L-2013-205, LER 13-002-00 for St. Lucie, Unit 2, Regarding Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000389/LER-2013-002]]
| number = ML13219A315
| issue date = 07/29/2013
| title = LER 13-002-00 for St. Lucie, Unit 2, Regarding Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve
| author name = Jensen J
| author affiliation = Florida Power & Light Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000389
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = L-2013-205
| document report number = LER 13-002-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 4
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:0 FPL.July 29, 2013 L-2013-205 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 2013-002-00 Date of Event: June 3, 2013 Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve The attached Licensee Event Report 2013-002-00 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant JJ/lrb Attachment Florida Power & Light Company 6501 S. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 tAqc NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection (10-2010) request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resourse@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE St. Lucie Unit 2 050000389 1 OF 3 4. TITLE Failure to Invoke Technical Specification Action Statement for Failed Containment Isolation Valve 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED S ENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUE REVO MONTH DAY YEAR SNUMBER NO. I 06 03 2013 2013 -002 -00 07 29 2013 FACILITYNAME DOCKETNUMBER
: 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
E- 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 El 20.2201(d)
C3 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
E- 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
F] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL E- 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[1 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[3 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
E_ 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[3 73.71(a)(4) 8% El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Lyle R. Berry -Principal Engineer, Licensing 772-467-7680
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MAU EPRAL MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACU RE PTOBP E FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURE TO EPIX A BB FSV V030 YES 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR[] YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) SUBMISSIONNO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On June 3, 2013 at approximately 2000, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 8 percent power.During monthly functional testing on the 2A hydrogen analyzer by Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel, the containment dome sample valve did not close when the selector switch was placed in the "OFF" position.
The valve was not recognized as a containment isolation valve (CIV) and consequently the applicable technical specification (TS) action statement to de-energize a downstream isolation valve within 4 hours was not entered. The downstream valve was however, in its normally closed position.
Subsequently, the TS action statement was met by de-energizing the downstream valve.This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Since the sample valve is designated as a Class E piping penetration, and is designed to be open during a design basis event, this event had no significant safety impact. An apparent cause evaluation identified that the cause was a human error in evaluating the impact to plant operation caused by the failure of the hydrogen analyzer CIV. Contributing causes included:
: 1) an inadequate procedure, and 2) ineffective hydrogen analyzer labeling.Corrective actions include: 1) revision of the hydrogen analyzer procedure, 2) re-labeling the hydrogen analyzers to clearly demonstrate that the valves on the hydrogen analyzer are CIVs, and 3) operator briefing on lessons learned from the event.NCR FORM 366 (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI (10-2010)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE I SEQUENTIAL REVISION YER NUMB ER NUMBER St. Lucie Unit 2 05000389 N Page 2 of 2013 -002 00 NARRATIVE Description of the Event On June 3, 2013 at approximately 2000, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel were given permission by operations to begin the performance of the monthly functional test on the 2A hydrogen analyzer (EIIS: BB) .Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 8 percent power in the process of raising power following a forced outage. Upon completion of the functional test on the hydrogen analyzer at 2112, the containment upper dome sample valve (EIIS: BB) did not close when the sample point selector switch (EIIS: BB) was taken to "OFF". When informed by I&C of the condition, the Unit Supervisor (US) did not recognize the valve as a containment isolation valve, and consequently did not enter the associated technical specification (TS) action statement and complete the required action to de-energize a downstream isolation valve within 4 hours. The downstream valve was however, in its normally closed position.
The dayshift operations crew recognized the condition and at approximately 0936 on June 4, 2013 the TS action statement was met by de-energizing the downstream valve by opening its breaker.Cause An apparent cause analysis identified that the cause was a human error in evaluating the impact to plant operation caused by the failure of the hydrogen analyzer containment isolation valve. Contributing causes included:
: 1) an inadequate procedure, and 2) ineffective hydrogen analyzer labeling.Analysis of Safety Significance The containment upper dome hydrogen sample valve is a containment isolation valve (CIV) designated as a Class E piping penetration, which is designed to be open during a design basis event. Thus by design this valve does not provide a barrier against the release of radioactivity during engineered safety feature system operation.
CIVs of Class E, such as the subject sample valve, are not modeled in the St. Lucie Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and therefore, this event had no risk impact and no significant safety consequence.
This containment isolation valve event is reportable pursuant 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Immediate Corrective Actions 1. Failure of the containment upper dome hydrogen sample valve was re-evaluated and it was determined that Technical Specification 3.6.3 was applicable.
At approximately 0936 on June 4, 2013 the TS action statement was complied with by de-energizing the inline hydrogen sample valve by opening its breaker. (COMPLETE)
: 2. Operations held a briefing for the department to document and share human performance lessons learned for the event. (COMPLETE)
Additional Corrective Actions The corrective actions listed below are entered into the site corrective action program. Any changes to the actions will be managed under the corrective action program.1) The hydrogen analyzer procedure will be revised to include information about containment isolation valves and TS implications concerning hydrogen analyzer maintenance.
SSION NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION YER NUMBER NUMBER St. Lucie Unit 2 05000389 1 Page 3 of 3 2013 -002 00 NARRATIVE 2) The hydrogen analyzer valves will be re-labeled to clearly demonstrate that the valves on the hydrogen analyzer are containment isolation valves.Similar Events A search and review of data in the St. Lucie Corrective Action Database addressing the past two years revealed no previous occurrences or similar events.Failed Component (s)ISOL VLV (PENETR P-48A) FOR CNTMT DOME AREA HYDROGEN SAMPLING IEEE Class 1E 3/8" solenoid valve Model V52600-515(3/8")
Manufacture Valcor Engineering Company NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)}}

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