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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000317/1997008]]
| number = ML20217F148
| issue date = 03/20/1998
| title = Insp Repts 50-317/97-08 & 50-318/97-08 on 971221-980207. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Plant Support & Results of Specialist Insps in Emergency Planning & Security
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000317, 05000318
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-317-97-08, 50-317-97-8, 50-318-97-08, 50-318-97-8, NUDOCS 9803310290
| package number = ML20217F131
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 45
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000317/1997008]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.
  .
                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                            REGION 1
      License Nos.          DPR-53/DPR 69
      Report Nos.            50-317/97-08 & 50-318/97-08
      Licensee:              Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
                            Post Office Box 1475
                            Baltimore, Maryland 21203
                                                                              4
      Facility:              Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
                            Units 1 and 2
                                                                              i
      Location:              Lusby, Maryland
      Dates:                December 21,1997 through February 7,1998
      Inspectors:            J. Scott Stewart, Senior Resident inspector
                            Fred L. Bower Ill, Resident Inspector
                            Henry K. Lathrop, Resident inspector
                            William Maier, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
                            Edward King, Physical Security inspector
                                                                              i
      Approved by:          Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief
                            Projects Branch 1
                            Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                              i
    9803310290 980320
    PDR
    G
          ADOCK 05000317
                    pyg
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  .
  .
                                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                            Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
                      Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/97-08and 50-318/97-08
    This integrated inspection report includes aspects of BGE operations, maintenance, and
    plant support. The report covers a seven week period of resident inspection and the
    results of specialist inspections in emergency planning and security.
    Plant Operations
    The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of control roorn operations and observed that
    the control room operators were attentive and responsive to plant conditions, and
    knowledgeable of the status of annunciators. Safety and risk significant systems and
    support systems were observed to be appropriately aligned during periodic main control
    panel walkdowns. Control room operators demonstrated appropriate use of self-checking,
    peer checking, and three-way communication techniques.
    The inspectors concluded that BGE was slow to recognize that the secondary control
    element assembly (CEA) indication system was inoperable, the plant had operated outside
    technical specifications, and that this event was reportable. This was determined to be a
    violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317/97-08-02). Recent unreliability of the primary
    CEA indication system contributed to BGE's difficulty in determining which CEA indication
    system was inoperable.
    Two examples of BGE's failure to develop adequate test procedures to ensure the
    operability of the CEA secondary position indicating systems viere identified. This was
    also determined to be a violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-01).
    When the secondary position indicating system was replaced during the 1994 Unit 1
    refueling outage, BGE's design control measures did not identify the need to change the
    variable power supply voltage and revise the applicable plant procedures and drawings.    l
    This was treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-317&318/97-08-03).
    The inspectors concluded that the non-licensed plant operators observed during two plant
    tours were experienced and knowledgeable. BGE established processes for problem
    identification, communications, and procedure adherence were wellimplemented.
    Maintenance
    The observed maintenance was conducted safely and in accordance with BGE approved
    procedures and controls. Workers were knowledgeable and performed work effectively.
    Quality verification personnel provided effective oversight of selected maintenance jobs.
    The observed surveillances were conducted safely and effectively demonstrated system
    operability. Thorough and detailed pre-test briefings were a strength of the surveillance
    testing observed.
                                                                                              J
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    .
    e
          Executive Summary (cont'd)
          Plant Suonort
i
['        .The BGE Self-Assessment of compliance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 was found to be a
'
        . good initiative and valuable tool for identifying areas for improvement. The results of the
          assessment will remain unresolved pending further NRC review of the specific issues and
      ,
          corrective actions taken.
l          A review of the fire protection program found excellent procedural guidance for the
!
          conduct of fire protection activities, an effective penetration seal program, appropriate
          control of fire brigade qualification, effective audits for identifying problems and initiating
          corrective actions, and good control of combustible materials.
                                                                                                          1
          Overall, the emergency preparednesss (EP) facilities, equipment, supplies and
        - instrumentation were being adequately maintained. Facility inventory verifications were
!          adequately performed. BGE's changes to the Emergency Response Plan and Emergency                ,
j          Response Plan implementing Procedures were made in accordance with 550.54(q) of NRC
l          regulations.
:
          The emergency planning training program implementation meets the requirements of the
          emergency response plan, the emergency response plan implementing procedures and the
          Emergency Response Training Program Manual. The qualifications of Emergency Response
l          Organization members were being tracked. Continuing emergency response training is
l        provided by the individual site departments. However, there was weak central oversight of
L        emergency planning training activities. Continuing training exams may cosa, a broad range
'
          of department specific topics and may not adequately examine knowledge of emergency
          planning concepts.
f        Communication circuit testing was in violation of NRC requirements from September 1996
!        through September 1997 (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-05). The corrective actions which
j        were taken prior to the inspection exit interview and which were presented in an meeting
          at the Region I offices on February 2,1998, were adequate in response to this violation.
,
          Two .on-shift chemistry technicians were unable to correctly interpret the significance of
''
          simulated radiation readings for assuming the level of core damage in table top
  '
          walkthroughs. They did not follow their procedure when they failed to consult with the          l
          interim Site Emergency Coordinator to develop this assumption (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-
          06). The inspectors noted that this training deficiency was similar to the exercise
          weakness observed in NRC Inspection Report 97-09. Due to the repetitive nature of this
          deficiency, these examples were cited as a violation of NRC requirements.
          Senior site management is adequately involved in and informed about Emergency Planning
          Unit (EPU) activities. The inspectors concluded that the two most recent Nuclear
          Performance Assessment Department audits met all regulatory requirements. The 1997
          audit report was thorough and detailed and was more detailed than previous audit reports,        f
          BGE's self-assessment program, with 127 self-assessments initiated in calendar year 1997,
          was a good initiative.
                                                                                                          1
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I                                                                                                          h
 
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*
  Executive Summary (cont'd)
  BGE was effectively maintaining and competently administrating the security program.
  Alarm station operators were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities, and
  communications requirements were being performed in accordance with the NRC-approved
  physical security plan. Security training was being performed in accordance with the NRC-
  approved training and qualification T&Q plan.
  Security equipment was being properly tested and maintained as evidenced by minimal
  compensatory posting. Assessment aids had good picture quality and excellent zone
  overlap. Detection aids were functional, affective ano met regulatory requirements.
  The access authorization program was being implemented in accordance with regulatory
  requirements, and personnel and packages were being properly searched prior to granting
  protected area (PA) access. Interviews with Nuclear Security Officers, inspector
  observations, and procedural reviews determined that visitor access was being controlled
  and maintained as required.
  Security audits were thorough and in-depth. Effective controls were in place for
  identifying, resolving, and preventing programmatic security problems. These controls    ;
  included an effective departmental self-assessment program.
                                                                                            l
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                                                TABLE OF CONTENTS
    E X EC UTIVE SU M M A RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . il
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    TA BLE O F C O NT E NTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
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    Summary of Plant Status        .....        ......................................1
    1. O pe r at io n s - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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              01    Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
                    01.1 General Comments (71707) ...........................1
                    01.2 Operability of Control Element Assembly Position Indication . . . . . 2
              O2    Operator Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
l                    02.1 Observation of Auxiliary Operator Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    ll . M ainte n a nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
              M1    Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
l                    M1.1 General Comme nts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
                    M1.2 Routine Surveillance Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
!    l il . Pl a nt Su pport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
,
              F1    Control of Fire Protection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
l                    F1.1 Control of Combustibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8                        I
l              F2    Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8                          l
                    F2.1 Fire Suppression System Walkdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
                    F2.2 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9                      i
              F3    Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10                              l
                    F3.1 Fire Protection Program procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                            10
              F5    Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
                    FS.1  Fire Brigade 1 raining Records .........................11
              F7    Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities ..................12
l                    F7.1  Quality Assurance Audits of Fire Protection Program . . . . . . . . . 12
l              F8    Miscellaneous Fire Protection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
L
                    F8.1  BGE Self-Assessment of Compliance with Appendix R to
                            10 CFR 50 ......................................13
,                    F8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-317&318/97-05-04, Emergency Lighting
l                          Units ..........................................14
!              P1    Conduct of EP Activities . ................................15
l              P2    Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
l              P3    EP Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
l              P5    Staff Training and Qualification in EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
j-            P6    EP Organization and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
i              P7    Quality Assurance in EP Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
l              P8    Miscellaneous EP issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
                    P8.1 (Closed): Unresolved item 50-317&318/96-06-04. . . . . . . . . . . 23
              S1    Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
              S2    Status of Security Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
              S3    Security cnd Safeguards Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . 26
                                                                v
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  .
  .
    Table of Contents (cont'd)
          S4    Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . 26
          SS    Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification (T&O) ......27
          S6    Security Organization and Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
l          S7    Quality Assurance (QA) in Security and Safeguards Activitics . . . . . . . . 28                        ;
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    V. M anagem ent Meeting s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9
                                                                                                                        .
l          X1    Review of UFSAR Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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          X2    Exit Meeting Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
          X3    Management Meeting Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
                                          ATTACHMENTS
                                                                                                                        i
l  Attachment 1:        Partial List of Persons Contacted
                        Inspection Procedures Used
:                        Items Opened, Closed and Discussed
                        List of Acronyms Used
                                                                                                                        J
    Attachment 2:        Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Inspected and Drawings Referenced
    Attachment 3:        Emergency Response Plan and Implementing                                                        )
l                        Procedures Reviewed                                                                              '
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                                          Report Details
  Summarv of Plant Status
  Unit 1 began the inspection report period at full power. Power was reduced to
  approximately 97 percent on January 2 and was returned to full power on January 4 after
  the completion of planned moderator temperature coefficient surveillance testing. On
  January 13, BGE initiated a plant shutdown in accordance with technical specification (TS)
  3.0.3 when the both low pressure safety injection headers were determined to be
  inoperable due to a cracked weld on a seismic restraint in the common discharge header.
  Power was reduced to 98 percent before the systems were restored to an operable status.
  Power was reduced to approximately 85 percent for scheduled maintenance on January 30
  and was returned to full power on January 31.
  Unit 2 also began the inspection report period at full power. Power was briefly reduced to    '
  99.5 percent after securing a heater drain pump in response to a level control valve failure.  *
  Unit 2 was operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection report period.
                                          I. Operations
  01      Conduct of Operations
  01.1 General Comments (71707)
  Plant operations were conducted safely with a proper focus on nuclear safety. On
  January 13, during the inspection of the common low pressure safety injection (LPSI)
  discharge line, engineering ' personnel identified a crack in the weld between a pipe support
  stanchion and the LPSI piping. Identification of this problem was not immediately
  communicated to Operations personnel. After notification of this problem approximately 3
  hours later, Operations declared both LPSI headers inoperable. A unit shutdown was
  commenced in accordance with the requirements of TS 3.0.3. BGE removed the support
  with a temporary alteration at:d performed an engineering evaluation to support operability.
  The plant was subsequently returned to full power. An NRC engineering inspection team
  was onsite during this period and reviewed this issue. The details of engineering team's
  review will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317&318/98-80.
  Using inspection Procedure 71707, " Plant Operations," the inspectors conducted frequent
  reviews of control room operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional
  and safety conscious. The control room operators were attentive and responsive to plant
  conditions. Control panels were periodically walked down and safety and risk significant
  systems and support systems were observed to be appropriately aligned. During the
  inspection period, control room operators were knowledgeable of the status of
  annunciators. Control room operators demonstrated appropriate use of self-checking, peer
  checking, and three-way communication techniques.
 
