ML14364A023

LER 14-003-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Lake Debris Intrusion Causing Degraded Forebay Conditions

ML14364A023
Person / Time
Site:
Issue date:	12/23/2014
From:	Partin S M Indiana Michigan Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP-NRC-2014-101 LER 14-003-00
Download: ML14364A023 (5)

Text

INDIANA Indiana Michigan PowerMICHIGAN Cook Nuclear PlantOne Cook PlaceBridgman, MI 49106A unit ofAmerican Electric Power India naMichigan PowercomDecember 23, 2014 AEP-NRC-2014-101 10 CFR 50.73Docket No.: 50-315U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk11555 Rockville Pike,Rockville, MD 20852Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 315/2014-003-00 Manual Reactor Trip Due to Lake Debris Intrusion Causing Degraded Forebay Conditions In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, Indiana Michigan Power, thelicensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, is submitting the following report:LER 315/2014-003-00:

"Manual Reactor Trip Due to Lake Debris Intrusion Causing DegradedForebay Conditions."

There are no commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory AffairsManager, at (269) 466-2649.

Sincerely, Samuel M. PartinPlant ManagerJEN/ampEnclosure c: M. L. Chawla -NRC Washington, DCJ. T. King -MPSCMDEQ -RMD/RPSNRC Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson

-NRC Region IIIA. J. Williamson

-AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosure NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:

01/31/2017 (02-2014)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:

80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory

Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),

Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DCfor each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters fcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGEDonald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000315 1 OF 44. TITLEManual Reactor Trip Due to Lake Debris Intrusion Causing Degraded Forebay Conditions

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDI F DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR DaldU C. NAMENUMBER NO. Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000316FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER11 01 2014 2014 -003 -00 12 23 2014 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)[] 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

LI 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

[] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

[1 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

E] 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

Z 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

[] 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

Ej 73.71(a)(4) 10 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

[j 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

LI OTHER1 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[-I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

,l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or inNRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER-ICENSEE CONI CTMichael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs ManagerI TELIPIUN NUMBER (IncIude Aqrea Code)(269) 466-2649'ICAUSE SYSTEM COMPOIA BA P14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED[] YES (If yes, complete

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I NOfBSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On November 1, 2014, at approximately 0249, Donald C. Cook Plant Unit 1 (Ul) and Unit 2 (U2) reactors were manuallytripped from 100 percent and 55 percent power, respectively, when high winds and high waves on Lake Michigan resultedin a heavy influx of dune grass and debris into the forebay which resulted in degraded forebay conditions, lowering forebaylevel, and damaged trash racks. Following the UI trip, the Ul Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump (TDAFP) trippedunexpectedly three minutes following the automatic start. Following the U2 trip, the U2 Main Generator trip was performed manually when the automatic trip failed.Corrective actions taken include cleaning and repair of damaged forebay trash racks and travelling water screens.Corrective maintenance also corrected the causes of the U1 TDAFP trip and the U2 Main Generator trip function.

Plannedcorrective actions include revising plant procedures to provide a comprehensive approach to adverse lake conditions.

The manual Reactor Protection System actuation and the automatic Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation werereported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)

(Event Notification 50587). Thevalid actuations are reportable as a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

Thestorm and lake conditions necessitating the reactor trips is reportable as an LER in accordance with 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iii).

NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:

0113112017

'02-2014)

ý0,-20,,,

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:

80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by..... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),

Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVDiYCokPiRU 1INUMBER NO.Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000315 2 OF 42014 -003 00NARRATIVE Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as [XX].The following information applies to both Unit 1 (Ul) and Unit 2 (U2).INTRODUCTION On November 1, 2014, at approximately 0249, Donald C. Cook Plant U1 and U2 were manually tripped from 100percent and 55 percent power, respectively, as directed by procedure, when a heavy influx of dune grass anddebris caused degraded forebay [NN] conditions.

One of the 14 Circulating Water System (CWS) [KE] Traveling Water Screens (TWS) [SCN][NN]

was out of service at the time of the event. Major plant components functioned as designed with the following exceptions:

The Ul Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump (TDAFP) [BA][P] tripped unexpectedly approximately threeminutes after it started.

The Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps (MDAFP) [BA][P] provided the necessary flowto the Steam Generators (SG) [SG].The U2 Main Generator

[TB] did not trip automatically.

Operators successfully actuated a manual trip of theMain Generator.

EVENT DESCRIPTION With both U1 and U2 operating at 100 percent power, high winds, wave heights greater than 20 feet, and atwo-foot level surge on Lake Michigan transported large amounts of dune grass and other debris to the plantcirculating water intakes [NN]. The dune grass and debris impinged upon the trash racks causing failure of someof the racks, and subsequent rapid fouling of the TWS.The following timeline describes the sequence of events on November 1, 2014 (times are approximate):

0015 With forebay level lowering due to buildup of debris on the trash racks [NN], operators on both Ul andU2 throttled main turbine condenser circulating water outlet valves [V] to lower total system flow inorder to recover forebay level. Level did recover slightly, but after a very brief period level continued tolower.0141 U2 Operators stopped one of the four U2 Circulating Water Pumps (CWP) [P] in an effort to recoverforebay level. Level did recover slightly, but after a very brief period level continued to lower.0154 Due to TWSs failing to maintain normal screen differential pressure (dp), U2 operators entered theprocedure for screen house forebay degraded conditions and ensured that Ul operators also enteredthe procedure.

