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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000155/1985010]]
| number = ML20133D228
| issue date = 08/01/1985
| title = Insp Rept 50-155/85-10 on 850603-0726.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Maint Activities & Qa/Qc Administration
| author name = Hasse R, Hawkins F
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000155
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-155-85-10, NUDOCS 8508070265
| package number = ML20133D214
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 10
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000603/2007026]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.    .
                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                        REGION III
  Report No. 50-155/85010(DRS)
  Docket No. 50-155                                        License No. DPR-06
  Licensee: Consumers Power Company
              212 West Michigan Avenue
              Jackson, Michigan 49201
  Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant
  Inspection At: Charlevoix, Michigan
                    Glen Ellyn, Illinois
  Inspection Ccnducted: June 3-7, June 10, June 17-21, July 9-12, July 17, 22,
                              24, and 26, 1985
  Inspector:      R.
                        %M
                      asse                                  R- \- %$
                                                            Date
  Approved By:
                  SDMk
                  F. Hawkins, Chief                          %- \d 5
                  Quality Assurance Programs Section      Date
  Inspection Summary
  Inspection on June 3-7, June 10, June 17-21, July 9-12, July 17, 22, 24, and 26,
  1985 (Report No. 50-155/85010(DRS))
  Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by one regional inspector of licensee
  action on previous inspection findings, maintenance activities, and QA/QC
  administration. The inspection involved 80 inspector-hours onsite and 15
  inspector-hours in the Region III office.
  Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
                          4
                                                                            h
                                                  ,                        F
                                                  >
  8500070A      $500055
  PDR                PDR
  G
 
.    .
                                                          .
                                        DETAILS
  1.  Persons Contacted
      Consumers Power Company
          D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent
          *C. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
        **G. Withrow, Maintenance Superintendent
          *D. Wilks, Maintenance Supervisor
          *J. Johnson, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
          *L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent
          G. Petitjean, Technical Superintendent
          D. Herboldsheimer, Outage Coordinator Supervisor
          W. Blosh, Senior Plant Technical Analyst
          D. Staton, Shift Supervisor
        **G. Slade, Executive Director, Quality Assurance (by telecon)
      #  **R. Alexander, Technical Engineer                                          -
          **T. Fisher, Senior QA Administrator
        **R. Barnhart, Senior QA Administrator
      USNRC
      *S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector
      Other personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the
      inspection.
      * Denotes those attending the exit interview on June 21, 1985.
      ** Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 12, 1985.
      # Denotes participation in telecon exit interview on July 26, 1985.
  2.  Action on Previous Inspection Findings
      (Closed) Unresolved Item (155/84-15-01): Administrative procedures did
      not require a documenteo 10 CFR 50.59 review for temporary modifications
      (liftedleadsandjumpers). The inspector verified that the applicable
      administrative procedures had been revised to require this review for all
      temporary modifications not previously addressed.
  3.  Program Areas Inspected
      a.    Maintenance Program
              During the most recent SALP period (SALP 5), the licensee was rated
              as a Category 2 in the maintenance area. This represented a decline
              in performance from the SALP 4 period in which the licensee was rated
              a Category 1. In addition, SALP 5 noted that performance continued to
              decline during the rating period. The primary reason for the decline
              in the SALP rating was the increase in the number of problems requiring
            maintenance attention. A particular concern was expressed about those
              that could have been prevented by a mnre aggressive PM program (i.e.,
              emergency diesel generator problems). Other concerns were the lack of
                          -
                                            2
 
