NL-09-1676, Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1, Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Service Water System (Sws).: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[NL-09-1676, Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Service Water System (Sws).]]
| number = ML092950286
| issue date = 10/21/2009
| title = Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1, Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Service Water System (Sws).
| author name = Ajluni M J
| author affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000348
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = NL-09-1676
| document type = Letter type:NL, License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50, Technical Specifications
| page count = 23
| project =
| stage = Other
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Overatiny Company, Inc SOUTHERN A October 21,2009 COMPANY Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-09-1676 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Request to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A to Facility Operating License Number NPF-2 for the Joseph M, Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1. This amendment request proposes a revision to TS 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)," Condition A to add a statement that, for a limited time, the condition is not applicable to a Unit 1 train that is inoperable for seismic concerns only, and to add a Condition D that is applicable to seismic concerns, and a Condition E to enter should Condition D not be met. These proposed changes are valid only for a Unit 1 one-time entry for each train, for the purpose of preventing an unnecessary Unit shutdown for the repair or replacement of SWS seismic support ring assemblies.
SNC has evaluated the proposed TS changes and the basis for the TS and has determined that it does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. The basis for that determination is provided in Enclosure
: 1. SNC has also determined that operation with the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the amount of effluents that may be released offsite nor a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Therefore, the proposed amendment is eligible for categorical exclusion as set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment is needed in connection with the approval of the proposed changes. The basis for that determination is also provided in Enclosure
: 1. Enclosure 2 provides a Unit 1 seismic support ring assembly drawing. The marked-up and clean typed TS pages are provided in Enclosures 3 and 4, respectively.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-09-1676 Page 2 The subject of this amendment request is similar to the Emergency TS change submitted to the NRC on October 8, 2009 and approved by the NRC on October 9,2009. SNC requests that the proposed TS changes be reviewed and approved as expeditiously as possible to supplement assessment of the condition of Unit 1 SWS seismic support ring assemblies.
Mr. M. J. Ajluni states he is Nuclear Licensing Manager of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true. This letter contains no NRC commitments.
If you have any questions, please advise. Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY M. J. Ajluni Nuclear Licensing Manager Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21 day of LJ c 104 e ,2009.
Notary Public My commission expires: 10 /9/;z., J J MJAlTDH/lac Enclosure 1: Description of the Proposed Changes Enclosure 2: Drawing -Unit 1 Seismic Support Ring Assembly Enclosure 3: Marked-Up Technical Specifications Page Enclosure 4: Clean Typed Technical Specifications Page U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-09-1676 Page 3 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Mr. J. R. Johnson, Vice President
-Farley Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President
-Engineering RTYPE: CFA04.054 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager -Farley Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector
-Farley Alabama Department of Public Health Dr. D. E. Williamson, State Health Officer Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Request to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Enclosure Description of the Proposed Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Request to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Enclosure Description of the Proposed Table of
 
===1.0 Summary===
 
===2.0 Detailed===
 
2.1
 
===2.2 Proposed===
3.0 Technical
 
===4.0 Regulatory===
 
===4.1 Applicable===
 
Regulatory Requirements
/
 
===4.2 Significant===
 
Hazards 4.3
 
===5.0 Environmental===
 
Enclosure Description of the Proposed 1.0 Summary Description Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Operating License NPF-2 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). The proposed changes to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS) involve changing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)," Condition A to add a statement that, for a limited time, the condition is not applicable to a Unit 1 train that is inoperable for seismic concerns, to add a Condition D that is applicable for seismic concerns only, and to add a Condition E to enter should Condition D not be met. These proposed changes are valid only for a Unit 1 one-time entry prior to December 7, 2009 for each train, for the purpose of preventing an unnecessary Unit shutdown to repair or replace the seismic support ring assemblies.
 
