ML22217A015

FRN: Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy Center, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

ML22217A015
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point, Holtec
Issue date:	11/09/2022
From:	Yoira Diaz-Sanabria Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch
To:
Allen W 3014156877
Shared Package
ML22217A014	List: ML22217A015 ML22217A016 ML22217A017
References
87 FR 68747, NRC-2022-0152
Download: ML22217A015 (13)

Text

[7590- 01-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 72 -1014, 72-51, 50- 247 and 50-286; NRC-202 2-0152]

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC

Indian Point Energy Center

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: E xemption; issuance.

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an exemption

in response to a request submitted by Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI),

on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC on

March 24, 2022. This exemption would, if granted, permit HDI to load up to three MPC -

32Ms, using Amendment No. 15 of the Holtec International Certificate of Compliance

(CoC) No. 1014 for the HI-STORM 100 storage system, with either up to 32 fuel

assemblies each containing either a C alifornium-252 (Cf-252) or an Antimony-Beryllium

(Sb-Be) neutron source assemblies (NSA) with sufficient cooling time, or a combination

of up to five P lutonium-Beryllium (Pu-Be) NSAs and up to all of the remaining basket

locations with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or an Sb-Be NSA with

sufficient cooling time. Further, it would permit HDI to load the fuel assemblies

containing either Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSAs in any location in the basket and the fuel

assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs such that one is located in the center of the basket

and no more than one NSA is located in each of the four basket quadrants.

DATES: The exemption was issued on Novem ber 7, 202 2.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022- 0152 when contacting the NRC

about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly

available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

• Federal Rulemaking Webs ite: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and

search for Docket ID NRC-2022- 0152. Address questions about Docket IDs to Stacy

Schumann; telephone: 301-415- 0624; email: Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical

questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information Contact section of

this document.

• NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public

Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the

search, select Begin Web-based ADAMS Search. For problems with ADAMS, please

contact the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209,

301-415-4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the convenience of the

reader, instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are provided

in the Availability of Documents section.

• NRCs PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents,

by appointment, at the NRCs PDR, Room P1 B35, One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make an appointment to visit the PDR,

please send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-

4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chris Alle n, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 -

0001; telephone: 301 -415-6877; email: William.Allen@nrc.gov.

2 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), holds a general license for the

Indian Point Energy Center Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) under

provisions in part 72 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Licensing

Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level

Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste. Under

10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5)(i), (b)(11) and 72.214, a general licensee may store

spent fuel in a cask, so long as it is one of the approved casks listed in 10 CFR 72.214

and the general licensee conforms to the terms, conditions, and specifications of the

relevant certificate of compliance (CoC) or amended CoC. HDI has stated that it plans

to use the HI -STORM 100 dry storage system, CoC No. 1014, Amendment No. 15 in an

upcoming spent fuel loading campaign.

II. Request/Action

By letter dated March 24, 2022, as supplemented on June 17, 2022, HDI, on

behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, requested an

exemption under 10 CFR 72.7. HDI further clarified its request during a Microsoft

Teams call on September 20, 2022. HDI specifically requested an exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3), and the portion of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(11) that

states [t]he licensee shall comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications of the

certificate of compliance (CoC). The exemption request would permit, if granted, HDI to

load up to three MPC-32Ms, using Amendment No. 15 of the Holtec International

Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1014 for the HI-STORM 100 storage system, with

either up to 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Californium-252 (Cf-252) or an

Antimony-Beryllium (Sb-Be) NSA with sufficient cooling time, or a combination of up to

3 five fuel assemblies each containing a Plutonium-Beryllium (Pu-Be) NSA and up to all of

the remaining basket locations with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or

an Sb-Be NSA with sufficient cooling time. Further, as discussed later, it would permit

HDI to load the fuel assemblies containing either Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs in any location

in the basket and the fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs such that one is located in

the center of the basket and no more than one is located in each of the four basket

quadrants. Additionally, although HDIs analysis included information about polonium

beryllium (Po-Be) NSAs, based on its September 20, 2022, Microsoft Teams call, HDI

indicated that they only wanted to load Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs.

