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#REDIRECT [[05000278/LER-1990-005-03, :on 900507,Group 2A Primary Containment Isolation Sys Isolation Occurred During Surveillance Test. Caused by Inadequate Worker Practices.Blown Fuse Replaced & Personnel Counseled]]
| number = ML20043D729
| issue date = 06/05/1990
| title = LER 90-005-00:on 900507,Group 2A Primary Containment Isolation Sys Isolation Occurred During Surveillance Test. Caused by Inadequate Worker Practices.Blown Fuse Replaced & Personnel counseled.W/900605 Ltr
| author name = Franz J, Fulvio A
| author affiliation = PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000278
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = LER-90-005-03, LER-90-5-3, NUDOCS 9006110118
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 4
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CCN-90-14114                                                                                                  ;
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACil IKYl'IDM ATOMIC POWER STATION R. D. I, hot 20H I                            Delta, Pennsylvania 17314 rum mornm.v.es roe a os ascett wr                      pl7) 4Kr?014 i
June 5, 1990 Docket No. 50-278 Document Control Desk                                                                                  :
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555                                                                                  '
 
==SUBJECT:==
Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3 This LER concerns a Primary Containment isolation System actuation which occurred due to a false isolation signal generated during surveillance testing.
 
==Reference:==
Docket No. 50-278 Report Number:          3-90-005 Revision Number:        00                                                                      ;
Event Date:              05/07/90 Report Date:            06/05/90-                                                              '
facility:                Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1 Box 208, Delta, PA 17314 This (ER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).                                                                                      -
Sincerely, l    l Plant Manager cc:    J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident inspector T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I
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On 5/7/90, 2215 hours, a Group 2A Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation occurred during the performance of a surveillance test.                                                                  The isolation resulted in the closing of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System suction and discharge valves. The valve closures resulted in the tripping of the RWCU pumps.
The PCIS isolation occurred when a test lead from a voltmeter being used as part of the test dislodged, became grounded, and blew the circuit fuse for t.a RWCU suction line break and RWCU tieat Exchanger tilgh Temperature isolation logic circuit. On 5/8/90, 0208 hours, the fuse was replaced and RWCU was placed back in service. The cause of this event was inadequate worker practice involving repositioning test leads at the voltmeter while installed in equipment circuitry as well as the use of short test leads and cotton gloves when performing the surveillance test. The technician involved was counseled. Other technicians will be similarly advised on repositioning voltmeter test leads when installed in equipment circuitry as well as the use of longer length test leads when necessary and to discontinue the use of cotton gloves during surveillances when not required. There were 2 previous similar LERs identified.
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Unit Status at Time of the Event
              -Unit 3 was in tne Run mode of operation at 84% rated power.
              -3B and 3C Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) (Ells:CE) pumps (Ells:P) in service.
              -Both RWCU filter Demineralizers (Ells:f0M) in service.
              -Surveillance test $13F-12-124-A1CQ " Calibration of RWCU High flow Instrument DPIS                12-124A" in progress.
Description of the Event On 5/7/90, 2215 hours, a Group 2A Primary Containment isolation System (PCIS)
(Ells:JM) isolation occurred during the performance of surveillance test $13F-12-124-A1CQ " Calibration of RWCU High flow Instrument OPIS-3-12-124A".                  The Group 2A PCIS isolation resulted in the closing of the motor operated RWCU System suction and discharge valves (Ells:ISV) (M0-3-12-15, MO-3-12-18, and M0-3-12-68). The closure of these valves resulted in the tripping of the 3B and 3C RWCU pumps.
The PCIS isolation occurred when a test lead from a voltmeter being used as part of the survelliance test dislodged from the voltmeter socket and became grounded. The other end of the grounded lead had been installed in the positive side of the circuit for Differential Pressure Indicating Switch DPIS-3-12-124A (Ells:PIS). DPIS-3                  124A is'used to provide a trip signal to isolate the RWCU System upon a RWCU suction line break event. Wito the test lead became grounded, the circuit fuse (Ells:fU) blew. The circuit contains the RWCU suction line break and RWCU Heat Exchanger (HX)
Discharge High Temperature isolation signal logic. Blowing the fuse resulted in these isolation signals which causes a Group 2A PCIS isolation (i.e., RWCU System suction and discharge valves close).
On 5/8/90, 0208 hours, the fuse was replaced and the RWCU isolation reset.                            The RWCU System was then placed back into service.
Cause of the Event The isolation occurred when a test lead from the voltmeter being used as part of the surveillance dislodged and became grounded. The root cause of the test lead becoming grounded was inadequate worker practices. While repositioning a voltmeter lead, the technician performing the surveillance (Utility, non-licensed) inadvertently moved the voltmeter such that the test lead became dislodged and grounded on nearby piping (Ells: PSF). This was attributed to the short length of voltmeter leads being used and the use of cotton gloves by the technician and the fact that the other end of the                                            ,
test lead was still installed in the circuitry. Cotton gloves were not required to be used but were being used by the technician because the instrumentation being                                                    j worked on was associated with the contaminated RWCU System. The use of cotton gloves                                              '
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olo ol3        0F ol3 twu        me: m      e anco mnenn contributed to the mishandling of the voltmeter l'f the technician when repositioning the test leads in the voltmeter.
Analysis of the Event No safety consequences occurred as a result of this event.
When the spurious RWCU System suction line break and RWCU Hx Discharge High Temperature isolation signals were generated, the Group 2A PCIS isolation function performed properly. The purpose of the suction line break isolation is to limit the loss of Reactor Coolant System water if the RWCU System suction line would break.
The purpose of the RWCU Hx Discharge High Temperature isolation is to protect the ion exchange resins in the RWCU filter demineralizers due to high temperature.
During this event, the RWCU System was out of service for approximately 4 hours. The purpose of the RWCU System is to circulate Reactor water through demineralizers to maintain a high degree of water purity. No significant changes to Reactor water purity occurred. Similarly, had this event occurred at 100% power, it would not be expected that significant changes to Reactor water purity would have occurred.
Corrective Actions lhe blown fuse was repleted on 5/8/90, 0?08 hours, and the RWCU System placed into service,    lhe technician involved was counseled on repositioning voltmeter test leads when installed in equipment circuitry as well as on the use of longer length test leads when required and not using cotton gloves if not required by Health Physics.
Technicians who perform similar surveillances will be informed of this event and advised about repositioning test leads while installed in equipment circuitry as well as the use of longer length voltmeter leads when necessary and also to discontinue the use of cotton gloves if not required when performing surveillances.
Previous Similar Events There were 2 previous LERs identified involving RWCU isolations during surveillance                                          i testing. LER 2-86-11 involved an isolation as a result of testing a wrong component during surveillance. LER 3-87 05 involved an isolation as a result of incorrectly                                            l l
installing a jumper during a surveillance. Both of these events involved personnel                                          j crror in not following procedures. Personnel counseling for these events did not prevent the occurrence of this LER because the counseling involved adherence to                                              j procedures and not worker practices.                                                                                          -
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NM 90RW 366A                                                                                        'G8. CPD: 1998- 9 0 069 ti O M P
                                                                                                            -  ______________J}}

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