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#REDIRECT [[NRC-2014-0207, Comment (3) of Kevin Kamps on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear on Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations]]
| number = ML14309A257
| issue date = 10/31/2014
| title = Comment (3) of Kevin Kamps on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear on Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
| author name = Kamps K
| author affiliation = Beyond Nuclear
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/ADM/DAS
| docket = 05000255
| license number = DPR-020
| contact person = SECY RAS
| case reference number = 79FR58812 00003, NRC-2014-0207
| document type = General FR Notice Comment Letter
| page count = 239
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Page 1 of IPUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: October 31, 2014Received:
October 30, 2014Status: PendingPost Tracking No. ljy-8f83-qkpx Comments Due: October 30, 2014Submission Type: WebDocket: NRC-2014-0207 Biweekly Notice: Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined LicensesInvolving No Significant Hazards Considerations Comment On: NRC-2014-0207-0001 Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations Document:
NRC-2014-0207-DRAFT-0003 Comment on FR Doc # 2014-23015
~. r n'Submitter Information
.Name: Kevin KampsAddress:
E- -Beyond Nuclear ,_6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 400Takoma Park, MD, 20912Email: kevin@beyondnuclear.org General CommentSee attached file(s)Attachments 10 30 14 Palisades PTS commentsSUNSI Review CompleteTemplate
= ADM -013E-RIDS= ADM-03Add /4)ýPhttps://www.fdms.gov/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648190cdfd&for...
10/31/2014 Public Comments re: Docket ID NRC-2014-0207 Submitted by Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear, andBoard of Directors Member, Representing the Kalamazoo
: Chapter, for Don't WasteMichigan1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability orconsequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Entergy Nuclear's Response:
No. We challenge this response.
: 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new ordifferent type of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Entergy Nuclear's Response:
No. We challenge this response.
: 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in amargin of safety?Entergy Nuclear's Response:
No. We challenge this response.
The NRC staff states that it "has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based onthis review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) aresatisfied,"
and "Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that theamendment request involves no significant hazards consideration."
We challenge NRC staffs determination.
BASIS FOR OUR CHALLENGES On July 8, 1993, Michael J. Keegan of the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakespublished Pressurized Thermal Shock Potential at Palisades:
History of Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels in Pressurized Water Reactors.
He rekeyed this documenton August 3, 2005. The report documents that Palisades first violated NRC's reactorpressure vessel embrittlement/pressurized thermal shock safety standards in 1981, a mere10 years into operations.
The report also documents repeated rollbacks of the NRC PTSregulations up to that point in time, enabling Palisades to continue operating, despite itsdegraded condition.
This weakening of PTS safety standards continues to the present day,as with this proposed license amendment.
We hereby incorporate as if rewritten the entirety of Keegan's 1993 report. We will alsosubmit the report for the official record on this proceeding.
This document is also postedonline athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/07l1805pressurizedthermalshockpotentialpalis ades.pdf.
A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission document (Date Submitted:
October 26,1 2004; Revised:
December 14, 2004), "Generalization of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Risk Results to Additional Plants,"
Table 1. Plants with highestRTNDT, showed that Palisades had the fifth "most embrittled materials" in the U.S.This document is posted online athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/121404nrc30mostembrittledrpvs.pdf.
It willalso be submitted for the record on this proceeding.
: However, at an NRC public meeting held at the Beach Haven Event Center in SouthHaven, MI in late Feb., 2012, in response to a direct question I made (I participated bytelephone from Washington, D.C.), NRC's Office of Research's Jennifer Uhle confirmed that Palisades has the most embrittled RPV in the U.S. So, in the short space of eightyears, Palisades had moved from fifth worst, to single worst embrittled RPV in the U.S.This dubious distinction was confirmed by an NRC resident inspector at Palisades, duringa meeting between environmental group representatives and concerned local residents with NRC Chairman Macfarlane on June 5, 2014. The meeting was held in BentonHarbor, MI. To a direct question raised by Michael Keegan of Coalition for a NuclearFree Great Lakes (who also serves as a board member of Don't Waste MI), the NRCresident inspector at Palisades, who took part in the meeting, also admitted that Palisades has the worst embrittled RPV in the U.S.On August 8, 2005, Don't Waste MI, and a number of additional environmental groupintervenors, as well as concerned local citizens, intervened against the Palisades' 20-yearlicense extension application.
This petition for hearings is posted online athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/petition.pdf, and has been submitted for therecord on this proceeding.
The very topmost of PETITIONERS' TECHNICAL/HEALTH/SAFETY ANALYSISCONTENTIONS was:1. The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to addressthe continuing crisis of embrittlement.
The Petitioners allege that the Palisades license renewal application is fundamentally deficient because it does notadequately address technical and safety issues arising out of the embrittlement ofthe reactor pressure vessel and unresolved Pressure Thermal Shock ("PTS")concerns that might reasonably result in the failure of the reactor pressure vessel("RPV").
The Palisades nuclear power station is identified as prone to earlyembrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel, which is a vital safety component.
Asnoted in the opinion of Petitioners' expert on embrittlement, Mr. Demetrios
: Basdekas, retired from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the longer Palisades
: operates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, with decreasing safety margins inthe event of the initiation of emergency operation procedures.
Therefore, ahearing on the public health and safety effects of a prospective additional twentyyears of operation, given the present and prospective embrittlement trend of theRPV is imperative to protecting the interests of those members of the petitioning organization who are affected by this proceeding.
(Page 4)2 The intervenors also submitted this related contention:
: 8. Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers to reduce embrittlement of RPVwalls. To mitigate the prospect of increased embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel(RPV), the Palisades operator uses previously-irradiated fuel to create a buffer next to theRPV wall. The second-use of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor core tends toweaken and damage the cladding on the fuel rods, making future waste handling, storage,and ultimate disposal
-whether on-site at Palisades, in transport, and at future storage ordump sites -problematic.
It poses an elevated risk for the safety of Palisades workers andthe general public. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") depends on theintegrity of the fuel cladding as a means of preventing or minimizing the chances ofunanticipated fissioning in storage casks or other units -in effect, as a means of delayingradiation releases into the groundwater at the Private Fuel Storage (Utah) and YuccaMountain (Nevada) sites. (Page 7)This submitted contention is also relevant, for it represents one of many scenarios thatcould lead to the need to activate the ECCS at Palisades, which could initiate PTS, RPVrupture, LOCA, containment
: failure, and large-scale release of hazardous radioactivity tothe environment:
: 11. Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against the Palisades nuclear power plant.Located on the shoreline of Lake Michigan, the source of drinking water, fish, recreation, and other economic value to tens of millions of people downstream, Palisades represents a target for potentially catastrophic terrorist attack or sabotage intended to release largeamounts of radioactivity into the Great Lakes basin. Palisades represents a radioactive bull's eye on the shore of 20% of the planet's surface fresh water, the Great Lakes. Theoperating reactor (containing many billions of curies of radioactivity) and high-level waste storage pool (containing tens to hundreds of millions of curies) are vulnerable tosuch attack, as are the outdoor dry storage casks, so highly visible stored in plain sight.(Page 9)Regarding Mr. Demetrios
: Basdekas, retired from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, he had authored the following op-ed in the New York Tines, published on the thirdanniversary of the Three Mile Island meltdown (March 28, 1982). Entitled "The Risk of aMeltdown,"
the op-ed is posted online at http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/kk-links/Basdekas%20op%20ed%2ONYT%203%2029%201982.pdf, and has been submitted for the record of this proceeding.
As the faxed version of the op-ed is not entirely
: legible, I have rekeyed it for legibility sake. Here is the full text, within brackets below:[The Risk of a MeltdownBy Demetrios L. Basdekas3 New York Times Op-Ed, March 29, 1982 [the 3rd anniversary of the Three Mile Islandmeltdown]
Washington-There is a high, increasing likelihood that someday soon, during aseemingly minor malfunction at any of a dozen or more nuclear power plantsaround the United States, the steel vessel that houses the radioactive core is going tocrack like a piece of glass. The result will be a core meltdown, the most serious kindof accident, which will injure many people, destroy the plant, and probably destroythe nuclear industry with it.On the third anniversary of the Three Mile Island Accident, the Government and industry are unable or unwilling to deal honestly and urgently with far-reaching nuclear-safety problems.
Another serious accident is very likely because the wrong metal was used inthe reactor vessels, and with each day of operation, neutron radiation is making themetal more brittle, and more prone to crack in case of sudden temperature changeunder pressure.
One manufacturer of nuclear reactors has reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that in three to five more years, the vessels in some plants will be toobrittle to operate safely. But this estimate is wishful thinking, based on unrealistic assumptions about plant operators' actions and accident sequences.
Some plants arealready too dangerous to operate without corrective measures.
The commission could do a great deal to prevent such an accident, andstretch out the lives of many of these brittle vessels, if it ordered the type ofcorrective steps already taken at some European reactors.
But the commission, regulating an industry that has serious financial and technical
: problems, instead oftaking initiatives tends to sweep difficult technical problems under the rug, reactingto crises only after they occur.The commission must realize that this crisis is upon us. A temperature change severe enough to crack a brittle reactor vessel already has occurred, inCalifornia, but not at one of the older, more vulnerable plants. The commercial nuclear industry's admirable safety record -no deaths caused by radiation
-still isintact, but this cannot last much longer, because the reactor vessels and othercritical components are aging.For many years, it has been known that vessels are becoming brittle.
Whatmakes the problem urgent is that the metal is aging more rapidly than expected, andthe circumstances that would cause such an accident now seem more likely.(continued) 4 At the Rancho Seco plant, near Sacramento, Calif., in March 1978 a workerdropped a small light bulb into an instrument panel, causing an electrical shortcircuit.
The short wreaked havoc on the plant's control systems -a variety ofinstruments that run crucial pumps and valves -and the result was that too muchwater was pumped through the reactor, chilling it suddenly.
It is very doubtful thatsome of the older plants operating today would be able to withstand the sameshock. Fortunately, Ranch Seco had been in operation less than two years; had itbeen in operation for 10, its pressure vessel most likely would have ruptured.
The kinds of control systems that went haywire at Rancho Seco are verylikely to fail at crucial times in other nuclear power plants. When a pipe bursts, or aseal fails, or a valve sticks, automatic control and safety systems almost instantly take action to compensate, but they do not always take the right action.Control systems are not reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
They are not immune to fire or power failure; they often have no backups, so areprone to simple failure.
They are not even earthquake-proof..
The N.R.C. staff has taken the position that if a plant gets into trouble becauseof control-system malfunctions, it has safety systems to take care of any problems.
But this is not so, as events of the last few years show. At Rancho Seco, at Three MileIsland, and at other plants, control systems not thought vital to the safe operation ofa plant ended up causing serious problems.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is charged with ensuring that nuclearplants are operated "with adequate protection" of the public health and safety. Butbureaucratic foot-dragging and preoccupation with public relations and financial problems of the industry are contributing to a shortsighted view -that technical problems can wait or do not exist. Some members of the staff acknowledge thesafety problems associated with control systems, but the agency has yet to demandfrom utilities operating nuclear power plants the technical data on control systemsnecessary to assess the systems' safety fully.It may be that we need nuclear power to maintain our standard of living. Butthere is a vast difference between having to accept something, and making itacceptable.
We can make nuclear power acceptable.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
: chairman, Nuncio Palladino, has spokenof cleaning up our nuclear act. As a private citizen, I hope that we do so, beginning with vigilance at the N.R.C. One more accident the size of Three Mile Island's, and thepublic's reaction almost certainly will foreclose the nuclear option.Demetrios L. Basdekas is a reactor safety engineer with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.]
5 On September 16, 2005, the environmental intervenors made the following response indefense of their PTS/RPV embrittlement contention (Pages 2 to 23 of PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS, posted online athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/contnresp.pdf and submitted for the record ofthis proceeding):
Response as to Contention No. 1 (The license renewal application is untimely andincomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement)
NMC and NRC staff have argued that Contention 1 regarding the Application's proposed management of the embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel isinadmissible because the Contention (i) fails to challenge the Application anddemonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law; (ii) failsto provide a factual basis to support any dispute with the application, and; (iii) improperly challenges Commission regulation.
These assertions are incorrect.
: 1) The embrittlement contention is within the scope of the proceeding The extended operation of the Palisades nuclear steam supply system falls squarelyunder 10 CFR § 54.21 and § 54.29(a) which focuses on the management of aging ofcertain systems, structures, and components and the review of time-limited agingevaluations.
A genuine dispute exists within the Application that is germane to the health and safetyof the petitioners who live, work and recreate out to 50 miles from the Palisades nuclearpower station in Covert, Michigan.
The Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel is the subject component.
There is no safetyredundancy to this single largest component in the Palisades nuclear steam supplysystem. Palisades is arguably one of the most embrittled reactor pressure
: vessels, if notthe most embrittled vessel, in the United States. The nuclear steam supply system forPalisades was the first of the Combustion Engineering line licensed for construction.
Documentation as early as 1970 identifies Surveillance specimens in the vessel will be used to monitor the radiation damage during the life of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect thesafety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce radiation damageeffects.
The results of annealing will be confirmed by tests on additional surveillance specimens provide for this purpose.
Prior to the accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 E19 nvt (>1 Mev) on the rector vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate thecontinued suitability of the currently proposed
: startup, cool down, and operating conditions.
[Footnote 1: Report on Palisades Plant, Letter from Joseph Hendrie (ACRS)to Glen Seaborg, Chair AEC, January 27, 1970.]6 Exhibit 1-A. All exhibits are found in "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support ofContentions" (Pet. App.), a copy of which is provided with this response in hard copy tothe ASLB and the parties.The Petitioners have been able to establish that the licensee could not providesurveillance materials for critical weld material in the Palisades vessel beltline welds in1994. [Footnote 2: Palisades Thermal Shock, NRC Staff Presentation to the ACRS,Viewgraphs, December 09, 1994, p.3.] See Exhibit 1-B.A commitment was made for the Palisades plant as early as 1970 to make actualphysical efforts by annealing the vessel to restore ductility should any "radiation damage"affecting plant safety be discovered.
In fact, calculations later recognized by NRC staffconcluded that the Palisades vessel could have surpassed its Pressure Thermal Shock("PTS") limits as early as 1995. Repeated Palisades re-analyses have produced awidening range of resulting estimates for exceeding vessel embrittlement limits with avery broad range of uncertainty (as much as +/- 25%) with as many PTS values for theseverely-embrittled reactor vessel. Palisades has neared the maximum-embrittlement goalposts time and again over the years, [Footnote 3: "For example that is sort of asummary of the regulatory framework that applies to annealing.
With regard to Palisades, we completed an evaluation in April of 1995 in which we concluded that they wouldreach the screening criteria.
At least they were okay until 1999. That evaluation wasconsistent with the 50.61, the Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule. The current license forPalisades expires in 2007 so they would fall somewhat short of the current operating license with regard to the life of the vessel."],
but each time they have been moved backfollowing rejiggering of the assumptions and calculations.
In 1995, fox example, theNRC staff noted that the "Palisades RPV... is predicted to reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other plant."]The filing continued, as mentioned, until page 23. This filing is incorporated byreference, as if rewritten in its entirety, herein.On March 17, 2006, environmental intervenors filed PETITIONERS' NOTICE OFAPPEAL FROM ASLB DENIAL OF HEARING, AND SUPPORTING BRIEF. Thisfiling is posted online athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/objections031706.pdf, in incorporated byreference.
as if rewritten in its entirety herein, and has been submitted for the record ofthis proceeding.
This filing included these relevant sections:
Status of Demetrios Basdekas asPetitioners' Expert on Embrittlement; Appeal of dismissal of Contention No. 1(The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address thecontinuing crisis of embrittlement).
On March 20, 2006, NIRS and a grassroots coalition sent letters to U.S. Senators CarlLevin and Debbie Stabenow of Michigan, requesting General Accounting Officeinvestigation into RPV embrittlement and PTS at Palisades and reactors across the U.S.7 The letters also urged that GAO investigate why -- instead of protecting publichealth and safety and the environment against such risks -- NRC had insteadweakened embrittlement/PTS standards, allowing dangerously deteriorated reactors such as Palisades to continue operating.
These two letters are posted online at:http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/032006gaorequestltrtolevin.pdf andhttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/032006gaorequestltrstabenow.pdf.
Both letters are incorporated by reference herein as if rewritten in their entirety.
Theyhave also been submitted for the record of this proceeding.
Please note that the signatories to these letters included the following:
Citizens ActionCoalition of Indiana
* Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination
*Citizens For Renewable Energy
* Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes
* Don'tWaste Michigan
* Great Lakes United
* The Green Party of Michigan
* Kalamazoo Nonviolent Opponents of War
* Lone Tree Council
* Michigan Citizens for WaterConservation
* Michigan Environmental Council
* Michigan Land Trustees
* NationalEnvironmental Trust
* Nuclear Energy Information Service
* Nuclear-Free Great LakesCampaign
* Nuclear Information and Resource Service
* Nukewatch
* PIRGIM *Radiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes (REAP-GL)
* Sierra Club,Mackinac Chapter
* Van Buren County Greens
* WAND Michigan:
Women's Action forNew Directions
* West Michigan Environmental Action Council.Note that the Consumers Energy (previous owner of Palisades before Entergy bought it)admitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission in spring 2006 that "Reactor vesselembrittlement concerns" were a primary reason it was selling the plant. This document isposted online at: http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/pg2.ipg.
It has also beensubmitted for the record.A Consumers Energy official told me directly that the reason the company was selling theplant to Entergy was so that Entergy -a much bigger company with more nuclear powerexperience and expertise
-could fix such problems as the RPV embrittlement.
However,no such fix has ever been made, not since ownership transferred in 2007. And Entergyhas no plans to make such a fix. But the fix is in, so to speak. Entergy has asked NRC toweaken applicable RPV PTS regulations, yet again, to enable its degraded reactor to keepoperating.
On May 18, 2006, a coalition of groups submitted "Halting 20 Extended Years of RiskyReactor Operations and Radioactive Waste Generation and Storage on Lake Michigan atPalisades Nuclear Power Plant" as Comments on NUREG-1437, Supplement 8
.27 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. This document is posted online athttp://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/Iicensing/cntsnureg 1437supplement27.pdf, andsubmitted for the record. It is incorporated by reference, as if rewritten herein in itsentirety.
On pages 26-27, the coalition states:[XI. Plant Aging Increases Accident RiskA top concern directly related to the re-licensing of Palisades for 20 additional years, isthe aging of the plant, in particular embrittlement, or the gradual weakening of thereactor pressure vessel (RPV) from decades of bombardment by neutrons emitted bythe nuclear chain reaction in the core. It is generally acknowledged that the reactorpressure vessel at Palisades is one of the most embrittled in the nation. The longerPalisades
: operates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, increasing the risk forPressurized Thermal Shock (PTS), a condition caused by any number of systemmalfunctions which can result in a severe, sudden overcooling of the reactor pressurevessel. This, combined with the intense pressurization in a pressurized water reactor,can stress the RPV such that its walls could crack or rupture, leading to a loss-of-coolant
: accident, meltdown, and catastrophic release of radiation to the entire Great Lakes basin.Age-related failure of Palisades' systems could initiate the sequence of events that leadsto PTS. Examples of aging systems at Palisades are evident in this short list of recentincidents:
: 1. Alert Declared Due to Loss of Shutdown Cooling (Event # 39699 March 25, 2003)2. Failure of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (see PNO-III-04-010 August 11,2004)3. Reactor Manually Tripped Due to Fire in 2B Condensate Pump (Event# 41002August 31, 2004)4. Relief Requests for Reactor Vessel Head Penetration problems (NMC Request10/4/04)5. Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle Cracking
-Through Wall Cracks (Degraded Condition 10/17/2004)
: 6. Manual Reactor Trip/Main Condenser Vacuum (Event # 41319) 267. Emergency Declared on Primary Coolant System Integrity
( Event # 41681)8. Control Rod Stuck in Reactor Core (Event #42569 May 11, 2006)The embrittlement at Palisades, the unresolved risks of PTS, and the ever-increasing likelihood of the failure of the RPV as Palisades ages warrant special environmental considerations.
This type of accident is considered one that goes beyond the design ofthe reactor.
NRC has not, however, included the issue in the EIS nor incorporated it in"Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" scenarios for Palisades as a potential accident.
: Further, NMC in its Environmental Report, has declined to undertake majorrefurbishment for Palisades' license renewal, despite Consumers Energy's earlier pledgeto "anneal" (super-heat) the reactor pressure vessel. This super-heating theoretically can bring back ductility or flexibility to the metal, thus reducing potential for PTS.9 Annealing has never been performed in the U.S., however, and thus raises concerns itselfas an experimental procedure.
Please include for the record the Adobe PDF documententitled "Palisades Nuclear Plant Yearly Capacity Factors"
& "Palisades Plant -Record ofTransients or Operational Cycles" for Occurrence
#1 dated 1/11/1972 throughOccurrence
# 126 dated 1/9/2005.
This is a record which has major implications forembrittlement and the Reactor Pressure Vessel at Palisades.
A hard copy will be sent.Please enter it into the record. Age-related deterioration also increases the likelihood ofunintentional leaks, as plant systems, structures and components wear out and fail.Palisades' age-related degradation means increasing amounts of radioactivity will be"routinely" released over time. Plans for addressing embrittlement and other aging issuesat Palisades are not provided in NMC's Environmental Reportor in the EIS. Anydiscussion of 20 additional years of operation at Palisades necessitates a specific plan foraddressing embrittlement and aging issues. The most recent NRC report on a potential accident at Palisades, done in 1982, (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences orCRAC- 2), predicted that a meltdown and large-scale radiation release from the Palisades reactor would cause 1,000 fatalities and 7,000 injuries in just the first year, 10,000 cancerdeaths over time, $52.6 billion in property damage (based on 1980 census, expressed in1980 dollars, thus significantly underestimating current and future impacts due topopulation growth and inflation; adjusting for inflation, property damage could exceed$100 billion expressed in year 2005 dollars).
The above CRAC -2 reportdid not take intoaccount a "Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" scenario.
We request the EIS provideassessment of the consequences of a "Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" asPalisades' embrittlement status increases the likelihood of such an accident.]
In June, 2011, Jeff Donn of the AP published a four-part expos6 on nuclear power safetyrisks. In his first article, "US nuke regulators weaken safety rules," Donn pointed torollbacks on PTS standards as the top example of this. See:http://www.ap.org/company/awards/part-i-aging-nukes Palisades suffered numerous serious accidents in 2011. One, on September 25, 2011, ledto an NRC "yellow finding,"
and landed Palisades on NRC's short list of worstperforming reactors in the country.
See:http://www.beyondnuclear.or.g/hom e/2012/1/25/palisades-its-an-accident-waiting-to-happen.html, including a link to a major, front page expos6 in the Detroit Free Press:http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/Freep%20 i %20155%2020 12.pdf.That very incident, as revealed in NRC's own inspection report, pushed a number ofPalisades' degraded
: systems, structures, and components to the breaking point:http://archive.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4183882113.PDF Although the ECCS was inadvertently activated, it did not completely work. If it had, therisk of PTS would have been increased even further than it was during the accident.
Embrittlement risks and NRC's weakening of PTS safety regulations to accommodate Palisades was a major subject matter of discussion with NRC Chairman Jaczko at BeachHaven Event Center in South Haven on May 25, 2012. Michael Keegan of Coalition for a10 Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, and Don't Waste Michigan, facilitated the presentation madeby two dozen environmental group representatives and concerned local residents.
Theenvironmental watchdogs expressed skepticism and deep concern when Chairman Jaczkoindicated that, if Palisades RPV could not meet embrittlement standards, themethodology could be adjusted.
We protested such pencil whipping, such weakening ofpublic health, safety and environmental protections.
Seehttp://www.beyondnuclear.org/homne/201 2/5/26/environmental-coalition-concerned-residents-met-with-nrc-cha.htmli.
I handed copies of the following to Chairman Jaczko and the entire NRC entourage whoaccompanied him:"Aging Nuclear Power Plants focusing in particular on irradiation embrittlement ofpressure
: vessels,
" by Ino Hisamitsu, published in Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 (May/June, 2012), posted online athttp://www.cnic.ip/english/newsletter/nit148/nitl 48articles/irradiation emnbrittlement.htm i.Despite handing out copies to a large number of NRC officials, including the chairmanand regional administrator, I never heard back from them about the concerns raised inthis article.The article was continued in the next issue of the newsletter:
"Aging Nuclear Power Plants focusing in particular on irradiation embrittlement ofpressure vessels,"
by Ino Hisamitsu, published in Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 (July/August 2012), the newsletter of CNIC Tokyo (Citizens Nuclear Information Center).
This articleis posted online athttp://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nitl49/nit149articles/06-aging.html Embrittlement concerns were also central to the discussion when NRC Commissioner William Magwood IV met with environmental group representatives and concerned localresidents at Beach Haven Event Center in South Haven on March 25, 2013. See:http://www.beyondnuc lear.org/ho-ne/20 1 3/3/27/coalition-of-concerned-citizens-details-concerns-about-palis.htmlni As mentioned above, PTS risks at Palisades was also a central issue discussed with NRCChairman Macfarlane on June 5, 2014 in Benton Harbor. See:http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nrc/2014/6/4/residents-environmental-groups-elected-official-meet-with-nr.htrnl In conclusion, a large number of environmental groups and concerned local citizens havelong objected to weakening PTS safety regulations at the badly embrittled Palisades atomic reactor.
Our concerns only grow deeper as time goes on, and the embrittlement worsens.
NRC must not weaken its PTS regulations yet again to enable Palisades to keepoperating.
The risks are too great.11
-44*PRet4lix,I-4JEACA D-V-n ec- orXO te04AVIw0UIU6*1 i 1ý .11 a t-t*Pot4IIIIII~JE-N24pN oFefPL14Genkdi-1 Monitoring Test Sample Dat and JEAC 4201-200 The Risk of a MeltdownBy Demetrios L. BasdekasNew York Times Op-Ed, March 29, 1982 [the 3rd anniversary of the Three Mile Islandmeltdown]
Washington-There is a high, increasing likelihood that someday soon, during a seemingly minor malfunction at any of a dozen or more nuclear power plants around the UnitedStates, the steel vessel that houses the radioactive core is going to crack like a piece of glass.The result will be a core meltdown, the most serious kind of accident, which will injuremany people, destroy the plant, and probably destroy the nuclear industry with it.On the third anniversary of the Three Mile Island Accident, the Government andindustry are unable or unwilling to deal honestly and urgently with far-reaching nuclear-safety problems.
Another serious accident is very likely because the wrong metal was used in thereactor vessels, and with each day of operation, neutron radiation is making the metalmore brittle, and more prone to crack in case of sudden temperature change underpressure.
One manufacturer of nuclear reactors has reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that in three to five more years, the vessels in some plants will be too brittle tooperate safely. But this estimate is wishful thinking, based on unrealistic assumptions about plant operators' actions and accident sequences.
Some plants are already toodangerous to operate without corrective measures.
The commission could do a great deal to prevent such an accident, and stretch outthe lives of many of these brittle vessels, if it ordered the type of corrective steps alreadytaken at some European reactors.
But the commission, regulating an industry that hasserious financial and technical
: problems, instead of taking initiatives tends to sweepdifficult technical problems under the rug, reacting to crises only after they occur.The commission must realize that this crisis is upon us. A temperature changesevere enough to crack a brittle reactor vessel already has occurred, in California, but not atone of the older, more vulnerable plants. The commercial nuclear industry's admirable safety record -no deaths caused by radiation
-still is intact, but this cannot last muchlonger, because the reactor vessels and other critical components are aging.For many years, it has been known that vessels are becoming brittle.
What makesthe problem urgent is that the metal is aging more rapidly than expected, and thecircumstances that would cause such an accident now seem more likely.(continued over)
At the Rancho Seco plant, near Sacramento, Calif., in March 1978 a worker droppeda small light bulb into an instrument panel, causing an electrical short circuit.
The shortwreaked havoc on the plant's control systems -a variety of instruments that run crucialpumps and valves -and the result was that too much water was pumped through thereactor, chilling it suddenly.
It is very doubtful that some of the older plants operating today would be able to withstand the same shock. Fortunately, Ranch Seco had been inoperation less than two years; had it been in operation for 10, its pressure vessel mostlikely would have ruptured.
The kinds of control systems that went haywire at Rancho Seco are very likely to failat crucial times in other nuclear power plants. When a pipe bursts, or a seal fails, or a valvesticks, automatic control and safety systems almost instantly take action to compensate, but they do not always take the right action.Control systems are not reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
They arenot immune to fire or power failure; they often have no backups, so are prone to simplefailure.
They are not even earthquake-proof.
The N.R.C. staff has taken the position that if a plant gets into trouble because ofcontrol-system malfunctions, it has safety systems to take care of any problems.
But this isnot so, as events of the last few years show. At Rancho Seco, at Three Mile Island, and atother plants, control systems not thought vital to the safe operation of a plant ended upcausing serious problems.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is charged with ensuring that nuclear plantsare operated "with adequate protection" of the public health and safety. But bureaucratic foot-dragging and preoccupation with public relations and financial problems of theindustry are contributing to a shortsighted view -that technical problems can wait or donot exist. Some members of the staff acknowledge the safety problems associated withcontrol systems, but the agency has yet to demand from utilities operating nuclear powerplants the technical data on control systems necessary to assess the systems' safety fully.It may be that we need nuclear power to maintain our standard of living. But thereis a vast difference between having to accept something, and making it acceptable.
We canmake nuclear power acceptable.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
: chairman, Nuncio Palladino, has spoken ofcleaning up our nuclear act. As a private citizen, I hope that we do so, beginning withvigilance at the N.R.C. One more accident the size of Three Mile Island's, and the public'sreaction almost certainly will foreclose the nuclear option.Demetrios L. Basdekas is a reactor safety engineer with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The Palisades Nuclear Power PlantHighlights of Palisades include:" Commenced commercial operation in 1971; current NRC operating license expires n 2011." License renewal application filed in March 2005; license renewal, anticipated early 2007, wouldextend the license to 2031." Qualified workforce of approximately 470 persons." Currently operated on behalf of Consumers by the Nuclear Management Company (NMC)." Required significant future capital expenditures required above the routine $20M per year,including:
" Reactor vessel head replacement "W 0 ,'%r" Steam generator replacement F I 1.L,.j f 4' -.--" Re-acor vessel embtittlement concerns" Increasing NRC fees and fire protection requirements
" Containment coatings and sump strainers2 Pressurized Thermal Shock Potential at Palisades Prepared by Michael J. KeeganCoalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes(July 8, 1993,Rekeyed August 3, 2005)History of Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vesselsin Pressurized Water ReactorsIrradiation em brittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) may be the single mostimportant factor in determining the operating life of a PWR. PWR vessels are generally constructed from eight inch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vesselstructure.
The major age-related mechanism associated with this component isembrittlement.
Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e., the ability to withstand stresswithout cracking, in the metals which make up the reactor pressure vessel. Embrittlement is caused by neutron bombardment of the vessel metals and is contingent upon theamount of copper and nickel in the metal and the extent of neutron exposure or fluence.In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about 40 degrees F. As the vesselbecomes embrittled, the temperature at which it loses its ductility rises. This change inthe mechanical properties of the metal from ductile to brittle is characterized as thereference temperature for nil ductility transition or Rtndt. Thus as the reactor ages andRPV is exposed to more radiation the Rtndt can shift from its original 40 degrees F to asmuch as 280-290 degrees F or more in extreme cases. (Server, Odette, Ritchie,"Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessels" Vol. 1, NUREG/CR-473 1)Embritllement is of even greater concern to those plants constructed prior to 1972. Thereason for this is that there is copper in the walls of older vessels.
The use of copper wasalso extensive in the welds of the vessel walls in older reactors.
Copper coated wire wasroutinely used to weld together the large plates which make up the RPV. Palisades beganconstruction in 1967 and went commercial in 1972. (Edelson, "Thermal Shock-New Nuclear Reactor Safety Hazard?",
Popular Science, June 1983, p.55-63)The significance of reactor pressure vessel embrittlement is the increased susceptibility toPressurized Thermal Shock (PTS). Pressurized Thermal Shock occurs when the reactorpressure vessel is severely overcooled.
As the PRV is overcooled, there is a drop in thepressure of the primary coolant loop. This rapid decrease in the pressure of the primarycoolant causes the high pressure injection pumps in the emergency core cooling system toautomatically inject coolant into the primary loop. As the injection of coolantI repressurizes the RPV, the vessel is subjected to pressure stresses.
The stresses placed onthe reactor pressure vessel by overcooling and repressurization causes Pressurized Thermal Shock. (Sholly, "Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening Criteria",
Reportprepared for Nuclear Information and Resource
: Service, January 1984)Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) can be initiated by a host of mishapsincluding:
instrumentation and control system malfunctions; small-break loss-of-coolant accidents; mainsteam line breaks; feed water pipe breaks; and steam generator tubruptures.
Any of these incidents can initiate a PTS event. If the fracture resistance of theRPV is reduced through neutron bombardment, severe overcooling accompanied byrepressurization could cause flaws in inner surface of the RPV to propagate into a crackwhich breaches the vessel wall. (Thadani, NRC Memorandum RE: Frequency ofExcessive Cooldown Events Challenging Vessel Integrity, April 21, 1981)Without the reactor pressure vessel surrounding the radioactive fuel it would beimpossible to sufficiently cool the reactor core and a meltdown would ensue. (Ibid,Thadani)
Pressurized Thermal Shock is a safety issue for every pressurized water reactor.(ibid, NUREG/CR-4731
: p. 105)The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has vacillated on the issue of Pressurized ThermalShock for over twenty five years now. Rtndt limits had been originally set at 200 degreesFahrenheit.
These limits were reached in the early to mid 1980's, the NRC begandeveloping new limits within the framework of the PTS rule. In 1982, the NRCconsidered Rtndt limits of 230 and 250 degrees F for longitudinal and circumferential welds respectively.
By 1985, the NRC sought to amend its regulations on Pressurized Thermal Shock. New reference temperatures established limits of 270 degrees F for platematerials and axial welds and 300 degrees F for circumferential welds.(Ibid, Edelson)The Commission (NRC) attempted to gloss over the fact that an increase in the Rtndttranslated into a decreased margin of safety. An NRC press release said the ruleconstituted "further protection from Pressurized Thermal Shock". (Demetrios L.Basdekas, Letter to New York Times, 1985) To cope with the most severely emnbrittled reactors the NRC has allowed some plants to redesign the configuration of the fuel rodsso that fewer neutrons bombard the RPV wall.(The above text has been excerpted from Chapter IV of: "The Aging of Nuclear PowerPlants: A Citizens Guide to Causes and Effects" Nuclear Information and ResourceService, August 1988 authored by James Riccio and Stephanie Murphy. Use granted byJames Riccio.)2)
Embrittlement at Palisades As early as July of 1981 the NRC identified the Palisades reactor as one of fourteenpressurized water reactors (PWR) with serious embrittlement problems.
These fourteenembrittled plants are especially troublesome at high pressures and low temperatures, andcan cause the pressure vessel to crack like hot glass dunked in cold water. At normaloperating temperatures embrittlement poses no problem.
But with a rapid drop in coolanttemperature, caused by a very common scram or transient, the pressure vessel 's insidestry to contract.
The outside of the vessel is still very hot and the temperature differential creates enormous tensile stresses.
(Excerpts from Not Man Apart, Nov. 1981, published by Friends of the Earth)According to Public Citizen Nuclear Lemons report (July 8, 1993) Palisades hasexperienced nine scrams in the previous three years ranking it the tenth worst in thenation (1993). As noted above these are precisely the conditions which can lead topressure vessel rupture if embrittlement is present.
Embrittlement at Palisades in 1981was reported to occur at temperatures of between 190 and 220 degrees F. (Ibid, excerptsfrom Not Man Apart) As noted earlier the NRC had originally set reference temperature for nil ductility transition (Rtndt) at 200 degrees F. As early as 1981 Palisades hadexceeded these original Rtndt limits.Very little can be done to forestall or avoid the problem; it is a process of aging. Anumber of fuel rods can be reconfigured and operating temperatures reduced; this simplyslows the rate of embrittlement and substantially reduces the output of the reactor.
Thisreduces the efficiency or capacity factor of the reactor.
(Ibid, excerpts from Not ManApart) Redesign of the configuration of the fuel rods at the Palisades plant is precisely what has been done in attempts to mitigate the ever increasing embrittlement of thePalisades reactor pressure vessel.The following is a synopsis of a Consumers Power Company document dated May, 1990entitled:
"Analysis of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Fast Neutron Fluence and Pressurized Thermal Shock Reference Temperatures for the Palisades Nuclear Plant" authored by theReactor Engineering Department at Palisades.
In a cover letter dated May 17, 1990 discussing the May report it is concluded that thePressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial welds(vertical welds) in September of 2001. Also, "that the flux reductions achieved in theCycle 8 and 9 core loading patterns are, by themselves, insufficient to allow plantoperation to the current expected end of life in (the year) 2011"...
"Further
: measures, eg,greater flux reduction, Regulatory Guide 1. 154 analysis, vessel shielding etc, arenecessary to allow plant operation to the nominal end of plant life and beyond."Initiated with fuel cycle 1 and continuing through fuel cycle 7 core loading patterns weretypical of out-in fuel management, in that fresh fuel was placed on the core periphery.
This approach results in the maximum overall core neutron leakage and flux to the3 reactor pressure vessel. This is the neutron bombardment which leads to embrittlement, this took place from 1971 through approximately 1987. Beginning with fuel cycle 8thrice used fuel assemblies with stainless steel shielding rods were located near the axialweld locations on the core periphery.
These are the locations where embrittlement is ofthe most concern.
With the fuel cycle 8 reconfiguration flux reduction of a factor of twowere reported at the axial weld locations.
Similar measures will be incorporated in fuelcycle 9. (Ibid, May 1990 p.1) However as noted in July of 1981 the Palisades plant wasalready experiencing embrittlement problems.
(Ibid, Not Man Apart)The old adage "like closing the barn door after the horse is out" comes to mind.Operation beyond the end of cycle 8 (September 1990) was assumed to occur at 75%capacity.
With no flux reduction
: utilized, the PTS screening criteria would be exceeded atthe axial welds in 1995. With flux reduction incorporated in cycle 9 and beyond, the PTSlimit would be exceeded at the axial welds in September, 2001. These predicted dates arefar short of the assumed nominal plant operating license expiration date of March, 2011.(Ibid, May 1990 p. 4) In order to get to the year 2001 before exceeding PTS limits it isassumed that the plant will not exceed 75% capacity factor after cycle 8. (Ibid. May 1990p. 12)The models for determining vessel flux and fluence calculations are extrapolations.
Thelast actual measurement data (from the suspect axial welds) that was taken forcomparison from an analysis of radiometric dosimeters irradiated in the W-290 vesselwall surveillance capsule was removed at the end of cycle 5. (ibid, May 1990 p. 8) Thereare methodological uncertainties with the reliance on proxy indicators of energygeneration data, and reactor power history to determine the level of vessel embrittlement.
The computer models employed to estimate the level of flux and fluence and ultimately vessel embrittlement are subject to "GIGO". That is garbage in, garbage out, they are atbest estimates based on many assumptions, they are not actual analysis of the metal.Specifically the problem axial welds identified which would limit the life of the Palisades reactor are located at 0 degrees and 30 degrees.
It is not clear if these are the only axialwelds that are suspect.
In the methodology section 3.3 Geometry it is stated that thePalisades reactor exhibits 1/8 th core symmetry, thus only a zero to 45 degree sector hasbeen included in the DOT model. Are there suspect axial welds in the remaining 7/8 th'sof the vessel? Are there suspect circumference welds?Consumers Power Company (Now CMS) acknowledges a calculational uncertainty of+ /-25% is estimated in the calculated vessel wall fluence, this is said to be typical ofcurrent neutron transport methodology uncertainties.
Considering the consequences of acore meltdown the + / -25% margin of error is not acceptable.
Consumers Power Company goes on to discuss other means to maximize vessel lifetimeincluding areas of greater flux reduction; waiting for the NRC to again relax PTSstandards; data manipulation and use of other estimating models; vessel annealing (artificially overheating the vessel to bring back the ductility);
and shielding actions to4 reduce the accumulated vessel embrittlement rate. (Ibid, May 1990 p. 45) These are allmeasures that were never considered or conceived when the promise of "too cheap tometer" was the talk of the day.As it stands the outside limit on the life of Palisades is the year 2001, running at a 75%capacity factor with a + / -25% margin of error on neutron bombardment.
These areserious economic constraints.
All of this with the perpetual threat of loss of thecontainment due to Pressurized Thermal Shock coupled with the danger of storage ofHigh Level Nuclear Waste on the shore of Lake Michigan.
Consider the risk: The NRCcommissioned a study from the Sandia Labs which was tho provide an assessment of aworst case accident at each U.S. nuclear power plant. The 1982 study concluded thatthere would be 52.6 billion dollars (1980 dollars) of damage at Palisades.
13,000 deathsdue to cancer would occur. This study does not consider the loss of 20% of the world'ssurface fresh water.Continued operation of the Palisades nuclear power plant constitutes poor economics andpoor public policy. The day has come to shut down Palisades for economic, environmental, and safety reasons.
The Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes calls onthe Michigan Public Service Commission to hold public hearings concerning the viability of the Palisades plant and to place the onus upon Consumers Power Company to showcause as to why the plant should not be removed from operation.
5 NUKar INFO TOKYONUKE NFO ay/June 2012Citizens' Nuclear Information CenterAkebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0065, JAPAN Phone: +81 3 3357 3800 Fax: +81 3 3357 3801URL: http://cnic.jp/english/
e-mail : cnic@nifty.com Complete Halt of All Nuclear Power Plants in JapanBut for how long can restarts be prevented?
May 5 is "Children's Day" in Japan, aholiday on which the happiness of children iscelebrated.
On this day in 2012, the childrenreceived the special gift of the total shutdownof all Japan's nuclear power plants. The onereactor that was online, Hokkaido ElectricPower Company's Tomari Unit 3 (PWR,912MW) was halted for regular maintenance.
At the time of the accident at TokyoElectric Power Company's (TEPCO)Fukushima Daiichi Power Station, Japan'snuclear reactors numbered
: 54. A yearlater, on April 19, Fukushima DaiichiPower Station's Units 1 to 4 (BWR, Unit1,460MW, Units 2 to 4,784MW each) wereofficially decommissioned, leaving theContentsComplete Halt ofAll NPPs in Japan 1 -3Fukushima:
Worker Compensation Recognized 4.5Radioactive contamination on HLW canisters 6.7Symposium on the Truth of Fukushima 7No Nukes Asia Forum in Korea 8.9Irradiation embrittlement of pressure vessels 10- 12Group Intro: JOSHRC 13News Watch 14 2May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148Man wears a Japanese helmet (kabuto) to wish for thehappiness and well-being of children at the "Goodbyeto Nuclear Power Plants" Rally on May 5 in Tokyo.number of reactors in Japan currently at50. After the Fukushima nuclear accident, nuclear reactors that had been halted due toregular maintenance or problems before theFukushima nuclear accident
: occurred, andthose shut down for regular maintenance one after the other in the weeks and monthsfollowing the nuclear accident could not berestarted.
As a result, all of Japan's nuclearreactors are now shut down.The government and the powercompanies have tried desperately to geteven one or two reactors restarted in orderto avoid this total shutdown
: scenario, andnow that all the reactors have been haltedtheir intention is to break out of this situation as soon as possible.
But they are faced withstrong resistance; that of gaining the approvalof the local administrations of the areas inwhich the power plants are located.
Legally,the local administrations have no power toprevent restarts.
Under the safety agreements concluded between the power companies and Fukui Prefecture, Niigata Prefecture and the administrative units (cities, townsand villages) in which the power plants arelocated, when it is judged that there is a needfor special measures to be taken following an on-site inspection by administrative bodyofficials, the administrative body can demandthat the power company take appropriate
: measures, including the shutting down ofreactors, and it is specified that in the caseof shutdowns consultations must take placebefore reactors are restarted.
In the case of Fukui, even whenthe state establishes a special commission to investigate an accident, there must beconsultations prior to reactor restarts.
Naturally,
: however, this is limited to thereactors in which the accident actuallyoccurred.
In addition, these are consultations, and it is considered that 'prior approval' is notin fact required.
In agreements other than theFukui and Niigata Prefecture agreements thereis not even mention of prior consultations.
That restarts cannot be implemented withoutthe prior approval of local administrations is, of course, due to strong public opinionfollowing the Fukushima nuclear accident.
: Moreover, because of the spread of nuclearcontamination that took place as a result of theFukushima nuclear accident, not only the localadministrations where nuclear power plantsare located but surrounding administrations are also insisting that the power companies seek their approval before reactor restarts (aswell as the conclusion of safety agreements).
On April 13, the government, in ameeting of the Prime Minister, the Ministerof Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministerof the Environment and for the Restoration from and Prevention of Nuclear Accidents, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary judgedthat proposed restarts of the Kansai ElectricPower Company's (KEPCO) Ohi nuclearplant Units 3 and 4 (PWR, 1,180MW each)were appropriate.
On the next day, April 14,the government explained this decision tothe local administration, Ohi Town in FukuiPrefecture, and to adjacent Shiga Prefecture and Kyoto Prefecture on April 23, urging their'understanding.'
In response, Fukui Pretecture indicated that it would initiate verification ofthe decision in the prefecture's Nuclear PowerSafety Specialist Committee and Shiga andKyoto Prefectures each stated their intention of deliberating the matter in specialist committees of experts.Prior to the government explanation, Shiga and Kyoto Prefectures submitted aseven-point proposal to the government onApril 17 in which they demanded the earlyestablishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and a roadmap indicating a phase-out of reliance on nuclear power, showingthat 'understanding' was still quite some wayoff. Further, on April 10, Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, one step further away fromFukui Prefecture, announced eight conditions, including the conclusion of safety agreements with local administrations within 100 km ofnuclear power plants, which was submitted tothe government on April 24. Fukui Prefecture Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 20123__1had already, on September 15, 2011,demanded that the government strengthen disaster prevention measures such as the earlyconstruction or improvement of roads fordisaster
: control, as well as making restartsconditional on such matters as the publicannouncement of all information concerning the Fukushima nuclear accident.
