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| | number = ML090720036 | | | number = ML090720036 |
| | issue date = 02/04/2009 | | | issue date = 02/04/2009 |
| | title = Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, 2009 Initial Examination 05000327-09-301 and 05000328-09-301, Draft Simulator Scenarios | | | title = 2009 Initial Examination 05000327-09-301 and 05000328-09-301, Draft Simulator Scenarios |
| | author name = | | | author name = |
| | author affiliation = - No Known Affiliation | | | author affiliation = - No Known Affiliation |
| Line 15: |
Line 15: |
| | page count = 281 | | | page count = 281 |
| }} | | }} |
| See also: [[followed by::IR 05000327/2009301]]
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|
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|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:BORON.txt 0[REACTF-VERS SQ2.1]BORATION/DILUTION CALCULATION | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| SEQUOYAH UNIT 1 CYCLE 16 RCS AVG TEMP 560.0 DEG F RCS PRESSURE 2235.0 PSIG PZR LEVEL 39.4%MAKEUP WTR CONC.0 PPM BORIC ACID CONC 6820.0 PPM INITIAL CONC FINAL BORIC ACID MAKEUP WTR BORON CONC CHANGE BORON CONC ADDITION ADDITION (PPM)(PPM)(PPM)(GAL)(GAL)----------
| |
| ------------------------------------
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| 1475.0-9.7 1465.3.0 421.4 0 page 1
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| Page 1 of 2 NRC09A Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
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| Sim. Setup
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| Reset IC- 188 Perform switch check. Allow the
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| simulator to run for at least 3 minutes before loading SCEN file
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| or starting the exercise. This will
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| initialize ICS.
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| | |
|
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| Load SCENS: NRC09A
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| Place simulator in RUN.
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| Place OOS equipment in required
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| position with tags. Clear alarms. Initialize simulator at
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| 24 % RTP. Place Mode
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| 1 placard on panels.
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| Place A Train Week sign on the simulator
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| Active when SCENS loaded imf RH01A f:1
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| ior ZLOHS7410A_GREEN f:0 1A-A RHR PUMP INOPERABLE.
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| | |
| PLACE 1A-A RHR PUMP HS IN PTL AND TAG WITH HOLD ORDER.
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| Place Protected equipment tags on B Train
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| RHR Pump, SI Pump, and CCP.
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| Event 1 INCREASE POWER
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| Event 2 When Power change complete as
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| Directed by Lead
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| Examiner Insert: Key-1 imf RX06B f:1 k:1
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| PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS LOW CHNL 2 68-335 If MSS or MIG contacted to trip Bistables, inform the crew that IMs will report to the MCR
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| in ~45 minutes.
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| Event 3 When LT AOP and
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| Tech Spec Eval complete as Directed by Lead
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| | |
| Examiner Insert: Key-2 imf RD07D4 f:1 k:2 DROPPED ROD D-4 (Rx Trip Not required)
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| If dispatched to investigate at Rod control panels report no obvious problem. Need maintenance to investigate. Report in ~5 min.
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| | |
| If MSS contacted to initiate maintenance respond maintenance personnel will report to
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| the MCR in ~30 min.
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| Event 4
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| When Rod AOP and Tech Spec Eval complete as Directed by Lead
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| Examiner Insert: Key-3 irf TCR02 f:2 k:3
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| Inadvertent turbine trip.
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| IF DISPATCHED to investigate wait ~2 min THEN report maintenance personnel
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| inadvertently bumped local trip device.
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|
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| Page 2 of 2 NRC09A
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| Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
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|
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| Event 5 Active when SCENS loaded Imf EG07 f:1 MAIN GENERATOR TRIP FAILURE (Gen PCBs can be manuallay opened)
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| Event 6
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| When crew Announces Turbine
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| Trip Using PA
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| system (AOP-S.06, Step 8) as Directed
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| by Lead Examiner
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| Insert: Key-4 imf RD07M4 f:1 k:4 imf RD07M12 f:1 k:4 imf RD07D12 f:1 k:4
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| DROPPED ROD M-4
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| DROPPED ROD M-12
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| DROPPED ROD D-12
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|
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| Note: Simulates dropping remainder of rods in the
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| group to require Rx Trip.
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| Event 7
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| Active when SCENS loaded
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| imf RP01C f:1 BOTH RX TRIP BKRS FAIL TO OPEN (ATWS)
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| When dispatched
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| to open Reactor Trip
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| Breakers locally, wait ~3 min (Note: Delay as necessary until Emergency
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| Boration is initiated) and insert: Key-6 irf RPR05A f:1 k:5 irf RPR05B f:1 k:5 RX TRIP BREAKER A MANUAL TRIP
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| RX TRIP BREAKER B MANUAL TRIP
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| Note: Simulates personnel opening reactor trip
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| breakers locally.
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| Event 8 When FR-S.1 Complete as Directed by Lead
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| | |
| Examiner Insert: Key-7 imf FW23C f:25 r:120 k:6
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| LOOP 3 FEEDWATER LINE BREAK INSIDE CNTMT. Event 9 Active when SCENS loaded imf RP07 f:1
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| FAILURE OF HI-HI CNTMT PRESS LOGIC TO
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| INITIATE PHASE B CNTMT ISOLATION.
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|
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 1 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| Console Operator:
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| No action required for Event 1
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| Indications available:
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| None: Crew will continue power increase from 24% IAW 0-GO-4, Section 5.5 at
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| Step [21]
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| CREW BOP Increase Turbine Load as directed
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| RO Withdraw Control Rods as directed
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| RO Perform dilutions as directed
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| Evaluator Note:
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| The following Steps are from 0-SO-62-7
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| Boron Concentration Control , Section 6.2, Dilute CAUTION 1: When making an RCS dilution of
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| >3000 gallons, it should be done in batches with an RCS boron concentration verification at the halfway point (e.g., 1500 gallons). Allow at least 15 minutes between batches.
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| | |
|
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| CAUTION 2; Returning the Boric Acid Blender to service after unplugging, cleaning, or maintenance on the Boric Acid System could introduce debris, sludge, air or chunks of solidified boron into the CCP suction resulting in pump damage. Extreme care must be exercised to properly flush the Boric Acid Blender system following an outage.
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| NOTE 1: If an excessive amount of dilution is required (plant startup), the pressurizer heaters should be energized to cause pressurizer spray operation for equalizing boron concentration in RCS and pressurizer.
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| | |
| NOTE 2: Dilute mode will be used anytime a long-term positive reactivity addition is desired. The operator should use the normal dilute mode whenever conditions permit.
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|
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 2 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| RO ENSURE unit is NOT in a Tech Spec or TRM action that prohibits positive reactivity additions.
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| NOTE: HUT level increase of 1% is equal to 1380 gallons (TI-28 fig. C.21)
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| RO RO ENSURE makeup system is aligned for
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| AUTO operation in accordance with Section 5.1.
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| RO RECORD the quantity of dilution water required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D. (N/A for minor
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| power changes)
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| NOTE Due to eyeball interpolation the verified calculation may slightly differ from the initial calculation. The following signoff indicates that any differences in the two results have been discussed and are close enough to be considered validated.
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| SRO PERFORM Appendix I Independent Verification of Calculation for Amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water. (N/A if App. D was performed by SRO to verify data from Rx Engineering) (Step not required provided in shift turnover package)
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| RO PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flow
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| Control Switch to the
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| STOP position.
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| RO PLACE [HS-62-140B], CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the
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| DILUTE position.
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| RO ENSURE [HS-62-140D], Boric Acid Valve to the Blender is CLOSED (Green light is
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| LIT). RO SET [FQ-62-142], Batch Integrator for the desired quantity.
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 3 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Raise Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| NOTE: Primary Water Flow Controller
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| [FC-62-142] receives its reference signal (70 gpm) from setpoint potentiometer (dial indicator) located on panel M-6. A setpoint of 35% corresponds to a 70 gpm primary water flow rate.
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| RO ADJUST [FC-62-142], Primary Makeup Water Flow Controller for the desired flow rate.
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| RO PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid Supply to Blender Flow
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| Control Switch to the
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| START position.
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| NOTE: Flow oscillations and/or erratic controller response may require manual operation of Primary Water Flow Controller
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| [FC-62-142] until stable conditions exist.
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| RO NOTE: Alternate dilution in small amounts is acceptable on a regular basis, provided no
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| significant changes in seal water temperature or seal leakoff are indicated. Batches of 5 to 10 gallons may be added through FCV-62-144 on a frequency not to exceed once per 30 minutes. ICS points for No. 1 seal leakoffs and seal water temperatures on the RCPs should be monitored during and after dilution.
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| RO NOTE: It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.
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| RO MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure the proper response from dilution.
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| RO IF [LI-62-129], Volume Control Tank Level, increases to 63
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| percent, THEN ENSURE [LCV-62-118], Volume Control Tank Divert Valve
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| OPENS to divert excess water to the Holdup Tanks.
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 4 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| RO Lead Examiner may direct initiation of the next event at his discretion. Steps on the next two pages are associated with performance of repetitive dilutions or may not be performed until all dilutions are complete.
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| RO [17] IF power increase in progress and additional dilutions will be
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| required, THEN use this table to re-perform steps
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| [4] through [18].
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 5 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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|
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| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| RO REALIGN the blender controls for AUTO makeup to the CVCS in accordance with Section 5.1.
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| RO ENSURE dilution(s) is logged in Unit Narrative Log.
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| NOTE 6 Sample may be obtained at normal RCS sample intervals provided the unit is at power and the unit response following the dilution is as expected.
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| IF RCS boron sample is required, THEN NOTIFY Chem Lab to
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| obtain RCS boron sample.
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| Evaluator Note: The following Steps continue the 0-GO-4 Section 5.5 power increase at step [22].
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| BOP RO RO SRO (Step is N/A based on turnover information)
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| CREW (Concentration will be within acceptable range)
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| SRO (Step will be N/A)
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| BOP BOP SRO (Step will be previously completed)
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| (Pumps will be aligned and ready for service)
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 8 of 38
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| Event Description: Raise Power
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| BOP CREW BOP SRO (Step should be N/A)
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| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Raise Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| SRO (Chemistry will be within limits per turnover information)
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| SRO (Step will be N/A)
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| SRO (SI has been completed)
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| SRO CREW SRO When power has been raised sufficiently lead examiner may cue the next event.
| |
| | |
|
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| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 10 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Pressurizer Level Channel Fails Low
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2
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| Indications available: Annunciator XA-55-5A Window E-3 "LS-68-335E/D PRZR LVL LOW HEATER OFF & LETDOWN SECURED" Indicator LT-68-335 indicates Zero Letdown is Isolated Pressurizer Heaters turn off
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| RO Diagnose and announce failure.
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| SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-I.04 Section 2.4
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| RO RO (RNO Required)
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| RO (RNO Required)
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|
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 11 of 38
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| Event Description: Pressurizer Level Channel Fails Low
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| SRO Action 6 (From Table 3.3-1 Item 11) Applies
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| N/A Action 2a (From Table 3.3-10 Item 7) Applies
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| Action b applies until selector switch is used to remove
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| the failed channel from heater control.
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| RO RO
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 12 of 38
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| Event Description: Pressurizer Level Channel Fails Low
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| CREW (Appendix J will apply)
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| SRO Lead Examiner may cue next event when AOP I.04 and Tech Spec Evaluation are
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| complete.
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|
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 13 of 38
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| Event Description: Control Bank D Group 1 Dropped Rod (D-4)
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3
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| Indications available: Control Bank D Rod D-4 Rod Bottom Light Lit and RPI indicates Zero. Annunciator XA-55-4B Window D-7 "FULL LENGTH RODS RODS AT BOTTOM Additional Annunciators - Various Automatic Rod Withdrawal
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| RO Diagnose failure and place rods in manual to stop withdrawal Refer to Annunciator Response Procedure
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| SRO Enter and direct action of AOP-C.01 Section 2.2
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| RO RO RO BOP/RO CREW OR
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| (If applicable RNO action N/A <50% power)
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 14 of 38
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| Event Description: Control Bank D Group 1 Dropped Rod (D-4)
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| RO S N/A Action c App
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| lies N/A N/A N/A DNB Parameters LCO 3.2.5 Action may apply momentarily while RCS pressure is <2220 psia (2
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| 205 psig)
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| S R O OR (N/A Power already less than 7
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| 5%) (STA may be requested to perform SDM Calcula
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| tion)
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 15 of 38
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| Event Description: Control Bank D Group 1 Dropped Rod (D-4)
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| CREW OR (If applicable RNO action N/A <50% power)
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| CREW CREW CREW
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 38
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| Event Description: Control Bank D Group 1 Dropped Rod (D-4)
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| (RNO Required)
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| Lead Examiner may cue the next event when Tech Spec Evaluation Complete and SRO has determined that AOP-C.01 cannot continue until repairs complete.
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
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| Form ES-D-2
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| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 & 5 Page 17 of 38
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| Event Description: Inadvertent Main Turbine Trip, Main Generator Fails to Trip
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4
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| Indications available:
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| Main Turbine Trip: Alarm XA-55-4C (Turb 1st out) Window E-4 "ZS-47-24 AUTO STOP TURBINE
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| TRIP" Steam Dump Valves Open Turbine Stop Valves Closed
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|
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| Main Generator Fails to Trip: Alarm XA-55-1A Window B-1 "GENERATOR REVERSE POWER TRIP and Generator PCBs not Open
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| Evaluator Note: When turbine Trips the crew may attempt to manually trip the reactor even though it is not required. If Rx trip is attempted, an ATWS will occur and the crew
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| will not enter AOP-S.06 for Turbine Trip. Therefore, most of the following event guide will not apply. Proceed to the next event guide for ATWS.
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| Crew Diagnose Turbine Trip with Rx Trip not Required
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| RO Monitor for Generator Breaker trip ~ 30 seconds after the Turbine trip. Open PCB when they fail to open. (Should open as prudent action or AOP-S.06 will direct opening them at step 4)
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| SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-S.06
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| BOP RO (RNO required)
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| (Manual insertion required)
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| RO
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| Appendix D
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| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 & 5 Page 18 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Inadvertent Main Turbine Trip, Main Generator Fails to Trip
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
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| BOP (if not previously performed RNO Required)
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| BOP RO BOP/RO CREW Lead Examiner may cue the next event when desired.
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|
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| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 19 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 6 Note: If Crew attempts Rx Trip when turbine trips (Event 4), Event 6 will not be required to initiate ATWS.
| |
| Indications Available:
| |
| | |
| Dropped Rods/ATWS: Rod Bottom lights lit for Rods M-4, M-12, D-12. RPIs indicate Zero for Rods M-4, M-12, and D-12. Alarm (Reactor 1
| |
| st Out) XA-55-4D Window C-4 "NC-41U POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLUX RATE REACTOR TRIP Alarm XA-55-6A Window B-1 "NC-41U/NC-41K NIS POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE" Both Reactor Trip Breakers Closed
| |
| RO Identify ATWS after attempting both Rx trip Switches.
| |
| CREW Dispatch Personnel to locally Trip reactor as prudent action or later as directed by procedure.
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| SRO Enter and Direct actions of FR-S.1
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 20 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
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| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 1 - Option 1 RO (RNO Required)
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| (Manual Rod Insertion will be required) Critical Task "Prior to completion of FR-S.1 step 4"
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| BOP Evaluator Note:
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| If FR-S.1 entered directly without performance of AOP-S.06 BOP should Monitor and Open Generator Breakers >30 seconds after the Main Turbine Trip.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 21 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (RNO) (RNO) (RNO) (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 22 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
|
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 1 - Option 2 RO/BOP PLACE boric acid transfer pumps in fast speed. ADJUST emergency borate valve [FCV-62-138]
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| to obtain boric acid flow between 35 gpm and 150 gpm on
| |
| | |
| [FI-62-137A]. MONITOR emergency boration flow:
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| a. CHECK emergency boration flow established on
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| [FI-62-137A]. b. IF boric acid flow less than 35 gpm, THEN (N/A) Critical Task "Prior to completion of FR-S.1 step 4"
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| RO
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| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 23 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW RO/BOP (RNO May be required if not previously performed and Reactor still not tripped)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 24 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Remaining Control Bank D Group 1 Rods (M-4, M-12, D-12) Drop, ATWS
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO BOP SRO/RO (SRO should return to E-0)
| |
| When Crew Returns to E-0 Lead Examiner may cue the next event.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 25 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 8
| |
| Indications available: Loop 3 Main Feedwater line Break Inside Containment: Alarm XA-55-5C Window B-3 "MS-30-241 LOWER COMPT MOISTURE HI Alarm XA-55-6E Window C-6 "ZS-61-186 ICE CONDENSER LOWER INLET DOOR OPEN Containment Pressure Increasing Containment Radiation Not Increasing Hi-Hi Containment Pressure Phase B Auto failure: Containment Spray Pumps Auto Start from containment pressure
| |
| >2.81 psi. MSIV Closure if not manually closed Phase B status lights not green on panels 6K and 6L (M-6)
| |
| CREW Diagnose Secondary Side Break inside containment and ensure Safety Injection actuated.
| |
| SRO Direct actions of E-0
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may manually close MSIVs based on foldout page of E-0 if Hi-Hi containment pressure signal does not close them first. AFW to Faulted S/G may also be isolated per the Foldout Page.
| |
| Evaluator Note: At some point during performance of E-0, FR-Z.1 may be entered due to High containment pressure since status tree monitoring is already in effect due to transition to FR-S.1 for ATWS. FR-Z.1 steps are included in this event guide at the transition to E-2. Entry into FR-Z.1 should be brief for a Secondary side break.
| |
| NOTE 1: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
| |
| NOTE 2: This procedure has
| |
| a foldout page.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 26 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO BOP BOP RO BOP (ES-0.5 At end of Scenario) (Note: If Phase B Failure not already identified and corrected it will be addressed during performance of ES-0.5)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 27 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (If not previously performed AFW to faulted S/G may be isolated at this step)
| |
| BOP/RO (MSIVs will be closed if not previously performed)
| |
| (Applicable Foldout Page actions include Tripping the RCPs and Isolating AFW to Faulted S/G #3 if not previously
| |
| performed)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 28 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RCPs will likely already be stopped)
| |
| RO/BOP (If No Perform RNO)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 29 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO B OP (R NO) (Transition to E-2)
| |
| Evaluator Note: Applicable FR-Z.1 Steps are included next prior to E-2 Steps. If FR-Z.1 previously performed, continue to E-2 Steps that follow.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 30 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO RO (Note: If Phase B Failure not already identified and corrected it should be manually actuated at this step)
| |
| RO (SRO return to E-0 or E-2 as applicable)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 31 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct actions of E-2
| |
| CRITICAL Task 2 Part 1 BOP (RNO if not previously performed)
| |
| (Critical Task "Prior to completion of E-2")
| |
| BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 32 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 2 - PART 2 BOP (Critical Task: "Prior to completion of E-2")
| |
| BOP CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 & 9 Page 33 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Loop 3 Feedwater Line Break In Containment, Phase B Cntmnt Isol Auto Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW OR Lead Examiner may terminate Scenar
| |
| io when Crew transitions to
| |
| ES-1.1.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 34 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| ES-0.5 Actions
| |
| VERIFY D/G ERCW supply valves OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:
| |
| Pump 1A-A (2A-A) Pump 1B-B (2B-B) Pump C-S.
| |
| BOP VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
| |
| MD AFW pumps TD AFW pump.
| |
| NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control S/G levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted S/G.
| |
| BOP CHECK AFW valve alignment:
| |
| a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.
| |
| b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
| |
| c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400
| |
| and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 35 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP VERIFY MFW Isolation:
| |
| MFW pumps TRIPPED MFW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controller outputs ZERO MFW isolation valves CLOSED
| |
| BOP MONITOR ECCS operation:
| |
| VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING: CCPs RHR pumps SI pumps
| |
| VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.
| |
| CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
| |
| VERIFY SI pump flow. CHECK RCS pressure less than 300 psig.
| |
| VERIFY RHR pump flow.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 36 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
| |
| Phase A ACTUATED:
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, B5].
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, B6].
| |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation ACTUATED:
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
| |
| Status monitor panels:
| |
| o 6C DARK o 6D DARK o 6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area
| |
| o 6H DARK o 6J LIT. Train A status panel 6K:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Train B status panel 6L:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 37 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (If not previously performed, Manual Phase B Containment Isolation should be actuated at this point)
| |
| (Step continued in next Table Cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # ES-0.5 Page 38 of 38
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP VERIFY pocket sump pumps STOPPED: [M-15, upper left
| |
| corner] HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump A HS-77-411, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.
| |
| BOP DISPATCH personnel to perform EA-0-1, Equipment Checks
| |
| Following ESF Actuation.