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                                                2
  01.2 Operability of Control Element Assembly Position Indication
    a.    J.nsoection Scope
          The inspectors reviewed the problems with the control element assembly (CEA)
          position indication systems.
    b.    Dbservations and Findinas
          On January.4, Unit 1 was operating at 97 percent power with the group 5 CEAs
          partially inserted for moderator temperature coefficient testing (MTC). During the
          MTC testing, a CEA motion inhibit alarm was received. The operators determined-
          that the pulse counting (primary) and voltage divider reed switch (secondary) CEA
          position indications deviated from each other by 5 to 6 inches for all the group 5
          CEAs. The tertiary indication, the " full out" reed switch position indication, was
          not operable with the CEAs partially inserted. The operators determined that the
          position indicating systems did not meet the TS requirement for two of the three
          position indication systems to agree within 4.5 inches.
          The operators investigated the problem and reviewed the issue with nuclear fuels
          and systems engineering personnel. Recently the primary position indicating        i
          system has been unreliable. The Unit 1 CEAs have been maintained at the " full      I
          out" position in lieu of the normal 132 inch position due to this system
        - unreliability. BGE had identified computer cards that required replacement to
          improve the system reliability; however, this corrective action had not been
          completed prior to the Unit 1 MTC testing. Additionally, BGE had considered the
          secondary indication more accurate than the primary indication since the
          secondary indication determines position from reed switches spaced along the
          CEA housing whereas the primary indication infers position from counting pulses
          sent to the CEA magnetic jack mechanism. The operators concluded that the
          primary indication system was inoperable based on the results of their
          investigations, the system's accuracy and unreliability, and consultation with
          engineering personnel.
          The operators promptly entered TS action 3.1.3.3.b, which allows continued
          operation for 24 hours with the primary position indication system and one of the
          remaining position indication systems inoperable. BGE personnel completed the
          MTC testing and proceeded to return the CEAs to the " full out" position. This
          action was completed, on January 5, within the 24 hour time allowed by the TS
          action statement. The deviation between the primary and secondary position
          indicating systems narrowed to approximately three inches, but remained until the
          CEAs reached " full out" indication on the tertiary indication. The TS action
          statement was exited when the " full out" indication became operable.
          Subsequent information indicated all of the CEAs in group 5 were maintained
          within 7.5 inches of each other as required by technical specifications. Therefore,
          this event was of low safety significance since assumed values for peaking
          factors, power distribution and shutdown margin were not exceeded by
          maintaining the CEA deviation within TS limits.
                                                                                              I
 
  .
  .
                                            3                                              i
                                                                                          j
                                                                                          i
    On January 5, the inspectors observed that instrument maintenance technicians
                                                                                          {
    were performing troubleshooting and adjusting the power supply voltage to the          '
    secondary position indication system voltage divider. The voltage had drifted from
    the setting specified in a once per refuel cycle instrument maintenance procedure      j
    for aligning the CEA position indicating system. The inspectors questioned why        j
    troubleshooting was being performed on the secondary system when the primary          '
    system had previously been identified as the inoperable system. The inspectors
    further noted that no specific TS action existed for the previous simultaneous        l
    inoperability of the secondary position indication and the " full out" indication. The ;
    inspectors questioned whether the plant was operated outside of technical
    specifications since TS 3.0.3 had not been entered on January 4. BGE personnel
    indicated that investigations and troubleshooting were ongoing.
    On January 6, the inspectors discussed the secondary position indication              j
    troubleshooting plan development with system engineering and instrument                j
    maintenance personnel. These personnelindicated that a three inch deviation
    would still remain if the CEAs were reinserted. For example, if the rods were          l
    reinserted from the " full out" position of 135 inches, the secondary would not        I
    indicate that the CEAs were moving until they were inserted below 132 inches.
    The deviation was suspected to have resulted from incorrectly setting the voltage      !
    for the variable power supply to the secondary position indicating system. The
                                                                                          {
    BGE personnel believed that the voltage setting had been incorrect and undetected      i
    since the system was modified in 1994 to install a new viewing screen that
    applied a smaller resistance to the voltage divider network. BGE personnel also        !
    identified that there was no periodic surveillance test of this power supply voltage  I
    setting that was critical to the accuracy of the secondary position indicating
    system. BGE personnel indicated that this issue would be reviewed for generic
    implications. Failure to establish a test procedure to verify that the voltage divider
    network power supply voltage was at the acceptance limit specified by the
    applicable design documents is the first example of a violation of 10 CFR 50,
    Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control" (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-01),
                                                                                          i
    Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.3.3 requires the
    CEA voltage divider reed switch position indication channel to be capable of          j
    determining the absolute CEA position within 1.75 inches. With three inches of
    suspected deviation between the primary and secondary, the inspectors
    questioned whether TS LCO 3.1.3.3 was being met. Operations personnel stated
    that all the position indicating systems met this requirement at the " full out"
    position. However, the inspectors commented that the system must be able to
    meet the TS LCO and perform its design function throughout the full travel of the
    CEA.
    BGE assembled a cross section of plant operations, maintenance, and engineering
    personnel to discuss and finalize a troubleshooting and repair plan for the
    secondary CEA position indicating system. These personnel concluded that the
    secondary indicating system was not capable of determining CEA position within
    1.75 inches and was therefore not operable. The secondary indicating system had
    not been operable since January 4. After declaring the secondary position
l
l
                                                                                  ~
 
                                                                                            ,
  .
  -w
                                            4
    indicating system inoperable, BGE promptly increased the surveillance of CEA
    position from every 12 hours to every 4 hours as required by TS surveillance
    requirements 4.1.3.1.1,4.1.3.3.2, and 4.1.3.6 The increased surveillances were
    required since the deviation circuit, CEA motion inhibit, and power dependent
    insertion limit alarm functions were also rendered inoperable. BGE personnel also
    concluded that Unit 1 had been operated outside TS on January 4 when both the          I
    secondary position indication and the " full out" indication were simultaneously
    inoperable. This was a violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317/97-08-02).
    BGE personnel concluded that the deviation resulted from a combination of an
    incorrect setting and a drift in the setting of the voltage for the variable power
                                                                                            f
    supply to the secondary position indicating system. During the 1994 Unit 1
    refueling outage (and 1995 for Unit 2), the secondary position indicating system        ,
    was replaced with a CEA voltage divider position indication system which has a          l
    lower voltage resistance load. At that time, BGE's design control measures did not
    identify the need to change the variable power supply voltage and revise the            ;
l    applicable plant procedures and drawings. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified
                                                                                            {
l    and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with      {
l
    Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-317&318/97-08-03).
    On January 6, BGE personnel calculated a new voltage setting for the Unit 1
    variable power supply. The troubleshooting included adjusting the voltage to the
i    new setting and testing the secondary position indicating system to ensure that        j
'
    the system was then accurate to within the LCO specifications. This new voltage
    setting was then made permanent. The troubleshooting was subsequently
    extended to Unit 2 to determine if a generic concern existed. The Unit 2 CEAs
    were located at their normal partially inserted position of 132 inches. No
    significant deviation between position indicating systems was observed. BGE
    troubleshooting determined that the variable power supply for the Unit 2 CEA
    position indicating system had drifted down to a value approximately equal to the
    new permanent voltage setting. The power supply was reset and the system was
    satisf actorily tested.
l    Through investigation and discussion with BGE personnel, the inspectors
l
'
    determined no surveillance test existed to verify the TS 3.1.3.3 LCO requirement
    for the CEA voltage divider reed switch position indication channel to be capable of
    determining the absolute CEA position within i 1.75 inches. BGE personnel
    identified that there may be additionalinstances where TS surveillance alone are
    not sufficient to verify that LCO requirements are met and no additional                :
    surveillance test exists. BGE personnel submitted an issue report to the corrective    !
    action system to investigate this issue further. This review was not completed
t
    during the inspection period. Failure to establish a test procedure to verify that the
    CEA voltage divider reed switch position indication channel was capable of              i
    determining the design acceptance limit of absolute CEA position is the second          !
    example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control" (VIO    !
    50-317&318/97-08-01).                                                                  '
                                                                                            I
 
.
.
                                                5
      The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and
      noted that. UFSAR figure 7-12 also indicates that the setpoint for the upper
      electrical limit or the " full out" position was at 136 inches. Additionally, the
      Operating Ir;structions specify aligning the primary CEA position indicating system
      to 135 inches when the CEAs are at the " full out" position. This figure was
      discussed with BGE personnel who stated that the " full out" position was actually
      located at between 135 and 135.75 inches. BGE personnel initiated an issue
      report to investigate and resolve these apparent conflicts. This issue is discussed
      further in Report Section X.1.
  c.  Conclusions
      During CEA manipulations for MTC testing the primary and secondary CEA position
      indications for all the group 5 CEAs deviated from each other by more than
      allowed by technical specifications. The tertiary indication, the " full out" reed
      switch position indication, was not operable with the CEAs partially inserted. The      i
      inspectors concluded that BGE was slow to recognize that the secondary CEA            '
      indication system was inoperable, the plant had operated outside technical
                                                                                            j
      specifications, and that this event was reportable. This was determined to be a
      violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317/97-08-02). Recent unreliability of the
      primary CEA indication system contributed to the BGE's difficulty in determining
      which CEA indication system was inoperable.
      Two examples of BGE's failure to develop adequate test procedures to ensure the
      operability of the CEA secondary position indicating systems were identified. The
      NRC inspectors identified one example. This was also determined to be a violation
      of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-01). BGE personnel identified that
      the inoperability of the secondary position indicating system resulted from a
      combination of an incorrect setting and a drift in the setting of the voltage for the
      variable power supply to the secondary position indicating system. When the            l
      secondary position indicating system was replaced during the 1994 Unit 1
      refueling outage, BGE's design control measures did not identify the need to
      change the variable power supply voltage and revise the applicable plant
      procedures and drawings. This was treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-
      317&318/97-08-03). However, throughout this event, all of the CEAs in group 5
      were maintained within 7.5 inches of each other as required by technical                i
      specifications. Therefore, this event was of low safety significance since assumed
      values for peaking factors, power distribution and shutdown margin were not
      exceeded by maintaining the CEA deviation within TS limits.
  02  Operator Knowledge and Performance
  O2.1 Observation of Auxiliary Operator Rounds
  a.  Inspection Scope (71707)
      The inspectors observed non-licensed nuclear plant operators (NPOs) conduct tours
      of the Unit 1 auxiliary and turbine buildings.
 
