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| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[05000346/LER-1980-064-03, /03L-0:on 800822,station Experienced Loss of Essential Instrument Ac Panel Y2.Caused by Failure of YV-2 Inverter Output Fuse.No Cause Determined for Fuse Failure. Failed Fuse Replaced]] |
| | number = ML19345D330
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| | issue date = 09/18/1980
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| | title = /03L-1:on 800822,station Experienced Loss of Essential Instrument Ac Panel Y2.Caused by Failure of YV-2 Inverter Input Fuse & Other Undetermined Causes.Failed Fuse Replaced
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| | author name = Isley T
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| | author affiliation = TOLEDO EDISON CO.
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| | addressee name =
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| | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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| | docket = 05000346
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| | license number =
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| | contact person =
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| | document report number = LER-80-064-03L, LER-80-64-3L, NUDOCS 8012120512
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| | package number = ML19345D332
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| | document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
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| | page count = 3
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| }}
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| {{LER
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| | Title = /03L-1:on 800822,station Experienced Loss of Essential Instrument Ac Panel Y2.Caused by Failure of YV-2 Inverter Input Fuse & Other Undetermined Causes.Failed Fuse Replaced
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| | Plant =
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| | Reporting criterion =
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| | Power level =
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| | Mode =
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| | Docket = 05000346
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| | LER year = 1980
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| | LER number = 64
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| | LER revision = 3
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| | Event date =
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| | Report date =
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| | ENS =
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| | abstract =
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| }}
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| =text=
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| CONTROL BLOCC l
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| CON'T 6d b3 EV ENT D ATE 74 7'J REPORT D ATE 80 6d 61 OOCAETNyYdER I
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| d EVENT DESCRIP'. TON AND PROB A6LE CCNSECUENCES h IO f 2l I(SP-33-SO-70 On 8/22/80 at 1446 hours and on 8/23/80 at 0922 hours, the station ex-l lperienced s. loss of Essential Instrument AC 'anel Y2.
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| The result was the de-energiza-l 93,3, System l
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| , o,,,, l tion of Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2, Reactor Protection
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| ,.l' g(RPS) Channel 2 and Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 2 wh
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| ,g,3, This placed the
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| ,3,e,, caused the containment radiation string for SFAS Channel 2 to fail.
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| There was no danger to the public or station j
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| i o I 7 I I station in violation of T.S. 3.3.2.1.
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| radiation monitoring were operable.l g ersOnnel. The other three channels of containment so p
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| VALVE SYSTEM
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| ==CAUSE==
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| CAUSE CCCE CODE SL8 CODE COMPON E NT CODE SU8 CODE SUSCODE lE lB l@ l Ej@ ]@ lC lK j T lB lR lK l@ {@ { @
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| 10 11 12 r3 18 13 20 SEQUE NT! AL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION g
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| ,_ EVENT YE AR REPORT NO.
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| CODE TYPE NO.
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| 21 22 2J 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 TAK N A f N ON PL T T
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| 33 34 35 36 31 40 48 4'
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| Q 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACflONS q
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| 1 101 IThe cause was the f ailure of the YV-2 inverter input fus5. however. the exact caitse of!
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| k Ii li l Ithe ftise failure has not been determined.
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| The first ew.it was corrected under Ma in teT4-Iii?Ii ace Work Order 80-3049 by replacing the failed fuse.
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| SFAS Channel 2 was re-energized I g
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| I1 13 I lat 1645 heurs on 8/22/80. The second event was corrected similarily under MUO 80-3051 l t
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| m land at 1346 hours on 8/23/80 SFAS Channel 2 was again re-energized.
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| ==DESCRIPTION==
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| t, 419-259-5000. Ext. 230 Tom Isley U
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| TOLEDO EDISON COMPAhT DAV' -BEGSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE sui r cAESTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-74 0 ATE OF EVENT:
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| .,st 22, 1980 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of Essential Instrument AC Panel Y2.
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| The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (WT) = 0 and Conditions Pric r to Occurrence:
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| Load (Gross MWE) = 0.
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| Description of Occurrence: On August 22, 1980 at 1446 hours, the station experienced a loss of Essential Instrument AC Panel Y2.
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| This resulted in the de-energization of Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 2, Reactor Protection System (RPS)
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| This Channel 2, and Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 2.
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| ais also failed caused the containment radiation string for SFAS Channel 2 to fail.
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| Since BWST Chan-the Channel 2 Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) low level bistable.
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| nel 4 vas already in the tripped condition for maintenance, the station expe rienced an Incident Level 5 actuation on actuation Channel 2.
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| The loss of RPS Channel 2 also caused the loss of Source. Range Indication NI-1.
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| NI-2 was operable at the time.
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| The loss of the containment radiatior string for SFAS Ch'annel 2 is reportable per Technical Specific _ ton 3.3.2.1 which _ -m: ires all four channels of containment radf a-tion to be operable in all modes.
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| The action statement, which requires the failed channel to be placed in the tripped condition, was met.
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| =
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| h The Incident Level 5 actuation is only required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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| [
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| Being in Mode 5, it is not reportable.
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| I
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| [
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| Again at 0922 hours on August 23, 1980, the station repeated its loss of Essential Instrument AC Panel Y2.
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| The result was a de-energization of SFAS CManel 2, RPS Chan-l nel 2, and SFRCS Channel 2.
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| This caused the loss of the SFAS Channel 2 centainment the failure of the BWST low level bistable for Channel 2 and with b
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| radiation string, the BWST Channel 4 already tripped, the station experienced an Incident Level 5 actua-tion on actuation Channel 2.
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| The same action statement was entered as with the first occurrence.
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| Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The loss of Y2 in each event was due to 1
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| a failed YV-2 inverter input fuse. The exact cause of the. fuse failure has not been And There was facility change request work ongoing in the cabinet room.
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| [
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| pinpointed.
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| a failure in the SFAS Channel 2, RFS Channel 2, or SFRCS Channel 2 cabinet would have This fed back to the YV-2 fuse before the fuse in the individual cabinet could fail.
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| g U
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| is because YV-2 is designed to fast fail to protect the inverter.
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| It appears that the failure occurred when wires were being connected in these cabinets. Apparently, leads touched some wrong terminals and cauued a short that caused the YV-2 failure.
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| g LER #80-064 L
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| ;.a-_.....-..-__-
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| O o
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| .I l
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| TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY I
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| DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE PAGE 2 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORM TION FOR LER NP-33-80-74 Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel.
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| The other three channels of containment radiation monitor-
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| :- ing were operable. The SFAS Incident Level 5 actuation did not cause any water to reach the emergency sump as the Emergency Sump Isolation Valves DH9A and DH9B were closed and power removed.
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| t
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| ==Corrective Action==
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| The first event was corrected under Maintenance Work Order 80-3049 by replacing the failed fuse.
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| SFAS Channel 2 was re-energized at 1645 hours on August 22, 1980. The second event was corrected under Nbintenance Work Order 80-3051 by again replacing the failed fuse. At 1346 hours on August 23, 1980,-SFAS 7
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| Channel 2 again was re-energized, which removed the station from the action' statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.
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| Previous similar events were reported in NP-33-79-13 (79-009) and Failure Data:
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| NP-33-80-70 (80-056).
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| LER #80-064 l
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