Although HDI only requested exemptions from 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and (b)(11),

to carry out this action, the NRC would also need to grant exemptions from 72.212(a)(2),

(b)(5)(i), and 72.214. Consequently, in eva luating the request, the NRC also consider ed,

pursuant to its authority in 10 CFR 72.7, exempti ng HDI from similar requirements in

10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(i); and 10 CFR 72.214, List of Approved

Spent Fuel Storage Casks. For clarity, when this Federal Register notice refers to

HDIs requested exemption, it means both the two provisions from which HDI requested

exemption and the additional provisions from which the NRC staff is considering

exempting HDI on its own initiative.

III. Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the Commission may, upon application by any

interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the

requirements of the regulations of 10 CFR P art 72 as it determines are authorized by law

and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and sec urity, and are

otherwise in the public interest.

4 The NRC staff prepared a safety evaluation report to document its safety

evaluation of the requested exemption. As summarized in this document, the NRCs

safety review concluded that the requested exemption meets the requirements for

issuance in 10 CFR 72.7.

A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law

The Commission has the legal authority to issue exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 as provided in 10 CFR 72.7. Issuance of this

exemption is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and is not

otherwise inconsistent with NRCs regulations or other applicable laws. Therefore,

issuance of the exemption is authorized by law.

B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and Security

The staff reviewed HDI s exemption request and concludes, as discussed further,

that the proposed exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 will not cause

the HI-STORM 100 storage cask to encounter conditions beyond those for which it has

already been evaluated and demonstrated to meet the applicable safety requirements in

10 CFR Part 72. The staff followed the guidance in NUREG-2215, Standard Review

Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities, April 2020, to complete its

safety evaluation.

Safety Review of the Requested Exemption

HDI submitted an exemption request to deviate from the requirement in CoC No.

1014, Appendix D, table 2.1-1, section V, "MPC MODEL: MPC-32M," Item C of

Amendment No. 15 for CoC No. 1014 only permits general licensees to load a single

NSA per cask. Further, per Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) table 2.II.1.1, R ev. 22,

the single NSA must be located in a cell in the inner part of the basket (i.e., fuel storage

location 13, 14, 19, or 20). The staff reviewed the exemption request and concluded that

5 the proposed exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 will not cause the

HI-STORM 100 storage system to encounter conditions beyond those for which it has

been evaluated and demonstrated to meet the applicable safety requirements in

10 CFR P art 72.

The staff determined that the presence of additional NSAs or the presence of

those NSAs in different locations throughout the basket will not cause the bounding

canister weight previously evaluated in approving Amendment No. 15 to be exceeded,

making a structural evaluation unnecessary. Further, the staff determined that the decay

heat contribution from activated metal associated with the NSAs at issue in the specified

locations is negligible compared to the decay heat from the fuel assembly.

Consequently, the staff determined that a thermal evaluation is unwarranted.

Since the NSAs are located inside the confinement boundary of the multi-purpose

canister (MPC) and changing the number of NSAs, or their locations, will not change that

fact, a confinement evaluation is also not necessary. In addition, increasing the neutron

source terms by adding NSAs in different locations does not increase the multiplication

factor. Therefore, criticality safety is not affected, and a criticality evaluation is

unnecessary. Therefore, shielding is the only area potentially affected by the requested

exemption.

Shielding

The current CoC authorizes general licensees to load only a single fuel assembly

containing an NSA per cask, and that fuel assembly must be loaded in a cell within the

inner part of the basket (i.e., fuel storage location 13, 14, 19, or 20) because NSAs can

have a significant neutron source term. The applicant developed a quantitative analysis

that explicitly evaluated the neutron dose rates associated with storing more than one

fuel assembly containing an NSA per cask to support new loading requirements. In its

6 analysis, the applicant evaluated two possible high-level loading scenarios: a maximum

of 32 fuel assemblies each containing an NSA and a maximum of five fuel assemblies

each containing a Pu-Be NSA.