===2.0 Detailed===
Description
 
===2.1 Background===
 
During October 2009, all Unit 2 SWS seismic support ring assemblies were replaced due to loose bolting issues. During the replacement activities, a Unit 2 emergency TS change to prevent an unnecessary shutdown was submitted to the NRC on October 8, 2009 and was approved by the NRC on October 9,2009. The Unit 1 seismic support ring assemblies are of a more robust design. A similar issue for Unit 1 is not anticipated; however, FNP management plans to inspect the Unit 1 assemblies and wants to be in a position to repair or replace the seismic support ring assemblies as expeditiously as possible.
Although the FNP staff does not anticipate the need to repair or replace the Unit 1 seismic support ring assemblies, contingences are in place to repair or replace as necessary.
Should inspection reveal the need for repair or replacement activities that require additional time beyond the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8 Required Action A, approval of these proposed TS changes will prevent an unnecessary shutdown to Mode 5, for seismic concerns only, of FNP Unit 1 for one inoperable train or for two inoperable trains. These shutdown actions are unnecessary because a clear success path for full restoration of seismic qualification exists and the likelihood of an earthquake occurring, during the repair or replacement period, is remote. 2.2 Proposed Changes FNP proposes the following licensing condition changes. LCO 3.7.8 Condition A is changed to add a statement that the condition is not applicable to a Unit 1 train that is inoperable for seismic concerns only (new Conditions will address seismic concerns), for a one-time entry prior to December 7, 2009. A Condition D is added for SWS train(s) being inoperable due to seismic concerns only, and is preceded by a note that states the Condition is for a one-time entry per train prior to December 7, 2009. The Completion Times for Condition D are to immediately verify that two pumps of the affected train(s) are available (OPERABLE Page 1 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes except during a seismic event) and to restore one affected train to OPERABLE status in 7 days and restore two trains to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days. The Condition also requires, for two trains INOPERABLE, to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. A Condition E is added for entry should the Required Action and associated Completion Times of Condition D not be met. Condition E requires the Unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 30 hours. 3.0 Technical Evaluation Justification for Proposed Changes The proposed changes to the TS allow completion times for any necessary repair or replacement of Unit 1 seismic support ring assemblies.
The TS changes will prevent an unnecessary shutdown to Mode 5, for seismic concerns only, of FNP Unit 1 for one or two inoperable SWS trains. Evaluation The SWS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and/or transient.
During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the SWS also provide this function for various safety related and non-safety related components.
The prinCipal safety related function of the SWS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Component Cooling Water System. The SWS consists of two separate, 100 percent capacity, safety related, COOling water trains. Each train consists of two 50 percent capacity pumps, one shared 50 percent capacity spare pump, piping, valving, and instrumentation.
Train A contains SWS Pumps A and B, and Train B contains SWS Pumps D and E. SWS Pump C is a swing pump. Four pumps are normally in operation on each Unit, with one (swing) pump not in service. In the event of failure of a pump, plant operators must align the swing pump to the train containing the failed pump, maintaining two pumps per train. TS 3.7.8 requires two SWS trains to be operable.
The SWS is capable of delivering COOling water during all modes of plant operation to all equipment required to function under accident conditions.
All safety related portions of the SWS, including the service water intake structure and pumps, are Seismic Category I and meet the single-failure criterion.
Because the SWS operates continuously during normal plant operation, its availability is apparent to plant operators.
The loss of any single component will not render the system incapable of supplying sufficient SWS flowrates.
The TS LCO 3.7.8 Action A of 72 hours is for a broad range of design basis accidents, the new Conditions are associated with seismic events only. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System maintains steam generator inventory.
The AFW system requires suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Both the AFW System and the CST are safety related Seismic Category I systems. The AFW System consists of two motor-driven pumps and one turbine driven pump. Each of the Page 2 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps are sized to supply the steam generators with 100 percent of the required feedwater flow for a normal safe cooldown of the reactor coolant system. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump is capable of providing 200 percent of the required feedwater flow for a normal safe cooldown of the reactor coolant system. The MDAFW pumps require operation of the pump room coolers (current cool weather provides additional heat sink margin with respect to room cooling) and operation of emergency diesel generators, which in turn, are dependant on the SWS. The Feedwater System maintains steam generator water level during steady-state and transient operation while in Modes 1, 2. In Mode 3, the system can be a backup for AFW, the preferred system. The Feedwater System provides normal means of heat removal. The Feedwater System is a non-safety system and is not seismically qualified.
With regard to safety margins, Codes and Standards and FSAR accident analyses acceptance criteria are met for the SWS except for the short duration until seismic support ring assembly repair or replacement is completed.
At least two pumps per train will be available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event) to respond to seismic FSAR analyzed events during the repair or replacement period. While in Condition D, risk-significant plant configurations and plant equipment outages will be minimized.
The risk impact for out-of-service equipment will be evaluated as part of the FNP Maintenance Rule 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program to assess and manage risk. While in Condition 0, the following compensatory actions will be in place and administratively controlled to avoid any potential high risk configurations:
* The TDAFW Pump will be considered a protected component.
* Additional safety related equipment will not be voluntarily removed from service, unless required by TS.
* Switchyard activities affecting transmission will be restricted.
* The SWS seismic support ring assembly repair or replacement activities will not be scheduled when adverse weather conditions are predicted or at times when the plant may be subjected to other abnormal conditions.
