millstone Unit 3 Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Rev. 16
203-SP-M2-SU-1046 Rev 00, Millstone Unit 2 Appendix "R" Compliance Report  Section 1R06:  Flood Protection Measures Millstone Unit 3 Internal Flooding Evaluation Reactor Plant Aerated Drains (contaminated) System Health Report 4th quarter 2007 and
: [[2008 DCR]] [[M3-97079, "Containment Recirculation Cubicle Sumps 3]]
DAS-SUMP7A/B Design
Change," Rev. 1
M3-EV-08-0029, "Technical Evaluation for
: [[DAS]] [[System and]]
ECCS Limited Passive Failure
Design Criteria/EQ Program Switch Submergence," Rev. 3
M3-EV-970281, "Technical Evaluation for
: [[EC]] [[]]
CS Passive Failure Design Criteria," Rev. 3
M3 05 15754
M3 06 02859  Section 1R07:  Heat Sink Performance
: [[EN]] [[31084, "Operating Strategy for Service Water System at Millstone Unit 3," Rev. 007 Service Water Cooled Heat Exchangers Inspection Forms for "B"]]
: [[EDG]] [[Heat Exchangers,]]
: [[3EGS]] [[*E1B and 3]]
EGS*E2B
CR323008
Section 1R11:  Licensed Operator Requalification Program Unit
: [[2 LORT]] [[Operating Exercise #2, Degraded Voltage]]
: [[MP]] [[3]]
: [[LOIT]] [[/]]
: [[LORT]] [[,]]
: [[LORT]] [[]]
: [[SE]] [[46, Rev. 2]]
: [[OP]] [[-]]
: [[MP]] [[-100-1000,]]
: [[AM]] [[illstone Operations Guidance and Reference Document.@    Section 1R12:  Maintenance Effectiveness C]]
PT 1402, "Timing Device Calibration," Rev. 001-03, performed August 14, 2006 C PT 1407, "Panel Meter and Transducer Calibration," Rev. 001-04, performed August 15, 2006
C PT 1410, "5kV and 8kV Cable Tests," Rev.001-03, performed April 25, 2007
C
: [[PT]] [[1425 B4, "Relay Type]]
BDD18B Transformer Differential," Rev. 1, performed November 3, 2008
M2-EV-01-0006, "Technical Evaluation for
: [[EDG]] [[Availability During Testing," Rev. 02]]
: [[MP]] [[2-]]
: [[ENG]] [[-ETAP-04014E2, "MP2 Electrical Distribution system Analysis," Rev. 1]]
: [[OP]] [[3346C, "]]
: [[EGLS]] [[Individual Load Testing," Rev. 005-01]]
: [[PT]] [[31412K1, "]]
: [[MP]] [[3 15G-3SA (4.16KV]]
: [[NS]] [[]]
: [[ST]] [[) Test," Rev.001-02, performed October 30, 2008]]
: [[PT]] [[31460A, "]]
: [[MO]] [[3]]
: [[RSST]] [[-B, 6.9]]
KV Non-segregated Bus Test," Rev.002-01, performed August
17, 2006
SP 3646A.16-001, "Train B Loss of Power Test," Rev. 013-01
: [[SP]] [[3646A.16-002, "Train B Loss of Power Test Failure and Retest Documentation," Rev. 006]]
: [[SP]] [[3646A.18-002, "Train B]]
ESF with LOP Test Failure and Retest Documentation," Rev. 006
Attachment
: [[EDG]] [[2346A, B Unavailability March 2007 to February 2009]]
EDG and Fuel Oil System, 2346A, B System Health Report 4th Quarter 2007, 2008 Eng'd Safeguards Actuation Sys (Sequencer), 3405, System Health Report, 4th quarter 2007 and 2008
: [[ESF]] [[Load Sequencer Unavailability 2007-2008]]
: [[MR]] [[ule (a)(1) Evaluation for the Normal Power System (2347),]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-06119, Rev. 00]]
: [[MR]] [[ule (a)(1) Evaluation for the Normal Power System (2347),]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-06209, Rev. 00]]
: [[MR]] [[ule (a)(1) Evaluation for the Normal Power System (3347),]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04550, Rev. 00]]
: [[MR]] [[ule (a)(1) Evaluation for the Emergency Generator Loading Sequencer (3405),]]
CR-07-
208, Rev. 0
MRule Functional Failure Evaluations Evaluation for Unit 2 Pressurizer Proportional Heaters
(07137),
: [[CR]] [[114357 Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluations,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-03270,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04550,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-05208,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-01476,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-04403,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-05611,]]