Ie
l
    4
t
  .
f
                                                  6
      b.  Observations and Findinos
l
          The inspectors noted that the NPOs were experienced, and knowledgeable of their
          duties and plant equipment for the areas assigned. The NPOs identified several
          deficiencies during the plant tours. The control room was promptly notified of out-
          of-specification readings and local alarms. Three-way communication techniques
          were implemented. The NPOs initiated issue Reports (IR) to enter the minor
          deficiencies into the corrective action program. The inspectors noted that the
          NPOs used appropriate personal and radiation safety techniques. Applicable
          procedures, including " memory use" procedures were brought to the operating
          stations and followed step-by-step.
l
      c.  Conclusions
          The inspectors concluded that the non-licensed plant operators observed during
          two plant tours were experienced and knowledgeable. BGE established processes
          for problem identification, communications, and procedure adherence were well
          implemented.
!
                                          11. Maintenance
l    M1  Conduct of Maintenance
l
;    M1.1 General Comments
      a.  Inspection Scoos (627_QZ)
l
          The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities and focused on the status of work
          that involved systems and components important to safety. Component f ailures
          or system problems that affected systems included in the BGE maintenance rule
          program were assessed to determine if the maintenance was effective. Also, the
          inspectors directly observed all or portions of the following work activities:
          IR3-OO2-228            22 Component Cooling HX Outlet Gage Calibration
          IR3-OO3 684            2B Emergency Diesel Speed Switch Adapter Replacement
          M0119980010.5          Remove SG Blowdown Piping and Hand Valve 104
l          M01199800117          Replace 2" SG Blowdown Piping and Valve
l          MO1199800006          CEAPDS Position Indication Troubleshooting
          MO1199705396          Leak Repair Unit 1 HP Turbine
      b.  Obseivations and Findinos
l
l          The inspectors found that tt e selected maintenance activities were performed
          safely and in accordance with approved procedures. Technicians were
          experienced and knowledgeable of the assigned duties. Pre-job briefings were
          effective in ensuring that the work was conducted in accordance with BGE work
          protocols and plans. The work instructions provided in the maintenance order
i
 
I.
l
  <
i
l                                              7
!
l        packages were adequate in scope and detail. Additions and changes to the
!        maintenance work order instructions were properly documented and approved.
l        When applicable, appropriate radiation control measuras were in place and foreign
!
        material exclusion controls were practiced. The inspectors noted that an
I        appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the work. Quality
l        verification personnel were seen providing effective oversight for some
        maintenance work observed.
-
l
    c.  Conclusions
        The observed maintenance was conducted safely and in accordance with BGE
,
'
        approved procedures and controls. Workers were knowledgeable and performed
        work effectively. Quality verification personnel provided effective oversight of    ,
        selected maintenance jobs.                                                          f
l
    M1.2 Routine Surveillance Observations
    a.  Insoection Scooe (61726)
        The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:
l        STP-O-73D-1 Charging Pump Performance Test
l        STP-O-73A-1 Saltwater Pump and Check Valve Quarterly Operability Test
        STP-O-29-1 Monthly CEA Partial Movement Test
        STP-O-8 A-1 1 A EDG and 114Kv Bus Testing
    b.  Findinas and Observations
        The pre-test briefings performed by the control room operators were detailed and
        thorough. Pre-test briefings included review of procedural steps, special
        precautions, means of communication, special test equipment, and contingency
        actions. As applicabic, past problems experienced during the performance of the
        tests were discussed. Excellent questioning attitudes were displayed during the
        pre-test briefs and all questions were satisfactorily resolved prior to commencing
        the test evolutions. The observed surveillance testing was performed safely and in
        accordance with approved procedures. The inspectors observed that an
        appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the testing including direct
        observation of test steps. The test equipment used met procedure and calibration
        requirements. The inspectors observed that the details of the approved procedures
        in use were clear and technically adequate. The inspectors noted that the testing
        was performed by qualified personnel, and the test results satisfied the acceptance
        criteria.
(    c.  Conclusions
        The observed surveillances were conducted safely and effectively demonstrated
        system operability. Thorough and detailed pre-test briefings personnel have
        continue to be a strength of the surveillance testing observed,
t
l
!
 
  .
  *
                                                                                              l
                                                8
                                        111. Plant Support
l
    F1  Control of Fire Protection Activities
    F1.1 Control of Combustibled
,
      a. Inspection Scope
1
        The inspector reviewed Section 5.2, " Controlling Transient Combustibles," of
        procedure SA-1-100, Rev. 4, " Fire Prevention," and observed the in-plant
        conditions during plant tours.
      b. Observations and Findinas
        The controls in SA-1-100, Section 5.2 required no special controls of transient    l
        combustibles in an area that are less than that amount assumed present in the
        Combustible Loading Analysis. Should the transient combustible loading exceed
        that amount, the job supervisor was responsible for obtaining guidance from the
        fire protection engineer (FPE), and implementing any additional measures specified
        by the FPE.
        During tours of the tacility, the inspector did not observe accumulations of      '
l        combustible materials in the plant. In addition, the gas cylinder storage cages,
        located outdoors, at the south-east corner of the services building, maintained    i
        25 feet separation between oxygen and fuel cylinders.
      c. Conclusions
        The inspector determined that there was good control of combustible materials and
        oxidizers, and that housekeeping in the plant was excellent.
    F2  Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
    F2.1 Fire Sucoression System Walkdown
                                                                                            )
      a. Inspection Scope
        The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Unit 2 Service Water Pump room
        Sprinkler System (Sprinkler System 205),in company of the Fire Protection
        Engineer (FPE). The inspector also reviewed Drawing No. 12261-28, Sheet 7,
        Rev.11, "Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Lusby, Maryland, Unit 2 - Elev. 5'-0"," the
        Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America (ASCOA) design drawing, and
        Drawing 60714SH0003,Rev. 24, " Plant Fire Protection System, Turbine and
        Service Bldgs. & Intake Structure," the fire protection water system piping and
        instrumentation drawing (P&lD).
l
.
                                                                                              l
l                                                                                          I
 
  e
    -
                                                  9
1
        b.  Observations and Findinas
            The Unit 2 Service Water pump room was served by a wet pipe sprinkler system,
            with local and remote alarms. The system was designed by ASCOA based on
.          hydraulic calculations. Local alarm was provided by a water driven bell. During
l-          the walkdown, the inspector observed that the pipiag was in good repair, and
!          conformed to the design configuration. In addition, the sprinkler heads were of the
l          type, and in the locations and orientations, specified by the ASCOA design. _The
{:          FPE pointed out to the inspector the location where a sprinkler head had been
l          removed after obtaining certification of the room's watertight door for a fire barrier
l.          door. This was performed to ease moving equipment into and out of the room,
!          without the need to disable the sprinkler system for removal of the sprinkler head.
l'
        c.  Conclusions
i
]          Based upon the observed condition of the Unit 2 Service Water pump room
i          sprinkler system and a review of the design drawings, the inspector concluded that
            the system was in conformance with its design, and was in good condition.
;
      F2.2 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals
        a.  Inspection Scone
                                                                                                  I
            The inspector, in company of the FPE, performed an inspection of fire barrier
            penetration seals between the Unit 2 45'switchgear room and the Unit 2 B cable
            chase. The specific penetrations inspected are listed in Attachment 2 to this          ;
j          report. The inspector also reviewed the drawings listed in Attachment 2 to            !
j          determine the design of the seals which should be present. The inspector also
            reviewed Section 5.4, " Controlling Fire Barrier Penetrations," of procedure SA-1-    ;
            100, Rev. 4, " Fire Prevention."                                                      !
l
        b.  Observations and Findinas                                                              i
            The fire barrier penetrations at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) used      !
            grout to seal the blockout around the original cable trays and conduits. The areas    :
,          inside the cable trays were sealed using a packing of ceramic fiber, and a covering    !
l          of flamemastic at both ends of tne penetration. Seals were required to be flush        l
!          with the face of the barrier, or not more then six inches from the face of the
            barrier. For those cases where shrinkage of the grout, or sagging of the metal        l
            covers of the cable tray has created a gap, the gap is sealed using a nominal 3"
            ceramic fiber and %" of approved silicone sealant. For new installations, the
            space between the blockout and the penetrant may be scaled with room
            temperature vulcanizing (RTV) silicone foam. The need for internal conduit seals
            was based on the specifics of the conduit (size, cable fill, distance of termination
            from barrier) and where an enclosure was considered part of the conduit run, the
            enclosure must be so marked.
 
L.
  .
'
                                                10
          The cable tray penetrations between the Unit 2 45' elevation switchgear room and
          the Unit 2 B cable chase all used ceramic fiber (kaowool) and flamastic to seal the
          tray interior. The inspector observed that both sides of the penetrations were
          sealed. Penetration 2-BARR 2B/407-TOOO2showed evidence of having been
          disturbed on the cable chase side. It was apparent to the inspector that the
          flamastic had been reapplied at one place on the face of the seal. The FPE
          indicated that this was a repair after installing a new cable.
          All the conduits inspected were appropriately plugged at the wall, or extended
          beyond the qualified minimum length, and the enclosures (junction boxes and
          condulets) were marked as part of the qualified penetration barrier.
          Section 5.4 of procedure SA-1-100 permits temporary seals to be installed during
          the conduct of modification work. The opening must be packed with ceramic              :
          fiber, and an impairment must be processed, and compensatory actions specified
          by the FPE in place for the duration of the temporary seal.
      c.  Conclusions
          Based upon the observed condition of the fire barrier penetration seals, and a
          review of the design documents and procedural controls, the inspector concluded
          that the penetration seal program has been effective in maintaining the integrity of
          the fire barrier penetration seals.
    F3  Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation
    F3.1 Fire Protection Proaram orocedure
                                                                                                  1
                                                                                                  I
      a.  Inspection Scone                                                                        1
                                                                                                  l
          The inspector performed a review of procedures SA-1, Rev. 2, " Fire Protection          i
          Program," and SA-1-100, Rev. 4, " Fire Prevention," in their entirety, to determine
          what administrative controls have been imposed on plant activities to control the
          risk of fires.                                                                          ;
      b.  Observations and Findinos
          Procedure SA-1, " Fire Protection Program," provided the general requirements, and
          assigns responsibilities for the CCNPP fire protection program. Procedure SA-1-
          100, " Fire Prevention," provided all the specific guidance for the various functions -  !
          of the fire protection program. All facets of the program were covered in the
          single procedure, with specific guidance for compensatory measures when
          impairments were identified or planned. For planned impairments (such as                !
          breaching a fire wall, disabling a suppression system, bringing in transient
          combustibles), compensatory actions were required to be in place prior to the            ,
          impairment being implemented.                                                            '
I'
t
 