Opinionpolls conducted by mass media companies also showed that opposition to restarts wasrunning strong and that the hurdles to nuclearreactor restarts are, in fact, very high.In spite of this, it is not easy to predicthow long restarts can be prevented.
Themost important thing is to prevent restartsfrom occurring for as long as possibleand show for a fact that there is no non-nuclear power supply shortage problemin Japan, even in overcoming the summerpeak power demand. It is undoubtedly forthis reason that the government and the powerindustry want to restart as many nuclearreactors as possible in order to be able tosay that we were spared blackouts thanks tonuclear power. Concerning power supply,the government and the power industryare disseminating the propaganda that ifnuclear reactors remain shut down demandwill exceed supply, especially in KEPCO'sgenerating region. However, with regard toKEPCO's estimated power demand, severalexperts have pointed out that KEPCO hasunderestimated both its supply estimates and the effect of power saving comparedwith other power companies, and that powersupply compatible with demand is possible bypurchase of power from other suppliers.
In any event, the implied notion thatsupply is more important than safety"is mistaken.
Even though that may be so, overand above that, and with the background ofthe proof that there is no non-nuclear powersupply shortage
: problem, we would like tobring about a phase-out of nuclear powerthrough clear enshrinement in laws as thepolicy of the state and/or as the firm decision ofthe power companies.
While a nuclear phase-out may be fraught with difficulties, it is notalways clear exactly what those difficulties are. Once the country is determined toimplement a nuclear phase-out policy, thedifficulties will then become clear in a muchmore concrete form. It is, indeed, only in thisway that appropriate countermeasures can beset up.The government has said that it willinitiate a national public discussion on energypolicy. The new energy policy, entitled the"Innovative Energy and Environmental Strategy" is due to be finalized sometimethis summer. Formulation of the "Strategy" is to be coordinated by an "Energy andEnvironment Council" consisting of theMinister for National Strategy as chairperson, and the Ministers of Economy, Trade andIndustry; Education,
: Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology; and the Minister for theRestoration from and Prevention of NuclearAccidents.
It is said that the "Strategy" will reflect discussions on a review of theFramework for Nuclear Energy Policy and theBasic Energy Plan.The Framework for Nuclear EnergyPolicy is a document drawn up and approvedby the Atomic Energy Commission, and thetask of drawing up a revised version beganin late 2010. The Basic Energy Plan is drawnup by the Advisory Committee for NaturalResources and Energy, a consultative body ofthe Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, is approved by cabinet decision and takes theforn of policy drawn Lip by the government.
The Plan was revised recently, in 2010, andsince it has a very strong bias towards thepromotion of nuclear power, following theFukushima nuclear power plant earthquake disaster it is due to be reviewed "fromscratch."
The review of the Basic Energy Planwill indicate options for the composition ofpower supply from different sources (nuclearpower, thermal, renewables, etc.), and therevision of the Framework for Nuclear EnergyPolicy will show options for the nuclear fuelcycle (reprocessing of all used fuel, directdisposal, and storage),
data such as costsand CO, emissions being given for each ofthese options.
The options for the new energypolicy will then be the subject of nationaldiscussion.
The options themselves look asif they will present problems, since the effectof energy conservation and other efforts arelikely to be underestimated for each of theoptions, leading to a higher estimate for totalpower demand. CNIC's Hideyuki Ban isparticipating as a committee member in bothreviews and is struggling to ensure that atleast some meaningful options are taken up.In the end, however, it is crucial that it is thepeople of the nation who decide energy policyand that the solicitation of opinions does notbecome a mere exercise in formality.
(Baku Nishio, CNIC Co-Director) 4May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148Labor Standards Inspection Office in Yokohamarecognizes death of Fukushima nuclear workeras eligible for compensation On February 24, the Yokohama MinamiLabor Standards Inspection Office (LSIO)determined that the fatal heart attack of a worker,Nobukatsu Osumi, at the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Station in May 2011 was caused byoverwork, and recognized his death as a workplace accident eligible for workers' compensation.
Thisis the first tinme in which compensation has beenrecognized for the illness or death of a worker at thenuclear accident site.Mr. Osumi was hired as a temporary worker by a construction
: company, a fourth-level subcontractor under the prinme contractor ToshibaCorp., in Omaezaki City, Shizuoka Prefecture, andwas dispatched to the Fukushima Nuclear PowerStation.
At around 2:30 a.m. on May 13, he left theworkers' dormitory, quite a long distance from thenuclear accident site, and began his first three-hour shift, from 6:00 to 9:00 a.m., working on pipingand other work for installing waste processing equipment in a radioactive waste disposal facility attie complex.On the second day, at around 6:50 a.rn. onMay 14, he collapsed while carrying a special kindof saw. He was rushed to the plant's first-aid room,but the doctor was off duty, and at 8:10 he wastransported to J Village, a sports facility about 20kilometers away from the plant now being used as alogistical base for workers at the Fukushima nuclearaccident site, which did not have sufficient medicalequipment.
He was then taken to a hospital in IwakiCity by ambulance, where he died at 9:33 a.m..It took more than two hours from the tinewhen Mr. Osumi complained of not feeling wellto his arrival at the Iwaki hospital.
Following hisdeath, some experts criticized the deficiencies inthe plant's emergency care system for workers.
Inresponse, plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co.(TEPCO) has at last placed a doctor on standby24 hours a day. While working at the plant, Mr.Osumi received only a small radiation dosage,0.68 millisieverts (mSv). According to somemedia reports, when Mr. Osumi's family appliedfor workers' compensation TEPCO commented that the company did not believe there was astrong connection between the work and his death.Meanwhile, Toshiba said the relationship betweenthe work and his heart attack was not clear, and that,at that stage it was difficult to judge whether or not itwas a workplace accident.
To date, neither Toshibanor TEPCO have offered consolatory money orother compensation, customary in Japan whena worker dies at the workplace, to his bereavedfamily.LSIO attaches importance to the extremely severe working environment at Fukushima plantAlthough Mr. Osumi only worked for a totalof just under four hours on the two days, the workwas carried out in a harsh environment, wearing amask and protective
: clothing, and entailed traveling a long distance late at night followed by work in theearly morning.
LSIO concluded that the extremely severe working environment placed heavy mentaland physical burdens on the worker, resulting in theheart attack, and therefore recognized his death asdue to overwork for a short period of time, which iseligible for compensation.
The Ministry of Health, Labor andWelfare (MHLW) says it will recognize brain orheart disease as a 'workplace accident eligible forcompensation' only when the patient was involvedin one of the following three cases immediately before the development of the symptom,
: 1) a longperiod of overwork,
: 2) extremely hard work for ashort period of time, or 3) an abnormal occurrence (e.g. an accident).
Up to now, however, it has proven verydifficult for nuclear power station workers to winLSIO recognition for workplace accidents.
Therecent government recognition of the workingenvironment at the nuclear power station asextremely severe is, therefore, a landmarkadmission, and is expected to pave the way forrelief for workers who have become ill or who havebeen involved in an accident at the site.Mr. Osumi is not the only worker to havedied while working at the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Station.
Three others have lost theirlives while working there, including a male workerengaged in the management of radiation exposuredoses of other workers using the resting station.He died of leukemia despite the fact that he wasengaged in this work for only seven days in earlyAugust last year. His cumulative radiation exposurewas 0.5 mSv, and his internal exposure is said tohave been zero.Another male worker in his 50's, whobegan work at the site on August 8, collapsed anddied on October 6 while working on the installation Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 20125of a tank for storing contaminated water fromthe crippled reactor units. The cause of his deathwas shock from blood poisoning resulting froma retroperitoneal abscess.
On the previous day,at around 7 a.m., he became unable to walk andcomplained of feeling ill as he was heading for aregular morning work meeting.
His cumulative radiation exposure was 2.02 mSv.The third worker was engaged in pouringconcrete in the sludge waste storage facility, underconstruction at the time, on January 9, 2012 whenhe complained of feeling unwell. He was rushed tothe emergency care room at Units 5 and 6, but hefell into a state of respiratory arrest and was taken toa hospital in Iwaki City.As of the end of February 2012, a totalof 35 applications for workers' compensation had been filed by workers at the nuclear accidentsite. In September 2011, MHLW Minister YokoKomiyama stated that she intended to relax theconditions for granting workers' compensation to nuclear power station workers so that workerssuffering from various types of cancer wouldbecome eligible for compensation.
We hope thisplan will be implemented and that more nuclearpower station workers will be able to receive suchcompensation.
Two persons have also died in decontamination workDecontamination work is currently beingcarried out in many parts of Japan, and two peoplehave already died while engaged in such work. OnDecember 12, 2011, a male worker participating ina model decontamination project in Shimo-oguni, Ryozen-machi, Date City, Fukushima Prefecture, was foundunconscious in atruck during lunchbreak. He was in astate of respiratory arrest and died inhospital about onehour later. The causeof his death is yet tobe announced.
T h eNuclear DisasterCountermeasures Headquarters of theCabinet Office andthe Japan AtomicEnergy Agencyjointly announced on January1 7, 2012that another maleat J- rillege (Photo by TEPCO) worker involved ina model decontamination project in Hirono Town,Fukushima Prefecture, collapsed while workingand died in hospital of a myocardial infarction.
In the short space of just two monthsfrom October last year, a new regulation ondecontamination was enacted and went into fulleffect on January 1, 2012. This regulation appliesto the whole area of Fukushima Prefecture, andto some areas of Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Tochigi,Gunma, Saitama, and Chiba Prefectures in whichradiation doses are expected to exceed 0.23microsievert per hour (gSv/hr).
These areas aredesignated as "special decontamination zones"where decontamination work should be carriedout under direct government
: control, or "priority areas for contamination surveys,"
where thedecontamination of land plots, including theremoval and collection of contaminated soil, is tobe carried out. The annual radiation exposure limitfor decontamination workers is 50 mSv and thefive-year limit 100 mSv, the same level as that fornuclear power station workers.As for decontamination work to beconducted in other places, such as in companypremises and branch offices, the government callson volunteer
: workers, the self-employed, or localresidents participating in the work to observe thenew regulation.
We will keep a close watch onthe development of this problem of the radiation exposure of decontamination
: workers, in additionto the exposure problems of nuclear power stationworkers.(Mikiko Watanabe, CNIC) 6May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148Inspections of vitrified HLW returning from Britainreveal radioactive contamination on canister surfacesWhat is the cause of this and how should Japan respond?On Aug. 3,2011, 76 canisters of vitrified high-level waste (HLW) were shipped from Sellafield inBritain, arriving at the port of Mutsu-Ogawara, AomoriPrefecture, oln Sept. 15. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.(JNFL) announced on Oct. 12, 2011 that radioactive contamination was discovered on the surface of threeof the 28 canisters which were contained in the No.1transport flask. The HLW in these canisters originated from the Kyushu Electric Power Company.Before storing the returned HLW in thehigh-level radioactive waste storage control center(in the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in AomoriPrefecture) its condition was checked for heat output,external appearance, size, weight, radiation enmissions, confinement of radiation, and contamination ofthe surface.
When a smear test revealed that thesurface of some of the vitrified HLW canisters werecontaminated with radioactive substances and thatthe contamnination level was higher than the reference level, decontamination measures (wiping) were takenrepeatedly.
Tihe reference level for the concentration of total alpha radiation is 0.4 Bq/cm2, and that for totalnon-alpha radiation 4 Bq/cm-. If repeated wiping of thesurface reduces the contamination level to below thereference level, the canisters pass the test.The table below shows the results of the teststhat began on Sept. 21. We asked for these data in mid-November.
Repeated wiping was conducted on twoof the three canisters whose surface was found to becontaminated.
With regard to the remaining canister(B305144),
an extremely high level of concentration ofnon-alpha radiation, 400 Bq/cm2, was detected in theinitial test, a contamination level 100 times higher thanthe reference level. Since then, a total of 29 tests havebeen carried out on the canisters.
Some of the testsrevealed a decline in the contamination level, whileother tests showed higher levels. Tilis may indicate thatradiation is leaking from the canisters.
This accident is serious.
The inspection jointlyconducted by JNFL, Kyushu Electric Power Co.(KEPCO) and Nuclear Fuel Transport Co. in BritainCanister Number: B04773Testnumber I 1 2 1 3Alpha Radiation(Bq/cm
) 0.071 L0.038 1.0.021Non-Alpha Radiation(Bqlcmn) 8.8 l4.9 t 1.9prior to the shipment of the vitrified HLW revealedno radioactive contamination on the surface of thecanisters.
If the contamination emerged during thetransportation period, only a matter of several weeks,this means that there must be a serious problem withthe integrity of the canisters.
Possible causes of thisflaw are defective welding onl the canister and damageto the surface of the canisters.
Unless full-fledged investigations into the cause of this problem are carriedout, including the re-examination of the whole processof HLW vitrification, and sufficient measures taken toprevent a recurrence of the problem, the transport ofvitrified HLW must be halted.(Reported on Nov. 19, 2011)This is a follow-up report on the radioactive contamination on the surface of the vitrified HLWcanisters returned from Britain to Japan onl Sept. 15,2011. The canister (B105144),
whose surface was foundto be contaminated with an extremely high level (4002) of non-alpha radiation, 100 times higher thanthe reference level, was wiped several tens of times andwas said to have cleared the reference level. On Dec.26, the canister was stored in the storage pit at the high-level radioactive waste storage control center in theRokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomrori Prefecture.
Three months later, on March 23, 2012, JNFLand KEPCO, the owner of the vitrified HLW, jointlyannounced the suspected cause of the contamination of the canister surfaces and measures to preventa recurrence of the problem.
As to the cause, theyclaimed that in the production
: process, fine glasspowder containing radioactive substances becameattached to the surface of the canister where the lid fitsonto the body of the canister.
The worker, however,welded the lid on without removing the glass powderstuck on the surface of the canister, and as a result oftiffs, the glass powder melted and formed a thin filmof glass on part of the surface.
The vitrified HLW wasthen shipped to Japan. According to the two companies, hi the JNFL inspection conducted prior to the storageCanister Number: B04851Testnmanber 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 9Alpha Raito(qc2 0.17 0.11 0.034 0.022 0.017 0.013 10.011 0.009 0.027Non-Alpha Radiation(Bq/em
: 2) 22 13 4.0 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.1 0.76 2.0Canister Number: B05144Testnumber 1 I2 13 4 S5 16 I7 [8 9 1 10 I11 112 113 114 115Test 3.1 1.4 0.64 0.22 0.70 0.40 o0.18 0.14 1 0.11 10.076 10.06610.048 0.046 0.034 1 0.028on-Alpha Radiation(tq/em2) 400 190 83 29 91 52 23 18 14 10 8.2 5.8 5.614.0 3.3I 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [2910.073 0.040 0.042105.043 10.045 1 0.039 0.040 [ 0.039 0.034 J 0.029 0.026 10.026 0.026 0.0259.1 4.9 5.1 1 5.2 1 5.5 14.7 14.9 14.7 4.3 13.4 3.5 13.1 3.0 12.9]Table showing results of tests on the three contaminated HLW canisters Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 20127Iof the glass blocks, the crane thatlifted the glass blocks came intocontact with the contaminated
: surface, crushing the glassfilm into small pieces, therebyexposing the contamination.
Thus far, no detaileddata on this incident have beendisclosed, and no explanation hasbeen given for the details of thecontaminated canister
: surfaces, the vitrification process in Britain,or why (or how) the lid was thecause of the contamination.
Referring to preventive
: measures, it has been suggested that there will be more frequentvisual inspections using camerasin Britain.
Should radioactive contamination be discovered on the canister surface duringphysical inspections, additional bead blasting, a process forA glass particle,
'The contaminating glassthe contamination
_* particle remained on thesource, became lip when the lid was placedattached to the on and welded to theupper part of the canister.
As glass is lighterlip for receiving than the welding material, the canister lid. the glass spread to form afilm over the surface.[External chieck] [Surface contamination
'It was notAs the objective of inspection]
[ tothe inspection is to As the glass, which is possible tocheck that there is no lighter than the welding eliminate theabnormal abrasion m al material, had spread out as contamination and so on, the a film over the surface, it usingexistence of the was not possible to bead blastinganomaly in question discover the existence of to reducewas not discovered, the contamination source. _contamination.
Due to the lifting gear approaching the canister lid slightly tilted fromthe horizontal, it came into contactLifting g Expanded view with the area of the contamination source, causing the contamination to become apparent.
If the liftinggear comes into contact with thecanister in a horizontal manner, itwill not touch against the area closeEnv to the weld.Diagram outlining inferred cause of contamination (Based on Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited website.)
removing surface deposits by spraying fine stainless-steel beads at a high pressure, will be carried out.However, the fact remains that beat blasting wasconducted in Britain after the vitrified HLW wasloaded into the canisters, and inspections did not detectcontamination on the canister surface.Under the current circumstances, the onlymeasure that can be taken when contamination isdiscovered in the pre-storage inspection is to applymore bead blasting to the surface of the vitrified HLW canisters produced in Sellafield.
Bead blasting,
: however, has a number of shortcomings, for example,that it will create more nuclear waste, and that it willaggravate the contamination of the canister surfaceif the beads themselves become contaminated.
Asthings stand now, JNFL is considering the quite natumlresponse of refusing to accept the return of the vitrified HLW to Japan if it is impossible to decontaminate thecanisters.
(Reported on April 11, 2012)(Masako Sawai, CNIC)International Symposium on the Truth of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the Myth of Nuclear SafetyThe March 11, 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster showed the tragic consequences that may occur when nuclear technology gets out of control.The causes and the process by which the accident occurred have still not beendetermined, but some people associated with the nuclear power industry continue topromulgate the nuclear safety myth. Arguing that the Fukushima accident was the result of laxmanagement and a larger-than-predicted
: tsunami, they blithelv claim that as long as nuclearpower plants are properly managed they can be operated safelyFrom a scientific and technical perspective, and to the extent currently
: possible, thisinternational symposium will attempt to get to the bottom of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclearaccident.
The symposium will look at Japan's nuclear energy policy and how it trivialized safety, and, by analyzing the facts, show how this led to such a massive nuclear accident.
Dates: August 30 & 31, 2012Venue: Tokyo University Komaba Campus, Building 18,First Floor Hall (seats 200), JAPANDraft ProgramWhat Happened at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power PlantCurrent Status of Radioactive Contamination Japan s Nuclear Policy and Formation of the Safety MythThe State of Nuclear Science and Technology1 Summing Up -from the Perspective of Scientists and Technologists SpeakersMitsuhiko Tanaka, Arnie Gundersen, Katsuhiko Ishibashi, Tetsuji inanaka, Hitoshi Yoshioka, Philip White, Tetsuva Takahashi, Miranda Schreurs, Satoru Ikeuchi and more...
8May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 14815th No Nukes Asia Forum in South Korea"No Nukes": Residents speak out in Samcheok andYeongdeok, proposed sites for new nuclear power plantsSince the Fukushima nuclearaccidents, there have been moves around theworld to reconsider nuclear energy policies, but, as always, there are also counter moveswhich ignore the fervent cries of the people.In March several pro-nuclear conferences were held in South Korea in quick succession.
The Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference washeld in Busan from March 18 to 23, theNuclear Industry Summit was held in Seoulon March 23, and the Nuclear SecuritySummit was held on March 26 and 27. It wasin this context that Energy Justice Actionsand other South Korean NGOs organized the15th No Nukes Asia Forum (NNAF) fromMarch 19 to 24. A total of 42 people attendedthe forum, 32 of these from Indonesia, thePhilippines,
: Thailand, Taiwan and Japan.Due to the Nuclear Security Summit,the atmosphere at the airport was very tense.Without giving any reason, the South KoreanGovernment refused entry to one of theJapanese NNAF participants.
On the morningof March 19 a press conference was heldin front of the Sejong Center to protest thedenial of entry to Shin Kurumizawa fromOsaka and the deception of the NuclearSecurity Summit.After that we attended an assembly ofPhoto by A. Kobayasin Catholic priests in Samcheok, Gangwon-do.
Along with Yeongdeok in Gyeongsangbuk-do, Samcheok was selected last Decemberby Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power as the siteof a new nuclear power plant. There werebanners everywhere saying "No Nukes!"One of the participants was KenichiHasegawa, a dairy farmer from litate Villagein Fukushima Prefecture.
He told how afterthe accident he was forced to destroy allhis cows and how the eight members ofhis family were scattered.
He said, "Themountains and farmland of my home townwere contaminated with radioactivity.
I wantFukushima to be the last place where peoplehave to go through this kind of experience."
At a demonstration of about 1,500 people wechanted "Absolutely no nukes!" and "Recallthe mayor," while onlookers joined in thechanting.
At the meeting in the evening, Mr.Hasegawa showed photos. "litate was a placewhere everyone cooperated to make thevillage beautiful.
After the accident we had toescape, leaving behind our cows, who werelike family to us." There were sighs fromthe audience as we heard stories of womensaying goodbye to their cows which werebeing led off to the slaughter, of a suicide Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 20129note from a despairing friend, and of cowsdying of starvation.
Emily Dela Cruz from the Philippines gave a report on how in 1986 they prevented operation of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,which was built in 1984. Behind their successwas a persistent movement from the mid1970s along with citizens' education.
Thecivil society movement reached its peak atthe end of the Marcos era in the mid 1980s. Iwas moved once again to hear how a strongpeople's movement was able to prevent anuclear power plant from being started up.I am sure it gave courage to the people ofSamcheok.
The following day, after a tour of theproposed site of the Samcheok nuclear powerplant we went to Yeongdeok.
Lee Byeong-hwan, the leader of the Stop Yeongdeok Nuclear Power Plant Committee expressed his opposition, saying, "The proposed siteis in a region of active faults. The nuclearpower plant will destroy the marine ecology."
Yeongdeok has on three occasions repellednuclear-related facilities, including aradioactive waste dump.At the forum Setsuko Kuroda fromKoriyama City in Fukushima Prefecture explained the painful situation that the peopleof Fukushima find themselves in. Lai Fenlanfrom Taiwan's Green Party said, "Taiwan's anti-nuclear movement developed in closeassociation with the fight for democracy.
Welearned from the renewable energy policiesof Germany and grew the movement insolidarity with Green Parties throughout theworld." Pan Han-Shen, who was a GreenParty candidate, said, "Our national supportrate is not that high, but on Orchid Island,the site of a radioactive waste dump, oursupport rate is 36%, making us the secondstrongest party." After that, Lin Shih-Lan, an indigenous person from Orchid Island,gave a report about the staggering situation on the island. "At first we were told that acanned fish factory would be built. At thedisposal site people don't wear any protective clothing.
The windows are left wide open,so radioactive materials and radiation arereleased to the outside.
This is happening because there is no strict regulation ofoperations."
He also said, "70% of theworkers at the disposal site are indigenous people. There is a big pay difference between the indigenous people and the otherworkers,"
indicating that indigenous peopleare discriminated against in terms of wagesNuclear Facilities in South KoreaOn March 21 in Busan we carriedout a protest action against the Pacific BasinNuclear Conference.
At a meeting about theFukushima nuclear accident I reported on thesituation of workers at the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Plant. Setsuko Kuroda andSaeko Uno, an evacuee from Fukushima, reported on the difficult conditions of thedisaster victims.On March 22 we participated in aninternational meeting at Sogang University in Seoul. The meeting was held in opposition to the Nuclear Security Summit and severalNNAF participants gave presentations.
On March 23, on the way to a pressconference opposing the Nuclear IndustrySummit, hoards of police blocked the subwaystation passageways.
We quickly unfurled ourplacards and chanted "No more Fukushimas!
No more Fukushimas!
No more nuclearenergy in Asia!" Mass media cameras flashed,lighting up the protesters, who did not budgein spite of harassment from the police. Oursubway press conference was a great success.In the afternoon, NNAF participants releaseda joint statement and decided that the nextNNAF meeting would be held in Indonesia.
It was the first time for me toparticipate in NNAF. It was a very movingexperience and a tremendous inspiration forme to take action and exchange opinionswith the participants, who came from manycountries.
I hope to make the most of theexperience in my future activities.
I also hopethat as friends united by a common goal, wecan continue to deepen our solidarity.
(Mikiko Watanabe, CNIC) 10May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148Aging Nuclear Power Plants focusing in particular on irradiation embrittlement of pressure vesselsHiromitsu InoOutline of Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement in Aging Nuclear Power PlantsDestruction of a reactor pressure vesseldue to neutron irradiation embrittlement should becalled an extreme severe accident.
If the pressurevessel breaks, there is almost no way of preventing a runaway chain reaction.
Such extreme damagemust be avoided at all costs.The benchmark for irradiation embrittlement is the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT). If an extreme situation arises,such as pipe rupture due to an earthquake, it isnecessary to cool the core using the emergency corecooling system (ECCS). However, if the DBTT ishigh, this becomes a dangerous operation.
Whencooled suddenly, a temperature difference arisesbetween the inner and outer walls of the pressurevessel and strong tensile stress is brought to bearon the inner wall. If such tensile stress is appliedwhen the temperature is below the DBTT, thereis a danger that cracks could occur in the pressurevessel wall, leading to failure of the pressure vesseland a severe accident.
Table 1 shows Japanese nuclear powerreactors in descending order of the DBTT of theirpressure vessels.
The table shows seven reactorsin which DBTT exceeds 50'C. They are all oldreactors that began operating in the 1970s.Genkai- I is the worst. The DBTT for thisreactor was anmounced in October 2010. The figurecomes from the most recent test of monitoring specimens in April 2009. The DBTT rose 42°Csince the previous test result of 56°C in February1993. This is a new record for Japan. This reactorwill be discussed in detail in NIT 149.All the reactors listed from second to fifthplace in the table are located in Fukui Prefecture and are owned by Kansai Electric Power Company(KEPCO).
In particular, we have been concerned about the continued operation of Mihama-1&2, where high DBTTs have been observed sincethe beginning of the 1990s. KEPCO asserts thatresults of pressurized thermal shock (PTS) analysisshow that even if the ECCS was used in the eventof a pipe rupture the pressure vessel would notfail. However, the evaluation methodology forthe stress arising, KI, has not been released, soit is impossible to know whether this analysis isreliable.
PTS analysis assesses the pressurized thermal shock to the core of PWR pressure vesselsin the case of accidents such as loss of coolantaccidents and main steam pipe ruptures.
It isnecessary to confirm that the critical stress intensity factor KI does not exceed the fracture toughness Kic.The reactors listed in sixth and seventhplaces in Table I are BWRs. The inner diameterof BWR pressure vessels is large compared toPWRs and the amount (flux) of neutron irradiation received in a given time is one or two orders ofmagnitude less than in PWRs. From the table it canbe seen that the total amount (fluence) of irradiation received by Tsuruga-I is about one thirtieth of thatof Mihama-1, even though they began operating atmuch the same time. (There is a slight difference inoperating time and also in the date the specimens were taken.) Consequently, it was thought thatneutron radiation embrittlement was not such abig problem in BWRs as it was in PWRs. (Evennow many researchers and engineers are still inthe grips of that "common sense.")
: However, aftermany years of operation, as we came to know thereality of irradiation embrittlement in BWRs, this"common sense" has been overturned..
The totalamount (fluence) of irradiation is not the onlydetermining factor for irradiation embrittlement.
It has become clear that the rate (flux) at whichirradiation occurs is also a determining factor.As will be discussed in part two, this led to anamendment to the monitoring specimen methodTable 1: Reactor Pressure Vessel Ducile-Britdle Transilon Temperature (DBTT) -Worst 7Neutron fklence Date of experiment Rank Reactor Unit Type Startup Classiicatin DBTT (10"s n/cm2) (removal) 1 Genkail-1 PWR Oct. 15, 1975 Mother material 980C 7.0 April 2009Mother materal 74oC2 Mhama-1 PWR Nov. 28, 1970 Weld material 810C 3.0 May 20013 Mhama-2 PWR July 25, 1972 Mother material 780C 4.4 Sep. 20034 Ohi-2 PWR Dec. 5, 1979 Mother materal 700C 4.7 March 20005 Takahama-1 PWR Nov. 19, 1974 Mother material 680C
* 1.3 Nov. 2002Mother material 51oc6 Tsuruga-1 BWR Mar. 14, 1970 Wedh material 430C 0.094 June 20037 Fukushia BWR Mar. 26 1971 Mother material 50oC 0.09 Aug. 1999Source: Prepared by the author from "Results of Monitoring Tests on Steel in Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessels,"
CNIC*As of July 2011. A DBT" of 95 °C was later observed in Takahama-1.
Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 2012I IJEAC-4201 and to the situation where two B3WRsare now listed among the worst seven and, otherBWRs are also known to have high levels ofirradiation.
Why Does Irradiation Embrittlement Occur? -Basic ConceptMetal materials become degraded forall sorts of reasons.
One reason is "radiation damage."
This phenomenon is investigated at theatomic level though the study of lattice defects.The Physical Society of Japan has had a sectionon lattice defects for over 50 years. As a personalnote, I have devoted myself to this field of researchsince becoming interested in it as a university student.
I became a tutor at Osaka University andexperienced the student uprisings of the I 960s.In hindsight I can see that this field of research, which originated in the United States, developed in tandem with nuclear energy. Nevertheless, that fact did not lead me to abandon the field. Icarried out materials research using radiation as aguest researcher at the Kyoto University ResearchReactor Institute.
: However, it was difficult to seea connection between this research and the socialproblems associated with nuclear energy.The reason why irradiation defectsbecame an important research theme was becausewhen neutrons generated by nuclear fission hitreactor vessels and pipes they damage the metalmaterials.
This is called "neutron radiation damage."
If this causes materials to become brittle,it is called "neutron irradiation embrittlement."
Of particular importance is neutron irradiation embrittlement of the steel of the reactor pressurevessel, which is the heart of a nuclear power plant.If this is damaged it can lead directly to a severeand uncontrollable accident.
What type of lattice defects arise fromneutron radiation?
In crystals, atoms are precisely aligned in lattices, but if they are struck by aneutron they are displaced, leaving a hole. Thisis called a "vacancy."
Displaced atoms are called"interstitial atoms." This phenomenon is calleda "lattice defect."
In addition, secondary defectsresult when vacancies and interstitial atoms moveabout and accumulate, creating "vacancy clusters" and "interstitial atom clusters,"
respectively.
Impurities within the metal (copper atomsetc:) move to form "impurity clusters."
These"secondary lattice defects" cause metals to losetheir characteristic ductility (plasticity) and becomebrittle.
To compare it to the human body, it is likethe hardening of the arteries which makes bloodvessels vulnerable to rupture.Usually, when a force is applied tosteel it simply deforms without breaking, butbelow a given temperature, if the slightest forceis applied, rather than deforming plastically itshatters like pottery.
This critical temperature iscalled the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT). This brittleness of steel used to be thebane of shipbuilders.
Many ships sank due to thisphenomenon.
The Titanic, which sank exactly 100years ago in 1912 when it struck an iceberg whilecrossing the North Atlantic Ocean, is a famousexample.
Subsequent studies showed that poorquality steel plate was used and that the DBTT was27°C.When reactor pressure vessels arebombarded by neutrons the DBTT rises. Whendesigning nuclear reactors it is necessary to predicthow high the DBTT will rise and whether theycan survive for the period of their design lives.However, assuming a design life for nuclearreactors of 40 years, it is impossible to knowwhat condition they will be in after 40 years untilthe 40 years has actually elapsed.
That presentsa problem, so accelerated experiments areconducted.
Accelerated experiments are tests thatare commonly used to assess endurance by, forexample, applying forces beyond the normal load,or operating plants at greater than normal speed.Likewise, when conducting tests forneutron irradiation embrittlement, the amount (flux)of neutron exposure in a given period of time isincreased far above normal amounts.
Materials testreactors can radiate materials at a rate of 10'2n/cmns(neutrons/square centimeter).
This rate (flux) ofexposure is between 100 and 10,000 times the rateof exposure in normal reactors, given that the rateof exposure for PWRs is 10"n/cm-s, while the ratefor BWRs is I 08n/cm2s. That means the amount ofirradiation a BWR would sustain in 40 years canbe applied in one or two days. Using such data aformula predicting embrittlement was produced.
Furthermore, besides the normal monitoring specimens, accelerated monitoring specimens are also placed in BWR reactor vessels.
They areplaced not on walls of the vessel itselt, but closerto the core, where the rate (flux) of radiation is anorder of magnitude higher. The idea is to predictthe future state of the reactor.
: Likewise, monitoring specimens are placed deeper inside PWRs thanthe walls of the reactor vessel. For example, in thecase of Genkai- 1, discussed in part two, the rate ofradiation is about double the normal rate. This is anattempt to read the future.However, there is an assumption underlying the notion that the future can bepredicted.
That is, regardless of the rate (flux) ofirradiation, or, to put it another way, regardless ofthe period of exposure, if the total amount (fluence) of radiation is the same, the result will be the same.The formula for this assumption is as follows:Rise in DBTT = material factor x F(f)The material factor is determined by thetype and the concentration of impurities in thesteel. For example, if the steel contains a largeamount of copper, the material factor will rise.F(f) is the irradiation factor. It is postulated to bea function of the fluence of neutron irradiation "Y'alone.With accumulated experience of operating nuclear power plants, it became possible to obtain 12May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148long-term monitoring test datain real life conditions, and itbecame clear that this fornmulawas suspect.
In particular, withregard to BWRs, for which therate of irradiation is slower, itbecame clear that the resultsfor the normal monitoring specimens and the accelerated monitoring specimens placedin reactors did not agree. Thistrend is particularly pronounced in reactors like Tsuruga-l and Fukushima Daiichi-l where the steel of the reactorpressure vessels contains largeamounts of copper impurity.
It can be seen from this thatthe irradiation factor F(f) isdependent not only on thefluence (total amount) of neutrbut also on the flux (amount inirradiation.
We noticed this over 1alerted researchers to the issuetime, the results of Americandependence on the flux of irradso Japanese researchers refusedseriously and did not alter thprediction formula.
Faced with dashowing unpredicted high levelsAging Response Review Commiresults saying they were due to dThereafter, analysiformation of copper progresse clear that when the rate of radiatclusters of copper atoms (obswhereas in accelerated irradiaclusters of vacancies form, sohardening (embrittlement) is difof this micro-analysis backedsimulations.
The outdated thinkirwas forced to give way and nowradiation embrittlement on theis the shared academic undirradiation embrittlement predicin monitoring test methodolo and a new methodology (JEA(produced
* .Assessment of pressto the 2007 formula from mid-2increase of DBTT using this fithan that using the previous 2004formula is included as a referencHowever, even thecannot explain the high DBTTin Tsuruga-1 that we have The metal welds in Tsuruga-1 copper impurities, unlike thethus should not show a high D1JEAC-2007 was not adequately complex nature of the reality oft]U'100 -' U~100-500 -50*00I I I I I I XJEAC4201-2004 Prediction curve + margin of error.JEAC4201-2004 Prediction curveX Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample Data-'e time of the 20t scheduled inspecon1/4 depth of plate thidcness)
I 'i IIAt 60 year from start of operations (from 1/4 depth of plabt thickness)
I I I I1 2 3 4 5 6 7Neutron Fluence [10'n/cmz]
Figure 1.Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample Data and JEAC 4201-2004 Prediction Curveon irradiation "f', Unpredicted Enibrittlement in Genkai-Ia given time) of Reactor Pressure Vesselen years ago and Further "unpredicted" monitoring
* However, at the specimen data were observed; these were the resultsresearch refuting from Genkai-l.
At the October 25, 2010 meetingdiation held sway, of Karatsu City Municipal Assembly's Pluthermal to take the matter Special Committee, Kyushu Electric Powerie embrittlement Company announced that the D13TT observedata from Tsuruga-I in Genkai-l's fourth monitoring test specimen, of DBTT, METI's taken during a periodic inspection in April 2009,ittee dismissed the had reached 98°C. Previously, the highest DBTTata scatter.
for a reactor pressure vessel had been 81°C fors of the micro- metal taken from a weld at Mihama-1 (see Tabled, and it became 1). The Genkai-I specimen exceeded this, so ition is slow mainly would be fair to conclude that Genkai-1 is the moststructions) form, dangerous reactor pressure vessel in Japan.tion tests mainly It is also very significant that thisthe cause of the embrittlement was unpredicted.
The DBTTferent. The results observed in the previous (third) monitoring testup our computer (February 1993) was 560C. That had increased byng described above 42°C, which was contrary to the predicted result.the dependence of Figure I is a diagram submitted by Kyushu Electricflux of irradiation in its December 2003 Aging Technical Assessment, erstanding.
The with a -x" added to the top right corner to showtion formula used the result of the fourth monitoring test. Up untilgy was changed the third monitoring test the data points could be' 4201-2007) was more or less plotted onto the predicted curve, buture vessels shifted the latest data point is way above that curve. If you011, but when the look closely at the diagram you will see that thermula is smaller broken line is the predicted curve and that a lineformula, the 2004 is added above that showing the upper limit of thee. margin for error. However, actual embrittlement is2007 formula way above that upper limit.for metal welds Kyushu Electric says that 98°C is theawn attention to. value predicted for 2060 (85 years after the start ofhave low levels of operations),
while the predicted DBTT for 2035 (60parent metal, and years after the start of operations) is 91°C and forTT. The amended August 2010 (35 years after the start of operations) able to explain the is 80'C. In part two, let us consider whether this ishe metal materials, correct or not.f Recentlv the author's group.1bund that the Jbrnzldation contaCis aatial misutnerstanding.
(To be continued in the next issue qfNuke Info Tokyo)
Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148 May/June 201213Group Introduction Japan Occupational Safety(JOSThe JapanOccupational Safety andHealth Resource Center(JOSHRC),
which existsto protect the health andlives of workers, is anNGO network established for the sake of eradicating occupational diseases.
Until now, ourfriends in the network havehandled the occupational problems of nuclear plantworkers.
Since 1976,however, there have beenonly ten examples ofrecognized cases of work-related cancer amongnuclear plant workers.Nuclear plant workerssuffering health damagefrom radiation continues to be an issue shrouded in JOSHRC and citizedarkness.
the worker radiation Since the 3/11 Station.Fukushima Nuclear Accident
: occurred, TEPCO's sloppy radiation countermeasures haveresulted in the appearance of a series of highlyirradiated workers.
Directly after the accident, the government raised radiation exposure limitsfrom 100 mSv to 250 mSv for emergency work employees as a special exception to theregulation regarding the prevention of ionizingradiation disorders.
In addition, the government also took measures to loosen the annual 50 mSvlimit for workers active at some distance awayfrom the emergency work.Was it acceptable to simply relax workerradiation exposure regulatory limits in the nameof emergency work? We believe the workerradiation exposure is a problem that can nolonger be overlooked, and from May last yearwe began negotiations with the government.
Originating with CNIC, citizens' groups as wellas labor unions have called on the $overnment to engage in negotiations seven times sinceMarch of this year. Through utilization of thefreedom of in formation system we have alsosought to elucidate the process by which theradiation exposure limits were raised within thegovernment.
These efforts have revealed that thenuclear-power promoting Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), fearing impediments for Japan's nuclear operations, made a specialcase for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear PowerStation's emergency worker radiation exposureand HealthHRC)Resource Centerby lida Katsuyasu*
ns'groups negotiating with the government regarding exposure problem at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Powerlimits, and changed the lifetime limit to ISievert.Meanwhile, the Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center is holding seminarstogether with the NGO Toxic Watch Network(T-Watch),
and we are studying the nuclearaccident and the effects of radiation.
T-Watch ismeasuring the radiation in food, water, and soilwith an Nal scintillation detector.
Last summer, in cooperation withT-Watch, we investigated radiation in Tokyo'ssewage treatment and water purification facilities, and proposed risk evaluations andcountermeasures for worker radiation exposure.
In April, we held a gathering in Tokyo to createan activist network for considering the problemsof worker radiation exposure.
We will continue to tackle the problemsof radiation spread through communities andworkplaces, and by developing campaignmovements and negotiations wit t egovernment, we would like to work towardsa change in the government and industry's position of radiation neglect.*Japan Occupational Safety and HealthResource Center Liaison Conference Director-General of Tokyo Occupational Safetyand Health Center 14May/June 2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148NEWS WATCHAbolition of Fukushima Daiichi Reactor Units 1-4As of April 19, TEPCO decommissioned Fukushima Daiichi reactor units 1-4 (BWRs,Unit 1: 460 MW, Unit 2-4: 784 MW each).Consequently, Japan's nuclear reactors werereduced from 54 units totaling 49,112 MW to 50units totaling 46,300 MW.Fiscal Year 2011 Facility Utilization Rate23.6%In FY2011 (April 2011 -March 2012),Japan's fifty-four nuclear reactor units set a recordlow utilization rate of 23.6%. Of the 54 units, 28units did not operate at all within the year.New Standards for Radioactive Cesium inFoodOn April 1, new regulatory standards became effective for radioactive cesium contained in food. The 500 becquerel per kilogram (Bq/kg) for general foods such as vegetables, grains,meat, and fish was lowered to 100 Bq/kg, 50 Bq/kg for baby foods. The standard of 200 Bq/kg formilk was lowered to 50 Bq/kg, and likewise thedrinking water standard was lowered to 10 Bq/kg. For rice and beef, interim measures were setthrough the end of September, and the new valuesare to be applied from October.Apart from these regulation values, co-ops and retail stores have created independent standards that are more stringent, but on April20 the Ministry of Agriculture issued a noticerequesting that the use of independent standards cease. Opposition from consumers on 23rd forcedthe Minister of Agriculture to defend the noticeby stating that "it is not compulsory and does notnegate independent standards."
Tokai Mayor demands Minister of Economydecommission Tokai-2On April 4, mayor Tatsuya Murakami, who has been requesting the decommissioning ofthe Tokai-2 Nuclear Power Plant (BWR, 1,100MW) since the Fukushima Nuclear accident, handed a written statement demanding thepermanent shutdown and decommissioning of theTokai plant to the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry, Yukio Edano.Inaugural Meeting of Mayors for NuclearAbolition With Tatsuya Murakami, Mayor of TokaiVillage in Ibaraki Prefecture, and Katsunobu
: Sakurai, Mayor of Minami Soma in Fukushima Prefecture, as organizers the founding meetingfor the "Heads of Local Governments Seekingto End Japan's Reliance on Nuclear Power" washeld on April 28. The Conference consisted of 69members at its inauguration.
Only Tokai VillageMayor Murakami is situated in a municipality hosting a nuclear plant (though there weretwo or three such observers at the inaugural meeting).
: However, there were many heads ofmunicipalities located within thirty kilometers of a nuclear plant present at the meeting, aswell as four or five heads of municipalities fromwhich planned nuclear power plants or recycling factories have been forced to withdraw.
The Conference is planning to makeefforts for the clarification of a road maptoward a nuclear phase-out and the promotion of regional renewable energy use, as well as toput forward policy proposals to the government and Diet. Also adopted at the inaugural meetingwere a "Resolution requiring consensus fromlocal governments and municipality citizensregarding the restart of nuclear plants such as theOhi Nuclear Power Plant," and a "Resolution demanding the determination of a new basicenergy plan that will include a nuclear phase-out."Nuke Info Tokyo is a bi-monthly newsletter that aims to provide foreign friends with up-to-date information on the Japanese nuclear industry as well as on the movements against it. It is published in html and pdfversions on CNIC's English web site: http://cnic.jp/english/
Please write to us if you would like to receive email notices when new editions are published.
Editor: Nobuko TanimuraTranslators:
Tony Boys, Sumie Mizuno, Philip Write, Erik Stromnien Proofreaders:
Tony Boys, Yukio Yamaguchi, Nozomu Nagai
-TiOKYOJuly/Auk.
2012Citizens' Nuclear Information CenterAkebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0065, JAPAN Phone: +81 3 3357 3800 Fax: +81 3 3357 3801URL: http://cnic.jp/english/
e-mail : cnic@nifty.com Energy options proposed"Goodbye to Nuclear Power Plants" Rally attended by 170,000 antinuclear protesters in Yoyogi Park, Tokyo. (July 16, 2012)Due to the nuclear disaster in Fukushima in March 2011, it has become impossible forJapan to carry out its former energy policy, onethat depended on nuclear power generation.
Thepolicy target was to cut the nation's carbon dioxideemissions by 25 percent from the 1990 level by theyear 2020, partially by building 14 more nuclearpower reactors.
This target for carbon dioxideemmissions was Japan's pledge to the international community.
Now that Japan has suffered extremely severe radiation damage from last year's nuclearaccident, it is evident to everyone that it is no longerpossible for the nation to achieve this goal.For this reason, the Japanese government has been forced to review its energy policy.The previous
: Cabinet, led by Naoto Kan,attempted to revise the policy from the viewpoint ofJapan's departure from nuclear power generation.
His successor Yoshihiko Noda, however, toneddown Kan's policy and is set to review theformer policy with the aim of reducing Japan'sdependence on nuclear power. Noda claims that theContentsEnergy options proposed 1 -3The Koodankulam Struggle 4.5Restart of Ohi Nuclear Power Plant 6.7Symposium on the Truth of Fukushima 7Clean-up operation at Fukushima 8.9Irradiation embrittlement of pressure vessels 10- 14Who's Who; Hiraku Yamami 15News Watch 16 2July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149reduction of Japan's dependence on nuclear powergeneration is his public pledge, but to what extentthe dependence should be reduced will be decidedupon by politicians after national debates are heldon the issue. Although it has been the bureaucrats who have formulated policies most of the time upuntil recently, the current government, led by theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is striving to alterthis tradition, and introduction of the new decision-making system is one example of this change.The Energy and Environment Council(EEC), which was set up within the National PolicyUnit of the Cabinet, has proposed a national debateon the desirable energy-mix options.The EEC says energy options will bepresented to the public before they start the nationaldebates.
