ML18087A101: Difference between revisions

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| document type = Letter, Technical Specifications
| document type = Letter, Technical Specifications
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
| project = TAC:85973
| stage = Approval
}}
}}


=Text=
=Text=
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WAS HI NGT ON , D .C . 20555--0001 May 20, 1999
WAS HI NGTON, D.C. 20555--0001 May 20, 1999 I
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I                  ..            l Mr. J. A.         Scalice Chief Nuclear Officer and                                                                     -        i    i *s f r~
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Executive Vice President                                                         ..,' '\  I ) )
Mr. J. A. Scalice i i *s Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 r~
Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street                                                                   " 'H.' s to:
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Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801                                                                ~ts
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==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
ISSUANCE OF CORRECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. 85973) (TS 92-08)
ISSUANCE OF CORRECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. 85973) (TS 92-08)  


==Dear Mr. Scalice:==
==Dear Mr. Scalice:==
During reactor startup activities following the Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, the Sequoyah staff noted an error in the Technical Specifications (TS) for Unit 2. Specifically, it was noted that, when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 163 to Operating License No. DPR-79 on November 26, 1993, Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.1.1.d was inadvertently omitted from Page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS. This omission was clearly a typographical error on the part of the NRC staff and the contractor that retyped the page in question. Deletion of this requirement was never requested by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and was not discussed in either the staff's determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration published in the Federal Register or the Safety Evaluation supporting the subject amendment.
During reactor startup activities following the Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, the Sequoyah staff noted an error in the Technical Specifications (TS) for Unit 2. Specifically, it was noted that, when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 163 to Operating License No. DPR-79 on November 26, 1993, Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.1.1.d was inadvertently omitted from Page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS. This omission was clearly a typographical error on the part of the NRC staff and the contractor that retyped the page in question. Deletion of this requirement was never requested by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and was not discussed in either the staff's determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration published in the Federal Register or the Safety Evaluation supporting the subject amendment.
To rectify this error, the NRC staff is hereby enclosing page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS as it should have appeared in Amendment No. 163. Please remove the existing page 3/4 1-1 in each copy of the TS and replace it with the enclosed corrected page.
To rectify this error, the NRC staff is hereby enclosing page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS as it should have appeared in Amendment No. 163. Please remove the existing page 3/4 1-1 in each copy of the TS and replace it with the enclosed corrected page.
We commend your Sequoyah Operations staff for identifying this discrepancy and your Licensing staff for promptly taking action with the NRC to correct the error. We also commend Sequoyah's decision "to do the right thing" by performing the subject surveillance test, even though it was not specifically required in the Unit 2 TS (it is correctly specified in the Unit 1 TS) .
We commend your Sequoyah Operations staff for identifying this discrepancy and your Licensing staff for promptly taking action with the NRC to correct the error. We also commend Sequoyah's decision "to do the right thing" by performing the subject surveillance test, even though it was not specifically required in the Unit 2 TS (it is correctly specified in the Unit 1 TS).
Sincerely,
Docket No. 50-328 Sincerely,  
                                                      ~ {>>. ;l,_1~
~
Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-328 C        
{>>. ;l,_1~
Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation C  


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==
Corrected TS Page 3/4 1-1 cc w/enclosures: See next page
Corrected TS Page 3/4 1-1 cc w/enclosures: See next page f


3/4.1   REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1   BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - Tavg ~ 200°F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.
(,--
APPLICABILITY:   MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN -
Tavg  
~ 200°F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
ACTION:
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:
: a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod{s) is
: a.
(,--              inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
: b.
: b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K     greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by veri~ftng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
: c.
: c. When in MODE 2, with K     less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
: d.
: d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.
Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod{s) is inoperable.
    *See Special Test Exception 3.10.1
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).
  -  SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2                   3/4 1-1 November 26, 1993 Amendment No. 163
When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by veri~ftng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
When in MODE 2, with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.  
*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 November 26, 1993 Amendment No. 163  


r 3/4.1   REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1   BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - Tavg ii!: 2 0 0 °F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.
r r
APPLICABILITY:   MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN -
Tavg ii!: 2 0 0 ° F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
ACTION:
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:
: a. Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is r
: a.
inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or.untrippable control rod(s).
: b.
: b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K     greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by veri~flng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
: c.
: c. When in MODE 2, with K     less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
: d.
: d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.
Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable.
  *See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 November 26, 1993 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2                     3/4 1-1                   Amendment No. 163
If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or.untrippable control rod(s).
When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by veri~flng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
When in MODE 2, with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.  
*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 November 26, 1993 Amendment No. 163  