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  *
?
  4
                                                11
        Procedure SA-1-100 also included step by step guidance for administrative
l        processing of permits and impairments, and provided detailed instructions for hot
!
        work fire watches and compensatory measures fire watches.
      c. Conclusions
I        The inspector concluded that procedure SA-1-100 provided excellent guidance for
j        the conduct of fire protection activities at the station. The inspector considered
        having all the guidance in one procedure a strength, since plant staff personnel can
        find the guidance for any activity affecting fire protection in the one procedure.
    F5  Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification                                      ,
l  F5.1 Fire Briaade Trainina Records
    a.  Insoection Scope
i        The inspector reviewed the monthly Fire Brigade Status Reports for 1997, the
l        monthly Fire Brigade Reports for 1997, attendance sheets from several 1997 fire
        brigade training sessions, and reviewed six lesson plans for fire brigade training. In
        addition, the inspector discussed the training and qualification program with the
;        Fire Brigade Training Coordinator.
l
l    b.  Observations and Findinas
l
!        BGE had committed to the 1975 edition of National Fire Protection Association
        (NFPA) Standard 27, which required monthly training for fire brigade members.
l        BGE was conducting training for the fire brigade on a monthly basic. The monthly
        topics were presented by the fire and safety technicians (FASTS). Attendance
        records were entered into the computer tracking system for training. A printout
        was generated monthly showing the training status of each person qualified as a
        fire brigade member. The fire brigade training coordinator used that report to
        generate a monthly fire brigade report, which was a matrix showing each person's
        training status. Training which will expire during the month was shown in blue,
,
        and training which expired was shown in red. The monthly fire brigade report was
'
        used by the FASTS to check the designated fire brigade members at the beginning
        of each shift to ensure that their qualifications were up to date.
        Physical examinations were conducted annually by the medical department.
        Physicals were currently conducted by physicians or physician's assistants from
l        Johns Hopkins University. On several occasions during the past five years, BGE
l        has had the physician or physician's assistant attend, and participate in, the annual
'
        fire school to give them a better perspective on what constitute the physical
        requirements for fire fighters. Physical qualification status was automatically
        down-loaded to the " Training Server" software which was used to generate the
        monthly status report.
I
 
  d
  4
                                                  12
          The training plans the inspector reviewed are listed in Attachment 2. Each lesson
          plan included discussion topics, lists of demonstration equipment needed for the
          lesson, and a set of questions for the students.
      c.  Conclusions
          Based on the review of the monthly fire brigade reports, the computer printouts of
          individuals' training status, and review of several lesson plans, the inspector
          concluded that the fire brigade qualification was appropriately tracked and
          controlled. In addition, the inspector considered the color coding of expired, and
          soon to expire, training on the monthly reports an excellent aid to the supervisors
          - for identifying training needs, and for the FASTS to identify qualified fire brigade
          members.
    F7    Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities
    F7.1  Quality Assurance Audits of Fire Protection Proaram
      a.  Insoection Scooe
          The inspector reviewed audits of the fire protection program conducted since the
          last inspection, to evaluate the depth of review, and whether identified deficiencies
,
          were being appropriately addressed. Specific audits reviewed were:
          -
                  Audit Report 96-13, Triennial Fire Protection, dated January 20,1996
          -
                  Report of Audit No. 95-4, Fourth Quarter 1995, dated December 19,1995
          -
                  Report of Audit No. 95-2, Second Quarter 1995, dated July 7,1995
          -
                  Report of Audit No. 95-1, First Quarter 1995, dated April 19,1995
      b.  Observations and Findinas
          BGE had included fire protection in the routine audit program performed by Nuclear
          Performance Assessment, rather than performing only a single audit each year.
l          Experienced fire protection personnel from an outside entity were included in one
          of the assessments performed each year. In addition, Nuclear Performance
          Assessment performs a triennial review of the program, which includes an outside
          auditor.
!          The audits found the program to be generally well implemented, with only minor
l.        findings. The triennial review performed in 1996 found an issue of some import.
          The review of training and qualification found a computer programming problem
          which affected updating the Calvert Cliffs Site Training Matrix for BGE offsite
          employees. BGE formed a " Focus" group to identify the cause, and extent of the
          problem and to work out a solution. The FPE stated that the problem did not
          resurface during the 1997 outage.
 
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                                                    13
        c.    Conclusions
              Based on the lack of repeat findings, and the issuance of issue Reports and
            - Programmatic Deficiency Reports (PDRs) for significant findings, the inspector
              concluded that the fire protection program audits were effective in identifying
              problems and initiating corrective actions.
      F8      Miscellaneous Fire Protection Activities
      F8.1 ' BGE Self-Assessment of Comoliance with Anoendix R to 10 CFR 50
        a.    Insoection Scope
                                                                                                )
              The inspector reviewed the report of the BGE self-assessment of compliance with
              Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, which was conducted during October and November
l              1996, and the Appendix R/HVAC Project Plan and Scoping Document, issued in
l
'
              August 1997. -In addition, the inspector reviewed issue Report (IR) 1-010-010,
              dated September 6,1996,IR1-011-955, dated September 6,1996, and Priority 3
            ' Root Cause Analysis for PDR 96029, dated March 7,1997.
i      b.    Observations and Findinas
              In response to escalated enforcement relating to switchgear room ventilation
              issues in 1996, BGE performed a self-assessment of compliance with Appendix R
              to 10 CFR 50. The assessment was conducted in October and November of
,
              1996, and was led by Nuclear Performance Assessment personnel, with technical
l            expertise augmentation by personnel from Engineering and Planning Management,
l            Inc. (EPM). The assessment focused on Appendix R, safe shutdown, fire
              protection regulatory framework, and key related programs. The team identified
              34 specific issues for additional evaluation and correction, as appropriate.
              Self-assessment team findings were broken down into three groups as follows:
              -
                      Group 1 Concerns - Corrective Actions Recommended
                      These concerns consisted of issues which were regarded by the team as
;                    potentially not in compliance with regulatory guidance, and not currently
l_                    active in BGE's corrective action program.
I              -
                      Group ll Concerns - Actions to be Completed
                      These concerns consisted of issues which the team considered might be
                      not in compliance with regulatory guidance, but which were currently under
;
                      review or in the design process for correction.                            ,
              -
                      Group 111 Concerns - Recommendations for Improvements                      l
                      These concerns were areas considered by the team to be in compliance
                      with regulations, but where improvements to the fire protection and safe
                      shutdown programs were warranted.
                                                                                                l
                                                                                                l
 
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        Pending further review of the specific issues, corrective actions already taken, and
        evaluation under the criteria in NRC's Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), the
        potential for a number of these issues to be not in compliance with NRC regulatory
                                                                                              {
        requirements is unresolved (URI 50 318&318/97-080-08)                                  I
    c.  Conclusions
                                                                                                !
l        Based upon the results of the BGE self-assessment, and the project plan for
l        addressing the issues raised, the inspector determined that the self-assessment
        was a good initiative, and valuable tool for BGE to identify areas for improvement
,        in their fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown programs.                        i
'
                                                                                                l
    F8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-317&318/97-05-04.Emeraency Liahtino Units
    a.  Insoection Scope                                                                      i
        The inspector reviewed NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-317:318/97-05,and
        its associated Notice of Violation (NOV), BGE's response to the NOV dated
l        November 17,1997, discussed emergency lighting unit (ELU) history with the FPE
l        and the system engineer, and observed the condition of ELUs during plant tours
        and a walkdown of Unit 2 technical procedure AOP-9J, Rev. 3, " Safe Shutdown
        Due to a Severe Fire in Room 311 Unit 2 Switchgear Room 27'."
    b.  Observations and Findinas
        ELU maintenance was not well tracked in the past at CCNPP. In 1995,the system
l        engineer initiated tracking and trending of the ELU corrective maintenance, to
        identify high failure items. Recurring failures in batteries was found, especially in
        high temperature and high vibration environments. Several ELU battery boxes in
l        the turbine buildings have been relocated to reduce vibration effects, and the main
l        steam isolation valve room battery boxes have been relocated to a lower
        temperature area outside the room. BGE has begun replacing the lead-acid
!        batteries with gel-cells, which should have a better life. All future battery
        replacements will use gel-cells.
        In addition, BGE has conducted " black-out" tests in most areas of the plant to
        evaluate the positioning and effectiveness of the emergency lights. These tests
!        confirmed the adequacy of the lights to provide sufficient illumination to perform
        required post-fire safe shutdown tasks.
1
l        During the field walkdown of AOP-9J, the inspector observed the condition of the
        emergency lights, and evaluated the aiming of the light heads. The inspector
        found that the paths to all the safe shutdown equipment requiring local manual
        operation were illuminated, and that the equipment was also illuminated. All the      .
        accessible lights on the routes were verified to be functioning by the FPE            I
        depressing the test switch, and the inspector observing the illuminated areas.
                                                                                              l
                                                                                              ,
 
                                      _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  .
  d
                                                                                                1
                                                                                              15
          By letter dated October 6,1997, BGE requested two specific exemptions to the
          requirements of Section Ill.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. These exemptions
          relate to using the diesel generator backed security lights for exterior areas of the
          plant, and the use of portable lights in high radiation areas and switchgear cabinet
          interiors. At the time of the inspection, the request had not received final action
          by NRC.
          To improve the reliability of the ELUs, BGE has entered them into the maintenance
          rule program. At the time of the inspection, the performance criteria and goals for
          ELUs were under development. BGE intends to run the ELUs to failure.
          Additional actions taken by BGE to ensure the ability of plant operators to perform
          post-fire safe shutdown manual actions included the purchase of helmet-mounted
          lamps with eight-hour battery packs. These lamps will supplement the installed
          battery-bacl:ed ELUs and compensate for any failures which do occur. The battery
          packs for the helmet-mounted lamps will be tested for eight hour discharge
          capability each quarter.
      c.  Conclusions
          Based on observations of the condition of the emtr,gency lighting units in the plant,
          discussions with the FPE, discussions with the system engineer, review of
          maintenance trending data, and review of the response to the notice of violation
          50-317,50-318/97-05-04 regarding emergency lighting, the inspector determined
          that the emergency lights were in good condition, and that BGE was taking actions
          to improve the reliability of the ELUs and to compensate for any ELU failures which
          may occur. This violation is closed.
    P1    Conduct of EP Activities
        The inspectors reviewed the documentation for a Notification of Unusual Event
          (UE) that occurred on May 29,1997 to verify whether the response was in
        accordance with NRC regulations and BGE's emetgency response plan (ERP). The
        UE was declared for a small reactor coolant leak requiring the shutdown of the
        plant. The event was properly classified in accordance with BGE's procedures.
        BGE made all the required notifications, including that made to the NRC operations
        center, within the required time periods. The inspectors concluded that BGE's
        response to this event was made in accordance with NRC regulations and the ERP.
    P2  Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources
    a.  Inspection Scope (82701)
        The inspectors toured the emergency operations facility (EOF), the emergency
        news center (ENC) and the farm demonstration building to ensure that these
        facilities were being maintained in accordance with the approved ERP and
        procedures. The inspectors also inspected a survey team vehicle to ensure that it
        was adequately supplied. The inspectors discussed habitability issues for the
l
                    - _ _ - _ _ _ _ .
 