  .. .
        increased management attention to reverse the trend toward more main-
        tenance problems and the occasional lack of aggressive action in solving.
        maintenance problems. This inspection was augmented to assess the
        reasons for the declining performance and any remedial actions being
        taken by the licensee to reverse it.
        (1)  Inspection Results
            The inspector reviewed the procedures controlling maintenance
            activities, maintenance history files for selected pieces of
            equipment, completed maintenance order packages, recent licensee
            audits of the maintenance program, the SALP 5 Report, Licensee
            Event Reports for 1983-85, and Deviation Reports. The inspector
            also interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the mainten-
            ance program. Specific observations were as follows:
            a_    During the review of completed maintenance orders (M0's),
                  the inspector noted that the equipment outage requests
                  (EOR's) were not always completed. Further investigation
                  indicated that this problem had been identified in the
4                  licensee's 1984 audit of maintenance activities and was
                  incorporated in that report as an observation. During the
                  licensee's 1985 audit of this area, the problem was found
                  to be worse and the matter was upgraded to a finding. This
                  is considered an unresolved item pending NRC review of the
                  licensee's prompt corrective action (155/85010-01).
            b    The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for independent
                  verification of system alignment for removal from and return
'
                  to service. When protective tagging (for personnel protection)
                  is required, independent verification of system alignment is
.
                  performed for removal from service; however, the tagging
                  system does not provide for independent verification of
l                  system alignment for return to service. In addition, instru-
                  mentation and control procedures for calibrations do not
                  require independent verification of system alignment during
i                  either removal from or return to service.
3
                  The inspector discussed this issue with licensee personnel,
l
                  and they stated that the E0R system does require action to
i                  determine equipment operability prior to returning it to
'
                  service. In some cases, this would represent independent
i
                  verification of system alignment. In other cases, only the
                  item worked on may be tested and overall system alignment
                  may not be verified. The Nuclear Operations Department
,
;
;                  Standard governing this area was revised during this
                    inspection to reflect this fact permitting operability
                  testing to be used for independent verification only when
l
                  personnel hazards precluded visual verification by a second
;                  qualified individual. This is considered an unresolved
!                  item pending NRC review of the revised operating procedures
                    (155/85010-02).
l
t
                                        3
i
k
 
    _
. .
      c-  The maintenance staff is experienced and well qualified.
          The licensee is generally able to replace experienced
          personnel that leave with personnel experienced in their
          particular craft.    Systems training is provided to the new
          personnel.  Some skill training is also provided. While no
          formal on-the-job training program is used, an apprentice
          type program is employed. This provides " hands-on"
          experience with plant equipment to new staff members under
          the supervision of experienced personnel. An INP0 accredited
          maintenance training program is being pursued.
      d_ Approximately 4000 maintenance orders (M0s) are processed
          each year. At the time of this inspection there were 2
          M0s open from 1982 (under review for necessity), 8 from
          1983 and approximately 115 from 1984. The backlog appeared
          to be reasonable. Preventive maintenance (PM) tasks were
          being completed in reasonable agreement with the PM schedule.
      ~
      e  To assess the reasons for the declining SALP performance,
          the inspector reviewed the examples listed in SALP 5. The
          inspector also reviewed LER's for 1983-1985 for other main-
          tenance problems which led to reportable conditions.
          Specific observations are as follows:
          .    The problems with the emergency diesel generator
                involved a fuel pump shaft failure, loose and pitted
                contacts, and failure of a drive coupling to the
                engine cooling water pump due to long term wear.
                While the diesel engine had recently been overhauled,
                the remainder of the system had not been examined or
                refurbished. It does appear that a more complete PM
                program for this sytem would have prevented these
                problems.
          .    An example of a corrective maintenance situation
                that might have been prevented by more aggressive
                corrective action involved the recirculating pump seal
                leakoff valves (IA60A and IA608). These valves are no
                longer used to control seal leakage but remain in a
                full open position.    In February 1984, the packing in
                IA60A failed leading to a high containment radiation
                level and a forced outage to repack the valve. During
                April 1985, IA60B packing failed leading to another
                forced outage to repack that valve. The inspector
                reviewed the deviation report associated with IA60A to
                determine why IA60B was not repacked after IAG0A
                failed. The licensee evaluation of the IA60A failure    "
                appeared to conclude that the reason for the failure
                was that the valve was not backseated. It also noted
                that there was some packing left and that the packing
                was still pliable. Corrective action included repacking
                IA60A, adjusting IA60B packing, and backseating the
                valve. A change was also initiated to an operations
                valve checklist to routinely ensure these valves were
                                4
 