CR-08-07480, CR118400
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluations for Unit
: [[2 EDG]] [[s,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-02244, CR-07-03568,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-06155,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-06624,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-11454,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-00303,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-00305,]]
CR-08-00329, CR-
08-00330
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluations for Unit
: [[2 RSST]] [[,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-04050, CR-08-04269,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-06119,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-06265]]
: [[NSST]] [[,]]
: [[RSST]] [[, Main Transformers, and Isophase Bus System Health Reports, 3347A, B, C, 4th quarter 2007, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter]]
: [[2008 NS]] [[]]
: [[ST]] [[Unavailability 2007-2008]]
: [[ODM]] [[for]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-06265]]
: [[RS]] [[]]
: [[ST]] [[, 2347A Fluid Analysis Report for Dissolved Gases 2008, 2009]]
: [[RSST]] [[, 2347A System Health Report 4th Quarter 2007 and 2008]]
: [[RSST]] [[2347A, Unavailability 2007-2008]]
: [[RS]] [[]]
ST 3347A, Unavailability 2007-2008
CR-06-00052
CR-06-01467
CR-07-04618
CR-07-06624
CR-07-07782
CR-07-08147
CR-07-08550
CR-07-12481
CR-08-00912
CR-08-06613
CR-08-07109
CR-08-08370
CR118400
CR322051
MRE006987
MRE007244
MRE007358
: [[MRE]] [[010264]]
: [[MRE]] [[010309 Section 1R13:  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control]]
: [[DCN]] [[]]
: [[DM]] [[2-00-0043-09, "Leak Sealant Repair of Valve 2-]]
MS-440"
Attachment
: [[NF]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-PRA-370, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures and Methods:]]
: [[PRA]] [[Guidance for]]
MRule (a)(4)," Rev. 0
North Bus Outage Implementation Plan, Rev. 0
: [[WM]] [[-]]
AA-100, "Work Management," Rev. 4
CR323435
Section 1R15:  Operability Evaluations
: [[DCN]] [[]]
: [[DM]] [[2-01-0212-07 Replacement of Spool P24 to the "B"]]
: [[EDG]] [[Strainer]]
: [[EE]] [[-99032, "Maximum Allowable Gas Bubble Size at]]
: [[EC]] [[]]
: [[CS]] [[High Points," Rev. 02]]
: [[IOD]] [[000147 Rev. 0, 3]]
SIH*V28 was replaced and field weld 43 did not have the required
: [[NDE]] [[performed]]
: [[IOD]] [[000149 Rev. 0, Air volume in "B"]]
SIH discharge piping
M3-EV-05-0008, "Determination of Allowable
: [[EC]] [[]]
CS Gas Accumulations in Support of
Surveillance 4.5.2.b.1," Rev. 2
: [[MP]] [[-]]
VE-9, "Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria for Weldments and Braze Joints," Rev. 000
53M30800403
: [[NUCENG]] [[-07-048, "Evaluation of Gas Voids in]]
MP3 SIH Discharge Piping," Rev. 4
203-ER-08-0005
: [[MP]] [[2]]
EDG Floor Drain Backwater Valves
Tech Eval M2-EV-01-0006 "EDG Availability during Testing"
: [[MRE]] [[07137 "Pressurizer heater 3]]
RCS*HTR48 has faulted"
MRE10244 "Group 2 Proportional heater Reduced Capacity"
IOD 000150 "Unit 2 Group 2 Pressurizer Heater Capacity Less than Normal"
CR114357
CR318967
CR318997
CR319295
CR319371
CR320282
CR324239
CR324869
: [[CR]] [[326019]]
: [[CR]] [[326558  Section 1R18:  Plant Modifications C]]
OP 200.13, "Cold Weather Preparations," Rev. 002-02 SP 3621.1, "Main Feedwater Valve Operability Test," Rev. 010-02
WC 10, "Temporary Modifications," Rev. 005-07
Temporary Log dated 1/1/09 Feedwater Isolation Valve Temperatures