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility:
| |
| Sequoyah Scenario No.:
| |
| 1 Op Test No.:
| |
| NRC Examiners:
| |
| Operators:
| |
| Initial Conditions: ~24% power equilibrium. 1A-A RHR Pump Out of Service.
| |
| Turnover: Plant startup was held at ~24% for approximately 70 hours for MFW Regulating valve repair. Repairs are complete continue Power increase to 100%. Target CTs: Insert Negative Reactivity using rods or boration prior to completion of FR-S.1 Step 4. Isolate Faulted S/G #3 prior to transition out of E-2 by closing the faulted S/G MSIV or MSIVs for all non-faulted S/Gs and isolating all feedwater flow, including AFW flow, to the
| |
| faulted S/G. Event # Malf. No. Event Type*
| |
| Event Description
| |
| 1 N/A R-ATC N-SRO/BOP Increase power from ~24%.
| |
| 2 RX06B TS-SRO I-SRO/ATC Pressurizer level Channel failure. Requires AOP-I.04 performance including selection of operable channel and restoration of letdown. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 3 RD07D4 TS-SRO C-SRO/ATC Dropped Rod (D-4) with reactor trip not required results in Auto rod
| |
| withdrawal and Immediate action to place rods in manual. AOP-C.01 is
| |
| performed. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 4 TCR02 C-SRO Inadvertent Turbine Trip does not result in or require reactor trip since power is less than 50%. Crew will stabilize plant and perform AOP-S.06.
| |
| 5 EG07 C-SRO/BOP Main generator fails to trip when main turbine trips requiring main generator PCBs to be manually opened.
| |
| 6 RD07M4
| |
| RD07M12 RD07D12 M-All Remaining rods in same group with rod D-4 are dropped resulting in
| |
| reactor trip signal however, reacto
| |
| r trip does not occur due to ATWS.
| |
| 7 RP01C C-All ATWS - Both RTBs fail to open. Rods are manually inserted and
| |
| Emergency Boration is initiated.
| |
| 8 FW23C C-SRO/BOP Loop 3 Feedwater Line break inside containment.
| |
| 9 RP07 C-SRO/ATC Failure of Hi-Hi containment pressure logic to initiate Phase B
| |
| containment isolation.
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Scenario 1 Summary
| |
| Crew will assume shift at ~24% power with 1A-A RHR pump out of service. Crew directions will be to increase power to 100%.
| |
|
| |
| When adequate power change has been completed, Pressurizer level Channel LT 68-335 fails low resulting in letdown isolation. SRO will direct performance of AOP-I.04 to select operable channel and restore
| |
| letdown. SRO will also evaluate Tech Specs.
| |
| When AOP-I.04 is complete and letdown has been restored, Control rod D-4 drops into the core. Due to power level and core location, an automatic reactor trip signal is not generated and manual reactor trip is not required for a single dropped rod. However, automatic rod withdrawal results requiring ATC to take
| |
| immediate action to place rods in manual. SRO w
| |
| ill direct performance of
| |
| AOP-C.01 and evaluate Tech
| |
| Specs. When applicable actions of AOP-C.01 are complete, an inadvertent Main Turbine trip will occur. An automatic Reactor trip signal is not generated with power level less than 50%. Crew should be able to stabilize plant and implement AOP-S-06 including power reduction to 20%. Rods should still be in manual. Normally 30 seconds after a turbine trip, the Generator trips and the PCBs open, however, in this scenario the generator trip fails to occur which requires manually opening the Main Generator PCBs. It is possible that if power level has been increased substantially above the initial 24% level, a heater string isolation could occur requiring manual Reactor Trip while performing AOP-S.06.
| |
| Assuming heater string isolation does not occur, the remaining 3 rods in the group with rod D-4 drop into the core producing an automatic negative rate reactor trip signal. The reactor does not trip due to an ATWS
| |
| condition and the crew will enter FR-S.1. ATC will manually insert control rods and most likely BOP will
| |
| initiate emergency boration to complete the first critical task. One of the ROs will dispatch
| |
| operators to trip
| |
| the reactor locally.
| |
| | |
| When the crew has completed FR-S.1, a feedwater line break occurs on loop #3 inside containment which will require a safety injection. When containment pressure reaches the Hi-Hi pressure setpoint of 2.81 psi, automatic Phase B containment isolation does not occur requiring manual actuation. Crew will continue in E-0 and transition to E-2 to isolate or verify isolated the faulted S/G to complete the second critical task. Upon completion of E-2, crew should transition to SI Termination procedure ES-1.1. FR-Z.1 may require brief entry for high containment pressure but
| |
| is exited at step 4 for faulted S/G entry.
| |
|
| |
| The scenario may be terminated when crew transitions to SI Termination procedure ES-1.1.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Unit 1 MCR Checklist
| |
| (751-2428 ID 7636)
| |
| Part 1 - Completed by Off-going Shift / Reviewed by On-coming Shift
| |
| Mode 1, 24% Power 175 MWe
| |
| PSA Risk: Green
| |
| Grid Risk: Green
| |
| | |
|
| |
| RCS Leakage ID .02 gpm, UNID .01 gpm
| |
| Cumulative Purge Time _50.5 Hours_
| |
| NRC phone Authentication
| |
| Code Until 0800 H3H8
| |
| After 0800 42DF
| |
| Common Tech Spec Actions U-1 Tech Spec Actions LCO 3.5.2 & 3.6.2.1 - 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform
| |
| motor winding test. Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| Protected Equipment 1B-B RHR Pump 1B-B Safety Injection Pump 1B-B Charging Pump
| |
|
| |
| Shift Priorities Plant Startup was suspended at ~24% for repairs to Loop #2 MFW Reg valve which are now complete. Continue
| |
| power increase to 100% per Reactor Engineer SpreadShee
| |
| t. Spreadsheet has been verified by the SRO/STA and 0-
| |
| SO-62-7 Appendix D and E have been performed. Currently in
| |
| 0-GO-4, Section 5.5, step [21]. Pre-Conditioned
| |
| power level is 100%.
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift
| |
| Verify your current qualifications
| |
| Review Operating Log since last held shift or 3
| |
| days, whichever is less
| |
| Standing Orders / Shift Orders
| |
| TACF Immediate required reading
| |
| LCO Actions
| |
| Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift
| |
| Walk down of MCR Control Boards
| |
|
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today MAIN CONTROL ROOM (7690) Train_A_Week
| |
| OUTSIDE (7666) [593-5214] AUXILIARY BUILDING (7775) 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform motor winding test.
| |
| Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| TURBINE BUILDING (7771) (593-8455)
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Equipment Off-Normal (Pink Tags) UNID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO / PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
| MCR WO List ID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO/PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
|
| |
| UNIT ONE REACTIVITY BRIEF
| |
| Date: Today Time: Now
| |
|
| |
| General Information
| |
| RCS Boron:
| |
| 1475 ppm Today
| |
| BA Controller Setpoint:
| |
| 38% * RCS B-10 Depletion:
| |
| 2 ppm Operable BAT:
| |
| A BAT A Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm BAT C Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm RWST Boron:
| |
| 2601 ppm Nominal Gallons per rod step from 219:
| |
| 7 gallons of acid,
| |
| 36 gallons of water
| |
| * Verify boric acid flow contro
| |
| ller is set at Adjusted BA Controller Setting iaw 0-SO-62-7 section 5.1
| |
| Estimated values for a 1° Change in Tave **
| |
| Gallons of acid:
| |
| 26 Gallons of water:
| |
| 138 Rod Steps: 4 Estimated rods/boron for emergency step power reduction ** (Assuming Xenon equilibrium and no reactivity effects due to Xenon. 2/3 total reactivity from rods, 1/3 from boron)
| |
| Power reduction amount
| |
| Estimated Final Rod Position
| |
| Estimated boron addition
| |
| 10% 198 Steps on bank D
| |
| 101 gallons
| |
| 30% 174 Steps on bank D
| |
| 295 gallons
| |
| 50% 152 Steps on bank D
| |
| 485 gallons
| |
| ** These values are approximations and not int
| |
| ended nor expected to be exact. The values may be
| |
| superseded by Rx Engineering or SO-62-7 calculated
| |
| values. These values are calculated assuming 100%
| |
| steady state power operation onl
| |
| y. Engineering data last updated one week ago. Data Valid until one week from now. Previous Shift Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total amount diluted: 0
| |
| Total amount borated: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 IN/Out
| |
| Current Shift Estimated Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: ***
| |
| Number of borations: ***
| |
| Rod steps in: ***
| |
| Gallons per dilution: ***
| |
| Gallons per boration: ***
| |
| Rod steps out: ***
| |
| Total expected dilution: ***
| |
| Total expected boration: ***
| |
| Net change: *** In/Out
| |
| Remarks: Rx Power - 100% MWD/MTU - 1000 Xenon & Samarium at Equilibrium
| |
| ***Per Reactor Engineering Spreadsheet.
| |
| Next Unit 1 Flux Map is scheduled -
| |
| three weeks from now
| |
| Unit 1 M-P is 0 PPM
| |
| Unit Supervisor: _______________________________
| |
| Name/Date
| |
| Operations Chemistry Information
| |
| Boron Results
| |
| Sample Point
| |
| Units Boron Date / Time
| |
| Goal Limit U1 RCS ppm 1475 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 816 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 RWST ppm 2601 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| U2 RWST ppm 2569 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| BAT A ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2556 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2575 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2591 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2589 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2531 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2650 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2522 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2526 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool
| |
| ppm 2547 Today / Now
| |
| > 2050 > 2000 Lithium Results
| |
| Goal Midpoint U1 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 1.1 Today / Now
| |
| >1 >1 U2 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 2.43 Today / Now
| |
| 2.18-2.48
| |
| 2.33 Primary to Secondary Leakrate In
| |
| formation (Total CPM RM-90-99/119)
| |
| Indicator
| |
| Units U1 Date / Time
| |
| U2 Date/Time
| |
| SI 50 S/G Leakage?
| |
| Yes/No No Today / Now
| |
| No Today / Now
| |
| SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate
| |
| gpd < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| 5 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 380 Today / Now
| |
| 68 Today / Now
| |
| 30 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 1980 Today / Now
| |
| 83 Today / Now
| |
| 50 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 3250 Today / Now
| |
| 206 Today / Now
| |
| 75 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 4850 Today / Now
| |
| 455 Today / Now
| |
| CVE Air Inleakage
| |
| cfm 10 Today / Now
| |
| 12.5 Today / Now
| |
| Bkgd on 99/119
| |
| cpm 50 Today / Now
| |
| 40 Today / Now
| |
| Correction Factor 99/119
| |
| cpm/gpd 10.69 Today / Now
| |
| 14.13 Today / Now
| |
| Steady state conditions are necessary for an accurate det
| |
| ermination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor
| |
|
| |
| Unit 1 DELTA REACTO R POWER ASSUMED INSERTED EXPECTED DELTA RHO BORON DELTA RECOMMEND RECOMMEND IODINE DATE/TIME TIME POWER DEFECT ROD HT WORTH XENON BORON CONC PPM DILUTION BORATION CONC (hrs)(%)(pcm)(steps)(pcm)(pcm)(pcm)(ppm)(ppm)(gal)(gal)(% eq)0 24.0 376.0 175.0-350.8-1537.0---1475.0---------24.2 Today 1 34.0 553.0 191.0-230.4-1514.3 37.0 1473.2-5.9 252 0 24.7 Today 2 44.0 714.9 201.0-129.0-1478.9 23.0 1471.5-4.1 183 0 26.1 Today 3 54.0 859.9 216.0-30.7-1439.1 6.9 1470.3-1.1 49 0 28.4 Today 4 64.0 1003.0 216.0-29.1-1401.7 104.0 1453.6-16.7 741 0 31.4 Today 5 74.0 1151.8 216.0-27.5-1371.7 117.2 1434.8-18.8 846 0 35.1 Today 6 84.0 1304.9 216.0-25.8-1352.6 132.4 1413.5-21.3 968 0 39.4 Today 7 94.0 1463.3 216.0-24.0-1346.4 150.4 1389.4-24.1 1119 0 44.3 Today 8 100.0 1566.2 216.0-23.0-1356.7 112.2 1371.4-18.0 845 0 49.5 Today 9 100.0 1574.3 216.0-23.0-1388.9 40.3 1364.9-6.5 305 0 54.5 Today 10 100.0 1577.2 216.0-23.0-1440.7 54.7 1356.2-8.8 417 0 58.9 Today 11 100.0 1581.1 216.0-23.0-1505.0 68.2 1345.2-10.9 524 0 63.0 Today 12 100.0 1586.0 216.0-23.0-1576.4 76.4 1333.0-12.2 592 0 66.6 Today 13 100.0 1591.5 216.0-23.0-1651.3 80.4 1320.1-12.9 628 0 69.9 Today 14 100.0 1597.2 216.0-23.0-1726.9 81.3 1307.1-13.0 642 0 72.9 Today 15 100.0 1603.1 216.0-23.0-1801.2 80.2 1294.3-12.8 639 0 75.5 Today 16 100.0 1608.9 216.0-23.0-1873.0 77.6 1281.8-12.4 625 0 77.9 Today 17 100.0 1614.6 216.0-23.0-1941.4 74.1 1270.0-11.9 602 0 80.1 Today 18 100.0 1620.1 216.0-23.0-2005.9 70.0 1258.8-11.2 574 0 82.1 Today 19 100.0 1625.2 216.0-23.0-2066.3 65.5 1248.3-10.5 542 0 83.8 Today 20 100.0 1630.0 216.0-23.0-2122.4 61.0 1238.5-9.7 508 0 85.4 Today 21 100.0 1634.5 216.0-23.0-2174.4 56.4 1229.5-9.0 473 0 86.8 Today 22 100.0 1638.7 216.0-23.0-2222.2 52.0 1221.2-8.3 438 0 88.1 Today 23 100.0 1642.5 216.0-23.0-2266.1 47.7 1213.6-7.6 405 0 89.3 Today 24 100.0 1646.0 216.0-23.0-2306.2 43.7 1206.6-7.0 373 0 90.4 Today 25 100.0 1649.2 216.0-23.0-2342.9 39.9 1200.2-6.4 342 0 91.3 Today 26 100.0 1652.1 216.0-23.0-2376.3 36.4 1194.4-5.8 313 0 92.2 Today 27 100.0 1654.9 216.0-23.0-2406.7 33.1 1189.1-5.3 287 0 92.9 Today 28 100.0 1657.3 216.0-23.0-2434.4 30.1 1184.3-4.8 262 0 93.6 Today 29 100.0 1659.6 216.0-23.0-2459.5 27.3 1180.0-4.4 238 0 94.3 Today 30 100.0 1661.6 216.0-23.0-2482.2 24.8 1176.0-4.0 217 0 94.8 Today 31 100.0 1663.5 216.0-23.0-2502.8 22.5 1172.4-3.6 197 0 95.3 Today 32 100.0 1665.1 216.0-23.0-2521.4 20.3 1169.2-3.2 179 0 95.8 Today 33 100.0 1666.7 216.0-23.0-2538.3 18.4 1166.2-2.9 162 0 96.2 Today 34 100.0 1668.0 216.0-23.0-2553.6 16.6 1163.6-2.7 147 0 96.6 Today 35 100.0 1669.3 216.0-23.0-2567.4 15.0 1161.2-2.4 133 0 96.9 Today 36 100.0 1670.4 216.0-23.0-2579.8 13.6 1159.0-2.2 121 0 97.2 Today
| |
| Unit 1 37 100.0 1671.4 216.0-23.0-2591.1 12.3 1157.1-2.0 109 0 97.5 Today 38 100.0 1672.3 216.0-23.0-2601.3 11.1 1155.3-1.8 99 0 97.7 Today 39 100.0 1673.2 216.0-23.0-2610.4 10.0 1153.7-1.6 89 0 98.0 Today 40 100.0 1673.9 216.0-23.0-2618.7 9.0 1152.3-1.4 81 0 98.2 Today 41 100.0 1674.6 216.0-23.0-2626.2 8.2 1151.0-1.3 73 0 98.3 Today 42 100.0 1675.2 216.0-23.0-2632.9 7.4 1149.8-1.2 66 0 98.5 Today 43 100.0 1675.7 216.0-23.0-2639.0 6.6 1148.7-1.1 59 0 98.7 Today 44 100.0 1676.2 216.0-23.0-2644.5 6.0 1147.8-1.0 54 0 98.8 Today 45 100.0 1676.7 216.0-23.0-2649.5 5.4 1146.9-0.9 48 0 98.9 Today 46 100.0 1677.1 216.0-23.0-2653.9 4.9 1146.1-0.8 44 0 99.0 Today 47 100.0 1677.4 216.0-23.0-2658.0 4.4 1145.4-0.7 39 0 99.1 Today 48 100.0 1677.8 216.0-23.0-2661.6 4.0 1144.8-0.6 36 0 99.2 Today 49 100.0 1678.1 216.0-23.0-2664.9 3.6 1144.2-0.6 32 0 99.3 Today 50 100.0 1678.3 216.0-23.0-2667.9 3.2 1143.7-0.5 29 0 99.3 Today 51 100.0 1678.6 216.0-23.0-2670.5 2.9 1143.2-0.5 26 0 99.4 Today 52 100.0 1678.8 216.0-23.0-2672.9 2.6 1142.8-0.4 24 0 99.5 Today 53 100.0 1679.0 216.0-23.0-2675.1 2.4 1142.4-0.4 21 0 99.5 Today 54 100.0 1679.2 216.0-23.0-2677.1 2.1 1142.1-0.3 19 0 99.6 Today 55 100.0 1679.3 216.0-23.0-2678.8 1.9 1141.8-0.3 17 0 99.6 Today 56 100.0 1679.5 216.0-23.0-2680.4 1.7 1141.5-0.3 16 0 99.6 Today 57 100.0 1679.6 216.0-23.0-2681.8 1.6 1141.3-0.2 14 0 99.7 Today 58 100.0 1679.7 216.0-23.0-2683.1 1.4 1141.1-0.2 13 0 99.7 Today 1000 MWD/MTU Hold Tavg = Tref +/- 1.5F
| |
| Total 16893 0 6850 BAT ppm Small hourly boration/dilution
| |
| volumes may be accumulated
| |
| for larger single additions
| |
| Reason for Maneuver
| |
| Plant Startup
| |
| Date Today RxEng Name
| |
| Comments
| |
| Page 1 of 2 NRC09B Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
| Sim. Setup
| |
| Reset IC- 189 Perform switch check. Allow the
| |
| simulator to run for at least 3 minutes before loading SCEN file
| |
| or starting the exercise. This will
| |
| initialize ICS.
| |
| | |
|
| |
| Load SCENS: NRC09B
| |
| Place simulator in RUN.
| |
| Place OOS equipment in required
| |
| position with tags. Clear alarms. Initialize simulator at
| |
| 10-3 % RTP. Place Mode
| |
| 2 placard on panels.
| |
| Place A Train Week sign on the simulator
| |
| Ensure Intermediate Range Channel N36 any Source Range Channel and on
| |
| selected N45 Recorder.
| |
| Event 1 Increase power to 1-2%
| |
| Event 2 When Power Increase complete
| |
| as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-1 imf NI04B f:0 k:1 IR CHANNEL FAILURE IR CHNL 2 (N-36) FAILS
| |
| LOW If IMs or MSS contacted, inform the crew that the IMs will report to the MCR in ~45 minutes.
| |
| Event 3 When IR AOP and Tech Spec complete as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-2 imf CV25A f:1 k:2 PT-62-81 FAILS LOW
| |
| If MSS contacted, inform the crew that IMs will report to the MCR in ~45 miutes.
| |
| Event 4 When manual letdown pressure
| |
| control has been established as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-3 imf ED08C f:1 k:3 LOSS OF 480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1B1-B
| |
| If personnel are dispatched to check the board locally report the normal supply breaker tripped apparently, due to 51 overcurrent rela
| |
| y. Report in ~3 min.
| |
| If dispatched to check D/G oil temperature, report temperature of ~99 degrees. Report in ~
| |
| | |
| 10 min. Event 5
| |
| When 480v Bd AOP and Tech Spec complete as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-4 imf TH05A f:4.2 k:4
| |
| STEAM GENERATOR TUBE FAILURE SG #1 (~200 gpm)
| |
| If RADCON/Chem Lab are requested to survey/sample S/Gs, wait ~20 min then report as RADCON that S/G #1 is slightly higher than
| |
| background and other S/Gs.