* The CST level will be maintained greater than 26 feet. Proposed Condition D The proposed Action D.1 for one-time use per train for non-seismic conditions is based on maintaining two pumps available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event) for the affected trains. The Completion Time of "Immediate" is appropriate, given the entry conditions.
Action D.3 is for one train Inoperable.
This condition is similar to the Unit 2 Emergency TS that was approved by the NRC on October 9, 2009. Seven days is necessary due to the seismic support ring assembly repair or replacement activities, which require drilling holes in underwater concrete, potentially hitting rebar at unknown locations.
For Action D.3, in the case of a seismic event, two SWS pumps and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump are operable.
Page 3 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes The proposed one-time use, for two trains INOPERABLE, of Action 0.4 is based on operation in Mode 3, as required by Action 0.2, with the steam generators available.
This provides a decay heat removal path that is not directly dependent on SWS. For defense-in-depth, a reasonable balance of prevention of core damage, prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation is preserved based on diversity of core cooling capability and appropriate restrictions to preclude simultaneous equipment outages. Containment integrity is maintained because the Containment is a Seismic Category I structure and undergoes periodic surveillance to ensure compliance.
As shown in Table 1, the most depth is available in Mode 3. Mode 3 will afford the greatest redundancy for consequence mitigation during repair or replacement of the seismic support ring assemblies.
Maintaining the plant at Mode 3 allows for normal core cooling by way of the AFW System and provides backup using the Feedwater System. If the Unit were placed in Mode 5, these system capabilities would be lost, placing full reliance on the degraded SWS. Therefore, maintaining the plant at Mode 3 rather than Mode 5 when both SWS trains are degraded, due to seismic reasons only, does not adversely impact core cooling since there are diverse methods of core cooling, containment integrity is preserved, and consequence mitigation is provided by the TDAFW system. FNP operating procedures require placing the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in service in Mode 4, where reliance on the SWS for core cooling begins, procedures do not utilize the TDAFW pump in Mode 4. In addition, at steam pressure below 90 psig or 320 degrees Fahrenheit, the TDAFW pump is no longer available.
For these reasons, Mode 3 is the preferred mode to complete repair or replacement.
If the plant cools down to Mode 5, no TDAFW System capability will be available, due to the lack of steam. Table 1 provides a comparison of operating modes and core cooling mechanisms available during normal and seismic event conditions.
The following is a summary of operating Modes and the core cooling mechanisms available in each Mode: In Modes 1 and 2, the Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (MDAFW pumps and TDAFW pump) are normally available.
Should a seismic event and loss of the SWS occur while in Modes 1 or 2, only the TDAFW and MDAFW pumps will be available for core cooling. The MDAFW pump will remain available only for a limited time during a seismic event, based on cooling availability for emergency diesel generators and for MDAFW pump room coolers. This assumes loss of offsite power during the seismic event. Manual actions, such as opening room doors, are required to supplement room cooling . In Mode 3, these same systems are available, but the Unit is at a lower heat load and temperature.
This is a preferred Mode of operation upon a loss of the SWS. Should a seismic event and loss of the SWS occur while in Mode 3, only the TDAFW and MDAFW pumps would remain available for core Page 4 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes cooling. The MDAFW pump will remain available during a seismic event, based on manual action to establish COOling for emergency diesel generators and for MDAFW pump room coolers . In Mode 4, RHR I Plant Service Water and the MDAFW pumps are normally available for core cooling. Should a seismic event and loss of the SWS occur, core cooling systems would not be available .
* In Mode 5, RHR I Plant Service Water is normally available for core cooling. Should a seismic event and loss of the SWS occur, core cooling systems would not be available.
i Table 1 Core Cooling -Redundancy Based on MODE MODE 1 and 2 MODE 3 MODE 4 MODE 5
* Feedwater System .
* MDAFW pump' I CST 1,2
* TDAFW pump' CST 2
* Feedwater System
* MDAFW pump'CST 1,2
* TDAFW pump' CST 2
* RHR I Plant Service Water
* MDAFW pump' CST 1.2
* RHR I Plant Service Water 1) Available for a seismic event and assumed loss of offsite power, based on manual action to establish alternate cooling from Unit 2 for emergency diesel generators.
For MDAFW pump room coolers, manual actions are to open room doors to supplement room cooling. 2) The bolded core cooling mechanisms remain available after a loss of the SWS concurrent with a safe shutdown earthquake (assumes loss of all non-seismic qualified equipment, offsite power transmission, and emergency diesel generators).
Proposed Condition E Condition E is for entry should the Required Action and associated Completion Times of Condition D not be met. Condition E requires the Unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 30 hours. The evaluation for the Mode 3 change is the same as for Condition D. Conclusion The proposed changes will provide a revision to the FNP Unit 1 TS, adding one-time Conditions.
The associated new Completion Times will allow an inoperable Unit 1 SWS train for up to 7 days to return to Operable status and, for two inoperable Unit 1 SWS trains, to be in Mode 3 and allow 7 days to restore one affected train to Operable status and restore two trains within the next 7 days. The new Completion Times will prevent an unnecessary shutdown to Mode 5, for seismic concerns only, of FNP Unit 1 for one or two inoperable SWS trains, while a clear success path exists to restore the SWS to full seismic qualifications.
In addition, for the condition of two SWS trains inoperable, maintaining the Unit in Mode 3 affords the greatest amount of redundancy for cooling and is the best condition to make the necessary repair or replacement.
Page 5 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes The SWS train pumps are capable of performing their intended function in the absence of a seismic event and are available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event), except when tagged out to effect repairs. The likelihood of a seismic event at FNP, during the Completion Times of Condition 0, is remote. The Plant Review Board reviewed the proposed changes to the Technical Speci'fications and concluded that they do not involve a significant hazard consideration and will not endanger the health and safety of the public. 4.0 Regulatory Evaluation
 