For both scenarios, the applicant considered three primary NSA types in its

evaluation: Cf-252, Pu-Be, and Po-Be. During the September 20, 2020, Microsoft

Teams call, HDI indicated that they only wanted to load Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs.

Consequently, the staff did not consider Po-Be NSAs in its evaluation of this exemption.

Cf-252 and Pu-Be NSAs have half-lives of 2.646 years and 87.7 years, respectively.

The applicant also considered a secondary NSA type, Sb-Be, with a half-life of 60.2

days. For Cf-252, which decays by neutron emission, the analysis identified that the

neutron source strength will reduce gradually over time because the half-life is on the

order of a few years; neither long enough for the source strength to remain relatively

constant, nor short enough for the reduction to be quick. For Pu-Be, which generates

neutrons when the beryllium absorbs an alpha particle emitted by the plutonium, the

analysis identified that the neutron source strength will remain essentially the same as

when the NSA was manufactured (i.e., it will not reduce significantly over time) because

the half-life for plutonium is very long. For Sb-Be, which produces neutrons when the

beryllium interacts with a high energy gamma emitted by activated antimony (i.e.,

antimony that has absorbed neutrons), the analysis identified that the neutron source

strength will reduce very quickly over time because of the short half-life of the activated

antimony.

In evaluating the scenario of loading a maximum of 32 fuel assemblies containing

NSAs, the applicant determined, using the initial source strength and the half-life values

in the previous paragraph, that after seven half-lives the neutron source strength of a

fuel assembly containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA is negligibly higher than the

7 neutron source strength of a design basis fuel assembly. Therefore, the applicant

asserted that, after seven half-lives, the presence of either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA

within a design basis fuel assembly will not significantly increase the dose rate from a

design basis fuel assembly. Consequently, the applicant concluded that up to 32 fuel

assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA can be loaded per basket,

and that they can be loaded into any basket location.

Staff reviewed the applicants approach. In reviewing this approach, staff found

that the applicant could load up to 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or

an Sb-Be NSAwith those 32 fuel assemblies having any combination of Cf-252 and

Sb-Be NSAs and that the neutron source strength of each fuel assembly with either a

Cf-252 NSA or an Sb-Be NSA increased by only a small amount, approximately 2 x 10 -6

neutrons per second, after seven half -lives relative to a design basis fuel assembly.

Because this increase is so small, after seven half-lives, the dose rate of a canister

containing 32 fuel assemblies with either Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSAs that have undergone

seven half-lives of decay will be very similar to the dose rate of a container containing 32

design basis fuel assemblies. More specifically, accounting for statistical uncertainties,

dose rates would potentially increase a millirem/hr or less, if at all, under both normal

and accident conditions. The NRC staff considers dose rate increases of this magnitude

to be negligible relative to the dose rates from design basis fuel assemblies. Therefore,

the staff determined that the anal ysi s demonstrated that dose rates under both normal

and accident conditions would increase negligibly by the addition of 32 fuel assemblies

containing either Cf -252 or Sb-Be NSAs after seven half-lives of decay time. Further,

because a canister loaded with 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or

Sb-Be NSA would have an NSA loaded in every fuel loading location and because the

effect on dose would be negligible, the NRC staff concludes that loading fuel assemblies

8 containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA in any location in the basket would have a

negligible effect on dose.

In evaluating loading a maximum of five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be

NSA the applicant performed dose rate calculations assuming each NSA had the design

basis fuel assembly neutron source term in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.2.15 rather

than the actual source strength of an NSA. The applicant evaluated dose rates using

the general-purpose, continuous-energy, generalized-geometry, time-dependent Monte

Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code. The applicant used MCNP5 version 1.41 to model the

MPC-32M, with up to five NSAs per basket, in both the HI -TRAC Version MS and the HI-

STORM 100S Version E overpack. The MCNP model located one NSA in the center of

the MPC-32M (i.e., cell locations 13, 14, 19 and 20 of appendix D, f igure 2.1-1). In

addition, the model located the remaining four NSAs on the basket periphery with one

NSA in each basket quadrant.