| |
| Wait 45 minutes and report as Chem Lab that
| |
| ruptured S/G is #1 S/G.
| |
|
| |
| Page 2 of 2 NRC09B
| |
| Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| Event 6 Active when SCENS loaded imf RP16K608A f:1
| |
| Failure of Train "A" ESF Equipment to start.
| |
| | |
| No auto Train "A" CR Isolation
| |
| | |
| No auto start of CCP 1A-A (Note: CCP1A-A may have been previously started manually
| |
| No auto start of SI pump 1A-A
| |
|
| |
| No auto start of RHR pump 1A-A
| |
| No auto start of CCS pump 1A-A (Note: 1A-A CCS pmp already running)
| |
| Event 7 Active when SCENS loaded imf MSCOHS115A f:1 ior ZLOHS115A_RED f:1 LOOP 1 TDAFW PUMP STEAM SUPPLY VALVE
| |
| | |
| 1-FCV-1-15 FAILS OPEN.
| |
| If dispatched to check valve locally report no
| |
| obvious problem locally. Report in ~8 min.
| |
| Event 8
| |
| Immediately when E-3 cooldown to target temperature complete as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-5 imf MS06A f:25 k:5 MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT - LP1
| |
| If personnel dispatched to look for steam leak, report steam coming from West Valve Vault
| |
| room. If requested
| |
| to bypass Con-DI wait
| |
| ~10 min and insert: Key-6 irf CNR02 f:3 k:3 k:6
| |
| HS-14-3, COND DEMIN BYPASS VLV (OPEN)
| |
| Report when complete.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 1 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Raise Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator:
| |
| No action required for Event 1
| |
| Indications available:
| |
| None. Crew will perform startup IAW 0-GO-3, Section 5.2
| |
| NOTE Average loop T (UO485) is considered to be the most accurate power indication below 15% power. NIS power range and steam dump demand should also be monitored.
| |
| | |
| (REFER TO 0-SO-1-2 for steam dump demand program.)
| |
| RO WITHDRAW RODS OR DILUTE to bring reactor power to between 1 and 2% RTP, while continuing with this instruction.
| |
| NOTE After refueling operations the "Initial Startup System Parameter Log" is performed during power escalations to provide the operator with alternate indications of power level
| |
| (indications independent of calorimetric calculations). If significant differences occur
| |
| (approx. 5%) between the alternate power indications then Engineering should be
| |
| | |
| notified.
| |
| US IF startup is after a refueling or maintenance on NIS, THEN INITIATE performance of 0-PI-OPS-000-001.0, Initial Startup System Parameter Log.
| |
| This Step N/A
| |
| | |
| RO COMPARE NIS power range instrumentation with loop T indicators and steam dump demand to evaluate accuracy of
| |
| PRMs.
| |
| RO SELECT the highest reading IRM or I and PRM channels to be recorded on NR 45.
| |
| Crew REVIEW plant parameters and indications to determine plant stability prior to startup of Main Feed Pump.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 2 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Raise Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO MAINTAIN reactor power approximately 1%.
| |
| NOTE Steps 5.2[7] and 5.2[8] may be performed in any order. (The following 2 steps)
| |
| BOP WHEN total Aux FW flow to SGs 1 and 2 is constant and
| |
| greater than or equal to 300 gpm, THEN CLOSE [FCV-3-400],
| |
| AFW PUMP A RECIRC ISOL VLV, and PLACE handswitch
| |
| [HS-3-400A] in the PULL TO LOCK position.
| |
| BOP WHEN total Aux FW flow to SGs 3 and 4 is constant and greater than or equal to 300 gpm, THEN CLOSE [FCV-3-401], AFW PUMP B RECIRC ISOL VLV, and PLACE handswitch
| |
| [HS-3-401A] in the PULL TO LOCK position.
| |
| | |
| NOTE Control rod bank D should be
| |
| >165 steps at steady state power levels below 85% RTP. This guidance is to preclude long-term operation at <165 steps to avoid potential impact on safety analysis assumptions. Short-term operation at <165 steps is
| |
| NOT a concern.
| |
| RO ENSURE the plant is stabilized between 1 and 2% reactor
| |
| power.
| |
| RO COMPARE NIS intermediate range instrumentation with loop
| |
| T indications to evaluate accuracy of IRMs.
| |
| RO RECORD IRM readings: N35 % RTP N36 % RTP
| |
| When power has been raised sufficiently to record a reactivity manipulation, and
| |
| demonstrate AFW control, lead examiner may cue the next event.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 3 of 35
| |
| Event Description: NIS Intermediate Channel N-36 Fails Low
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2
| |
| Indications available:
| |
| N-36 indicator on Panel M-4 Fails low. NR-45 Recorder channel (M-6) fails low (if selected). Note: No audible Alarms received.
| |
| | |
| RO Diagnose and announce failure.
| |
| SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-I.01 Section 2.2
| |
| RO (RO may adjust rods to stabilize power)
| |
| RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 4 of 35
| |
| Event Description: NIS Intermediate Channel N-36 Fails Low
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO Action 3b (From Table 3.3-1 Item 5) Applies
| |
| Action 8a (From Table 3.3-1 Item 22.A) Applies but no
| |
| actions required for SR Rx Trip.
| |
| N/A Action 1a (From Table 3.3-10 Item 17b)
| |
| N/A RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 5 of 35
| |
| Event Description: NIS Intermediate Channel N-36 Fails Low
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Evaluator Note: Some steps may be performed by RO or BOP depending on SRO direction for back panel operations.
| |
| RO/BOP RO/BOP RO/BOP RO RO SRO Lead Examiner may cue next event when AOP I.01 and Tech Spec Evaluation are
| |
| complete.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 6 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Letdown Pressure Transmitter PT-62-81 Fails low.
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3
| |
| Indications available:
| |
| Alarm XA-55 6C Window C-4: "TS-62-75 Low Pressure Letdown Relief Temp High"Letdown Flow drops to zero.
| |
| RO Refer to Annunciator Response Procedure.
| |
| RO (Indicates zero Pressure)
| |
| RO (Should restore ~75 gpm letdown flow)
| |
| RO RO Evaluator Note: Remaining steps of ARP are N/A. Lead Examiner may cue the next event when manual letdown flow control has
| |
| been established.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 7 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 480 volt Shutdown board 1B1-B Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4
| |
| Indications available:
| |
| Alarm XA-55 1B Window D-6: "480V SD BD 1B1-B Failure/Undervoltage Panel M-1 Indicator 1-EI-57-83A indicates Zero Volts. Green Lights on both 480V SD BD 1B1-B supply Bkr mimic lights on (M-1)
| |
| | |
| RO Refer to ARP for XA-55-1B window D-6
| |
| RO RO RO SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-P.05 section 2.5
| |
| BOP RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 8 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 480 volt Shutdown board 1B1-B Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO SRO Evaluator Note: SRO should identify Tech for the inoperable board and other more limiting Tech Specs from the list in
| |
| Appendix AA. LCO 3.8.2.1, Action a (8 hr action for 480V BD 1B1-B Inop) LCO 3.4.3.2 Action d (1 hr action to close and remove power from PORV with De-Energized Block Valve. Action d also requires implementation of Action b which potentially
| |
| leads to 3.0.3 since the block valve cannot be closed to comply with Action b.) Several other Tech Specs less limiting than the PORV Spec may also be identified.
| |
| BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 9 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 480 volt Shutdown board 1B1-B Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (Note: Vital Charger II is normally in service therefore crew
| |
| | |
| may not dispatch personnel)
| |
| BOP BOP BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 10 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 480 volt Shutdown board 1B1-B Failure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Crew BOP SRO When Tech Spec Evaluation complete, Lead Examiner may cue the next event.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 11 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5 Insert S/G #1 SGTR at 4.2 severity (~200 gpm).
| |
| Indications Available:
| |
| Loop 1 Steam Generator tube Rupture: 0-AR-M12-A, C1, CNDS VAC PMP LO RNG AIR EXH MON HIGH RAD Pressurizer pressure decreasing Pressurizer level decreasing and charging flow increasing Loop 1 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Increasing
| |
| Train A SSPS Slave Relay Failure: Train A CRI annunciator not lit with SI 1A-A RHR Pump not running with SI 1A-A SI Pump not running with SI
| |
| TDAFW Pump Steam supply form Loop 1 Fails open; Red light on and Valve will not close for man transfer to loop 4.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may momentarily enter AOP-R.01 for S/G Tube leak prior to Rx Trip and Safety Injection
| |
| RO Manually Trip Reactor and initiate SI.
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct performance of E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety
| |
| Injection.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 12 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| NOTE 1: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
| |
| NOTE 2: This procedure has
| |
| a foldout page.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Slave Relay failure should be identified and manual actions taken during performance of prudent operator actions immediately
| |
| following performance of Immediate Operator Actions. Manually Start 1A-A RHR Pump (M-6) Manually start 1A-A SI Pump (M-6) Manually Actuate A Train Control Room Isolation (M-6)
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may also attempt to transfer the TDAFW steam supply from the
| |
| ruptured S/G early as prudent action. If steam supply transfer is
| |
| attempted the failed open steam supply valve from S/G #1 should be
| |
| identified and steam supply to the TDAFW pump isolated. If not
| |
| isolated early the failure will be addressed later in E-3.
| |
| RO BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 13 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP RO Evaluator Note: If not previously Identified, Slave relay failures should be identified during performance ES-0.5. When Identified, equipment should be
| |
| | |
| manually actuated promptly.
| |
| BOP (ES-0.5 At end of Scenario)
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 14 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP/RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 15 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO/BOP (If No Perform Following RNO)
| |
| (AFW Flow to Ruptured S/G #1 may be isolated during control step. Level should be >10%)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 16 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO BOP BOP (Crew will Transition to E-3 at this Step)
| |
| SRO Enter and direct performance of E-3 Steam Generator Tube
| |
| rupture. RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 17 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 18 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (FCV-1-15 will not close RNO Required)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 19 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Critical Task 1 - Part 1 BOP Critical Task: Prior to Initiation of RCS Cooldown to Target Temperature.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Isolating TDAFW pump from Ruptured S/G should also be considered part of this critical task.
| |
| Critical Task 1 -
| |
| Part 2 BOP (Crew will isolate or verify isolated AFW to Loop 1 S/G)
| |
| Critical Task: Prior to Initiation of RCS Cooldown to Target Temperature.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 20 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP Critical Task 1 -
| |
| Part 1
| |
| (Cont'd) BOP (FCV-1-15 will not close, if not previously performed RNO will
| |
| be required)
| |
| BOP SRO Determine Target Temperature using table on next page.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 21 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 22 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 23 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 24 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP RO RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 25 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Critical Task 2 BOP (Critical Task: Prior to RCS Depressurization)
| |
| IMPORTANT
| |
| Evaluator Note: When cooldown complete, initiate Event 8 (S/G #1 Steamline break outside containment to ensure prompt transition to ECA-3.1 in the next step.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5,6, & 7 Page 26 of 35
| |
| Event Description: #1 S/G Tube Rupt, ESF Slave Relay Failure, TDAFW Stm Supply Vlv Fails Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (Pressure in S/G #1 will be rapidly decreasing due to steamline break, RNO required)
| |
| (SRO should transition to ECA-3.1)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 27 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 8
| |
| Indications available: S/G #1 Pressure decreasing Auto Closure of intact S/G MSIVs
| |
| SRO Enter and direct actions of ECA-3.1, SGTR AND LOCA SUBCOOLED RECOVERY
| |
| RO RO RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 28 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO RO RO BOP (If Not RNO)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 29 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 30 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW BOP (If not RNO Next Step)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 31 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (SRO Should continue in ECA-3.1)
| |
| BOP CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 32 of 35
| |
| Event Description: S/G #1 SteamLine Break outside containment
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Evaluator Note: Since a cooldown has already been performed in E-3, it is likely that only a small amount of additional cooldown, if any, will be required during the first hour
| |
| since the trip. Tcold at the time of the trip should have been ~547 degrees. Cooldown
| |
| should be limited such that Tcold is not decreased below ~447 degrees until an hour has
| |
| | |
| elapsed since the trip.
| |
| Critical Task 3 (Critical Task: Prior to RCS Depressurization
| |
| ) Scenario may be terminated
| |
| when cooldown evaluation is complete and cooldown is initiated as required.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: Audit Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 33 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| ES-0.5 Actions
| |
| VERIFY D/G ERCW supply valves OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:
| |
| Pump 1A-A (2A-A) Pump 1B-B (2B-B) Pump C-S.
| |
| BOP VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
| |
| MD AFW pumps TD AFW pump.
| |
| NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control S/G levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted S/G.
| |
| BOP CHECK AFW valve alignment:
| |
| a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.
| |
| b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
| |
| c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400
| |
| and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.
| |
| BOP VERIFY MFW Isolation:
| |
| MFW pumps TRIPPED MFW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controller outputs ZERO MFW isolation valves CLOSED
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: Audit Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 34 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP MONITOR ECCS operation:
| |
| VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING: CCPs RHR pumps SI pumps
| |
|
| |
| VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.
| |
| CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
| |
| VERIFY SI pump flow. CHECK RCS pressure less than 300 psig.
| |
| VERIFY RHR pump flow. (If Not previously performed A Train RHR and SI pumps should
| |
| be started in this step)
| |
| BOP VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
| |
| Phase A ACTUATED:
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, B5].
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, B6].
| |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation ACTUATED:
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
| |
| Status monitor panels:
| |
| o 6C DARK o 6D DARK o 6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area
| |
| o 6H DARK o 6J LIT. Train A status panel 6K:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Train B status panel 6L:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN (Even thought not specifically checked in this step A Train CRI failure may also be addressed at this step)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: Audit Scenario # 2 Event # ES-0.5 Page 35 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP VERIFY pocket sump pumps STOPPED: [M-15, upper left
| |
| corner] HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump A HS-77-411, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.
| |
| BOP DISPATCH personnel to perform EA-0-1, Equipment Checks
| |
| Following ESF Actuation.
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility:
| |
| Sequoyah Scenario No.:
| |
| 2 Op Test No.:
| |
| NRC Examiners:
| |
| Operators:
| |
| Initial Conditions:
| |
| ~10-3 % power in Intermediate Range
| |
| Turnover: Raise Power to 1-2% Power
| |
| Target CTs: Isolate Steam flow and Feedwater flow to ruptured S/G prior to initiation of RCS Cooldown to target temperature.
| |
| Cooldown RCS to less than or equal to target temperature prior to RCS depressurization.
| |
| Evaluate RCS T-cold 100
| |
| o F/hr cooldown requirements, and initiate cooldown as required by ECA-3.1 prior to RCS depressurization. Event # Malf. No. Event Type*
| |
| Event Description
| |
| 1 R-ATC N-SRO/BOP Raise Power to 1-2%
| |
| 2 NI04B TS-SRO I-SRO/ATC Intermediate Range Channel N-36 Fails low. ATC/SRO Identify and bypass failed channel per AOP. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 3 CV25A C-SRO/ATC Letdown back pressure transmitter fails low manual control required to restore normal letdown flow.
| |
| 4 ED08C TS-SRO C-SRO/BOP Failure of 480 V Shutdown Board 1B1-B & related Safety Related Pumps
| |
| are locked out. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 5 TH05A M-All S/G #1 Tube Rupture ~200 gpm requires Reactor Trip and Safety
| |
| Injection.
| |
| 6 RP16K608
| |
| A C-SRO/ATC Train "A" SSPS Slave Relay failure requires manual isolations and ESF
| |
| equipment starts.
| |
| 7 MSCOHS1
| |
| 15A C-SRO/BOP Steam supply to Turbine Driven AFW pump from S/G #1 fails open and
| |
| cannot be transferred to S/G #4. Requires isolation to reduce releases.
| |
| 8 MS06A C-SRO/BOP S/G #1 Steam Line Brk Outside Containment. Requires crew
| |
| implementation of actions in Faulted/Rupture S/G Procedure ECA-3.1.
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Scenario 2 Summary
| |
| The Crew will assume shift with the unit in a startup and power in the intermediate range with instructions to continuing raising power to the Point of Adding Heat. ATC will manipulate control rods as directed by SRO, BOP will primarily control S/G le
| |
| vels as power is increased.
| |
| When the power increase is complete, Intermediate range channel N-36 will fail low. SRO will enter AOP-I.01 and direct RO actions to bypass the failed channel. If power increase is still in progress when the
| |
| failure occurs, ATC will stabilize reactor power. SRO will evaluate Tech
| |
| Specs and determine power cannot be increased above 5% until N-36 is operable.
| |
|
| |
| After the NIS channel failure has been addressed, letdown backpressure transmitter PT-62-81 will fail low. Automatic control action will reduce letdown flow to attempt to increase pressure. ATC manual control of the controller in accordance with the annunciator re
| |
| sponse procedure will be re
| |
| quired to restore normal letdown flow.
| |
| When normal letdown flow has been restored, 480 Vac Shutdown board 1B1-B will be lost due to a board fault and will not be restored during the scenario. SRO will implement AOP-P.05 and direct various ESF pumps to be locked out due to loss of power to the pump or supporting equipment. SRO will evaluate Tech
| |
| Specs to identify, as a minimum, the Tech Spec directly related to the board and any other more limiting Tech Specs including 3.0.3 due to power loss to PORV block valve.
| |
| | |
|
| |
| When 480 Vac board AOP actions and SRO Tech Spec evaluation is complete, Steam Generator #1 will develop a ~200 gpm tube rupture requiring Reactor Trip, Safety Injection, and implementation of
| |
| emergency procedures. During performance of E-3, crew will isolate ruptured S/G to complete the first critical task and cooldown to target RCS Temperature to complete the second critical task.
| |
|
| |
| When Safety Injection is actuated, a Slave Relay failure in the SSPS results in failure of several automatic
| |
| actions to occur including Train "A" Control Room isolation and several ESF Pump Starts. Manual action is required by ATC to initiate isolation and start ESF Pumps.
| |
|
| |
| During performance of E-3 actions, or possibly earlier as prudent action, operators will attempt to transfer steam supply for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump from ruptured S/G #1 to S/G #4. The normal transfer will not work due to a failure of the #1 S/G steam supply valve. Isolation of an upstream steam supply will be required to reduce offsite releases from the ruptured S/G.
| |
|
| |
| After the cooldown to target temperature in E-3 is complete, ruptured S/G #1 will develop a steam line break outside containment upstream of the MSIV resulting in depressurization of the Ruptured S/G and transition
| |
| to Emergency Contingency Procedure ECA-3.1. In ECA-3.1 the Crew will evaluate current RCS cooldown and initiate continued cooldown to cold shutdown as required at this time consistent with specified T-cold cooldown limit of 100
| |
| oF/hr to complete the third critical task.
| |
| The scenario may be terminated after RCS Cooldown evaluation is complete and cooldown is initiated if required.
| |
| | |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Unit 1 MCR Checklist
| |
| (751-2428 ID 7636)
| |
| Part 1 - Completed by Off-going Shift / Reviewed by On-coming Shift
| |
| Mode 2, 10
| |
| -3% Power 0 MWe
| |
| PSA Risk: Green
| |
| Grid Risk: Green
| |
| | |
|
| |
| RCS Leakage ID .02 gpm, UNID .01 gpm
| |
| Cumulative Purge Time _50.5 Hours_
| |
| NRC phone Authentication
| |
| Code Until 0800 H3H8
| |
| After 0800 42DF
| |
| Common Tech Spec Actions U-1 Tech Spec Actions Protected Equipment
| |
| Shift Priorities Plant Startup in progress following 1 week shutdown. O-GO-2 Section 5.3 is complete and Plant is stable
| |
| at ~10-3 % power. Continue reactor startup in accordance with 0-GO-3 Section 5.2, step 1 and stabilize
| |
| between 1and 2% power. Rx Engineering spreadsheet for power increase above 1 to 2% is being
| |
| developed and verified and will be provided prior to power increase above that point. The Preconditioned
| |
| | |
| power level is 100%.