===4.1 Applicable===
 
Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The regulatory bases and guidance documents associated with the systems discussed in this amendment application include the following:
a) Criterion 44 -Cooling Water A system to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components important to safety to an ultimate heat sink is provided.
The system safety function is to transfer the combined heat load of these structures, systems, and components under normal operating and accident conditions.
Suitable redundancy in components and features and suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolation capabilities are provided to assure that for onsite electrical power system operation (assuming offsite power is not available) and for offsite electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure. The proposed TS changes satisfy Criterion 44 because the service water system provides transfer of heat from the plant to an ultimate heat sink. This system has been designed to transfer its heat load under all anticipated operating and accident conditions.
Suitable redundancy, leak detection, and system interconnection and isolation capabilities have been incorporated into the design of this system to assure that the system can accomplish all required safety functions, assuming a Single failure concurrent with either onsite or offsite power exclusively.
The SWS train pumps will remain capable of performing their intended function in the absence of a seismic event and are available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event), except when tagged out to effect repairs. The likelihood of a seismic event at FNP, during repair or replacement of Unit 1 seismic support ring assemblies, is remote. Page 6 of 8 Enclosure 1 Description of the Proposed Changes 4.2 Significant Hazards Consideration Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below: 1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
For the proposed license amendment, the only event of concern is a seismic event. The proposed changes are to extend the time to restore one inoperable Service Water (SW) train from 72 hours to 7 days and for two inoperable SW trains to extend the time to reach Mode 5. These extensions do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the likelihood of an earthquake during the extension period is remote. 2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed changes do not involve any physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? The current Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation
 