                                                                                __ - _ __ ___ _
  .
  9 -
                                                  16
          technical support center (TSC) with the EP Director and the licensing engineering
          staff; and, reviewed equipment inventory and communication circuit testing
          surveillances to verify compliance with the ERP and NRC regulations.
a
      b.  Observations and Findinas
          The EOF is a dedicated facility located just outside of the 10-mile emergency
          planning zone. The inspectors observed that the facility had all of the required
          equipment with only a few minor discrepancies. Two of the telephones used for
          notification of offsite authorities were not operating properly. BGE investigated,
          and corrected the problem.
          The Emergency News Center (ENC) is not a dedicated facility. The equipment and
          supplies used for its operation are kept in carts in a locked closet. There were only
          minor discrepancies in the supplies listed on the checklists for the ENC. The
          equipment checklists were posted on the carts, but these posted checklists were
          not the current revision. BGE removed the outdated checklists. The inspectors did
          not identify any deficiencies at the farm demonstration building, where responders
          entering the site under adverse radiological conditions would be staged and
          outfitted in protective clothing and respiratory protection.
          The TSC is located above the control room and is part of the control room
          ventilation envelope. Because of design inadequacies of the control room
          ventilation system, which have already been documented in an NRC Letter dated
          August 28,1997, BGE provides for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
          usage by the control room staff in the event of a serious loss of coolant accident.
          BGE also credits the use of potassium iodide (Kl) tablets for blocking the uptake of
          radioactive iodine in the event of an iodine release following an accident.
          There are adequate SCBAs for use by all control room personnel and all are
          qualified and trained in the use of SCBAs. There are not adequate SCBAs for the
          TSC responders who would be recalled following an accident. Nor are all TSC
          responders qualified for SCBA use. BGE takes credit for Kl blocking of radioactive
          iodine for the majority of TSC responders. BGE has not, however, determined if all
        TSC responders are able to either wear a SCBA or ingest Kl tablets (i.e., they are
          not allergic to iodine). Based on the inspectors' concerns, BGE has initiated a
          survey to determine which TSC responders are unable to take either of the above
        protective actions. BGE also initiated an issue report to document this problem
        and initiate corrective action.
        A survey team vehicle was inspected and had all of the supplies required. The
        vehicle was operationally ready except for a dead battery. The inspectors
        expressed concern over the ability of the teams to rapidly mobilize with a vehicle
        in such a condition. BGE replaced the battery and the inspectors verified that the
        vehicle was operational the next day. The inspectors reviewed the records for
        facility inventories. All facility inventories except one are completed by a
        technician in BGE's emergency planning unit (EPU). Inventories are completed
l
l
 
.
e
                                            17
      quarterly and following equipment use. The inspectors noted no significant
      discrepancies.
      The EPU turned over responsibility for communication circuit testing to the
      Telecommunications Department (TCD) it. September 1996. The TCD conducted          I
    tests of the circuits quarterly, despite the fact that NRC regulations require
      monthly testing of communication links to the NRC and to the contiguous State
      and local governments. The TCD had tested these circuits quarterly instead of
    monthly from September 1996 through September 1997. BGE's audit 97-10, of
    the emergency planning (EP) program, identified the failure to perform monthly
    tests of the communication circuits used to communicate with the NRC. This
      audit was performed in September 1997 and an issue report (IR) was written to
    document this fact. BGE responded to the IR, performed corrective action and
    closed it out.
    The inspectors noted that the communication circuits used to communicate with
    State cnd local governments had not been tested monthly during the same interval
      (September 1996 through September 1997). Monthly tests were being conducted
    from September 1997 through December 1997. Discussions with TCD : staff
    revealed that BGE was unaware that these circuits required the same monthly
    testing as the NRC communication links. These circuits were tested monthly
    during October to December 1997 due to workups and/or troubleshooting for the
    biennial exercise of November 1997. Further discussions with the EP Director
    revealed that BGE's self assessment of the problems noted in an issue report were
    ongoing, despite the closure of IR; i.e., the EPU was planning to investigate the
    regulatory compliance of all communication circuit testing.
    In a February 2,1998, meeting between BGE and NRC Region I management, the
    EP Director presented BGE's actions taken for correction of the communications
    circuit testing problems described above. These actions were: (1) the
    reinstatement of monthly testing requirements for the circuits ia question, (2) the
    resumption of tracking the communication surveillances by the EPU, and (3) the
    addition of a step to the EPU task tracking schedule to evaluate changes to that
    schedule for potential decreases of effectiveness of the emergency plan.
    Additional details concerning this meeting are documented in report section X3.
  c. Conclusions                                                                          l
    Overall, the inspectors concluded that the EP facilities, equipment, supplies and
    instrumentation were being adequately maintained despite the deficiencies noted.
    These facilities, equipment, and supplies would be able to perform their intended
    functions in the event of a radiological accident.                                  j
    The inspectors considered BGE's failure to screen TSC responders for Kl sensitivity
    to be an oversight worthy of corrective action. They noted that BGE was
    aggressively pursuing this corrective action by the initiation of the IR and the
    responder questionnaire. The inspectors are tracking this item as an inspector        l
    follow-up item to assess BGE's corrective actions to ensure protection of TSC        i
 
                                                                                        _
  *
'
  .
                                              18
        responders while the control room ventilation system is still degraded. (IFl 50-
        317&318/97-08-04)
l      The inspectors considered the facility inventories to be adequately performed. The
l
        inspectors concluded that the failure to do monthly communication circuit testing
        with the NRC, and State and local governments, from September 1996 through
        September 1997, was a violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317&318/97-08-
        05). Despite the fact that BGE self-identified their failure to perform adequate
        testing of circuits for communication with the NRC, the corrective actions taken by
        BGE were not effective in identifying the failure to perform communication circuit
        testing with State and local governments for four months after the initial
        identification of the violation.
,
I
        The inspectors reviewed BGE's corrective actions which were taken prior to the
        inspection exit interview and which were presented in the February 2,1998
        meeting, and considered them to be adequate in response to the violation.
l
'
    P3  EP Procedures and Documentation
    a. Insosction Scope (82701)
        The inspectors reviewed recent changes BGE made to its ERP and the Emergency
        Response Plan implementing Procedures (ERPIPs). The inspectors performed this
        review in the NRC reDional office to verify that BGE's changes to these documents
        were made in accordance with 550.54(q) of NRC regulations; i.e., that the
        changes did not reduce the effectiveness of the approved ERP and the ERP, as
        changed, continued to meet the requirements of $50.47(b) and Appendix E to
        Part 50 of NRC regulations. A list of the specific ERP and ERPIP changes reviewed
i      is included as Attachment 3 to this report. The inspectors reviewed the 50.54(q)
l      evaluations performed for selected changes during the onsite inspection.
    b. Observations and Findinos                                                          l
l      Based upon BGE's determination that the changes did not decrease the overall
        effectiveness of the ERP and after limited review of the changes, the inspectors
l      determined that no NRC approval was required, in accordance with
l      10 CFR 50.54(q).
l      BGE's 50.54(q) evaluations were adequately written to address the elements of
l      emergency preparedness that would indicate potential decrease of effectiveness of
        the emergency plan.
    c. Conclusions
        The inspectors concluded that BGE's changes to the ERP and ERPIPs listed in
        Attachmant 3 and reviewed onsite were made in accordance with 650.54(q) of
        NRC regulations.
                                                                                          _
 
.
..
                                              19
  P4  Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
    a. Inspection Scooe (82701)
                                                                                                l
      The inspectors conducted tabletop walkthroughs with two on-shift chemistry
      technicians who perform interim radiological assessment until the activation of the
      offsite dose assessment staff. Each technician was given two scenarios involving
      hypothetical gaseous releases of radioactive material offsite. These scenarios
      were conducted in the simulated control room under static conditions. The
      technicians were evaluated to determine if they were able to gather information for
      use in generation of accurate offsite dose consequence assessments.
                                        *
    b. Findinas and Observations
      Both technicians demonstrated familiarity with the location and reading of the
      radiation monitor displays in the simulated control room. They both knew where
      the computer for the automated dose assessment model was located and knew
      how to start up the automated dose assessment program. Both technicians
      assumed an incorrect isotopic concentration for their first scenario. They assumed      ,
      an isotopic breakdown based on reactor coolant activity instead of gap activity, as      j
      would be required based on the radiation monitors' indications. This error yielded
      non-conservatively low dose projections compared to the intended values for the
      scenarios.
      Step 1.E in the procedure the technicians were using, ERPlP 107 (Interim
      Radiological Assassment), requires the technician to obtain concurrence of the
      interim Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) on the type of accident to select for the
      dose projection. Neither technician performed this step properly.
      This error in choosing the wrong isotopic assumptions in calculating the offsite
      doses is similar to that noted '. iring the last full participation emergency
      preparedness exercise, held on November 18,1997, (NRC Inspection Report
      50-317&318/97-09). In that exercise, the NRC assessed the EOF staff's failure to        j
      use the proper isotopic mix as a causal factor in their inability to effectively use the '
      computer-based dose assessment model to give reliable offsite dose projections.
      The NRC classified this issue as an exercise weakness, requiring corrective action.      ]
                                                                                                i
    c. . Conclusions                                                                            ;
      The inspectors concluded the technicians were adequately trained in most of their        i
      duties as interim radiological assessment personnel. They were not adequately
      trained to implement the procedure to obtain the concurrence of the SEC. Nor
      were they trained adequately to qualitatively interpret the significance of the          i
      radiation monitor readings as far as the level of core damage they were indicating.
      This training deficiency raised concern on the part of the inspectors as to the
      effectiveness of BGE's training of the on-shift dose assessment staffs to be able to
      provide consistently accurate dose projections. This deficiency is a violation of
      NRC requirements (WO 50-317&318/97-08-06).
 
  ,
  *
                                              20
    P5  Staff Training and Qualification in EP                                                    ,
                                                                                                I
    a. Insoection Scone (82701)
                                                                                                  !
        The inspectors interviewed EP and security training administrators to determine the
        level of oversight of the training program for emergency responders. The
        inspectors also reviewed the ERP, the EP. PIP describing EP training administration
        (ERPIP 904), the Emergency Response Training Program Manual (ERTPM) and                l
        continuing training examinations for selected members of the emergency response
        organization (ERO).
    b. Observations and Findinas                                                              (
        The EP training program is administered in accordance with the ERP, ERPIP 904          y
        and the ERTPM. The EP Director and the EP training coordinator, who works in
        the Technical Training Unit, coordinate closely to oversee the program of providing
        training and tracking the qualifications of ERO members.
        The responsibilities for conduct of EP training rest with several Groups, including
        emergency planning, technical training unit staff, general orientation training staff,
        operations training, the safety and fire protection unit, the security training and      ;
        support unit, and the facilities management communications staff. The EP training        -
        coordinator is a central coordinating point for these groups and maintains many of
        the EP training records in a central location. A certain amount of records, most
        notably lesson plans and examinations for some continuing EP training are
        maintained by the individual organizations. Additionally, training for the
        responders at the ENC is not within the scope of the ERP, and the EP training
        coordinator does not review or comment on its quality or effectiveness.
        Through their discussions with the EP and security training coordinators, the
        inspectors learned that certain groups evaluate their students' knowledge of EP            ;
        within the context of the students' overall continuing training programs. For              l
                                                                                                  '
l      example, a small percentage of the questions on the annual requalification
        examinations for security guards cover EP concepts. These EP questions are not
        separately analyzed to evaluate a guard's knowledge of his or her EP duties.
        Therefore, it is possible for a guard to miss all the EP questions on an exam and
        still pass. That guard's lack of EP knowledge would go undetected. The
                                                                                                  '
        inspectors learned that the same situation existed with the basic emergency
,      response training that is given as part of general orientation refresher training. The
I
        inspectors discussed this issue with the training staff and the EP Director. BGE
l      Indicated plans to review, and modify if necessary, their method of examination to
        evaluate if conditions like the ones described above could occur.
        The inspectors also learned that there is only one generic lesson plan for all EP
        training administered by the EP training coordinator. All students are trained to the
        ERPIP they follow in performiag their emergency response duties, because the
        essential tasks the students perform are all described in the procedures. Under
        this arrangement, students are tested on their knowledge of procedures, but the
 