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift
| |
| Verify your current qualifications
| |
| Review Operating Log since last held shift or 3
| |
| days, whichever is less
| |
| Standing Orders / Shift Orders
| |
| TACF Immediate required reading
| |
| LCO Actions
| |
| Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift
| |
| Walk down of MCR Control Boards
| |
|
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today MAIN CONTROL ROOM (7690) Train_A_Week
| |
| OUTSIDE (7666) [593-5214] AUXILIARY BUILDING (7775) TURBINE BUILDING (7771) (593-8455)
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Equipment Off-Normal (Pink Tags) UNID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO / PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
| MCR WO List ID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO/PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
|
| |
| UNIT ONE REACTIVITY BRIEF
| |
| Date: Today Time: Now
| |
|
| |
| General Information
| |
| RCS Boron:
| |
| 1729 ppm Today
| |
| BA Controller Setpoint:
| |
| 47% * RCS B-10 Depletion:
| |
| 2 ppm Operable BAT:
| |
| A BAT A Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm BAT C Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm RWST Boron:
| |
| 2601 ppm Nominal Gallons per rod step from
| |
| N/A: N/A gallons of acid,
| |
| N/A gallons of water
| |
| * Verify boric acid flow contro
| |
| ller is set at Adjusted BA Controller Setting iaw 0-SO-62-7 section 5.1
| |
| Estimated values for a 1° Change in Tave **
| |
| Gallons of acid:
| |
| N/A Gallons of water:
| |
| N/A Rod Steps: N/A Estimated rods/boron for emergency step power reduction ** (Assuming Xenon equilibrium and no reactivity effects due to Xenon. 2/3 total reactivity from rods, 1/3 from boron)
| |
| Power reduction amount
| |
| Estimated Final Rod Position
| |
| Estimated boron addition
| |
| 10% N/A Steps on bank D
| |
| N/A gallons
| |
| 30% N/A Steps on bank D
| |
| N/A gallons
| |
| 50% N/A Steps on bank D
| |
| N/A gallons
| |
| ** These values are approximations and not int
| |
| ended nor expected to be exact. The values may be
| |
| superseded by Rx Engineering or SO-62-7 calculated
| |
| values. These values are calculated assuming 100%
| |
| steady state power operation onl
| |
| y. Engineering data last updated one week ago. Data Valid until one week from now. Previous Shift Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total amount diluted: 0
| |
| Total amount borated: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 IN/Out
| |
| Current Shift Estimated Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: ***
| |
| Number of borations: ***
| |
| Rod steps in: ***
| |
| Gallons per dilution: ***
| |
| Gallons per boration: ***
| |
| Rod steps out: ***
| |
| Total expected dilution: ***
| |
| Total expected boration: ***
| |
| Net change: *** In/Out
| |
| Remarks: Rx Power - 0% MWD/MTU - 1000
| |
| ***Reactor Engineering Spreadsheet to be provided.
| |
| Next Unit 1 Flux Map is scheduled -
| |
| three weeks from now
| |
| Unit 1 M-P is 0 PPM
| |
| Unit Supervisor: _______________________________
| |
| Name/Date
| |
| Operations Chemistry Information
| |
| Boron Results
| |
| Sample Point
| |
| Units Boron Date / Time
| |
| Goal Limit U1 RCS ppm 1729 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 816 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 RWST ppm 2601 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| U2 RWST ppm 2569 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| BAT A ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2556 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2575 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2591 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2589 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2531 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2650 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2522 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2526 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool
| |
| ppm 2547 Today / Now
| |
| > 2050 > 2000 Lithium Results
| |
| Goal Midpoint U1 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 1.1 Today / Now
| |
| >1 >1 U2 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 2.43 Today / Now
| |
| 2.18-2.48
| |
| 2.33 Primary to Secondary Leakrate In
| |
| formation (Total CPM RM-90-99/119)
| |
| Indicator
| |
| Units U1 Date / Time
| |
| U2 Date/Time
| |
| SI 50 S/G Leakage?
| |
| Yes/No No Today / Now
| |
| No Today / Now
| |
| SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate
| |
| gpd < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| 5 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 380 Today / Now
| |
| 68 Today / Now
| |
| 30 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 1980 Today / Now
| |
| 83 Today / Now
| |
| 50 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 3250 Today / Now
| |
| 206 Today / Now
| |
| 75 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 4850 Today / Now
| |
| 455 Today / Now
| |
| CVE Air Inleakage
| |
| cfm 10 Today / Now
| |
| 12.5 Today / Now
| |
| Bkgd on 99/119
| |
| cpm 50 Today / Now
| |
| 40 Today / Now
| |
| Correction Factor 99/119
| |
| cpm/gpd 10.69 Today / Now
| |
| 14.13 Today / Now
| |
| Steady state conditions are necessary for an accurate det
| |
| ermination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor
| |
|
| |
| Page 1 of 4 NRC09C Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
| Sim. Setup
| |
| Reset IC- 16 Perform switch check. Allow the
| |
| simulator to run for at least 3 minutes before loading SCEN file
| |
| or starting the exercise. This will
| |
| initialize ICS.
| |
| | |
|
| |
| Load SCENS: NRC09C
| |
| Place simulator in RUN.
| |
| Place OOS equipment in required
| |
| position with tags. Clear alarms. Initialize simulator at
| |
| 100 % RTP BOL
| |
| Place Mode
| |
| 1 placard on panels.
| |
| Place A Train Week sign on the simulator
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded imf RH01A f:1
| |
| ior ZLOHS7410A_GREEN f:0 1A-A RHR PUMP INOPERABLE.
| |
| | |
| PLACE 1A-A RHR PUMP HS IN PTL AND TAG WITH HOLD ORDER.
| |
| Place Protected equipment tags on B Train
| |
| RHR Pump, SI Pump, and CCP.
| |
| Event 1 When Directed by Lead Examiner
| |
| insert: Key-1 irf ED120B1B007 f:0 k:1
| |
| 120VAC BD 1-I BREAKER 7, CONTAINMENT RAD MAN 1-RE-9O-106 (Open Brkr)
| |
| If Dispatched to 120 v vital power board I, report Bkr 7 to 1-RE-90-106 tripped. Report in ~ 3 min.
| |
| If Dispatched to RM-90-106 report pump not running. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 2
| |
| After ARP and Tech
| |
| Spec Eval complete as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-2 imf CH01C f:100 k:2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE PDT-30-44 (100%)
| |
| If MSS contacted report IM will report to MCR in ~45 min.
| |
|
| |
| Page 2 of 4 NRC09C Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| Event 3 when AOP and Tech Spec Eval complete as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-3 imf HD03A f:1 k:3
| |
| imf HD06A f:60 k:3 #3 HEATER DRAIN PUMP A TRIP
| |
| LCV-6-105A FAILS TO
| |
| VARIABLE POSITION (60%) Results in BOP Runback in 3-5 min.
| |
| | |
| If requested, provide tank level and valve position information from simulator diagram. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| | |
| If dispatched to check pump, report motor is hot and smells like burnt insulation. Report in
| |
| ~ 5 min If dispatched to check motor breaker report
| |
| instantaneous overcurrent relay operation. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 4 Active when SCENS loaded imf RD09 f:1
| |
| RODS FAIL TO MOVE IN AUTO
| |
| If Operations personnel dispatched to check rod control system locally, respond the problem is not obvious locally. Maintenance will need to investigate. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 5
| |
| When AOP for HDT RB complete including reset of
| |
| Turb and Steam Dump controls as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-4 imf RX20 f:1 k:4 MAIN STEAM HEADER PRESSURE
| |
| TRANSMITTER FAILS HI, PT-1-33 (Main Feedwater Pump Speed Increases)
| |
| If Maintenance requested to investigate inform crew that IMs will report to the MCR in ~45 min to discuss the failure.
| |
| Event 6 When MFP Speed
| |
| and S/G levels are
| |
| controlled and AOP is complete as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-5 imf TH04A f:12 k:5 PZR SAFETY FAILURE SV-68-563 (Fails partially open ~13 gpm leak)
| |
|
| |
| Page 3 of 4 NRC09C Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| Event 7 N/A Initiate Rapid Plant shutdown using AOP-C.03 per
| |
| AOP-R.05.
| |
| If crew elects to shutdown using O-GO-5, provide the following input from Operations
| |
| Management as required with Lead Examiner concurrence:
| |
|
| |
| Operations Management directs rapid shutdown using AOP-C.03 to minimize chance
| |
| of SV leak worsening.
| |
| Event 8 Modify SV Failure
| |
| after load decrease complete as Directed by Lead
| |
| | |
| Examiner.
| |
| mmf TH04A f:100 PZR SAFETY FAILURE SV-68-563 (Fails Full Open requiring Rx Trip and SI)
| |
| Event 8 (Cont'd)
| |
| Event trigger 6 min after PRT rupture {th_rupt}imf TH01B f:0.075 d:360 LOCA - HOT LEG LOOP 2 (~400 gpm) (Note: Provides additional RCS leakage to
| |
| simulate more severe SV Failure)
| |
| Event 9 Active when SCENS
| |
| loaded imf RH01B f:1 RHR PUMP B TRIP ON START (Instantaneous Overcurrent)
| |
| | |
| If dispatched to check pump locally report
| |
| smell of burnt insulation. Report in ~5 min.
| |
| | |
| If dispatched to check breaker locally, report instantaneous overcurrent relay operation.
| |
| Report in ~5 min.
| |
| Event 10
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded imf RP17A f:1
| |
| imf RP17B f:1
| |
| FAILURE OF AUTO PHASE A ISOL - TRN-A FAILURE OF AUTO PHASE A ISOL - TRN-B (Can be manually actuated)
| |
| Event 11
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded imf CSCOHS7210A f:2
| |
|
| |
| ior ZLOHS7210A_GREEN f:1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1B AUTO/MAN
| |
| START FAILURE
| |
|
| |
| OVERRIDE CONTAINMENT SPRAY BUMP 1B SWITCH GREEN LIGHT ON
| |
| If dispatched to check pump or breaker report no obvious problem locally. Report in ~5 min.
| |
| Page 4 of 4 NRC09C
| |
| Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| If crew requrest transfer of 1A Spray
| |
| pump to Aux and
| |
| closing locally wait ~ 3 min and insert: Key-6 ior AN_OV_609 f:2 k:6 ior ZLOHS7210A_RED f:0 k:6 ior ZLOHS7210A_GREEN f:0 k:6
| |
| ior ZLOHS7210A_WHITE f:0 k:6
| |
| 6900V SD BD 1B-B XFER SW IN AUX MODE
| |
| CNTMT SPRAY PMP B MTR SW - RED OFF CNTMT SPRAY PMP B MTR SW - GRN OFF
| |
| CNTMT SPRAY PMP B MTR SW - WHT OFF
| |
| After inserting key-6, wait ~2 min and report the pump would not start after transfer to Aux Control.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 1 of 49
| |
| Event Description: 120 Volt Vital A/C Breaker to Lower Cntmnt Rad Monitor RM-90-106 Trips
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 1
| |
| Indications available: Alarm XA-55-1C, A-7 "120V AC VITAL PWR BD 1-I UV OR BKR TRIP" Alarm XA-55-12A, A-4 "1-RA-90-106A CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON HIGH RAD" Alarm XA-55-12A, A-5 "1-RA-90-106B CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON
| |
| GAS INSTR MALF" Alarm XA-55-12A, A-6 "1-RA-90-106C CNTMT BLDG LWR COMPT AIR MON PART INSTR MALF" Flow light Dark on RI-90-106A (M-12)
| |
| Evaluator Note: Primary response is contained in two Annunciator Response Procedures. One is for the Breaker trip the other is for the radiation monitor instrument malfunction. Applicable steps from each are listed below.
| |
| Crew Refer to Annunciator Response Procedures for Vital Board I
| |
| | |
| Breaker Trip.
| |
| BOP CREW Refer to Annunciator Response Procedures for Rad Monitor Gas or Particulate Instrument Malfunction.
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 2 of 49
| |
| Event Description: 120 Volt Vital A/C Breaker to Lower Cntmnt Rad Monitor RM-90-106 Trips
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation:
| |
| Action b. requires Action 27 of Table 3.3-6 item 2.b.i & ii. 3.4.6.1 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.
| |
| Action b. Applies. 3.4.6.2 RCS Leakage Operational Leakage:
| |
| N/A CREW
| |
| When Tech Spec Evaluation complete lead examiner may cue the next event.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 3 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Cntmnt Press Transmitter PT-30-44 Fails to 100%
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2
| |
| Indications available: Alarm XA-55-6B, A-6 "PDS-30-42-B/A CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE S.I. ACTUATE Alarm XA-55-6B A-7 "PDS-30-42A CONTAINMENT HI-HI PRESSURE STEAMLINE ISOL Indicator PDI-30-44 on M-6 Failed upscale Blue Light for S/G Level Adverse SP Prot Set II Lit on M-4 (XI-3-204) Alarm XA-55-3C, E-2 "STM GEN LEVEL ADVERSE SETPOINT
| |
| SR-I.05 O Implement actions of AOP
| |
| SRO ns are complete) (Tech Spec Evaluation will probably not be done until AOP
| |
| actio Action 11 from Table 3.3-1 item 14.D. Ap
| |
| plies Action 17 Applies from Table 3.3-3 ite
| |
| m 4.c & 4.c c.d.ii. Action 18 Applies from Table 3.3-3 items 2.c, 3.b.3, Action 38 Applies from Table 3.3-3 Items 6.c.i.d & 6.
| |
| Action 1 from Table 3.3-10 item 4 Ap
| |
| plies SRO (Go To Sectio
| |
| n 2.1)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 4 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Cntmnt Press Transmitter PT-30-44 Fails to 100%
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW (Appendix C is applicable)
| |
| When Tech Spec Evaluation is complete lead examiner may cue the next event.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 & 4 Page 5 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Plant Runback #3 HDTP A Trip, HDT Bypass vlv fail 60%, Control Rod Auto fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3
| |
| Indications available:
| |
| #3 Heater Drain Tank Pump A Trip: White light on associated handswitch HS-6-112A (M-2) and Buzzer Alarm XA-55-1B, E-4 "MOTOR OVERLOAD PANEL 1-M-1 THRU 1-M-6 Alarm XA-55-2C, B-7 "ZS-6-105A & B NO 3 HTR DR TK BYPASS TO COND
| |
| Runback: Alarm XA-55-2A, B-1 "TURBINE RUNBACK BOP Generator Megawatts decreasing
| |
| Auto Rod Failure: Megawatts decreasing with no rod insertion
| |
| Evaluator Note: Runback does not occur immediately when #3 HDT pump trips. Bypass valve failure will eventually result in reducing #3 HDT discharge flow to less than 5500 gpm as #3 HDT level decreases due to excessive bypass flow. The Runback will
| |
| be delayed 2-3 minutes from the time of the pump trip.
| |
| BOP Refer to AOP for motor trip out alarm
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct actions of AOP-S.04 Section 2.1
| |
| BOP BOP (RNO until Runback actually occurs))
| |
| (Skip c. until Runback occurs. Continue where noted below)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 & 4 Page 6 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Plant Runback #3 HDTP A Trip, HDT Bypass vlv fail 60%, Control Rod Auto fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Evaluator Note: Following 3 steps will not be performed until runback actually occurs.
| |
| BOP RO (Manual insertion required when runback occurs)
| |
| RO Evaluator Note: Continue at this step until runback occurs.
| |
| BOP BOP CREW BOP BOP CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 & 4 Page 7 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Plant Runback #3 HDTP A Trip, HDT Bypass vlv fail 60%, Control Rod Auto fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| W CRE (RNO) BO P R O SR O (SRO may address AOP-C.01 for the Auto Rod Failure at this time. AOP-C.01 performance not assumed for this scenario)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 & 4 Page 8 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Plant Runback #3 HDTP A Trip, HDT Bypass vlv fail 60%, Control Rod Auto fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| When Turbine controls have been restored and Steam Sump C-7 Interlock has been reset, lead examiner may cue the next event.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 9 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Steam Hdr Pressure Transmitter PT-1-33 Fails High
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5
| |
| Indications available: Alarm XA-55-3C, C-1 "PS-3-4 NO 1 FW HTR PRESSURE HI" Indicator PI-1-33 on M-4 Failed upscale. Main Feedwater Pump speed increasing
| |
| SRO Enter and direct performance of AOP-S.01, Section 2.2.
| |
| BOP (Main Feed Pump Speed will need to remain in manual for the
| |
| rest of the scenario)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 10 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Steam Hdr Pressure Transmitter PT-1-33 Fails High
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (MFP Trip not required)
| |
| BOP RO CREW SRO Lead Examiner may cue the next event when desired.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 11 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 6
| |
| Indications Available: Alarm XA-55-5A, D-2 "TS-68-328 PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE LINES
| |
| TEMP HIGH Safety Valve Acoustic Monitor indication increasing (~50%) XX-68-363A on M-4 Tailpipe temperature indicator TI-68-563 increasing on M-4 RCS Press decrease
| |
| SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-R.05.
| |
| SRO (Not Evaluated for this event)
| |
| SRO CREW SRO (Should Go To Section 2.1)
| |
| RO RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 12 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO RO RO BOP BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 13 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW (RNO) (RNO) (Step continued next Table Cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 14 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW (RNO) (Crew may elect to vent PRT during scenario to keep pressure
| |
| within normal range)
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 15 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW (RNO) (Step RNO Continued next Table Cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 16 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Pressurize Safety Valve Leak ~13 gpm
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW CREW Evaluator Note: Leak exceeds 10 gpm Tech Spec Limit therefore, Shutdown should be initiated. AOP-R.05 may be discontinued at this point and shutdown initiated. See Next Event Guide.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 17 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: No action required for this event.
| |
| Indications Available:
| |
| | |
| N/A Directed by procedure.
| |
| | |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may decide to shutdown using 0-GO-5 rather than AOP-C.03. If this is the case, a prompt from Operations Management should be provided that rapid shutdown should be performed using AOP-C.03.
| |
| S RO 3. Enter and direct performance of AOP-C.0
| |
| S RO CR EW BOP/RO B OP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 18 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO/RO (Due to previous runback, power is not at 100%, Boration volume may be around 500-600 gal for reduction from ~80% to 20% at 10 gal/%)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 19 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 20 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (Automatic Rod control not available due to earlier failure RNO
| |
| Required)
| |
| OR OR
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 21 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (Automatic MFP Speed Not available due to earlier failure.
| |
| RNO Required)
| |
| BOP RO SRO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 22 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO RO CREW SRO (RNO) SRO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 23 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Rapid Plant Shutdown Due to Small RCS Leak Using AOP-C.03
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW When sufficient load reduction has been completed, lead examiner may cue the
| |
| next event.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 24 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 8
| |
| Indications available: Safety Valve Acoustic Monitor indication Maximum (XX-68-363A on M-4) Pressurizer Pressure decreasing
| |
| SRO Direct Manual Rx Trip and Safety Injection.