====3.7.8 Action====
A of 72 hours is for a broad range of design basis accidents.
The new conditions are associated with seismic events only. The proposed amendment extends the time to restore one inoperable SW train from 72 hours to 7 days and for two inoperable SW trains to extend the time to reach Mode 5. These extensions do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the likelihood of an earthquake during the extension period is remote and the new conditions are associated with seismic events only. Maintaining Mode 3 maximizes core cooling redundant equipment over the lower modes (Modes 4 or 5). Conclusion Based on the preceding evaluation, SNC has determined that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Page 7 of 8 Enclosure Description of the Proposed 4.3 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the pubic will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, (4) approval of these TS changes enhances diversity and redundancy of core cooling during repair or replacement of the seismic support ring assemblies.
 
===5.0 Environmental===
 
Consideration This amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as follows: (i) The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
As described above, the proposed changes involve no significant hazards consideration. (ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. The proposed changes do not involve the installation of any new equipment or the modHication of any equipment that may affect the types or amounts of effluents that may be released offsite. Therefore, there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. (iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumUlative occupation radiation exposure.
The proposed changes do not involve plant physical changes or introduce any new mode of plant operation.
Therefore, there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Based on the above, SNC concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria specified in 10 CFR 51.22 for a categorical exclusion from the requirements of 10 CFR 51.22 relative to requiring a specific environmental assessment by the Commission.
Page 8 of 8 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Request to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Enclosure Drawing -Unit 1 Seismic Support Ring Enclosure Drawing -Unit 1 Seismic Support Ring Date: 1 0/6/2009 Time: 04:19:37 PM
.
U  /:bre Ik 1 0-,,,,,,"'
"" SlusN/C. JZS$T1iItJIINT IS __.. CW"I''''''
OM" o.:>._'7HE&#xa3;u 't"......,...:s..r..-r 11<17"_ I!. If{ 1Vta.,
/!U-1iI6S' Z>M' AUD ......___
1&1"1 .. ".. t t. I j I ... II' r t I i \{'it r-,i I' I t ..... tJJd&#xa5; 1'4'1"tN. ..
'I"",U",\P':I
---I ,,"'---,.
h '" 'I OIA tl=Ol..'NOA.TtO"-l E5r0l...T1a . e<!!! " i -............-N-........
....-..::::,.
"'.........
..:1 -..
..... _ '!::".. _..:w OtlOD v MDlUID , :..
* VI ". "" MO. " ,.VIIIftD
,"I..: _."f/. '=l LI-::a. WI.& 1""" '" PilMP"" 8E -.,
@
WITN R,\VE'A..
w ... ""VE'R WA,"'l&#xa3;R..
.. I j " II '!,! II' I I rg 'I i lls'ol"ill I itlill . , " I Title: C:\DATA \Documentum\viewed\U 160679.cal Page 1 of 1 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Req uest to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Enclosure Marked-Up Technical Specifications List of Affected Pages 3.7.8-1 3.7.8-2 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT 3.7.8 Service Water System LCO 3.7.8 Two SWS trains shall be APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SWS train inoperable.
A.1
: 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of 1 LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for \ OR One Unit 1 SWS train inoperable for other than seismic concerns for a time entry prior to December 7, 2009. emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by SWS. Restore SWS train to 72 hours* OPERABLE status. B. One SWS automatic
 