: [[DM]] [[-2-00-0054-08 "Removal of "A" and "B"]]
: [[EDG]] [[Service Water Inlet Strainer"]]
: [[MP]] [[58B-00138]]
: [[EM]] [[, Rev 3 "Service Water Supply to Diesel Engine Coolers" CCN-22]]
: [[OP]] [[-2346A Rev 27-04 "A"]]
: [[EDG]] [[]]
: [[ARP]] [[-2591A Rev 004-01 "Alarm Response for "A"]]
DG Panel, C-38"
50.59 Screen Removal of "A" and "B" EDG Service Water Inlet Strainer
50.59 Screen Supplemental Heating for
: [[FW]] [[]]
: [[IV]] [[Room]]
: [[DCN]] [[:]]
DM2-00-0014-09
50.59/72.48 Screen for
: [[DN]] [[2-00-0014-09]]
: [[DCN]] [[:]]
DM2-00-0064-09 "Temporary Leak Encapsulation on Body to Bonnet Leak at
M22-CN-543 "B"
: [[SG]] [[]]
FP Suction Vent"
Calc#
: [[PIPEWH]] [[]]
IP -1802M2 Rev 2, "Assessment of Pipe Whip Restraints, Millstone Unit 2"
Attachment Calculation Change Notice
: [[PIPEWH]] [[]]
: [[IP]] [[-1802M2 Rev 2 Vendor Calc# Bechtel]]
: [[PR]] [[-L Rev 1, "Main Feedwater Restraint]]
MFR 16 and MFR 16"
CR119948
CR119953
CR119959
CR317924
CR325093
Section 1R19:  Post Maintenance Testing Bechtel Calculation#
: [[PR]] [[-L "Main Feedwater Pipe Restraint]]
: [[MFR]] [[15 and]]
: [[MFR]] [[16" Rev 1]]
: [[DCR]] [[M3-06004, "Unit 3 Vital Inverters Replacement", Rev. 0]]
: [[DCN]] [[]]
DM2-00-0064-09 "Temporary Leak Encapsulation of Body to Bonnet Leak at M22-CN-543
"B"
: [[SG]] [[]]
: [[FP]] [[Suction Vent Valve"]]
: [[DM]] [[3-00-0027-07, "]]
: [[MP]] [[3 Vital Inverter Replacement," Rev. 07]]
: [[MP]] [[3760]]
: [[DB]] [[, "SG]]
: [[FW]] [[]]
IV - Hydraulic Fluid and N2 Levels," Rev. 008-01
OP 3346D, "Station Blackout Diesel," Rev. 011-05
Calc #
: [[PIPEWH]] [[]]
: [[IP]] [[-1802M "Assessment of Whip Restraints, Millstone Unit 2" Rev 2 and CCN 1]]
: [[SP]] [[3442A40-001, "T/Tavg Channel 4 Calibration Data Sheet," Rev. 013-06]]
: [[SP]] [[3443D21-001, "Protection Set Cabinet IV Operational Test Data Sheet," Rev 018-07]]
: [[SP]] [[3626.8-001, "Control Building Air Conditioning Booster Pump 3]]
: [[SWP]] [[*P2A Operational Test"]]
: [[SP]] [[3670.4-015, "Quarterly]]
SBO PM," Rev. 001-04
Readiness Test," Rev. 010-06"
M3 07 00922
53102177167
53M30406863
53M30711915
53M30713534
53M30713536
53M30808635
CR325093
CR325463
CR325558
CR325591
Section 1R22:  Surveillance Testing
: [[SP]] [[3601F.6-001, "]]
: [[RCS]] [[Inventory Balance," Rev. 002-04  Section]]
: [[2OS]] [[1/2]]
OS2:  Access to Radiologically Significant Areas/ALARA Planning and Controls Procedures RPM 1.3.8, Rev 8, Criteria for Dosimetry Issue
RPM 1.3.13, Rev 9, Bioassay Sampling and Analysis
: [[RPM]] [[1.3.14, Rev 8, Personnel Dose Calculations and Assessments]]
: [[RPM]] [[1.4.1, Rev 8,]]
: [[ALARA]] [[Reviews and Reports]]
: [[RPM]] [[1.4.2, Rev 2,]]
ALARA Engineering Controls
: [[RPM]] [[1.6.4, Rev 4, Siemens Electronic Dosimetry System]]
: [[RPM]] [[2.1.1, Rev 7, Issuance and Control of]]
: [[RWP]] [[s]]
: [[RPM]] [[2.1.2, Rev 2,]]
ALARA Interface with the RWP Process
RPM 2.1.3, Rev 2, Identification and Control of High Radiological Risk Work
Attachment
: [[RPM]] [[5.2.2, Rev 13, Basic Radiation Worker Responsibilities]]
: [[RPM]] [[5.2.3, Rev 3,]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
: [[RA]] [[Program and Policy]]
: [[RPM]] [[-]]
: [[GDL]] [[-008, Rev 0, Electronic Dosimeter Alarm Set Points]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-201, Rev 2, Access Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-202, Rev 0, Radiological Posting]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-220, Rev 0, Radiological Survey Scheduling]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-221, Rev 0, Radiological Survey Records]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-222, Rev 0, Radiation Surveys]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-226, Rev 0, Airborne Activity Surveys]]