They therefore consulted the Ministry ofEconomy, Trade and Industry (METI) for energyoptions based on the share of various energysources, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEA) for options concerning the nuclear fuelcycle, and the Environment Ministry (EM) formeasures to cope with global warming.Three optionsBased on the reports from the two ministries and JAEA, the EEC formulated three options onthe share of nuclear power generation in the totaldomestic power supply and released them on June29. As the current basic energy plan lays out Japan'senergy strategy heading towards 2030, the share ofnuclear power in 2030 was proposed.
The current share of nuclear powerIn Japan, the operation of all nuclear powerstations was halted on or before May 5, and onlyone reactor at Ohi Nuclear Power Station resumedoperations on July 4, despite a strong public outcryagainst the restart.
A second reactor at the nuclearpower station will probably restart operations atthe end of July 2012 .As for other nuclear powerstations, it will not be so easy to resume operation.
Japan's new nuclear regulatory commission is toestablish new safety standards based on the resultsof the official investigations into the Fukushima nuclear disaster and will determine the propriety ofresuming operations of each reactor.As things stand now, the proposed review ofthe share of nuclear power should have been basedon the current situation where all nuclear powerstations are shut down or only two reactors areoperational.
The fact, however, is that the optionsare based on the share of nuclear power in the pre-nuclear disaster period.One of the three options is to cut theshare of nuclear power in the nation's total powersupply to zero. This option calls for realizing atotal departure from nuclear power generation with strong determination and at as early a date aspossible, while achieving a desirable energy mixthat depends mainly on renewable energy sources.This is the only option that aims at the termination of nuclear power generation.
The second option is to cut the share ofnuclear power to 15% by 2030. This figure isbased on two factors.
One of them is the plan todecommission nuclear reactors after 40 years ofservice, which was decided upon in negotiations on the establishment of the new nuclear powerregulatory commission.
If nuclear reactors are shutdown after 40 years of service, and no new ones arebuilt, the ratio of nuclear power will be reduced to15 percent by 2030 (calculated on the assumption that the average operation rate stands at 80%), andto zero by around 2050. The second option will alsocall for reinforcement of safety and anti-disaster measures at nuclear power stations.
: However, this option is to be reviewedsometime around 2030, taking into account thespeed of expansion in the use of renewable energy.This may make leeway for extending the period ofoperation of old nuclear reactors, or for buildingnew ones.The third option is to maintain the current20-25% share of nuclear power. This figure is basedon the 2010 data that nuclear power generation accounted for 26% of the nation's power supply.Whether or not this option is appropriate dependson the operation rates of nuclear reactors.
Shouldpower shortages occur, this is likely to pave the wayfor construction of new nuclear reactors that havealready been planned by electric power suppliers.
The three options do not fully reflect theviews of the people who are demanding a nuclearphase-out.
For example, they have proposed thatmore radical energy-saving measures be introduced to achieve the 25% cut in carbon dioxide emissions that Japan has pledged.
But all three optionsestimate the cut to be achieved by the electric powergeneration sector at a much smaller 10%. In themeetings of the Advisory Committee for NaturalResources and Energy, where the three optionswere discussed, the anti-nuclear members proposeddiscussions on this issue many times in an attemptto expand the size of the reduction, but in vain.Methods of national debates on energy mixoptionsThe govermnent says it will listen to publicopinion on the three options via various means,such as public opinion polls conducted by the massmedia, public hearings to be held at II sites acrossthe country, the public comments system, and thenation's first deliberative poll, in which the publicwill submit their opinions and discuss the issuein debate sessions to be held across the nation.The government plans to grasp the trend of publicopinion through these efforts.
In the deliberative poll, around 3,000 people will be randomlyselected, and asked to respond to questionnaires.
Ofthese, 120 will be chosen and divided into groups ofseveral persons each for the debate session.
Thereare, however, some concerns about this scheme.The government plans to adopt one of the threeoptions by the end of August, and so there is notmuch time left. Whether or not the deliberative pollwill be held as projected remains uncertain underthese circumstances.
Another concern is that the Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
20123period for accepting public comments is limitedto one month, and this may be too short to allowfor a substantial number of public opinions to besubmitted.
What about options for the nuclear fuel cycle?It is no exaggeration to say that the nuclearfuel cycle has been left out of the options fornational debates.
If all nuclear power stations wereto be decommissioned, it would become impossible to recycle spent nuclear fuel, and all spent fuelwould then have to be disposed of directly.
In thiscase, there would be no need to put the issue to anational debate. But if other options are selected, three different plans can be proposed; to recycle thespent fuel, to dispose of the spent fuel directly, or todo both at the same time. These plans are mentioned in the energy-option
: proposal, but are not proposedas "options."
Motohisa
: Furukawa, State Minister ofNational
: Strategy, Economic and Fiscal Policy, saidin a recent press conference that the consideration of options on the recycling of spent nuclear fuelis not an issue that should be determined by vote.His position that the energy policy should be put tothe vote (national debates) because it will serve asthe nation's basic policy, while the policy on spentnuclear fuel does not fall within this framework is not convincing.
: However, a non-official studygroup led by Japan's Nuclear Disaster MinisterGoshi Hosono, and with the participation of TetsuyaEndo, Kenji Yamaji and other lawmakers, hadearlier proposed a number of plans that included theuse of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in AomoriPrefecture jointly with other nations.
Furukawaprobably made the above remark because he wasinfluenced by this proposal.
There is another possibility.
A secretmeeting of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) was held on April 24, at which thegovernment officials and people from the powerindustry jointly discussed Japan's nuclear fuel cyclepolicy. This disclosure by the media spurred publicdistrust of the commission's report and Furukawamay have presumed that the JAEC-proposed options on the spent nuclear fuel cycle should notbe presented to the public.Nevertheless, JAEC presented its reportconcerning options on the spent nuclear fuel cyclethat matched with the energy mix options to theEnergy and Environment Council on June 29.The report proposed that all spent nuclear fuel bedirectly disposed of in the case of Japan's totaldeparture from nuclear power generation.
In thecase where the share of nuclear power is reduced to15%, the report said part of the spent fuel should berecycled and the rest should be disposed of directly, and in the case where the share of nuclear power ishigher, all spent fuel should be recycled or part of itdisposed of directly.
Secret meetings disclosed The Mainichi Shimbun disclosed theexistence of the secret meetings in its May 24 issue.According to media reports, the secret meetings, dubbed 'study meetings,'
were held 23 times at aconference room on the seventh floor of the CentralGovernment Building No. 4, in which JAEC has itsoffice. Each time, more than 30 people participated in the meeting, including officials from electricpower suppliers, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., JAEA,the Ministry of Education,
: Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology, and the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry.
The fact that the electric powersuppliers attended all of the 23 meetings becamethe target of public criticism.
In the meetings, thecontents of the JAEC report were reportedly revisedin line with the intentions of the electric powersuppliers.
Although JAEC admitted that it heldmeetings attended by electric power suppliers, itinsisted that the purpose of the meetings was limitedto contacting the parties concerned in preparation for compiling the report that was to be presented tothe JAEC subcommittee.
: Moreover, JAEC deniedthe allegation that the commission revised the reportto reflect the views of electric power suppliers.
The conference materials that were latermade public indicate that the organizer allottedthe work of drafting responses to the proposals presented by the technical sub-committee members.This means that the secret meetings virtually servedas occasions to discuss the contents of the report.Among others, Chairman Shunsuke Kondopromised to take the following measures-1.) to not hold secret meetings again,2) to make public the materials which werediscussed at the meeting,3) to return all officials dispatched to JAEC fromelectric power suppliers by around the end ofJune, and4) to present plans for the reform of JAEC and itsdeliberation councils.
When this writer met Chairman Kondo onJuly 3, he said the return of the officials of electricpower suppliers to their offices at the end of Junehad made it difficult for JAEC to carry out deskwork without delay. His remark indicates that JAECwas taking advantage of its cozy relationship withelectric power suppliers in order to draft its policies.
With regard to the reform of JAEC, rules forhandling information and for creating the minutesof its meetings were decided upon, but no proposals have been presented yet on the appropriate role ofJAEC in the future. The commission says it willdiscuss this issue from now on.Because of the mass media's revelations regarding JAEC's secret meetings, deliberations on nuclear power policy by JAEC's New NuclearPolicy Planning
: Council, previously held in parallelwith the discussions on the energy-mix options,were suspended.
Hideyuki BAN (Co-Director of CNIC)Reported on July 4, 2012 4July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149The Koodankulam Struggle
*S. P. Udayakumar Ph.-D. in Political Science* People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE)* National Alliance of Anti-nuclear Movements (NAAM)Photo of Mr S. P Udayakumar We have been fighting against the Koodankulam Nuclear power Project (KKNPP) since the late 1980s.This Russian project was shelved right after the SovietUnion's collapse and taken up again in 1997. The Indiangovernment and Russians have constructed two hugereactors of 1,000 MW each without any consent of orconsultation with the local people. We have just obtainedthe outdated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)report after 23 years of long and hard struggle.
TheIndian nuclear authorities have not shared any basicinformation about the project with the public. They donot give complete and tmrthful answers for our questions on the 'daily routine emissions' from these reactors, theamount and management of nuclear waste, fresh waterneeds, impact of the coolant water on our sea and seafood,decommissioning costs and effects, Russian liability andso forth. We are deeply disturted by all this.Our people watched the Fukushima accidentof March 11, 2011 on TV at their homes and understood the magnitude and repercussions of a nuclear accident.
Right after that on July 1, 2011, the KKNPP announced the 'hot run' of the first reactor that made so much noiseand smoke. Furthermore, the authorities asked the people,in a mock drill notice, to cover their nose and mouth andnrn for their life in case of an emergency.
As a result of allthese, our people in Koodankulam and Idinthakari villagesmade up their minds and took to the streets on their ownon August 11, 2011. Then we all together decided to hosta day-long hunger strike on August 16 at Idinthakarai anda three-day fast on August 17-19 at Koodankulam.
Onthe 17th itself authorities invited us for talks and asked usto postpone our struggle to the first week of September because of the upcoming Hindu and Muslim festivals.
Ina few days' time, the chief of the Department of AtomicEnergy (DAE) announced that the first reactor would gocritical in September 2011.So we embarked upon an indefinite hungerstrike on September 11, 2011 and our women blockeda state road on September 13 for a few hours when thestate and central governments continued to ignore us. Thestate Chief Minister invited us for talks on September 21and passed a cabinet resolution the next day asking thecentral government to halt all the work until the fears andconcerns of the local people were allayed.
We ended ourhunger strike on the 22nd but went on another round ofindefinite hunger strike from October 9 to 16 when thetalks with the Indian Prime Minister failed. We laid siegein front of the KKNPP on October 13-16, 2011 when theKKNPP authorities did not halt work at the site as perthe Tamil Nadu state cabinet resolution.
We ended boththe indefinite hunger strike and the siege on October 16in order for our people to participate in the local bodyelections on the 17th. From October 18, 2011, we havebeen on a relay hunger strike continuously.
We havebeen carrying out massive rallies, village campaigns, public meetings,
: seminars, conferences, and otherdemonstrations such as shaving our heads, cooking on thestreet, burning models of the nuclear plants, etc. When thestate government ofTamil Nadu arrested some 200 of ourcomrades on March 19, 2012, 15 of us embarked on anindefinite hunger strike until March 27. This struggle hasbeen going on for more than 260 days and the morale ofthe people is still very, very high.There is no foreign country or agency or moneyinvolved in this classic people's struggle to defend ourright to life and livelihood.
Our fishermen, farmers,workers and women make small voluntary donations incash and kind to sustain our simple Gandhian struggle.
Our needs are very few and expenses much less. We onlyprovide safe drinking water to the hunger strikers andvisitors.
People from all over Tamil Nadu (and sometimes from other parts of India) come on their own arranging their own transportation.
For our own occasional travel,we hire local taxis.Instead of understanding the people's genuinefeelings and fulfilling our demands, the government hasfoisted serious cases of 'sedition' and 'waging war onthe Indian state' on the leaders of our movement.
There Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
20125are more than 200 criminal cases on us. There havebeen police harassment, intelligence officers'
: stalking, concocted news reports in the pro-government media,abuse of our family members, hate mail, death threats andeven physical attack.Although India is a democracy, our Delhigovernment has been keen on safeguarding the interests of the multinational corporations (MNCs) and pleasingsome powerful countries such as the United States,Russia, France, etc. The welfare of the 'ordinary citizens' of India does not figure on their list of priorities.
Thecentral government and the ruling Congress party standby the secretive nuclear agreements they have madewith all different countries and consider us as stumbling blocks o01 their road to development.
The main opposition party, Bharatiya Janata Party (Hindu nationalist party) isinterested in the nuclear weapons progrmn and makingIndia a superpower and hence loves everything nuclear.It is ironic that these two corrupt and conununal forcesjoin hands with each other against their own people. Theybend backwards to please their American and other bossesbut question our integrity and nationalist credentials.
Our leaders and the group of 15 women werephysically attacked on January 31, 2012 at Tirunelveli by the Congress thugs and Hindutva Fascists when wehad gone for talks with the central government expertteam. Now the government cuts the electricity supply sooften and so indiscriminately in order to drive home themessage that nuclear power plant is needed for additional power. They try to create resentment and opposition among the public against our anti-nuclear struggle.
To put it all in a nutshell, this is a classic David-Goliath fight between the 'ordinary citizens' of India andthe powerful Indian government supported by the richIndian capitalists, MNCs, imperial powers and the globalnuclear mafia. They promise foreign direct investment, nuclear power, development, atom bombs, securityand superpower status. We demand risk-free electricity, disease-firee life, unpolluted natural resources, sustainable development and a harmless future. They say theRussian nuclear power plants are safe and can withstand earthquakes and tsunamis.
But we worry about their side-effects and after-effects.
They speak for their scientist
,MadrasAA
-FBTR A-PFBR AT~vdltaft Operable cLr:o plann~edPWR 0 0BWR R0 "]Others afriends and business partners and have their eyes oncommissions and kickbacks.
But we fight for our childrenand grandchildren, our progeny, our animals and birds, ourland, water, sea, air and the skies.Right now, the Indian government is trying tocommission the KKNPP reactors without conducting themandatory disaster training and evacuation exercises tothe people in the 30-km radius. The government and theDepartment of Atomic Energy have not told the peopleanything about the Koodankulam nuclear waste and itsmanagement, the secretive liability agreement betweenNew Delhi and Moscow, and the geology, hydrology, oceanography and seismology issues with regards to theKoodankulam reactors.
Since May 1, some 300 women and 35 menhave been on an indefinite hunger strike with I 1 demands.Neither the Indian government nor the state government has come forward to talk to the people on our demands.Instead, they have embarked upon an intimidating campaign.
And the struggle continues.
Continued from page 15Of the seven nuclear power plants identified inthis paper as having striking irradiation embrittlement, the Fukushima Daiichi Unit I reactor has beentransformed into a hideous mess and will not operateagain. We believe the other six aging reactors shouldbe permanently shut down forthwith.
A bill to wind up NISA and NSC andestablish a new Nuclear Regulatory Commission isnow being debated in the Diet. The bill proposed bythe government contains a clause saying, "The life ofnuclear power plants will in principle be 40 years."This condition allows a life extension of 20 years inexceptional circumstances, so there is the possibility that the 40-year condition will be gutted of meaning.It should state that nuclear power plants will, withoutexception, be decommissioned after 40 years.All nuclear power plants that beganoperations in the 1970s will be over 40 years oldby 2019. All these early reactors have numerousproblems with manufacturing technology and qualityof materials, and they are deteriorating.
Of courseTsuruga-1 and Mihama-1&2, which are already over40 years old, should be closed down, and Genkai-land Takahama-1, which have extreme irradiation embrittlement, should be closed down withoutwaiting for them to turn 40.Acknowledgement:
Much of this paper isbased on discussions of the Nuclear Aging ResearchTeam. I express my thanks to Chihiro Kamisawa, Yuuta Aono and all the members of the Team.
6July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149We oppose the restart ofOhi Nuclear Power PlantFrom 5th May this year, all of Japan's 50nuclear reactors were shut down. However, statingthat Japan's economy would not be able to survivewithout nuclear power, and that he would personally take the responsibility for ordering the restart of nuclearpower plants. PM Noda agreed to the restart of OhiNPP Units 3 and 4, which was officially decided ata meeting of the four relevant cabinet ministers on16th June. On 2nd July it was reported that Ohi-3 hadreached criticality.
Despite the fact that the Fukushima accident it is not yet over no matter how you look atit, PM Noda and the govenunent, who proclaimed inDecember 2011 that the accident was over, have madeyet another blunder.
We at CNIC believe that PMNoda and the government's judgment is fundamentally flawed.What should we have learned from theaccident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company(TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant? It is thatif we see some sign of possible danger in a nuclearpower plant it should be thoroughly investigated and allappropriate measures taken to ensure safety. It is totallyunacceptable to say things such as, "I don't understand the science, but from the engineering assessment itlooks as if it's probably OK." Even having taken everypossible precaution, a catastrophic accident might stilloccur.The Diet Fukushimna Nuclear AccidentIndependent Investigation Commission will soon bereleasing its report. However, it is unlikely that thedegree of damage to the nuclear power plant and itscausal relation to the accident will all be revealed.
Theproblem of 'how to ensure the safety of nuclear plants'is one that has no 'right answers.'
'Safety' cannot be assured by stress testsAll of this began on 1 1th July 2011, with thethree cabinet ministers at the time, Edano, Kaieda andHosono, declaring that "the condition for restarts willbe the primary assessment of the stress test." Fourdays before that, the then PM Kan had stated in thebudget committee of the House of Councilors that "allnuclear power plants will be subject to a stress test."In contrast to the stress tests that originated in Europe,the Japanese version divides the test into a primary andsecondary evaluation, and moreover it was decidedthat the primary evaluation would be the condition forrestarting nuclear plants down for regular maintenance.
It is hard to believe that at this stage the politicians understood what a stress test is. They probably justhad the idea planted in their heads by the bureaucrats, nuclear industry people and their friendly academics inthe infamous
'nuclear village.'
The fonnal name of the so-called "Stress TestHearing" that began on 14th November 2011 was "TheHearing on the Comprehensive Evaluation of Safety inPower Generating Nuclear Reactor Facilities."
A totalof II members sat on the Hearing panel. It was notthe kind of event where citizens who live near or whomight be affected by a nuclear plant come and listen tothe opinions of experts.
The process of the Hearing wasthat the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)would first hear the opinions of the members.
NISAwould then make a judgment on the appropriateness of the report submitted by Kansai Electrical PowerCompany (KEPCO),
which would then be passed upto the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) for a finalcheck.The aim of the primary evaluation is toidentify a nuclear plant's weak points. It is not a set ofevaluation criteria for judging the safety of a nuclearplant. The test is simply a computer simulation toassess the tolerance of a number of selected crucialpieces of equipment in the case that a large earthquake or tsunami should occur. That is not a "Comprehensive Evaluation of Safety."
KEPCO itself has still notcarried out the secondary evaluation.
The NSCapproved NISA's judgment on Ohi-3 and 4, but theNSC Chairman Madarame is reported to have said that"this is not something that can be used to judge safety."It has been confirmed recently by Professors Mitsuhisa Watanabe and Yasuhiro Suzuki that thereis a fracture zone (i.e. an active fault) beneath OhiNPP. New discoveries should, of course, be takeninto account immediately.
The reality is that it isinconceivable that a nuclear power plant should exist inthe current location.
The former establishment must take responsibility for the Fukushima nuclear accidentThose officials who continued to push thesafety myth and the agencies they worked for shouldtake responsibility by resigning or by being dismantled.
In spite of this, the fact that the same old people in thesame positions as they were in previously are screening and passing judgment on the safety of Ohi NPP withno evaluation criteria in place is truly outlandish andfarcical.
At each meeting of the Stress Test Hearing, themembers Masashi Goto and Hiromitsu
[no submitted question papers and uncovered doubts concerning KEPCO's report, but in this totally abnormal Hearing,having three members with conflicting interests, oneof whom was the chair and facilitator of the Hearing,these crucial matters were simply ignored.Incomprehensible events have been takingplace one after the other. Two examples are, I)NISA, responsible for enforcing safety standards atnuclear power plants, rejecting instructions from its Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
20127superior organization, the NSC, which is responsible for approval of the safety standards, and 2) the JapanAtomic Energy Commission continuing to hold secretmeetings consisting only of nuclear proponents tochew over the contents of discussions in the draftingcommittee for the new Nuclear Policy PlanningCouncil of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, selecting the agenda items and rewriting the report.In the current session of the Diet, it has beendecided to establish a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (with five members) and a Nuclear Regulatory Agencyas its secretariat.
The independence of these bodies isexpounded on as "Article 3 commissions."*
NISA willslide laterally into the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, andit is being said that the 'no return' rule will be observed.
But how will the selection for the five members of theCommission be possible?
: Moreover, we also doubtthat the people who have made the lateral slide (fromNISA to the Agency) will now suddenly be capable ofcarrying out robust regulatory activities.
With these concerns in mind, we believe thatdiscussions on the issue of Ohi NPP restart should atleast wait for the publication of the Diet Investigation Commission's report and the launch of the new nuclearregulatory arrangements.
Yukio YAMAGUCHI (Co-Director of CNIC)Reported on July 2, 2012* Article 3 commissions:
Conunissions established underArticle 3 of the National Government Organization Act. Since impartialitY is essential and since the issuesdeliberated upon require specialized knowledge, thesecommissions are given a certain degree of independence firom the Cabinet while existing as external organs of theCabinet Office.International Symposium on the Truth of the Fukushima NuclearAccident and the Myth of Nuclear SafetyDates: August 30 & 31, 2012. 9:30 -18:00Venue: Tokyo University Komaba Campus, JAPANOpening remarksSteering Committee:
Kotaro Kuroda (Chair)Session 1: What Happened at theFukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power PlantAugust 30, 9:40 -12:00SpeakersMitsuhiko Tanaka (Former nuclear powerplant designer:
niember of the Diet Investigation Commission on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Plants)Arnie Gundersen (Chief engineer of Fairewinds Associates)
Coordinator; Hiromitsu InoAugust 30, 13:00 -15:00SpeakerKatsuhiko Ishibashi (Seismologist.
member of theDiet Investigation Conumission on the Accident atthe Fukutshima Nuclear Plants)Coordinator; Yukio Yamaguchi Session 2: Current Status of Radioactive Contamination August 30, 15:30 -18:00SpeakerTetsuji Inanaka (Kyoto University ResearchReactor Instittute)
Coordinator; Koinei Hosokawa18:30 -: Social gathering Session 3: Japan's Nuclear Policy andFormation of the Safety MythAugust 31, 9:30 -12:30SpeakersHitoshi Yoshioka (Science historian, memberof governmnent Investigation Committee on theAccident at the Fukushinma Nuclear Power Stationof Toklo Electric Powier Conmpany)
Philip White (PhD student at Adelaide University (A ustralia).
former International Liaison Officerof Citizens'Nuclear Information Center)Coordinator; Harutoshi Funabashi Session 4: The State of Nuclear Scienceand Technology August 31, 13:30 -16:30SpeakersTetsuya Takahashi (Philosopher)
Miranda Schreurs (Professor of FreieUniversitdit Berlin)Satoru Ikeuchi (Physicist)
Coordinator
; Makoto Maruyaina Session 5: Summing Up -from thePerspective of Scientists and Techinologists August 31, 17:00 -18:00Steering Committee:
Kotaro Kuroda (Chair).Tamotsu Sugenami (Secretary General)Organizer Steering Committee of "International Symposium onthe Truth of the Fukushinia Nuclear Accident and the Myth of Nuclear Safety"Cooperating GroupsGroup of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling.for tihe Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.Citizens'Nuclear Infiormation Center (CNIC),Centerjbr Sustainable Development Research.
Graduate Prograin on Human Securit "y Universin, of Tokyo,Union/br Alternative Pathways in Science & Technologyo (A.P4ST),
The Takagi Fund for Citizen ScienceContact information:
smuposium@takagifbid.
org 8July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149Clean-up operation at the nuclear accident site atFukushima DaMichi Nuclear Power StationtPresence of subcontractors affiliated with crimesyndicates and their employees Two local newspapers in Fukushima Prefecture have recently reported that businesses affiliated with crime syndicates are involved inthe clean-up operation at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
One of them is theFukushima Min-yu Shimbun, which reported in itsMay 23 issue that on May 22 the Koriyama Citypolice and the Futaba Gun (County) police arrestedleading members of a gangster group affiliated with the Sumiyoshi-kai crime syndicate based inNihonmatsu, Fukushima Prefecture.
According tothe newspaper, they were charged with violation of the Temporary Staffing Services Law bydispatching five to six members of the group to thenuclear power station for the clean-up operation.
Prior to this, another local newspaper, theFukushima Mimpo, reported on May 15 that thepresident of Watanabe Kogyo Ltd. in Naraha Townwas arrested on suspicion of illegally possessing agun. He was deeply involved in the staffing of thenuclear power station and was the president of thelocal chamber of commerce and industry, as wellas a member of the Fukushima Prefecture NuclearPower Plant Town Information Council ", thenewspaper said.These incidents indicate that the businesses based near the nuclear power station and run bypeople linked to the Yakuza (crime syndicate gangs)are deeply involved in the staffing of the nuclearTokyo Electric Power Company ('EPCO)VA (Main Contractor) 1 30,000 -40,000 yenMchl Ltd., Toshba Corp, Il4ibtsil Heavy Industries Ltd., General Elctrrc,Ntsul&Co.,
Ltd., IshikawaJina-Harna Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.power plant for the purpose of making profits fortheir executives and employees.
At the same time,Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) is also makingthe most of such people, despite its position as apublic utility company.
In other words, TEPCOand the vakuza have built up a structure of mutualinterdependence.
In Japanese workplaces wheredangerous, tough and demeaning jobs have to bedone, there is a tradition that crime syndicates areinvolved in the recruitment of workers.
Nuclearpower stations are no exception.
In the extremely difficult clean-up operation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, it is highly probablethat businesses affiliated with crime syndicates andtheir employees will increase their presence.
As Table I shows, approximately 350 businesses are participating in the clean-up operations at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.They form a pyramid-shaped, multi-layered subcontractor system with TEPCO at the top of thepyramid.
Under the utility, there are plant makers,subsidiaries of TEPCO and the plant makers, large,medium- and small-sized construction and repaircompanies, independent master carpenters andplumbers, and so on.Japanese nuclear power stations arerequired to conduct a regular inspection onceevery 13 months. Originally, it took around threemonths to carry out the inspection, which includedchanging the nuclear fuel rods, thorough checks offacilities and equipment, replacement of old partsand. consumables with new ones, remodeling ofsome facilities, and inspection by the government.
Three plant makers, Hitachi Ltd., Toshiba Corp.and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., receivedorders from TEPCO, and then allocated the ordersto their subcontractors.
: However, the partialliberalization of the Japanese electric powergeneration market in 1997 brought a number ofchanges to this practice.
Taking advantage of the occasion, TEPCOdesignated its subsidiaries as the principal subcontractors and slashed repair and othercosts as much as possible.
At the same time, thecompany pressed the subcontractor to shorten thetime required for a regular inspection, triggering competition within the market. It is said that thesmaller and weaker companies dropped out ofthe race in this process, and the pyramid-shaped system of subcontractors was reduced by severallayers. The result of this was that workers hiredby higher-level subcontractors enjoyed favorable conditions concerning the type of employment, working conditions, working period, and type of8 (Princial Subcontractor) 20,o0o -300 enýachl Plant Ltd., Toshba Plant Ltd., Kandenko Ltd., Tokyo Denki KornutenLtd., Toden Kogyo Ltd., Toden Kankyo EN Ltd., TOm Real Estate Ltd.C 10.000 -20,000 yenD 9,000 -12,000 yenE 8,000 -10,000 yenF .7,000 -9000 yenG 6,000 -8,000 yenH 5,000 -7.000 yenI 4,000 -6.000 yenJ 5,000 yen-Converted to daiah. wages. Prepared by' Ishimaru based onevidence fJom an Fl rank company president Table 1. Multi-layered structure within the nuclearpower station and wages in 2000350 companies were involved in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power StationI) The scantal over fiidsified inspection records atnd concealed probleins by TEPCO ot its nicleaO powe-r plants caine to light in 2002. This 23-mnemnber coqnfrence, set up in the wake of this incident.
was composed qofnie trsidents each/fivm fbur towns where ntclear polwer plants are located, oneintellectual.
and the mnciagers of the Ao. I and ANo.2 mniclear power stations in Fukiahima Prefectuov.
The Nuclear and hidustrial Safet, Agency the.4genc, for Ahatutral Resources atd Energiy and the Fukushima Pre/qctural governuienijoined the organti-ation as obsetrvers.
The first mneeting was heklon Februta,
: 1. 2005. subsequent meetings being held continuous/v until hmynnediately before the nuclear accident in Fuiushi~na in7 : tfarh. 2011.
Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
20129work, while those working for the lowest-level subcontractors were forced to accept the worstworking conditions.
Workers hired by the lowest-level subcontractors were paid only around 5,000yen per day, and were not covered by socialinsurance or employment insurance.
In the case of the workers currently employed by the lowest-level subcontractor andengaged in the clean-up operation at the Fukushima nuclear power station, the current averagedaily wage is said to be 8,000 yen, althoughTEPCO pays 60,000-70,000 yen per capita to theprincipal subcontractor.
This is because each ofthe subcontractors from the top to the bottom ofthe subcontracting pyramid takes a cut from theworkers' wages.Koshiro Ishimaru has been participating in the Futaba Region Anti-Nuclear Power PlantFederation since the 1970's, supporting the nuclearpower plant workers' efforts to win workers'compensation.
"Because I couldn't bear thesituation where workers could not stand up againstthe power of the companies and openly tell thetruth, I established the Anti-Nuke Information Center in 1979," he said. Mr. Ishimaru launchedactivities to support nuclear power plant workers'attempts to win official recognition for theirinjuries and sicknesses as those eligible for officialcompensation, and conducted surveys on radiation damage to their health.Although he himself was affected by thesevere accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NuclearPower Station in March 2011 and is currently evacuated to lwaki, Fukushima Prefecture, he isserving as the representative of the organization.
We have learned a lot from Mr. lshimaru's activities and surveys.
The following arenoteworthy comments he has made in negotiations with TEPCO, and the pledges he and his grouphave obtained from TEPCO.The late Nobuhiro Sato, who worked at thenuclear power plant for a long time said the severe,dangerous and demeaning working conditions atthe plant are a magnet for the increased presenceof crime syndicates and their front companies.
According to Mr. Sato, there are no otherworkplaces better fitted to the yakuza than nuclearpower plants. Their strict hierarchical relationship between the group leader and the members workseffectively for getting jobs done at the plant. Theplant workers change into protective garmentsbefore they enter the radiation-controlled areas,and this is the time when gangster group membersshow off their tattoos to the other workers.
Thus,troubles in workplaces can be suppressed by force,said Mr. Sato.Mr. Ishimaru and his group, together withMr. Sato, complained to TEPCO in October 2005.They claimed that the multi-layered subcontractor system was causing a great deal of trouble at thenuclear power plant. According to them, some ofthe workers were yakuza group members and hadtattoos, which was an abnormal situation for apublic utility."Illegal acts, such as the forgery of healthreports and registered seal impressions (theequivalent of forging a signature or an officialrubber stamp), and not allowing workers tosubscribe to health insurance and employees' pension plans, are rampant,"
they said. In response, TEPCO said the work contract refers to qualitycontrol, methods of construction, completion of thework, etc., and that the problems with the worker'sbody or personality are not mentioned.
TEPCO also said the company summonedthe deputy chief of the Tom ioka Town Police andasked him to give the subcontractors a lecture onhow to deal with crime syndicates in staffing theFukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in an attemptto raise their awareness of such problems.
Thisremark indicates that TEPCO implicitly admittedthe presence of crime syndicates in the plant, butused the work contract as an excuse for evading adirect response to the workers' demands.Furthermore, Mr. Sato accused TEPCO ofpoor management of the plant workers.
"Workeraccidents are usually covered up inside the nuclearplant. Even if workers suddenly fall ill, they arenot allowed to call an ambulance.
In my case, afterhaving been left unattended for three hours, I wastaken to hospital in a colleague's car. I therefore suffered aftereffects later and became physically handicapped.
Of all accidents occurring in thenuclear power station, 90% were concealed."
Referring to the presence of yakuza inthe plant, he asked TEPCO,. "Do you know thatgangsters and their affiliated-company employees are working at the plant with impunity, bettingon baseball games and gambling with Hanqfuda(Japanese playing cards) in the workplaces?
TEPCO is responsible for the management of theplant workers."
TEPCO officials tend to fall silentwhen something disadvantageous to their positionand hard to respond to is mentioned.
That is theattitude they took in this case.One year later, in 2006, TEPCO reportedly attempted to drive the gangsters and their affiliated companies out of the plant, but gave up becausethese people took a defiant attitude and threatened TEPCO by saying, "Do it if you think you can."Asked about the truth of this incident in furthernegotiations TEPCO refused to admit that theincident had occurred.
Apparently, TEPCO had a great dealof trouble dealing with two major problems.
One of them was illegal conduct and the cover-up of worker accidents, and the other was crimesyndicates and their affiliated companies.
As forthe former problem, the situation has improvedconsiderably.
Currently, ambulances are allowedto come into the nuclear power station and thereis a doctor onsite 24 hrs a day. However, the latterproblem is still beyond TEPCO's control becausethe subcontractor system is deeply multi-layered and complex, and because the yakuza are so deeplyentrenched in the system.(Mikiko WATANABE, CNIC) 10July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149-Continued from p.10, Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148-Aging Nuclear Power Plants focusing in particular on irradiation embrittlement of pressure vesselsHiromitsu InoWe m us t first Sample taken DBTT* Neutronfluence afectiveyetar understand the data on which (0c) (x 101grVcml)
! ofoperation this is based. Table 2 shows Intialvaleprbr Operatonbegan
-16 0the results for the first to fourth to madiatbn Ih October 1975 -16 0 0monitoring tests. The amount #1 Nov-76 35 0.5 Approx. 5 yearsof neutron irradiation is the #2 Apr-80 37 2.1 Approx. 20 yearsamount for the specimens, not #3 1 Feb-93 56 3.5 Approx. 33 yearsfor the pressure vessel itself. #4 Ap-09 98 7.0** Approx. 66 yearsThe specimens were placed Source: Prepared from Technological Assessment of Aging in Nuclear Reactors 2003deeper inside the reactor than December2003' p.15, Table 2.3-1, and materials distributed at the Karatsu City Conference t25 October 201u).the reactor walls, so they were
* Ductile-brittle transition temperature
* Authors' estimation.
irradiated by more neutrons.
Table 2: Results of monitoring tests on mother material of Genkai-l reactorSince the specimens have been Table vesulirradiated by more neutrons pressure vesselthan the reactor walls in the same time, operating years However, as discussed above, the formula used in theare converted to "effective operating years". past has been pronounced invalid.Effective operating years for the fourth So can the new 2007 prediction formulamonitoring test specimen was 66 years, meaning the explain the DBTT of Genkai- I? The answer is no.reactor walls would be irradiated by the same amount Figure 2 shows the irradiation embrittlement of neutrons after 66 years. Since the reactors do not prediction curve drawn by us on the basis of the 2007operate continuously, this amount of irradiation would prediction
: formula, and the observed DBTT. Likenot actually be reached until 85 years after the reactor Figure 1, this diagram shows both the scale for DBTTbegan operating.
How then are the present ductile-and also for the increase in DBTT, the difference frombrittle transition temperature (DBTT) and the DBTT the initial DBTT of minus 16°C.after 60-years estimated?
Since DBTT is 98°C after 85 It can be seen that the observed data of 980Cyears, bringing it back to 35 years and 60 years Kyushu is 42°C above the predicted curve. This cannot beElectric comes up with the lower temperatures of 80°C explained in terms of margin of error. Compared toand 910C respectively.
Figure 1, if anything the deviation is greater.
Thus theThe method used to derive this estimate is to 2007 prediction formula fails completely to reproduce redraw the prediction curve, adding a margin of error the irradiation embrittlement behavior of Genkai- I.so that it passes through data point "x" in the top right Hence, there is no explanation why a high DBTT wascomer of Figure 1 (see Nuke Info Tokyo No. 148), then observed in Genkai-I.
Given that such high DBTTsto read off the DBTT corresponding to the amount of are observed when there is a high amount of copperirradiation after 35 years and 60 years respectively.
But impurity, or there is phosphorous grain boundaryfor such a method to have a basis, the embrittlement segregation, we cannot rule out the possibility that theprediction curve in Figure 1 must have some legitimacy.
Genkai-1 pressure vessel contains, depending on theE40080E~6040.2020.7 120S100JEAC4201-2007 Prediction curve2.OE+10
.5.OE+101.0E+11kcc,* Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample Datalocation of the monitoring specimens, lowquality steel with high levels of impurities.
In regard to Genkai-1, both the 2004formula (Figure I) and the 2007 formula(Figure 2) have lost their predictive power.It is meaningless to estimate based on theseformulas that the current DBTT is 800C, orthat after 60 years operation it will be 91°C.So what should we suppose theDBTT to be now? There is no sound methodof estimating it. In that case, Kyushu Electricshould respect the observed data of 98°C,assume that the pressure vessel itself hasalready reached this high DBTT (that beinga true safety margin) and consider whatresponse should be taken. The responseshould be to carry out the abovementioned PTS assessment based on a DBTT of 98°C,reconsider the operating sequence based onthe 980C figure, and also carry out pressuretests based on 980C.-1615 6 7Neutron Fluence [10'9n/cm']NISA's Response and Public CommentsWe were surprised at the observedhigh DBTT for Genkai- I. As soon as weFigure 2: Genkai-l Monitoring Data and JEAC-2007 Prediction Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
201211found out about it we requested Social Democratic Partyleader Mizuho Fukushima to arrange a hearing withofficers of Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency (NISA)to find out about the monitoring test methodology, etc.To our amazement, at that point in time (December 15, 2010) NISA had received no information aboutthe results of the fourth monitoring test for Genkai-I.
The first they heard of it was from the questions inour letter. Kyushu Electric had not informed NISA ofthe strikingly high DBTT and NISA said they did notknow because they had no obligation to inquire.
Whata careless and lax safety monitoring system. At thehearing we demanded that NISA pay great attention toGenkai-l's DBTT, and that it publish raw data for theCharpy test.It is a matter of great significance that theresults of the fourth monitoring test for Genkai-I cannotbe accounted for by either the former prediction formula(JEAC 4201-1991),
or the current formula (JEAC 4201-2007), and that the high DBTT is totally unpredictable.
NISA called for opinions regarding the 2010 supplement to JEAC 4201-2007, so, in light of this serious situation, the Nuclear Aging Research Team submitted a publiccomment to NISA articulating fundamental questions about the monitoring test methodology.
The essence of our public comment was asfollows (abbreviated):
" The 2007 prediction formula is totally unable toreproduce the results of the monitoring test onmother material in the Genkai-I reactor and metalwelds in the Tsuruga-1
: reactor, so the monitoring test system cannot be implemented based on the2007 prediction formula." It is necessary to make a decision to permanently shut down nuclear reactors in which a high DBTTthat cannot be explained by the prediction formulais observed.
" A fundamental review of JEAC-4201 is necessary, including whether prediction is possible.
This public comment calls for a fundamental review of JEAC-4201, which stipulates the monitoring test methodology for steel in pressure
: vessels, and for anexplicit statement in the rule that there are cases wherethe option of permanent shutdown should be selected.
NISA's response to our public comment waspublished on its web site on May 6, 2011. There wasno direct response to the points we made. The responsemade no reference to the striking deviation in theGenkai-I data. It simply stated that where there is adeviation the margin for error should be reset and thatthere was no problem.
NISA's reply was an insult to ourintelligence.
What needs to be corrected is the thinkingbehind the monitoring test methodology that usesmargin for error to paper over problems.
Discussion and Issues in the "NISA AdvisoryCommittee on the Technological Assessment of Agingin Nuclear Reactors" Launch of the "NISA Advisory Committee on theTechnological Assessment of Aging in NuclearReactors" Last November the Nuclear Industrial andSafety Agency (NISA) initiated the NISA AdvisoryCommittee on the Technological Assessment of Agingin Nuclear Reactors.
As it turned out, I was invited tobecome a member of the committee.
: Hitherto, NISAhas ignored our ideas. I decided to participate in theHearings because I believed it was necessary to havea forum in which to communicate our thoughts aboutthe issue of aging nuclear power plants, in particular concerning the extraordinary embrittlement of theGenkai-I plant. However, these Hearings are, as theirname implies, a forum in which committee members'views are heard and debate takes place, but in the endNISA takes responsibility for writing the report. I wasaware of this limitation when I decided to become acommittee member.The following three issues have beenconsidered during the Hearings:
(I) Assessment of the aging of individual plants:(2) Relation between aging and the Fukushima Daiichiaccident:
(3) Cause of the greater than predicted embrittlement ofGenkai- 1:Consideration of how to interpret the resultsof the monitoring tests of the Genkai-I DBTT, whichexceeded the predicted 980C, and whether the equationfor predicting embrittlement is appropriate.
Theme (3), which relates to irradiation embrittlement in Genkai-I and whether the existingprediction equation is appropriate, is the issue thatinterests me most. Debate about the cause of the highDBTT (98(C) observed in the Genkai-1 pressure vesselmonitoring tests revolved around two theories:
[i] wasit caused by poor quality pressure vessel material or abad manufacturing method, or lii] was it because theembrittlement prediction equation does not accurately reflect reality in the high irradiation range?Kyushu Electric claimed that the results of achemical analysis of the steel materials showed thatthere were no irregularities and that uniformity wasmaintained.
They also claimed that examinations carriedout by the Central Research Institute of Electric PowerIndustry (CRIEPI) and others into micro-organization in the monitoring samples showed a good correlation between embrittlement and the formation of impurityclusters, so there was no abnormal embrittlement.
: However, to confirm the accuracy of this judgment andform a conclusion about whether or not the materialof the pressure vessel is sound, instead of getting aresearch organization like CRIEPI, which is part of thenuclear industry, to assess the samples, they should begiven to fair and trustworthy university researchers toexamine their micro-organization.
To support Kyushu Electric's claim, areport entitled "Preliminary Consideration towardsImprovement of the Accuracy of the Embrittlement Prediction Method "jointly produced by CRIEPI andthe Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC)was submitted to the eighth meeting (February 22,2012, document 10). It concluded that it is not necessary to change the thinking behind the embrittlement modeland the reaction rate equation, which form the basis ofthe current prediction
: equation, and that the variation from reality arose due to the lack of data in the highirradiation range. Further, by giving importance to thehigh irradiation range data (applying a weighting) andresetting the parameters of the equation (impurity clusterformation rate equation coefficient) the Genkai-1 datafit was improved.
In fact, however, the fourth data pointof 98°C is still above the standard deviation margin andthe second and third data points drop below, making thecurve look very suspicious.
In other words, they were 12July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149unable to draw a meaningful curve connecting the third solubility limit and also the square of the diffusion (56°C) and fourth (98C) data points, coefficient."
It must be said that this is a mistake.It is problematic that in order to improve the Because two (or more) copper atoms come togetherfit in the high irradiation range the coefficients for the to form a cluster, it is appropriate to the think that it isreaction rate equation, etc. were greatly changed.
These proportional to the square of the concentration of copperreaction rate equations are the master equations that atoms, but it is a mistake to say that it is proportional todetermine the whole method, so for the parameters the square of the dispersion coefficient*.
Because twoto change greatly depending on the data sets that are atoms move, at first sight it might seem that it would beused indicates the brittleness of the model itself. The proportional to the square of the speed, but that is notreliability of the embrittlement prediction equation the case. Whether one atom is moving or stationary atmodel, which is the basis of JEAC4201-2007, is one point, the rate at which they come together is thetherefore called into question.
The problem goes beyond same. This can be proved mathematically.
For example,the Genkai Nuclear Power Plant. It extends to all aging the chance of two people meeting in a crowd in anuclear power plants. stadium is the same whether one of the two is movingLooking at the diagram in which NISA or stationary.
compared the prediction equation for aging nuclear As stated above, there is an error in the basicpower plants with the observed data (Hearing number 5, model of CRIEPI's prediction equation.
Naturally, 23 January 2012, document 2), a large gap between the any arithmetical calculation using this equation willpredicted figure and the observed figure can be seen in produce the wrong result. Since the JEAC4201-the high irradiation region. It is a fact that the prediction 2007 embrittlement prediction equation includesequation is unable to predict reality.
: However, the this fundamental error, it is a useless equation forinaccuracy for Genkai-1 is particularly striking.
The predictions.
inaccuracy for other reactors is within 200C, but the In addition to the abovementioned brittleness data from the fourth monitoring sample for Genkai-1 of the embrittlement prediction
: equation, a mistake inis out by 4200. Besides the fact that the embrittlement the derivation of the equation itself was discovered.
prediction equation does not match the pressure vessel The JEAC4201-2007 embrittlement prediction equationof Genkai-I (see [ii] above), we must consider that the must be discarded.
The current situation is that there isextraordinary embrittlement is due to the materials or no reliable prediction equation.
the manufacturing method (i]).Another surprising thing was that when Is Genkai-1 Pressure Vessel Sound? NISA'swe investigated CRIEPI's embrittlement prediction Predictable Assessment
: equation, we discovered an elementary but important At the 12th Hearing, held on March 29, NISAerror in the equation itself. This prediction equation submitted a draft report entitled "Concerning Neutronexpresses changes in the micro-organization, namely the Irradiation Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vesselsformation of impurity clusters and lattice defect clusters, (Draft)"
(referred to hereon as "Draft Report").
Thewhich are the cause of irradiation embrittlement, as a purpose was to bring to a close the debate since Januaryreaction equation set, by tracing impurity atoms (copper this year about "the cause of embrittlement in excess ofatoms, etc.) and point flaw reaction (combination and predictions in the Genkai-1 reactor."
I strongly opposeddisappearance) processes, and relating this to the rise in the Draft Report and listed the problems.