The applicant calculated the maximum dose rate from the NSAs in the fuel

assembly and not the maximum total dose rate from the fuel assembly and the NSA.

The applicant asserted that this approach would result in conservative dose rates

because the maximum dose rate due to the design basis fuel assembly may be in a

different location (e.g., the midplane of the overpack radial surface) from the maximum

dose rate due to the NSAs. The applicant calculated dose rates at the same surface

and one-meter locations for design basis fuel under normal conditions as reported in HI-

STORM 100 FSAR tables 5.II.1.1 and 5.II.1.3. Additionally, the applicant evaluated the

dose rate at 100 meters for design basis fuel in the HI-TRAC under accident conditions

at the same locations as reported in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.4. The analysis

determined the maximum dose rate increase under normal conditions due to adding four

fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA, in addition to the fuel assembly

9 containing an NSA authorized by CoC No. 1014, at the following locations: the overpack

surface, one meter from the overpack surface, the HI-TRAC surface, and one meter

from the HI-TRAC surface. The analysis calculated the following dose rate increases at

these locations: 3.44 millirem per hour (mrem/hr), 0.78 mrem/hr, 1099.92 mrem/hr and

122.69 mrem/hr respectively. Finally, the analysis determined the maximum dose rate

increase under accident conditions due to adding four NSAs, in addition to the NSA

authorized by CoC No. 1014, at 100 meters from the HI-TRAC is 0.27 mrem/hr.

In conducting its evaluation, the applicant assumed the Pu-Be NSA source

strength equaled the design basis fuel assembly source strength of 1.4 x 109 neutrons

per second. The staff determined that this approach is conservative because the initial

source term of a Pu-Be NSA is approximately 1.5 x 106 neutrons per second which is

less than the value HDI used. Because the MCNP code is a standard tool in the nuclear

industry for performing Monte Carlo criticality safety and radiation shielding calculations,

the staff found MCNP an acceptable code for this application. Because the exemption

request is limited to fuel stored in an MPC-32M, which can only be stored in the HI-

STORM 100S Version E overpack, and because the HI-TRAC MS can only be used with

the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack, staff found it acceptable to limit the MCNP

analyses to the HI-TRAC MS and the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack. In addition,

the applicant calculated the dose rates related to this exemption at the same locations at

which it calculated the dose rates for HI-STORM Amendment No. 15. In issuing

Amendment No. 15, staff determined the dose rates at these locations satisfied as low

as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles, where relevant, and demonstrated

compliance with 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106, as well as 10 CFR Part 20, as

documented in Section 6 of the SER staff prepared to support issuance of Amendment

No. 15. Nothing about this exemption would affect, or in any way make inapplicable, the

10 staffs previous finding that calculating the dose rate at those locations is acceptable.

Therefore, staff finds these locations are appropriate for calculating dose rates

associated with this exemption.

Further, the staff reviewed the applicants approach of only calculating the

maximum dose rate caused by the NSAs in the fuel assemblies and not the overall

maximum dose rate. The total dose rate from two different sources (i.e., the design

basis fuel assembly and the NSA) is simply the sum of the individual dose rates.

Consequently, by taking the dose rate caused by design basis fuel assemblies in the

canister, which are found in FSAR tables 5.II.1.1, 5.II.1.3 and 5.II.1.4 and adding them to

the dose rate caused by the NSAs within fuel assemblies, the staff was able to evaluate

the overall maximum dose rate as part of its review. Therefore, the staff also found

acceptable the applicants approach of only calculating the maximum dose rate due to

fuel assemblies containing NSAs.

When the staff approved the MPC-32M, the HI-TRAC MS and the HI-STORM

100S Version E overpack, the staff identified two accident conditions that increased the

dose at the controlled area boundary: (1) the draining of the neutron shield water jacket

for the transfer cask and (2) a non-mechanistic tipover of the overpack which exposes

the bottom of the cask. As discussed in the SER approving the HI-STORM 100S

Version E overpack, staff found it very unlikely that the Version E overpack would

tipover. Nothing about this exemption would affect that conclusion. Therefore, the staff

found the applicants approach of modeling the HI-TRAC with the assumed loss of the

neutron absorber as the bounding accident acceptable for this evaluation.