  .
  *
                                                21
l
l        test questions are based on explicit procedural references and the procedures are
l        provided when the tests are administered. In such a situation, the students are
l        tested on their ability to look up answers to the questions in the procedures.
l      . The inspectors interviewed the EPU clerk who is tasked with ERO roster
          maintenance to determine the level of oversight of ERO member qualifications.
          The inspectors learned that the ERO qualification records are maintained in an
l        electronic data base that is sortable to identify impending or recent qualification
l        lapses. The inspectors' review of the ERO roster did not reveal any serious
          shortages of responders.
!    c.  Conclusions
l
          The inspectors concluded that the EP training program meets the requirements of
          the ERP, the ERPIPs and the ERTPM. The inspectors further concluded that the
          qualifications of ERO members were being closely tracked. However, there was
          week central oversight of EP training activities. The inspectors consider the fact
          that EP continuing training is " hidden" in overall requalification training for some
          groups to warrant increased attention by the EP Director to ensure that the EP
          training is being properly administered to, and evaluated for, these groups. The
          inspectors considered the method of training to the ERPIPs to be valid, assuming
          the ERPIPs contain all the tasks that responders will perform. However, the
          inspectors consider the method of testing this training, with ERPIPs provided to the
          examinees, not to be a good indicator of the trainees' knowledge of concepts.
!  P6    EP Organization and Administration
l    a.  Insoection Scope (82701)
          The inspectors interviewed the Manager-Nuclear Site Support Services and the
!        Vice President-Nuclear Energy to determine their involvement and knowledge of
;        the administration of the EP organization at the site. The inspectors also
l        interviewed the EP Director to discuss recent changes to the EPU staff and
          activities.
    b.  Observations and Findinas
        The Manager-Nuclear Site Support Services and the Vice President-Nuclear Energy        i
          were knowledgeable of the activities of the EPU. They were aware of recent
                                                                                                '
l        changes at the site in the area of EP. They were conscious of the position of their
          organization relative to the industry in the area of staffing. They held regular
        meetings with the EP Director.
        The EPU was decreased by one position as of the beginning of calendar year
          1998. An EP technician left the unit. The technician was utilized in a less-than-
        full-time capacity while with the EPU, spending a significant amount of time on
        loan for outage management tasks. The EP Director does not plan to fill this
        vacancy, but rather intends to use his available staff, two of which spend
 
  .
  .
                                              22
!      significant fractions of their tirne working for offsite state agencies. The EP
l      Director plans to use these persons for a greater percentage of the time to handle
l      the additional work, relying on the other nuclear utility with radiological emergency
l
'
        preparedness obligations to the State of Maryland to assume a greater share of the
        work for the State. The EP Director stated that this re-alignment of tasks has been
        agreed to by all parties concerned.
    c. Conclusions
        Senior site management was adequately involved in and informed about EPU
        activities. The EP Director had evaluated the reduction in his staff and
;      compensated for it by realignment of resources. The inspectors concluded that no
!      reduction of emergency response capability is likely to occur from the recent
        changes in the EPU organization.
    P7  Quality Assurance in EP Activities
                                                                                              '
    a. Inspection Scope (82701)
        The inspectors reviewed reports of the last two annual EP audits - (Audits 96-17
        and 97-10) conducted by the Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
        (NPAD) and interviewed the lead auditors for these reports. The inspectors also      3
                                                                                              '
        reviewed the EPU's self-assessment program and discussed the self-assessment
        effort with the EP Director,
    b. Observations and Findinas
        The two audit reports that the inspectors reviewed, as well as the two audit plans
        used in their formulation, were very different in their level of detail. Audit report
        97-10 was much more comprehensive than audit report 96-17, which was
        completed the previous year. The auditors explained the recent adoption of a          j
,
        Master Assessment Plan (MAP) by the Nuclear Performance Assessment                    j
l      Department (NPAD) as the reason for the change in methodology and level of            l
        detail. This program established a more uniform method of program audits, using        i
        standardized checklists to audit such attributes as organization and administration,  I
l      and self-assessments. Both audit reports met all the requirements of 650.54(t) of    j
'
        NRC regulations, including the evaluation of licensee interface with offsite
        agencies. Audit report 97-10 generated seven issue reports. The audit also
        identified an example of licensee non-compliance with NRC regulations regarding
l
        testing of communication circuits for NRC notification. The inspectors'
        assessment of this finding was documented in report section P2.
        The EPU was extensively involved in self-assessment during the past year. They
        performed 127 formal self-assessments that resulted in fourteen issue reports.
        One of these self-assessments was for the licensee-identified failure to test
        communication circuits used to notify the NRC within the required frequency. This
        self-assessment was still ongoing at the time of the NRC inspection, and had not
 
  .
  og
                                                  23
          yet identified the fact that the circuit used to notify state and local agencies was
          similarly affected,
      c.  Conclusions
          The inspectors concluded that the NPAD audits met all regulatory requirements.
          They considered the 97-10 audit report, written after the implementation of the
          Master Assessment Plan, to be a substantial improvement over the 96-17 audit
          report in both methodology and scope. The inspectors concluded that BGE's self-        I
          assessment program, with 127 self-assessments initiated in calendar year 1997,          *
          was a good initiative.
    P8  Miscelianeous EP issues
    P8.1 (Closed): Unresolved Item 50-317&318/96-06-04                                          q
          Inspectors conducting the last EP program inspection in 1996 opened this item
          because BGE had self-identified a deviation from its UFSAR and had not taken
          corrective action to resolve the deviation. The UFSAR described the emergency
          radios onsite as having digital voice protection, but BGE had removed this feature
          to improve reception quality. BGE revised its ERPIP for making changes to the EP
          program to include a review of proposed changes against the UFSAR, but failed to
          correct the identified deviation. This item was classified as an unresolved item.
          The inspectors performing this inspection verified that BGE had removed the
          reference to the digital voice protection from the UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed
          BGE's evaluations of the change both to the EP program and the UFSAR as
          required in 150.54(q) and $50.59 of NRC regulations.
l
          The inspectors also reviewed BGE's ERPIP 900, which governs BGE's preparation
          and control of the ERP and ERPlPs. The inspectors noted that the step for
          checking the change against the UFSAR had been removed from this procedure
          but that the requirement to review the UFSAR had been retained by reference to
          procedure EN-1-102, Safety Evaluation Screenings and Safety Evaluations, in
          Step 5.3.E.1 of ERPlP 900.
                                                                                                4
          Based on their review of the above items, the inspectors concludea that BGE had
          failed to update the UFSAR in a timely fashion for a change affecting the UFSAR.
          BGE had also completed all corrective actions to remedy the problem and prevent
i        recurrence of the problem. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance
          and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV nf the
          NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-317&318/97-08-07).
                                                                                                  1
                                                                                                  ,
l
 
                                                                                              ,
  .
. .
I
i
                                              24
    S1  Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
i    a.  Insoection Scope (81700)
                                                                                              I
        Determine whether the conduct of security and safeguards activities met BGE's
        commitments in the NRC-approved physical security plan (Plan) and NRC
l      regulatory requirements. Areas inspected included: access authorization program;
        alarm stations; communications; protected area access control of personnel and
        packages.
    b. Observations and Findinas
        Access Authorization Proaram. The inspectors reviewed implementation of the
        Access Authorization (AA) program to verify implementation was in accordance          ;
l      with applicable regulatory requirements and Plan commitments. The review              i
'
        included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the AA procedures, as implemented,
        and an examination of AA records for 10 individuals. Records reviewed included
        both persons who had been granted and had been denied access. The AA
        program, as implemented, provided assurance that persons granted unescorted
        access did not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the
        public. Additionally, the inspectors verified by reviewing access denial records and  i
        applicable procedures, that appropriate actions were taken when individuals were      i
        denied access or had their access terminated which included a formalized process
        that allowed the individuals the right to appeal BGE's decision.
        Alarm Stations. The inspectors observed operations of the Central Alarm Station
        (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and verified that the alarm stations
        were equipped with appropriate alarms, surveillance and communications
L      capabilities. Interviews with the alarm station operators found them
        knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors also verified,      l
        through observations and interviews, that the alarm stations were continuously
l      manned, independent and diverse so that no single act could remove the plants
        capability for detecting a threat and calling for assistance, and the alarm stations
        did not contain any operational activities that could interfere with the execution of
        the detection, assessment and response furctions.                                    l
        Communications. The inspectors verified, by document reviews and discussions
        with alarm station operators, that the alarm stations were capable of maintaining
        continuous intercommunications, and communications with each nuclear security
        officer (NSO) on duty, and were exercising communication methods with the local
        law enforcement agencies as committed to in the Plan.
        Protected Area (PA) Access Control of Personnel and Hand-Carried Packaaes. On
        February 4 and 5,1998, the inspectors observed personnel and package search
        activities at the personnel access portal. The inspectors determined, by
        observations, that positive controls were in place to ensure only authorized
l
l
 
    o                                                                                            -1
                                                                                                  I
  .e --
                                                      25
l              individuals were granted access to the PA and that all personnel anu sod carried
y              items entering the PA were properly searched.
l
[        c.    Conclusions
1
l              BGE was conducting its security and safeguards activities in a manner that
                protected public health and safety and that this portion of the program, as
            ' implemented, met BGE's commitments and NRC requirements.
        82    Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
          a.    insoection Scone (81700)
1:
                Areas inspected were: Testing, maintenance and compensatory measures; PA        y
                assessment aids; PA detection aids and personnel search equipment.                !
          b.    Observations and Findinas
                Testina. Maintenance and Comnensatory Measures. The inspectors reviewed
                testing and maintenance records for security-relatea equipment and found that
i              documentation was on file to demonstrate that BGE was testing and maintaining
                systems and equipment as committed to in the Plan. A priority status was being
                assigned to each maintenance request and repairs were normally being completed
,
                within the same day a maintenance request necessitating compensatory measures
l              was generated. The inspectors reviewed security event logs and maintenance
l              work requests generated over the past six months. These records indicated that
                the need for establishing compensatory measures due to equipment failures was
                minimal and when implemented, the compensatory measures did not reduce the
                effectiveness of the security systems as they existed prior to the failure.
l              Additionally, BGE is in the process of developing and implementing an automated
                tracking system for security equipment maintenance requests.
                Assessment Aids. On February 3,1998, the inspectors evaluated the
                effectiveness of the assessment aids, by observing on closed circuit television
                (CCTV), a NSO conducting a walkdown of the PA. The assessment aids had good
                picture quality and excellent zone overlap. Additionally, to ensure the Plan
                commitments are satisfied, BGE has procedures in place requiring the
l              implementation of compensatory measures in the event the alarm station operator
                is unable to properly assess the cause of an alarm.
                PA Detection Aids. On February 3,1998, the inspectors observed testing of all    )
                the intrusion detection systems in the plant protected area and the independent  i
                spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) and determined they were functional and
                effective, and met the requirements of the Plan.
                Personnel and Packsae Search Eauioment. The inspectors observed both the
                routine use and the daily performance testing of BGE's personnel and package
                search equipment. The inspectors determined, by observations and procedural
l
                                                                                                  \
 