In the end theDBTT. This can be said to be an epoch-making change, report was not finalized in March as planned and debatecompared to the rough and ready 2004 equation that continued.
just tried to fit the data, ignoring the rate of irradiation.
: However, there was a vital error in the Kyushu Electric Power Company's PTS Assessment reaction rate equation.
The main cause of irradiation
-- 300embrittlement is the formation of *1 "Calculatedbasedoon thecopper clusters (or impurity clusters if JEAC3201-2007prediclio curvein general).
In the model there 9-250 (2)FY2011
-1 Q After 60 yearsare two types, irradiation induced "4
* of operation
*1clusters and irradiation promoted
/clusters.
Irradiation induced clusters 2 200are accumulations of copper atoms J'g 2 Most severe incdeta r e0 a s s e smeo t o f ain lattice defects caused by neutron ! ass5melcfaf irradiation.
The rate of formation is assumed incdentsproportional to the concentration of .Curves do not intercept copper atoms and the rate of diffusion Z -E100 Assessed as soundof copper atoms (the speed at which 'they move). Physically this is an LAappropriate assumption.
However, 50CRIEPI's report says, "Because theformation of irradiation-enhanced clusters is a process in which copper 0atoms that exceed the solid solubility
-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300limit form a nucleus together, it Temperature
[*C]is described by the square of the Figure 3: Kyushu Electric's Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Assessment forquantity of copper above the solid Genkai-I Pressure Vessel.* The equation is: Formation rate of irradiation-enhanced clusters
= A x (quantity of copper above the solid solubility limit x its diffusion coefficient 2
13I strongly opposed the report because even though thereason why a high DBTT of 980Cwas observed was hardly explained, the conclusion was drawn that thepressure vessel of Genkai-l wassound, and the fact that the DBTTfailed to agree with predictions wasblamed on flaws in the prediction equation.
Furthermore, NISAconcluded that the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) assessment "carried out by Kyushu Electric wasappropriate and that the pressurevessel was in sound condition.
However this type of assessment is Utotally inappropriate.
Figure 3 shows the results ofKyushu Electric's PTS assessment.
The curve that looks like a mountainin the bottom right hand corneris called the PTS state transition curve (K, curve). In the case of asudden large loss of coolant (Lossof Coolant Accident
= LOCA), theEmergency Core Cooling System(ECCS) kicks in and coolant is fedinto the reactor.
The K, curve showstime in the force (strictly speaking thfactor K,) applied under those circuleading end of cracks that are presuthe inner surface of the pressure veof inserting cooling water, the teninternal surface drops. At the same tirdifference arises across the thicknes:
vessel and tensile stress is applied tEventually the temperature differenc vessel becomes smaller and the valudecreases towards the bottom left.On the other hand, the curvefrom the bottom left of Figure 3 is toughness transition curve (K,, curvthe fracture toughness K,,. changethe temperature.
If the material beccurve shifts to the right. How is thisBesides Charpy shock test specimenplaced inside the pressure vessel totoughness.
These are extracted atoughness is measured at various tempis drawn as an envelope around the b(measurements, in other words belorno data. In the Japan Electric AssocJEAC4206-2007 this curve is derfollowing equation:
K1,,=20.16+129.9exp[0.0161 Parameter Tp is determined so as to daround the measured data (i.e. so thatabove the curve).As the amount of neutron irrathe fracture toughness is reduced andembrittlement occurs at higher tempeto derive a fracture toughness tran--25% -50%300250 .........
~150 --------oD100.............
50500 5(, -~Maisubara, Okamurs Kicurm ery doee:to a ri100 150Temperature
[CJ300Figure 4: Results of Authors' Examination of Genkai-I Pressurized Thermal Shock(PTS) Assessment.
JEAC4206-2007 Appendix C and Appendix A, using references (a) and (b).the change over corresponds to amounts of irradiation embrittlement e stress intensity other than those given by the measurement testimstances to the specimens, with the measurement data on the horizontal umed to exist in axis the curve is shifted an amount AT,,,. parallel to thisssel. As a result axis in the higher temperature direction.
In that case,nperature of the AT,,, is said to hold. ARTlIJT is the difference in thene, a temperature DBTT (the amount by which DBTT shifts).
In others of the pressure words, it is assumed that if the temperature at whicho the inner wall. the fracture toughness value was measured is shiftede of the pressure by the same amount that the DBTT increased, the samee of the K, curve fracture toughness value will be obtained.
There is notheoretical basis for this relationship, but since it morerising to the right or less works experimentally, JEAC4206 used thisailed the fracture assumption.
e). It shows how Theoretically, an enveloping curve cans depending on therefore be drawn using all the observed test dataomes brittle the from the first to the fourth test at Genkai-l, as well ass curve derived?
data measured before irradiation.
Also, for an arbitrary s, specimens are amount of neutron irradiation, a fracture toughness measure fracture transition curve (C8) can be drawn. In this way the twond the fracture curves in Figure 3 show the current K,,. curve and theieratures.
A curve K,,. curve 60 years after commencement of operation ottom limit of the for estimated amounts of irradiation of the inner surfaceA( which there is of the pressure vessel.iation's standard According to NISA's draft, "The fracturerived using the toughness measurement for accumulated irradiation equivalent to that in 22 years from now (60 years fromcommencement of operations) was approximately T-T,)]...
.(C8) double (over 50°C in terms of temperature) thecritical stress intensity factor. This fracture toughness Iraw an envelope measurement is a directly measured value not related toall the data falls the accuracy and correlation equations of the prediction method. Even bearing in mind that in general there isdiation increases, a variation of +/-25% in fracture toughness for materials breakage due to within the transition temperature range, it was confirmed eratures.
In order that at this point in time there is sufficient margin forsition curve that operation of Genkai- ." (p. II)(a) Nuclear Industrial and Sqfety Agency. "Concerning Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement of'Reactor Pressure Iessels (Drafi%.
-Hearings onTechnological.Assessment of the Aging meeting 12 document 5, March 29. 2012.(b) Kvushu Electric Power Company, "Responses to Committee Member Comments
". Hearings on Technological Assessment of the Agingmeeting 8 document 6, February 22, 2012, pp. 3-5.
14Is this true?The first problem is the qualification, "Evenbearing in mind that ... there is a variation of +25% infracture toughness."
Is not the variation in the fracturetoughness larger within the transition temperature range? Is it not said that it is from double to halt? Ifthere is a variation of 50% in the 80'C measurement ofthe fourth monitoring test, what will happen to the K,,curve'? I drew this in Figure 4. The result is that the K,,.curve approaches much closer to the K, curve.The second problem follows on from the abovequote, "In regard to the variation in the monitoring measurement values, although the measurements each time are few in number, they are carried outcontinuously for fracture toughness for temperatures which take into account the increase in temperature (which can be thought of as the DBTT) for eachmonitoring test and it is considered rational to take theoverall lower limit." This is also on p. I 1 of NISA'sdraft report. This sentence refers to a shift in the fracturetoughness ARTVL)T based on the abovementioned assumption that
: However, I submitted an opinion to the Hearings with an analysis thatspecifically showed that for Genkai-l, at least, thisassumption does not hold. It is unacceptable that NISAcompiled this draft with no reference to my analysis.
If this assumption does not hold, the shifteddata point is not valid and the only two data points thatcan be used to draw the K,,. curve are those from thefourth monitoring test. With such limited data it is hardto claim that a reliable value for fracture toughness canbe derived.
I therefore presented the curve in Figure 4taking into account a variation of 50%.However, in appendix A to JEAC4206-2007 there is a rule about what should be done "in the casewhere the value for fracture toughness is not derived."
This is an instruction to use the following equation toderive the K,. curve from the DBTT values.K,6=36.48+22.78exp[0.036(T-RTDT)]...
(A7)Figure 4 shows the curve derived by inserting the fourth monitoring test values for DBTT RT.,D =980C into equation A7. This curve approaches almost tothe point of touching the stress curve K,. If the curveswere to cross that would mean the pressure vesselwould break.Next I would like to consider the PTS statetransition curve (K, curve), which shows the size ofthe stress arising.
Are Kyushu Electric's calculations sufficiently conservative?
The assumption in JEAC4206is for a semi-elliptical 10mm deep and 60mm long crackin the inner surface.
It calculates the stress applied to theleading edge of this crack (stress intensity factor K,).Figure 3 shows the PTS state transition curve derived byKyushu Electric for Genkai-I.
According to document20 presented to the Hearings by Kyushu Electric, forthe PTS assessment the most severe large ruptureLOCA (loss of coolant accident) is assumed.
KyushuElectric said that it is a conservative assessment inwhich, without considering the temperature conditions of the inner surface or mixing with cooling water, thetemperature would fall in steps from 291°C to 2700.(Kyushu Electric gave a confusing explanation implyingthat the temperature of the inner surface also falls insteps.)On the other hand, in Figure 4 the K, curvereferred to as 'Matsubara and Okamura' shows the,results of a PTS assessment for a pressure vessel of thesame dimensions as Genkai-l (plate thickness 168ram,diameter 3.37). It is a diagram showing the case ofa 10mm deep crack (a ratio of crack depth to platethickness of 0.06). This curve gives a much larger K,curve than the curve in Kyushu Electric's assessment.
Matsubara and Okamura's paper assumes a sufficiently long crack, so compared to assuming a crack of 60mmlength the values are rather large, but that variation is about 15% based on stress calculations (personal correspondence from Dr. Aono). Even if that amountis subtracted it is above Kyushu Electric's K, curve.There is therefore a possibility that Kyushu Electric's assessment is not sufficiently conservative in regard topressure conditions, etc.On this point, committee member Meshii saidthat the K, curve changes greatly depending on the heattransfer coefficient h of the inner surface.
If the equationis taken as h=IkW/m2K the result is close to KyushuElectric's
: analysis, but if it is taken as h=2kW/m-K theresult is about the same as the Matsubara and Okamuraanalysis, and for h=co it crosses the K, curve. Fromthis result, Meshii concluded, "The PTS assessment carried out by Kyushu Electric was judged to be closeto realistic, but not so conservative that it was notnecessary for variation in the fracture toughness valueto be taken into account."
He is saying that the curve inthe assessment is at the limit and that Kyushu Electric's analysis does not have sufficient leeway.Seen in this light, the conclusion in NISA'sdraft report that it has been confirmed that Genkai-I is"sound enough" in regard to pressurized thermal shockmust be seen as lacking foundation.
At the sixteenth meeting of the Hearings NISA submitted a new draftwhich to some extent took into account the variouscritical views expressed.
Debate on this draft is set tobegin. However, even though the wording is slightlychanged and the data reinforced, the arguments andthe conclusion in this draft are the same as before. Theconclusion that the Genkai-I pressure vessel is soundwas there from the beginning.
The new draft does nomore than add all sorts of considerations.
For reactors with such extreme irradiation embrittlement that the conclusion concerning whetheror not they are safe varies depending on the analytical method and point of view, there is no other way toensure people's sense of security than to make adecision to shut these reactors down.The dangers of nuclear power plants arenot limited to earthquakes and tsunamis.
Aging isanother big problem.
In this context, the irradiation embrittlement discussed in this paper is the mostfundamental problem requiring attention.
Operating for60 years nuclear power plants which were assumed tohave a life expectancy of 40 years is just increasing thedanger.Destruction of the pressure vessel due toembrittlement is an accident that must not be allowed tohappen. If the pressure vessel is destroyed the nuclearfuel will be spread over a wide area and there will beno way of cooling the nuclear fuel to remove the decayheat. Emergency response fire trucks and power supplytrucks will all become ineffective.
Reactors with evena small risk of being destroyed due to embrittlement should be shut down.Continued on page 5 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149 July/Aug.
201215Anti-Nuke Who's WhoHiraku Yamami of the Hinodeya Institute for Ecological Lifestyle In spring 2002, Hiraku Yamami, atthe age of 22, had his first direct contact withthree organizations-the Takagi School,the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center,and the Society for Studies on Entropy-almost simultaneously.
More specifically, he began to participate in the seminars andlectures held by these organizations in orderto meet with the authors of the books he hadread. He made many !ong day trips to theeastern or central regions of Japan, wheresuch gatherings were organized, from hishometown of Nara City, located in westernJapan. The frequent participation of the youngman from a distant region must have beenwelcomed.
Today, Mr. Yamami works for theHinodeya Institute for Ecological Lifestyle in Kyoto as a researcher, while engaging inhis lifelong commitment to social action.Mr. Yamami's main work at theinstitute is to promote energy conservation to small businesses and shops. "Even if apiece of machinery saves energy, peoplecan increase energy consumption and'trade-off' the reduction if neither societynor citizens understand the significance ofenergy conservation,"
he says. "For example,suppose nuclear power is completely replacedwith natural energy. Will society be better ina real sense? If humans continue to consumeprolific amounts of energy, as we do today,our society will eventually collapse.
Unlesspeople's attitudes change along with changesin energy, the problems we have today willemerge again."Regarding the March 11, 2011 disaster, Mr. Yamami says firmly: "Our society willbreak down unless we steer it in a different direction now. We must change."As a schoolchild, Mr. Yamami lovedscience.
"Technology is really wonderful!"
He hoped to find a job related to technology in the future. As a senior high school student,he had an experience that swayed his trustin technology.
In class, he participated in adebate about whether recycling PET bottleswas good or bad. "If it is technically possibleto recycle the bottles, it should be promotedpositively,"
he argued. He was met bycounterarguments such as: "Who will pay therecycling cost?" and "If we can recycle thebottles, can we use PET bottles limitlessly?"
by Haruka Ozeki*The pedal-power bicycle generator is lighting thelamp. Mr Yamami is involved in the development ofpedal power generators.
After this experience, he became able toexamine issues from many angles, including social viewpoints, not only technological ones."Technology may not be the universal solution."
About the time he had thisexperience, Mr. Yamami started to think oftechnology from a critical point of view.In response to his questions, his fatherrecommended books by Jinzaburo Takagi.The process of trying to find something that might undermine the values of scienceand technology he loved, such as learningabout the negative aspects of nuclear powergeneration, must have been a tough task thatconsumed a great deal of physical and mentalpower for a susceptible youth, who was lost,confused and puzzled.Since then, Mr. Yamami has beenplacing importance on the point of view ofcitizens and on fostering approaches that areaccessible to all. "I believe we can make ourlives richer and even more joyful by usingless energy than we do today. In the future,I'd like to see more people getting involvedwith energy-saving opportunities."
he saysfirmly.Staff of the Hinodeya Institute for Ecological Lifestyle 16July/Aug.
2012 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 149NEWS WATCHHitachi-GE to Accept Order for Lithuanian Nuclear PlantOn June 21, the Lithuanian Parliament approved a construction contract between itsgovernment and Hitachi-GE for an ABWR (1,384MW).Construction plans for the Visaginas Nuclear Plant, close to the border of Latvia andBelarus, aim for completion in 2021. Latvia andEstonia will also receive electricity and are beingrequested to bear a part of the cost burden. It isplanned to conclude the official contract after theinvestment amounts are approved.
: Hitachi, thenuclear plant's operating company has also becomean investor, and should the investment figure forthe three countries decrease then Hitachi's burdenwill increase.
Some of the surrounding countries also have anti-construction movements, and thusthis is a major risk for Hitachi.Demands for Nuclear Plant Decommissioning:
ASuccession of LawsuitsFollowing the Fukushima nuclearaccident, new lawsuits demanding nuclear plantdecommissioning are being filed in various areas.Lawsuits filed this year include:
KyushuElectric's Genkai Nuclear Plant on January 3 1,Tokyo Electric's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Planton April 23, Kyushu Electric's Sendai NuclearPlant on May 30, and Hokuriku Electric's ShikaNuclear Plant on June 26. It seems as thoughlawsuits are about to be filed against all of Japan'snuclear plants.Around 7.5 Million Signatures for NuclearPhase-out Submitted to Government and DietEminent writers and critics such asKenzaburo Oe have called for a petition named"Goodbye to Nuclear Power Plants",
and haveobtained around 7.5 million signatures.
The petitionwas submitted to both the Chairman of the LowerHouse on July 12th, and to the Chief CabinetSecretary on July 15th. On July 12th, eighty Dietmembers participated in a report meeting in theDiet Member's building to listen to Mr. Oe's appeal.New Law Establishes Nuclear Regulatory Commission In NIT Issue 147, News Watch reportedthat a bill for restructuring Japan's nuclearregulatory organizations had been submitted to the Diet. In the bill, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency was to be created under the Ministry ofthe Environment, but the LDP and Komeito partiessubmitted a counterproposal stating that thereshould be a Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The ruling DPJ party met the opposition partieshalfway and withdrew its first plan. The threeparties submitted to the Diet a revised plan basedon a new agreement, which was enacted on June20. Accompanying this enactment, the provision "contribute to Japan's national security" wasadded to tile three laws, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act, the NuclearReactor Regulation Law and the Basic Law onAtomic Energy, raising concerns that this may leadto the abrogation of the principle of peaceful use ofnuclear power.Demand for a Citizens' Referendum Ordinance Fails to PassThe demand in Osaka City and the Tokyometropolis for a citizens' referendum ordinance fora vote on the restart of nuclear plants was rejectedboth in the Osaka Assembly on March 27 and inthe Tokyo Assembly on June 20. At the same time,movements with a similar claim have started inShizuoka and Niigata Prefectures.
Nuke Info Tokyo is a bi-monthly newsletter that aims to provide foreign friends with up-to-date information on the Japanese nuclear industry as well as on the movements against it. It is published in html and pdfversions on CNIC's English web site: http://cnic.jp/englishl/
Please write to us if you would like to receive email notices when new editions are published.
Editor: Nobuko TanimuraTranslators:
Tony Boys, Sumie Mizuno, Philip Write, Erik Strommen, Mayumi NishiokaProofreaders:
Tony Boys, Yukio Yamaguchi March 9, 2012Dear U.S. Senators Levin and Stabenow, This week marks the sixth anniversary of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) AtomicSafety and Licensing Board's (ASLB) decision to steamroll our opposition, and rubberstamp a 20 yearlicense extension (2011 to 2031) at the problem-plagued Palisades atomic reactor in Covert, Michigan.
Our protest of the NRC's finalization of its license extension approval on January 17, 2007 is attached.
Given the then-dilapidated status of Palisades, it was profoundly disturbing that there was alicense extension granted.
In light of recent developments, it is inexcusable that Palisades is allowed tocontinue operations.
Palisades has now been identified by the NRC as one of the four worst plants inthe US and is now the very most embrittled plant in the country.Palisades, located on the Lake Michigan shoreline five miles south of South Haven, has a richhistory of trouble.
Our concerns are manifold, from radioactive waste risks to multiple reactor safetyrisks, but we focus now on the serious matter of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) embrittlement.
RPV embrittlernent is caused by neutron radiation bombardment of the RPV's metal walls overtime, resulting in a significant loss of ductility.
In pressurized water reactors like Palisades, embrittlement risks causing Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS). For example, if overheating occurs in the operating reactor core, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is designed to inject cooling water, in order toprevent a meltdown.
But such sudden temperature change, combined with such high pressure, couldfracture an embrittled RPV like a hot glass under cold water. A fractured RPV would lead to a Loss ofCoolant Accident (LOCA) which in turn can lead directly to a reactor core meltdown.
The pressurized primary core cooling water would instantly turn to steam and escape the RPV through the break in thevessel and fill the containment with radioactive steam and other escaping radioactive gases and particles, all at deadly levels. If the meltdown burned its way through the containment structures, or if the large,concentrated quantity of hazardous radioactivity found other escape pathways out of containment, acatastrophic radioactivity release to the environment could occur.The ongoing Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Catastrophe, which began one year ago on March 11 th,demonstrates that catastrophic radioactivity releases are not confined to Soviet designed reactors as atChernobyl but also can befall Western designed reactors.
Fukushima shows that we can no longer abidesuch risks in our midst.Palisades is an accident waiting to happen. It must be shut down, before it melts down.What kind of risks are we talking about? A 1982 study by Sandia National Laboratory predicted that catastrophic radioactivity releases could cause casualties and property damage downwind anddownstream.
For Palisades, the predictions are shocking:
1,000 "peak early fatalities,"
7,000 "peak earlyinjuries,"
10,000 "peak cancer deaths,"
and $52.6 billion in property damage. Populations have grownsignificantly in the past several decades, so casualties would be much worse now. When adjusted forinflation alone (not accounting for the economic development in the ensuing decades),
the propertydamage figure would top $117 billion in 2010 dollars.The NRC admitted just February 29, 2012 at a public meeting in South Haven that "Palisades' vessel is the most embrittled vessel at an operating nuclear power plant" in the U.S. (Jennifer Uhle, Ph.D.,NRC Office of Regulatory Research).
We had long suspected as much, as the main basis of ourintervention against the Palisades license extension was RPV embrittlement risk. But six years ago, theNRC ASLB steamrolled us and rubberstamped the 20 year license extension.
Perhaps no reactor in theU.S. is as old and degraded as Palisades.
The NRC also admitted that night that Palisades' ECCS actually activated in the chaotic, high-risk aftermath of the September 25, 2011 accident cutting power to half the control room. Fortunately, theECCS did not actually inject coolant into the core. This would have tested NRC's highly questionable assurances and regulatory rollbacks on PTS, in the real world.The public is being forced to bear the risk of Entergy's game of radioactive Russian roulette onthe Lake Michigan shoreline.
What are you going to do to help us? You and your staffs never evenacknowledged receipt of, let alone acted upon, the letter we sent you six years ago this month, demanding a GAO investigation of the progressive weakening of embrittlement requirements at Palisades.
It wassigned by 16 of Michigan's leading environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and the MichiganEnvironmental
: Council, a coalition of 70+ constituent groups. The combined memberships of theseorganizations represented the views of hundreds of thousands of Michiganders.
Additionally, organizations from Indiana,
: Illinois, Wisconsin, and Ontario also signed the letters, as well as Great LakesUnited, itself a coalition of 150 groups in the U.S. and Canada, from 8 states and 2 Canadian provinces.
Certainly, the concern about Palisades' RPV embrittlement risks is widespread
-and the deafening silence from your offices has left us feeling that the public has no voice in the critical issue of whetherPalisades should be allowed to continue operating in such dangerous circumstances.
It is now 2012, 45 years since Palisades got its operating license.
NRC has rubberstamped a riskylicense extension for 20 more years. It is our moral duty to plead that you address the matter of the RPVembrittlement danger. We repeat our modest request that you launch a GAO investigation, albeit sixyears late. We also request meetings with you, personally, by mid-April, or even sooner. We want toknow what you are going to do to protect us against the overt, out-of-control, worsening risks atPalisades, starting with its embrittled RPV, the worst in the country.
Please work with us to meet at yourGrand Rapids offices, either separately on the same day, or jointly.
Please plan on booking a room bigenough to accommodate a large number of concerned citizens who will want to come.Entergy is making a killing, while getting away with murder. We must not let the figurative become literal.Our point of contact is Kevin Kamps with Beyond Nuclear.
Please contact him at (240) 462-3216. Thank you.Sincerely,
/s/ Corinne Carey, Don't Waste Michigan, Grand Rapids chapter/s/ Alice Hirt, Don't Waste Michigan, Holland chapter/s/ Kevin Kamps, Don't Waste Michigan, Kalamazoo chapter/s/ Michael Keegan, Don't Waste Michigan, Monroe chapter/s/ Kathryn Barnes, Don't WasteMichigan.
Sherwood chapter/s/ Terry Lodge. Legal Counsel for Environmental Intervenors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission document:
Generalization of Plant-Specific Pressurized ThermalShock (PTS) Risk Results to Additional PlantsDate Submitted:
October 26, 2004 Revised:
December 14, 2004Table 1. Plants with highest RTNDT.Tolerance to a PTS Challenge Plant Name NSSS VendorMost Embrittled MaterialRTNDT(u)
+ Irradiation Shift at 40 years [0 F]Vessel Manufacturer The estimated tolerance to a PTS challenge increases as the number in the next columnincreases (i.e., plants with the lowest ranking have the most embrittled materials).
1 Salem 1 Westinghouse Plate 204 Combustion Engineering 2 Beaver Valley 1 Westinghouse Plate 194 Combustion Engineering 3 TMI-1 Babcock & Wilcox Axial Weld 186 Babcock & Wilcox4 Fort Calhoun Combustion Engineering Axial Weld 181 Combustion Engineering 5 Palisades Combustion Engineering Axial Weld 179 Combustion Engineering 6 Calvert Cliffs 1 Combustion Engineering Axial Weld 178 Combustion Engineering
* 7 Diablo Canyon 1 Westinghouse Axial Weld 171 Combustion Engineering 8 Diablo Canyon 2 Westinghouse Plate 170 Combustion Engineering 9 Sequoyah 1 Westinghouse Forging 167 Rotterdam Dockyard10 Watts Bar 1 Westinghouse Forging 164 Rotterdam Dockyard11 St. Lucie 1 Combustion Engineering Axial Weld 164 Combustion Engineering 12 Surry 1 Westinghouse Axial Weld 163 Babcock & Wilcox13 Indian Point 2 Westinghouse Plate 162 Combustion Engineering 14 Ginna Westinghouse Forging 161 Babcock & Wilcox15 Point Beach 1 Westinghouse Axial Weld 159 Babcock & Wilcox16 Farley 2 Westinghouse Plate 158 Combustion Engineering 17 Mcguire 1 Westinghouse Axial Weld 158 Combustion Engineering 18 Oconee 1 Babcock & Wilcox Axial Weld 157 Babcock & Wilcox19 North Anna 2 Westinghouse Forging 155 Rotterdam Dockyard20 Shearon Harris Westinghouse Plate 153 Chicago Bridge & Iron21 North Anna 1 Westinghouse Forging 153 Rotterdam Dockyard22 Cook 2 Westinghouse Plate 152 Chicago Bridge & Iron23 Salem 2 Westinghouse Axial Weld 148 Combustion Engineering 24 Crystal River 3 Babcock & Wilcox Axial Weld 141 Babcock & Wilcox25 Calvert Cliffs 2 Combustion Engineering Plate 139 Combustion Engineering 26 Robinson 2 Westinghouse Plate 138 Combustion Engineering 27 Cook 1 Westinghouse Axial Weld 138 Combustion Engineering 28 Farley 2 Westinghouse Plate 133 Combustion Engineering 29 Farley 1 Westinghouse Plate 133 Combustion Engineering 30 Arkansas Nuclear 1 Babcock & Wilcox Axial Weld 129 Babcock & WilcoxNotes:Plants analyzed in the PTS re-evaluation effort.Plants compared in the Generalization activity.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety andLicensina BoardIn the Matter ofNUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period)Docket No. 50-255-LR
) ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LR
)) March 17, 2006)PETITIONERS' NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM ASLB DENIALOF HEARING, AND SUPPORTING BRIEFTerry J. Lodge (Ohio #0029271) 316 N. Michigan St., Suite 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-8582tjlodge50@yahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners TABLE OF CONTENTST able of A uthorities
..........................................................
iiNotice of Appeal 1Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal 1ARGUMENT 2Status of Demetrios Basdekas as Petitioners' Expert on Embrittlement 2Appeal of dismissal of Contention No. 1 (The license renewal application is untimely andincomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement) 3Appeal of Dismissal of Contention No. 3 (The Palisades reactor has no place to store itsoverflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations) 9Conclusion 12Certification of Service 13-i-TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CasesDuke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC328, 334 (1999) 4Houston Lighting, ALAB-549, 9 NRC 649 3.North Atlantic Energy Services Corp. (Seabrook
: Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201,219-21 (1999) 4Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8AEC 13, 21 (1974) 4Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
LBP-98-7, 47NRC 142, aff'd, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998) 4Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
LBP-01-3, 53NRC 84, 99 (2001) 3Regulations 10 CFR § 2.202 1110 CFR § 2.206 9, 1110 CFR § 2.311 110 CFR § 54.21(c)(1) 610 CFR Part 72 Subpart K 1110 CFR § 72.212(b) 9, 10-ii-NOTICE OF APPEALNow come the Nuclear Information and Resource
: Service, et al., Petitioners-Inter-venors herein (and hereinafter referred to as "Petitioners"),
by and through counsel, andpursuant to 10 CFR § 2.311, give notice of their appeal from the March 7 "Memorandum andOrder" (hereinafter "Order")
issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel in thismatter, by which the ASLB denied Petitioners a hearing on their sundry contentions.
/s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF APPEALL INTRODUCTION This proceeding involves the application of Nuclear Management
: Company, LLC("NIMC")
to renew the operating license for its Palisades Nuclear Plant for an additional twenty-year period commencing in 2011. A number of groups and individuals jointly petitioned forstanding as intervenors and submitted contentions challenging various safety andenvironmental aspects of the proposed license renewal.There was no genuine controversy raised over the standing of the Petitioners, all ofwhom were granted status to intervene.
The matter proceeded to a prehearing conference inNovember 2005, and in its March 7, 2006 "Memorandum and Order," the ASLB reviewed the-I-contentions and denied Petitioners a hearing on any of them, terminating the adjudication, "despite
[Petitioners]
having in some instances touched upon some serious topics."
Order p.2.From the order ending the adjudication, Petitioners have timely taken this appeal,challenging the ASLB's rulings on Contentions.
1, 3 and 5.II. ARGUMENTStatus of Demetrios Basdekas as Petitioners' Expert on Embrittlement After being presented extensive evidence of Demetrios' Basdekas involvement withPetitioners in the drafting of Contention 1 on reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, the ASLBdenigrated the value of Basdekas' involvement by relegating him (Order p. 17) to the role ofhaving "assisted Petitioners in drafting Contention 1, not that he would be relied upon oravailable to assist them at any hearing."
Petitioners have proven that Basdekas framed hisstatement to the press, that he actively co-wrote Contention No. 1, and that in his pressstatement, he stated that the best indicators of embrittlement at Palisades were NMC's ownrecords.
Basdekas' assertions about embrittlement were not simply "obvious" or generic, butwere made with specific reference to Palisades.
Mr. Basdekas was Petitioners' expert at thetime of submission of Contention No. 1 on August 8, 2005. He was not merely a co-drafter ofthe contention.
The ASLB has exalted form. over substance, letting slavish adherence to rules work tobar the litigation on its merits of matters which the Board has itself termed "very serious."
Asthe below discussion
: reveals, infra, Petitioners timely submitted their contentions in thisintervention, and then followed up with a supplemental filing some five (5) weeks later whichthe Board has declined to consider, calling the supplemental filing untimely.
This licenseextension proceeding has seen several major delays for accommodation of other parties or incurred on the Board's own motion, which in the aggregate amount to more lost time from"delay" than the "delay" of the five weeks supposedly caused by Petitioners betweencontention submission and supplemental filing. However, the perceived damage to therelatively slow progress of the proceedings is laid only at the feet of the Petitioners.
Appeal of dismissal of Contention No. I (The license renewal application isuntimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement)
Despite giving lip service (Order p. 23) to the adages that "technical perfection is not anessential element of contention pleading" 1 and that the "[s]ounder practice is to decide issueson their merits, not to avoid them on technicalities,"
2 the ASLB nonetheless contrived to denyadmission of the embrittlement contention.
The licensing panel notes (Order p. 34) that in"Petitioners' Combined Reply to NRC Staff and Nuclear Management Company Answers" filedon September 16, 2005 -5 weeks after Petitioners' submission of their embrittlement contention
-that Petitioners "provide[
] additional support for the contention, of the sort thatmight have been included in the original basis for the contention."
The panel emphasized that embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel is a "veryserious topic, with regard to Palisades or indeed any nuclear plant," Order p. 35; that it waswithin the scope of license renewal, Order p. 36, and "warrants close attention."
Id. But theASLB proceeded to discard the contention for stating the "obvious" and presenting no specificissue which is Palisades-specific and susceptible to litigation.
Order p. 37-38. The panelcharitably noted that the rules of contention pleading might have "place[d]...
petitioners in adifficult position,"
Order pp. 40-41, but denies the contention, with the ASLB limiting itself to the'Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
LBP-01-3, 53 NRC84, 99 (2001).2Houston Lighting, ALAB-549, 9 NRC at 649.
information which accompanied the presentation of the timely-filed August 8, 2005 petition, notthe supplementation filed on September 16, 2005.By parsing the information available to it so constrictively, the ASLB carefully erectedthe very "fortress"'
3 which it had counseled should be avoided.4The ASLB "fortress" is impervious to these inconvenient facts: The Palisades reactorvessel was built some 39 years ago of an alloy containing unknown percentages of copper andnickel. The blend has been lost to history, if it ever were written down in the first place. Thisfact, alone, creates tremendous difficulty in accurately predicting the degree of embrittlement present in the reactor pressure vessel at any point during Palisades' operating history.Moreover, when the reactor pressure vessel was constructed, the utility elected not toinstall a thermal shield in the vessel, making it somewhat anomalous among similar reactors inthe U.S. nuclear industry.
When the vessel was completed, it was outfitted with so-called 3Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 334(1999):This is not to say that our contention rule should be turned into a "fortress to denyintervention."
[Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 21 (1974)].
The Commission and its boards regularly continueto admit for litigation and hearing contentions that are material and supported byreasonably specific factual and legal allegations.
See, e.g.' [North Atlantic EnergyServices Corp. (Seabrook
: Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 219-21 (1999)];Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
LBP-98-7, 47NRC 142, aff'd, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998)Id. at 335.4 Prehearing Tr.149-50 (ASLB chair questioning Staff Counsel):
... [t]here's also case law that says the contention rule should not be used [as] a fortressto deny intervention[,]
that what you need is enough to indicate that further inquiry isappropriate
.... Basically something to indicate that the petitioners are qualified, able tolitigate the issue that they raise. So what we have here is [-] we have an allegation thatthe application is incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis ofembrittlement[,]
supported by this factual allegation about early embrittlement and theidentification of an expert who used to work with the NRC. So on the face of that itwould seem that that provides something to indicate that further inquiry might beappropriate.
"surveillance coupons,"
pieces of metal deliberately left inside the vessel to be serially removedat refueling outages so they could be analyzed to predict the extent of embrittlement going onin the reactor vessel. Yet there was an insufficient number of coupons originally placed in thereactor, which ran out in the early 1990's, far before completion of the initial, 40-year, licensing period. See Exhibit 1-B in the "Appendix of Evidence" accompanying Petitioners' "Combined Reply.5Calculations by NMC show that the Palisades vessel may have surpassed its PressureThermal Shock ("PTS") limits as early as 1995. Re-analyses of Palisades have produced anever-widening range of resulting estimates for exceeding vessel embrittlement limits with avery broad range of uncertainty (as much as +/- 25%) with many PTS values for the severely-embrittled reactor vessel. Palisades has neared the maximum-embrittlement boundaries timeand again over the years,6 but each time those "goalposts" have been moved back withcontemporaneous rejiggering of the assumptions and calculations.
In 1995, for example, theNRC staff noted that the "Palisades RPV... is predicted to reach the PTS screening criteriaby late 1999, before any other plant." NRC Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1:Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity (May 19, 1995) (Exhibit 1-J to "Combined Reply").
Themost recent estimates project that the current PTS criteria will be exceeded in 20147 -three (3)years into the proposed 20-year license extension period which would begin in 2011.5 Palisades Thermal Shock, NRC Staff Presentation to the ACRS, Viewgraphs, December 09,1994, p. 3.6"For example that is sort of a summary of the regulatory framework that applies to annealing.
With regard to Palisades, we completed an evaluation in April of 1995 in which we concluded that theywould reach the screening criteria.
At least they were okay until 1999. That evaluation was consistent with the 50.61, the Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule. The current license for Palisades expires in 2007so they would fall somewhat short of the current operating license with regard to the life of the vessel.""Briefing on Annealing Demonstration Project,"
NRC Public Meeting, August 27, 1996.7Application,
: p. 4-15.
The Applicant claims that to address new technical issues relating to neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel, NMC proposes to use the third measure set forthin 10 CFR § 54.21 (c)(1) to disposition the issue -i.e., adequate management of the effects ofneutron irradiation embrittlement
-for the period of extended operation.
But in its application, NMC merely demonstrates that it plans to make an election by 2011 -that the utility currently plans to have a plan at the beginning of the 20-year proposed extension period.The Petitioners treat NMC's admission (Application
: p. 4-10) that the option of installing shield assemblies or flux suppression devices to achieve flux reduction would not be cost-effective as a sign that public safety concerns must be given center stage in the licenserenewal proceeding.
NMC admits it cannot cost-effectively reduce an increasing safety-significant risk to the public through flux reduction, states that its current pressure/temperature analyses for the reactor vessel expire in 2014, and cannot adequately demonstrate in advanceof the 20-year licensing period that the available alternatives can properly address and mitigateadvancing embrittlement and the associated higher Pressure Thermal Shock values anybetter. The deep and disturbing history of embrittlement management and projection atPalisades compels the conclusion that 2006, not 2011 or 2014, must be the date at whichNMC is required to provide a plan which conclusively demonstrates the ability of the companyto sustain operations for the full 20 years of additional licensure.
The adequacy of that planwould be the focus of an adjudication here, and it is that plan which the ASLB presently, andthe NRC staff before it, have declined to require of NMC.NMC currently relies on a complex re-analysis to assure safety margins in thephysically-deteriorating reactor pressure vessel. The resulting labyrinth of smoke-and-mirrors computer models has been viewed skeptically by the NRC's own Advisory Committee onReactor Safeguards.
Petitioners suggest that it is unreasonable for the Applicant to forego Flux Reduction programs for the extension period which might reasonably reduce the risk topublic health and safety from a Pressure Thermal Shock accident potentially occurring duringthe same license extension period unless NMC can show, now, with high confidence thatalternative approaches, including the option of annealing the vessel,8 can adequately preserverequired public safety margins in the 20-year extension period. It is therefore unreasonable and unacceptable for the Applicant to foreclose options within its established management strategy for economic reasons without first being required to demonstrate with confidence thatthe proposed alternatives adequately provide for the public's protection from this significant ongoing and potentially worsening age-associated safety issue.In its final remarks in denying the embrittlement contention for hearing, the ASLBscolds Petitioners for not requesting an extension to research and develop relevant technical and legal issues and arguments or to obtain access to experts or counsel competent in NRCpractice.
Order p. 41. It is easy, at this end of the adjudicatory
: process, to suggest that suchrequests from the public might have been greeted with compassion and sensitivity.
But that isbelied by the ASLB's record of time management in these proceedings.
The panel moved the originally-schedule prehearing conference dates back nearlythree (3) weeks, from October 14 to November 3, 2005 to accommodate the religious requirements of the lead attorney for the Staff.9 Following the November 3-4 prehearing conference, the Board granted itself an indeterminate period of several weeks, into December2005, by which time to issue its final ruling. On December 21, 2005, the ASLB orderedPetitioners to provide a brief immediately after the holidays on the status of their embrittlement 8There is no safe, proven annealing process.9A request to which Petitioners had absolutely no objection.
expert, occasioned by an email to the Board by the NRC staff counsel.
Following submission of Petitioners' filing on the expert controversy, the Staff and NMC were given a week torespond, pushing any decision on the overall merits deeper into January 2006. Then, at theend of February 2006, the Board again granted itself an indeterminate period of time intoMarch 2006 to issue its "Memorandum and Order" which, of course, was ultimately issued onMarch 7.Any damage from Petitioners' five-week delay (between the August 8 and September 16 filings) which is attributed to the belated completion of these proceedings or the fulfillment of the lockstep mandate of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to complete milestones according to a strict calendar has been more than offset by the time delays caused by caseevents beyond the control of Petitioners.
Yet the Board's whipping-children for delays remainthe Petitioners, who produced relevant and detailed information "too late" -5 weeks into thelicense extension case -to have it considered.
The ASLB uses Petitioners' supposed delay tojustify the exclusion of relevant and detailed information about the "very serious" topic ofembrittlement.
The ASLB has devoted a lot of time to building a fortress of compliance withprocess to the detriment of considering potentially inconvenient facts which happen not tohave arrived at a technical, rule-prescribed interval.
Such is the method by which form not merely triumphs over, but supplants, substance before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Rather than compelling NMC to affirmatively prove the physical capability of Palisades to operate for a full 20 years beyond 2011 (aproposition which Petitioners submit is metallurgically and financially specious),
the ASLBascends the ramparts to stave off the question.
Rather than having the NRC staff explain theagency's culpability in the methodological legerdemain which contrives never to see firmembrittlement mileposts, the ASLB instead flogs Petitioners for belatedly introducing relevant detail the tragic flaw of which has nothing to do with its content and all to do with the timing ofits introduction.
This result is unfair, unjust, disparages the public interest in safety, flies in the face ofeven the NRC's present draconian regulations, and should be reversed by the Commission.
The embrittlement contention should be sent back to the ASLB for adjudication.
Appeal of Dismissal of Contention No. 3 (The Palisades reactor has no place tostore its overflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations)
The licensing board ruled Contention 3 inadmissible because it is outside the scope ofa license renewal proceeding for not addressing an age-related component, and because 10CFR § 2.206 supposedly affords Petitioners a remedy to complaint about two (2) concrete drycask storage facilities which unaccountably do not meet NRC engineering specifications.
Order, pp. 48-49.Petitioners demonstrated using the expert calculations of Dr. Ross Landsman, formerlyof the NRC staff, that Palisades' dry cask storage arrangements violate NRC regulations.
Neither the old pad nor the more recently-constructed concrete pad for holding irradiated fuelcasks at Palisades conform with longtime NRC requirements for earthquake stability standards.
The Affidavit of Dr. Landsman demonstrates that both of the existing pads werebuilt on compacted sand and other subsurface materials, but dozens of feet above bedrock,and well above the ground elevation of the nearby nuclear power plant. Dr. Landsman, whohad direct oversight role in the inspection of dry cask storage at Palisades when he worked atNRC Region III during the critical 1993-2005 period of dry cask storage installation andoperation, concluded from his personal knowledge of the subsoil conditions that the older pad(the one nearer the lake) violates NRC liquefaction regulations under 10 CFR § 72.212(b)
(2)(i)(B) 1°, while the newer pad (further inland) violates NRC amplification regulations under thesame regulations.
Neither the older nor newer cask storage pads at Palisades plant weredesigned in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation.
See LandsmanAffidavit, T T 3-13.11Either violation, then, comprises an ongoing violation of 10 CFR § 72.212(b)(3).
12 Thismeans that the cask storage pads have violated NRC regulations since they were constructed, and in the absence of enforcement will continue to violate NRC regulations during thecontemplated 20-year license extension, and beyond.The NRC considers the older pad to be in compliance with regulations and allows NMCto store high-level radioactive waste there,13 while the NRC is supposedly still trying to resolvethrough ongoing inspection, investigation, and analysis the status of the newer pad. Duringthis period of supposed ongoing investigation, and despite evidence of apparent structural insufficiency, the NRC is prepared to let NMC store waste on the new pad in the face of these10[The general licensee shall perform written evaluations, prior to use, that establish that]: Caskstorage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of thestored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, andsoil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion."The Landsman Affidavit appears in hard copy at pp. App. 3-a through 3-d of the "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support of Contentions."
12[The general licensee shall]: Review the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) referenced in theCertificate of Compliance and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the generallicense, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports.
Theresults of this review must be documented in the evaluation made in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.1 3ncluding the unloadable, unmovable cask #4 at Palisades, loaded in June 1994 and shortlythereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faulty welds. Now, eleven years on,Consumers has yet to unload the defective cask, because it technically cannot do so safely. And theconfiguration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is suchthat the casks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of them have beenmoved out of the way first. This situation increases the risks, making it very difficult to addressemergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timely manner.
documented, unresolved safety concerns.
The simple reality is, there is high likelihood thatNRC inaction will make the noncompliant cask storage facilities of 2006 the older, less-compliant storage facilities of 2011-2031.
In 1994, Dr. Landsman, then an NRC Region III safety engineer and dry cask storageinspector overseeing Palisades, warned then-Commission
: Chairman, Ivan Selin that:[I]f you use NRC-approved casks under Subpart K [of 10 CFR Part 72], theregulations are silent about the foundation material or the pad. Actually, it's theconsequences that might occur from an earthquake that I'm concerned about. Thecasks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loose sand because ofliquefaction
.... It is apparent to me that NMSS [sic] doesn't realize the catastrophic consequences of their continued reliance on their current ideology.
(Emphasis added)It is impossible to disconnect the dry cask storage pad problems from the proposedlicense extension.
If both dry cask storage pads are ever finally deemed to violate NRC safetyregulations and are barred from use, then where, exactly, would NMC store its bulginginventory of irradiated nuclear fuel? And where would the dozens of dry casks already loadedand stored on those defective pads be moved? The pads constitute aging-related or aging-affected facilities, since they have been obsolescent literally from the date of construction.
Petitioners' contention is integral to the 20- year license extension period, since high-level radioactive waste is an inevitable byproduct of electricity production at the Palisades nuclearreactor and there will be several refuelings during the renewal period which will increase theusage of the concrete storage pads.Petitioners urge reversal and remand of this issue to the ASLB for adjudication.
In thealternative, the Commission presently having been put on notice of a potential serious safetyissue rife with facial violations of NRC regulations, should assume jurisdiction and set thismatter separately for adjudication pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202 and 2.206.-I1-CONCLUSION The NRC license extension adjudicatory process is, at turns, remniscent of a 19 h-century children's novel coupled with a post-industrial existential dystopia.
Within Petitioners' intervention, it was possible to be on time, but too late, to be superficially
: complete, butconclusively unfulfilled, as though one were in a novel by Kafka. The obligation to have theentirety of one's case marshaled as if for trial on the first day of the case, poised for itscomprehensive and visceral deconstruction, brings to mind Alice in Wonderland:
Through theLooking Glass. Just as the inevitability of embrittlement is somehow "obvious" but notremediable for want of just the right wording, linked to the proper documentation and servedlukewarm at precisely the optimum moment, it is equally "obvious" that the concept ofsubstantive justice is secondary to perfunctory, bloodless conformance to ironic standards.
The notion that one can raise a contention of "very serious" import, yet be denied theopportunity to litigate it on its merits because the NRC Staff deigns ignore it on behalf of thegeneral public, is anathema to the notion of justice.