NRC staff concluded that the increased dose rates under normal conditions from

the presence of up to five fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs are acceptable for the

HI-STORM overpack because the dose rate increase is less than a mrem/hr for all

11 locations except at the midplane of the radial surface on the overpack surface where it

increased by less than four mrem/hr. Relative to the dose rates from loading the

canister as already-approved, staff considers dose rate increases of this magnitude

negligible. Additionally, the dose rate increases at a distance of one meter are even less

than the dose rate increases at the surface. Thus, relative to the dose rates from

loading the canister as already approved, the staff also considers these dose rate

increases to be negligible. Further, the HI-TRAC MS dose rates increased by less than

ten percent compared to the dose rates in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.3 at all

locations both on the HI-TRAC MS surface and one meter from the HI-TRAC MS surface

except at the HI-TRAC MS radial surface midplane where the dose rate increased by 28

percent (i.e., 1099.92 mrem/hr). Staff considers the dose rate increase at the HI-TRAC

MS radial surface midplane a very localized effect due to the reduced neutron shielding

capability of the HI-TRAC MS compared to the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack.

The staff considers the HI-TRAC MS dose rate increases, including the increase at the

radial surface midplane, acceptable for the following reasons. First, radiological workers

would only be exposed to these increased dose rates for relatively short periods of time.

Second, members of the public will be exposed to even lower dose rates since

10 CFR 72.106(b) requires a minimum distance of 100 meters between spent fuel and

members of the public and dose rates decrease as distance increases. NRC staff also

determined that an increase in the HI-TRAC dose rates of less than ten percent

compared to the dose rates in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.4 for the HI-TRAC MS

accident condition dose rates due to the presence of up to five fuel assemblies

containing Pu-Be NSAs is acceptable because staff confirmed through hand calculations

that the dose at 100 meters meets the 10 CFR 72.106 requirement assuming a 30 -day

duration. Finally, after adding the dose rates considered when issuing CoC 1014,

12 Amendment No. 15 to the dose rate increases that would result from approving this

exemption, staff finds that canisters loaded in accordance with this exemption will

continue to satisfy overall dose limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions,

10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions, and the limits in 10 CFR Part 20. These

conclusions only apply, however, when the fuel assemblies containing the Pu-Be NSAs

are loaded such that one is located in the center of the basket (i.e., fuel storage location

13, 14, 19, or 20) and no more than one is located in each of the four basket quadrants.

As referenced earlier, if granted, this exemption would permit HDI to load a fuel

canister with up to five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu -Be NSA and up to all of the

remaining basket locations with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or an

Sb-Be NSA that has decayed for at least seven half-lives. HDI did not provide an

analysis of this specific configuration. That said, as discussed previously, staff has

already analyzed a canister loaded with five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be

NSA and a canister loaded with 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or an

Sb-Be NSA that has decayed for at least seven half -lives. Staff concluded that the

neutron source strength of a fuel assembly with either a Cf-252 NSA or an Sb-Be NSA

increased by only a small amountapproximately 2 x 10 -6 neutrons per secondafter

seven half-lives relative to a design basis fuel assembly. As discussed before, the staff

concluded that that source strength increase was so small that the neutron dose rate

increase, if any, associated with loading a canister with 32 fuel assemblies each

containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA would be negligible. As the dose rate

increase from loading a canister with 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252

or an Sb-Be NSA would be negligible, it follows that adding 27 fuel assemblies each

containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA that has undergone seven half-lives of

decay, will have a similarly negligible effect on dose rate because the increase in

13 neutron source strength will be even smaller than when loading 32 such fuel assemblies.