===8.1 Restore===
both inoperable 72 hours turbine building isolation turbine building isolation valve inoperable in each valves to OPERABLE SWS train. status . ..* For the FNP Unit 2 October 06,2009 entry Into Technical Specification 3.7.B, the Service Water Tram A may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 7 days provided that during the extended completion time for Train A, two Train A pumps are available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event). Farley Units 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 1) Amendment No. 177 (Unit 2) 3.7.8 SWS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met. C.1 AND C.2 Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 5. 6 hours 36 hours Insert A I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.8.1 SURVEILLANCE Isolation of SWS flow to individual components does not render the SWS inoperable.
FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.2 SR 3.7.8.3 SR 3.7.8.4 Verify each accessible SWS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.
Verify each SWS automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Verify each SWS pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Verify the integrity of the SWS buried piping by visual inspection of the ground area. 31 days 18 months 18 months 18 months Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-2 Amendment No.
: 1) Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)
Insert A [). Condition
[) is for a Unit 1 one-time entry per train prior to [)ecember 7, 2009. ()ne or more SWS train(s) inoperable due to seismic concerns only. Required Action and associated Completion lIime of Condition
[) not met. Verify two pumps of affected train(s) available
()PE:RABLE:
except during a seismic event). ()nly applicable for two trains Be in M()[)E: 3. Restore one affected train to OPE:RABLE:
status. Restore two trains to ()PE:RABLE:
status. Immediately 6 hours 7 days Within the next 7 days E1 Be in MO[)E: 3. 6 hours E2 Be in M()[)E: 5. 30 hours Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit Request to Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System Enclosure Clean Typed Technical Specifications Changed Pages List 3.7.8-1 3.7.8-2 3.7.8-3 SWS 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Service Water System (SWS) LCO 3.7.8 Two SWS trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SWS train inoperable.
One Unit 1 SWS train inoperable for other than seismic concerns for a one-time entry prior to December 7,2009. A.1
: 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS. 2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by SWS. Restore SWS train to OPERABLE status . 72 hours*
* For the FNP Unit 2 October 06,2009 entry into Technical Specification 3.7.8, the Service Water Train A may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 7 days provided that during the extended completion time for Train A, two Train A pumps are available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event). Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-1 Amendment No. (Unit 1 ) Amendment No. 177 (Unit 2) 3.7.8 SWS ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One SWS automatic turbine building isolation valve inoperable in each SWS train. B.1 Restore both inoperable turbine building isolation valves to OPERABLE status. 72 hours C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met. C.1 AND Be in MODE 3. 6 hours C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours D. ---------------
NOT E Condition D is for a Unit 1 one-time entry per train prior to December 7,2009. ----------_
..
One or more SWS train(s) inoperable due to seismic concerns only. D,1 AND D.2 AND D,3 AND D.4 Verify two pumps of affected train(s) available (OPERABLE except during a seismic event). -------------
NOTE Only applicable for two trains INOPERABLE.
-------------_
... _-_...
Be in MODE 3. Restore one affected train to OPERABLE status. Restore two trains to OPERABLE status, Immediately 6 hours 7 days Within the next 7 days Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-2 Amendment No. (Unit 1 ) Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2) 3.7.8 SWS ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met. E.1 AND E.2 Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 5. 6 hours 30 hours SURVEILLANCE SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 Isolation of SWS flow to individual components does not render the SWS inoperable.
Verify each accessible SWS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.
31 days SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each SWS automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 18 months SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each SWS pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 18 months SR 3.7.8.4 Verify the integrity of the SWS buried piping by visual inspection of the ground area. 18 months Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-3 Amendment No. (Unit 1 ) Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)}}

Latest revision as of 15:11, 9 February 2019

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=NL-09-1676,_Joseph_M._Farley,_Unit_1,_Request_to_Revise_Technical_Specification_3.7.8,_Service_Water_System_(Sws).&oldid=1310481"