,
t
  .
  d
                                              26
l      reviews, that the search equipment performed in accordance with licensee
!      procedures and Plan commitments.
    c. Conclusions
t
        BGE's security facilities and equipment were determined to be well maintained and
        reliable and were able to meet BGE's commitments and NRC requirements.
l  S3  Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
    a. Insoection Scope (81700)
        Areas inspected were implementing procedures and security event logs.            l
    b. Observations and Findinas
        Security Proaram Procedures. The inspectors verified that the procedures were
        consistent with the Plan commitments, and were properly implemented. The
        verification was accomplished by reviewing selected implementing procedures
        associated with PA access control of personnel, testing and maintenance of        q
        personnel search equipment and visitor processing.
        Security Event Loos. The inspectors reviewed the Security Event Log for the
        previous eight months. Based on this review, and discussion with security _
        management, it was determined that BGE appropriately analyzed, tracked, resolved
        and documented safeguards events that BGE determined did not require a report to
        the NRC within 1 hour.
                                                                                          i
!
    c. Conclusions
i      Security and lateguards precedures and documentation were being properly
        implemented. Eved ! ngs v sre being properly maintained and effectively used to
l      analyze, track, cnd resolve safeguards events.
    S4  Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
    a. Inspection Scope (8170G)
        Area inspected was security staff requisite knowledge,
    b. Observations arlifindinas
        Security Force Reauisite Knowledae. The inspectors observed a number of NSO's
        in the performance of their routine duties. These observations included alarm
        station operations, personnel and package searches, visitor processing and
        requalification range instruction. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed NSOs
        and based on the responses to the inspector's questioning, determined that the
l
 
  .
  o
                                              27
        NSOs were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and duties, and could effectively
        carry out their assignments.
    c. Conclusions
        The NSOs adequately demonstrated that they have the requisite knowledge
        necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with
        their position.
    S5  Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification (T&Q)
    a. Iriggection Scoce (81700)
        Areas inspected were security training and qualifications, and training records.
    b. Observations and Findinas
        Security Trainina and Qualifications. On February 4,1998, the inspectors
        randomly selected and reviewed T&Q records of 14 NSOs. Physical and
        requalification records were inspected for armed, unarmed, and supervisory
        personnel. The results of the review indicated that the security force was being
        trained in accordance with the approved T&Q plan. Additionally, the inspectors
        observed requalification range instruction, performed by the training staff. The
        training included a demonstration of the penetration capabilities of ammunition and
        the significance of selecting proper cover in the event of a weapons engagement.
        The instructors were knowledgeable of the course material and presented it in an
        effective manner.
        Trainina Records. The inspectors was able to verify, by reviewing training records,
        that the records were properly maintained, accurate and reflected the current
        qualifications of the NSOs.
    c. Conclusigna
        Security force personnel were being trained in accordance with the requirements of
        the Plan. Training documentation was properly maintained and accurate and the
        training provided by the training staff was effective.
    S8  Security Crganization and Administration
    a. Inspection Scoce (81700)
        Areas inspected were management support, effectiveness and staffing levels.
I
    b. Observations and Findinas
        Manacement Sucoort. The inspectors reviewed various program enhancements
        made since the last program inspection, which was conducted in June 1997,
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            l
                                                                                            4
 
  .
  d
t                                              28
        These enhancements included the procurement of cellular phone capability in the
l      security vehicles for enhanced communication capability and the security screening
        database system was updated to improve efficiency and reduce the potential for
        human error.
                                                                                                1
l      Manaaement Effectiveness. The inspectors reviewed the management
        organizational structure and reporting chain. The Director-Nuclear Security's
        position in the organizational structure provides a means for making senior
l      management aware of programmatic needs. Senior management's positive
l      response to requests for equipment, training and resources, in general, has
        contributed to the effective administration of the security program.
        Staffina Levels. The inspectors verified that the total number of trained NSOs      )
        immediately available on shift meets the requirements specified in the Plan.        .
    c. Conclusions. The level of management support was adequate to ensure effective
        implementation of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing
        levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
    S7  Quality Assurance (QA) in Security and Safeguards Activities                          5
                                                                                              i
    a. Insoection Scope (81700)                                                              l
        Areas inspected were audits, problem analyses, corrective actions and
        effectiveness of management controls,
    b. Observations and Findinas
        Audits. The inspectors reviewed the 1997 QA audit of the security program,
        conducted August 18 through September 23,1997,(Audit No. 97-13) and the                1
        1997 QA audit of the fitness-for-duty (FFD) program, conducted April 16 through        !
        May 21,1997,(Audit No. 97-06). The audits were found to have been conducted
        in accordance with the Plan and FFD rule. To enhance the effectiveness of the          i
        audits, both audit teams included an independent technical specialist.
        The security audit report identified one finding and four recommendations. The        {
        finding was associated with security equipment not being listed on the currunt
        Controlled Materials List. The FFD audit identified one finding and three
        recommendations. The FFD finding was associated with employees exceeding                !
        overtime limits and the potential for fatigue to impac1 an individual's fitness-for-    !
        duty. The inspectors determined that the findings were not indicative of                j
        programmatic weaknesses, and the findings would enhance program effectiveness.          j
l      Inspector discussions with security management and FFD staff revealed that the          l
l      responses to the findings were completed, and the corrective actions were              l
        effective.
!                                                                                              :
l                                                                                              I
1
 
  e
l8
!                                                29
        Problem Analyses. The inspectors reviewed data derived from the security
        department's self-assessment program. Potential weaknesses were being properly
        identified, tracked, and trended.
        Corrective Actions. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions implemented by
        BGE in response to the QA audit and self-assessment programs. The corrective
        actions were effective, evidence by a reduction in personnel performance issues
        and loggable safeguards events.
        Effectiveness of Manaaement Controls. The inspectors observod t' at BGE has
        programs in place for identifying, analyzing and resolving problems. They include
        the performance of annual QA audits, a departmental self-assessment program and
        the use of industry data such as violations of regulatory requirements identified by    {
                                                                                                I
        the NRC at other facilities, as a trigger for performing a self assessment.
    c. Conclusions
        The review of BGE's Audit program indicated that the audits were comprehensive
        in scope and depth, that the audit findings were reported to the appropriate level
        of management, and that the program was being properly administered. In
        addition, a review of the documentation applicable to the self-assessment program
        indicated that the program was effectively implemented to identify and resolve          l
        potential weaknesses.
                                  V. Manacement Meetinas
    X1  Review of UFSAR Commitments
        While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed
        the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. Since the
        UFSAR does not specifically include security program requirements, the inspectors
        compared licenses activities to the NRC-approved physical security plan, which is
        the applicable document. While performing the inspection discussed in this report,
        the inspectors reviewed Section 5.5(D) of the Plan, titled " Visitor Access". The
        inspectors determined, by interviews with Nuclear Security Officers (NSOs),
        observations, and procedural reviews, that visitor access was being controlled and
        maintained as required in the Plan.
        The following inconsistency was noted between the UFSAR and the plant
        practices, procedures and/or parameters observed by the inspectors. As described
        in Report Section 01.2, UFSAR figure 7-12 also indicates that the setpoint for the
        upper electrical limit or the " full out" position was at 136 inches. Additionally, the
        Operating Instructions specify aligning the primary CEA position indicating system
        to 135 inches when the CEAs are at the " full out" position. This figure was
        discussed with BGE personnel who stated that the " full out" position was actually
        located at between 135 and 135.75 inches. BGE personnel initiated an issue
        report to investigate and resolve these apparent conflicts. BGE has an UFSAR
 
  .
  o
                                            30
      Review Project in progress. Enforcement action regarding design issues identified
      during the BGE review have been Unresolved (URI 50-317&318/96-10-03)pending
      completion of the BGE initiative and NRC inspection of the completed review.
    X2 Exit Meeting Summary
      During this inspection, periodic meetings were held with station management to
      discuss inspection observations and findings. On March 9,1998, an exit meeting
      was held to summarize the conclusions of the inspection. BGE management in
      attendance acknowledged the findings presented.
                                                                                          I
    X3 Management Meeting Summary
      On February 2,1998, BGE's Manager of Nuclear Site Support Services, the Site
      Security Manager and the EP Director met with inspectors and the Chief of the
      Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch of the Division of Reactor Safety
      at the NRC Region I office. This meeting was scheduled to introduce licensee
      plant support area management to the Region i Branch CLf. At the end of the
      meeting, the EP Director presented additional corrective actions taken in response
      to NRC-identified violation 97-08-05 that deals with communication circuit testing.
                                                                                          l
                                                                                          l
                                                                                          .
                                                                                            !
1
l
l
                                                                                          :
1
                                  _
 
i.
  4
                                          ATTACHMENT 1
                              PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
    Bf1E
                                                                                '
!
    C. Cruse, Vice President- Nuclear Energy Division
    P. Katz, Plant General Manager
    P. Spina, Acting Superintendent, Nuclear Maintenance
    K. Neitmann, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations
    T. Pritchett, Acting Manager, Nuclear Engineering                        ,
    S. Sanders, General Supervisor, Radiation Safety                          I
    T. Sydnor, General Supervisor, Plant Engineering                          I
    J. Lemons, Manager Nuclear Support Services Department
    A. Edwards, Director Nuclear Security
    J. Holleman, Fitness-for-Duty Administrator
.  J. Alvey, Supervisor Security Training and Support
!  M. Burrell, Supervisor Security Screening, Training and Support
    J. Frost, Nuclear Security Supervisor
    D. Dean, Security Program Specialist
    P. Hines, Security Training Specialist                                    ;
    T. Roxey, Senior Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Matters
    C. Sly Senior Engineer
                                                                              (
l
'
    T. Forgette, Director- Emergency Planning
l  J. Hardison, Emergency Response Training Coordinator
    J. Osborne, Nuclear Regulatory Analyst
    J. Phifer, Senior Assessor- Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
    P. Pringle, Emergency Planning Analyst
!  W. Ramstedt, Assessor- Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
l  M. Tonacci, General Supervisor- Chemistry
i
    C. Sinopoli, Appendix R & Fire Protection Engineer
l  J. Wood, Fire Protection Design Engineer
l  L. Williams, Emergency Lighting System Engineer
l  D. Buffington, Fire Protection System Engineer
    L. Nuse, Fire Protection Specialist
l  W. Hale, Senior Technical Instructor
    G. Cooper, Sr. Electrical Engineer
    E. Mc Cann, Electrical Engineer
    N_!1C
!
l  A. Dromerick, Project Manager, NRR
    T. Hoeg, Reactor Engineer
    F. Laughlin, Resident inspector- Salem
    G. Meyer, Chief, Civil, Mechanical, and Materials Engineering Branch, DRS
    L. Nicholson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety
    J. Wiggins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
    K. Kolaczyk, Operations Engineer
                                                                                !
                                                                              I
 