Consequently, loading 27 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be

NSA that has undergone seven half-lives of decay into a canister with five fuel

assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA will negligibly increase the neutron dose rate,

if at all, beyond the neutron dose rate associated with loading just five fuel assemblies

each containing a Pu-Be NSA. Therefore, the staff determined that under this loading

scenarioup to five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to 27 fuel

assemblies, each containing a Cf-252 of Sb-Be NSAthe dose rates under both normal

and accident conditions will continue to satisfy overall dose limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for

normal conditions, 10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions, and the limits in

10 CFR Part 20. Finally, the staff determined that this loading scenario, along with the

scenario of loading 32 fuel assemblies each containing a Cf -252 or an Sb-Be NSA

bound all loading scenarios that this exemption, if granted, would permit because the

other loading scenarios will be a version of these two scenarios with fewer fuel

assemblies containing NSAs and, therefore, less dose.

As a final note, the staffs analysis of a canister loaded with five fuel assemblies

each containing a Pu-Be NSA depends on HDIs dose rate analysis. As discussed

previously, that analysis was based on a model with one NSA in the center of the MPC-

32M (i.e., cell locations 13, 14, 19 and 20 of a ppendix D, figure 2.1-1) and the remaining

four NSAs on the basket periphery with one NSA in each basket quadrant.

Consequently, the staffs analysis of and conclusions about this loading

scenarioup to five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to 27 fuel

assemblies, each containing a Cf-252 of Sb-Be NSAonly apply when the fuel

assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs are loaded with one in the center of the basket and

a maximum of one in each of the remaining quadrants.

14 Although the exemption request did not explicitly evaluate the gamma dose

associated with storing more than one NSA, the applicant asserted that the additional

gamma dose due to activation of the NSA components will remain within the limits of

10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions and 10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions. In

evaluating this assertion, staff reviewed HI-STORM 100 FSAR sections 5.2.7.1

submitted with Amendment No. 15 in which Holtec International stated that the total

Burnable Poison Rod Assembly (BPRA) activation source term bounded the total NSA

activation source term. In approving Amendment No. 15, in SER section 6.2.2.3, the

staff found the use of the BPRA source term to represent all non-fuel hardware

including Pu-Be, Cf-252, and Sb-Be NSAsacceptable. Further, the SER approving

Amendment No. 15 determined that a canister loaded with 32 fuel assemblies containing

BPRAs would remain within the limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions and

10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions. Because the staff found that the BPRA

activation source term bounded the NSA activation source term in approving

Amendment No. 15, and because this exemption does not change or affect that

determination, the staff determined, for this exemption request, that the gamma source

term associated with storing either five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA

and up to 27 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA or 32

fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA in an MPC-32M

canister is bounded by the dose rates evaluated in Amendment No. 15. Therefore,

because the dose rates evaluated in Amendment No. 15 met the applicable regulatory

requirements, the staff finds that the dose due to activation of NSA components will

remain within the limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions, 10 CFR 72.106 for

accident conditions, and the limits in 10 CFR Part 20.

15 Finally, the staff reviewed the application from the perspective of dose rates

remaining ALARA. Staff determined that the proposed exemption did not alter those

aspects of the HI-STORM 100 system that the SER issued with CoC No. 1014

Amendment No. 15 had indicated contributed to a finding that ALARA had been satisfied

(e.g., temporary shielding equipment utilized during loading operations). In addition, as

explained in section 11.1.2 of the SER issued with Amendment No. 15 to CoC No. 1014,

the staff found reasonable assurance that the design of the HI-TRAC MS and the

operational restrictions meet ALARA objectives for direct radiation levels because the

estimated occupational exposure in FSAR t able 10.II.3 wa s below the

10 CFR 20.1202(a) dose limit for an individual. For this exemption request, staff

increased the estimated occupational exposure in FSAR t able 10.II.3.1 by 3.3 percent,

which was the greatest increase for locations where most operations occurred. The

revised estimated occupational exposure remained below the 10 CFR 20.1201(a) dose

limit. Therefore, consistent with these previous evaluations, the staff finds that for a

canister loaded as permitted by this exemption, the occupational doses would remain

ALARA despite the overall increase in dose.