Humpty Dumpty would be pleased.Petitioners respectfully pray the Commission reverse the ASLB decisions as to theirFirst and Third contentions, and remand the same for a hearing on their merits.Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners,
/s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.com Counsel for all Petitioners
-1 2-UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDIn the Matter ofNUCLEAR MANAGEMENT
: COMPANY, LLC(Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))))Docket No. 50-255-LR ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LR CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM ASLBDENIAL OF HEARING, AND SUPPORTING BRIEF" in the above-captioned proceeding havebeen served on the following through deposit in the NRC's internal mail system, with copies byelectronic mail, as indicated by an asterisk, by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by doubleasterisk, with copies by electronic mail, or by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by tripleasterisk, were delivered all parties at the following mailling addresses; all on this 17th dayof March, 2006:Office of the Secretary*
ATTN: Docketing and ServiceMail Stop: O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 (E-mail:
HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov)
Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
ajb5@nrc.gov)
Dr. Nicholas G. Trikouros*
Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
n.trikouros@att.net)
Dr. Anthony Baratta*
Ann Marshall Young*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
amy@nrc.gov)
Paul Gunter**DirectorNuclear Information
& Resource Service1424 16th Street, NWSuite 404Washington, DC 20036(E-mail:
pgunter@nirs.org)
Chuck Jordan**ChairmanGreen Party of Van Buren County50521 34th AvenueBangor, MI 49013(E-mail:
jordanc@btc-bci.com)
Alice Hirt**Western Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SESuite 280Grand Rapids, MI 49506(E-mail:
alicehirt@charter.net)
Maynard Kaufman***
Michigan Land Trustees25485 County Road 681Bangor, MI 49013David R. Lewis, Esq.**Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP2300 N Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20037-1128 (E-mail:
david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com)
Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.**Vice President,
: Counsel,
& Secretary Nuclear Management
: Company, LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016(E-mail:
jonathan.rogoff@nmcco.com)
Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General CounselMail Stop: O-15D21Washington, D.C. 20555(E-mail Address:
slu@nrc.gov)
/s/ Terry J. LodgqeTerry J. LodgeMichael Keegan**Co-ChairDon't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 49505(E-mail:
mkeeganj@comcast.net)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodREQUEST FOR HEARINGANDPETITION TO INTERVENE Now come the Nuclear Information and Resource Service(hereinafter "NIRS"),
West Michigan Environmental Action Council(hereinafter "WMEAC"),
Don't Waste Michigan (hereinafter "DWM"), theGreen Party of Van Buren County (hereinafter "Green Party"),
theMichigan Land Trustees (all collectively known as Petitioners-Intervenors),
and Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck, Lee Burdick, BruceCutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, Barbara Geisler, KarenHeavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, Alice Hirt, LaurettaHolmes, Chuck Jordan, Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, NellyKurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson,Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm, Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, RobinTinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond (collectively known asMember-Intervenors) and hereby make their REQUEST FOR A HEARING andPETITION TO INTERVENE in the captioned matter, pursuant to the-I-Federal Register Notice of June 08, 2005 [Volume 70, Number 109, Page33533-33535]
and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.714and § 2.309.In support of their Request and Petition, said Intervenors further state as follows:1. Nuclear Information and Resource Service is a nonprofit corporation with over 6000 members, a number of whom live in theGreat Lakes Region of the United States, including over 100 inMichigan and 50 of whom make their residences within fifty (50) milesof the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station (hereinafter "Palisades").
The central office of NIRS is located at 1424 16thStreet NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036.2. Western Michigan Environmental Action Council is a nonprofit, tax-exempt environmental organization started in the mid-1960's.
Ithas 1500 members, most of whom live in Michigan, and an estimated 400to 500 live within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.3. Don't Waste Michigan is a nonprofit organization begun in the1980's with about 25 members, nearly all of whom live in Michigan, and of which an estimated 5 currently live within 50 miles of thePalisades nuclear plant.4. The Green Party of Van Buren County is a political party andassociation of persons which came into being around environmental issues. It has a membership of approximately 15 members, all of whomare residents of Van Buren County, Michigan, and all of whom residewithin 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.5. Michigan Land Trustees (website www.michiganlandtrust.org) was founded in 1976. It is an association of 60 to 70 individuals and families dedicated to preserving and protecting farm land inMichigan.
Most of its members reside in southwest
: Michigan, at least15 of whom live within the 50-mile zone around the Palisades nuclearreactor.6. Members of these organizations who live or have property andfamily within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) including theimmediate area around the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station whichis sited in Covert, Michigan have requested Nuclear Information andResource
: Service, West Michigan Environmental Action Council, Don'tWaste Michigan, the Green Party of Van Buren County and the MichiganLand Trustees (hereinafter "Petitioners")
to represent them and theirrespective interests in this proceeding.
: 6. The Declarations of individuals Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck,Lee Burdick, Bruce Cutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, BarbaraGeisler, Karen Heavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, LaurettaHolmes, Chuck Jordan. Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, NellyKurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson,Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm, Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, RobinTinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond are annexed to thisRequest and Petition, with each individual declarant identifying hisor her affiliation with the petitioning organizations.
: 7. Petitioners-Intervenors, as organizational intervenors, believe that their members' interests will not be adequately represented without this action to intervene, and without theopportunity to participate as full parties in this proceeding.
If the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station license is renewed withoutresolving the Petitioners'-Itervenors' safety concerns andenvironmental issues, this nuclear generating station may operateunsafely and pose an unacceptable risk to the environment, therebyjeopardizing the health and welfare of the respective Petitioners'-
Intervenors' members who live, recreate and have businesses withinthe vicinity of the nuclear power reactor.PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONS TECHNICAL/HEALTH/SAFETY ANALYSIS CONTENTIONS
: 1. The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement.
The Petitioners allege that the Palisades license renewalapplication is fundamentally deficient because it does not adequately address technical and safety issues arising out of the embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel and unresolved Pressure Thermal Shock.("PTS") concerns that might reasonably result in the failure of thereactor pressure vessel ("RPV").
The Palisades nuclear power stationis identified as prone to early embrittlement of the reactor pressurevessel, which is a vital safety component.
As noted in the opinion ofPetitioners' expert on embrittlement, Mr. Demetrios
: Basdekas, retiredfrom the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the longer Palisades
: operates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, with decreasing safetymargins in the event of the initiation of emergency operation procedures.
Therefore, a hearing on the public health and safetyeffects of a prospective additional twenty years of operation, giventhe present and prospective embrittlement trend of the RPV isimperative to protecting the interests of those members of thepetitioning organization who are affected by this proceeding.
: 2. Excessive radioactive and toxic chemical contamination inlocal drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear powerplant as part of its daily, "routine" operations.
The radioactive and toxic chemical emissions from the Palisades nuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan contaminate therecently-installed drinking water supply intake for the City of SouthHaven, built just offshore from Van Buren State Park and justdownstream from the Palisades
: reactor, due to the direction of theflow of Lake Michigan's waters and the very close proximity of thePalisades reactor to the South Haven drinking water supply intake.U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration modelsconfirm the direction of water flow in Lake Michigan toward the intake. Petitioners-Intervenors hope to produce public records oftoxics and radiation testing of the water source to evidence thispublic health problem.ENVIRONMENTAL CONTENTIONS
: 3. The Palisades reactor has no place to store its overflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations.
The indoor irradiated fuel storage pool reached capacity in1993. But the outdoor dry cask storage pads at Palisades, both theolder one nearer Lake Michigan and the newer one further inland, arein violation of NRC earthquake regulations.
10 CFR § 72.212(b)
(2)(i) (B) requires that:Cask storage pads and areas have been designed toadequately support the static and dynamic loads of the storedcasks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory groundmotion ....According to Petitioners' anticipated expert, Dr. Ross Landsman, former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III dry cask storageinspector, the older pad violates the liquefaction portion of thisregulation, and the new pad violates the amplification portion of theregulation.
Petitioners contend that neither the older nor new drycask storage pads at the Palisades plant were designed inconsideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation.
: 4. The unloadable, unmovable dry storage cask #4 at Palisades.
In 1993, Consumers Power (now Consumers Energy) assured afederal district judge that if it encountered problems with loadeddry casks at Palisades, it would simply reverse the loading procedure and return the high-level radioactive waste to the storage pools. Butthe fourth cask loaded at Palisades, in June 1994, was shortlythereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faultywelds. However, eleven years on, Consumers has yet to unload thedefective cask, because it cannot. Petitioners state that Consumers perpetrated a fraud upon the court and the public, with the complicit support by the NRC, and has critically undermined its credibility asto any pledges about the safety of dry cask storage.The significance of this problem with cask #4 is considerable.
For example, the configuration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is such that the casksfurthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks infront of them have been moved out of the way first. This configur-ation increases the risks, making it very difficult to addressemergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timelymanner.
: 5. There is no permanent repository for the nuclear waste whichwould be generated at Palisades after 2010.Any waste generated at Palisades after 2010 would be excess tothe capacity of the proposed national dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevadaaccording to U.S. Department of Energy projections in its YuccaMountain Final Environmental Impact Statement (Feb. 2002), asrevealed in Tables A-7 and A-8 on pages A-15 and A-16 of Appendix A.In fact, the waste generated at Palisades from 1971 to 2010 may alsobe excess to Yucca, in that the proposed dump may never open. TheState of Nevada maintains that NRC's "Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision" is erroneous, in that it biases NRC to favor the YuccaMountain dump license lest it be proven wrong in its assurance to thepublic that a high-level radioactive waste geologic repository willopen in the U.S. by 2025. Because so much uncertainty surrounds theYucca Mountain dump proposal, as well as other high-level radioactive waste proposals, Petitioners-Intervenors contend that waste generated at Palisades during the 20 year license extension could very well bestored at Palisades indefinitely, a scenario inadequately addressed by the applicant and NRC.6. Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry caskstorage pads.The more casks loaded on the storage pads at Palisades, the morerisk of erosion to the sand supporting the pads, given the largeweight of the casks themselves (well over 100 tons each), weatherrelated erosion of the sand dunes, as well as the erosion that willoccur due to more severe weather impacts from the global climatecrisis and climate de-stabilization.
Arresting erosion at both padsis important to safety and radiation containment over the long haul,given the proximity of the waters of Lake Michigan.
The State ofMichigan and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have designated thesand dunes upon which the older pad is located -so close to thewaters of Lake Michigan
-as a high-risk erosion zone.The Lake Michigan dunes are subject to "blow outs" where entiredunes are blown out during wind storms and lighting strikes.
See F.Nori, P. Sholtz, and M. Bretz (Department of Physics, The University of Michigan),
"Sound-Producing Sand Avalanches,"
Scientific AmericanVol. 277, No. 3 (September 1997). At Warren Dunes, some 35 milessouth of Palisades, sand blowouts have been estimated to travel asmuch a one-quarter mile per day, exposing 5,000-year-old trees thathave long since turned to charcoal.
"Some chilling facts about Duneshistory,"
http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/region/0256d4c429632 b30862570460062843b.txt The Palisades dunes could, in a wind storm or lightning strike,shift, blow and cover the dry cask storage area. As weather patternsintensify (as anticipated) this potential for erosion will increase.
Additionally, the dunes and shore line are geologically prone to sandavalanche.
A sand avalanche coupled with a seismic event couldcompromise the integrity of one or more casks at Palisades.
: 7. Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens to area watersources.The impact of 20 additional years of pollution by toxicsdisclosed but not adequately controlled under requirements of theNational Pollutant Discharge Elimination System will directly affectwater quality of nearby sources, including Lake Michigan.
In 2000,for example, Palisades was found to be in "continuing noncompliance" for its apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol in Lake Michiganfor the dispersion of mussels and clams affecting the water intakes.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi4qtrOl.txt NPDES violations also contradicts the spirit, intention andexplicit recommendation of The International Joint Commission.
In its"Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality,"
theCommission's Recommendation
#16 (at p. 42) urges that "[g]overnments monitor toxic chemicals used in large quantities at nuclear powerplants, identify radioactive forms of the toxic chemicals and analyzetheir impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem."
MISCELLANEOUS CONTENTIONS
: 8. Zncreased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers toreduce embrittlement of RPV walls.To mitigate the prospect of increased embrittlement of thereactor pressure vessel (RPV), the Palisades operator usespreviously-irradiated fuel to create a buffer next to the RPV wall.The second-use of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor coretends to weaken and damage the cladding on the fuel rods, makingfuture waste handling,
: storage, and ultimate disposal
-whether on-site at Palisades, in transport, and at future storage or dump sites-problematic.
It poses an elevated risk for the safety of Palisades workers and the general public. Moreover, the U.S. Department ofEnergy ("DOE") depends on the integrity of the fuel cladding as ameans of preventing or minimizing the chances of unanticipated fissioning in storage casks or other units -in effect, as a means ofdelaying radiation releases into the groundwater at the Private FuelStorage (Utah) and Yucca Mountain (Nevada) sites.8. Environmental justice denied by the continuing operations ofPalisades.
Palisades nuclear generating station is a the source ofenvironmental justice violations.
Located within a predominantly African-American and low-income
: township, Palisades provides woefullyinadequate tax revenues to the host community, considering the largeadverse impacts and risks the reactor inflicts.
Palisades' African-American employees have traditionally been stuck in the dirtiest andmost dangerous jobs at the reactor, with little to no prospects forpromotion.
Some of Palisades' African American employees have alsoexperienced death threats at the work place, including nooses hung intheir lockers or in public places to symbolize
: lynching, an attempt to silence their public statements for workplace justice.Palisades' license extension application also has inadequately addressed the adverse impacts that 20 additional years of operations and waste generation would have on the traditional land uses, spiritual,
: cultural, and religious practices, and treaty rights of variousfederally-recognized tribes in the vicinity of the plant and beyond,as well as effects upon non-federally recognized tribes governed byinternational law. Only three tribes were contacted by the NRC byAugust 8th, 2005, and invited to participate in the license extension proceedings, which effectively excluded a number of tribes within the50-mile zone around the reactor.
For this reason alone, the August 8,2005 deadline for requesting a hearing to intervene against thePalisades license extension should be extended, until all tribeswithin the 50-mile zone and beyond, which have ties to the powerplant site and its environs, are contacted.
Also, Palisades' license extension application inadequately addresses the adverse socio-economic impacts of acatastrophic radiation release due to reactor core embrittlement leading to core rupture, as they would be found among the low-income Latin American agricultural workforce of the Palisades area. Too,possible synergistic effects of such catastrophic radiation releasescombined with the toxic chemical exposures these low income Latin-American agricultural workers already suffer on the job have not beenevaluated.
: Finally, there is an unacceptable lack of Spanish languageemergency evacuation instructions and notifications to serve theSpanish speaking Latino population within 50 miles of the Palisades
: reactor, especially migrant agricultural workers.9. Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ.Emergency responders in the 50 mile zone around the Palisades nuclear reactor are inadequately trained and inadequately equipped torespond to a major radioactivity release during an accident or attackat the plant.Even with its shiny new fire trucks, Covert, Michigan does nothave the staffing,
: equipage, training nor preparedness for a majorradiological emergency.
Covert's best, good as it is, is still nomatch for a chernobyl style fire. The remainder of the emergency planning zone is occupied by rural, volunteer fire departments, whichhave even less equipment and resources with which to work. Radiation monitors and radiation-protective gear are in short supply or unheardof. Isolation wards for radioactively contaminated victims (so theydon't harm the doctors and nurses and other patients) are very rareor non-existent at most, probably all, hospitals within 50 miles.10. Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident orattack on the power plant causing severe radiation release.Given that a severe radiation release from Palisades due toaccident or attack would significantly damage the economic base ofwestern Michigan, not only within the 50 mile zone around the
: reactor, but even beyond it, due to crops and products that wouldhave to be destroyed, as well as the lingering stigma attached towestern Michigan agricultural products after such a release, a SevereAccident Mitigation Analysis must be performed, publicized andcirculated for public review and comment as a precondition toconsidering whether or not to grant a license extension.
: 11. Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against thePalisades nuclear power plant.Located on the shoreline of Lake Michigan, the source ofdrinking water, fish, recreation, and other economic value to tens ofmillions of people downstream, Palisades represents a target forpotentially catastrophic terrorist attack or sabotage intended torelease large amounts of radioactivity into the Great Lakes basin.Palisades represents a radioactive bull's eye on the shore of 20% ofthe planet's surface fresh water, the Great Lakes. The operating reactor (containing many billions of curies of radioactivity) andhigh-level waste storagepool (containing tens to hundreds ofmillions of curies.)
are vulnerable to such attack, as are the outdoordry storage casks, so highly visible stored in plain sight.12.Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners, Is/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.com Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423(616) 399-4408Fax (616) 399-0868Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-Intervenors and Member-Intervenors CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE/TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that the foregoing Request for Hearing andPetition to Intervene, along with five (5) Notices of Appearance, wassent this 8th day of August, 2005 via email only to the following:
Office of the Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications StaffEmail to Office of the Secretary
: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov Office of General CounselUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email OGCMailcenter@nrc.gov And that the same was sent via first-class mail on the 9th ofAugust, 2005 to:Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.Vice President Counsel & Secretary Nuclear Management Company LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016Is! Terry J. LodgeTerry J. Lodge UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF PAUL GUNTERPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b),
Paul Gunter hereby enters anappearance on behalf of Nuclear Information and Resource Service(NIRS) and provides the following information:
: 1. I am Director of the Reactor Watchdog Project for NuclearInformation and Resource Service at 1424 16th Street NW, Suite 404,Washington, DC 20036, Tel. 202 328 0002 and my email address is<pgunter@nirs.org>.
: 2. I have been appointed by NIRS to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding.
/s/ Paul GunterPaul Gunter8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL KEEGANFOR DON'T WASTE MICHIGANPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b),
Michael Keegan hereby enters anappearance on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan (DWM), and provides thefollowing information:
: 1. I am Co-Chair of the board of Don't Waste Michigan at 2213Riverside Drive, NE, Grand Rapids, MI 49505, phone (734) 735-6373 andmy email address is <mkeeganj@comcast.net>.
: 2. I have been appointed by DWM to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding.
/s/ Michael KeeganMichael Keegan8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF ALICE HIRTFOR WESTERN MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION COUNCILPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b),
Alice Hirt hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Western Michigan Environmental ActionCouncil (WMEAC),
and provides the following information:
: 1. I am a member of WMEAC, the office of which is located at1415 Wealthy Street, SE, Suite 280, Grand Rapids, MI 49506, phone(616) 335-3405 and my email address is <alicehirt@charter.net>.
: 2. I have been appointed by WMEAC to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding.
/s/ Alice HirtAlice Hirt8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF CHUCK JORDANFOR GREEN PARTY OF VAN BUREN COUNTY, MICHIGANPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b),
Chuck Jordan hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Green Party of Van Buren County,Michigan, and provides the following information:
: 1. I am the Chairman of the Green Party of Van Buren County,the office of which is located at 50521 34th Avenue Bangor, MI 49013,phone (home) 269.427.8339 (cell) 269.271.2038, email <jordanc@btc-bci.com>.
: 2. I have been appointed by the Green party to jointlyrepresent the organization and its members in this proceeding.
/s/ Chuck JordanChuck Jordan8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MAYNARD KAUFMANFOR MICHIGAN LAND TRUSTEESPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b),
Maynard Kaufman hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Michigan Land Trustees and provides thefollowing information:
I am a member of the Michigan Land Trustees.
My office islocated at my home, 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013.2. I have been appointed by the Michigan Land Trustees tojointly represent the organization and its members in thisproceeding.
/s/ Maynard KaufmanMaynard Kaufman8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing BoardIn the Matter of) Docket No. 50-255-LR NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING
) ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LR STATION)Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period ) September 16, 2005PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFFAND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERSNow come the Nuclear Information and Resource
: Service, et al., Petitioners-Intervenors herein (and hereinafter referred to as "Petitioners"),
by and through counsel, and respond tothe "NRC Staff Answer Opposing Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing" (hereinafter referred to "Staff Answer"),
and to the "Nuclear Management Company's Answer to the August8, 2005 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene" (hereinafter referred to as "NMCAnswer").
Petitioner respond in opposition to those portions of the respective Answers whichdeny the admissibility of Petitioners' proffered contentions.
ARGUMENTPreliminary Note As To Standing IssuesNuclear Management Company raises no objections to the standing of the sundryIntervenors.
NMC Answer p. 2. The Staff quibbles, not about the standing of the Intervenors, but only that the Organizational Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that they have-I-organizational standing.
Staff Answer pp. 7-8. Because they are assured that somecombination of their numbers has standing to raise the pending contentions, thePetitioners/Intervenors will make no further arguments on the standing issue, but instead willdefer to the Board to render a final determination.
Response as to Contention No. 1 (The license renewal application is untimely andincomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement)
NMC and NRC staff have argued that Contention 1 regarding the Application's proposed management of the embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel isinadmissible because the Contention (i) fails to challenge the Application and demonstrate theexistence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law; (ii) fails to provide a factualbasis to support any dispute with the application, and; (iii) improperly challenges Commission regulation.
These assertions are incorrect.
: 1) The embrittlement contention is within the scope of the proceeding The extended operation of the Palisades nuclear steam supply system falls squarelyunder 10 CFR &sect; 54.21 and &sect; 54.29(a) which focuses on the management of aging of certainsystems, structures, and components and the review of time-limited aging evaluations.
A genuine dispute exists within the Application that is germane to the health and safetyof the petitioners who live, work and recreate out to 50 miles from the Palisades nuclear powerstation in Covert, Michigan.
The Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel is the subject component.
There is no safetyredundancy to this single largest component in the Palisades nuclear steam supply system.Palisades is arguably one of the most embrittled reactor pressure
: vessels, if not the mostembrittled vessel, in the United States. The nuclear steam supply system for Palisades was thefirst of the Combustion Engineering line licensed for construction.
Documentation as early as1970 identifies Surveillance specimens in the vessel will be used to monitor the radiation damage during the life of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect thesafety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce radiation damageeffects.
The results of annealing will be confirmed by tests on additional surveillance specimens provide for this purpose.
Prior to the accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 E19 nvt (>1 Mev) on the rector vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate thecontinued suitability of the currently proposed
: startup, cool down, and operating conditions.
1Exhibit 1-A. All exhibits are found in "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support ofContentions" (Pet. App.), a copy of which is provided with this response in hard copy to theASLB and the parties.The Petitioners have been able to establish that the licensee could not providesurveillance materials for critical weld material in the Palisades vessel beltline welds in 1994.2See Exhibit 1-B.A commitment was made for the Palisades plant as early as 1970 to make actualphysical efforts-by annealing the vessel to restore ductility should any "radiation damage"affecting plant safety be discovered.
In fact, calculations later recognized by NRC staffconcluded that the Palisades vessel could have surpassed its Pressure Thermal Shock ("PTS")limits as early as 1995. Repeated Palisades re-analyses have produced a widening range ofresulting estimates for exceeding vessel embrittlement limits with a very broad range ofuncertainty (as much as +/- 25%) with as many PTS values for the severely-embrittled reactorvessel. Palisades has neared the maximum-embrittlement goalposts time and again over theyears,3 but each time they have been moved back following rejiggering of the assumptions and'Report on Palisades Plant, Letter from Joseph Hendrie (ACRS) to Glen Seaborg, Chair AEC, January27, 1970.2 Palisades Thermal Shock, NRC Staff Presentation to the ACRS, Viewgraphs, December 09, 1994, p.3.3'For example that is sort of a summary of the regulatory framework that applies to annealing.
With regard to Palisades, we completed an evaluation in April of 1995 in which we concluded that theywould reach the screening criteria.
At least they were okay until 1999. That evaluation was consistent with the 50.61, the Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule. The current license for Palisades expires in 2007so they would fall somewhat short of the current operating license with regard to the life of the vessel."
calculations.
In 1995, fox example, the NRC staff noted that the "Palisades RPV... ispredicted to reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other plant." NRCGeneric Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1: Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity (May 19,1995) (Exhibit 1-J). The most recently-recognized estimates project that the current PTScriteria will be exceeded in 2014, which is early in the proposed 20-year license extension period.The Applicant asserts that NRC approved methodology was used to perform neutronfluence calculations consistent with Regulatory Guide &sect; 1.190 and described in WCAP-15353, "Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Evaluation."
The Applicant argues that "at theappropriate time, prior to exceeding the PTS screening
: criteria, Palisades will select theoptimum alternative to manage PTS in accordance with NRC regulations, and will make theapplicable submittals to obtain NRC review and approval."
4 The Applicant argues that withrespect to addressing technical issues relating to neutron irradiation embrittlement of thereactor pressure vessel that the Applicant adopts the third measure set forth in 10 CFR &sect;54.21(c)(1) to disposition the issue -i.e., adequate management of the effects of neutronirradiation embrittlement
-for the period of extended operation.
The content of technical information of an application is set forth in 10 CFR &sect; 54.21 toinclude a review of systems, structures and components subject to an aging management review to include the reactor vessel, the core shroud and component supports.
10 CFR &sect;54.21 (c)(1) stipulates an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses where the applicant mustdemonstrate (i) the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation; (ii) the analyses"Briefing on Annealing Demonstration Project,"
NRC Public Meeting, August 27, 1996.4"Application for Renewed Operating License for Palisades Nuclear Generating Station,"
NuclearManagement
: Company, March 22, 2005, ADAMS Accession Number ML050940446,
: p. 4-15.
have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation; (iii) the effects of aging onthe intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of operation.
Under the current rule (10 CFR &sect; 50.61), three courses of action can be taken tomanage aging of the reactor vessel: 1) The operator shall implement flux reduction programsthat are reasonably practicable to avoid exceeding the PTS screening criteria;
: 2) For those plants where no "reasonable flux reduction program will prevent RTptsfrom exceeding the PTS screening criterion" the operator can take a look at plant-specific evaluation of plant systems, thermal hydraulics, reactor vessel design, etc. This analysis mustbe submitted at least three years before RTpts is projected to exceed the PTS screening criteria; or;3) Anneal the pressure vessel as provided under 10 CFR &sect; 50.66, or the annealing ruleand Regulatory Guide &sect; 1.162, which provides guidance on how to implement the annealing rule.There is a requirement that a licensee that desires to anneal the reactor vessel mustsubmit a thermal annealing report 3 years before actually performing the annealing.
Thisthermal report has four major sections in it. One is an operating plan basically identifying howannealing is to be performed.
The Petitioners do not agree that the current rule necessarily affords an either/or choiceto be made by the company, as with choosing from a Whitman's Sampler box of candy, butrather, that it contemplates a combination of efforts in concert to achieve the largest margins ofsafety. The Petitioners further suggest that the operative words in 10 CFR &sect; 50.61 (b)(4) [wherethere is "no reasonably practicable flux reduction program" to prevent exceeding the PTScriteria]
: require, not only consideration of the financial interests of the utility, but that the regulation is heavily weighted in the direction of considering public safety. Hence thePetitioners dispute licensee's assertion in the Application
( page 4-10) that:The flux to the reactor vessel would have to be reduced by an additional factorof 3 in order to reach March 24, 2031. Some additional flux reduction could conceivably be achieved by installation of additional shield assemblies and/or flux suppression devices (e.g. hafnium inserts).
Flux reduction of the magnitude required at Palisades would require far more extraordinary
: measures, such as the installation of neutronshields on the exterior of the core support barrel. It is unlikely that a plant modification of this magnitude would be cost-effective.
(Emphasis added)It is highly likely that NMC would pursue alternative solutions rather than rely on fluxreduction to extend the reactor vessel life. Other alternatives that would be considered wouldinclude completion of the safety analysis as specified in 10 CFR &sect; 50.61 (b)(4), and thermalannealing treatment as specified in 10 CFR &sect; 50.61(b)(7).
Any alternative that NMC maypropose in the future to extend the life of the Palisades reactor vessel would, of necessity, bediscussed thoroughly with the NRC and would be subject to formal NRC review and approvalbefore it could be implemented.
The ultimate method used to manage PTS for extended plantoperation would be governed by NRC regulations independently from the license renewalprocess.
"5The Petitioners also dispute that part of the Application where the licensee states (p. 4-15) in its Analysis that "The current pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond thecurrent operating license period, but not to the end of the period of extended operation.
Theseanalyses are estimated to expire in 2014."6 The licensee admits in its Application that it seeksto limit an aging management strategy as required in 10 CFR &sect; 54.21(c)(1)(iii) and adopt asubset of the established management strategies as established by 10 CFR &sect; 50.61 forfracture toughness requirements to protect against pressurized thermal shock events based on"Id., p. 4-10.6Id., p. 4-15.
economic considerations to the licensee.
It does so, however, without adequately demonstrating that the proposed alternatives can confidently address and mitigate advancing embrittlement and the associated higher Pressure Thermal Shock values any better than thelicensee's admitted inability to reduce, cost-effectively, an increasing safety-significant risk tothe public through flux reduction programs.
Petitioners argue that all of these management strategies are in place to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety willbe protected, first and foremost, and that they are not mere options to be predicated onconsideration of the company's financial bottom line.Petitioners submit that an effective and reliable management plan for a twenty-year extension must begin with the incorporation of all NRC management strategies as outlinedunder 10 CFR &sect; 50.61, including fluence reduction
: efforts, not just the company's perceived cost-effective ones. This is particularly germane to Palisades, as the NRC staff has recognized through a broad set of calculations and associated uncertainties in determining the actualseverity of the embrittlement that the vessel might have exceeded the PTS criterion as early as1995 or might, according to later questionable estimations, exceed as late as 2014. That wouldbe three (3) years into the 20-year license extension period sought by NMC.The Applicant has already abandoned a previous commitment to anneal the severelyembrittled Palisades pressure vessel, discussed infra. Petitioners are unsure whether theApplicant abandoned its previous commitment to anneal the Palisades reactor pressure vesselbecause of economic considerations, or because of operational issues and risks associated with re-embrittlement of annealed beltline welds. NMC instead now relies on a complex re-analysis to assure safety margins in the physically-deteriorating reactor pressure vessel. Therequisite labyrinth of computer models that has resulted has been subjected to much healthyskepticism from the NRC's own Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
In light of these problems, petitioners suggest that it is unreasonable for the Applicant to forego Flux Reduction programs for the extension period which might reasonably reduce therisk to public health and safety from a Pressure Thermal Shock accident potentially occurring during the same license extension period without demonstrating with a high degree ofconfidence that alternative approaches, including the option of annealing the vessel, canadequately preserve required public safety margins in the extension period.Instead, the Application seeks less costly and undemonstrated efforts for the extension period by vaguely proposing to alternately;
: 1) incorporate another embrittlement and PTS re-analysis which is recognized bysignificant uncertainties that potentially seek to merely pencil whip a worsening safety issuewith narrowing safety margins for the proposed extension period or;2) resort to a yet-to-be demonstrated effective annealing of the reactor pressure vessel,a process which the same operator had already previously committed to in 1995 andabandoned in 1997.The applicant's statement that it can abandon actual physical and operational measures to reduce the neutron fluence affecting embrittlement of the pressure vessel raisesan undue public risk from a Pressure Thermal Shock event.Therefore, the Petitioners suggest that under current established management strategyPalisades may have already exceeded the current PTS criteria or if not, will exceed the criteriaearly in the proposed license renewal period (viz., 2014). It is therefore unreasonable andunacceptable for the Application to foreclose options within its established management strategy for economic reasons without first being required to demonstrate with confidence thatthe proposed alternatives adequately provide for the public's protection from this significant ongoing and potentially worsening age-associated safety issue.
Petitioners are particularly concerned that safety focused measures such as FluxReduction Programs at Palisades fall victim to the economic imperative to keep the reactoroperating even at unacceptably reduced margins of safety rather than make much-need investments.
This controversy is an historical problem at Palisades.
The New York Times reportedApril 12, 1992 on a comment by then-NRC Chairman Ivan Selin on the vulnerability ofPalisades to early closure because of embrittlement:
Mr. Selin said it was unlikely that any utility would decide to close a plant thatwas running smoothly and was not in immediate need of any big investment.
But if aplant required a large investment, he said, 'that could push it over the brink.' In thatcategory he put the Consumers Power Company's Palisades plant, near South Haven,Mich., which opened in 1971, where the reactor pressure vessel may now be brittle, thesame weakness that was suspected at Yankee Rowe....Exhibit 1-C.There is a grave issue of law here: whether the economically-dictated priorities ofPalisades, or the health and safety concerns of the Petitioners, conform to NRC regulations.
ALicensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining itsadmissibility.
Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal PowerAgency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 541 (1986); TexasUtilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric
: Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912,933 (1987); What is required is that an intervenor state the reasons for its concern.
HoustonLighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating
: Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC542 (1980).The Petitioners have stated reasons for their concern.
The Board should conclude thatthe Application is deficient and should be rejected.
I "Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some Reactors,"
Matt Wald, New York Times, April 14,1992.
: 2) There are many factual disputes affecting public health and safetyPalisades Nuclear Power Station is a Combustion Engineering Pressurized WaterReactor identified as one of the earlier reactor vessels of greater concern whose current 40-year license expires in 2011 after being granted a four-year recapture period.As NIRS has pointed out in its earlier publication, "The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants,A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects":
Irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) may be the singlemost important factor in determining the operating life of a Pressurized Water Reactor.The design of pressure vessels is generally the same for all PWRs generally constructed from 8 inch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vesselstructure.
The major age-related mechanism associated with this component isembrittlement.
Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e, the ability of the pressure vesselmetals to withstand stress without cracking.
It is caused by neutron bombardment ofthe vessel metal and is contingent upon the amount of copper and nickel in the metaland the extent of neutron exposure or fluence.
As the metal in the reactor pressurevessel is bombarded with radiation, high-energy atomic particles pass through the steelwall. In doing so, these atoms collide with atoms in the metal and knock them out ofposition.
Over time this results in the loss of ductility.
In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about 40 degreesFahrenheit.
As the vessel becomes embrittled, the temperature at which it loses itsductility rises. This change in the mechanical properties of the metal from ductile tobrittle is characterized as the 'reference temperature for nil ductility transition' or RTndt.Thus as the reactor ages and the pressure vessel is exposed to more radiation, theRTndt can shift from its original 40 degree F to as much as 280-290 degrees F or morein extreme cases.8From Exhibit 1-D.The embrittlement of the all-important reactor pressure vessel, which has no redundant safety feature in a nuclear power station, is of even greater concern to those plantsconstructed prior to 1972. Palisades was issued its construction license in 1967. According tothermal shock experts within Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), there is anI The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants: A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects, Nuclear Information andResource
: Service, 1988, Chapter IV, " Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Reactor PressureVessel Supports in Pressurized Water Reactors,"
: p. 19.
indeterminate amount of susceptible copper in the metal walls of these older vessels and inthe weld material used to join the vessel plates.The significance of embrittlement of the vessel component and the shift in RTndt is theincreased susceptibility to pressurized thermal shock (PTS). Pressurized thermal shock occurswhen the reactor pressure vessel is severely overcooled.
RPV technical specifications generally limit the cool down to a rate of 1000 F per hour. During an overcooling event (Le.,pipe break) the vessel may experience a drop in temperature of several hundred degrees perhour. This extreme drop in temperature can send a thermal shock through the vessel wall. Asthe vessel is overcooled there is a drop in the pressure of the primary coolant loop. This rapiddecrease in the pressure of primary coolant cause the high pressure injection pumps in theEmergency Core Cooling System to automatically inject coolant into the primary loop. As theinjection of coolant repressurizes the RPV, the vessel is subject to pressure stresses.
Thestresses placed on the RPV by overcooling and repressurization cause the Pressure ThermalShock.Pressure Thermal Shock can be initiated by numerous accidents, including:
controlsystem malfunctions, small, medium and large break loss of coolant accidents including mainsteam line break, feed water pipe break, and steam generator tube ruptures.
Any of theseevents can initiate a PTS event, but as long as the fracture resistance of the reactor pressurevessel material and welds remains high, i.e., RTndt values remain low, such transients areconsidered unlikely to cause vessel failure.
: However, the reduction of fracture resistance withinthe RPV wall and weld materials, severe overcooling accompanied by repressurization cancause pre-existing flaws in the inner surface of the RPV to propagate into cracks which can gothrough the vessel wall resulting in the associated uncontrollable loss of coolant water over thereactor core.
For failure of the RPV to occur a number of factors must be present:1) the vessel must have a flaw of sufficient size to propagate and a typical vessel canhave thousands of varied-sized flaws;2) the vessel material must be susceptible to irradiation embrittlement due to copperand nickel content;3) the vessel must be sufficiently irradiated to cause a decrease in ductility, represented by an increase in the RTndt value;4) an event must initiate a severe overcooling transient with repressurization;
: 5) the resulting crack must be of such size and location that the RPV's ability tomaintain core cooling is affected.
Petitioners believe it more likely than not that some or all of these factors are present atPalisades, as they articulate below. Petitioners believe they have provided quite sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with the applicant on a materialissue of law or fact, as required by 10 CFR &sect; 2.309(f)(1)(v)
(formerly
&sect; 2.714(b)(2)(iii)).
SeeGeorgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-9121, 33 NRC 419,422-24 (1991), appeal dismissed, CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63 (1992); Arizona Public Service Co.(Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
: Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155-56(1991); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64-68 (2002).A. Significant flaws are likely to exist on the surface of the Palisades reactor pressurevessel wall and considerable uncertainty exists to dispute assumptions with regard to theextent that these flaws can contribute to making PTS events increasingly risk-significant.
The Petitioners have significant safety-related concerns with regard to the uncertainty that exists with the analyzed flaw distribution in the Palisades reactor pressure vessel. Asdocumented in transcripts as recent as 2004, the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shares in those concerns and disputed flaw distribution assumptions:
Dr. Wallis [ACRS]: This flaw distribution is based on rather skimpy evidence.
This is one of the areas where---I mean, heat transfer Dittus-Boelter if you believe that.It's based on data points. But the flow [sic "flaw"] distribution in these walls is based ona few examinations.
Isn't it?Mr Ericksonkirk
[NRC RES]: A few examinations but infinitely more than we hadthe first time.Dr. Wallis: It's much better than you had the first time.Mr. Ericksonkirk:
Much better than we had the first time. I think as a laboratory geek at heart I have to admit I would really like to have more data on this and I don'tthink there's anybody in the technical community that would disagree with this. But Ithink that it's also important to recognize that the flaw distribution doesn't rest onexperimental evidence alone. Certainly we started with -excuse me. We start withexperimental evidence both from destructive and nondestructive evaluations but that'sthen also bolstered by --Dr. Wallis: But those are individual reactors' vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk:
That's right.Dr. Wallis: But there are a hundred reactor vessels.
I don't know howconvincing it is that the flaw distribution that you might measure in a couple of vesselswhich were taken apart is typical of all other vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk:
No. I think it would be unfair to say that a single experimental distribution derived from two vessels could be just looked at and thought to berepresentative of the other vessels.9Excerpted from Exhibit 1-E.B. The Petitioners urge that Palisades reactor pressure vessel is susceptible toirradiation embrittlement due at least to its copper/nickel/phosphorus content and disputeassumptions that regard the viability of reactor vessel sampling of susceptible materials andthe associated RTndt /RTpts assumptions specific to Palisades reactor oressure vessel.Palisades does not have representative samples of susceptible materials forsurveillance requirements of its reactor pressure vessel, including the weld material in theOfficial Transcript of NRC Proceeding, ACRS Joint Subcommittees:
Materials and Metallurgy ThermalHydraulic Phenomenon Reliability and Probablistic Risk Assessment
: Meeting, December 01, 2004, p. 15line 17-p. 16, line 25.
vulnerable beltline welds. Palisades' assumptions on the material contaminants in the vesseland weld materials are based on questionable extrapolations of generic industry data andmaterials taken from weld material in Palisades' discarded steam generator which arguably didnot experience the same level of adverse operational conditions as those degrading thereactor vessel beltline welds.Further, adequate analysis of the Palisades beltline welds has been problematic due touncertainties in determining the copper, nickel and phosphorous content of the susceptible materials.
In 1994, NRC staff at one point clashed with ABB Combustion Engineering staffwho had refused to divulge data on reactor vessel weld integrity that the vendor on proprietary grounds that the company wanted to keep confidential.
NRC said that it might need to compelCE to release the data.1&deg; Exhibit 1-F.C. Petitioners dispute the viability of NMC assumptions regarding the degree to whichPalisades pressure vessel materials have been degraded due to radiation-induced embrittlement and suggest that significant uncertainty exists with regard to the degraded stateof the vessel, represented by an increase in its RTndt and RTpts values, for them to beaccurately used as a reference point for an additional twenty-year extension.
The Applicant has over the years set forth many re-evaluations of the Palisades Rtndtand RTpts values with a wide range of findings and uncertainty as to bring into question theviability of the degree of embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel in its currentcondition to withstand a PTS event. The petitioners dispute the Applicants' claim that "Thecurrent pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond the current operating license period,but not to the end of the period of extended operation.
These analyses are estimated to expirein 2014."11'0 Palisades Could Reach Its PTS Screening Limit Earlier Than Expected,"
Inside NRC, December 12,1994, p. 13.Palisades Application,
: p. 4-15 Petitioners are aware of NRC communications which raise this dispute with regard tothe NMC assertions that they do not exceed PTS screening criteria until 2014:From: Stephanie CoffinTo: Hoffman, StephenDate: 11/24/04 3:05PM
 
==Subject:==
 
Palisades phone callWe had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.
: Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance fromReyes to the Commissioners.
They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valleyclosely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the currentrule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER withOpen Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil:If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currently exceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they willsubmit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.Stephanie CC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barny; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John12Exhibit 1-G. Petitioners contend that at best, whether or not Palisades has exceeded its RTptsremains inconclusive and at worst RTpts were exceeded as early as 1995 or 2001. As such,the petitioners dispute that the licensee has established an accurate and reliable reference temperature point for Palisades pressure vessel RTndt and RTpts values as a basis forextending Palisades operations for an additional 20-year period.D. The petitioners contend that a significant dispute exists with regard to NMCassumptions on the low probability of an event to initiate a severe overcooling transient withrepressurization such that the resulting crack will be of such size and location as to make theprobability of a significant Palisades vessel fracture acceptably smallS2Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206.
NMC relies heavily upon assumptions that the probability of an initiating event isacceptably small, as do other pressurized water reactor operators.
Given the associated uncertainty with the actual degradation of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel, thePetitioners submit that to take any comfort that the "big one" is not going to occur isuncomfortably remniscent of the lack of an effective governmental response to the inadequate levees around New Orleans based on the improbability of conditions leading to the Gulf Coastcity encountering a hurricane greater than Category Il1.This type of accident is beyond the design basis of Palisades Nuclear Power Station,namely its safety systems, including the emergency core cooling system and the containment, which are not designed to withstand cracks in the pressure vessel resulting in the inability tosufficiently cool the reactor core and reactor core damage.3) The petitioners dispute the Applicant's assertion that it can optionally anneal theembrittled vessel, given the lack of a demonstrated effective annealing process for anyirradiated commercial reactor pressure vessels and the applicant's abandonment of aprior commitment for annealing the Palisades reactor pressure vessel that make theabandonment of Flux Reduction efforts for economic considerations unreasonable Annealing, while a routine process in metallurgy, is acknowledged to be complicated byreactor pressure vessel radioactivity.
For Palisades it would involve heating the beltline weldand perhaps the axial welds or some vessel plates to about 850' F for approximately a weekor more. Even then, early estimates as to how long an annealing repair will last is a matter ofdebate and depend on a number of factors.
Alan Hiser, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was attributed to say "If the material is a weld, rather than a plate, the annealing repair will beless effective and the re-embrittlement faster. The chemistry of the material is crucial, as well --
steels or welds containing nickel or copper are more subject to embrittlement and re-embrittlement.''
13 Exhibit 1-H.Palisades has previously announced plans to anneal the reactor pressure vessel buthas taken no action. On January 5, 1995, Consumers Power Company informed itsemployees that the Palisades reactor would reach its PTS screening criteria limit as early as1996. Consumers Power then announced plans to anneal the Palisades vessel by the year2000.14Palisades operators met with the NRC Commission Chairman on May 11, 1995regarding its planned annealing operation.
15While the Applicant refers to annealing of the pressure vessel to mitigate the severelyembrittled component as an option it can take up at the "appropriate time," in fact, theApplicant withdrew its original request for further NRC staff review of its Preliminary ThermalAnnealing Report as the company disclosed that it no longer had plans to anneal theembrittled vessel in 1998.16NRC and the nuclear industry had an opportunity to test the annealing process on theirradiated decommissioned Yankee Rowe nuclear reactor pressure vessel but took no suchaction, instead Yankee Atomic Corporation used the badly embrittled vessel as a nuclearwaste container for burial in Barnwell, South Carolina.
While the NRC and industry havereferred to the Yankee Atomic vessel as atypical of other commercial
: vessels, a valuableopportunity to test the annealing process on an irradiated specimen was a lost opportunity for11 Outlook for Life Extension, Special Report to the Readers of Nucleonics Week, Inside NRC andNuclearFuel,"
April 11, 1991 p. 10.14 "Consumers May Anneal Palisades' Vessel-A U.S. First," Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1995, p. 1." Meeting Summary between the Chairman and Consumers Power Co., US NRC, Microfiche Address84015:231-84015:231.
16 Consumers Energy Co. (formerly Consumers Power Co.) Withdraws Request for Further Staff Reviewof Preliminary Thermal Annealing Report, April 24, 1997, US NRC PDR, Microform Addresses:
92745:358-92745:359.
the entire industry.
As a result, there is no experience with annealing severely-embrittled commercial power reactors in the United States which, coupled with the Applicant's abandonment of Flux Reduction Programs and the unreliability of the Applicant's past safetyanalysis, renders the Application deficient and deserving of rejection.
: 4) The Petitioners argue that Contention 1 on the Palisades embrittlement andPTS issue is not an improperly challenge to Commission rulingsThe Petitioners have valid and proper concerns regarding consistent, thorough andviable analysis and documentation of Pressure Thermal Shock values calculated by both theindustry and the NRC for Palisades, which is arguably one of the most embrittled reactors inthe United States. Since 1981, the Palisades pressure vessel has been at the forefront of theembrittlement controversy and associated safety concerns for a Pressure Thermal Shockaccident.