: [[RP]] [[-]]
: [[AA]] [[-230, Rev 0, Personnel Contamination Monitoring and Decontamination]]
: [[OP]] [[3316A, Rev 8, Personnel Access Control to the]]
MID System Components Inside Containment
Quality Assurance Reports Field Observation Report Nos. 9108, 9140, 9201, 9338, 9345, 9212, 8744, 8746, 8737, 8780, 09-005, 09-
2, 08-052, 08-051, 08-045, 08-046, 08-048
 
Self Assessment Report
: [[SAR]] [[000819, High Radiation Area (]]
HRA) & Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) Controls, Gap Analysis
 
Condition Reports (Access Controls/ALARA) 116937, 114914, 117796, 317011, 117550, 321230, 322470-1, 317349
: [[ALA]] [[]]
: [[RA]] [[Evaluation Numbers 02-09-01, 02-09-02, 02-09-09, 03-09-03, 03-09-10]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA Council Meeting Minutes Meeting Dates: 02/26/2009, 12/18/2008, 09/17/2008
 
Miscellaneous Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Reports for October 2008 through January 2009
MP2 Thimble Replacement Overview
Ten Highest Doses received during 2008
3R12 Post Outage Report
Radiation Protection Top Focus Items for 2009
2R19 3" Spray Line Cut and Replace Risk Evaluation
Section
: [[4OA]] [[1:  Performance Indicator (]]
: [[PI]] [[) Verification]]
: [[CP]] [[3807F, "Operation of the Reactor Plant Sample Sink," Rev. 004-09]]
SP 3601F.6, "Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Measurement," Rev 005-06
SP 3670.1, "Mode 1-4 Daily and Shiftly Control Room Rounds," for March, September, and
December 2008
SP 3855, "Reactor Coolant Analysis for Dose Equivalent I-131," Rev. 007
SP 3855-001, "Reactor Coolant Analysis for Dose Equivalent I-131," Rev. 007-01
Dose Equivalent Iodine Spreadsheet, 2008
Unit 3 Quantitative Radioisotopic Iodine Analysis February 2008 and September 2008
RCS Leakage Spreadsheet 2008
Section 4OA2:  Identification and Resolution of Problems
Attachment  Simulator Testing
: [[NS]] [[]]
EM-4.07, "Nuclear Simulator Engineering Manual, Master Testing Schedule"
MP2 Simulator Recovery Plan
RCE108505, "Discrepancies Exit with Unit 2 Simulator Testing Records"
Unit 2 Simulator Core Performance Test Cycle 19 2008 (all CPTs)
Unit 2 Scenario Based Testing
: [[ES]] [[08101a, "]]
: [[SGTL]] [[,]]
: [[SGTR]] [[with Complications" and]]
SO8202,
"Plant Heatup and Termination of Shutdown Cooling" dated 2/20/2008
Unit 2 Simulator Transient Tests: T1, "Manual Reactor Trip" dated 11/5/2008, and T4,
"Simultaneous Trip of all RCPs" dated 11/5/2008
Unit 2 Simulator Steady State Tests Stability Test 100% Power dated 9/10/2008
Internal Assessment 2008-01 dated 9/19/2008
Internal Assessment 2008-05
Unit 3 Simulator Core Performance Tests Cycle 13 (all CPTs)
CR-07-08202
CR-08-06997
CR108371
CR108505
CR108838
CR109159
CR109817
CR111110
CR324101
CR324772
CR325250
CR325305
CR325584
CR325620
CR327009
CR327201
CR327592
CR328186
 
Unit 3 Radiation Monitors Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan for
: [[RE]] [[16B,]]
CR107039
Maintenance Rule Evaluations for the following
: [[CR]] [[s:]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04412,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-04977,]]
CR-07-
05812,
: [[CR]] [[-07-09317,]]
: [[CR]] [[-7-10934,]]
: [[CR]] [[-07-11455,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-00432,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-00671,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-02554,]]
: [[CR]] [[-08-02759,]]
CR-08-02782, CR-08-03343
Maintenance Rule Scoping Tables for Radiation Monitors, 3404
Radiation Monitoring, 3404 System Health Report 4th quarter 2007 and 2008 ACE013937