Review of Common Defense and Security

HDIs exemption request is not related to any aspect of the physical security or

defense of the Indian Point Energy Center ISFSI. In addition, the number of NSAs

stored within a multipurpose canister does not affect the Indian Point Energy Center

ISFSI security plans. Therefore, granting the exemption would not result in any potential

impacts to common defense and security.

As discussed earlier, the staff has evaluated the effects this exemption would

have, if granted, on shielding for the configurations that exist during the different stages

of storage operations including under both normal and accident conditions. This

16 evaluation includes dose rate results which lead the staff to conclude that the HI-STORM

100 system will meet the limits in 10 CFR Part 20, the 10 CFR 72.104 and 72.106

radiation protection requirements, and that ALARA principles for occupational exposure

are adequately considered and incorporated into the HI-STORM 100 system design and

operations after implementing the exemption. The staff reached this finding based on a

review that considered the regulations, appropriate regulatory guides, applicable codes

and standards, accepted engineering practices, and the statements and representations

in the application. Based on this evaluation, the staff concludes that granting this

exemption will not endanger life, property or the common defense and security.

D. Otherwise in the Public Interest

During a June 17, 2022, Microsoft Teams call with the NRC, the applicant

indicated that granting the requested exemption would result in shorter operation of the

spent fuel pool cleaning system. Shorter operation of the cleaning system would

generate less waste of which the licensee would ultimately need to dispose. The staff

reviewed the information provided by HDI, and based upon the earlier stated

information, concludes that granting the requested exemption would be in the public

interest because it would result in the generation of less low-level waste.

E. Environmental Considerations

The NRC staff also considered whether there would be any significant

environmental impacts associated with the exemption. For this proposed action, the

NRC staff performed an environmental assessment pursuant to 10 CFR 51.30. The

environmental assessment concluded that the proposed action would not significantly

impact the quality of the human environment. The NRC staff concluded that the

proposed action would not result in any changes in the types or quantities of effluents

that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in occupational or public

17 radiation exposure because of the proposed action. The e nvironmental assessment and

the finding of n o significant impact was published on Oc tober 31, 2022 (87 FR 65613).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the statements and representations provided by HDI in its exemption

request, the staff concludes that the proposed action is authorized by law and will not

endanger life, property, or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the

public interest. As a result, the NRC staff concludes the requested exemption meets the

requirements in 10 CFR 72.7. Therefore, the NRC staff hereby grants HDI, an

exemption from 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5)(i), (b)(11), and 72.214, pursuant to

10 CFR 72.7, permitting HDI to load up to three MPC -32Ms, using Amendment No. 15

for CoC No. 1014, with either up to 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252

or an Sb-Be NSA with sufficient cooling time, or a combination of up to five fuel

assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to all of the remaining basket locations

with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf -252 or an Sb-Be NSA with sufficient

cooling time. Further, it permits HDI to load the fuel assemblies containing either Cf -252

or Sb-Be NSAs in any location in the basket and the fuel assemblies containing Pu -Be

NSAs such that one is located in the center of the basket (i.e. fuel storage locations 13,

14, 19, or 20) and no more than one is located in each of the four basket quadrants.

The exemption is effective upon issuance.

V. Availability of Documents

The documents identified in the following table are available to interested

persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated.

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION ADAMS ACCESSION No.

Issuance of Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, ML21118A862 (package)

Amendment No. 15 for the HI-STORM 100 Multipurpose Canister Storage System, dated May 13, 2021

18 Indian Point Energy Center - Request for Exemption from an Allowable Contents Requirement Contained in the ML22083A191 Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 for the HI-STORM 100S Version E Cask, dated March 24, 2022 Indian Point Exemption Environmental Assessment Conversation Record (6-16-22), date of contact ML22172A174 June 16, 2022 Neutron Source Assembly Loading Clarification Call, date ML22264A045 of contact September 20, 2022 Safety Evaluation Report, dated November 7, 2022 ML22217A017 HI-2002444, Revision 22, Holtec International Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System, ML21221A329 dated July 1, 2021

Dated: November 9, 2022.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

Yoira K. Diaz-Sanabria, Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division of Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

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