The Palisades nuclear power station pressure vessel has been analyzed and re-analyzed by NRC and projected to exceed its Pressure Thermal Shock Screening Criteria innumerous time frames:> April 03, 1989, Consumers Power provided a revised report on reactor vessel fluencefor operational cycles 1 through 8 in association with its vessel fluence reduction report. "Itconcludes that the PTS screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial welds in September 2001 as opposed to the previously reported exceed date of March 2002.017 Exhibit 1-1.Consumers Power Company (Now CMS) acknowledges a calculational uncertainty of + / -25%in estimating the calculated vessel wall fluence, this is said to be typical of current neutrontransport methodology uncertainties.
Consumers reported:
Compliance with Pressurized Thermal Shock Regulation 1 OCFR50.61 and Regulatory Guide 1.99Revision 2 (TAC No. 59970), Consumers Power, May 17, 1990, p. 1.
A number of factors contribute to the uncertainty in the projected peak fastfluence at the reactor vessel wall. These factors are due to the conversion of measuredactivity data to fluxes, uncertainties in material composition, neutron cross sections, power distributions, as-built core/vessel dimensions and cycle-by-cycle variation in thefast flux lead factors.18> In the October 28, 1994 revision of NRC's "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues"(SECY 94-267) reports the staff indicated that the Palisades Pressure Vessel would reach thepressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in the year 2004.19> In a revision in November 1994, NRC staff reported that:[T]he staff was informed of preliminary data from the retired steam generators that indicates the Palisades reactor pressure vessel could reach the PTS screening criteria earlier than 2004. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the new data and togather additional materials properties from its retired steam generators.
If thepreliminary data are confirmed, the plant would reach the PTS screen criteria at thenext outage in May 1995.20> On January 24, 1995 in a NRC meeting on "Materials Issues in Palisades PTSEvaluation,"
the Palisades PTS criteria is again referenced and revised in staff view graphsstating:
"November 1, 1994, licensee informed staff that data from SG [steam generators]
welds -Indicated higher copper contents than previously assumed -Indicated higher RTndtthan mean generic value- Licensee assessment indicated reaching PTS screening criteria in1999.,,21
> On November 24, 2004, a documented NRC telephone conversation furtherenlightens the ongoing uncertainty and inconsistency of estimating a still elusive timetable forexceeding the public safety-related criteria:
From: Stephanie Coffin18 Id,, p. 33."9 "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues,"
SECY-94-267, US NRC, October 28, 1994 (Exhibit 1-K).20"Items of Interest,"
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Week Ending November 04, 1994 (Exhibit 1-L)..21 "Materials Issues in Palisades PTS Evaluation,"
Presented to NSRRC Subcommittee on Materials andEngineering, US NRC, January 24, 1995 (Exhibit 1-M).
To: Hoffman, StephenDate: 11/24/04 3:05PM
 
==Subject:==
 
Palisades phone callWe had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.
: Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance fromReyes to the Commissioners.
They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valleyclosely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the currentrule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER withOpen Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil:If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currently exceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they willsubmit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.Stephanie CC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John" 22[The petitioners note that the referenced May 27,. 2004 communication from Reyes to theCommissioners regarding Palisades management plan is not available to the public throughNRC ADAMS.]Palisades values for exceeding the PTS criteria have been extremely fluid, back andforth, with significant disparity in the year that the criteria is exceeded.
The lack of consistent reliable analyses of the rate and level of embrittlement, complicated by the lack of viablePalisades-specific in-vessel sampling materials, together with dependence on generic industrydata, demonstrate the unreliability of data used to establish Palisades' compliance with thescreening criteria and subsequent effective mitigation actions for the license extension period.22 Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206, Exhibit 1-G.
This contention arises from evidence contained within the NRC's Staff contacts with theaffected utility.
The bases for a contention need not originate with the petitioner.
Petitioners here properly may base their contention on NRC Staff letters to an applicant, so long as thereis an adequate explanation of how alleged deficiencies support its contention and that there isadditional information in support.
Louisiana Energy Services L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center),
LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338-339 (1991). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station),
LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 136 (1992), appealgranted in part and remanded, CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135 (1993).5) The significant uncertainty represents a dispute of fact that undermines confidence in Palisades treatment of PTS values for the License Renewal ProcessThe Palisades nuclear power station one of four U.S. reactor sites participating in thedevelopment of models for developing the technical basis for the revision of the PTS Rule. Areview of transcripts of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Joint Subcommittees Materials and Metallurgy and Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment reveals substantial and significant uncertainties with regard to capturing andbounding public safety risk associated with ongoing operations further complicated by thetwenty year license extension in three major technical areas: probabilistic fracture mechanics, thermal hydraulics and probabilistic risk assessment.
NRC staff went to the ACRS in November 2004, seeking a letter of endorsement of thestaff effort to revise the current PTS rule. The revised PTS screening criteria is incomplete andfraught with uncertainty.
According to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in its Conclusions and Recommendations on NUREG-1809 "Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation ofPressure Thermal Shock "should be substantially revised.'"
23There are numerous citations in the ACRS transcripts that underscore the uncertainty that prompted the ACRS' call for the substantial revision of the technical basis for on Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressure Thermal Shock.5) There is a lack of transparency and an incomplete record of NRC processes anddocuments which potentially affect the Palisades License Renewal Process with regardto how the Revision of the PTS Rule may affect the outcome of the Application The NRC has not provided sufficient transparency and completeness of the publicrecord germane to the processes with potential implications for the Palisades licenseextension.
The Petitioners are not able to thoroughly review current NRC efforts to revise itsPressure Thermal Shock Rule. NRC has not made all of its germane safety documentation, albeit draft documents, available for public review. Two key examples are:1) "Technical Basis for Revision of Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Limitin the PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61): Summary Report,"
NUREG-1806, Draft for Peer ReviewPanel and ACRS Review, November 2, 2004; and2) "Thermal Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock," NUREG- 1809, Draft,February, 2005.Whether or not a basis for contentions has been established must be decided byconsidering the contentions in the context of the entire record of the case up to the time thecontentions are filed. Thus, when an application for a license amendment is itself incomplete,Pressure Thermal Shock (PTS) Evaluation Project:
Technical Basis for Revision of the PTS Screening Criterion in the PTS Rule," March 11, 2005, Graham Wallis, Chairman, Advisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards, US NRC, p. 1., NRC ADAMS ML 050730177.
the standard for the admission of contentions is lowered, because it is easier for petitioners tohave reasons for believing that the application has not demonstrated the safety of theproposed procedures for which an amendment is sought. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (PointBeach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853 (1981). Petitioners urge thatthis contention should be deemed admissible at a lower standard precisely because there isundisclosed information which can be explored adequately for its relevance to the Application at a hearing.With respect to their Contention No. 1, Petitioners have demonstrated many factualconundrums which must be resolved by means of a merit hearing.
All that is required for acontention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specific and have a basis. Whether or notthe contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in the licensing proceeding.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 551n.5 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1193 n.39 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating
: Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 694 (1985). The factual supportnecessary to show that a genuine dispute exists need not be in formal evidentiary form, nor beas strong as that necessary to withstand a summary disposition motion. What is required is "aminimal showing that material facts are in dispute, thereby demonstrating that an 'inquiry indepth' is appropriate."
Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC43, 51 (1994) (citing Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings
--Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989),quoting Connecticut Bankers Association
: v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.1980).
Response as to Contention No. 2 (Excessive radioactive and toxic chemicalcontamination in local drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear powerplant as part of its daily, "routine" operations)
NMC states (Answer p. 14) that this contention "is inadmissible because (i) thesubstance of the assertions (alleged radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant) areoutside the scope of this proceeding, and (ii) the assertions are vague and unsupported byfactual basis." The Staff likewise challenges (Staff Answer p. 14) this contention as "...vague and lacking in the required supporting information
... " The NRC goes on to state (Answer p.14) that Petitioners failed "to provide the specific factual information necessary to provide avalid basis for any safety claim ..." Petitioners provide considerable information below, but itshould be noted that the NRC has had in its possession these very documents for years, evendecades.
NRC staff also challenges this contention as being "generalized and unsupported arguments,"
but the information supplied below turns away that assertion.
The NRC staffsfailures to address these concerns is a violation of the agency's own mandate and mission toprotect public health and safety and the environment.
NMC says (Answer p. 15) that "radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant arenot issues related to the management of aging or time-limited aging analyses."
On thecontrary, such emissions are age-related, in that deteriorating and degrading reactor systems,including the Palisades reactor's fuel rods, pipes, tanks, and valves, will increase the amountsof toxic chemicals and radioactivity released into the Lake Michigan ecosystem over time dueto increased leaks and malfunctions.
Not only do "routine" releases thus increase, but so doesthe risk of more severe incidents and accidents as the reactor ages.NMC (Answer p. 15) seeks to dismiss the validity of this contention by stating"[r]adiation exposure to the public during the renewal term is a Category 1 issue determined to be small, based on a generic finding that radiation doses to the public will continue at currentlevels associated with normal operations."
: However, as stated above, releases of toxicchemicals and radioactivity over time can be expected to increase due to more leakage andmalfunctioning of age-deteriorated and degraded equipment and systems.
In addition, therecent report published by the National Academies of Science (NAS) Committee on theBiological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII, published June 2005 and entitled "HealthEffects from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation")
found that exposure to even lowlevels of ionizing radiation has a negative impact on human health. See http://www.nap.edu
/books/030909156X/html.
The significance of the NAS BEIR VII Report's findings andrelevance to ascertaining the implications of 20 more years of radioactivity emissions fromPalisades is unmistakable.
The NRC's previous conclusion that the impact to public health isminimal or trivial must be re-evaluated in light of the recently published NAS BEIR VII report.NMC urges that the contention is "inadmissible because it is vague and unsupported byany factual basis, "that it "fails to identify what toxic and radioactive substances allegedly arereleased during the plant's 'routine' operations, and in what respect any such emissions areallegedly
'excessive.'
"Specifically, the radioactive releases from the Palisades nuclear powerplant into the environment of the Great Lakes Basin that are of most concern includeradioactive hydrogen (tritium),
radioactive noble gases (such as xenon and krypton, whichrelatively quickly transform into biologically active radioactive substances such as cesium andstrontium),
as well as fission products, activation
: products, and transuranics that find their wayinto the environment after escaping the reactor or the irradiated fuel.Documentation recording such releases at Palisades includes the "Radioactive Materials Released from Nuclear Power Plants,"
NUREG/CR-2907, BNL-NUREG-51581, Vol.
14, Annual Report 1993, prepared by J. Tichler, K. Doty, and K. Lucadamo, Brookhaven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, covering the years1974 to 1993, and documenting reported annual emissions of such liquid and airborneeffluents from Palisades as tritium, mixed fission and activation products.
See Exhibit 2-A.The following figures were reported for emissions from the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant:From Table 2, pages 8 to 10Airborne Effluents Comparison By Year/Fission and Activation Gases (Total Curies)1974: <1.0OE+00 1975: 2.61E+031976: 2.99E+011977: 5.99E+011978: 3.23E+021979: 6.84E+011980: 1.40E+021981: 3.OOE+031982: 7.38E+031983: 3.OOE+031984: 2.84E+011985: 3.68E+031986: 1.73E+021987: 1.75E+031988: 2.43E+031989: 1.52E+021990: 1.21E+021991: 6.26E+011992: 7.46E+011993: 9.29E+01From Table 6, pages 20 to 22 Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Tritium (Curies)1974: 8.10E+001975: 4.16E+011976: 9.63E+001977: 5.58E+011978: 1.01E+021979: 1.26E+021980: 7.47E+011981: 2.78E+021982: 1.79E+021983: 2.35E+021984: 6.95E+011985: 4.29E+021986: 6.32E+011987: 1.19E+021988: 2.83E+021989: 8.06E+011990: 1.49E+021991: 5.52E+011992: 8.09E+011993: 2.10E+02From Table 8, pages 26 to 28Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Mixed Fission and Activation Products (Curies)1974: 5.90E+001975: 3.45E+001976: 4.40E-011977: 9.29E-021978: 9.65E-021979: 1.28E-011980: 8.73E-031981: 3.31 E-02 1982: 1.27E-011983: 7.48E-021984: 3.68E-021985: 5.83E-021986:1.40E-01 1987: 9.23E-021988: 3.43E-021989: 3.75E-031990: 7.75E-031991: 1.14E-021992: 3.88E-031993: 1.40E-02Similarly, the Palisades effluent release reports for 1994 to 2000 could be similarly examined in detail. The following reports for 2001 to 2003 clearly show that emissions havecontinued.
In fact, annual reports for 2004 to the present day would show that emissions continue still. Radioactivity emissions into the air, water, and soil are inevitable at Palisades nuclear power plant, and would continue from 2011 to 2031 if allowed.Palisades'
"".RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" ATTACHMENT 2 reports thefollowing:
FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:1st Qtr: 3.01 E+00 Ci2nd Qtr: 2.92E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 2.21E-02 Ci4t' Qtr: 0.00Specific radionuclides are listed individually.
See Exhibit 2-B.
In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including
: tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:1st Qtr: 2.81 E-06 Ci2nd Qtr: 2.45E-04 Ci3rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci4th Qtr: 3.68E-05 CiAgain, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-C.Palisades'
""RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" ATTACHMENT 2 reports thefollowing:
FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:lstQtr: 5.01E-01 Ci2nd Qtr: 3.20E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 1.65E+00 Ci4th Qtr: 3.26E+01Specific radionuclides are listed individually.
See Exhibit 2-D.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including
: tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:1st Qtr: 9.59E-05 Ci2nd Qtr: 0.000 Ci3rd Qtr: 1.83E-04 Ci 4th Qtr: 7.48E-07 CiAgain, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-E.Similarly, Palisades' "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUSEFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" ATTACHMENT 2 reports the following:
FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:1st Qtr: 6.07E+01 Ci2nd Qtr: 3.p5E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 4.96E-01 Ci4th Qtr: 7.42E-01Individual fission gases identified as being released in various amounts from Palisades include:
krypton-85, 87, and 88; Xenon-131 m, 133, 135m, 138; individual lodines identified asbeing released in various amounts from Palisades include:
Iodine 131, 132, 133, 135;Particulates with half-lives greater than 8 days include:
Chromium-51
; Manganese-54; Cobalt-58; Cobalt-60; Niobium-95; Ruthenium-103; Strontium-89; Strontium-90; Cesium-134; Cesium-137; Zirconium-95; Cobalt-57; as well as net identified beta emitters.
See Exhibit 2-F.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS
-SUMMATION OF RELEASES:
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including
: tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:1st Qtr: 2.09E-04 Ci2nd Qtr: 5.40E-04 Ci3rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci4th Qtr: 1.45E-03 Ci Again, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2G.As the NAS BEIR VII Report found, even so-called "low" level radiation exposure has anegative, adverse impact on human health.Petitioners challenge the methodology upon which all of these annual reports arebased. On September 13, 2005 Kevin Kamps of NIRS spoke by phone with a worker at theCity of South Haven, Michigan's Water Filtration Plant. The City of South Haven's WaterFiltration Plant supplies drinking water to customers in the City and townships of Casco, Covertand South Haven. This plant supplies water to nearly 3,400 customers located in these areas.The water comes from Lake Michigan, a surface water source, through an intake pipe locatedabout a mile offshore from South Beach in the City of South Haven, just several miles northand downstream (given the prevailing direction of flow in Lake Michigan) from the Palisades nuclear power plant, which emits radioactivity into the waters of Lake Michigan daily. The lakewater is treated,
: settled, filtered and disinfected as it goes through the Water Filtration Plant,but radioactivity is not removed by any of these processes.
The worker at the Water Filtration Plant explained that while he does collect samples ofLake Michigan water on a daily and monthly basis to test for radiation, he turns those samplesover to the Palisades nuclear power plant, which then performs the testing itself (and/orthrough subcontrators).
This fox-guarding-the-henhouse transfer of the water samples backinto the hands of the Palisades nuclear power plant represents an unacceptable methodology, given its vulnerability to falsification by Palisades personnel, which would be in the interest ofPalisades, to under-report radioactivity levels in the source of drinking water for nearbycommunities.
Genuinely independent radiation monitoring must be performed, without the risk of falsification by the very company that stands to benefit from low reports of radiation in thewaterNMC states (NMC Answer p. 16) that "...Petitioners..
failed to provide any 'allegedfacts' or 'expert opinion that supports the contention.'
" To the contrary, Petitioners haveconsulted with Dr. John Robbins, a Great Lakes limnologist recently retired from the U.S.Chamber of Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminstration (NOAA),Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) in Ann Arbor, Michigan (where,among other things, he specialized in analyzing radioactivity in the Great Lakes, beingreferenced in such publications as the International Joint Commission's Nuclear Task Force'sDecember 1997 "Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," namely, the report he co-authored in 1980 entitled "Plutonium in the Great Lakes," which appeared in "Transuranic Elements in the Environment,"
edited by W.C. Hanson, published by the U.S. Dept. of Energy,see specifically pages 659 to 683 of that report, referenced on page 98 of the IJC report).
SeeExhibit 2-H. Dr. Robbins has established that the predominant current flow is from south tonorth in Lake Michigan near the Palisades nuclear reactor.
Therefore, not only the new intakebuilt just offshore from Palisades, but the old intake at South Beach in South Haven aredirectly in line for radioactive and toxic chemical contamination.
Dr. Robbins believes that it isnot implausible, on average, for those water intakes to serve as radioactivity receptors from theemissions into Lake Michigan at Palisades.
Thus, the drinking water for South Haven, Casco,and Covert could very well be contaminated with radioactivity from Palisades, which, even atso-called low levels, would have an adverse impact on human health, as found by the NASBEIR VII Report.To confirm the direction of Lake Michigan water flow in the vicinity of Palisades, Dr.Robbins referred us to Dr. Dave Schwab, who still works at NOAA's GLERL. Dr. Schwab is one of the top experts on the direction of flow of Lake Michigan's waters. Dr. Schwab confirmsthat the prevailing direction of Lake Michigan water flow is from south to north, the verydirection of flow that would carry radioactivity and toxic chemicals released by Palisades intothe drinking water intakes for South Haven, Casco, and Covert. Dr. Schwab pointed to thefollowing field data to support this finding:Gerald Miller, Michael McCormick, James SaylorGreat Lakes Environmental Research Lab2205 Commonwealth Blvd.Ann Arbor, MI 48105Phone: 734/741-2119, 734/741-2277, 734/741-2118 FAX: 734/741-2055 Email: michael.mccormick@noaa.gov GLERL Vector Averaging Current Meter (VACM) Moorings 10/1999-06/2000 Manufacturer:
EG&GHeader Line: N Lat (dec. deg), W. Lon (dec. deg), VACM Depth (m), Inst. No.,Year Deployed, Mooring NameExplanation of Columns in the Data SetYEAR Year (UT)DOY Day of year (UT)TIME Universal time (UT -Hours and minutes HHMM)E Eastward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)N Northward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)WT Water Temperature (deg C)Data Sources:Inst DepthFile Name Mooring Lat (N) Lon (W) No. Dates VACM/Water Op #V01-1999-12M.txt V01-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 556 No Data 12/20m S1999294.01 V01-1999-19M.txt V01-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 265 10/20/99-06/15/00 19/20m S1999294.01 V03-1999-14M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 569 10/20/99-06/15/00 14/62m S1999293.03 V03-1999-61 M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 348 10/20/99-06/15/00 61/62m S1999293.03 V04-1999-1OM.txt V04-99 41 54.85' 86 40.74' 347 10/20/99-06/15/00 10/18m S1999294.02 (A)V04-1 999-1 7M.txt V04-99(A)V05-I 999-1 2M.txt V05-99V05-1999-39M.txt V05-99V06-1999-13M.txt V06-99V06-1999-60M.txt V06-99V07-1999-11 M.txt V07-99V07-1999-58M.txt V07-99(B)V08-1999-09M.txt V08-99V08-1999-56M.txt V08-99V09-1999-1 1M.txt V09-99V09-1999-18M.txt V09-99V10-1999-10M.txt V10-99V10-1999-27M.txt V10-99V1 1-1999-1 OM.txt V1 1-99V1 1-1 999-37M.txt V1 1-99V12-1999-11M.txt V12-99V12-1999-58M.txt V12-99V1 3-1999-13M.txt V1 3-99V1 3-1999-20M.txt V1 3-9941 54.85' 86 40.74' 354 10/20/99-06/15/00 17/18m S1999294.02 41414242424257.95' 86 44.82' 57257.95' 86 44.82' 55100.53' 86 47.90' 27400.53' 86 47.90' 31107.41' 86 41.19' 57407.41' 86 41.19' 31910/20/99-06/15/00 12/40m S1999293.05 10/20/99-06/15/00 39/40m S1999293.05 10/20/99-06/14/00 13/61m S1999293.04 10/20/99-06/14/00 60/61 m S1999293.04 No Data 11/59m S1999299.01 10/26/99-06/14/00 58/59m S1999299.01 42 15.18' 86 39.87' 27942 15.18' 86 39.87' 56842 14.51' 86 25.19' 57342 14.51' 86 25.19' 35242 15.83' 86 27.90' 55342 15.83' 86 27.90' 27742 17.20' 86 31.35' 55542 17.20' 86 31.35' 28042 20.27' 86 38.08' 58342 20.27' 86 38.09' 34942 20.04' 86 21.65' 57742 20.04' 86 21.65' 57610/26/99-06/13/00 10/26/99-06/13/00 10/27/99-06/14/00 10/27/99-06/14/00 10/27/99-06/14/00 10/27/99-06/14/00 10/27/99-06/14/00 10/27/99-06/13/00 10/27/99-06/13/00 10/27/99-06/13/00 10/19/99-04/25/00 10/19/99-04/25/00 09/57m56/57m11/19m18/19m10/28m27/28m10/38m37/38m11/59m58/59m13/21 m20/21 mS1999299.02 S1999299.02 S1999300.05 S1999300.05 S1999300.04 S1999300.04 S1999300.03 S1999300.03 S1999300.02 S1999300.02 S1999292.01 S1999292.01 (A) Water temperature only(B) Current velocity data ends 10/26/99, water temperature to end.Missing data denoted by -999.0Manufacturers specifications:
Velocity:
Threshold 2.5 cm/sRotor Constant 34.6 cm/revTemperature:
Accuracy
+-0.1CCompass:
Accuracy
+-5 degSee http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/1999-00/moormiller/vacm.meta.txt for a better laidout format, and also see http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/objects/obj_18.V13.4.html Station V-13 is the closest to Palisades, and thus the most relevant to questions ofLake Michigan water flow direction in the vicinity of the reactor.
Dr. Schwab has mostlyaddressed the macro level of water flow in Lake Michigan, but is now delving into the issue ofmicro level of water flow. Thus, he will address locales of tight scope, such as the immediate vicinity of the Palisades
: reactor, so close as it is to one operational and one potential source ofdrinking water for the residents (and large numbers of visitors, given the tourism of theLakeshore region) in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.Additionally, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, GNSH, with the International Institute of Concern forPublic Health, has provided consultation to Petitioners.
Dr. Bertell has also served as alongtime National Advisory Board member of NIRS. Dr. Bertell has served on the Nuclear TaskForce of the International Joint Commission, where she helped in the publication of the"Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," (Dec. 1997), as well as the 1999 "Report onBioaccumulation of Elements to Accompany the Inventory of Radionuclides in the Great LakesBasin." Dr. Bertell has worked professionally in Environmental Epidemiology since 1968,served on the Advisory Boards for the Great Lakes Health Effects Program of Health Canada,and the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board and has been a member of the IJC ScienceAdvisory Board. She has published a "Handbook for Estimating the Health Effects of Exposureto Ionizing Radiation" and the popular non-fiction book "No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for aRadioactive Earth," together with more than 100 other publications.
She has providedconsultation to Petitioners on the issue of performing water sampling near Palisades in order tocorrect the methodological flaw mentioned earlier of Palisades handling the water samplesbefore they are actually tested by an independent institution.
Dr. Bertell referred Petitioners to Dr. Hari Sharm in Waterloo,
: Ontario, Canada, anuclear chemist who can test for radioactivity and toxic chemicals in Lake Michigan water samples for Petitioners.
Dr. Sharm has expressed an interest in helping to carry out this vitalwork and is assisting Petitioners in the process of developing a methodology for carrying outthis independent assessment on the radiation and toxic chemicals being emitted by thePalisades nuclear power plant into the drinking water source, Lake Michigan, for the residents and visitors in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.The basis-with-reasonable-specificity standard requires that an intervenor include in asafety contention a statement of the reason for his contention.
This statement must eitherallege with particularity that an applicant is not complying with a specified regulation, or allegewith particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are silent. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook
: Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982), citing 10 CFR &sect; 2.335 (formerly
&sect; 2.758). While NRCregulations have not yet changed to accommodate the conclusions of BEIR VII, this majorscientific pronouncement compels a rethinking of the exposure of the public to routine radiation emissions from Palisades through their water supply. A substantial safety issue is exposed inthis contention, and it must be admitted for the inquiry of a contested hearing.Response as to Contention No. 3 (The Palisades reactor has no place to store itsoverflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations)
The Staff argue that "[t]his proposed contention lacks basis and support...
[and] failsto establish that a genuine dispute exists on a material issue of law or fact. ..." Staff Answerp. 15. The Nuclear Management Company maintains that the contention is "...inadmissible because it is not supported by a basis demonstrating the existence of a genuine materialdispute."
NMC Answer p. 16. In a way, the Petitioners agree; there is no material dispute overthe facts, but the facts compel the conclusion that Palisades' dry cask storage arrangements violate NRC regulations.
Specifically, the material facts prove -and exceed the threshold showing that must bemade here -that neither the old nor the more recent, "new" concrete pads holding dry casks atPalisades conform with longstanding NRC requirements for earthquake stability standards.
Asthe attached Affidavit of Dr. Ross Landsman, formerly of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, depicts, both pads were built on compacted sand and other subsurface materials, dozens of feet above bedrock and well above the ground elevation of the nearby nuclearpower plant. Dr. Landsman, who has decades of experience and a direct oversight role in theinspection of dry cask storage at Palisades when he worked at NRC Region III during thecritical period of dry cask storage installation and operation from 1993 to 2005, has concluded from his personal knowledge of the subsoil conditions that the older pad nearer the lake is inviolation of NRC liquefaction regulations under 10 CFR Part 72.212(b)(2)(i)(B) 24, while thenewer pad further inland is in violation of NRC amplification regulations under the sameregulations.
Neither the older nor newer dry cask storage pads at the Palisades plant weredesigned in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation.
See LandsmanAffidavit,
&#xb6; &#xb6; 3-13.2 5 Either violation, then, violates 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3).
26 This means that thecask storage pads have violated NRC regulations since they were constructed, andabsent enforcement will continue to violate NRC regulations during a 20-year license24[The general licensee shall perform written evaluations, prior to use, that establish that]: Caskstorage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of thestored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, andsoil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.25The Landsman Affidavit appears in electronic form annexed hereto and also in hard copy at pp.App. 3-a through 3-d of the "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support of Contentions."
26[The general licensee shall]: Review the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) referenced in theCertificate of Compliance and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the generallicense, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports.
Theresults of this review must be documented in the evaluation made in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
extension and beyond.The NRC, unfortunately, considers the older pad nearer the lake to be in compliance with regulations and allows NMC to store high-level radioactive waste there, while the NRC issupposedly still trying to resolve through ongoing inspection, investigation, and analysis thestatus of the newer pad, which is situated further inland from Lake Michigan.
: However, duringthis alleged period of ongoing investigation, the NRC is allowing NMC to store waste on thenew pad despite the unresolved safety concerns.
Dr. Landsman's understanding is that thenewer pad was built big enough to accommodate all the dry casks currently stored on the olderpad nearer the lake, because, despite public pronouncements to the contrary by Consumers Energy, Nuclear Management
: Company, and the NRC, the older pad clearly violatesregulations, which means that the 18 to 19 casks currently stored on the older pad27 must bemoved to the newer pad. The problem is, moving the casks from the older pad to the newerone is analogous to jumping from the frying pan into the fire.Dr. Landsman sought repeatedly while he worked for the NRC to see this unresolved safety issue corrected.
Now, however, four casks are being stored on the newer pad. Inaddition, plans have been in place for additional casks to be loaded and stored on the newerpad in the near future, perhaps as early as fall 2005.While the NRC staff inveighs (Staff Answer p. 16) that "[p]etitioners lack the requisite 27Including the unloadable, unmovable cask #4 at Palisades, loaded in June 1994 and shortlythereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faulty welds. Now, eleven years on,Consumers has yet to unload the defective cask, because it technically cannot do so safely. And theconfiguration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is suchthat the casks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of them have beenmoved out of the way first. This situation increases the risks, making it very difficult to addressemergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timely manner.Although Petitioners/Intervenors are withdrawing their Contention No. 7 concerning dry cask #4as a separate contention (see infra), Palisades' noncompliance with earthquake standards has elevatedportents for this particular vessel of high-level radioactive waste.
basis and support for their claim, highlighted by the fact that they have not produced anyaffidavits or other evidence as to the opinion of their 'anticipated expert',"
the NRC had thebenefit for years of Petitioners' expert's warnings and has done little to nothing about it,contrary to the agency's mission and mandate to protect public health and safety and theenvironment.
NMC states (NMC Answer p. 19) that "Contention 3 is not supported by a basisdemonstrating a genuine issue." Actually, it is the dry cask storage pads, and the very deadlyhigh-level radioactive waste they hold, that is not supported by a base that is safe and securefrom earthquake dangers.
NMC further urges (Answer p. 19) that "[t]he results of the licenseeanalysis showed that the [older] pad could support the casks safely. The results aredocumented in a letter to the NRC dated July 27, 1994." NMC additionally cites the NRC'sSeptember 20, 1994 "Independent NRC Staff Final Safety Assessment of the Dry StorageFacility at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Site" as further proof of issue resolution.
NMClikewise points out a June 5, 1995 NRC Information Notice (95-28, "Emplacement of SupportPads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites," p. 3) as proof that all is fine atthe older pad nearer the lake.But both the Staff and NMC somehow have failed to disclose the contents of a letterwritten by Dr. Landsman while at NRC Region III as a safety engineer and dry cask storageinspector overseeing Palisades, to the then-Commission
: Chairman, Ivan Selin, on February17, 1994, warning that:[I]f you use NRC-approved casks under Subpart K [of 10 CFR Part 72], theregulations are silent about the foundation material or the pad. Actually, it's theconsequences that might occur from an earthquake that I'm concerned about. Thecasks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loose sand because ofliquefaction
.... It is apparent to me that NMSS [sic] doesn't realize the catastrophic consequences of their continued reliance on their current ideology.
(Emphasis added)Dr. Landsman has never received a meaningful response to this warning and would attest under oath at the hearing of this contention that his safety concerns about the older pad, whichinvolve violations of NRC regulations and violations of public health and safety andenvironmental protection
-remain inadequately addressed and unresolved to this day.The NRC staff (Staff Answer p. 16) asserts that "[t]his part of the Commission's regulations has no relation to license renewal."
NMC states (Answer p. 16) that "[t]hiscontention is beyond the scope of 10 CFR Part 54, because the dry cask storage pads are partof the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
('ISFSI')
facility which is distinct from -andlicensed separately from -the Palisades nuclear power plant." Both responses are disingen-uous. It is impossible to disconnect the dry cask storage pad problems from the proposedlicense extension.
If both dry cask storage pads violate NRC safety regulations and are barredfrom use, then where, exactly, would NMC store its bulging inventory of irradiated nuclear fuel?And where would the 22 to 23 dry casks already loaded and stored on those defective pads atPalisades be moved to? These are not rhetorical questions; the answers are integral to the 20year license extension
: proposal, given that high-level radioactive waste is an inevitable byproduct of electricity production at the Palisades nuclear reactor.NRC staff also claim (Staff Answer p. 16) that this contention impermissibly attacksNRC regulations, specifically the GElS on reactor license extension as well as the "NuclearWaste Confidence Rule." But, truth be told, at present there is no place for the wastesgenerated during a 20 year license extension at Palisades to be stored without violating NRCregulations.
The NRC's "Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision" places false confidence in theavailability of a geologic repository in the U.S. by the year 2025, and biases the NRC in favorof approving a license for the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada dumpsite (the only oneunder consideration).
It also, by implication, biases the NRC in favor of approving a 20-yearlicense extension at Palisades.
NMC dismisses this contention (NMC Answer p. 18) by stating "... it is a challenge..
.to the generic findings in the GElS and Appendix B to Part 51." NMC further cites aCommission ruling on license extension at Oconee which states that "[t]he Commission's generic determinations governing onsite waste storage preclude the Petitioners fromattempting to introduce such waste issues into this adjudication."
But there was not firmevidence of regulatory violation concerning onsite waste storage in the Oconee proceeding.
Presumably when the NRC establishes generic findings regarding on-site waste storage itassumes either that its safety regulations are being met at the particular nuclear plant inquestion, or else that it plans to take enforcement action against any violations of itsregulations.
But, Petitioners here have articulated evidence that tends to prove in a compelling fashion that both of the dry cask storage pads at Palisades are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations.
This begs the question, why is NRC allowing high-level radioactive waste storageon pads at Palisades that are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations?
At page 17 of its Answer, NMC states as fact something which is wholly false: that"[b]oth site specific and general licenses are issued for a maximum of 20 years, not 40 yearsas for nuclear power plants."
Yet, late last year, the NRC Commissioners, by a 2 to 1 splitdecision (with NRC Chairman Nils Diaz voting against the proposal),
approved a 40 yearlicense extension at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant ISFSI in Virginia, the oldest ISFSI in theU.S. So while the initial license may be granted for an initial 20 year period, NRC has indeedgranted a license extension for an ISFSI for 40 years. This potentially monumental safety errorcould well be relicensed.
On page 18 of its Answer, NMC misconstrues Petitioners' contention, perhaps tomislead the Board. NMC states "[t]he regulations do not require licensees to explore the agingof components for a facility not covered by this license renewal proceeding...".
It is not the aging of the pads that is at the heart of this contention (although pad deterioration over time isa significant safety issue that must be addressed as well), but rather the fact that both ISFSIpads at Palisades have continuously violated NRC earthquake regulations since the day theywere built.At the August 28, 2005 NRC public meeting in South Haven concerning the proposed20 year license extension at Palisades, neither NRC nor Nuclear Management Companyofficials could give the number of dry casks already loaded on the two pads at Palisades.
Evenif the Staff and NMC don't ascribe the requisite seriousness to these issues -given the deadlynature of high-level radioactive waste -the Board must.All that is required for a contention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specificand have a basis. Whether or not the contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in thelicensing proceeding.
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook
: Station, Units 1 and 2),LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 282 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990);Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
: Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 411 (1991), appeal denied, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991). Here, the factsalleged, coupled with the expert opinions proffered, easily meet those requirements.
A Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining itsadmissibility.
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook
: Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1654 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek NuclearGenerating
: Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (WolfCreek Generating
: Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 34 (1984); Commonwealth EdisonCo. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617 (1985),rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986). The petitioner simply must provide sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with theapplicant on a material issue of law or fact. 10 CFR &sect; 2.309(f)(1)(v)
(formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)).
See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-35, 34 NRC163, 166, 169-170, 175-76 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear PowerStation, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 279 (1991); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.(Claiborne Enrichment Center),
LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338 (1991); Northeast NuclearEnergy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 214(1992); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station),
CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 142 (1993); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco NuclearGenerating Station),
LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 205 (1993); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River BendStation, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994). Certainly, Petitioners have in respect to thiscontention shown material facts which implicate s~rious issues of regulatory law. The ASLB,given the strong facial showing Petitioners have made, cannot inquire more deeply into themerits of the contention, but instead must admit it for hearing.The standard for a safety contention in operating license cases (Petitioners recognize this is not an operating license case) is relatively loose; a contention about a matter notcovered by a specific rule need only allege that the matter poses a significant safety problem(10 CFR &sect; 50.57(a)(3)]
for finding of reasonable assurance of operation without endangering the health and safety of the public. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982). Here, of course, the contention alleges incompelling fashion the continuous violations of specific regulations.
As it appears they wouldeasily meet the operating license standard for a safety issue, the panel must admit theircontention for the continuation of that operating license for 20 years beyond its expiration.
Because as a matter of fact, Petitioners have met -and exceeded
-the pleading requirements for this contention, the Board must, as a matter of law, proceed to hear it on themerits.Response as to Contention No. 7 (Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens toarea water sources)NRC staff claim (Answer p. 22) that this contention "lacks specificity and support."
Below is the actual NPDES report summarizing a number of areas in which Palisades is not incompliance with its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit requirements, specifically in continuing non-compliance concerning the toxic chemical Betz Clam-Trol.
NPDES NUMBER GRANT LIMIT VIOLATION ENFORCEMENT STATUSINSTANCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE RNC DATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION DATE STATUS DATE COMMENTSOCPCO-PALISADES POWER PIT NON-COMPLIANT COVERTM10001457
***FINAL***
.........
* SUMMARY SECTION ..........
PH 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE TRO-DISCHARGE TIME 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE
: OXIDANTS, TOTAL RESIDUAL 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE BETZ CLAM-TROL CT-2 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE BETZ CLAM-TROL CT-4 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE "Continuing Noncompliance" indicates that the violation cited in the above summary was notthe first time such a violation had occurred, so that violations on limits of releases of persistent toxic chemicals from Palisades nuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan appearsto be an unfortunate, and harmful, pattern.
As late as 2003 and 2004, the formal NPDESreports on the use of Clam-Trol at Palisades were mere recitations of the 2000 reporting data.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO4.pdf (for 2004), andhttp://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO3.pdf (for 2003).Thus, NMC's claim (Answer p. 26) that Petitioners' reference provides "no basis for Petitioners' allegation or 'apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol"'
is false, for "continuing noncompliance" indicates a pattern extending over time.The NRC staff states (Answer p. 22) that "it is not within the [Nuclear Regulatory]
Commission's jurisdiction to make any determination as to the adequacy of such permits [suchas NPDES permits]
in protecting the environment."
Yet the scope of 10 CFR Part 54 (set outat &sect;54.4) encompasses
"(a) Plant systems, structures, and components...
[including]
(2) Allnonsafety-related
: systems, structures, and components whose failure could preventsatisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii)of this section."
Presumably, maintaining unclogged water intakes at Palisades fall within thisscoping parameter.
If so, then NPDES noncompliance is a relevant issue because NMC is notbeing truthful about the measures it is taking concerning the perennial clogging problemcaused by zebra mussels in Lake Michigan.
This disregard for compliance with regulations, not to mention indifference to the environmental health of Lake Michigan and the public healthimpacts of persistent toxic chemicals released as part of reactor operations does not comportwith the NRC's supposed mandate and mission to protect public health and the environment.
Palisades' ongoing releases of persistent toxic chemicals into Lake Michigan is aviolation of the letter and spirit of the "Ninth Biennial Report On Great Lakes Water Quality" bythe International Joint Commission, the binational U.S.-Canadian federal governmental agencywhose mandate and mission is protecting and preserving the Great Lakes. At page 35 of thatIJC report, it states:Specific Persistent Toxic Substances:
The Commission reiterates from its Sixth Biennial Report that, under theAgreement, (Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978) 'the overall strategy or aimregarding persistent toxic substances is virtual elimination, and the tactic or method tobe used to achieve that aim is through zero input or discharge of those substances created as a result of human activity.'
This is both necessary and reasonable.
'Persistent toxic substances are too dangerous to the biosphere and to humans to permit their release in any quantity.'
Twenty additional years of such toxic chemical emissions from Palisades into LakeMichigan
-especially if they are too inconvenient to report -will have a significant adverseimpact on human and ecosystem health.There regulations requirement that an intervenor supply the bases on which theintervenor intends to rely. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1and 2), LBP-94-22, 40 NRC 37, 39 (1994).Nonreporting of important, and required, information about toxic releases obscures anymeaningful evaluation of the functioning of nonsafety features of Palisades which will benecessary to plant operations during the license extension period. This contention should beadmitted.
Response as to Contention No. 8 (Environmental justice denied by the continuing operations of Palisades)
NMC states (NMC Answer p. 28) that Petitioners J...fail to challenge the Application and to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law..."and "fail[s]
to provide an adequate factual basis to support any dispute with the Application."
NMC states that "... none of Petitioners' claims address the 'essence of an environmental justice claim' arising under NEPA in a NRC licensing proceeding
-i.e., 'disproportionately highand adverse human health and environmental effects' on minority and low-income populations that may be different from the impacts on the general population."
Petitioners dispute these conclusions.
The heart of the contention is that Palisades' 20-year license extension could very well adversely affect minority and low-income populations indisproportionately high ways not faced by the general population in the area, in particular uponNative Americans.
NMC cites (NMC Answer p. 30) NRC pleading rules requiring that contentions "mustinclude references to specific portions of... the applicant's environmental report..
.that thepetitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute."
Petitioners take greatestissue with NMC's Environmental Report, Section 2.10, entitled "Historic and Archaeological Resources."
The Environmental Report gives very short shrift to historic and archaeological resources.
The potential for Native American burial sites, or other Native sites such as formervillages or encampments, at or near Palisades is not mentioned anywhere in theEnvironmental Report.Petitioners submit that the conclusion "no significant historical or archaeological resources were known to occur in the study area" is unsupported by the "Attachment C.Cultural Resources Correspondence" found in the Report. There are just two letters, one fromConsumers/NMC to the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office, the second from theDepartment of the Interior to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Respecting the February 11, 2005 letter from Dan Malone at NMC and Stephen Wawroat Consumers to Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office (MSHPO),
the first paragraph reveals that MSHPO has "concern pertaining to possibleunreported archaeological properties on, or within the vicinity of, the Palisades site." Yet NMCfails to include any documentation spelling out these concerns from MSHPO in the companies' Environmental Report, other than the brief mention that concerns exist.Also in the letter, Malone and Wawro state in conclusory fashion that 20 more years ofnuclear activities at the site will not disturb the land, and "Therefore, NMC and Consumers donot believe a survey of the project area is necessary, as Federal and state agencies haveconfirmed on multiple occasions that no historic properties, archeological or architectural, are known to exist on, or in the immediate vicinity of the Palisades site."However, Petitioners fear that 20 more years of operations at Palisades risks a large-scale radiological accident.
Even if no accident were to occur, the daily operations of Palisades nuclear power plant releases "low" levels (and sometimes, not-so-low levels) of radioactivity into the air, water, and soil. It also generates high-level radioactive waste, large quantities ofwhich have already been stored at Palisades for nearly 40 years, and ever-growing quantities of which will continue to be stored on-site for at least several decades to come, even if dumpstargeted at Native American lands out West (sacred Western Shoshone Indian treaty land atYucca Mountain, Nevada; the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah) are opened.Since the actual opening of such dumps is ever more doubtful, this means that Palisades' high-level radioactive waste could remain on-site indefinitely into the future. The "routine" or"accidental" radioactive contamination caused by 20 additional years of operations atPalisades would be a significant adverse impact upon Native American burial or other siteslocated there. Such sites are considered sacred and religiously significant in the cultures ofmany Native American tribes, so befouling these sites with radioactive or toxic chemicalcontamination or heavy industrial usage could qualify as a desecration under the terms of thefederal Native American Freedom of Religion Act.Certainly this qualifies as a disproportionate, highly adverse impact on NativeAmericans, that, for example, European-Americans do not face from 20 more years ofoperations at Palisades.
There most likely are not European-American sacred burial groundsat the Palisades site, nor former village sites (also considered sacred and worthy of greatrespect by Native cultures) there. But there is certainly the potential, and perhaps thelikelihood, that burial sites or former encampment, habitation, or village sites exist on thePalisades property.
Lea Foushee, a Native American woman at the North American Water Office in Minnesota, has explained to Petitioners that beautiful vistas were often chosen asburial sites by Native Americans since time immemorial.
Palisades certainly overlooks abeautiful vista to the west, overlooking Lake Michigan.
Native American cultures in Michiganalso regard the westward direction as the one people travel when they pass away, passingthrough the "Western Door," making it even more likely that burial sites exist at or nearPalisades.
Traditional Grand River Band of the Odawa Indians storyteller Larry Plamondon also has told Petitioners that rivers and creeks were often chosen as habitation sites by NativeAmericans since time immemorial.
The Palisades nuclear power plant is bounded not only by the lakeshore to the west,but by the Brandywine Creek to the immediate south, as well as an even larger creek to theimmediate north in Van Buren State Park. The possibility for significant Native Americanarchaeological resources on the Palisades site is very real, and should not be so flippantly dismissed by NMC. It is irresponsible that NMC and Consumers would state so strongly thatno "survey of the project area is necessary" when it, and federal and state agencies, appear tohave done little if any such surveying in the past.The only documentation NMC and Consumers give in their Environmental Report tosupport their claims is a letter dated April 7, 1972 from the U.S. Department of the Interior(DOI) to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (the predecessor to today's NRC). In that letter,DOI states "It does not appear that the existing plant should directly affect any existing orproposed unit of the National Park System, nor any site eligible for registration as a nationalhistoric, natural or environmental education landmark;
: however, the final statement shouldcontain evidence of consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer concerning theeffects of the power station on places on or being considered for nomination to the NationalRegister of Historic Places."
This statement seems potentially irrelevant to such issues as Native American burial sites, former village sites, etc. located on the power plant site or alongthe transmission line corridor.
It's interesting that consultation with the Michigan State HistoricPreservation Officer is mentioned, because from Petitioner Kevin Kamps' (of NIRS) recentcontact with Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at MSHPO by phone on August 30, 2005, it apearsthat very little consultation had taken place between her office and the companies involved.
Infact, she admitted that the "ball may have been dropped" on these important matters.
TheMSHPO's files on this matter do not put to rest the question as to whether or not NativeAmerican archaeological resources at the Palisades site could be in harm's way if a 20 yearlicense extension were granted.
