ML13057A541: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[Press Release-IV-13-006, NRC Issues Updated Confirmatory Action Letter to Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant Operator]]
| number = ML13057A541
| issue date = 02/26/2013
| title = Press Release-IV-13-006: NRC Issues Updated Confirmatory Action Letter to Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant Operator
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC/OPA/RGN-IV/FO
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000285
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = Press Release IV-13-006
| document type = Press Release
| page count = 1
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:No. IV-13-06 Contact:  Victor Dricks  (817) 200-1128                Lara Uselding  (817) 200-1519                                    February 26, 2013                                          E-Mail: OPA4.Resource@nrc.gov    NRC ISSUES UPDATED CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER  TO FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued an updated Confirmatory Action  Letter (CAL) outlining three additional actions Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) officials  have agreed to take prior to restarting the Fort Calhoun nuclear plant. The plant, located 19 miles north of Omaha, is owned and operated by OPPD and has  been shut down since April 2011 for a refueling outage and impacts from the Missouri River  floodwaters. NRC issued a CAL in June 2012 with a list of NRC-developed action items known as the  restart checklist. The new CAL items include a requirement to address safety system functional  failures, containment internal structure issues, and the use of Teflon as a sealant on electrical  cables inside containment. NRC is requiring OPPD to identify the causes and resolve issues that led to numerous  safety system functional failures (SSFF) that were identified over the course of a year. A number of systems are paramount in safely shutting down the plant and cooling the reactor during an accident. If a key system has the potential for failure, the NRC defines it as a SSFF. An example is the June 2011 electrical switchgear fire that disrupted power to vital systems and components needed for the safe shutdown of the plant. Additionally, OPPD must identify the causes and resolve two existing conditions inside  containment. Plant workers discovered that structures supporting equipment do not meet all design requirements. Secondly, over 600 pipes housing electrical cables that run through the containment building are insulated using a material that is known to degrade under some accident scenarios involving high radiation exposure. Previous CALs have been incorporated into the recently issued document. The current CAL will be posted to the Fort Calhoun Web site.  ###  News releases are available through a free listserv subscription at the following Web address:  http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver.html. The NRC homepage at www.nrc.gov also offers a SUBSCRIBE link. E-mail notifications are sent to subscribers when news releases are posted to NRC's website. NRC NEWS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Public Affairs  Region IV                              1600 E. Lamar Blvd.                          Arlington, TX  76011-4511 Telephone: (817) 860-8100 Site: www.nrc.gov Blog: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov}}

Latest revision as of 09:04, 21 July 2018