  . .
                            backseated. One item not addressed was anticipated
                            packing life and establishing a repacking schedule for
                            these valves. Considering the consequences of packing
                            failure it would appear prudent to have repacked
                            IA60B at the same time as IA60A or at least scheduled
                            it for the next outage. The valves had not been
                            repacked within the period covered by their machinery
                            history records (1977 was earliest entry).
          (2) Conclusions and Recommendations
              There is evidence of weaknesses in the PM program and a lack of
              management aggressiveness in upgrading that program based on plant
                experience to prevent equipment failures. This is particularly
                important considering the age of the plant resulting in the
                increased potential for end-of-service-life failures. The
                licensee has taken some actions to reduce equipment failures and
                increase reliability. Among these are budgeting for replacement
                of recorders and transmitters, assessing the replacement of
                neutron instrumentation, and the establishment of a PM program
                for limitorque operators. However, the following additional
                actions should be-considered:
              ~
                a    Treat corrective maintenance M0s more like corrective action
                      documents. Specifically, a review should be performed to
                      ensure the root cause has been properly identified and an
                      assessment made to determine if better PM (or other action)
                      could prevent recurrence. The assessment should include
                      generic implications and be completed prior to closing the
                      M0.
              -
                b    A formal evaluation should be made for important plant
                      equipment to assess the potential for end-of-service life
                      failures and determine actions necessary to prevent these
                      failures.
              ~
                c    The infonnal assessments of equipment problems currently
                      performed by the maintenance staff should be documented in
                      the maintenance history files to ensure their availability
                      for future assessments.
I
      b. QA/QC Administration
          The licensee had recently reorganized resulting in the transfer of
          some functions previously performed at the General Offices (GO) to
          the Big Rock Point (BRP) site organization. The transfer of these
,
          functions necessitated changes to the QA program implementing
l        procedures and increased the the BRP QA staff workload. Because of
l        NRC concerns relative to the safety impact, the inspector assessed
'
          these changes to determine the adequacy of the procedure changes, if
          BRP QA personnel were qualified to perform their new responsibilities,
          and the impact of the added workload on the ability of the BRP QA
          staff to adequately perform their assigned tasks.
,
'
                                            5
:
I
L.
 
  , .
      (1) Procedure Changes
          The top tier implementing documents for the QA program are the
            Nuclear Operations Department Standards (N0DS). These standards
            specify the organizational responsibilities and requirements
            for various subject areas (such as fire protection and plant
            security. Due in part to the reorganization, 16 N0DS had been
            revised and 15 cancelled. Changes to Administrative Procedures
            (APs) (second tier implementing procedures) had not been
            completed at the time of this inspection.
            a_    Inspection Results
                The inspector reviewed the revised and cancelled N0DS and
                  identified the following concerns:
                ~
                  1    The inspector noted that in some cases a revised NODS
                      referenced a cancelled NODS. In one case the reference
                      was a "use" reference: N0DS-Q01, (" Corrective Action
                      and Nonconforming Items") was revised to require QA
                      Support to trend certain items in accordance with
                      h0DS-M05 (" Supplier Evaluation and Selection") which
                      had been cancelled. The inspector asked whether the
                      requirements of the cancelled N0DS were included in
                      either the remaining N0DS or the Administrative Proce-
                      dures (APs). Licensee personnel stated that the
                      situation had been reviewed and they were satisfied
                      that all requirements of the cancelled N0DS were
                      addressed; however, they recognized that cancelled N0DS
                      were still referenced in both the APs and active N0DS
                      and could not ensure that there were no other cases in
                      which the reference was a "use" reference. The
                      licensee's current plan was to delete references to
                        the cancelled N0DS in the APs or N0DS when they were
                        revised for other reasons or at the time of their
                      biennial review. The inspector was concerned that in
                        the case where the reference was a "use" reference, as
                        in the case noted above, this schedule could lead to
                        the use of uncontrolled documents (cancelled N0Ds) or
                        the lack of specific direction for performing safety
,
                        related activities. This is considered an unresolved
                        item pending further NRC review (155/85010-03).
                  2_  The NODS provide a convenient reference to applicable
                        requirements for a specific subject area and provide
                        a vehicle for G0 level interpretation of these require-
                      ments. The inspector was concerned that the APs
                        become more vulnerable to missing requirements in
                        those areas where a NODS had been cancelled since the
                        gap between the baseline requirements (Facility
                        License, NRC approved QA program, etc.) and the APs
                        had been widened. The preparation of APs becomes more
                        difficult since the baseline documents must be searched
                        to identify applicable requirements. The workload
!
                                        6
<
 