ACE017322
CR-07-00577
CR-07-02356
CR-07-02703
CR-07-05966
CR-07-06024
CR-07-06631
CR-07-07753
Attachment
: [[CR]] [[-07-11132]]
CR-07-11583
CR-08-00188
CR-08-00567
CR-08-02191
CR-08-02201
CR-08-02226
CR-08-02467
CR-08-04517
CR107011
CR120626
CR326590
MRE006964
MRE007117
MRE007126
MRE007237
MRE007360
MRE010152
MRE010237
MRE010250
MRE010263
MRE010267
Section
: [[4OA]] [[3:  Followup of Events]]
CR113238 CR118282
Section
: [[4OA]] [[5: Other Activities]]
: [[WANO]] [[Peer Review Report]]
: [[LIST]] [[]]
: [[OF]] [[]]
: [[ACRONY]] [[]]
: [[MS]] [[AC  Alternating Current]]
: [[ADAMS]] [[Agencywide Documents Access and Management System]]
: [[AE]] [[]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
RA Evaluation
: [[AFW]] [[Auxiliary Feedwater]]
: [[ALA]] [[]]
: [[RA]] [[As Low as Reasonably Achievable]]
: [[AS]] [[]]
ME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers
: [[BOC]] [[Beginning of Cycle]]
: [[CE]] [[]]
DE  Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations
CIV  Containment Isolation Valve
CLB  Current Licensing Basis
CR  Condition Report
DNB  Departure from Nucleate Boiling
DNC  Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
DP  Differential Pressure
DR  Discrepancy Report
DRP  Division of Reactor Projects
Attachment
: [[DRS]] [[Division of Reactor Safety]]
ECCS  Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG  Emergency Diesel Generator
EOC  End of Cycle
EP  Emergency Preparedness
ESF  Engineered Safety Feature
: [[FRV]] [[Feedwater Regulating Valves]]
: [[FS]] [[]]
: [[AR]] [[Final Safety Analysis Report]]
: [[HP]] [[]]
SI  High Pressure Safety Injection
HRA  High Radiation Areas
JIT  Just-in-Time
JPM  Job Performance Measure
I&C  Instrumentation and Control
ILT  Initial License Training
IMC  Inspection Manual Chapter
IST  In Service Training
JPM  Job Performance Measures
: [[LER]] [[Licensee Event Reports]]
: [[LH]] [[]]
: [[RA]] [[Locked High Radiation Areas]]
: [[LO]] [[]]
RT  Licensed Operation Requalification Training
MCC  Motor Control Center
MOC  Middle of Cycle
mrem  millirem
NCV  Non-Cited Violation
NDE  Non-Destructive Examination
NEI  Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC  Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OA  Other Activities
OD  Operability Determinations
: [[OOS]] [[Out Of Service]]
: [[PA]] [[]]
RS  Publicly Available Records System
PI  Performance Indicator
PI&R  Problem Identification and Resolution
PM  Preventive Maintenance
PMT  Post Maintenance Testing
QSS  Quench Spray System
RCA  Radiologically Controlled Area
RCS  Reactor Coolant System
RHR  Residual Heat Removal
RO  Reactor Operator
RPS  Reactor Protection System
: [[RSS]] [[Recirculation Spray System]]
: [[RS]] [[]]
ST  Reserve Station Service Transformer
: [[RWP]] [[Radiological Work Permit]]
: [[RW]] [[]]
ST  Refueling Water Storage Tank
SBO  Station Black Out
SBT  Scenario Based Training
SDP  Significance Determination Process
SG  Steam Generator
Attachment
: [[SI]] [[Safety Injection]]
: [[SW]] [[Service Water]]
: [[TDA]] [[]]
: [[FW]] [[Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater]]
: [[TDF]] [[]]
: [[WP]] [[Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump]]
: [[TE]] [[]]
DE  Total Effective Dose Equivalent
: [[TS]] [[Technical Specification]]
: [[TS]] [[]]
: [[AS]] [[Technical Specification Action Statement]]
: [[UFS]] [[]]
: [[AR]] [[Updated Final Safety Analysis Report]]
: [[VH]] [[]]
: [[RA]] [[Very High Radiation Areas]]
: [[WA]] [[]]
NO  World Association of Nuclear Operators
: [[WO]] [[Work Order]]
}}

Latest revision as of 18:00, 9 February 2019

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000245/2009002&oldid=1313077"