It's clear that the companies, Consumers and NMC, as well asthe state and federal agencies, have allowed this license extension proceeding to progress tothis advanced stage without adequately addressing the potential impacts to Native Americansites, rights, and values.The U.S. federal and State of Michigan agencies also have not adequately consulted with the impacted tribes in a meaningful, government-to-government manner, as is requiredunder treaty, law, and regulation.
In its February 2005 letter to the Michigan State HistoricPreservation Office, NMC and Consumers also mention that: "A May 19, 1972 letter from theMichigan State Liaison Officer for Historic Protection to the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]
confirmed the DOr's determination and stated that Palisades would not 'adversely affect knownhistorical or archaeological resources of the State of Michigan.'
" They go on to state that a"Terrestrial Ecological Survey" conducted 26 years ago by a private contractor paid byConsumers "found no significant historical or archaeological resources were known to occur onthe Palisades site" and that these findings were confirmed by the Director of the MichiganDepartment of State's Michigan History Division, which verified that "no significant historical orarchaeological sites had been found in the immediate area of Palisades."
We question how "significant" and "immediate" were and are defined by these profit-driven private companies, and by these state agencies?
Are Native American sites such as burials or villages considered significant, especially 25 to 40 years ago, when many of these reports referred to werepublished?
It seems imperative that an updated, comprehensive, independent site survey beconducted before Palisades is granted a license to perform nuclear and other activities on thissite for another 20 years.It appears from the lack of supporting documentation that neither the AEC nor the DOIever did a careful survey of the Palisades site or adjoining transmission lines. NMC andConsumers seem unconcerned about the potential for unknown Native American burial sites orother cultural resources.
Yet, given the presence of creeks just north and just south of thePalisades nuclear power plant site, it seems all the more likely that Native American villages orencampments might have been located there. And given the forested, large dunes surrounding the Palisades nuclear power plant, it seems possible that even burial sites might be locatedthere, especially considering the great beauty of the area, and the remarkable view to the westover Lake Michigan.
One definition for "palisade,"
after all, is "a line of bold cliffs."
(Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary)
It very well may be that the hundred-year-old Palisades Parksummer community with 200 cottages immediately south of the Palisades nuclear power planttook its name from the "cliffs,"
or tall forested sand dunes, on the site. Certainly Palisades nuclear plant took its name from the Palisades Park community, much to the chagrin of theresidents, many of whom have opposed the nuclear reactor since before it was built in the late1960s.NMC and Consumers state in the 2005 letter that adequate protections are in place tosafeguard cultural resources on the site. They write "Examples of activities requiring anEnvironmental Review include disturbance of I or more acres of previously undisturbed land,-51I-any earth change within 600 feet of water, wetland and waterway activities, and structural interference with landforms, lakes and streams, among others."
But, given the decades ofapparent lack of concern, perhaps it should not be surprising that such "protections" actuallycontain huge loopholes.
For example, a good deal of Palisades nuclear power plant property
-including much of the forested dunes -almost certainly is more than 600 feet from LakeMichigan.
Thus, even such "protections" could still allow for overlooking or ignoring burial sitesduring construction projects.
The nuclear companies state repeatedly throughout theEnvironmental Report that "NMC does not plan to undertake any major refurbishment activities,"
an admission that itself has dire implications, given the deteriorated state of thereactor and its safety systems.
But then again, Consumers never envisioned in the early 1970sthat it would need to install dozens of 20 foot tall, 132 ton concrete and steel silos to storehigh-level radioactive waste just 150 yards from the waters of Lake Michigan.
And yet, 20years later, that is exactly what they did. So who knows, really, what projects the companies will need or want to perform on the site over the course of the next 20 years?In addition to the ever growing stockpile of high-level radioactive waste stored on-site,in 2008 the so-called "low" level radioactive waste dump where Palisades has sent largequantities of atomic trash for decades will no longer accept such wastes from Palisades.
It isvery possible that Palisades would thus expand on-site "storage" for "low" level radioactive wastes, as well, some of which is actually intensely radioactive, despite the euphemistic name.Lastly, NMC and Consumers state in the last paragraph of their letter that it, and a copy of theresponse to it from the Michigan Historic Preservation Office, would be included in theEnvironmental Report. No such response is included.
It is disconcerting, given the dearth ofsupporting documentation (Consumers Power Company's 1979 "Terrestrial Ecological Survey-Palisades Plant Site" is referenced in the Environmental Report, but a copy of this survey -
seemingly the only actual site survey ever conducted, or at least mentioned in theEnvironmental Report or documents provided by MSHPO, is not included).
Brian D. Conway of the State of Michigan Historic Preservation Office wrote a letter onMarch 14, 2005 to James Holthaus at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant stating "...we havereviewed your comments and concur with the recommendations outlined in your [Feb. 11,2005] letter...".
This begs the question, who dropped the ball? NMC/Consumers, or MSHPO?Or both? It's encouraging that MSHPO has expressed
: concerns, apparently, in the past. Butit's discouraging that NRC-imposed deadlines such as the August 81h deadline forintervening/requesting hearings and the August 22nd deadline for environmental scopingcomments have come and gone, with no action regarding the potential for Native Americanimpacts from this proposal being adequately addressed by the companies nor by the federal orstate agencies.
Given the sovereignty of these tribes and bands, and the treaty rights that existbetween them and the United States federal government, the NRC has a government-to-government responsibility to meaningfully consult with these tribes and bands on suchsignificant federal actions as granting the Palisades reactor an additional 20 years ofoperations.
An independent, comprehensive archaeological survey must be conducted beforeNRC grants a 20-year license extension to assure that Native American archaeological sitesare not negatively impacted by future Palisades reactor operations.
Such impacts as harm tolake sturgeon
-sacred to some Great Lakes tribes -must also be evaluated.
It is interesting and telling that NMC's Environmental Report assigns no "importance" to lake sturgeon (inTable 2.3-1, Page 2-47), despite its State of Michigan "threatened" status, and its sacredstatus in the cultures and traditions of various Great Lakes Native American Tribes, and itsimportance to the natural history of Lake Michigan as an ancient indigenous species in the ecosystem.
This is an indication that NMC/Consumers is not acknowledging or addressing environmental justice impacts of 20 more years of operations at Palisades on NativeAmericans.
Quite recently, a Native American cultural site came to the attention of local tribalofficials who did not know about it before. An August 12, 2005 article in the Grand RapidsPress ("Sense of adventure:
Historic sites will highlight a new Black River paddling pathway")
had an accompanying map showing a Native American site of historical significance southeast of South Haven on the Black River, just south of 12th Street, east of M-43, and west of 66thStreet/County Road 687. This is well within the ten mile zone from the Palisades reactor,perhaps even within seven miles. Dave Lemberg, director of the Great Lakes Center forMaritime Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, played an important role inselecting the historic sites that would be featured along the water trail for canoes and kayakersdescribed in the article.
He and other historical and archaeological experts -but mostimportantly tribal officials and traditional elders -must be meaningfully consulted to ensure anindependent site survey at and around Palisades to protect Native American cultural resources there.The NRC Staff, in its challenge to this contention, inexplicably ignores Petitioners' arguments about the potential for disproportionately high adverse impacts on Native Americancultural resources on the Palisades site that have never been identified.
Tom Goldtooth, executive director of Indigenous Environmental Network in Minnesota, and Winona LaDuke, executive director of Honor the Earth, are long-time advisors to NIRS onsuch matters and can serve as expert witnesses on these Native American environmental justice contentions.
Technical perfection is not an essential element of contention pleading.
Private Fuel
: Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
LBP-01-3, 53 NRC 84,99 (2001). The sounder practice is to decide issues on their merits, not to avoid them ontechnicalities.
Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC108, 116117 (1979).WITHDRAWN CONTENTIONS Petitioners hereby give notice of the withdrawal of the following contentions fromconsideration:
Contention No. 5 (no permanent repository for the nuclear waste which would begenerated at Palisades after 2010)Contention No. 6 (Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry caskstorage pads)Contention No. 828 (Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers to reduceembrittlement of RPV walls)29Contention No. 9 (Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ)Contention No. 10 (Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident or attackon the power plant causing severe radiation release)Contention No. 11 (Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against the Palisades nuclear power plant)Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners, 28This Contention was mislabeled as No. 8 in the original Petition inasmuch as there was aseparate Contention also numbered 6, but for consistency of reference is defined in this section as beingNo. 8.29This Contention is being withdrawn in the belief that the gravamen of it can be addressed withinContention No. 1 raised by the Petitioners, "The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement."
Is/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.com Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423(616) 399-4408Fax (616) 399-0868Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-intervenors and Member-Intervenors UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDIn the Matter of* NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT
: COMPANY, LLC(Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))))Docket No.ASLBP No.50-255-LR 05-842-03-LR CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFFAND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following through deposit in the NRC's internal mail system, withcopies by electronic mail, as indicated by an asterisk, by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated bydouble asterisk, with copies by electronic mail, or by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by tripleasterisk, and that paper copies only of "PETITIONERS' APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE INSUPPORT OF CONTENTIONS" were delivered all parties at the following mailling addresses; all on this 16th day of September, 2005:Office of the Secretary*
ATTN: Docketing and ServiceMail Stop: O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 (E-mail:
HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov)
Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dr. Anthony Baratta*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
ajb5@nrc.gov)
Dr. Nicholas G. Trikouros*
Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
n.trikouros@att.net)
Ann Marshall Young*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail:
amy@nrc.gov)
Kary Love, Esq.**Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2Holland, Ml 49423(E-mail:
karylove@yahoo.com)
Paul Gunter**DirectorNuclear Information
& Resource Service1424 16th Street, NWSuite 404Washington, DC 20036(E-mail:
pgunter@nirs.org)
Chuck Jordan**ChairmanGreen Party of Van Buren County 50521 34th AvenueBangor, MI 49013(E-mail:
jordanc@btc-bci.com)
Alice Hirt**Western Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SESuite 280Grand Rapids, MI 49506(E-mail:
alicehirt@charter.net)
Michael Keegan**Co-ChairDon't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 49505(E-mail:
mkeeganj@comcast.net)
Maynard Kaufman***
Michigan Land Trustees25485 County Road 681Bangor, MI 49013David R. Lewis, Esq.**Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP2300 N Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20037-1128 (E-mail:
david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com)
Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.**Vice President,
: Counsel,
& Secretary Nuclear Management
: Company, LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016(E-mail:
jonathan.rogoff@nmcco.com)
Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General CounselMail Stop: O-15D21Washington, D.C. 20555(E-mail Address:
slu@nrc.gov)
/s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry J. Lodge Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana
* Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination
*Citizens For Renewable Energy
* Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes
* Don't WasteMichigan
* Great Lakes United
* The Green Party of Michigan
* Kalamazoo Nonviolent Opponents of War
* Lone Tree Council
* Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
* MichiganEnvironmental Council
* Michigan Land Trustees
* National Environmental Trust
* NuclearEnergy Information Service
* Nuclear-Free Great Lakes Campaign
* Nuclear Information andResource Service
* Nukewatch
* PIRGIM
* Radiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes(REAP-GL)
* Sierra Club, Mackinac Chapter
* Van Buren County Greens
* WAND Michigan:
Women's Action for New Directions
* West Michigan Environmental Action CouncilMarch 20, 2006The Honorable Carl LevinU.S. SenateWashington, D.C. 20510
 
==Dear Senator Levin,==
We are writing you because of our serious concerns about issues of nuclear safety in Michigan.
The owner (Jackson, Michigan-based Consumers Energy Company, a subsidiary of CMS) andoperator (Hudson, Wisconsin-based Nuclear Management
: Company, LLC) of the long-troubled Palisades nuclear power plant in Covert (just seven miles south of South Haven, on the Lake Michigan shoreline insouthwestern Michigan) have applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a 20 yearextension to its original 40 year license.But concerned citizens fear that extending the 35-year-old Palisades nuclear power plant'soperational license from 2011 till 2031 risks a catastrophic accident.
Palisades, as affirmed by the NRC[U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Generalization of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock(PTS) Risk Results to Additional Plants,"
Date Submitted:
October 26, 2004; Revised:
December 14,2004, Table 1, "Plants with highest RTNDT," page 5.], has one of the most embrittled reactor vessels inthe United States. In fact, Nuclear Management Company itself has recently admitted that Palisades willviolate embrittlement standards by 2014, just three short years into its proposed license extension
[Mr.Lewis, attorney for Nuclear Management
: Company, Nov. 3, 2005 ASLB 20 year license extension proceedings pre-hearing, South Haven, MI, transcript page 114.]. Consumers Energy has previously pledged to take action, such as annealing (superheating to restore the metal's ductility) the reactorpressure vessel by 1999, to address the embrittlement
[documented by NRC in "Reactor Pressure VesselEmbrittlement and Annealing" published prior to May, 2000, and Kalamazoo Gazette newspaper coverage].
But apparent NRC regulatory rollbacks have allowed Palisades to keep operating whileignoring embrittlemnent
: dangers, which worsen with time.Embrittlernent is caused by neutron radiation from the nuclear chain reaction in the reactor coreseriously impacting the reactor pressure vessel's metallic ductility.
The safety significance ofembrittlement is the vessel's increased susceptibility of "pressurized thermal shock" (PTS). PTS occurswhen a vessel is severely overcooled, followed by sudden re-pressurization.
As the vessel is overcooled, there is a corresponding rapid drop in the pressure of the primary coolant loop. This causes the reactor's I
high pressure injection pumps in the emergency core cooling system to automatically inject coolant intothe primary loop. As this injection of coolant re-pressurizes the vessel, it is subjected to significant pressure stresses.
The stresses placed on the reactor pressure vessel by overcooling and re-pressurization cause pressurized thermal shock, PTS. [Steve Sholly, "Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening Criteria,"
Nuclear Information and Resource
: Service, Jan. 1984.]Thus, emergency cooling water pumped into the Palisades reactor pressure vessel would causepressurized thermal shock, which could rupture the brittle vessel like a hot glass under cold water. Thevessel, the primary containment for the deadly radioactivity within, could crack. A loss of coolantaccident would ensue. The superheated nuclear fuel could melt down, burning its way through the plant'sfloor and foundations until it hit the underlying water table, releasing catastrophic amounts ofradioactivity into the air and Lake Michigan.
The most recent analysis
-"Consequences of Reactor Accident Consequences" or CRAC-2,published in 1982 by NRC and Sandia National Lab -on the effects of a large scale melt down atPalisades shows that 1,000 peak early fatalities, 7,000 peak early injuries, 10,000 peak cancer deaths, and$52.6 billion in property damage (in 1982 dollars; if adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars, this would beover $100 billion) would result. This may be a significant underestimate of deaths, injuries, and propertydamage, given population growth and economic development over the intervening 24 years since theanalysis was performed.
Given this severe risk to the safety, health, and environment of Michigan and its residents, as wellas to Lake Michigan (source of drinking water, and so much more, to tens of millions downstream throughout the Great Lakes in the U.S. and Canada),
a growing coalition opposes the 20 year licenseextension at Palisades.
Last August, a group of over 50 local concerned citizens and five groups (Don't Waste Michigan, Green Party of Van Buren County, Michigan Land Trustees, Nuclear Information and Resource Service,and West Michigan Environmental Action Council) residing within the 50 mile emergency planning zonearound Palisades officially intervened before the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB)against the 20 year license extension, citing embrittlement and PTS of the reactor pressure vessel as theprimary safety contention.
Since then, nearly 20 additional environmental and public interest organizations and coalitions from Michigan, four other states, and two Canadian provinces have joined the effort against the Palisades license extension.
They are: Alliance for the Great Lakes (formerly Lake Michigan Federation),
CitizensAction Coalition of Indiana, Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination, Citizens for Renewable Energy in Ontario, Clean Water Action, Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, Great Lakes United (abi-national coalition of over 150 grassroots groups in the U.S. and Canada, headquartered in Buffalo, NewYork and Montreal, Quebec),
Green Party of Michigan, Kalamazoo River Protection Association, Leagueof Women Voters of the Holland Area, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, MichiganEnvironmental Council (MEC), NuclearEnergy Information Service of Illinois, Nuclear-Free Great LakesCampaign, Nukewatch of Wisconsin, Public Interest Research Group in Michigan (PIRGIM),
Radiological Evaluation
& Action Project of the Great Lakes, Sierra Club's Michigan
: Chapter, andWAND Michigan (Women's Action for New Directions).
Altogether, the organizations comprising thiscoalition represent well over 200,000 Michigan residents, as well as many thousands more peoplethroughout the Great Lakes Basin.On Nov. 3 and 4, 2005 the NRC's ASLB convened a pre-hearing in South Haven regarding theadmissibility of the contentions filed by the intervening citizens and organizations.
The vast majority of2 time was devoted to discussing the embrittlement and PTS contention.
Not only Nuclear Management Company attorneys (on behalf of Consumers Energy),
but also the NRC staff itself, argued againstadmission of the embrittlement and PTS contention.
This was most troubling, given that NRC's supposedmandate is to protect public health and safety and the 6nvironment.
It is especially troubling when combined with the history of NRC action -or lack thereof-onnational embrittlement standards over the past several decades.
Our best efforts to track NRC's actionsindicate that embrittlement standards have apparently been weakened several times since the 1980s. Thereneeds to be an objective audit, such as by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), todetermine if and how those standards have been relaxed, and whether those changes were justified or not.We are most concerned with how those relaxed standards have potentially lowered safety margins atPalisades, but embrittlement is a national problem afflicting dozens of reactors across the country.
Anessential question to address is, have embrittlement safety standards been weakened in order to allowreactors such as Palisades to continue operating?
If regulatory rollbacks placing profits over safety haveoccurred, what actions must NRC and/or Congress take to protect the public? After all, Palisades wasfirst identified by NRC as violating embrittlement and PTS standards in 1981, just ten years into itsoperations.
["Not Man Apart," Nov. 1981, Friends of the Earth; "Pressurized Thermal Shock Potential atPalisades,"
Michael J. Keegan, Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, July 8, 1993, attached.]
We should hasten to mention that, due to lack of resources, we focused on the single mostsignificant safety issue at Palisades
-embrittlement and PTS of the reactor pressure vessel. However, weraised numerous other contentions, such as regulatory violations involving the dry cask storage pads forhigh-level radioactive waste on the Lake Michigan shoreline.
But the focus of our intervention, and of thisletter, is on embrittlement and PTS of the reactor pressure vessel.Embrittlement and PTS had been identified as a significant national nuclear safety issue more than25 years ago, such as by NRC reactor safety engineer Demetrios Basdekas.
Basdekas's courage to speakout on the dangers of embrittlement and PTS in the face of nuclear industry and even NRC harassment ledto his being awarded the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' Society on the SocialImplications of Technology Carl Barus Award in 1991, "[i]n recognition of his long-standing efforts toimprove the regulatory process in the nuclear power field." Basdekas advised the Palisades intervenors onthe writing of their embrittlement and PTS contention, and they have depended heavily upon thedocumentation of his work on the issue at NRC over the previous decades.The intervenors' contentions were submitted to NRC's ASLB on August 8, 2005. On August 22,2005 Basdekas informed the intervenors he could no longer serve as their expert witness, for personalreasons.
Intervenors have since communicated with Dr. Joe Hopenfeld, another retired NRC safetyengineer, who has indicated interest in serving as an expert witness on the embrittlement and PTScontention.
A very troubling aspect of the ASLB proceedings is an apparent attempt by the NRC staffattorney to threaten any former NRC employees serving as expert witnesses for the intervenors with a$50,000 fine and two years imprisonment.
After legal consultation we have concluded that such threatsare without legal merit, and fortunately Dr. Hopenfeld (and Dr. Ross Landsman, another former NRC drycask inspector) have courageously agreed to continue serving as our experts.
The attempted intimidation did chill the proceeding,
: however, including causing Mr. Basdekas considerable anxiety.
Our question is,why would the NRC, whose mandate it is to protect public health and safety, attempt to intimidate theexpert witnesses of citizen intervenors attempting to raise significant safety concerns?
Numerous rounds of filings have occurred between the intervenors, defending the embrittlement and PTS contention, and the companies and NRC staff, attacking the contention as inadmissible.
Almostall of the attacks against the contention involve legalistic technicalities and procedural objections, 3
disregarding the merits of the safety concerns about embrittlement and PTS. In addition, the disparity ofresources (between the intervenors' non-profit and largely volunteer legal effort, versus the substantial resources of the companies and agency involved),
the NRC's very strict intervention proceeding rules,and the intimidation intervenors' potential expert witnesses have faced, have put the intervenors at asignificant disadvantage.
Unfortunately, on March 7 the NRC licensing board ruled against all of the intervenors' contentions, including embrittlement.
They denied granting intervenors a hearing on the merits of theirsafety concerns, ruling against them based upon legalistic and bureaucratic technicalities under the NRC'soverly strict and Byzantine licensing proceeding rules. But this comes as little surprise, given NRC'sclearly established pattern of denying intervenors' contentions and approving 20 year license extensions:
NRC has approved 37 reactor license extensions since 1998, having ruled against almost all intervenors' contentions, including contentions involving reactor pressure vessel embrittlement and PTS. NRC nowseems poised to rubberstamp the Palisades license extension as well. The ASLB's rejection of ourcontentions reflects an overriding pattern at NRC -the downplaying and outright neglect of significant safety issues such as security, waste, age-related deterioration, and other issues in the rush to rubberstamp 20 year license extensions.
NRC's rubberstamp on the Palisades 20 year license extension will now likely eventually followas a mere formality, leaving the significant safety issues surrounding embrittlement and PTS of the reactorpressure vessel unaddressed.
The intervenors will appeal this adverse ASLB ruling on the embrittlement contention to the five member NRC Commission itself, in order to preserve the record of the intervention and exhaust all administrative remedies.
But history is again clear: no intervention appeals to the NRCCommission have ever succeeded against a 20 year license extension.
Although very unlikely, if the NRCCommissioners do overrule the ASLB decision and admit the embrittlement contention, the intervenors fully intend to prove during the adjudicatory hearing that embrittlement and PTS risks are too high forNRC to grant Palisades a 20 year license extension.
Seeing the writing on the wall -- that our administrative remedies are being exhausted and ourappeal will almost certainly fail at the NRC -- we are writing to ask you to request a GAO investigation into the significant nuclear safety issue of reactor pressure vessel embrittlement and PTS. Michiganresidents downwind and downstream from Palisades are not the only Americans put at risk by this. NRChas identified the 30 most embrittled pressurized water reactor vessels in the U.S. (see attached)
According to this NRC listing, the most embrittled reactor vessel in the country is at Salem Unit 1in New Jersey, very close to the border with Pennsylvania.
(Salem Unit 2 is also listed, as the 23rd mostembrittled.)
Beaver Valley (2 most embrittled in U.S.) and Three Mile Island Unit 1 (3rd most embrittled) areboth in Pennsylvania.
Despite this, they have sent NRC letters of intent to apply for 20 year licenseextensions.
The Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant in New York State has also indicated its intention tore-license, despite being identified as having the 13th most embrittled reactor vessel in the U.S.In fact, NRC has already granted 20 year license extensions to several reactors also identified asamong the 30 most embrittled.
These include both Calvert Cliffs units in Maryland, Ginna in New YorkState, Point Beach Unit 1 in Wisconsin (also on the Lake Michigan shoreline, upwind of northernMichigan),
and -of additional concern for Michigan
-- both Cook units in southwest Michigan.
Other pressurized water reactors on this NRC watch list, such as Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 inCalifornia, have not yet indicated their intention to apply for license extensions.
But they very likely will4 do so, especially if NRC's license extension approvals continue to essentially be pro forma, de factorubberstamps, despite such significant safety concerns as embrittlement.
Given the potentially catastrophic risks associated with the worsening problem of reactor pressurevessel embrittlement and PTS at pressurized water reactors across the U.S., we urge you, Senator Levin,to join with Senator Stabenow and your Senate colleagues from other impacted states to request a GAOinvestigation into the apparent weakening and non-enforcement of NRC safety standards regarding reactor pressure vessel embrittlement and PTS at Palisades and other reactors.
We stand ready to assist in whatever way we can, as by providing copies of NRC and otherdocuments showing the worsening embrittlement and PTS potential at Palisades and other reactors acrossthe U.S. Some of the intervenors' legal team members, representing Don't Waste Michigan, Coalition fora Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, and Nuclear Information and Resource
: Service, have watch dogged theembrittlement and PTS issue for many years, and even decades, at Palisades and nationally, and would bewilling to meet with your staff and be interviewed by GAO investigators.
Thank you for your previous leadership on opposing dangerous nuclear proposals, such as: your2004 vote against allowing the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to abandon high-level radioactive waste sludge in underground tanks at such sites as West Valley, New York, which would endanger LakeErie with severe radioactive contamination; and your 2003 vote against $7.5 billion in direct federaltaxpayer subsidies for the construction of the first new nuclear reactors in the U.S. in 30 years.Our largely volunteer
: efforts, as with other grassroots actions around the country, have fallen ondeaf ears at NRC, whose ever more strict intervention rules benefit the nuclear power industry at theexpense of the public's health, safety and environment.
So widespread and significant a problem asreactor pressure vessel embrittlement and PTS should not be left to the vagaries of grassroots interventions in NRC license extension proceedings, where concerned citizens are most often stopped atthe threshold, without ever being granted hearings on the merits of this complex yet potentially disastrous generic safety problem.
We need Congress to investigate this issue to make certain that NRC's mandate toprotect public health and safety and the environment is being fulfilled in the face of embrittled reactorpressure vessels susceptible to catastrophic failure due to PTS.We respectfully urge you to request GAO to investigate NRC's inaction in the face of theembrittlement and PTS crisis, in order to shed light on this risk to Michigan residents downwind anddownstream of Palisades, and other Americans living in the shadow of nuclear power plants withembrittled reactor pressure vessels.For more information, please contact Kevin Kamps at Nuclear Information and Resource Servicein Washington, D.C. (and a board member of Don't Waste Michigan) at 301.270.6477.
Sincerely, Grant SmithExecutive DirectorCitizens Action Coalition of IndianaIndianapolis, IN5 Kay CumbowSecretary Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination Brown City, M1S.(Ziggy)
KleinauCoordinator, Citizens For Renewable EnergyLion's Head, Ontario, CanadaMichael KeeganChairperson Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great LakesMonroe, MichiganAlice Hirt (Holland chapter) and Kathryn Barnes (Sherwood chapter)Board MembersDon't Waste MichiganMaria MaybeeGreat Lakes UnitedBuffalo, NY and Montreal, Quebec, CanadaSylvia Inwood, ChairThe Green Party of MichiganAnn Arbor MIDr. Torn SmallKalamazoo Nonviolent Opponents of WarKalamazoo, MichiganTerry Miller, ChairmanLone Tree CouncilBay City, MITerry SwierMichigan Citizens for Water Conservation
: Mecosta, MIJames CliftPolicy DirectorMichigan Environmental CouncilLansing, MichiganMaynard Kaufman and Barbara GeislerMichigan Land TrusteesBangor, Michigan6 Vicki Levengood Michigan Representative National Environmental TrustLansing, MichiganDave KraftExecutive DirectorNuclear Energy Information ServiceEvanston, ILKeith GunterNuclear-Free Great Lakes CampaignLivonia, MichiganKevin KampsNuclear Waste Specialist Nuclear Information and Resource ServiceWashington, D.C.John LaForgeNukewatch Luck, Wisconsin Mike Shriberg, Ph.D.Director, PIRGIM (Public Interest Research Group in Michigan)
Ann Arbor, MIHenry Peters,Radiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes (REAP-GL),
Ewen, MichiganAnna Holden,Chair of the Conservation Committee Sierra Club, Mackinac Chapter,Detroit, MichiganChuck JordanCo-chair, Van Buren County Greens,State Central Committee, Green Party of MichiganBangor, MichiganClare Mead RosenWAND Michigan:
Women's Action for New Directions Southfield, MichiganThomas J. LeonardWest Michigan Environmental Action CouncilGrand Rapids, MI7 8
Is Palisades Safe?The field of Evaluation uses "claims and evidence" to support conclusions as to whether or notsomething is working or worthwhile.
I'd like to apply those principles to the question of whether ornot Palisades is safe. Entergy and the NRC claim that it is.But let's look at the evidence.
There are five permanent indicators.
They are conditions that cannot be changed.1. Entergy is in the business of making money not in community well-being.
Entergy's primaryresponsibility is to its shareholders not to the community.
: 2. Palisades is very old and getting older every day. It has already passed its life span. One cannotturn back the calendar when it comes to aging.3. The Palisades reactor is the most embrittled in the country.
That cannot be changed except byannealment.
But that's not logical.
I ask: what foundry would be willing to accept such a large pieceof radioactive equipment and heat it up to 1400 degrees?
In fact then, the present vessel is left tobecome more embrittled every day.4. Thousands of spent fuel rods are being stored on site and the number continually grows. There isno national repository for long-term storage so the current policy is to have plants store waste onsite. There is no change on the horizon.5. NRC personnel are on site, but they cannot do anything about the age of the plant or spent fuelrods or even dictate what Entergy should do. They can only deal with day-to-day dashboard readings and file reports.
: Further, the NRC is bound by administrative code. It can only go so far.There are three temporary indicators.
They are conditions that can be changed.1. Employee morale is low. That can be mitigated if management changes its approach to employeeculture.
But so far that has not happened.
A cultural change at Entergy would have to start withmanagement style at the top. But Entergy executives don't appear interested.
Aren't they the onesselling off their Entergy stock?2. Tritium leaks into Lake Michigan could be halted. We've heard time and time again fromPalisades and NRC personnel that the water in Lake Michigan dilutes tritium to safe levels. But waita minute! Dilution is a PR term. In reality, the actual word should be "concentration".
With eachleak, Lake Michigan is actually increasing its concentration of tritium.3. Equipment failures are often reported in the press. They can be fixed. However spending moneyon maintenance decreases Entergy's profits.Is Palisades safe? The evidence is clear. Palisades is not safe and is a disaster waiting to happen.Palisades must be shut down.Barbara Pellegrini 4022 Evergreen Lane (within the 10 mile evacuation radius)Benton Harbor Michigan 49022 Halting 20 Extended Years of Risky, Reactor Operations and Radioactive Waste Generation and StorageOn Lake Michigan at Palisades Nuclear Power PlantComments on NUREG-1437, Supplement 27 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement forLicense Renewal of the Palisades Nuclear Power PlantSubmitted to:Chief, Rules Review and Directives BranchU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T6-D59Washington, DC 20555-0001 From:Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana; Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility/Regroupement pourla surveillance du nucl~aire; Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination; Citizens Resistance atFermi Two (CRAFT);
Citizens for Renewable Energy; Huron Environmental Activist League; Clean WaterAction; Home for Peace and Justice; Great Lakes United; IHM Justice, Peace and Sustainability Office;Indigenous Enviromnental Network (IEN); International Institute of Concern for Public Health; LoneTree Council; Kalamazoo River Protection Association; Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation; Michigan Land Trustees; Michigan Environmental Council; Michigan Interfaith Climate and EnergyCampaign/Voices for Earth Justice; National Environmental Trust; Nuclear Energy Information Service(NEIS); Nuclear-Free Great Lakes Campaign; Nuclear Policy Research Institute; Nukewatch; Radiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes; Sierra Club, Mackinac (Michigan)
Chapter; Van Buren CountyGreens, West Michigan Environmental Action Council.Individuals endorsing these comments are listed at the end of this submission.
Please direct questions to the following organizations responsible for research and content development:
Don't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 48505Email: alicehir t@charter.net Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great LakesP.O. Box 331Monroe, MI 48161Email: rnkeeganj@comcast.net Nuclear Information and Resource Service6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 340,Takoma Park, MD 20912Tel: 301-270-NIRS (301-270-6477)
Fax: 301-270-4291 Email: nirsnet@nirs.org Coordinated by:Tanya Cabala, Great Lakes Consulting, Tel: 231-981-0016; Email: tcabala@charter.net May 18, 2006I I. Introduction A 20-year license extension is proposed for Palisades Nuclear Power PlantConsumers Energy, owner, and Nuclear Management Company (NMC), LLC, operator, of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant situated on Lake Michigan in Covert Township,
: Michigan, have applied to extend Palisades' operating license 20 years beyond itsoriginal 40-year operation tenure, which began in 1971. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a federal agency responsible for regulating nuclear power plants, isrequired by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) to seek input frommembers of the public and interested groups, regarding the environmental impacts ofthis action, as well as alternatives to the proposed action.Don't Waste Michigan, the Coalition for a Nuclear Free-Great Lakes, and the NuclearInformation and Resource Service have researched, coordinated and taken a lead in thedevelopment of these comments on the proposed action. In addition to providing important background information on the plant and its impact on the region, thegroups also present their assessment of the NRC's draft environmental impactstatement (EIS), comments on the re-licensing process and stakeholder participation, and recommendations for improving security at the plant, as well as comments aimedat prevention of the continued risky operation of the plant, and the establishment of apermanent site for storage of high-level radioactive waste on the Great Lakes shoreline.
Description of groups submitting commentsDon't Waste Michigan is a federation of environmental organizations with a 25-member board and membership of 1,000 founded in 1987 to oppose the designation of the stateof Michigan as a repository for what was misleadingly termed "low-level" radioactive waste from eight states. Don't Waste Michigan's work was ultimately successful andthe state of Michigan was eliminated from consideration as a repository for the wastes.Don't Waste Michigan, with the Lake Michigan Federation (now the Alliance for theGreat Lakes) and support from numerous local grassroots organizations, along withMichigan Attorney General Frank Kelly, brought suit in federal court in 1993 to preventthe loading of high-level nuclear waste in casks on the shore of Lake Michigan at thePalisades plant. The suit was unsuccessful and the issue was further pursued by Don'tWaste Michigan and Lake Michigan Federation in a letter [Docket #:05000255,07200007]
sent to NRC Commissioner Dr. Shirley Jackson.
A hard copy of thisletter will be provided to the NRC by Don't Waste Michigan to be included ascomments for this draft EIS.The Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, founded 1986 in the wake of Chernobyl, is an association of groups and individuals from eight states and three Canadianprovinces advocating for a nuclear-free Great Lakes. The group's inaugural conference drew representation from 35 reactor communities throughout the Great Lakes basin.The Coalition exchanges expertise and information across the basin regarding nuclearpower while advocating for safe alternative energy sources and has held a series of tenbasin-wide educational and conferences.
The Coalition and its member groups succeeded in encouraging the International Joint Commission to acknowledge radio-nuclides as persistent toxic substances, as well as undertaking major studies on theeffects of radio-nuclides in the Great Lakes Basin. The coalition is based in Monroe,Michigan.
The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), founded in 1978 and based inWashington, DC, is an international information and networking center for citizens andenvironmental organizations concerned about nuclear power, radioactive waste,radiation, and sustainable energy issues. NIRS and the World Information Service onEnergy (WISE) joined forces in 2000, to create a worldwide network of information andresource centers for citizens and environmental organizations concerned about nuclearpower, radioactive waste, radiation, and sustainable energy.History of involvement by submitting groups in the Palisades nuclear power plantDon't Waste Michigan, the Coalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, and the NuclearInformation and Resource
: Service, have a history of monitoring the operations ofPalisades, as well as consistently participating in public meetings, providing
: comments, and instituting legal interventions as needed. The groups have been active participants to date in the meetings, licensing proceedings, and comment processes provided by theNRC as part of the review of the application by Palisades to extend its license.Both Don't Waste Michigan, and NIRS (representing 50 of its members within 50 milesof Palisades) filed as official interveners against the 20-year license extension, andpetitioned the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), the NRC's administrative law licensing board, to hold hearings on the 20-year licensing extension, raisingnumerous safety and environmental concerns.
The ASLB ruled against granting ahearing on March 7, 2006 upon which the groups appealed the decision to the NRCCommissioners.
This EIS process is separate and distinct from the ASLB/Commission appeal.NRC's comment framework unnecessarily restricts public involvement The NRC has established a framework for this application process that unfairly andarbitrarily eliminates a huge array of issues from consideration, discussion andcomment by individuals, organizations, and Native American tribes that provides aneffective obstacle to meaningful public participation.
Because of this, some of thesecomments will fall "outside" of the scope of this process.
Regardless, these commentsare provided on issues that we believe are germane, and we vigorously object to thearbitrary and overly strict limitations on the scope of public input.II. Adverse Consequences of Approval of Palisades' License Extension RequestThere is much at stake with the prospect of 20 additional years of nuclear power andradioactive waste generation and the associated risks and serious consequences associated with the Palisades plant, which is already unfortunately sited right in the3 heart of an exceedingly environmentally valuable and sensitive dune and shoreland onLake Michigan.
Part of the Great Lakes basin, Lake Michigan is an essential facet of asystem that is invaluable from a planetary perspective, not only for its contribution tothe water supply on the globe -approximately 20% of the world's fresh surface water -but also for its rich and abundant fish and wildlife and the ecosystem services itprovides to people, as well as supporting a primary economic engine for the nation.There is no price that can be placed on the value of Lake Michigan, but we do know thiswith absolute certainty:
Lake Michigan provides essential water resources for 10 million people, supports necessities crucial to the overall htealth of the region, such as fresh, healthy food from its abundantagricultural base, and provides a significant contribution to the recreation and tourismeconomies of the four states that border its lakeshore.
It is the essential core of the region'snatural resource base and provides a value to its human inhabitants that cannot be quantified.
Because pollutants tend to remain in the Great Lakes and cycle through the atmosphere, sedinient, water, and biological food chain, contamination of Lake Michigan is a concern for tHieentire Great Lakes basin, home to one-tenth of the population of the United States and one-quarter of the population of Canada.Lake Michigan is currently in a critical stage of initial recovery, after suffering decadesof impacts from toxic substances, as well as habitat degradation.
This initial recovery, unfortunately, has already slowed from the impacts of the more recent intrusion ofinvasive species.
Much has been done and millions of dollars spent to restore andprotect the values provided by Lake Michigan, as well as the entire Great Lakes. Arecent proposal by a government led coalition has recommended that $20 billion infunds be appropriated to fully restore and protect the Great Lakes.Given what is at stake with consideration of extending an operating license forPalisades, a nuclear power plant and waste storage facility unwisely situated within theheart of Great Lakes, it is imperative to examine the pertinent issues exhaustively aswell as encourage the full and meaningful participation of the large constituency ofcitizens and stakeholders who will be affected by the license decision.
The aforementioned coalition of organizations and individuals listed at the end of thesecomments oppose the 20-year extension of a license for the Palisades nuclear powerplant for the following
: reasons, elaborated more extensively further in this document:
: 1. There is strong evidence that suggest security measures at Palisades are not adequate.
Recent reports, including one in March of 2006 by the Government Accountability Office, call into question the ability and motivation of the NRC and nuclear powerindustry to take the necessary steps to ensure that the nation's nuclear power plantshave instituted the most stringent security measures to protect against terrorist attacks.2. Palisades' license extension will increase the amount of high-level waste on the LakeMichigan shoreline and the number of dangerous barge shipments of high-level 4
radioactive waste on Lake Michigan.
Palisades will generate approximately 290 moretons of high-level radioactive wastes in 20 additional years with no national repository likely to be established to receive the wastes. The U.S. Department of Energy's plan fortransporting high-level radioactive wastes generated by the plant's operation, involvesbarging up to 125 or more giant rail-sized containers of the wastes from Palisades to thePort of Muskegon, up along the Lake Michigan shoreline.
The slightest leakage of evena small amount of this waste could not only threaten Lake Michigan as a source ofdrinking water for ten million people, but also cause a host of other irrevocable impactson the lake's fish, wildlife, people, and economy.3. Palisades' high-level radioactive waste storage facility is defective and risky, situatedon the Lake Michigan shoreline.
There are numerous incidents dating from theinstallation of the waste storage facility to the present that demonstrate the risksassociated with the dry cask storage containers, as well as their problematic placement on a high risk erosion stretch of the shoreline, on pads not adequately designed to bestable during events such as earthquakes.
: 4. The Palisades plant harms the environment and the health of its workers andsurrounding residents from its discharges of radioactive.and toxic substances to LakeMichigan, the air, and land. Routine radioactive discharges by nuclear power plants areincorrectly deemed legal and judged to be "safe" by the NRC and the nuclear powerindustry, contrary to a recent National Academy of Sciences report that confirms thatthere is no safe level of exposure to radiation.
: Further, other toxic chemical discharges to Lake Michigan, such as Betz Clam-Trol, discharged via a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, require stricter controls andenforcement of violations, as part of any license extension application.
: 5. Aging and extended operation increase the risk of accidents at Palisades.,
The longerPalisades
: operates, the more embrittled its reactor pressure vessel becomes, increasing the risk for Pressurized Thermal Shock, a condition caused by any number of systemmalfunctions which can result in a severe, sudden overcooling of the reactor pressurevessel. This can lead to a loss-of-coolant
: accident, meltdown, and catastrophic releaseof radiation to the entire Great Lakes basin.6. The analysis of alternatives to extending the license for Palisades was flawed andbiased. Renewable energy sources such as wind power and solar power, as well asalternatives such as energy efficiency and conservation, are not given credibleconsideration in the EIS. NMC/Consumers and the NRC reveal a bias in favor of fossilfuel and nuclear power by presenting only those two sources favorably and bydownplaying the potential for energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable sources of electricity.
: 7. The draft EIS prepared by the NRC unaccountably discounts the effects of globalwarming.
There is considerable evidence that more extreme winds, as well morefrequent and intense tornadoes
-all of which global warming could cause -could5 make operation of Palisades more and more risky over time.8. Financial benefits to Covert Township, host to Palisades nuclear power plant, are notevident and not expected with a license extension.
The township consistently ratessubstantially below comparable county, state and national economic indicators inmedian household and per capita incomes and the draft EIS notes no improvements areexpected by the license extension.
: 9. A 20-year extension for Palisades will be costly. Ratepayers and (by default)taxpayers are to pay for maintenance of the waste generated by the utilities.
The fiftyyear old Price-Anderson Act requires taxpayers to pay for any major accident orterrorist incident at nuclear power plants over a cap of merely $11 billion paid for by thenuclear utilities and their insurance companies for accidents or terrorist incidents at theplant, a liability that could run into many hundreds of billions of dollars.
This liability protection is a unique subsidy provided to the nuclear power industry, at taxpayerexpense.10. A license extension at Palisades increases the fragile status of numerous alreadythreatened, endangered, or candidate
: species, from daily "routine" radiation releasesand/or potential large-scale radiation releases.
Species exposed to cumulative exposures from the radioactive discharges of a nuclear power plant may over timedevelop subtle genetic alterations that are not observable in the short term, but thatcould have large, subtle impacts within a population, not immediately apparent.
Thishas significant implications for the threatened and endangered species of southwest Michigan.
III. Background Palisades nuclear power plant, a one-unit pressurized water reactor with 798 mega-watt-electric
: capacity, began operation in 1971. It is owned by Consumers Energy andoperated by Nuclear Management Company (NMC). NMC operates six nuclear powerplants in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Michigan.
Consumers Power is amember/investor in NMC and retains ownership of the Palisades plant.The operating license for the Palisades nuclear power plant, located 5 miles south ofSouth Haven on Lake Michigan, will expire in March 2011. NMC has applied for anextension to operate the plant for an additional 20 years, until March 2031. Nuclearpower plants were originally licensed to operate for 40 years, as allowed by the AtomicEnergy Act of 1954. There has been a nationwide movement by government regulators and the nuclear power industry to extend the licenses well beyond that time period,even though the reactors are beginning to show signs of aging, raising considerable concerns about safety. To date, 39 of the nation's 103 nuclear reactors have received 20-year extensions, while 12 others are in the process, including Palisades.
The NuclearRegulatory Commission has approved all applications to date.6 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (headed by a 5-member commission, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate) was established in 1974 to license andregulate nuclear power plants with a mission of protecting public health and safety andthe environment, as well as protecting the common defense and security.
Unfortunately, the NRC's implicit mission has been more one of protecting the nuclearpower industry's interests rather than the interests of the public. This may be due inpart to its budget: by law, the NRC is required to collect fees from nuclear power plantapplicants and holders of licenses for the majority of its budget. $628 million of theNRC's $777 million budget for fiscal year 2007 is provided by the nuclear powerindustry.
The drive for re-licensing of the nation's nuclear power plants started as early as 1982,with research on aging of nuclear reactors, and began in earnest in 1991 when the NRCpublished safety requirements for renewal.
Currently, re-licensing plans are movingmore rapidly as proponents attempt to take advantage of the nation's current energycrisis. Extended and new nuclear power generation is now being promoted as a "clean"alternative to the use of fossil fuels, which are now universally acknowledged ascontributing to global warming.
Many utilities that own nuclear power plants,however, including Consumers Energy, also own coal-burning plants. Consumers Power, in particular, generates a sizable share of its electricity from the burning of fossilfuels.The NRC and power companies thus advocate for a dangerous source of electricity, nuclear power, calling it "clean" and "green" by appearing to discourage anotherharmful electricity source, one, however, that they plan to continue utilizing to thefullest extent possible.
Nuclear reactors, including Palisades, are not 'clean."
They emitharmful radioactivity into the environment on a daily basis and generate long-lasting radioactive wastes. Further, nuclear power is not "carbon free," as it relies heavily onthe use of fossil fuels in the mining, milling, processing, transportation, management, and storage of its fuel and waste products.
IV. Inadequate Security at Palisades is an Unacceptable RiskThe NRC has placed this issue outside the scope of the EIS for extending the license forPalisades.
We strongly disagree and assert that the decision to allow Palisades tooperate an additional 20 years in a much higher risk condition mandates extensive involvement by the public.Maintaining the security of the Palisades plant is a high priority concern since theevents of September 11, 2001. That threat is real and imminent, as nuclear power plantswere considered to be potential targets by the terrorists who carried out 9/11, according to the report of the 9/11 Commission.
The Commission report notes that several of theterrorists had given indications that a nuclear power plant near New York City was aconsidered target for an airplane attack, due to the large population that would beaffected by a release of radioactivity.
That did not happen, reportedly, because the7 terrorists appeared to have concluded that it would have been difficult to control theeffects of a release of radioactivity.