, -
        and potential for error are thus increased. The
        licensee is planning to mitigate this problem to some
        extent b
        Matrix (yQARM).
                    revising
                          TheitsQARM
                                  Quality  Assurance
                                      is currently a twoRequirements
                                                          dimensional
        matrix relating requirements to implementing procedures.
        The revision will add a third dimension relating
        subject to requirements. This is considered an open
        item pending further NRC review of the adequacy of the
        revised QARM for identifying regulatory requirements
        relating to subject areas (155/85010-04).
    _3_ The N0DS also provide a vehicle for establishing
        corporate level policy related to regulatory
        requirements in a subject area. The inspector was
        concerned that for those subjects covered by the
        cancelled N005, this policy making authority had been
        effectively transferred to the plant and department
        level managers thereby reducing corporate level control.
        The licensee stated that this had been discussed
        extensively and that corporate level management felt
        they had adequate control through the performance
        appraisal (MB0) system. .The inspector had no further
        questions concerning this subject.
    4  Some changes in the revised N0DS, taken collectively,
        appeared indicative of weakened controls. Specifically:
        .    The Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) will
              no longer review completed Event Reports (ERs)
              or Deviation Reports (DRs). They will review
              only the initial reports.
        .    ERs and DRs will no longer be prioritized.
        .    Applicability of many N0DS is for safety-related
              items only. The issues of "important to safety"
              and " reliability" are not addressed.
        .
              Overdue corrective actions will no longer be
              explicitly escalated to higher levels of
              management.
          .
              The Plant Review Committee (PRC) will no longer
              review Q-list changes.
          .    The PRC will no longer review all violations of
              procedures required by the Technical
              Specifications, only those considered to have
              significant safety impact.
          Individually, these items may be justified on the basis
        of efficiency or line management responsibility or both.
        However, as noted above, they do appear indicative of
        weakened controls.
                        7
 
  .
.
            b_    Conclusions and Recommendations
                    Based on the observation noted above, the inspector
                    concluded that the cancellation of some of the NODS
                    was premature in that the licensee did not adequately
                    ensure that they were no longer required as a "use"
                    reference nor provide a fully operational alternative
                    for efficient identification of requirements for
                    specific subject areas (eg, QARM). Further, overall
                    operational controls may have been weakened. Based
                    on these conclusions, the following actions appear
                    warranted:
                    -
                      1  The licensee should perform an immediate and in
                          depth review to identify any case where a
                          cancelled NODS is required as a "use" reference.
                          In those cases, immediate corrective action
                          should be taken.
                      2  The revision to the QARM should be given a high
                          priority.
                      3_  The licensee's audit and trending programs
                          should be augmented on a temporary basis to
                          focus on these changes to determine if they have
                          impacted the safety of facility operation.
    (2) Site QA Workload and Staff Qualifications
        The site QA staff had been assigned new functions previously
        performed by the GO QA staff. These functions were:
        .    Fuel vendor inspections
        .    Inservice inspection program
        .    In-line QA reviews for the G0 projects
              organization (BRP projects)
        .    Equipment environmental qualification (EEQ)
              program for BRP
        .    Appendix R (safe shutdown) building for BRP
        .    Core physics packages for BRP
        The lead responsibility for the fuel vendor inspections haa
        originally been reassigned to BRP. However, the lead was later
        transferred to the Palisades QA staff with BRP providing auditor
        support. The EEQ program and Appendix R building were primarily
        one time efforts.
        The inspector interviewed site QA personnel and reviewed formal
        workload projections to determine if the site QA organization
        was qualified and adequately staffed to perform these newly
        assigned tasks.
                                    8
 