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct Actions of E-0
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may Trip RCPs based on E-0 foldout page at any time during performance of E-0 when RCP Trip Criteria are met. If not addressed based on foldout page, RCPs should be stopped at step
| |
| 8 of E-0. (CRITICAL TASK 1)
| |
| Crew may manually initiate Phase A Containment Isolation during performance of E-0 as prudent action. If not initiated as prudent action, it will be initiated during performance of ES-0.5. (CRIITICAL
| |
| TASK 2). NOTE 1: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
| |
| NOTE 2: This procedure has
| |
| a foldout page.
| |
| RO BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 25 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP RO BOP (ES-0.5 at end of Scenario)
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 26 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP/RO Critical Task 1 RO (Critical Task - Trip RCPs based 1250 psi RCP Trip criteria
| |
| | |
| Prior to Exiting E-0)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 27 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO/BOP OR (If No Perform RNO)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 28 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RNO Required)
| |
| (Transition to E-1)
| |
| Evaluator Note: The primary procedure flowpath at this point should be E-1 to ECA-1.1 at step 15 of E-1. The Event Guide for this path
| |
| follows. Upon transition to E-1, Status Tree monitoring is in effect therefore, during the performance of E-1, crew may transition to FR-Z.1 based on containment pressure >2.8 psi. An event guide for the applicable portions of FR-Z.1 follows this event
| |
| | |
| guide for E-1 and ECA-1.1.
| |
| Also, During performance of E-1, ECA-1.1, or FR-Z.1, sump swapover conditions may occur (RWST <27%). The crew
| |
| should transition to ES-1.3. An event guide for the applicable portions of ES-1.3 follow the event guide for FR-Z.1. If ES-1.3 is implemented, the crew should transition to ECA-1.1 at
| |
| step 5. Whenever ECA-1.1 is entered, it allows for concurrent performance of FR-Z.1 with ECA-1.1 if required.
| |
| Evaluator Note: When Phase B occurs during E-0 or E-1, 1B-B Containment spray pump will fail to Auto start and will not manually start.
| |
| When the pump fails to start, crew should attempt to manually start it. This failure requires no other specific action
| |
| other than dispatching personnel to determine the problem as
| |
| time allows. This failure may be addressed during
| |
| performance of ES-0.5.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 29 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct Actions of E-1.
| |
| SRO (RCPs should already be stopped)
| |
| RO/BOP OR (RNO) (Step continued next table cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 30 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 31 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 32 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO/BOP (Based on crew specific timing criteria may or may not be met) (RNO if required)
| |
| OR (Pressure should still be decreasing slowly RNO required)
| |
| (Sub steps d. and e. included for information only)
| |
| RO (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 33 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RNO) BOP RO/BOP (RNO) RO/BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 34 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RNO) BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 35 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO OR (RNO) SRO Enter and direct actions of ECA-1.1
| |
| RO (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 36 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO RO (RNO) BOP RO RO RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8, 9, & 10 Page 37 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Przr SV Fails 100%, 1B-B RHR Pmp Trips, Both Trn Phase A Isol Auto Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 3 RO RO (RNO - Required # of Spray pumps should be 0. Running spray
| |
| pump 1A-A should be stopped)
| |
| (Critical Task: Stop Containment Spray Pumps prior to initiating RCS cooldown in ECA-1.1)
| |
| Lead Examiner may Terminate Scenario When Running Containment Spray Pump is shutdown in the preceding ECA-1.1 step.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # FR-Z.1 Page 38 of 49
| |
| Event Description: High Containment Pressure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| FR-Z.1 Actions
| |
| RO RO RO BOP (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # FR-Z.1 Page 39 of 49
| |
| Event Description: High Containment Pressure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RNO) RO RO RO (Phase A Failures should be previously addressed at this point)
| |
| RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # FR-Z.1 Page 40 of 49
| |
| Event Description: High Containment Pressure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO BOP BOP BOP OR (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # FR-Z.1 Page 41 of 49
| |
| Event Description: High Containment Pressure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (RNO as required)
| |
| (Steps c. thru e. as required)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # FR-Z.1 Page 42 of 49
| |
| Event Description: High Containment Pressure
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO RO (RNO) SRO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-1.3 Page 43 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Transfer To RHR Containment Sump
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| ES-1.3 Actions
| |
| RO RO (RNO) RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-1.3 Page 44 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Transfer To RHR Containment Sump
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO/SRO (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-0.5 Page 45 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| ES-0.5 Actions
| |
| VERIFY D/G ERCW supply valves OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:
| |
| Pump 1A-A (2A-A) Pump 1B-B (2B-B) Pump C-S.
| |
| BOP VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
| |
| MD AFW pumps TD AFW pump.
| |
| NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to control S/G levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted S/G.
| |
| BOP CHECK AFW valve alignment:
| |
| a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.
| |
| b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
| |
| c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400
| |
| and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-0.5 Page 46 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP VERIFY MFW Isolation:
| |
| MFW pumps TRIPPED MFW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controller outputs ZERO MFW isolation valves CLOSED
| |
| BOP MONITOR ECCS operation:
| |
| VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING: CCPs RHR pumps SI pumps
| |
| VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.
| |
| CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
| |
| VERIFY SI pump flow. CHECK RCS pressure less than 300 psig.
| |
| VERIFY RHR pump flow.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-0.5 Page 47 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 2 BOP VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
| |
| Phase A ACTUATED:
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, B5].
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, B6]. (RNO) Critical Task: Initiate at least one train of Phase A
| |
| Containment Isolation prior to completion of ES-0.1
| |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation ACTUATED:
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
| |
| Status monitor panels:
| |
| o 6C DARK o 6D DARK o 6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area
| |
| o 6H DARK o 6J LIT. Train A status panel 6K:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Train B status panel 6L:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-0.5 Page 48 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (RNO - 1B-B Cntmnt Spray Pmp will not start Auto or Manual)
| |
| (Step continued in next Table Cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # ES-0.5 Page 49 of 49
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP VERIFY pocket sump pumps STOPPED: [M-15, upper left
| |
| corner] HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump A HS-77-411, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.
| |
| BOP DISPATCH personnel to perform EA-0-1, Equipment Checks
| |
| Following ESF Actuation.
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility:
| |
| Sequoyah Scenario No.:
| |
| 3 Op Test No.:
| |
| NRC Examiners:
| |
| Operators:
| |
| Initial Conditions: 100% Power BOL 1A-A RHR Pump Out of Service. Turnover: Maintain Current Plant conditions. Target CTs: Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps based on 1250 psi RCP Trip Criteria prior to exiting E-0. Initiate at least one train of Phase A Containment isolation prior to completion of ES-0.5. Operate/Stop containment Spray pumps in accordance with ECA-1.1 to minimize RWST outflow prior to initiating RCS cooldown to cold shutdown in ECA-1.1. Event # Malf. No. Event Type*
| |
| Event Description
| |
| 1 ED120B1B 007 TS-SRO C-SRO 120 Vac Vital power breaker to lower Containment radiation monitor 1-RM-90-106 trips. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 2 CH01C TS-SRO I-SRO Containment pressure instrument fails high requiring implementation of AOP-I.05. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 3 HD03A HD06A C-SRO/BOP Number 3 Heater Drain Tank (HDT) pump A trips resulting in #3 HDT
| |
| bypass to condenser valve opening and sticking partially open resulting in plant runback. AOP-S.04 performance required including BOP reset of main turbine and steam dump controls.
| |
| 4 RD09 C-SRO/ATC Control Rods fail to move in Auto during plant runback. ATC manually controls rods to control RCS temperature. If time allows, SRO refers to
| |
| AOP-C.01.
| |
| 5 RX20 C-SRO/BOP Steam header pressure transmitter PT-1-33 fails high increasing MFP
| |
| speed and requiring manual control of MFP.
| |
| 6 TH04A C-SRO/ATC Pressurizer safety valve develops small leak (~13 gpm). Requires
| |
| performance of AOP-R.05 and manual control of charging. Leak also
| |
| requires rapid plant shutdown.
| |
| 7 N/A R-ATC N-SRO/BOP Perform rapid plant shutdown using AOP-C.03. Manual Rod control will
| |
| be required.
| |
| 8 TH04A M-All Leaking Pressurizer safety valve fails full open requiring Reactor Trip and
| |
| Safety Injection.
| |
| 9 RH01B C-SRO/ATC 1B-B RHR pump trips on start from SI. With 1B-B RHR pump out of
| |
| service containment sump recirculation capability is lost which eventually requires implementation of ECA-1.1.
| |
| 10 RP17A RP17B C-SRO/ATC Both trains of Phase A Containment Isolation fail to automatically actuate. Manual actuation of at least one train of isolation is required. * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Scenario 3 Summary
| |
| Crew will assume shift at 100% power BOL with the Train A RHR pump out of service for repairs. Crew directions will be to maintain current plant conditions.
| |
|
| |
| Shortly after assuming shift, 120 Vac vital power supply breaker to lower containment radiation monitor 1-RM-90-106 will trip. BOP should refer to annunciator response procedures and dispatch personnel to
| |
| check the power board and radiation monitor. SRO will evaluate Radiation monitoring and RCS leakage detection instrumentation Tech Specs.
| |
| After Tech Spec evaluation is complete, containment pressure instrument will fail high requiring implementation of AOP-I.05. SRO will evaluate and apply Reactor Trip, ESF and Post Accident Monitoring instrumentation Tech Specs.
| |
|
| |
| After AOP and Tech Spec Evaluation are complete, Number 3 Heater Drain Tank Pump A will trip. Increasing #3 Heater Tank level will result in bypass to condenser valve 1-LCV-6-105A opening which
| |
| sticks partially open eventually resulting in low #3 HDT level and reduced HDT return flow to the condensate system below the runback criteria. A BOP automatic plant runback will occu
| |
| r. During the runback, automatic rod insertion will not work requiring manual rod control for RCS Temperature control. Following the runback, AOP-S.04 will require resetting turbine controls and steam dump controls. If time allows prior to the next event SRO may begin implementation of AOP-C.01 which contains minimal actions that can be taken for this event.
| |
| | |
| When turbine and steam dump controls have been reset from the runback, Main Steam Header pressure transmitter PT-1-33 fails high. Speed of both Main Feedwater pumps will increase to attempt to increase D/P between Main Steam Header and Feedwater pressure. Manual control of MFW pump is required SRO
| |
| will implement AOP-S.01.
| |
|
| |
| When Main Feedwater pump speed and S/G levels are controlled, Pressurizer safety valve SV-68-563
| |
| develops a leak of ~13 gpm. Crew will diagnose t
| |
| he leak and enter AOP-R.05 fo
| |
| r RCS leakage. Charging
| |
| flow adjustments will be required and a leak rate estimate will be re
| |
| quired to determine that the leak exceeds Tech Spec limits and Rapid plant shutdown is required. Rapid plant shutdown will be initiated using AOP-C.03.
| |
| | |
| After the rapid shutdown has resulted in sufficient power reduction, the leaking Przr safety valve will fail full open requiring reactor trip and safety injection. RCS pressure will reach the 1250 psi Reactor Coolant pump trip criteria setpoint. At this point, timely RCP trip is required to complete the first critical task.
| |
| When SI is actuated, both trains of Phase A Containment Isolation fail to automatically actuate. Since the Pressurizer Relief Tank ruptures shortly after the SV fails open, at least one train of containment isolation is required to ensure leakage from the containment is minimized. Timely manual actuation of Phase A containment isolation (at least one train) is required to complete the second critical task.
| |
| Also, when Safety Injection is actuated the only operable RHR pump (1B-B) trips on overcurrent. With both RHR pumps unavailable transition to ECA-1.1 due to loss of containment sump recirculation capability will eventually be required. Depending on crew specific timing, they may progress through E-0, E-1, ES-1.1, FR-Z.1, ES-1.2, and ES-1.3 prior to transitioning to
| |
| ECA-1.1. In ECA-1.1, crew will ensure both containment spray pumps are stopped to conserve RWST inventory to complete the last critical task.
| |
|
| |
| The scenario may be terminated after Containment Spray pumps are shutdown as required in ECA-1.1.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Unit 1 MCR Checklist
| |
| (751-2428 ID 7636)
| |
| Part 1 - Completed by Off-going Shift / Reviewed by On-coming Shift
| |
| Mode 1, 100% Power 1204 MWe
| |
| PSA Risk: Green
| |
| Grid Risk: Green
| |
| | |
|
| |
| RCS Leakage ID .02 gpm, UNID .01 gpm
| |
| Cumulative Purge Time _50.5 Hours_
| |
| NRC phone Authentication
| |
| Code Until 0800 H3H8
| |
| After 0800 42DF
| |
| Common Tech Spec Actions U-1 Tech Spec Actions LCO 3.5.2 & 3.6.2.1 - 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform
| |
| motor winding test. Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| Protected Equipment 1B-B RHR Pump 1B-B Safety Injection Pump 1B-B Charging Pump
| |
|
| |
| Shift Priorities
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift
| |
| Verify your current qualifications
| |
| Review Operating Log since last held shift or 3
| |
| days, whichever is less
| |
| Standing Orders / Shift Orders
| |
| TACF Immediate required reading
| |
| LCO Actions
| |
| Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift
| |
| Walk down of MCR Control Boards
| |
|
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today MAIN CONTROL ROOM (7690) Train_A_Week
| |
| OUTSIDE (7666) [593-5214] AUXILIARY BUILDING (7775) 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform motor winding test.
| |
| Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| TURBINE BUILDING (7771) (593-8455)
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Equipment Off-Normal (Pink Tags) UNID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO / PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
| MCR WO List ID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO/PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
|
| |
| UNIT ONE REACTIVITY BRIEF
| |
| Date: Today Time: Now
| |
|
| |
| General Information
| |
| RCS Boron:
| |
| 1093 ppm Today
| |
| BA Controller Setpoint:
| |
| 27% * RCS B-10 Depletion:
| |
| 2 ppm Operable BAT:
| |
| A BAT A Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm BAT C Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm RWST Boron:
| |
| 2601 ppm Nominal Gallons per rod step from 219:
| |
| 7 gallons of acid,
| |
| 36 gallons of water
| |
| * Verify boric acid flow contro
| |
| ller is set at Adjusted BA Controller Setting iaw 0-SO-62-7 section 5.1
| |
| Estimated values for a 1° Change in Tave **
| |
| Gallons of acid:
| |
| 26 Gallons of water:
| |
| 138 Rod Steps: 4 Estimated rods/boron for emergency step power reduction ** (Assuming Xenon equilibrium and no reactivity effects due to Xenon. 2/3 total reactivity from rods, 1/3 from boron)
| |
| Power reduction amount
| |
| Estimated Final Rod Position
| |
| Estimated boron addition
| |
| 10% 198 Steps on bank D
| |
| 101 gallons
| |
| 30% 174 Steps on bank D
| |
| 295 gallons
| |
| 50% 152 Steps on bank D
| |
| 485 gallons
| |
| ** These values are approximations and not int
| |
| ended nor expected to be exact. The values may be
| |
| superseded by Rx Engineering or SO-62-7 calculated
| |
| values. These values are calculated assuming 100%
| |
| steady state power operation onl
| |
| y. Engineering data last updated one week ago. Data Valid until one week from now. Previous Shift Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0***
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total amount diluted: 0
| |
| Total amount borated: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 IN/Out
| |
| Current Shift Estimated Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total expected dilution: 0
| |
| Total expected boration: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 In/Out
| |
| Remarks: Rx Power - 100% MWD/MTU - 1000 Xenon & Samarium at Equilibrium
| |
| ***The boron letdown curve is flat for the next 25 EFPD.
| |
| Next Unit 1 Flux Map is scheduled -
| |
| three weeks from now
| |
| Unit 1 M-P is 0 PPM
| |
| Unit Supervisor: _______________________________
| |
| Name/Date
| |
| Operations Chemistry Information
| |
| Boron Results
| |
| Sample Point
| |
| Units Boron Date / Time
| |
| Goal Limit U1 RCS ppm 1093 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 816 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 RWST ppm 2601 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| U2 RWST ppm 2569 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| BAT A ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2556 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2575 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2591 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2589 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2531 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2650 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2522 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2526 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool
| |
| ppm 2547 Today / Now
| |
| > 2050 > 2000 Lithium Results
| |
| Goal Midpoint U1 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 1.1 Today / Now
| |
| >1 >1 U2 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 2.43 Today / Now
| |
| 2.18-2.48
| |
| 2.33 Primary to Secondary Leakrate In
| |
| formation (Total CPM RM-90-99/119)
| |
| Indicator
| |
| Units U1 Date / Time
| |
| U2 Date/Time
| |
| SI 50 S/G Leakage?
| |
| Yes/No No Today / Now
| |
| No Today / Now
| |
| SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate
| |
| gpd < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| 5 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 380 Today / Now
| |
| 68 Today / Now
| |
| 30 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 1980 Today / Now
| |
| 83 Today / Now
| |
| 50 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 3250 Today / Now
| |
| 206 Today / Now
| |
| 75 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 4850 Today / Now
| |
| 455 Today / Now
| |
| CVE Air Inleakage
| |
| cfm 10 Today / Now
| |
| 12.5 Today / Now
| |
| Bkgd on 99/119
| |
| cpm 50 Today / Now
| |
| 40 Today / Now
| |
| Correction Factor 99/119
| |
| cpm/gpd 10.69 Today / Now
| |
| 14.13 Today / Now
| |
| Steady state conditions are necessary for an accurate det
| |
| ermination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor
| |
|
| |
| BORON.txt 0[REACTF-VERS SQ2.1]BORATION/DILUTION CALCULATION
| |
| SEQUOYAH UNIT 1 CYCLE 16 RCS AVG TEMP 578.2 DEG F RCS PRESSURE 2235.0 PSIG PZR LEVEL 60.0%MAKEUP WTR CONC.0 PPM BORIC ACID CONC 6820.0 PPM INITIAL CONC FINAL BORIC ACID MAKEUP WTR BORON CONC CHANGE BORON CONC ADDITION ADDITION (PPM)(PPM)(PPM)(GAL)(GAL)----------
| |
| ----------------
| |
| ----------
| |
| ----------
| |
| 1093.0 17.3 1110.3 191.8.0 0 page 1
| |
| Page 1 of 3 NRC09D Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
| Sim. Setup
| |
| Reset IC- 16 Perform switch check. Allow the
| |
| simulator to run for at least 3 minutes before loading SCEN file
| |
| or starting the exercise. This will
| |
| initialize ICS.
| |
| | |
|
| |
| Load SCENS: NRC09D
| |
| Place simulator in RUN.
| |
| Place OOS equipment in required
| |
| position with tags. Clear alarms. Initialize simulator at
| |
| 100 % RTP BOL
| |
| Place Mode
| |
| 1 placard on panels.
| |
| Place A Train Week sign on the simulator
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded imf RH01A f:1
| |
| ior ZLOHS7410A_GREEN f:0 1A-A RHR PUMP INOPERABLE.
| |
| | |
| PLACE 1A-A RHR PUMP HS IN PTL AND TAG WITH HOLD ORDER.
| |
| Place Protected equipment tags on B Train
| |
| RHR Pump, SI Pump, and CCP.
| |
| Event 1 Initiate Unit Shutdown for Main Gen H2 Leak Repair.
| |
| Event 2
| |
| When sufficient Load
| |
| decrease complete as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-1 imf CC10A f:1 k:1
| |
| CCS PUMP A OVERCURRENT TRIP
| |
| If personnel dispatched to motor report motor hot to the touch and burned electrical insulation odor. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| | |
| If dispatched to Breaker, report Overcurrent Trip. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 3
| |
| when CCS AOP and
| |
| Tech Spec Eval complete complete as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert:
| |
| Key-2 imf RC05 f:50 k:2
| |
| | |
| 1-FCV-68-334
| |
| PRZR PORV FAILS 50% OPEN
| |
|
| |
| Page 2 of 3 NRC09D Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| If Dispatched
| |
| to remove power from 1-FCV-68-333 use Key-3 irf RCR04 f:0 k:3
| |
| PRZ PORV BLOCK VLV FCV-68-333 PWR
| |
| REMOVAL When Dispatched to remove power from PORV Block Valve 1-FCV-68-333, wait ~ 5 min, insert
| |
| remote function, and report to crew.
| |
| Event 4
| |
| When PORV AOP
| |
| and TS Eval complete complete
| |
| as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-4 imf CV09 f:1 k:4
| |
| VCT LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS HIGH; 130-A (Letdown is diverted to HUT can be manually re-aligned to VCT)
| |
| If dispatched to check LI-62-129C in ACR report normal. If value requested report same as indicator on M-6 (Use camera to determine
| |
| value). Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| If dispatched to check LI-62-130 Locally (Panel
| |
| L-268) report 100%. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 5
| |
| When Letdown re-aligned to VCT complete as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-5 imf FW05A f:1 k:5 TURBINE DRIVEN FEED PUMP A TRIP (lo Oil Pressure)
| |
| If dispatched to check the pump report significant oil line leak locally. If oil pumps (normal and DC emergency) are stopped the
| |
| leak will decrease to trickle. Modify report accordingly. Report in ~ 3 min.
| |
|
| |
| Role play as Fire OPS personnel and contain
| |
| the spill as required.
| |
|
| |
| Role play as Envoirnmental if contacted to evaluate the spill.
| |
| Event 6
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded imf FW10 f:1 TURBINE AFW PUMP AUTO-START FAILURE (Will manually start)
| |
|
| |
| Page 3 of 3 NRC09D
| |
| Rev 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS
| |
| ELAP. TIME IC/MF/RF/OR # DESCRIPTION
| |
|
| |
| Event 7 When Turb control Restoration I/P (AOP-S.01) as Directed by Lead
| |
| Examiner insert: Key-6 imf MS02A F:100 k:6
| |
| imf MS02B F:100 k:6
| |
| imf MS02C F:100 k:6
| |
| imf MS02D F:100 k:6 MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK Outside Cntmt on
| |
| | |
| S/G # 1, 2, 3, & 4 (Note: Simulator Models limit Max individual S/G Break size. These 4 breaks
| |
| are comparable to a 20% Design Basis S/L Break and therefore will be reported to the crew as a
| |
| single break on S/G #1).
| |
| If dispatched to look for steam leak report large volume of steam coming from west valve vault room. MSIV closure will isolate the leak therefore, modify report as required based on
| |
| MSIV status. Report in ~ 5 min.
