ENS 51729: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 02/11/2016 15:04 EST | | event date = 02/11/2016 15:04 EST | ||
| last update date = 02/11/2016 | | last update date = 02/11/2016 | ||
| title = Automatic Start | | title = Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generator and Loss of Shutdown Cooling | ||
| event text = At 1504 EST on February 11, 2016, with the plant shutdown in a forced outage, the Division 1, 4.16 Kv Safety Bus (EH11) lost power. Division 1 Shutdown Cooling was in service at the time and the Division 1 Shutdown Cooling pump A tripped. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded EH11 as designed. However, the Emergency Service Water (ESW) A pump, which supplies cooling water to the EDG did not start. Due to the absence of cooling water to the EDG, operators took manual action to secure the Division 1 EDG. Division 2 Shutdown Cooling was operable during this transient and was subsequently started. The Division 1 Shutdown Cooling common suction isolation valve (1E12F0008) had previously been de-energized in the open position to support planned maintenance. The Division 2 Shutdown Cooling isolation valve was not affected by the loss of bus EH11. Shutdown Cooling was re-established at 1544 EST using the Division 2 Shutdown Cooling pump. Reactor coolant temperature rose from approximately 89 degrees Fahrenheit to 115 degrees Fahrenheit during the event. The cause of the loss of EH11 and subsequent failure of ESW A pump to start are currently under investigation. | | event text = At 1504 EST on February 11, 2016, with the plant shutdown in a forced outage, the Division 1, 4.16 Kv Safety Bus (EH11) lost power. Division 1 Shutdown Cooling was in service at the time and the Division 1 Shutdown Cooling pump A tripped. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded EH11 as designed. However, the Emergency Service Water (ESW) A pump, which supplies cooling water to the EDG did not start. Due to the absence of cooling water to the EDG, operators took manual action to secure the Division 1 EDG. Division 2 Shutdown Cooling was operable during this transient and was subsequently started. The Division 1 Shutdown Cooling common suction isolation valve (1E12F0008) had previously been de-energized in the open position to support planned maintenance. The Division 2 Shutdown Cooling isolation valve was not affected by the loss of bus EH11. Shutdown Cooling was re-established at 1544 EST using the Division 2 Shutdown Cooling pump. Reactor coolant temperature rose from approximately 89 degrees Fahrenheit to 115 degrees Fahrenheit during the event. The cause of the loss of EH11 and subsequent failure of ESW A pump to start are currently under investigation. | ||
This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a specific system actuation due to the auto start of the Division 1 EDG on a valid signal. | This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a specific system actuation due to the auto start of the Division 1 EDG on a valid signal. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:45, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Perry  Ohio (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.43 h-0.0179 days <br />-0.00256 weeks <br />-5.89014e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Tony Kledzik 19:38 Feb 11, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Donald Norwood |
| Last Updated: | Feb 11, 2016 |
| 51729 - NRC Website
| |