  .. o
        a Inspection Results
          The inspector made the following specific observations:
          1    The workload projection did not include all categories
              of work performed by the QA organization. Non-projected
              categories included surveillance (approximately 9% of
              1983 effort), training, corrective action closecut
              reviews, independent assessments, consulting, and
              other miscellaneous activities. For those categories
              that were projected, the projection for 1985 was based
      -        on actual manpower expended during the first 6 months
              of the year. It included neither the additional effort
              required to support the refueling outage scheduled for
              late 1985 nor any increase in workload due to the
              reorganization which was not fully reflected in the
              effort expended during the first six months of 1985.
              Site QA personnel felt that the 1985 workload for the
              projected categories would be approximately 10% higher
              than projected. No projections were available beyond
              1985.
              The projected categories required an increase of 10%
              of the total QA manpower available over that expended
              in 1984 in the same categories (adjusted for the
              anticipated 10% increase in the 1985 projection for
              these categories). An increase in the manpower require-
              ments for the non-projected categories of training and
              consulting was also experienced during the first 6
              months of 1985. The manpower to support the increase
              in the projected and non-projected categories was to
'
              come from a decrease in the number of surveillances to
'
              be performed during 1985. The site QA staff felt that
'              those surveillances performed would also contain less
              depth than those performed during 1984. Thus, it
l
              appeared that an increase of 10% of available manpower
j              for projected categories plus an increase in non-pro-
!              jected categories plus added refueling outage effort
I              was to be recovered by reducing (not eliminating)
'
              effort in a category utilizing only 9% of available
              manpcwer during 1984. This did not appear feasible
              to the inspector.
          -
          2  The inspector was satisfied that the QA staff was
              qualified to perform the newly assigned functions.
              However, extra time was required by the staff to
l
              familiarize themselves with the specific requirements
l
i
                in certain areas such as inservice inspection and fuel
!
              vendor audits. Also, one QA staff member (representing
              25% of available staff hours) was still in training and
l-
              currently qualified to perform only certain categories
              of work. This impacted the flexibility in assigning
                staff work and increased staff training time.
                              9
 
  ~
    ,.    .
                      b    Conclusions and Recommendations
                            Based on the observations noted above, the inspector con-
                            cluded that workload projection for the site QA staff was
                            inadequate in that historical data was used to project
                            workloads in a changed situation and only a portion of the
                            total workload was projected. Further, the uncertainties
                            noted above not withstanding, the site QA organization did
                            appear to be understaffed, at least for the short term.
                            Based on these conclusions, the following recommendations
                            are made:
                            1    A more meaningful workload projection for the site QA
                                  staff should be made. The projection should include
                                  all categories of effort and reflect the full impact
                                  of newly assigned functions. The projection should
                                  also extend beyond 1985.
                            2_    The site QA staff should be temporarily supplemented
                                  at least until all current staff members are fully
                                  qualified, the 1985 refueling outage is complete, and
                                  the above projection is completed. Any permanent
                                  change in staff level should be based on the
                                  completed projection.
      4.  Unresolved Items
            Unresolved items are matters about which more infonnation is required in
            order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or
            deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are
            presented in Paragraphs 3.a.(1).a_, 3.a.(1).b_, and 3.b.(1).a.1.
      5.  Open Items
            Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
            will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
1
            on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed
'
            during this inspection is presented in Paragraph 3.b.(1).a.2.
      6.  Exit Interviews
            The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
            on June 21, 1985 and July 12, 1985, and summarized the purpose, scope, and
            findings of the inspection. A final summary of the inspection findings was
            presented to the licensee via telecon on July 26, 1985. The licensee
            indicated that the inspector had no access to proprietary information
            during the inspection.
                                                10
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