| |
| Event 7 (Cont'd)
| |
| Active when SCENS loaded IMF RP16K616A F:1 IMF RP16K616B F:1 IMF RP16K623A F:1 IMF RP16K623B F:1 Tr A Main Stm Isol signal to FCV-1-4/11 Fails
| |
| Tr B Main Stm Isol signal to FCV-1-4/11 Fails Tr A Main Stm Isol signal to FCV-1-22/29 Fails Tr B Main Stm Isol signal to FCV-1-22/29 Fails
| |
| (All four MSIV do not receive an Auto main steam isolation signal requiring manual closure.)
| |
| Event 8
| |
| Event Trigger 10 sec
| |
| after SI imf EG02A f:1 e:2 d:10
| |
| DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP DG 1A-A - (D/G Differential Trip 10 Sec after SI)
| |
| | |
| If dispatched to check D/G report Gen Differential Relay actuation. Report in ~ 10
| |
| min. Event 9
| |
| When crew starts checking SI
| |
| termination criteria in
| |
| E-0 as Directed by Lead Examiner insert: Key-7 imf ED01 f:1 k:7 TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
| |
|
| |
| Report Grid disturbance from load dispatcher time to recover not yet known. Call and report
| |
| in ~ 5 min.
| |
| If Unit 2 Status Requested, Unit 2 is tripped
| |
| and stable, both 6.9 Kv Shutdown Boards are energized from D/Gs, no other problems at this time. Event 10
| |
| Active when SCENS
| |
| loaded imf EG12B f:1
| |
| | |
| DG 1B-B BREAKER 1914 AUTO CLOSE
| |
| | |
| FAILURE
| |
| (Bkr can be manually closed with Bkr switch after placing D/G 1B-B Synchronize switch in "SYNC" position at panel M-26)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 1 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator:
| |
| No action required for Event 1
| |
| Indications available: None: Crew will initiate power reduction IAW 0-GO-5 Section 5.3.
| |
| SRO Direct a load reduction in accordance with 0-GO-5 Normal Power Operations, Section 5.3, and 0-SO-62-7 Boron
| |
| Concentration Control, Section 6.4.
| |
| Evaluator Note:
| |
| Following Steps are from 0-SO-62-7
| |
| Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.4
| |
| CAUTION: Returning the Boric Acid Blender to service after unplugging, cleaning, or maintenance on Boric Acid System could introduce debris, sludge, air or solidified boron
| |
| into CCP suction resulting in pump damage. Extreme care must be exercised to properly flush the Boric Acid piping following an outage.
| |
| NOTE: If a large amount of boration is required (plant shutdown), pzr heaters should be energized to cause spray operation for equalizing boron concentration in RCS and pressurizer.
| |
| RO ENSURE makeup system aligned for
| |
| AUTO operation in accordance with Section 5.1.
| |
| NOTE Steps 2 and 3 are
| |
| N/A for minor power changes OR if immediate boration is required to maintain shutdown margin, to maintain rods above the insertion limit, during an emergency shutdown (AOP-C.03), during recovery of a dropped/misaligned rod (AOP-C.01), or at Chemistry recommendation in mode 3, 4, 5 or 6.
| |
| RO RECORD the quantity of boric acid required to achieve desired boron concentration using Appendix D.
| |
| | |
| ___________ gals
| |
| Crew PERFORM Appendix I Independent Verification of Calculation for Amount of Boric Acid or Primary Water. (N/A if App. D was performed by SRO to verify data from Rx Engineering)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 2 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO DETERMINE available boric acid volume in in-service BAT.
| |
| ___________ gals
| |
| RO PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid to Blender Flow Control
| |
| Switch to the
| |
| STOP position.
| |
| RO PLACE [HS-62-140B], CVCS Makeup Selector Switch to the BORATE position.
| |
| RO ADJUST [FC-62-139], Boric Acid Flow Controller to the desired flow rate.
| |
| RO SET [FQ-62-139], Batch Integrator to the desired quantity.
| |
| RO PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid to Blender Flow Control
| |
| Switch to the
| |
| START position.
| |
| RO ENSURE Boric Acid Pump aligned to blender in FAST speed
| |
| by right red light
| |
| LIT on [HS-62-230A] OR [HS-62-232A]. NOTE Flow oscillations and/or erratic controller response may require manual operation of
| |
| Boric Acid Flow Controller
| |
| [FC-62-139] until stable conditions exist.
| |
| RO VERIFY Boric Acid Flow established.
| |
| NOTE It may take approximately 15 minutes before any changes to reactivity are indicated on
| |
| nuclear instrumentation or RCS temperature indication.
| |
| RO IF reactor is critical, THEN MONITOR nuclear instrumentation and reactor coolant temperature to ensure proper response
| |
| | |
| from boration.
| |
| NOTE BAT operability limits are prescribed by TRM 3.1.2.6 (Modes 1-3) or 3.1.2.5 (Modes 4-6).
| |
| RO MONITOR Boric Acid Storage Tank level.
| |
| RO IF Volume Control Tank level increases to 63 percent, THEN ENSURE [LCV-62-118], Volume Control Tank Divert
| |
| Valve OPENS to divert excess water to the Holdup Tank.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 3 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| NOTE Sample may be obtained at normal RCS sample intervals provided the unit is at power
| |
| and the unit response following the boration is as expected.
| |
| RO WHEN boration is complete, THEN PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid to Blender Flow
| |
| Control Switch to the
| |
| STOP position. CHECK no primary water flow on either
| |
| [FI-62-142A] OR [FQ-62-142]. ENSURE [FC-62-142], Primary Water to Blender Flow Controller is in
| |
| AUTO position and the potentiometer (dial indicator) is set at 35%. ADJUST [FC-62-139], Boric Acid Flow Controller to the desired blend solution in accordance with TI-44 Boron
| |
| Tables. ENSURE [FCV-62-128]
| |
| is CLOSED. PLACE [HS-62-140B], CVCS Makeup Selector Switch
| |
| to the AUTO position. PLACE [HS-62-140A], Boric Acid to Blender Flow
| |
| Control Switch to the
| |
| START position.
| |
| IF RCS boron sample required, THEN NOTIFY Chem Lab to
| |
| obtain RCS boron sample.
| |
| NOTE Boration is done in batches until the total boron and/or power change is completed.
| |
| RO REPEAT this section as required to complete total boron
| |
| change. RO WHEN total boration is complete, THEN: REALIGN the blender controls for AUTO makeup to the CVCS in accordance with Section 5.1.
| |
| NOTIFY Chem Lab to obtain RCS boron sample.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 4 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| US IF in modes 1, 2, or 3, THEN ENSURE
| |
| requirements of TRM 3.1.2.6 are met.
| |
| Evaluator Note:
| |
| Following Steps are from 0-GO-5, Normal Power Operation, Section 5.3 Beginning at Notes prior to step 7. NOTES 1) Guidance on restoration of EHC Controls after a BOP runback is contained in Appendix B, Turbine Runback Restoration. 2) For core operating recommendations for situations such as end of core life coast down or unusual power maneuvers, contact Reactor Engineering for guidance.
| |
| 3) It is recommended that AFD be controlled within the target band.
| |
| | |
| 4) The following general approach should be used during power reduction: (a) borate RCS to reduce RCS TAVG within limits of TREF, (b) reduce turbine load to match TREF with TAVG (c) periodically take rod control to MANUAL from AUTO and insert the bank to move AFD near the target value, (d) return rod control to AUTO when not using the bank to control AFD, and (e) repeat the above as necessary to accomplish the load change.
| |
| 5) Actions effecting reactivity are directed in the following step. 0-SO-62-7 requirements shall be adhered to for reactivity changes (i.e. reactivity balance, amounts of boric acid or water). All appropriate verifications and peer checks shall be utilized during
| |
| performance.
| |
| BOP INITIATE a load reduction.
| |
| BOP MONITOR turbine load decreasing.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 5 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| MONITOR MFP discharge pressure:
| |
| DETERMINE MFP D/P Program setpoint using Appendix A.
| |
| IF auto control of any MFWP controller is
| |
| NOT functional, THEN ADJUST MFWP speed as necessary to maintain MFWP A and B flow/speed approximately matched USING one of the following:
| |
| MFWP speed controller in MANUAL OR Gov Vlv Positioner
| |
| USING 1, 2-SO-2/3-1, Sect 8.6.
| |
| CAUTION Do NOT exceed a load change rate of plus or minus 5%/minute or a step change of 10% NOTE TAVG is programmed from 578.2°F at 100% power to 547°F at zero power at a rate of
| |
| | |
| 0.312°F per % power.
| |
| Crew MONITOR the following during the load reduction:
| |
| TAVG following TREF program.
| |
| All RPIs, group step counters for rod insertion limits and inoperable rods or rod misalignment, Loop T, and NIS for correct power distribution and quadrant power tilts.
| |
|
| |
| Core AFD within ~5% control band around the power level dependent target value.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 6 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Decrease Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| NOTE Valve position limit and governor control meter are displayed on EHC Display panel 1, 2-XX-047-2000 (M-2).
| |
| BOP Valve position limit approximately 10% above the current governor control indication as turbine load is changed.
| |
| When power has been decreased sufficiently lead examiner may cue the next
| |
| event at his discretion.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 7 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 1A-A Component Cooling Water Pump Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 2
| |
| Indications available: 0-AR-M27-B-A, A1, CCS REAC BLDG SUPPLY HEADER FLOW LOW 0-AR-M27-B-A, E4, ERCW/CCS PUMP MOTOR TRIP
| |
| Crew Responds to alarm response procedure(s)
| |
| SRO Enter AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water
| |
| SRO (Tech Spec Evaluation will most likely not be performed until AOP actions are complete)
| |
| N/A N/A N/A Action already in effect at turnover due to 1A-A RHR pump
| |
| out of service.
| |
| N/A Tech Spec Evaluation continued in next table Cell)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 8 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 1A-A Component Cooling Water Pump Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| (Tech Spec Evaluation - Continued)
| |
| N/A Action already in effect at turnover due to 1A-A RHR pump
| |
| out of service.
| |
| 72 hour Action Applies
| |
| SRO Determine section 2.1 applies (CCS Pump Trip or Failure) from
| |
| | |
| table, CAUTION: The Containment Spray Pumps may experience bearing failure after 10 minutes of loss
| |
| | |
| of CCS cooling.
| |
| NOTE 1: When the associated TRAIN of CCS is out of service the CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps are INOPERABLE for ECCS purposes due to not being able to fulfill its design function for sump recirculation. LCOs 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.6.2.1, 3.7.3 should be evaluated
| |
| and appropriately entered by the SRO.
| |
| NOTE 2: When CCS is out of service to mechanical seal HXs ONLY, the affected CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps have been evaluated to be OPERABLE and AVAILABLE. These pumps can run indefinitely without CCS cooling water to mechanical seal HXs
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 9 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 1A-A Component Cooling Water Pump Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP ENSURE the following pump that is currently aligned to B Train RUNNING: C-S CCS Pump
| |
| OR 1B-B CCS Pump
| |
| OR 2B-B CCS Pump (Determines that the C-S Pump is aligned to the B train header)
| |
| SRO Go to Step 10
| |
| BOP IDENTIFY and LOCK OUT failed CCS Pump.
| |
| | |
| CAUTIONS: Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP motor, requires RCP be stopped within two (2) minutes. Containment Spray Pumps may experience bearing failure during operation after 10 minutes of loss of CCS cooling.
| |
| NOTE 1: When the associated TRAIN of CCS is out of service the CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps are INOPERABLE for ECCS purposes due to not being able to fulfill its design function for sump recirculation. LCOs 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.6.2.1, 3.7.3 should be evaluated
| |
| and appropriately entered by the SRO.
| |
| NOTE 2: When CCS is out of service to mechanical seal HXs ONLY, the affected CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR Pumps have been evaluated to be OPERABLE and AVAILABLE. These pumps can run indefinitely without CCS cooling water to mechanical seal HXs
| |
| BOP ENSURE affected Unit's standby CCS Pump (aligned to Train
| |
| A) RUNNING.
| |
| BOP CHECK Train A CCS Heat Exchanger inlet pressure NORMAL for present plant conditions.
| |
| [1-PI-70-24A, 1A1/1A2 CCS HX] [2-PI-70-17A, 2A1/2A2 CCS HX] Between 87 psig and 110 psig (Determines pressure approximately 105 psig)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 10 of 35
| |
| Event Description: 1A-A Component Cooling Water Pump Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| SRO Go to Procedure and step in effect (Tech Spec Evaluation will likely occur at this point)
| |
| When directed to go to appropriate plant procedure and Tech Spec Evaluation complete, Lead Examiner may cue the next event
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 11 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Pressurizer PORV Fails ~50% Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 3
| |
| Indications available: Alarm XA-55-5C, B-6, "XS-68-363 PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE OPEN" Alarm XA-55-5A, E2, "PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF LINE TEMP HIGH" PORV 334 position indication extinguished Acoustic monitors on M4 indicate flow
| |
| RO Take immediate/prudent action to close PORV Block Valve. May also attempt to close the open PORV as well.
| |
| RO Refer to actions in Annunciator Response Procedure for XA-55-5C, B-6
| |
| Evaluator Note: SRO may only refer to the AOP-R.05 since the RCS leak is isolated when PORV Block Valve is closed. AOP-R.05 is not included in this Event Guide.
| |
| SRO Direct performance of AOP-I.04 Section 2.1. "Uncontrolled RCS
| |
| pressure drop due to open PORV in Modes 1-3"
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 12 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Pressurizer PORV Fails ~50% Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO (RNO if not previously performed)
| |
| RO RO RO SRO SRO Action may be applicable for a short time if RCS pressure drop to
| |
| | |
| less than 2205 psig before the PORV is isolated.
| |
| Action b applies and requires PORV restored or Block valve closed
| |
| and Power removed within 1 hour.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 13 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Pressurizer PORV Fails ~50% Open
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CREW (Section 8.3 contains instructions for removing power from Block Valve))
| |
| RO CREW SRO When Tech Evaluation Complete, Lead Examiner may cue the next event at their
| |
| discretion.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 14 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Volume Control Tank Level Transmitter LT-62-130 Fails High
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4
| |
| Indications available: Alarm XA-55-6C, A-3, "LS-62-129A/B VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL HI-
| |
| LOW" 1-LT-62-130 Indication failing high (ICS or M-6 Trend Recorder)
| |
| RO Refer to and perform applicable portions of Annunciator Response
| |
| Procedure.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Several steps, notes, and cautions in the Annunciator response procedure do not apply to this failure. Only those that are applicable are listed in this
| |
| | |
| event guide.
| |
| RO RO Lead Examiner may cue the next event when desired.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 & 6 Page 15 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Main Feedwater Pump 1A Trips, Turbine Driven AFW Pump
| |
| Fails to Auto Start
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5
| |
| Indications Available: Alarm XA-55-3B, A-2 "TRIPPED" Alarm XA-55-3B, A-2 "MFPT A OIL PRESSURE LOW Green Light on MFPT A Reset/Trip Switch HS-46-9A (M-3) Main Turbine Runback Initiated (Megawatts Decreasing)
| |
| SRO Enter and direct actions of AOP-S.01, Section 2.3
| |
| BOP RO BOP BOP (If TDAFW Pump not started previously as prudent action it should be started at this step)
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 & 6 Page 16 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Main Feedwater Pump 1A Trips, Turbine Driven AFW Pump
| |
| Fails to Auto Start
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP CREW RO RO (RNO if required)
| |
| CREW CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 & 6 Page 17 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Main Feedwater Pump 1A Trips, Turbine Driven AFW Pump
| |
| Fails to Auto Start
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| B OP B OP When Lead Examiner may cue the next event at their discretion.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 18 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 7
| |
| Indications Available: Automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection (Within a few seconds) 1 st Out Alarm XA-55-4D, F-1 "STEAM LINE LO PRESS SI REACTOR TRIP" All S/G Pressures Dropping uncontrolled All MSIVs Open (Red Light on Handswitch) with "STEAM LINE LO PRESS SI REACTOR TRIP" Alarm actuated.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may close MSIVs based on E-0 foldout page at any time during
| |
| performance of E-0.
| |
| | |
| Evaluator Note: D/G failure occurs ~10 seconds after Safety Injection occurs. Crew will likely address this failure when the Immediate Actions are complete.
| |
| SRO Enter and Direct Actions of E-0, "Reactor Trip Or Safety
| |
| Injection"
| |
| NOTE 1: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps.
| |
| NOTE 2: This procedure has
| |
| a foldout page.
| |
| RO BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 19 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP RO BOP (ES-0.5 at end of Scenario)
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 20 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL TASK 1 BOP/RO (MSIVs will be closed if not previously performed) (Critical Task - Manually close all 4 MSIVs prior to transition to
| |
| ECA-2.1) RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 21 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO/BOP (If No Perform RNO)
| |
| RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 22 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP (Transition to E-2 should not be required if MSIVs have been
| |
| closed) BOP RO/BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 23 of 35
| |
| Event Description: SteamLine Brk Outside Cntmnt & Auto Close Fail of All MSIVs, D/G 1A-A Trip
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Evaluator Note:
| |
| The next Event should be initiated during
| |
| performance of the next step.
| |
| CREW OR Lead Examiner should Cue the next event prior to Entry into ES-1.1
| |
| | |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 & 10 Page 24 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss of Offsite Power, 1B-B D/G Supply Bkr to Shutdown BD Auto Close Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 9
| |
| Indications available: Loss of Offsite Power: Numerous alarms, buzzers, and white disagreement lights on component switches and switchyard breakers. Numerous Electrical board Voltages indicate 0 volts including the Shutdown Boards and Unit boards. (Battery supplied AC & DC boards will be energized) D/G 1B-B SD Board Supply Breaker Auto Close Failure: O Volts on 1B-B Shutdown Board Voltage Indicator EI-57-66 on M-1 D/G 1B-B Breaker 1914 Mimic on M-1 and Handswitch on M-26 green light. 1B-B Shutdown board load breaker mimic on M-1 red lights indicating no board differential operation.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Event guide assumes crew will enter ECA-0.0 to close D/G 1B-B supply breaker to SD BD 1B-B. Crew may perform this as Prudent action in which case ECA-0.0 is not required.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Scenario should be terminated when D/G Supply breaker to 1B-B SD Board is closed and board is energized.
| |
| Evaluator Note: Crew may designate and operator to perform AOP-P.01 for Loss of Offsite Power Reader Doer method. A partial Event Guide for AOP-P.01 is included at the end of the scenario event guide if needed.
| |
| CREW Diagnose Loss of Offsite power and both SD BDs De-
| |
| Energized.
| |
| SRO Enter and direct action of ECA-0.0
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 & 10 Page 25 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss of Offsite Power, 1B-B D/G Supply Bkr to Shutdown BD Auto Close Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO BOP RO CREW
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 & 10 Page 26 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss of Offsite Power, 1B-B D/G Supply Bkr to Shutdown BD Auto Close Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 & 10 Page 27 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss of Offsite Power, 1B-B D/G Supply Bkr to Shutdown BD Auto Close Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 & 10 Page 28 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss of Offsite Power, 1B-B D/G Supply Bkr to Shutdown BD Auto Close Fail
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| CRITICAL STEP 2 BOP (Steps a. & b. may not be performed since 1A-A D/G has
| |
| differential fault and 1B-B D/G is already running)
| |
| (RNO Required)
| |
| (Critical Task: Energize SD BD 1B-B from D/G 1B-B prior to
| |
| placing equipment in PTL in ECA-0.0)
| |
| TERMINATE SCENARIO WHEN D/G 1B-B SUPPLY BREAKER TO SD BD
| |
| 1B-B IS CLOSED.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ES-0.5 Page 29 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| ES-0.5 Actions
| |
| VERIFY D/G ERCW supply valves OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY at least four ERCW pumps RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY CCS pumps RUNNING:
| |
| Pump 1A-A (2A-A) Pump 1B-B (2B-B) Pump C-S. (1A-A CCS Pump will not be running due to earlier failure in the
| |
| scenario)
| |
| BOP VERIFY EGTS fans RUNNING.
| |
| BOP VERIFY generator breakers OPEN.
| |
| BOP VERIFY AFW pumps RUNNING:
| |
| MD AFW pumps TD AFW pump.
| |
| NOTE AFW level control valves should NOT be repositioned if manual action has been taken to
| |
| control S/G levels, to establish flow due to failure, or to isolate a faulted S/G.
| |
| BOP CHECK AFW valve alignment:
| |
| a. VERIFY MD AFW LCVs in AUTO.
| |
| b. VERIFY TD AFW LCVs OPEN.
| |
| c. VERIFY MD AFW pump recirculation valves FCV-3-400
| |
| and FCV-3-401 CLOSED.