Mr. J. A. Scalice                 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Tennessee Valley Authority cc:
\\
Senior Vice President               Mr. Pedro Salas, Manager Nuclear Operations                   Licensing and Industry Affairs Tennessee Valley Authority           Sequoyah Nuclear Plant SA Lookout Place                     Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street                   P.O. Box 2000 Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801           Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Jack A. Bailey                  Mr. D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Vice President                      Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Engineering & Technical Services    Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority           P.O. Box 2000 6A Lookout Place                    Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801          Mr. Melvin C. Shannon S~nior Resident Inspector Mr. Masoud Bajestani                Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site Vice President                  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sequoyah Nuclear Plant              2600 Igou Ferry Road Tennessee Valley Authority          Soddy Daisy, TN 37379
~
\ P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 General Counsel Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Division of Radiological Health Tennessee Valley Authority          3rd Floor, L and C Annex ET10H                                401 Church Street 400 West Summit Hill Drive          Nashville, TN 37243-1532 Knoxville, TN 37902 County Executive Mr. N. C. Kazanas, General Manager  Hamilton County Courthouse Nuclear Assurance                    Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Tennessee Valley Authority SM Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
\\
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Mr. J. A. Scalice Tennessee Valley Authority cc:
\}}
Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority SA Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Jack A. Bailey Vice President Engineering & Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Masoud Bajestani Site Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 Mr. N. C. Kazanas, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority SM Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Mr. Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Melvin C. Shannon S~nior Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Division of Radiological Health 3rd Floor, L and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801}}

Latest revision as of 04:51, 6 January 2025

Issuance of Corrected Technical Specification Page for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (TAC No. 85973) (TS 92-08)
ML18087A101
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah 
Issue date: 05/20/1999
From: Hernan R
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
To: Scalice J
Tennessee Valley Authority
Hon A
References
TAC 85973
Download: ML18087A101 (4)


Text

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WAS HI NGTON, D.C. 20555--0001 May 20, 1999 I

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Mr. J. A. Scalice i i *s Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 r~

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SUBJECT:

ISSUANCE OF CORRECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. 85973) (TS 92-08)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

During reactor startup activities following the Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, the Sequoyah staff noted an error in the Technical Specifications (TS) for Unit 2. Specifically, it was noted that, when the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 163 to Operating License No. DPR-79 on November 26, 1993, Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.1.1.d was inadvertently omitted from Page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS. This omission was clearly a typographical error on the part of the NRC staff and the contractor that retyped the page in question. Deletion of this requirement was never requested by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and was not discussed in either the staff's determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration published in the Federal Register or the Safety Evaluation supporting the subject amendment.

To rectify this error, the NRC staff is hereby enclosing page 3/41-1 of the Unit 2 TS as it should have appeared in Amendment No. 163. Please remove the existing page 3/4 1-1 in each copy of the TS and replace it with the enclosed corrected page.

We commend your Sequoyah Operations staff for identifying this discrepancy and your Licensing staff for promptly taking action with the NRC to correct the error. We also commend Sequoyah's decision "to do the right thing" by performing the subject surveillance test, even though it was not specifically required in the Unit 2 TS (it is correctly specified in the Unit 1 TS).

Docket No. 50-328 Sincerely,

~

{>>. ;l,_1~

Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation C

Enclosure:

Corrected TS Page 3/4 1-1 cc w/enclosures: See next page f

(,--

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN -

Tavg

~ 200°F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:

a.
b.
c.
d.

Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod{s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s).

When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by veri~ftng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

When in MODE 2, with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.

  • See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 November 26, 1993 Amendment No. 163

r r

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN -

Tavg ii!: 2 0 0 ° F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k for 4 loop operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 35 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6120 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% delta k/k:

a.
b.
c.
d.

Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or.untrippable control rod(s).

When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by veri~flng that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

When in MODE 2, with K less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor crit!b£lity by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.

  • See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 November 26, 1993 Amendment No. 163

\\

~

\\

Mr. J. A. Scalice Tennessee Valley Authority cc:

Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority SA Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Jack A. Bailey Vice President Engineering & Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Masoud Bajestani Site Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 Mr. N. C. Kazanas, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority SM Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 Mr. Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Mr. Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P.O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Melvin C. Shannon S~nior Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Division of Radiological Health 3rd Floor, L and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801