Initial actions of the procedure are to monitor various forebay parameters.

0210 U2 Operators entered the procedure for rapid power reduction response and lowered power at fourpercent per minute to approximately 50 percent power to establish conditions to stop a second CWP.0218 U2 Operators stopped the second of four CWPs in accordance with the degraded forebay procedure.

0242 Ul Operators stopped one of three CWPs in accordance with the degraded forebay procedure.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR INUMBER NO.Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000315 2014 3 OF 42014 -003 -00NARRATIVE 0249 The forebay conditions degraded further and met procedure conditions directing removal of all CWPsfrom service; the procedure requires both units to trip their reactors, manually close the SteamGenerator Stop Valves (SGSV), and then remove all CWPs from service.

Both Ul and U2 performed these actions successfully.

0258 While performing actions of the Reactor Trip Response procedure, U2 Operators identified that theMain Generator

[GEN] output breakers

[BKR] did not automatically open as expected.

The Operators manually tripped the generator in accordance with the procedure.

0300 Ul Operators, responding to the 'TDAFP Trip and Throttle Valve Unlatched' annunciator, noted thatthe TDAFP, which started automatically as expected following the reactor trip, had tripped for unknownreasons.

The TDAFP was subsequently declared inoperable.

Troubleshooting was completed andthe Ul TDAFP was restored to operable on 11/3/2014 at 0017 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.0323 Ul Operators noted that the Number 1 SG pressure was low -approximately 980 psig -the expectedpressure was approximately 1000 psig. Operators in the field noted three of the five SGSVs [RV] wereleaking-by.

Mechanical agitation of the safety valves was effective in seating all three valves.Number 1 SG pressure then increased and was being controlled by the SG Power Operated ReliefValve [PCV] at approximately 1000 psig as expected.

The Root Cause requiring the units to be taken off line was that the organization did not establish aggressive preventive methodologies to identify and mitigate risks associated with storm induced debris intrusion prior tochanging forebay conditions or to prevent significant damage to the forebay structures.

EVENT ANALYSISRough lake conditions (high winds causing 20-foot waves and a level surge of two feet) caused ingress of dunegrass and debris into the forebay at a rate that challenged and damaged the trash racks, and subsequently theability of the TWSs to continue to operate.

As a result of the blockage, forebay level was lowering.

Operators entered the procedure for degraded forebay conditions in an attempt to restore forebay level, but were notsuccessful to allow for continued safe operation of Ul and U2. Both Units were manually removed from service, themain steam isolation valves were manually closed, and all CWPs were removed from service.The reactors were manually tripped prior to any automatic reactor trip set-points being achieved.

The reactor wasoperated well within Safety Limits and no Limiting Safety System Settings were challenged.

The safety systems maintained mitigation capability without degradation.

Safety margins and redundancy of theEssential Service Water [BI] and Component Cooling Water systems were maintained throughout the event andafter the event. There was no loss of safety functions of these systems.In both Ul and U2, following the manual reactor trip, Main Feedwater

[SJ] was unavailable due to closure of theMain Steam Isolation valves, and the Auxiliary Feedwater systems operated to supply makeup to all SGs asdesigned.

Following the Ul trip, the Ul TDAFP tripped 3 minutes following the automatic start. Both MDAFPs operated toprovide makeup as designed throughout the event. Ul also experienced three of the five SGSVs on one SG liftingand simmering; mechanical agitation was effective to seat the valves. The apparent cause of the TDAFP trip wasdetermined to be mechanical interference that affected the operation of the Trip and Throttle Valve. Theinterference has been corrected to preclude further interference.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEY SEQUENTIAL REVIYEAR NUMBER NO.Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000315 4 OF 42014 -003 -00NARRATIVE Following the reactor trip on U2, an automatic trip of the Main Generator did not occur as expected due to failure ofa relay in the trip circuit.

Operators were able to perform a manual trip. The failed relay has been replaced.

Based on a review of each of the control room (CR) logs, Plant Process Computer

[CPU] information, and thepost-trip review performed by operations, all other plant systems performed as designed to shut down the Units andremove decay heat. No further risk-significant equipment functions were affected or failed and no significant operator actions were required outside those required for normal trips.Both Units required repair and cleaning of the common forebay trash racks and TWSs. Health and safety of thepublic were not compromised as a result of this event.CORRECTIVE ACTIONSTaken:The CWS trash racks and TWS systems were cleaned and repaired.

Planned:Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition-

• Create a comprehensive, tiered approach for corrective and preventive actions for the determination offorecasted and current lake [Lake Michigan]

condition's impact to CWS health, and incorporate into theScreen House Vulnerability Determination procedure.

• Formalize Significant Operating Experience Report, SOER 07-2 required Lake Threat Assessment.

Perform assessment with representation from System Engineering and Environmental at a minimum,assessing new threats from the lake [Lake Michigan].

Initiate a corrective action to incorporate new threatsinto the Screen House Vulnerability determination procedure.

Additional Corrective Actions-* Install instrumentation to provide indication in the CR of changing conditions across the trash racks." Develop a design calculation to determine maximum allowable differential pressure across the trashracks.* Revise Ul and U2 CWS System Operation procedures to provide allowable CWP line-ups.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTSA review of Licensee Event Reports for the past three years found no similar events.NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)