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ES-0.5 Page 30 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP VERIFY MFW Isolation:
| |
| MFW pumps TRIPPED MFW regulating valves CLOSED MFW regulating bypass valve controller outputs ZERO MFW isolation valves CLOSED
| |
| BOP MONITOR ECCS operation:
| |
| VERIFY ECCS pumps RUNNING: CCPs RHR pumps SI pumps
| |
| VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.
| |
| CHECK RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.
| |
| VERIFY SI pump flow. CHECK RCS pressure less than 300 psig.
| |
| VERIFY RHR pump flow.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ES-0.5 Page 31 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP VERIFY ESF systems ALIGNED:
| |
| Phase A ACTUATED:
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, B5].
| |
| o PHASE A TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, B6].
| |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation ACTUATED:
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN A alarm LIT [M-6C, C5].
| |
| o CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION TRAIN B alarm LIT [M-6C, C6].
| |
| Status monitor panels:
| |
| o 6C DARK o 6D DARK o 6E LIT OUTSIDE outlined area
| |
| o 6H DARK o 6J LIT. Train A status panel 6K:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
| Train B status panel 6L:
| |
| o CNTMT VENT GREEN
| |
| o PHASE A GREEN
| |
|
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # ES-0.5 Page 32 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Equipment Verifications
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP VERIFY pocket sump pumps STOPPED: [M-15, upper left
| |
| corner] HS-77-410, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump A HS-77-411, Rx Bldg Aux Floor and Equipment Drain Sump pump B.
| |
| BOP DISPATCH personnel to perform EA-0-1, Equipment Checks
| |
| Following ESF Actuation.
| |
| BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # AOP-P.01 Page 33 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss Of Offsite Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| AOP-P.01 Actions
| |
| BOP (RNO) (May attempt to close 1B-B D/G BKR to SD BD 1B-1 at this
| |
| step) BOP BOP BOP (RNO)
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # AOP-P.01 Page 34 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss Of Offsite Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| BOP BOP BOP
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| Required Operator Actions
| |
| Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # AOP-P.01 Page 35 of 35
| |
| Event Description: Loss Of Offsite Power
| |
| Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
| |
| RO
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility:
| |
| Sequoyah Scenario No.:
| |
| 4 Op Test No.:
| |
| NRC Examiners:
| |
| Operators:
| |
| Initial Conditions: 100% Power BOL Equilibrium
| |
| 1A-A RHR Pump Out of Service Turnover: Unit 1 main Generator has developed a small H2 leak which cannot be repaired on line. Management has decided to shutdown the Unit to make repairs. Shutdown the Unit using 0-GO-5 over the next 8 hours. Target CTs: Manually Close all 4 Main Steam Isolation Valves prior to transition to ECA-2.1.
| |
| Energize Shutdown board 1B-B from D/G 1B-B from prior to placing equipment in PTL in
| |
| ECA-0.0. Event # Malf. No. Event Type*
| |
| Event Description
| |
| 1 N/A R-ATC N-SRO/BOP Decrease power.
| |
| 2 CC10A TS-SRO C-SRO 1A-A CCS Pump trips. AOP-M.03 implemented. SRO Tech spec Evaluation.
| |
| 3 RC05 TS-SRO C-SRO/ATC Pressurizer PORV fails ~50% open requiring Block valve closure. AOP-I.04 implemented. SRO Tech Spec Evaluation.
| |
| 4 CV09 C-SRO/ATC Volume control Tank level transmitter fails High. Letdown is diverted to HUT. Manually re-align to VCT.
| |
| 5 FW05A C-SRO Main Feedwater Pump 1A trips on low oil pressure. Auto plant runback is initiated. AOP-S.01 is implemented.
| |
| 6 FW10 C-SRO/BOP Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump fails to Auto Start during runback. Requires manual start.
| |
| 7 MS02A MS02B MS02C
| |
| MS02D RP16K616A
| |
| | |
| RP16K616B
| |
| RP16K623A
| |
| RP16K623B
| |
| M-All Steam Line break outside containment downstream of MSIVs requiring Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. Manual isolation required due to auto failure of all 4 MSIVs.
| |
| 8 EG02A N/A D/G 1A-A Generator Differential Trip 10 Sec after SI.
| |
| 9 ED01 C-SRO/BOP Loss off Offsite Power.
| |
| 10 EG12B C-SRO/BOP 1B-B D/G Breaker to Shutdown board 1B-B fails to auto close (Can be manually closed) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline
| |
| Form ES-D-1
| |
| Scenario 4 Summary
| |
| Crew will assume shift at 100% power BOL with the 1A-A RHR pump out of se
| |
| rvice for repairs. Crew directions will be to shutdown the Unit using 0-GO-5 over the next 8 hours. Unit 1 main Generator has developed a small H2 leak which cannot be repaired on line. Management has decided to shutdown the
| |
| Unit.
| |
| When adequate power decrease is complete, Component Cooling water pump 1A-A will trip and the standby pump will auto start. SRO will implement AOP-M.03 and evaluate Tech Specs.
| |
| When AOP-M.03 and Tech Spec Evaluation complete, Pressurizer PORV FCV-68-334 fails ~50% open. PORV block valve should be closed as an immediate action and AOP-I.04 implemented. SRO will evaluate Tech Specs and should identify that power is to be removed from the block valve in accordance with Tech
| |
| Specs. When AOP I.04 and Tech Spec Evaluation complete, Volume Control Tank level instrument LT-62-130A fails High which causes letdown to divert to the Holdup tank. ATC should refer to the Annunciator response procedure and manually realign letdown to the VCT. This instrument does not have an indicator in the main control room, however, indication is available on the plant computer system (ICS) and locally.
| |
| Following realignment of letdown to VCT, Main Feedwater Pump turbine 1A will trip due to low oil pressure
| |
| from a leaking oil pressure senseline. MFW Pump trip will initiate an auto plant runback to ~72% and require performance of AOP-S.01. During the runback, the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will fail to Auto start and should be started as prudent action or during performance of the AOP.
| |
|
| |
| When Crew begins reset of turbine controls following the runback, a steamline break occurs downstream of MSIVs requiring Reactor trip and Safety Injection. The steam Line break will be isolated when the MSIVs are closed, however, due to a failure of the auto MSIV steamline isolation signals to all MSIVs the crew will manually close the MSIVs to complete the first critical task. Also, ten seconds after the 1A-A D/G starts from the SI signal it will trip due to a generator differential. The crew will continue in E-0 to check SI termination criteria.
| |
| | |
| When the crew begins checking the SI termination criteria in E-0, a loss of offsite power will occur. 1B-B D/G breaker to the shutdown board will not automatically close and will require manual closure to energize the 1B-B shutdown board. Crew may close the D/G Breaker to the shutdown board as prudent action or transition to ECA-0.0 which contains procedural direction for closing the breaker. Energizing the 1B-B Shutdown Board from the 1B-B D/G will complete the second critical task.
| |
|
| |
| The scenario may be terminated when the 1B-B Shutdown board is energized from a D/G 1B-B and the crew transitions to SI Termination procedure ES-1.1.
| |
| Appendix D
| |
| NUREG 1021 Revision 9
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Unit 1 MCR Checklist
| |
| (751-2428 ID 7636)
| |
| Part 1 - Completed by Off-going Shift / Reviewed by On-coming Shift
| |
| Mode 1, 100% Power 1204 MWe
| |
| PSA Risk: Green
| |
| Grid Risk: Green
| |
| | |
|
| |
| RCS Leakage ID .02 gpm, UNID .01 gpm
| |
| Cumulative Purge Time _50.5 Hours_
| |
| NRC phone Authentication
| |
| Code Until 0800 H3H8
| |
| After 0800 42DF
| |
| Common Tech Spec Actions U-1 Tech Spec Actions LCO 3.5.2 & 3.6.2.1 - 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform
| |
| motor winding test. Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| Protected Equipment 1B-B RHR Pump 1B-B Safety Injection Pump 1B-B Charging Pump
| |
|
| |
| Shift Priorities Unit 1 main Generator has developed a small H2 leak which cannot be repaired on line. Management has decided to shutdown the Unit to make repairs. Shutdown the Unit using 0-GO-5 over the next 8 hours. Initiate boration and rod insertion per Reactor Engineer SpreadSheet. Spreadsheet has been verified by the
| |
| SRO/STA. 0-SO-62-7 Appendix E and D have been performed.
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift
| |
| Verify your current qualifications
| |
| Review Operating Log since last held shift or 3
| |
| days, whichever is less
| |
| Standing Orders / Shift Orders
| |
| TACF Immediate required reading
| |
| LCO Actions
| |
| Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift
| |
| Walk down of MCR Control Boards
| |
|
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today MAIN CONTROL ROOM (7690) Train_A_Week
| |
| OUTSIDE (7666) [593-5214] AUXILIARY BUILDING (7775) 1A-A RHR pump has been tagged for 6 hours for maintenance to perform motor winding test.
| |
| Expected Return to service is ~2 hours.
| |
| TURBINE BUILDING (7771) (593-8455)
| |
| Time: Now Date:
| |
| Today Equipment Off-Normal (Pink Tags) UNID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO / PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
| MCR WO List ID And Noun Name
| |
| Panel Problem Description
| |
| WO/PER Number
| |
| Date Scheduled
| |
|
| |
| UNIT ONE REACTIVITY BRIEF
| |
| Date: Today Time: Now
| |
|
| |
| General Information
| |
| RCS Boron:
| |
| 1093 ppm Today
| |
| BA Controller Setpoint:
| |
| 27% * RCS B-10 Depletion:
| |
| 2 ppm Operable BAT:
| |
| A BAT A Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm BAT C Boron:
| |
| 6850 ppm RWST Boron:
| |
| 2601 ppm Nominal Gallons per rod step from 219:
| |
| 7 gallons of acid,
| |
| 36 gallons of water
| |
| * Verify boric acid flow contro
| |
| ller is set at Adjusted BA Controller Setting iaw 0-SO-62-7 section 5.1
| |
| Estimated values for a 1° Change in Tave **
| |
| Gallons of acid:
| |
| 26 Gallons of water:
| |
| 138 Rod Steps: 4 Estimated rods/boron for emergency step power reduction ** (Assuming Xenon equilibrium and no reactivity effects due to Xenon. 2/3 total reactivity from rods, 1/3 from boron)
| |
| Power reduction amount
| |
| Estimated Final Rod Position
| |
| Estimated boron addition
| |
| 10% 198 Steps on bank D
| |
| 101 gallons
| |
| 30% 174 Steps on bank D
| |
| 295 gallons
| |
| 50% 152 Steps on bank D
| |
| 485 gallons
| |
| ** These values are approximations and not int
| |
| ended nor expected to be exact. The values may be
| |
| superseded by Rx Engineering or SO-62-7 calculated
| |
| values. These values are calculated assuming 100%
| |
| steady state power operation onl
| |
| y. Engineering data last updated one week ago. Data Valid until one week from now. Previous Shift Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0***
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total amount diluted: 0
| |
| Total amount borated: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 IN/Out
| |
| Current Shift Estimated Reactivity Manipulations
| |
| Number of dilutions: 0
| |
| Number of borations: 0
| |
| Rod steps in: 0
| |
| Gallons per dilution: 0
| |
| Gallons per boration: 0
| |
| Rod steps out: 0
| |
| Total expected dilution: 0
| |
| Total expected boration: 0
| |
| Net change: 0 In/Out
| |
| Remarks: Rx Power - 100% MWD/MTU - 1000 Xenon & Samarium at Equilibrium
| |
| ***The boron letdown curve is flat for the next 25 EFPD.
| |
| Next Unit 1 Flux Map is scheduled -
| |
| three weeks from now
| |
| Unit 1 M-P is 0 PPM
| |
| Unit Supervisor: _______________________________
| |
| Name/Date
| |
| Operations Chemistry Information
| |
| Boron Results
| |
| Sample Point
| |
| Units Boron Date / Time
| |
| Goal Limit U1 RCS ppm 1093 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 816 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 RWST ppm 2601 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| U2 RWST ppm 2569 Today / Now
| |
| 2550 - 2650
| |
| 2500 - 2700
| |
| BAT A ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6850 Today / Now
| |
| Variable Variable U1 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2556 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2575 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2591 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U1 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2589 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #1
| |
| ppm 2531 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #2
| |
| ppm 2650 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #3
| |
| ppm 2522 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| U2 CLA #4
| |
| ppm 2526 Today / Now
| |
| 2470-2630
| |
| 2400-2700
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool
| |
| ppm 2547 Today / Now
| |
| > 2050 > 2000 Lithium Results
| |
| Goal Midpoint U1 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 1.1 Today / Now
| |
| >1 >1 U2 RCS Lithium
| |
| ppm 2.43 Today / Now
| |
| 2.18-2.48
| |
| 2.33 Primary to Secondary Leakrate In
| |
| formation (Total CPM RM-90-99/119)
| |
| Indicator
| |
| Units U1 Date / Time
| |
| U2 Date/Time
| |
| SI 50 S/G Leakage?
| |
| Yes/No No Today / Now
| |
| No Today / Now
| |
| SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate
| |
| gpd < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| < 0.1 Today / Now
| |
| 5 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 380 Today / Now
| |
| 68 Today / Now
| |
| 30 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 1980 Today / Now
| |
| 83 Today / Now
| |
| 50 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 3250 Today / Now
| |
| 206 Today / Now
| |
| 75 gpd leak equivalent
| |
| cpm 4850 Today / Now
| |
| 455 Today / Now
| |
| CVE Air Inleakage
| |
| cfm 10 Today / Now
| |
| 12.5 Today / Now
| |
| Bkgd on 99/119
| |
| cpm 50 Today / Now
| |
| 40 Today / Now
| |
| Correction Factor 99/119
| |
| cpm/gpd 10.69 Today / Now
| |
| 14.13 Today / Now
| |
| Steady state conditions are necessary for an accurate det
| |
| ermination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor
| |
|
| |
| Unit 1 DELT A R EACTO R POWER A SSUME D INSERTED E XPECTE D D ELTA RH OBORONDELT A E COMME N RECOMM EIODINEDATE/TIMETIMEPOWERDEFECTROD HTWORTHXENONBORONCONCPPMDILUTIONBORATIONCONC
| |
| (hrs)(%)(pcm)(steps)(pcm)(pcm)(pcm)(ppm)(ppm)(g al)(g al)(% eq)0100.0 1702.4 216.0-23.0-2728.0---1093.0---------99.9 Toda y190.0 1530.3 200.0-102.5-2739.8-80.71105.912.9014299.4Toda
| |
| y280.0 1358.4 185.0-199.2-2784.3-30.71110.84.905498.0Toda
| |
| y370.0 1193.8 175.0-271.2-2851.0-26.01114.94.104695.7Toda
| |
| y460.0 1032.9 165.0-344.1-2933.1-5.91115.80.901092.7Toda
| |
| y550.0 874.0 160.0-385.3-3026.3-24.51119.73.904389.0Toda
| |
| y640.0 712.4 155.0-425.8-3128.3-19.21122.83.103484.6Toda
| |
| y730.0 548.2 150.0-465.7-3237.5-15.01125.22.402679.8Toda
| |
| y820.0 376.6 150.0-472.9-3353.8-48.21132.97.708574.4Toda
| |
| y 1000MWD/MTUHold Tavg = Tref +/- 1.5FTotal0442
| |
| 6850 BAT ppm Small hourly boration/dilution
| |
| volumes ma
| |
| y be accumulated
| |
| for lar g er sin g le additions
| |
| Reason for Maneuve
| |
| r Unit Shutdown for Main Gen H2 Leak Repai
| |
| r Date Toda y RxEn g Name Comments
| |
| Unit 1 0.0 20.0
| |
| 40.0
| |
| 60.0
| |
| 80.0 100.0
| |
| 120.0
| |
| 140.0
| |
| 160.0
| |
| 180.0
| |
| 200.0
| |
| 220.0
| |
| 240.0024681012141618202224262830323436384042444648505254565860626466
| |
| Time% Power or Steps
| |
| -2800.0-2600.0-2400.0-2200.0-2000.0-1800.0
| |
| -1600.0-1400.0-1200.0-1000.0-800.0Xenon (pcm)
| |
| RodWorths U1C16 Table 6-34 HFP Integral Rod Worth
| |
| (Table Inverted)Bank DCycle Burnup (MWD/MTU)
| |
| Steps04000100001600021438
| |
| Withdrawn52-1164-1123-1135-1359-151360-1078-1039-1050-1265-1416
| |
| 68-999-962-973-1174-1318
| |
| 76-927-892-902-1085-1219
| |
| 84-856-824-836-1001-1122
| |
| 92-782-754-769-923-1033100-700-675-698-851-954
| |
| 108-656-632-659-816-917
| |
| 116-609-587-618-780-879
| |
| 124-560-540-575-740-836
| |
| 132-510-491-529-695-788
| |
| 140-459-442-481-647-735
| |
| 148-408-392-431-594-678
| |
| 156-358-343-381-539-617
| |
| 164-309-296-330-482-555
| |
| 172-261-249-279-421-488
| |
| 180-214-203-228-356-417
| |
| 188-167-157-177-286-341
| |
| 196-121-113-127-213-260
| |
| 204-78-72-80-140-177
| |
| 212-39-35-39-72-94
| |
| 220-8-8-7-17-23
| |
| 22800000
| |
| 23100000
| |
| 23200000 U1C16 Table 6-33 HZP Integral Rod Worth, Peak Xenon
| |
| (Table Inverted)Bank DCycle Burnup (MWD/MTU)
| |
| Steps04000100001600021438
| |
| Withdrawn52-1298-1311-1404-1601-171560-1216-1230-1310-1496-1611
| |
| 68-1140-1152-1215-1377-1485
| |
| 76-1071-1082-1122-1249-1341
| |
| 84-1006-1014-1039-1129-1202
| |
| 92-943-952-974-1037-1094100-876-892-933-992-1042
| |
| 108-840-861-919-985-1035
| |
| 116-803-828-903-980-1032
| |
| 124-762-791-881-972-1027
| |
| 132-719-750-849-955-1014
| |
| 140-673-704-807-928-992
| |
| 148-625-653-755-891-959
| |
| RodWorths156-574-599-695-842-915164-520-540-626-782-859
| |
| 172-460-476-548-708-787
| |
| 180-393-404-460-615-696
| |
| 188-317-322-363-503-583
| |
| 196-234-236-262-377-451
| |
| 204-152-151-165-247-309
| |
| 212-76-75-79-125-164
| |
| 220-17-17-17-29-39
| |
| 22800000
| |
| 23100000
| |
| 23200000 U1C16 Table 6-32 HZP Integral Rod Worth, No Xenon
| |
| (Table Inverted)Bank DCycle Burnup (MWD/MTU)
| |
| Steps04000100001600021438
| |
| Withdrawn52-1214-1172-1210-1574-169460-1136-1097-1131-1464-1585
| |
| 68-1063-1028-1058-1344-1457
| |
| 76-998-966-993-1220-1317
| |
| 84-933-904-934-1106-1184
| |
| 92-863-838-878-1020-1082100-781-761-821-978-1033
| |
| 108-735-718-791-970-1025
| |
| 116-687-672-758-964-1022
| |
| 124-636-624-719-955-1015
| |
| 132-585-574-675-936-999
| |
| 140-533-523-625-907-974
| |
| 148-481-471-571-867-937
| |
| 156-430-419-512-816-889
| |
| 164-379-368-450-752-828
| |
| 172-326-315-384-674-752
| |
| 180-272-260-315-579-658
| |
| 188-214-203-243-467-543
| |
| 196-155-145-170-343-413
| |
| 204-98-91-104-219-277
| |
| 212-48-44-49-108-143
| |
| 220-11-10-11-24-34
| |
| 22800000
| |
| 23100000
| |
| 23200000
| |
| RodWorths
| |
| RodWorths 2-D Interpolation of Table 6-X(L)XX(H)Y(L)YY(H)(Steps)(Burnup)212216220010004000196200204010004000
| |
| 180185188010004000
| |
| 172175180010004000
| |
| 164165172010004000
| |
| 156160164010004000
| |
| 148155156010004000
| |
| 148150156010004000
| |
| 148150156010004000#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| | |
| #N/A g = Tref #N/A010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/Ar Main G
| |
| e#N/A010004000#N/AToday#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| RodWorths#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| RodWorths-3 4 InsertedA(LL)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Rod Worth (pcm)-39.0-35.0-8.0-8.0-23.0-121.0-113.0-78.0-72.0-97.8
| |
| -214.0-203.0-167.0-157.0-182.0
| |
| -261.0-249.0-214.0-203.0-240.5
| |
| -309.0-296.0-261.0-249.0-299.8
| |
| -358.0-343.0-309.0-296.0-330.0
| |
| -408.0-392.0-358.0-343.0-360.5
| |
| -408.0-392.0-358.0-343.0-391.6
| |
| -408.0-392.0-358.0-343.0-391.6#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths 2-D Interpolation of Table 6-X(L)XX(H)Y(L)YY(H)(Steps)(Burnup)212216220010004000196200204010004000
| |
| 180185188010004000
| |
| 172175180010004000
| |
| 164165172010004000
| |
| 156160164010004000
| |
| 148155156010004000
| |
| 148150156010004000
| |
| 148150156010004000#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| | |
| #N/A g = Tref #N/A010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/Ar Main G
| |
| e#N/A010004000#N/AToday#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| RodWorths#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000
| |
| RodWorths-3 3 InsertedA(LL)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Rod Worth (pcm)-76.0-75.0-17.0-17.0-46.4-234.0-236.0-152.0-151.0-193.1
| |
| -393.0-404.0-317.0-322.0-347.3
| |
| -460.0-476.0-393.0-404.0-438.4
| |
| -520.0-540.0-460.0-476.0-517.4
| |
| -574.0-599.0-520.0-540.0-552.6
| |
| -625.0-653.0-574.0-599.0-586.7
| |
| -625.0-653.0-574.0-599.0-619.1
| |
| -625.0-653.0-574.0-599.0-619.1#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths 2-D Interpolation of Table 6-32X(L)XX(H)Y(L)YY(H)A(LL)(Steps)(Burnup)212216220010004000-48.0196200204010004000-155.0
| |
| 180185188010004000-272.0
| |
| 172175180010004000-326.0
| |
| 164165172010004000-379.0
| |
| 156160164010004000-430.0
| |
| 148155156010004000-481.0
| |
| 148150156010004000-481.0
| |
| 148150156010004000-481.0#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!010004000#REF!#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| | |
| #N/A g = Tref #N/A010004000#N/A#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/Ar Main G
| |
| e#N/A010004000#N/A#N/AToday#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| RodWorths#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A#N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| #N/A0#N/A010004000#N/A
| |
| RodWorths 1-D Xenon
| |
| I InsertedA(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Rod WorthHZ
| |
| P (pcm)0-44.0-11.0-10.0-28.9-46.4-145.0-98.0-91.0-124.4-193.1
| |
| -260.0-214.0-203.0-232.9-347.3
| |
| -315.0-272.0-260.0-302.9-438.4
| |
| -368.0-326.0-315.0-369.6-517.4
| |
| -419.0-379.0-368.0-401.8-552.6
| |
| -471.0-430.0-419.0-433.7-586.7
| |
| -471.0-430.0-419.0-465.7-619.1
| |
| -471.0-430.0-419.0-465.7-619.1#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths I nterpolatio
| |
| n 1-D Rod Worth Table Interpolatio
| |
| n P Power DefectPower (%)
| |
| InterpolatedHZPHFP Interpolate
| |
| d-3947By Xenon0100By Power-28.9-34.3-34.3-23.0-23.0-124.4-145.6-145.6-97.8-102.5
| |
| -232.9-267.9-267.9-182.0-199.2
| |
| -302.9-342.8-342.8-240.5-271.2
| |
| -369.6-410.7-410.7-299.8-344.1
| |
| -401.8-440.5-440.5-330.0-385.3
| |
| -433.7-469.4-469.4-360.5-425.8
| |
| -465.7-497.5-497.5-391.6-465.7
| |
| -465.7-493.3-493.3-391.6-472.9#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| RodWorths#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#N/A#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#VALUE!
