L-2014-189, LER 14-003-00 for Turkey Point, Unit 3, Regarding Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Failure of Group Step Counter: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000250/LER-2014-003]]
| number = ML14192A012
| issue date = 06/18/2014
| title = LER 14-003-00 for Turkey Point, Unit 3, Regarding Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Failure of Group Step Counter
| author name = Kiley M
| author affiliation = Florida Power & Light Co
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000250
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = L-2014-189
| document report number = LER 14-003-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 4
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:0 FPL6 L-2014-189 10 CFR § 50.73 JUN 1 8 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Re: Turkey Point Unit 3 Docket No. 50-250 Reportable Event: 2014-003-00 Date of Event: April 23, 2014 Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Failure of Group Step Counter The attached Licensee Event Report 05000250/2014-003-00 is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The reactor was subcritical at the time in Mode 3. The reactor trip breakers were opened in accordance with the site Technical Specifications.
If there are any questions, please call Mr. Robert Tomonto at 305-246-7327.
Very truly yours, Michael Kiley Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power & Light Company 9760 SW 344th St., Florida City, FL 33035 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES: 01131/2017 (02-20141 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, OC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and..See. PrRegulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC (See Page 2 for required number of 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Turkey Point Unit 3 05000250 1 of 3 4. TITLE Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Failure of Group Step Counter 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL Rev FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO. 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 4 23 2014 2014 003 00 6 18 2014 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)W 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
E 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 E 20.2201 (d) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
ED 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[:] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL [D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[] 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[1 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
E] 50.36(c)(2)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
E] 73.71 (a)(4)0% 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
E] 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D] 73.71 (a)(5)0D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Paul F. Czaya 305-246-7150
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSSION YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces i.e, approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On April 23, 2014 at approximately 1302 hours, Unit 3 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.3 Action as a result of the Shutdown Bank B Group 1 step counter failing to increment.
The reactor was subcritical in Mode 3 progressing to reactor startup. The reactor trip breakers were opened as required by the Action of TS 3.1.3.3. The TS requires that the reactor trip breakers be opened if the group step counter demand position indicator (group I and group 2) are not within +/- 2 steps of each other. All rods fully inserted.
The unit remained in Mode 3. This was a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. Therefore, an 8-hour report (EN# 50054) was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) to the NRC Operations Center. The cause of the event was a supervisory data logging card not fully seated in the circuit card rack because of insufficient instruction in a functional test procedure.
The supervisory data logging card was re-seated and the testing sequence continued successfully.
A revision to the procedure will require a visual inspection and independent verification to verify proper engagement of the printed circuit cards.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
-.Branch(T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,or b)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is nos required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REV YER NUMBER NO. 2 O Turkey Point Unit 3 05000250 of 2014 -003 -00 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On April 23, 2014 at approximately 1302 hours, Unit 3 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.3 Action as a result of the Shutdown Bank B Group I Step Counter [AA, CTR] failing to increment.
The reactor was subcritical in Mode 3 progressing to reactor startup. The reactor operator opened the reactor trip breakers in accordance with the Action of TS 3.1.3.3, which requires that the reactor trip breakers be opened if the group step counter demand position indicator (group 1 and group 2) are not within +/- 2 steps of each other. All rods fully inserted.
The unit remained in Mode 3.This was a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. Therefore, an 8-hour report (EN# 50054)was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) to the NRC Operations Center. This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
CAUSE OF THE EVENT The direct cause of the event was the failure of the group step counter demand position indicator to increment because the supervisory data logging card A 114 was not fully seated in the circuit card rack.The root cause is attributed to lack of sufficient instruction in a functional test procedure to verify proper card seating. Card Al 14 gave a false indication of being fully seated by allowing the urgent failure alarm to clear although complete contact was not established.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT During operation of the Rod Control System (RCS), the Logic Cabinet generates and sends pulses to the Power Cabinets.
When the Power Cabinet receives this pulse it initiates a Rod Step. When the Rod Step cycle is complete a reply pulse is sent back to the Logic Cabinet. Once this reply pulse is received at the Logic Cabinet, the Logic Cabinet then triggers a relay which in turn sends out a 100 Vdc pulse to the associated Group (demand) Step Counter on the Control Room Operator's Console. When this pulse is received at the Group (demand) Step Counter the step counter increments in the required direction
(+1 if rods out and -1 if rods in). These Group (demand) Step Counters rely on continuity with the RCS. At time of discovery, the A 114 printed circuit card was found not fully seated and confirmed as protruding beyond the edge of the card cage assembly by approximately YA -'A inch. The A 114 card was tight, however additional force was required to ensure the card was fully seated.On April 23, 2014, early in the dayshift, RCS testing was performed in accordance with 0-PMI-028.05, Rod Control System Preventative Maintenance and Power Cabinet Functional Test. In accordance with this procedure, card A 114 was withdrawn to verify proper operation of the Urgent Failure Alarm and then re-seated in the card cage. The Urgent Failure Alarm cleared.Later, while performing cold rod stepping, Operations personnel observed that while the Shutdown Bank B (SBB) rods were withdrawn, the group 2 step counter indicated 7 steps withdrawn, but the group 1 step NRC (02-201 FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 41/1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01131/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (1-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
or by intemet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME Turkey Point Unit 3 3. PAGE 3 of 3 2014 -003 -00 counter remained at 0 steps. The console and the Digital Control System rod position indication both indicated that both the group 1 and group 2 SBB were withdrawn to approximately 7 steps. Operations personnel concluded that the shutdown bank group step counters were not indicating properly and the decision was made to open the Unit 3 reactor trip breakers.Reportability The event (a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System) is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because the reactor trip breakers were required to be opened in response to a plant condition.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE At the time of the event, the reactor was in Mode 3 (sub-critical) and the plant remained in Mode 3. The reactor trip breakers were opened and all systems functioned as required.
Significant subcriticality margin was available based on the balance of the control rods being fully inserted and the boron concentration being greater than the predicted dilution value for criticality.
There was no impact on safety.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective action is in accordance with condition report ARI 960842 and includes: Revise plant procedure 0-PMI-028.05, Rod Control System Preventive Maintenance and Power Cabinet Functional Test, to require a visual inspection and independent verification to verify the engagement of the printed circuit boards (PCB) by ensuring the front edge of the PCBs are flush with the card cage assembly.
An additional supervisor visual inspection step will also be added to the procedure.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION EIIS Codes are shown in the format [IEEE system identifier, component function identifier, second component function identifier (if appropriate)].
Condition Report 1960842 was initiated due to this event.FAILED COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED:
None.PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: None in the last five years.}}

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