  .
>
  <
    Attachment 1                                  2
.
                                INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
    IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
    IP 62707: Maintenance Observation
    IP 71707: Plant Operations
    IP 82701: Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program
i  IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
    IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
l  lP 64704: Fire Protection Program
'
    IP 64150: Triennial Postfire Safe Shutdown Capability Reverification
L                          ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
    Opened
l
    50-317,318/97-08-01          VIO  Failure to establish adequate test procedures for the
                                        secondary CEA position indicating system
    50-317/97-08-02              VIO  Failure to meet TS 3.1.3.3 when two CEA position
                                        indications systems were inoperable
l  50-317,318/97-08-03          NCV inadequate design contrcl of variable power supply
                                        voltage settings
    50-317,318/97-08-04          IFl  Follow up on licensee actions to identify and protect
                                        TSC responders from thyroid exposure during
                                        accidents
    50-317,318/97-08-05          VIO  Failure to test communicatica circuits in accordance
                                        with Part 50, appendix E, par. IV.E.9
    50-317,318/97-08-06          VIO  Training deficiencies in on-shift dose assessment staff
                                        use of automated dose assessment model
    50-317,318/97-08-07          NCV Survey team radios not compliant with UFSAR (URI)
    50-317,318/97-08-08          URI  Potential for issues identified during Appendix R self
                                        assessment to be not in compliance with regulatory
                                        requirements.
    Closed                                                                                      l
    50-317,318/96-06-04          URI  Survey team radios not compliant with UFSAR (NCV)
f  50-317,318/97-08-03          NCV inadequate design control of variable power supply
                                        voltage settings
 
,
  .
  .
1
l
    ' Attachment 1                                3
      50-317,318/97-08-07          NCV Survey team radios not compliant with UFSAR
      Discussed
      50-317,318/96-10-03          URI Old design issues identified during the BGE UFSAR
                                        review
l'
                                      LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
        AA          Access Authority
        ASCOA      Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America
        BGE        Baltimore Gas and Electric
        CAS        Central Alarm System
        CCNPP      Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
!      CCTV        Closed Circuit Television
i      CDA        Containment Dose Assessment
        CEA        Control Element Assembly
        CFR        Code of Federal Regulations
        CR/TSC      Control Room / Technical Support Center
l      ELU        Emergency Lighting Unit
        EOF        Emergency Operations Facility
l      ENC        Emergency News Center
'
        EPZ        Emergency Planning Zone
        ERO        Emergency Response Organization
        ERP        Emergency Response Plan
        ERPIP      Emergency Response Plan implementing Procedure
        ERTPM      Emergency Response Training Program Manual
        FAST        Fire and Safety Technician
        FFD        Fitness For Duty
        FPE        Fire Protection Engineer
        HX          Heat Exchanger
        IFl        Inspector Follow-Up Item
        IR          issue Report
        ISFSI      Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
        Kl          Potassium lodide
        LCO        Limiting Condition for Operation
        LPSI        Lower Pressure Safety injection
l      MAP        Master Assessment Plan
l      MTC        Moderator Temperature Coefficient
l      NCV        Non-Cited Violation
'
        NEF        Nuclear Energy Facility
        NFPA        National Fire Protection Association
        NOV        Notice of Violation
        NPAD        Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
        NPO        Nuclear Plant Operations
        NRC        United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
        NSO        Nuclear Security Officer
!
I                                                                                          i
:                                                                                          1
                                                                                            .
                                                                                          .j
 
  e
  W
!  Attachment 1                              4
l    OSC        Operations Support Center
      PA        Protected Area
;    PDR        Public Document Room
(.  P&lD        Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
t
    QA          Quality Assessment
      QS        Quality Services
      RTV        Room Temperature Vulcanizing
      SAS        Secondary Alarm System
    SCBA        Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
    SEC        Site Emergency Coordinator
    SG          Steam Generator
    T&Q        Training and Qualification
    TCD        Telecommunications Department
    TSC        Technical Support Center
    TS          Technical Specification
    UE          Unusual Event
    UFSAR      Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
    URI        Unresolved item
    VIO        Violation
                                                      l
                                                      ,
                                                      !
!
1
                                                      !
                                                      l
                                                      ;
 
n                                                                                              l
.
                                              ATTACHMENT 2
                    Fire Barrier Penetration Seals inspected and Drawings Referenced
      Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-SOOO1
      Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-SOOO2
      Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-SOOO3
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-SOOO4
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-SOOO5
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-28/407-SOOO6
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-28/407-TOO1
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-TOO2
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407 TOO3
                                                                                            ..
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-TOO4
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-TOO5
                                                                                          J
                                                                                          V
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-28/407-C010
    Penetration Seal 2-BAF?:-2B/407-C011.
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-C012
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-C013
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-C015
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407 C016
    Penetration Seal 2-BARR-2B/407-C017
    Drawing No. 62152 SHOO 24,Rev. 3, Barrier Segment Drawing for I'lant Elevation 45'-O"
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.0, Sheet 1, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.0, Sheet 2, Rev. O, Fire Barriers / Stops                  ,
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 1, Rev. 3, Fire Barriers / Stops                  f
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 2, Rev. 3, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 3, Rev. 4, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 4, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 5, Rev. 3, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 6, Rev. 3, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 7, Rev. 3, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 8, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 81-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 9, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.1, Sheet 10, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.3, Sheet 1, Rev. 4, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.3, Sheet 2, Rev. 2, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.3, Sheet 3, Rev.1, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.3, Sheet 4, Rev.1, Fire Barriers / Stops
    Drawing No. 61-406-A, SEC.108.3, Sheet 5, Rev. 4, Fire Barriers / Stops
                                Emergency Lighting Drawings Reviewed
    Drawing No. 63401 SHOO 28,Rev.13, Emergency Lighting & Communication Elevation
    45'-O" Unit 2 Auxiliary Building
    Drawing No. 63402 SHOO 27,Rev. 9, Emergency LightinD & Communication Elevation 27'-
    0" Unit 2 Auxiliary Building
    Drawing No. 61402 SHOO 36,Rev. 9, Emergency Lighting & Communication Elevation 45'-
    0" Turbine Bldg. & Service Building Unit 1 & 2
  .
        .
                        .
                                                          _    .
                                                                    __
                                                                                    .
 
r
i*
l
  e
!  Attachment 2                                  2
                                                                                  l
    Drawing No. 61402SH0034,Rev.13, Emergency Lighting & Communication Elevation
l    12'-O" Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg. & Intake Structure Unit 1 & 2
i  Drawing No. 61402 SHOO 30,Rev.12, Emergency Lighting & Communication Elevation
    27'-0" Unit 1 Auxiliary Building
l
    Drawing No. 61402SH0029,Rev.12, Emergency Lighting & Communication Elevation
    45'-0" Unit 1 Auxiliary Building
l
                                Fire Brigade Lesson Plans Reviewed
    Emergency Operations for the SCOTT 4.5 Pressure-Pak
    Fire Fighting Foam and Equipment
    NFPA 704 Haz-Mat identification System
    incident Command System                                                        i
    Fire Fighting Strategies
    Emergency Elevator Operations
                                                                                  j
                                                                                  L
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  !
                                                                                  I
                                                                                  !
                                                                                  1
l
l
l
 
I.,
  e
,                                        ATTACHMENT 3                                  !
l
                                                                                      l
l                Emergency Response Plan and implementing Procedures Reviewed
    DOCUMENT                            DOCUMENT TITLE                      REVISION
l        NO.                                                                  / CHANGE
                                                                                NO.
    ERPIP-OO5                  Recovery Organization Notification                2
    ERPIP-201                  Technical Support Center Director                2/5
;    ERPIP-202                        Plant General Manager                      2/1
    ERPIP-208                  Plant Parameters Communications                  1/1
!    ERPIP-301                      Operational Support Center                    4
    ERPIP-401                  Nuclear Engineering Facility (NEF)                3
    ERPIP-105                      Control Room Communicator                    3/2
    ERPIP-108                      Interim Radiation Protection                O/1
    ERPIP-209              Technical Support Center Communicator              3/2
l
'
    ERPIP-303 -                    Radiation Protection Director                1/3
l
    ERPIP-310                      Maintenance Team Leaders                      2
    ERPlP-312                        First Aid Team Leader                      1/3
    ERPIP-315                Plant Parameters Communications-OSC                O/5
    ERPIP-322                        First Aid Team Members                      1/1
    ERPIP-832                        Emergency Work Permits                    2/1
                                                                                      i
    ERPIP-900            Preparation of Emergency Response Plan and              5  l
                                    Implementation Procedures
    ----    ---
                                    Emergency Response Plan                      23
l
    ERPIP-OO5                                  Canceled                            2
    ERPIP-105                      Control Room Communicator                    3/3  ;
                                                                                      i
    ERPlP-209                            TSC Communicator                        3/3
    ERPlP-509                            EOF Communicator                        3/3
    ERP!P-750                                  Security                          4/2
    ERPIP-760            Plant Parameters Communications, Media Center          2/O
    ERPIP-B.1                          Equipment Checklist                      19/3
l
i
I
 
e
a
e
    Attachment 3                      2
    DOCUMENT                  DOCUMENT TITLE                REVISION
        NO.                                                  / CHANGE
                                                                NO.
      ERPIP-105          Control Room Communicator              3/4
  ,
      ERPIP-3.0                immediate Action                18/9
      ERPIP-102      Superintendent-Nuclear Operations          2/1
      ERPIP-107        Interim Radiological Assessment          2/1
      ERPIP-201      Technical Support Center Director        2/6
      ERPlP-203                Chemistry Director              2/O
      ERPIP-301            Operational Support Center            4/1
      ERPlP-311              Chemistry Team Leader                1/3
      ERPIP-401  Nuclear Engineering Facility (NEF) Director    4/O
      ERPIP-501          Site Emergency Coordinator            3/1
      ERPlP-503  Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Director    3/O
      ERPIP-511        Radiological Assessment Director            %
      ERPIP-840                      Canceled                    3/0
      ERPIP-841'                    Canceled                    2/O
      ERPIP-842                      Canceled                    2/O
        E-Plan                Attachment 1-2 (MAP)                24  ]
        E-Plan      Facilities and Equipment Section (#5)        24
      ERPIP-3.0                  Immediate Action                18/9  j
      ERPIP 801  CDA Using Containment Rad. Dose Rates          %
      ERPIP 803                CDA Using Hydrogen                %
    ERPIP 810  Main Steam System Radioactivity Release Est.    2/0
      ERPIP 308        Onsite Monitoring Team Leader            O/3  ;
      ERPIP 309              Dosimetry Team Leader              2/1
      ERPIP 319            Dosimetry Team Members                %
      ERPIP 506        Offsite Monitoring Team Leader          O/3
      ERPIP 507              Offsite Monitoring Team            O/7
                                                                      l
 
  a
  v
e C
    Attachment 3                      3
;    DOCUMENT                  DOCUMENT TITLE              REVISION
        NO.                                                / CHANGE
                                                              NO.
1
      ERPIP 720            Technical Representatives          2/2
      ERPIP 750                    Security                    4/3
      ERPIP B.1              Equipment Checklist              19/4
      ERPIP 201      Technical Support Center Director        3/O
      ERPlP 319            Dosimetry Team Members                %
      ERPIP 105          Control Room Communicator            3/5
      ERPIP 209              TSC Communicator                3/4
      ERPIP 509                EOF Communicator                3/4
      ERPIP 900  Preparation of Emergency Response Plan and    6/O
                          Implementation Procedures
      ERPIP 210                CR/TSC Monitor                3/O
l
      ERPIP 308        Onsite Monitoring Team Leader          1/0
      ERPIP 316      Operational Support Center Monitor        3/0
      ERPIP 403                  NEF Monitor-                3/O
      ERPIP 703        Nuclear Security Facility Monitor        1/0
      ERPIP 750                    Security                    4/5
                                                                    ,
                                                                    l
}}

Revision as of 16:53, 26 January 2022

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