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#VALUE!
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| RodWorths on d
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-23 Power Defect at 150 MWD/MTU
| |
| Boron Concentration (ppm)
| |
| Power100011001200130014001500
| |
| (%)0 000000 5104102100989694
| |
| 10204200196192188184
| |
| 15301294288282276270
| |
| 20394385377369361354
| |
| 25484474464454444434
| |
| 30573560548536524512
| |
| 35659644630616602589
| |
| 40744727711695679663
| |
| 45828809791772755737
| |
| 50912891870849829810
| |
| 55995971948926904882
| |
| 601078105210271002978954
| |
| 65116111331105107810511025
| |
| 70124512141184115511261097
| |
| 75133012961264123112001169
| |
| 80141513791344130912751242
| |
| 85150214631424138713511315
| |
| 90158915471506146614271388
| |
| 95167816331589154615041463
| |
| 100176817201673162715821538
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-24 Power Defect at 4000 MWD/MTU
| |
| Boron Concentration (ppm)
| |
| Power90010001100120013001400
| |
| (%)0 000000 5989694929088
| |
| 10192189185181177173
| |
| 15284278272266260254
| |
| 20372364356348341333
| |
| 25458448438429419409
| |
| 30542530519507495484
| |
| 35625611597584570557
| |
| 40707691675659644628
| |
| 45789770752734717699
| |
| 50870849829809789770
| |
| 55951928905883861840
| |
| 6010321007982958934910
| |
| 6511151087105910321006980
| |
| 70119711671137110810791051
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 75128112481216118411521122
| |
| 80136613301295126112271193
| |
| 85145314141376133913021266
| |
| 90154114991458141713781339
| |
| 95163015851541149714551414
| |
| 100172116721625157915331489
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-25 Power Defect at 10000 MWD/MTU
| |
| Boron Concentration (ppm)
| |
| Power400500600700800900
| |
| (%)0 000000 5116114112111109107
| |
| 10227224220217213210
| |
| 15335330325319314309
| |
| 20441434426419412406
| |
| 25544535526517508499
| |
| 30646635624613602591
| |
| 35748734721707694682
| |
| 40849832817801786771
| |
| 45950931913895878861
| |
| 50105110301009989969950
| |
| 55115411301107108410611039
| |
| 60125812311205117911541130
| |
| 65136413341305127612491221
| |
| 70147214391407137513441314
| |
| 75158215461510147614421409
| |
| 80169516551616157815411505
| |
| 85181117671725168316431603
| |
| 90193018821836179117471704
| |
| 95205220001950190118531807
| |
| 100217721212067201419621912
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-26 Power Defect at 16000 MWD/MTU
| |
| Boron Concentration (ppm)
| |
| Power0100200300400500
| |
| (%)0 000000 5158156154152150147
| |
| 10312307303299295290
| |
| 15461454448442435429
| |
| 20607598589581572564
| |
| 25749738727717706696
| |
| 30889876863850838825
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 3510281012996981966952
| |
| 40116511461128111110931077
| |
| 45130112801259123912191200
| |
| 50143614121389136613441323
| |
| 55157215451519149314691445
| |
| 60170916791649162115931566
| |
| 65184718131781174917181689
| |
| 70198719491913187818441812
| |
| 75212920872048200919721936
| |
| 80227422282184214221022062
| |
| 85242223722324227822332190
| |
| 90257425202467241723682321
| |
| 95273126712614255925062455
| |
| 100289328282766270626482593
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-27 Power Defect at 21438 MWD/MTU
| |
| Boron Concentration (ppm)
| |
| Power0100200300400500
| |
| (%)0 000000 5165163161158156154
| |
| 10327322318313309304
| |
| 15486479472465458451
| |
| 20641632623614605596
| |
| 25794783771760749738
| |
| 30945931917904891878
| |
| 35109410781062104610301015
| |
| 40124212231204118611691151
| |
| 45138913671346132613061286
| |
| 50153615111487146414421420
| |
| 55168216551628160215771553
| |
| 60182917991769174017131686
| |
| 65197719431910187918481819
| |
| 70212720892053201819851953
| |
| 75227822362197215921222087
| |
| 80243223862343230122612223
| |
| 85258825382491244624022361
| |
| 90274826942642259325462500
| |
| 95291228532797274326922643
| |
| 100308130172956289728422789
| |
| PowerDefects16001700180019002000
| |
| 000009290888684180177173169165
| |
| 265259253248242
| |
| 346338331323316
| |
| 425415406396387
| |
| 501489478467456
| |
| 575562549536523
| |
| 648633618603588
| |
| 720703686669652
| |
| 790771752734715
| |
| 860839819798778
| |
| 9309078848628391000974950925901
| |
| 106910421015988962
| |
| 11391109108010511023
| |
| 12091177114611151084
| |
| 12801245121111781145
| |
| 13511314127712421207
| |
| 14221383134413061268
| |
| 14951452141113701330150016001700180019002000
| |
| 000000868583817977169166162158155151
| |
| 249243238232227221
| |
| 326318311304296289
| |
| 400391382373364355
| |
| 473461450440429418
| |
| 544531518505493480
| |
| 613598584569555541
| |
| 682665649633616601
| |
| 751732713695677660
| |
| 819798777757737718
| |
| 886864841819797776
| |
| 9559299058818578341023996969943917892
| |
| PowerDefects1092106210331005977950116111291098106710371008
| |
| 123111961163113010971066
| |
| 130212651228119311581124
| |
| 137313331294125612191183
| |
| 1445140313611320128112421000110012001300140015001600
| |
| 00000001061041031011009897
| |
| 207204201198195192188
| |
| 304300295290285281276
| |
| 399392386379373367360
| |
| 491482474466458450442
| |
| 581570560550541531521
| |
| 669657645633622610599
| |
| 757743729715701688675
| |
| 844827811796780765750
| |
| 9319128948768598428251018997977957937918899
| |
| 11061083106010381016994973
| |
| 1195116911441119109510711048
| |
| 1285125612291201117511491123
| |
| 1377134513151285125612271200
| |
| 1470143614021370133813071277
| |
| 1565152814911456142213881355
| |
| 1662162215821544150614701434
| |
| 1762171816751633159315541515
| |
| 1863181617691725168116391597600700800900100011001400
| |
| 0000000145143141139136134128
| |
| 286282278273269265253
| |
| 423417410404398392374
| |
| 556548540532524516492
| |
| 686676666656646636607
| |
| 813801789777765754719
| |
| PowerDefects9379239098968828698291060104410281012997982937
| |
| 1181116311451127111010931043
| |
| 1302128112611241122212031147
| |
| 1421139813761354133213111250
| |
| 1540151514901466144314201353
| |
| 1660163216051578155215271455
| |
| 1780174917201691166216351556
| |
| 1901186818351804177317431658
| |
| 2024198819521918188418521760
| |
| 2149210920702033199719621862
| |
| 2276223321912150211120731966
| |
| 2406235923132269222721862070
| |
| 25392488243923912345230121776007008009001100
| |
| 00000151149147144140
| |
| 299295290286277
| |
| 445438431425412
| |
| 587578570561544
| |
| 727716706695674
| |
| 8658528398278021000986971957928
| |
| 11341118110110851052
| |
| 12671248123012111175
| |
| 13991378135713371297
| |
| 15291506148414621418
| |
| 16601635161015861539
| |
| 17911763173617101659
| |
| 19211891186218341778
| |
| 20532020198919581898
| |
| 21862151211620832019
| |
| 23212282224522092140
| |
| 24572415237523372262
| |
| 25962551250824662386
| |
| 27382689264225972512
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 2-D Interpolation o
| |
| f X(L)XX(H)Y(L)YY(H)(% Power)(ppm)95100100100010931100909095100010931100
| |
| 808085110011061200
| |
| 707075110011111200
| |
| 606065110011151200
| |
| 505055110011161200
| |
| 404045110011201200
| |
| 303035110011231200
| |
| 202025110011251200#REF!#REF!#REF!110011331200
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!1700#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| 0#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| 95#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| 185#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| 271005#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| 354#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 434#N/ABAT ppm#N/A#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 512005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 587005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 662005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 735005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 808005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 880005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 952#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1025#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1098005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1172005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1247005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1323005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1399005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1477005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1557005#N/A0#N/A005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 005#N/A0#N/A1600005#N/A0#N/A005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 0005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 124005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 245005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 362005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 476005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 587005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 696005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 802005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 907005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1010005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1111005#N/A0#N/A
| |
| 1211 1310
| |
| 1408
| |
| 1506
| |
| 1604
| |
| 1702
| |
| 1801
| |
| 1899
| |
| 1999
| |
| 2100
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| f Table 6-2
| |
| 3 PowerA(L,L)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Defect (pcm)1678.01633.01768.01720.01723.41589.01547.01678.01633.01549.9
| |
| 1379.01344.01463.01424.01376.9
| |
| 1214.01184.01296.01264.01210.8
| |
| 1052.01027.01133.01105.01048.3891.0870.0971.0948.0887.7
| |
| 727.0711.0809.0791.0723.8
| |
| 560.0548.0644.0630.0557.3
| |
| 385.0377.0474.0464.0383.0
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
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| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| PowerDefects05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 05#N/A0#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| PowerA(H,L)A(H,H)DefectX(L)XX(H)(pcm)(% Power)1863.01816.01819.3951001001762.01718.01624.8909095
| |
| 1528.01491.01434.0808085
| |
| 1345.01315.01253.1707075
| |
| 1169.01144.01079.6606065997.0977.0909.1505055
| |
| 827.0811.0740.2404045
| |
| 657.0645.0567.7303035
| |
| 482.0474.0390.5202025
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!005#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/ABAT ppm#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/ABAT ppm#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| PowerDefects#N/A#N/A#N/A005#N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A005
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 2-D Interpolation of Table 6-26Y(L)YY(H)A(L,L)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)(ppm)1000109311002227.02186.02345.02301.01000109311002111.02073.02227.02186.0
| |
| 1100110614001852.01760.01962.01862.0
| |
| 1100111114001635.01556.01743.01658.0
| |
| 1100111514001420.01353.01527.01455.0
| |
| 1100111614001203.01147.01311.01250.0
| |
| 110011201400982.0937.01093.01043.0
| |
| 110011231400754.0719.0869.0829.0
| |
| 110011251400516.0492.0636.0607.0
| |
| 110011331400#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!00100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 00100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 00100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 00100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| PowerDefects001000.00.0158.0156.0001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| 001000.00.0158.0156.0
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 2-D Interpo
| |
| l PowerDefectX(L)XX(H)Y(L)Y(pcm)(% Power)(ppm)2304.19510010090010932075.79090959001093
| |
| 1850.280808511001106
| |
| 1632.270707511001111
| |
| 1416.760606511001115
| |
| 1200.050505511001116979.040404511001120
| |
| 751.330303511001123
| |
| 514.020202511001125
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!11001133
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!005#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A00
| |
| #N/A#N/ABAT ppm#N/A000.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500#N/A#N/AMWD/MTU#N/A00
| |
| #N/A#N/ABAT ppm#N/A000.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| PowerDefects0.0005000.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| 0.000500
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| o lation of Table 6-2
| |
| 7 PowerY(H)A(L,L)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Defect (pcm)11002466.02386.02597.02512.02515.011002337.02262.02466.02386.02264.6#REF!2019.0#REF!2140.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!1778.0#REF!1898.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!1539.0#REF!1659.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!1297.0#REF!1418.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!1052.0#REF!1175.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!802.0#REF!928.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!544.0#REF!674.0#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 100#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| PowerDefects1000.00.0165.0163.00.01000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| 1000.00.0165.0163.00.0
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| 1-D Power Defect Table Interpola
| |
| Burnup (MWD/MTU)15040001000016000209581723.41628.31819.32304.12515.0
| |
| 1549.91460.91624.82075.72264.6
| |
| 1376.91293.01434.01850.2#REF!
| |
| 1210.81133.91253.11632.2#REF!
| |
| 1048.3978.41079.61416.7#REF!887.7825.8909.11200.0#REF!
| |
| 723.8671.8740.2979.0#REF!
| |
| 557.3516.3567.7751.3#REF!
| |
| 383.0354.0390.5514.0#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| PowerDefects#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| PowerDefects#N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0#N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| #N/A#N/A#N/A0.00.0
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| a tio n Interpolated
| |
| By Burnup 1702.4
| |
| 1530.3
| |
| 1358.4
| |
| 1193.8
| |
| 1032.9 874.0
| |
| 712.4
| |
| 548.2
| |
| 376.6
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!
| |
| #REF!#N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| PowerDefects
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| #N/A
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| U1C16 Table 6-7 Differential Boron Worth
| |
| BoronCycle Burnup (MWD/MTU)
| |
| Conc1505001000200040006000 (ppm)0-6.445-6.436-6.427-6.419-6.442-6.508
| |
| 200-6.419-6.41-6.4-6.392-6.415-6.481
| |
| 400-6.392-6.383-6.373-6.365-6.387-6.453
| |
| 600-6.365-6.356-6.346-6.338-6.36-6.425
| |
| 800-6.337-6.328-6.318-6.31-6.332-6.397
| |
| 1000-6.309-6.299-6.29-6.281-6.304-6.37
| |
| 1200-6.279-6.27-6.26-6.252-6.275-6.342
| |
| 1400-6.249-6.24-6.231-6.223-6.247-6.314
| |
| 1600-6.219-6.21-6.201-6.193-6.218-6.286
| |
| 1800-6.187-6.179-6.17-6.163-6.189-6.258
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| BoronWorth8000100001200014000160001800021438-6.608-6.734-6.882-7.047-7.228-7.423-7.798-6.58-6.707-6.855-7.02-7.2-7.395-7.768-6.553-6.679-6.827-6.992-7.172-7.366-7.736
| |
| -6.525-6.652-6.799-6.964-7.143-7.335-7.701
| |
| -6.497-6.624-6.772-6.935-7.113-7.304-7.665-6.47-6.596-6.743-6.907-7.083-7.271-7.627-6.442-6.569-6.715-6.877-7.052-7.238-7.587
| |
| -6.414-6.541-6.687-6.847-7.02-7.203-7.544
| |
| -6.387-6.513-6.658-6.817-6.988-7.167-7.5
| |
| -6.359-6.485-6.629-6.787-6.954-7.13-7.454
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| 2-D Interpolation of Table 6
| |
| -X(L)XX(H)Y(L)YY(H)(ppm)(Burnup)100010931200100010002000100011061200100010002000
| |
| 100011111200100010002000
| |
| 100011151200100010002000
| |
| 100011161200100010002000
| |
| 100011201200100010002000
| |
| 100011231200100010002000
| |
| 100011251200100010002000
| |
| 100011331200100010002000#REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| BoronWorth#REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000#REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!100010002000
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!10001000200000200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| BoronWorth0020010001000200000200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| 00200100010002000
| |
| BoronWorth
| |
| -7 BoronA(L,L)A(L,H)A(H,L)A(H,H)Worth (pcm)-6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.276-6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.274
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.273
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.273
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.273
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.272
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.272
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.271
| |
| -6.290-6.281-6.260-6.252-6.270#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| BoronWorth#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!-6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| BoronWorth-6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427-6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| -6.427-6.419-6.400-6.392-6.427
| |
| DiluteBorate
| |
| TI-44 Data
| |
| 1-D (10 ppm change/10)Interpolation
| |
| RCS CbDiluteBorateDILUTEBORATE514308.79.3158.311.1501430.879.3858.011.1100675.619.4557.811.1
| |
| 150442.409.5257.811.1
| |
| 200328.919.5957.611.1
| |
| 250261.769.6657.411.1
| |
| 300217.399.7457.311.2
| |
| 350185.889.8156.911.2
| |
| 400162.359.89#REF!#REF!
| |
| 450144.129.96#REF!#REF!
| |
| 500129.5510.04#REF!#REF!
| |
| 550117.6610.12#REF!#REF!
| |
| 600107.7710.21#REF!#REF!
| |
| 65099.4210.29#REF!#REF!
| |
| 70092.2710.37#REF!#REF!
| |
| 75086.0710.46#REF!#REF!
| |
| 80080.6010.54#REF!#REF!
| |
| 85075.8910.63#REF!#REF!
| |
| 90071.6510.72#REF!#REF!
| |
| 95067.8610.81#REF!#REF!100064.4510.91#REF!#REF!
| |
| 105061.3711.00#REF!#REF!
| |
| 110058.5611.10#REF!#REF!
| |
| 115056.0111.20#REF!#REF!
| |
| 120053.6611.30#REF!#REF!
| |
| 130049.5211.50#REF!#REF!
| |
| 140045.9711.71#REF!#REF!
| |
| 150042.8911.93#REF!#REF!
| |
| 250025.7014.70#REF!#REF! #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF! #REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| Page 79
| |
| DiluteBorate#REF!#REF!#REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!
| |
| #REF!#REF!#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A Page 80
| |
| DiluteBorate#N/A#N/A#N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A
| |
| #N/A#N/A Page 81
| |
| }} | |