But, the fact that it was considered means that eachand every nuclear power plant in the U.S., including Palisades, should be regarded as apotential target for terrorism and security measures must be the most stringent available to address this threat. In fact, reactors such as Palisades are likely more at riskof terrorist attack than certain other reactors, as it is situated on the shoreline of LakeMichigan, the source of drinking water for the region.Both the NRC and nuclear power companies assert that the events of 9/11 stimulated additional security at plants. However, numerous reports following 9/11 suggestotherwise, including a 2002 report by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)referencing the plight of overworked and fatigued security guards at the plants duringthe year following 9/11, and numerous high-profile media accounts of risky gaps insecurity.
An October 3, 2002 Kalamazoo Gazette article, "Palisades incident leads toreassessment,"
describes a security response lapse due to Palisades' failure to followproper procedures, leading to a communications breakdown.
When three carsapproached Palisades on the eve of the first anniversary of the 9/11/01 attacks,Palisades mistakenly phoned the local police rather than the county 911 system, leadingto a 45 minute delay before state police arrived on the scene. By that time, thesuspicious cars were long gone.An October 20, 2002 New York Times article, "Guards at Nuclear Plants Say They FeelSwamped by a Deluge of Overtime,"
described an emotional breakdown by an armedsecurity guard at Palisades with "unescorted access" to vital areas of the plant after shehad been forced to work 72 hour work weeks for months on end. If guards complained about their fatigue, they faced the loss of their job, or forced psychiatric evaluations.
Apparently, as reported by POGO, some nuclear utilities chose to nearly double currentguards' duty time in order to avoid the added costs of training and providing benefitsfor newly hired guards.In March of 2006, an independent nonpartisan investigatory federal agency, theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO), issued a report that demonstrates that thereis much yet to be done to protect the nation from terrorist threats to nuclear powerplants. The report, Efforts Made to Upgrade Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process Should be Improved (GAO-06-388),
assessed the NRC's current efforts and found evidence that suggested the nuclearindustry attempted to avoid strengthening security to avoid costs. It also noted slowprogress in conducting mock attacks or force-on-force exercises to test safety at plants,as well as egregious examples of security lapses in the small number of mock attacksthat NRC has carried out to date.8 NRC'S process for determining risk to nuclear power plants was flawed and undercutby the nuclear power industryThe recent GAO report was done to review the process that the NRC used to revise theDesign Basis Threat (DBT) that was in place for nuclear power plants prior to 9/11. TheDBT is a description of the threats that might be anticipated from terrorist activities andis used to recommend appropriate security efforts at plants. The GAO also looked atwhat nuclear plants were doing to meet the threats, and the results of mock attacks,called "force-on-force" inspections, to test security
: efforts, carried out by NRC staff.Trained "threat assessment" staff within the NRC used intelligence information thatprovided information on the capabilities of terrorists and recommended that the DBT bechanged to accommodate a larger suite of threats.
After sending out the revised DBTfor review by nuclear power plant industry officials and groups, however, the NRCchanged their recommendations for revising the DBT to reflect nuclear industryconcerns about what was "reasonable and feasible" to defend against.Judgment calls were made on most likely threatsMuch of the threat assessment analysis involved a review of a limited amount ofinformation (not much was available specific to nuclear power plants) as well aspersonal judgment by NRC staff to predict what might be used in a terrorist attackagainst nuclear power plants. For example, the staff considered whether to increase thenumber of potential attackers in the DBT, based on knowing the number of attackers inother incidents.
Staff did not, however, recommend increasing the number of attackers in the DBT because they assumed that a large number of attackers would be more likelyto be caught before they could carry out an attack -a judgment call. NRC staffconcluded that an attack similar to 9/11 would not focus on a single nuclear powerplant and that since an attack from the air was not an option used often by terrorists, did not recommend that scenario to be included in the DBT. Staff did assess thepossibilities of an attack from water, but concluded that a bomb transported by waterwould necessarily be of smaller size, because it would need to be carried on a boat.(This assessment would not apply to a facility on Lake Michigan, as boats of quite largesize could approach Palisades; in addition, it is plausible that speedboats could have theability to launch an attack on Palisades before plant security defenses could react.Undue influence by the nuclear industry changed NRC recommendations The GAO report, in its review of the revisions to the DBT, noted that because thenuclear industry had the opportunity to review the draft DBT, the changes that weremade to the draft appeared to reflect concerns by the nuclear industry over the highcost of some increased security
: measures, suggesting undue influence by the industry.
For example, industry representatives protested the inclusion of certain weapons in theDBT, saying that one would render the ballistic shielding of the plants obsolete and thatanother would be too costly. The industry argued as well that protecting against theuse of certain weapons by terrorists was the responsibility of the U.S. federalgovernment, namely, the Department of Defense.9 The industry also opposed the inclusion of a threat of an attack from inside the plant,from an "active violent insider,"
saying there were no cost effective ways of avoidingthis scenario.
NRC staff made changes to the draft DBT that appeared to be influenced by the industry comments.
When the draft DBT was presented to NRC commissioners, even more changes were made based on industry objections, for example, allowingplants to use a "human reliability program" to reduce the potential for an insidersituation.
The commissioners also removed some weapons from the list recommended by staff that plants would have to defend against that would have added to the cost ofincreasing
: security, as well as voting to decrease the maximum amount of weight ofequipment,
: weapons, and explosives an attacker might carry, downgrading the level ofsecurity required at plants. The GAO report concluded that some of the changessuggested by commissioners and included as part of the DBT, were made due tojudgment, rather than specific criteria.
Few mock attacks carried out to dateThe GAO report noted that as of November 2005, the NRC had only conducted mockattacks, or force-on-force demonstrations at 20 of the 65 nuclear plant locations (with103 reactors) in the U.S. The GAO reviewed documents from inspections and force-on-force demonstrations as well as observing a number of force-on-force demonstrations.
Its review of 18 baseline inspection reports and demonstrations noted problems, including an intrusion detection failure at one site:Notice of demonstration dates were given 8 to 12 weeks in advance, and daytimeand nighttime exercises were generally convened at the same times at each event,leading to a lack of unpredictability in the exercises.
There were instances where advance information about attack scenarios hadinadvertently been provided to plant personnel.
The quality of feedback from NRC personnel to plants after an inspection varied.For example, not all potential problems were discussed by NRC with plantofficials after each demonstration.
Alarms failed to activate; some did not function properly.
> Gaps in patrols were observed.
Not all personnel entering protected areas within the plant were searched (forexample, a security officer did not examine objects that set off the metaldetector).
Some security officers were inadequately trained for a terrorist attack (lack ofphysical stress preparedness, training inappropriate to threat).) Security officers in one location were noted as inattentive at their posts.A vehicle barrier system was improperly and ineffectively placed at one plantlocation.
Accountability to the public on security is non-existent The need to keep classified certain sensitive information about measures taken atpotential targets of terrorism is understandable, but those who live in the vicinity ofPalisades, as well as those throughout the region who might be affected by a terrorist 10 attack directed at Palisades, must be assured in no uncertain terms by the NRC,Palisades, and elected leaders that every measure has been instituted that will providesafety and peace of mind to the public. It is disturbing to note that keeping backinformation on the plants has even broader implications.
In March 2004, for example,the NRC decided not to publicize results of problems related to security at plants, aswell as enforcement information relating to actions taken by the NRC against thereactor licensees for violations of safety regulations.
This appears to be takingadvantage of the heightened attention and concern for security at nuclear power plantsto limit information about unsafe operations that should be readily available tomembers of the public.If a force on force demonstration has not been conducted at Palisades, it should beconducted as soon as possible.
Classified results of the demonstration should then bedirectly communicated to the region's U.S. Congressional representatives and senators, as well as the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Michigan, for theirthorough review and approval and reporting back to the public. To truly secure thePalisades nuclear power plant and dry cask storage, the following security safeguards, if not instituted
: already, would need to be in place.Sufficient cameras and patrols;Delay measures, such as fences outside buildings and entrances that would delaypotential attackers;
> Bullet resistant structures in the protected areas of the plant site;Adequate and specific training for security officers;
> Several levels of intrusion detection systems (Needed especially by Palisades toprotect against intrusion from potential attackers that may enter from Van BurenState Park, adjacent to the plant site);> Vehicle barrier systems to prevent vehicles with bombs from entering the site;> Anti-aircraft capability, and;> Shore patrol equipped with stationary weaponry capable of preventing anoffshore assault.While some of these safeguards may appear excessive, they are necessary to secure thefacility.
Unfortunately, some of these measures have significant civil liberties ramifications for the communities surround Palisades, therefore we request that theNRC address how this will be handled in a 20-year license extension in the draft EIS.Palisades must also ensure that its irradiated nuclear fuel storage pools are safeguarded from terrorist activities.
A study released in April 2005 by the National Academy ofSciences shows that the cooling pools at nuclear reactors, which store 10 to 30 timesmore radioactive material than that contained in the reactor core, are at risk fromattacks by terrorists.
According to the study, the cooling ponds could be severelydamaged by crashing
: aircraft, high-powered weapons or explosives, releasing largequantities of radioactive material into the environment.
11 V. Lake Michigan Dunes and Shoreline Unsafe Location for Stored WasteContainers and Concrete PadsChanging conditions of Lake Michigan dunes pose risks to waste storage facilities Lake Michigan dunes constitute a series of dynamic environmental
: settings, from barebeach shorelines, to "growing dunes" or lightly vegetated foredunes, fragile interdunal wetlands and ponds, and finally to mature, forested "oldest" dune hills. Vegetation
--grasses, bushes, and trees -- is an essential key to the stability of the dunes. When dunevegetation is disturbed by footpaths or other activities, high winds and storms canwiden a small stretch of bare sand into an increasingly wide swath or "blowout."
: Blowouts, areas of blowing and unstable sands, in dunes in the vicinity of Palisades' dry cask storage system could threaten the integrity of the dry cask storage wastesystem, by clogging vents in the casks, and causing the wastes to overheat, which couldlead to an explosion.
Left unattended, large blowouts in the dunes surrounding thecasks could possibly decrease the stability of the pads on which the casks are situated.
This issue must be addressed in the EIS. Palisades must, at minimum, be required tomonitor the dunes for potential blowouts and ensure that the dunes are consistently vegetated and stable.Threat to the waste storage facility from earthquake impacts ignoredMichigan has had a lengthy history of earthquake
: activity, dating back to the firstseveral historically recorded quakes, in 1811 and 1812, originating from the NewMadrid fault, centered in New Madrid, Missouri.
These quakes registered at 8.0 orhigher on the Richter scale. Additional quakes were felt in a variety of locations throughout Michigan in the later 1800s. The largest earthquake experienced inMichigan was in 1947. With a magnitude of 4.6, it was felt throughout southernMichigan, affecting an area of 50,000 square miles. A quake originating in south centralIllinois in 1968 extended approximately 580,000 square miles and was felt throughout southern Michigan.
The last earthquake in Michigan registered 3.5 and was centered inLansing in 1994.The New Madrid zone has produced the country's largest earthquake and is considered the country's most seismically active region east of the Rocky Mountains.
The UnitedStates Geological Survey (USGS) has given the New Madrid fault a 25 to 40%probability of having an earthquake of 6.0 or greater in the next 50 years (USGS Fact SheetFS-131-02).
Movement has already been noted and described in a June 2005 Nature articledescribing the results of a University of Memphis study that detected a half-inch shift inthe fault from 2000 to 2005.The potential for earthquake activity to damage Palisades' outdoor dry cask storagepads, upon which the casks have been placed, warrants rigorous consideration, whichunfortunately, is not in evidence in the draft EIS. Concerns regarding the impacts of anearthquake that might cause disruptive movement to the waste storage facilities atPalisades surfaced as early as 1994, from within the NRC. Dr. Ross Landsman, NuclearSafety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage Inspector, questioned the adequacy of12 requirements associated with earthquake activity for Palisades' dry cask storage facilityin a letter to the chairman of the NRC. In his letter, Dr. Landsman voiced his concerns, "Actually, it's the consequences that might occur from an earthquake that I'mconcerned about. The casks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loosesand because of liquefaction
[soil taking on liquid characteristics].
This event might bein the public's mind in view of what just happened in Southern California.
It is'apparent to me that NMSS [NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards]
doesn't realize the catastrophic consequences of their continued reliance on theircurrent ideology."
In a September 15, 2005 affidavit, Dr. Landsman further describes his concernsregarding the ability of the storage pads to withstand movement due to earthquakes, asserting that both the older pad nearer Lake Michigan and the newer one furtherinland, are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations, 10 CFR &sect; 72.212(b)(2)(i)(B),
which require that: "Cask storage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion ....." Dr. Landsmannoted that Palisades' analysts and engineers apparently failed to acknowledge thedifferences in elevation between the plant and pad sites in their design of the storagefacility.
This led to mistakes in the calculations made to determine the potential movement of the pads due to an earthquake.
Dr. Landsman noted the violation afterinspecting the new storage pad in 2004 and warned that it was not safe, but his concernswere not addressed and casks have nonetheless been allowed by NRC to be placed onthe pad right up to the present.The implications of damage to the casks from an earthquake are significant.
Wastes incasks covered in or buried by sand, could overheat, causing severe damage to theirradiated nuclear fuel assemblies and making future storage,
: handling, transport, andmanagement more dangerous.
Overheated radioactive wastes could damage the drystorage casks, leading to leakage of radioactivity into the environment.
Emergency responders could be at risk from any damage to the radiation shielding measures on thecasks.The dangers of nuclear waste cask submersion underwater are two fold. First,radioactivity could leak from the cask into the water. Leakage of even a fraction of acask's contents into Lake Michigan could endanger the source of drinking water for tenmillion people. Second, enough fissile uranium-235 and plutonium is present in thehigh-level radioactive waste inside the casks, that water, with its neutron moderating properties, could actually cause a nuclear chain reaction to take place within the cask.This would complicate emergency responses, as potentially fatal radiation doses couldbe emitted from within the cask.There is undoubtedly an elevated probability of a strong earthquake originating fromthe New Madrid fault in the next 50 years, and the potential for it to extend to13 southwest Michigan.
Because of that, it is imperative that the question of the safety ofthe concrete pads and the 29 storage casks of high-level wastes be resolved to thesatisfaction of citizens of the region.VI. Native American Tribes Left Out of the EISNRC staff, in the draft supplement to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), recommended that the Commission determine that the impacts of continued operation of Palisades were not significant enough to make its extended operation unreasonable.
The document states further that: "This recommendation is based on (1)the analysis and findings in the GEIS; (2) the Environmental Report submitted by NMC;(3) consultation with Federal, State, and local agencies; (4) the NRC staff's ownindependent review; and (5) the NRC staff's consideration of public comments receivedduring the scoping process."
Astoundingly, it is obvious that Native American tribeswere not included in the consultation process for the development of the draft EIS forPalisades.
The role of affected federally recognized, as well as non-federally recognized NativeAmerican tribes can best be described as unfairly and severely restricted throughout allaspects of the development of the EIS. Even though the re-licensing application fromNMC was submitted to the NRC in March of 2005, it was not until four months laterthat eleven tribes in Michigan and Oklahoma were invited to participate (via one letter)in the license extension proceedings.
A single letter to a federally recognized tribe is notlegally sufficient government-to-government consultation.
: However, other tribes thatmight be expected to have a substantial interest in proceedings involving Palisades relating to treaty rights and other related issues were left completely out of any part ofthe process, such as the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Keweenaw Bay IndianCommunity, the Sault Saint Marie Tribe of Chippewa
: Indians, all in Michigan's UpperPeninsula, tribes in Wisconsin, the Sauk and Fox Tribes and others in Oklahoma, andthe Kickapoo Tribe of Texas (which absorbed the Mascouten Tribe), all with ancestral ties to the Lake Michigan shoreline.
In particular, there are concerns for the continued disregarding of sacred burial grounds and other artifacts of tribal groups that may bepresent on the site and possibly along electric transmission lines extending from theplant, as well as concerns from the tribes in safeguarding such species as the sturgeonthat may be negatively impacted by continued operations at Palisades.
Native American tribes are known to have traveled regularly throughout the dunes inWest Michigan, hunting in them and using dune plants for food and medicinal purposes.
Because of that, it is likely that villages or encampments, as well as burialsites, may well have been located on or in the vicinity of Palisades, especially given thepresence of creeks just north and just south of the plant site and the heavily forested, large dunes of the property.
This likelihood is confirmed in the draft EIS, on page 2-61to page 2-62, where the NRC reports "Native American groups that inhabited the areaduring the historic period were predominantly the Potawatomi, Mascouten, Miami, andOttawa. During the early historic period, their villages were situated on the edge of14 forested land, adjacent to prairies and convenient to streams or the lakeside; temporary winter camps were established in sheltered areas. By the beginning of the nineteenth
: century, the Potawatomi had established 11 known villages in southern Michigan.
Mostwere near the shorelines of Lake Michigan and Lake Erie, generally along the streamsthat flow into their waters."
Thus, Palisades has a significant potential for such NativeAmerican sites to be located on its property.
Nuclear Management Company (NMC), however, gives scant attention to the interests of Native American tribes in its over 500 page Environmental Report, prepared as partof the re-licensing application process.
Section 2.10, "Historic and Archaeological Resources,"
of the report consists of four paragraphs, taking up less than two-thirds ofone page (Page 2-46). In fact, the potential for Native American sites on the Palisades property is not explicitly mentioned at all. In its Environmental Report, NMCreferenced a number of documents prepared as part of the original license application for Palisades that noted the absence of known archeological or historical resources onthe site or in the vicinity to discount the potential for Native American artifacts to beimpacted by the license extension application.
The only specific documentation NMC provides in the Environmental Report tosupport its claim that there are no Native American artifacts, is a letter dated April 7,1972 from the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) to the U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission (the predecessor to today's NRC), in terms of nuclear power plantregulation).
In that letter, reproduced from Pages C-5 to C-9 of NMC's Environmental Report, DOI states "It does not appear that the existing plant should directly affect anyexisting or proposed unit of the National Park System, nor any site eligible forregistration as a national
: historic, natural or environmental education landmark;
: however, the final statement should contain evidence of consultation with the StateHistoric Preservation Officer concerning the effects of the power station on places on orbeing considered for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places."
However,the DOI statement does not seem to indicate that there was attention placed on locatingNative American burial sites, former village sites, etc. located on the power plant site oralong the transmission line corridors.
Even though the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office (MSHPO) noted thepossibility of unreported artifacts (see Page C-2, Cultural Resources Correspondence ofNMC's Environment Report),
there has been no survey done by Consumers Power toconfirm or dispute this claim and no actions taken by MSHPO officials to resolve thequestion, demonstrating a distinct lack of significance attached to protecting theinterests of Native American tribes. In fact, NRC staff acknowledged in the draft EISthat no adequate surveys have ever been conducted at Palisades.
: Further, although thedraft EIS document determined that the license extension for Palisades might pose a"moderate" impact on the interests of Native American tribes regarding archaeological or historical cultural resources, this initial determination was verbally deemed "amistake" by NRC staff at the April 5, 2005 draft EIS public comment meeting in SouthHaven, Michigan.
We ask for an explanation as to the reason for this "mistake" and15 justification for a significant downgrading of the impact level ascribed to NativeAmerican interests in such cultural resources as burial sites from "moderate" in thedraft EIS to "small" at the public meeting.Forty years ago, Native American tribes were seemingly ignored in decisions regarding the original placement and construction of the Palisades nuclear power plant, eventhough it was an intense and disruptive use on lands at one time occupied by a numberof tribes along Lake Michigan, which is revered by all Native Americans of the region.It can only be concluded from this most recent lack of attention in the re-licensing
: process, that these tribes have once again been accorded neither legally sufficient notification nor appropriate involvement, which is especially negligent in respect to thefederally recognized tribes, which are sovereign entities and are legally entitled to havea government-to-government relationship with the United States.All Native American tribes and bands that could be expected to have an interest in theapplication by Palisades to operate an additional 20 years deserve both notification ofthis process, as well as the opportunity to share government-to-government decisionmaking regarding the application, as allowed for under NEPA and other federal laws.A comprehensive site wide survey should be performed on the entire Palisades property
-as recommended by Palisades' own cultural resource assessment subcontractor as described in the draft EIS -carried out in close consultation with allaffected tribes. If Native sites, such as burials, are found, then appropriate actionsshould be taken to protect them from damage, again, in close and meaningful consultation with affected tribes in order to ensure that NEPA, treaties, and the terms ofother relevant federal laws, such as the Native American Graves Protection andRepatriation Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, are met.VII. Socio-economic Impact Conclusions in EIS Biased by Substandard Methodology Palisades has been considered a major contributor to Van Buren County's property andmunicipal tax revenues, but the economic benefit to Covert Township has beenambiguous.
In fiscal year 2004, a total of $3.6 million in property taxes went to CovertTownship and schools, with an additional
$1.6 million to Van Buren County andschools.
As host to the Palisades plant and benefactor of its tax revenue, it is reasonable to assume that Covert Township should at minimum be at economic parity withsurrounding geographic household and per capita incomes.
Despite the financial benefit such payments
: suggest, however, Covert Township consistently ratessubstantially below comparable county, state and national economic indicators inmedian household and per capita incomes.
The EIS overlap of Geographic Distribution of Minority Populations (figure 4-1 on p. 4-29 of the NRC draft EIS) and Low-Income Populations (figure 4.2 on p. 4-30) shows a large area of Covert Township (andSt. Joseph/Benton Harbor) to be both "high minority and low-income.
Poverty persistsin the Covert Township, a high minority and low-income community, despite thepresence of the Palisades nuclear power plant for nearly four decades.16 Consumers Energy is described as the largest employer in Van Buren County, with 484employees (draft EIS, Table 2-8). The draft EIS states that unemployment in the county"was moderately high at 7.2% in December 2004," but determines no "incremental change" in employment and personal income resulting from a Palisades license renewal--new employment opportunities are not projected to occur.Palisades' Permanent Employee Residence Information by County and City (Table 2-3)lists employee residence totals as: South Haven (156), Bangor (14), Grand Junction (13),Paw Paw (12), Hartford (8), and Others (30). Unfortunately, residents of CovertTownship that might be employed at Palisades are not specified in this information, raising the question as to whether or not Covert Township residents benefit at all fromemployment at the plant.A review of household income further shows a lack of positive benefit to CovertTownship from Palisades.
Per capita incomes in 2000 were $21,587 for the United States,$22,168 for Michigan,
$17,878 for Van Buren County and $12,156 for Covert Township(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census, in 1999 dollars).
These figures reveal incomes forCovert Township that range from 45% and 33% consistently lower than the state ofMichigan and Van Buren County respectively.
Covert Township reported 14.3% of families with incomes less than $10,000, threetimes the rate of Van Buren County. There are over three times as many families belowpoverty level in Covert Township as in Van Buren County. Covert bears the burden of34% of related children under 18 years of age in poverty compared to Van Buren's 11%;related children under 5 years of age in poverty, 38% compared to Van Buren's 17%;Covert families with female householders, no husband present, 48% compared to VanBuren's 25%; related children under 18 years of age for Covert at 57% compared to VanBuren's 30%, and Covert related children under 5 years of age living below povertylevel at 80% versus Van Buren's at 48%. Covert reports 32% of individuals in povertywhile Van Buren reports 11% of individuals living in poverty.
As unfortunate as VanBuren County poverty levels may be, Covert Township's poverty is consistently twoand three times worse. None of this data was provided whatsoever in the scope of theEIS socio-economic factors.Comments by local and county government and Chambers of Commerce officials atpublic hearings have extolled the benefits of new fire trucks and infrastructure improvements, and the EIS notes that Palisades' property tax revenues are "used tofund local and county emergency management
: programs, public safety, local publicschools, local government operations, local road maintenance, and the local librarysystem,"
(page 2-58, of the draft EIS). Still, Covert Township experiences chronicpoverty.NRC staff ultimately determined that the socio-economic impacts resulting fromPalisades' license renewal would be "small",
implying that the impacts "would notproduce an incremental change in any of the impact measures used. Unfortunately, thedraft EIS's methodology neglected a comprehensive analysis of socio-economic 17 conditions in Covert Township and Van Buren County, leaving out those conditions that did not support a positive benefit from the nuclear power plant.NMC/Consumers discounts potential impacts to Latin American migrant workers insouthwest Michigan from an extension of Palisades' license.
NMC/Consumers' Environmental Report (page 2-32) notes (inaccurately) that "Berrien and Van BurenCounties host moderate numbers of migrant workers."
According to the U.S.Department of Agriculture,
: however, in 2004, 3,677 and 6,733 temporary farm laborers(many of them Latino) were employed in Berrien and Van Buren Counties, respectively.
These numbers, in addition to family members of the workers, represent populations aslarge as the county seats and even the biggest towns in these counties.
Rather thancharacterizing the number of migrant workers, many of whom are Latino and of lowincome, as "moderate,"
a more accurate characterization relative to the populations ofthe host counties would be "large,"
and therefore worthy of significant consideration not only in NMC's Environmental Report, but also in NRC's draft EIS.The Latin American agricultural workforce of the Palisades area is also atdisproportionate risk from both routine radioactive discharges, as well as catastrophic radiation
: releases, given this workforce's complete reliance on agricultural sectoremployment.
A large-scale radiation release from Palisades could seriously damage theregion's agricultural base. Even a "minor" accident at Palisades involving radiation release could significantly harm area agriculture, due to the stigma attached toradioactive contamination.
In either scenario, the Latino migrant labor workforce would suffer disproportionate harm. There also has been no evaluation of the potential for the synergistic effects of chronic or catastrophic radiation releases combined withthe toxic pesticides to which field workers have been exposed.
In addition, there are noSpanish language emergency evacuation instructions and notifications prepared toserve the Spanish speaking Latino population within 50 miles of the Palisades reactor.VIII. NRC's Re-Licensing Process Arbitrarily Eliminates Major Impactsfrom Consideration With no new nuclear plant orders (that were not later canceled) since 1973, aconsequence of the partial meltdown in 1979 of the Three Mile Island plant inPennsylvania, and with the last reactor built in the U.S. completed in 1996, theAmerican public believed that nuclear power was on the way out, too risky and costlyto contemplate.
That was not the case. Plans for extending the licenses of operating nuclear power plants were already underway, begun in 1991, with draft rules written toestablish a process that would ensure approvals for the extension applications.
Although there were major concerns about the procedure raised by the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, the President's Council on Environmental Quality(CEQ), state officials, environmental and safe energy organizations, concerned
: citizens, and others about the proposed rule, the procedure nonetheless went forward andended with a final rulemaking published in the Federal Register in 1995 that provides18 for a generic environmental impact review process for any and all nuclear power plantsin the country intending to extend their licenses.
The rule requires nuclear power plant applicants to submit an environmental report(ER) and the NRC to write an environmental impact statement (EIS). Both documents are to analyze the environmental impacts associated with the proposed licenseextension, consider alternatives to a 20-year extension, and alternatives for reducingadverse environmental effects.This process allows renewal applicants to take advantage of a generic analysis ofenvironmental impacts for numerous environmental issues. Out of 92 issues identified that need to be addressed in an environmental impact analysis of re-licensing, the NRChas determined that 69 are already "adequately" addressed in the generic impactstatement.
Only 23 issues were found to require additional assessment for at least someplants at the time of the license renewal review. In other words, members of the publicand those who live around Palisades are not allowed to address the 69 issues incomments to the NRC about re-licensing, only the short list of 23 identified by the NRC.At that time, over a decade ago, NRC made no meaningful or adequate public outreachin the vicinity of Palisades to alert the public and potentially interested stakeholders tothe significance of the rulemaking and the opportunity to provide meaningful inputinto the decision.
The NRC also made a determination "that, although no standard exists that can be usedto reach a conclusion as to the significance of the magnitude of the collective radiological effects attributable to any plant, these impacts are acceptable in that theseimpacts would not be sufficiently large to require the NEPA conclusion, for any plant,that the option of extended operation under 10 CFR Part 54 should be eliminated."
Thisdetermination made by the NRC is in direct conflict with a 2005 National Academy ofScience report, which concluded that no dose of radiation, no matter how small, can bedeclared "safe."The NRC also concludes that any impacts from high-level waste and irradiated fueldisposal from a license extension (even acknowledging the uncertainties about theproposed Yucca Mountain repository) would not be sufficiently large to require theNEPA conclusion, for any plant, that the option of extended operation under 10 CFRPart 54 should be eliminated.
Through these determinations, the NRC has effectively stifled debate on two of themost significant impacts of a 20-year license extension
-the continued and cumulative effects of radioactive discharges to the environment and humans from the Palisades plant, and the buildup of close to 300 more tons of high-level radioactive waste. Thismeans storage of more wastes on the lakeshore, added to the 29 storage casks already inplace, and the remainder of wastes stored in the pool within the plant, which is also arisky method for storing these deadly wastes.19 IX. Routine Radioactive Discharges Pose Serious Threat to HealthThe NRC has placed this issue outside the scope of the EIS for extending the license forPalisades.
We strongly disagree.
There are routine everyday discharges from nuclear power plants, deemed to be bothexplicitly "permissible" or "allowable,"
and implicitly "safe" or "insignificant" by theNRC and the nuclear power industry.
Prior to the advent of nuclear power, radioactive fission products, produced in nuclear reactors, were present in only exceedingly rare,trace amounts in isolated locations on earth. Over 300 different radioactive chemicals are currently created by nuclear chain reactions
-and it takes hundreds of thousands tomany millions of years for these new chemicals to return to a stable state.Radioactivity is emitted to the air and the water, as part of routine discharges bynuclear power reactors.
It settles upon or is washed back up on the soil and beach aswell. For example, reactors use large amounts of water for cooling, and that waterwhen it is returned to a lake or river will have radioactive substances in it.Radioactivity from air discharges also can fall out into water bodies and becomeembedded in bottom sediments, as well as upon soil on land. Contamination of soilsand groundwater can occur through routine discharges, as well as through leaks,accidents, and spills, which are not always fully detected or reported.
Wind, water,precipitation, and ecological processes (such as bio-accumulation) can move theradioactive contaminants off site where they are dispersed or diluted, but still present inthe ecosystem where they can eventually make their way into living organisms.
Although radiation monitoring occurs at reactor sites, it only provides information onlevels of discharges emitted or released.
It does not provide specific information aboutwhere the radioactive materials end up, or if they contribute to radiation levels inplants, fish, and wildlife as well as body burdens of local and downwind ordownstream residents.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission relies upon self-reporting and computer modeling from reactor operators to track radioactive releases and theirprojected dispersion.
A significant portion of the environmental monitoring data isextrapolated
-or virtual, not real.Radioactive materials are toxic, persistent pollutants, now widely acknowledged tohave many adverse affects on people, as well as fish and wildlife.
According to theUnion of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the adverse affects are numerous, and can includecancer, reproductive difficulties, genetic and birth defects, and death. "Routine" radioactive releases from nuclear power plants, while reported by the utility to bebelow "permissible" levels, are still potent due to their ability to become concentrated inorganisms.
For example, a report by UCS found that mallard ducks carriedconcentrations of cesium-137 in their flesh that was 2,000 to 2,500 times that in theirfood, while strontium-90 was concentrated by a factor of 65,000 in clam shells. UCS'sreport also found increased levels of radioactivity in marine life up to 300 miles fromthe source.20 Ionizing radioactivity differs from natural background radioactivity because it producesradioisotopes that mimic natural chemicals and concentrate in the body where thesechemicals reside. Strontium-90, which is routinely released during fission, can get intocow's milk and mimic calcium, following the path of that element in the body and endup in teeth and bones. It can concentrate to high levels and cause leukemia, a deadlyform of cancer. Iodine-131, another highly toxic by-product of nuclear power, canconcentrate in the thyroid where naturally occurring iodine is deposited, and produceserious hormonal dysfunctions or even thyroid cancer in children.
Radioactive byproducts in reactor waste have different half-lives
-- the amount of timeit takes for half of a given amount of radioactive material to decay. Some decay in a fewhours. Others, like strontium-90 and cesium-137 last longer, with half-lives of about 30years. It takes them around 300 years, or ten half-lives, to decay. But some by-products, like iodine-129, have half-lives of a million years or longer. Plutonium-239, one of themost toxic human-made materials, has a half-life of nearly 25,000 years.While concerns about the consequences of human exposure to ionizing radiation are notnew, the 2005 National Academy of Science's seventh Biological Effects of IonizingRadiation (BEIR VII) report on "Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of IonizingRadiation" has confirmed that there is no safe level of exposure to radiation-that evenvery low doses can cause cancer and other maladies
-and that risks from low doseradiation are likely greater than previously thought.
The implications of NAS's recentfindings require a thorough analysis by NRC in its EIS of the human health impacts ofthe radioactive substances released by Palisades.
NMC/Consumers should be required to provide the communities in the vicinity of thePalisades plant, with a monitoring program to supply independent information regarding radioactive discharges and releases.
These communities are currently dependent upon the operators of Palisades to provide notification of radiological releases.
Establishment of an independent program would give evidence ofNMC/Consumers' interest in and commitment to ensuring the health of itssurrounding communities.
Historically, the NRC has relied on a 1990 National Cancer Institute (NCI) study toaddress cancer rates near nuclear power plants. However, this study is now outdated, not accounting for latency periods which could have developed into cancers since 1990.And it was essentially methodologically flawed from the start, as the only dataconsidered by the NCI was from the county that each reactor is located in, and not otherdownwind and downstream populations potentially affected by radioactive releases ofthe plants. Further, there are a host of other diseases associated with radiation exposurethat have not been assessed, such as thyroid disease, infertility, genetic damage andbirth defects, heart disease, and immune system suppression, which require monitoring and attention.
A baseline assessment, as well as regular monitoring, of cancer and otherdisease rates is warranted prior to consideration of Palisades' proposal for'a 20-yearlicense extension.
21 X. More Palisades Waste to Build Up On the Lake Michigan Shoreline Palisades' high-level radioactive waste storage facility is defective The NRC has placed the issue of waste generation and storage outside the scope of theEIS for extending the license for Palisades.
We strongly disagree.
The Palisades nuclear power plant has generated, on average, 14.5 tons [U.S. Dept. ofEnergy's Feb. 2002 Final EIS for Yucca Mountain.
Appendix A. Tables A-7 and A-8] peryear of high-level radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended in1982 to allow the NRC to approve interim storage of high-level radioactive waste in drycask storage facilities in a "generic licensing" without studies specific to each plant siteor Environmental Impact Statements.
In 1993, several tons of wastes that wereaccumulating in the Palisade plant's overfull irradiated fuel pools were moved intomassive concrete and steel storage casks on concrete pads on the plant site.Inexplicably, the extremely dangerous radioactive wastes from Palisades, that willremain dangerous for tens to hundreds of thousands of years, were deliberately placedwithin a high-risk erosion zone, which is highly unstable, dynamic and risky. Currently, around 20 of a total of 29 casks, weighing 132 tons each, are situated approximately 150yards from Lake Michigan, sitting atop loose sand dozens of feet thick. Thus, the casks,and the concrete pad upon which they sit, are not anchored to bedrock.
This stretch ofLake Michigan's southwest shoreline is known to have the ability to recede in anexceptionally short time frame. The high-risk erosion zone requires 30-year construction setbacks that range from 55 ft. to 140 ft. and 60-year setbacks that range from 115 ft. to260 ft.One of the waste storage cask systems at Palisades, the "VSC-24,"
(Ventilated storagecask containing 24 pressurized water reactor irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies) utilizespassive ventilation to keep the waste at the appropriate temperature.
The vents on thistype of cask need regular cleaning so they will not clog from blowing dune sand, debris,or snow. This cask is also not considered transportable, like some casks, and as such,wastes contained within them will need to be unloaded and transferred into shippingcontainers, when or if transport occurs. But even though Consumers Energy and theNRC testified in federal court that the casks could be safely unloaded, there have beennumerous problems.
When weld defects were detected in the fourth VSC-24 cask to beloaded in 1994, for example, it was found that there were critical questions about how tohandle the procedure.
This defective cask has yet to be unloaded, twelve years later.To further complicate the unloading problems of Palisades' casks, the configuration ofthe dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is such that thosecasks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of themhave been moved out of the way first. Thus, casks that cannot be unloaded on the shoreside of the pads will effectively halt unloading of the casks behind them.22 There have been other accidents and incidents with the VSC-24 system. While a VSC-24cask was being welded shut at the Wisconsin Point Beach nuclear power plant in 1996, aspark from the welding caused a hydrogen gas explosion that tilted the lid of the cask (3tons of metal) several inches ajar; this incident occurred on the edge of the waste storagepool, threatening to damage the pool and unleash a potentially catastrophic radiological accident.
Additional weld defects have been detected in other casks at Palisades and atother plant sites.On February 6, 1997, Mary P. Sinclair Ph.D. co-chair of Don't Waste Michigan, wrote toDr. Shirley Jackson, Chair U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reviewed thishistory in great detail with documentation and references for each point made. In herletter to Dr. Jackson, Dr. Sinclair wrote the following:
... Attorney General Frank Kelley petitioned for an injunction in May 1993, againstthe loading of these casks in the Western Michigan Federal Court at Grand Rapids.(Case No. 4:93 CV 67). Consumers Power Co.'s response to the Court was that thecompany would unload the casks and place the nuclear waste back in the spent fuelpool if the Court should rule against them and, therefore, an injunction to preventloading was unnecessary.
A supporting position for the utility's action was filed byCharles Haughniey of the NRC, in which he assured Judge Robert Holmes Bell thatConsumers was able to do this by simply reversing the process of loading, if the Courtso ordered.
This demonstrates that, not only did Consumers Power Co. mislead theJudge, perhaps out of ignorance, about Consumers' ability to unload these casks, butmore importantly, Charles Haughney of the NRC pledged the Agency's credibility insupport of this position.
His statement is signed, "Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746, Ideclare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct."
(Executed andsigned on May 5, 1993). Judge Bell, of course, could hardly grant an injunction underthose circumstances.
This is one of many instances in which the judgment of the staffwas flagrantly in error, and helped to compound the problems that have laterdeveloped.
[pp. 3-4, Requests that Commission review 2.206 petition filed on 950919 &amended on 960930 by Lake Michigan Federation
& Don't Waste Michigan, Sinclair MP.Accession Number: 9704090248, Docket Number: 05000255,07200007, Microform Address:
92410:204-92410:2111 A hard copy of this letter is being provided by Don'tWaste Michigan to be entered in its entirety into the record as part of comments beingsubmitted on this draft EIS. There are additional comments in the letter, which alsopertain to this EIS process.The Wisconsin explosion led to a three year hiatus in the loading of VSC-24 casksnationwide, in order to improve safety procedures.
Palisades was the first plant in thecountry to begin loading VSC-24s again, in June, 1999. However, mistakes were madeyet again. A welding crew accidentally ignited flammable hydrogen gas being ventedoff a loaded VSC-24. But it failed to notify the next welding crew coming on shift toreplace them. The new crew also ignited the leaking hydrogen gas, representing abreakdown of safety protocols, risking a repeat of the Wisconsin explosion.
During the June, 1999 dry cask loading campaign, Palisades also loaded irradiated fuelthat had not yet thermally cooled and radioactively decayed in the underwater storage23 pool for the required minimum of five years. This represented a violation of thetechnical specifications for the casks, and thus NRC safety regulations.
Also in June1999, a fire at Palisades in an office trailer storing paper records on the dry cask storageinstallation destroyed records on the most recent, and earlier, accidents.
Palisades also uses Transnuclear NUHOMS-32PT dry storage casks. In October 2005,crane handling errors led to a 107 ton NUHOMS transfer cask fully loaded with high-level radioactive waste dangling for 55 hours above the storage pool. Reportsconfirmed that the risk of a heavy load drop had been increased due to improperemergency brake manipulation during the incident.
NRC reported that, had the loaddropped, severe damage to the pool could have resulted.
A separate NRC report, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk atDecommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,"
(NUREG-1738, Feb. 2001) revealed that aheavy load drop can cause the cooling water to drain away. The densely-packed wastein the pool could then overheat, spontaneously
: combust, and ignite a waste fire causingcatastrophic radiation release.
NRC concluded that up to tens of thousands of peoplecould die from cancer over time, downwind of such an accident..
Despite similar craneproblems years earlier at its Big Rock Point nuclear power plant in northern
: Michigan, failure to communicate "lessons learned" within the nuclear utility contributed torepeating the same dangerous errors at Palisades.
Establishment of a permanent national waste repository remains indefinitely delayedIn 1982, with the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the U.S. Department ofEnergy (DOE) was given the responsibility for finding a permanent site to build andoperate a repository for all of the wastes accumulating at the reactors across thecountry.
Original plans were for the repository to begin accepting irradiated nuclearfuel in 1998, but it has been pushed back until 2020, according to the most-recent predictions made by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. In 2002, Congress voted toallow DOE to apply for a license from NRC to construct and operate a repository atYucca Mountain in Nevada. The opening of the repository is uncertain:
the State ofNevada has actively opposed the plan, and raised legitimate questions about thesuitability of the site; DOE does not have full funding for construction and operations, and recently, a federal appeals court found that the impact of the project must beevaluated for longer than the 10,000 years currently considered.
Even if the Yucca sitewere to open in 2020, DOE has projected in its 2002 Final EIS for Yucca that it wouldtake 24 to 38 years to transport wastes to Yucca from reactors across the U.S., including Palisades.
Thus, even if Yucca opened in 2020, it would take until 2044 or even until2058 for the wastes generated before 2010 at Palisades to be moved to Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Because of this, existing wastes from Palisades are likely to remain on the LakeMichigan shoreline indefinitely.
Waste from 20 additional years of operation at Palisades will not go to Yucca MountainYucca Mountain is limited by law to store 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste. Only90%, or 63,000 metric tons, of that can come from commercial nuclear reactors.
63,00024 metric tons is approximately the amount of nuclear waste that will be stored on-site atreactors around the country by 2010. A 2004 analysis by the Environmental WorkingGroup found that the 26 reactors at nuclear power plants re-licensed between 2000 and2004 will produce an additional 9,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste over the20-year period of their license extensions.
Eighteen more reactors at nine power plantswith license extensions pending would add another 6,600 metric tons of waste, for atotal of 15,600 additional metric tons. Wastes produced at Palisades for 20 additional years-- 290 additional tons of irradiated nuclear fuel --will likely be stored indefinitely in the same manner as the other Palisades wastes that have been produced to date,resulting in a massive assemblage of concrete and steel silos extending along the highrisk erosion zone on Lake Michigan, as well as a packed storage pool within thePalisades plant.If Yucca Mountain opens, waste will be transported by barge and railThe DOE has estimated that transporting the waste from the plants to Yucca Mountainwould require more than 53,000 truck shipments to Yucca over 24 years or about 2,200per year. If rail is the primary means of transporting the waste -and DOE has statedthat it prefers rail -the proposed action would require more than 10,700 cross-country shipments over 24 years, or about 450 per year (Halstead 2002). Re-licensing to date hasadded about 5,700 more truck shipments, or 1,050 rail shipments to that total.The Department of Energy declared in April 2004 that rail shipment to Nevada is thepreferred mode of transportation for high-level nuclear waste. Barge shipments arebeing considered under this option because 17 nuclear power plants, including Palisades, have no rail access, yet could connect to rail lines via barges.For Palisades, DOE has proposed barging up to 125 giant rail-sized containers of high-level radioactive waste from Palisades to the Port of Muskegon, up the Lake Michiganshoreline.
DOE's estimate of 125 shipments may very well be an underestimate, in thatDOE assumed Palisades would only get a 10-year license extension, while NRC'spractice to date has been to approve every request for a 20-year license extension.
Thus,an additional 10 years worth of waste generation would mean that many more bargeshipments between Palisades and Muskegon.
The barging of 125 or more shipments of high-level radioactive waste is very risky.Any submersion of the casks in water, could stimulate the fissile uranium-235 andplutonium, both present in the high-level waste, to cause a nuclear chain reaction.
Theslightest leakage of even a small amount of this waste could not only threaten LakeMichigan as a source of drinking water for ten million people, but also cause a host ofother irrevocable impacts on the lake's fish, wildlife, people, and economy.Storage of "low" level radioactive waste from Palisades not addressed in the draft EISThe Barnwell, South Carolina "low" level radioactive waste dump, which has acceptedshipments from Palisades for decades, will close its doors to wastes from Michigan in2008. Neither NMC in its Environmental Report, nor NRC in its draft EIS, have25 explained how Palisades will deal with the "low" level radioactive wastes whenBarnwell closes, such as establishing storage installations for "low" level radioactive wastes on the plant site. What NRC and the nuclear industry term "low" levelradioactive wastes contain many of the same radio-nuclides as high-level radioactive waste, only less concentrated.
Some "low" level radioactive waste can even deliver alethal dose of radiation at close enough range in as little as 20 minutes.
"Low" levelradioactive waste management at Palisades is a significant health, safety, andenvironmental issue that requires is largely unaddressed by NMC and NRC in thelicense extension application and requires specific consideration.
XI. Plant Aging Increases Accident RiskA top concern directly related to the re-licensing of Palisades for 20 additional years, isthe aging of the plant, in particular emibrittleinent, or the gradual weakening of thereactor pressure vessel (RPV) from decades of bombardment by neutrons emitted bythe nuclear chain reaction in the core. It is generally acknowledged that the reactorpressure vessel at Palisades is one of the most embrittled in the nation. The longerPalisades
: operates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, increasing the risk forPressurized Thermal Shock (PTS), a condition caused by any number of systemmalfunctions which can result in a severe, sudden overcooling of the reactor pressurevessel. This, combined with the intense pressurization in a pressurized water reactor,can stress the RPV such that its walls could crack or rupture, leading to a loss-of-coolant
: accident, meltdown, and catastrophic release of radiation to the entire Great Lakesbasin.Age-related failure of Palisades' systems could initiate the sequence of events that leadsto PTS. Examples of aging systems at Palisades are evident in this short list of recentincidents:
: 1. Alert Declared Due to Loss of Shutdown Cooling (Event # 39699 March 25, 2003)2. Failure of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (see PNO-III-04-010 August 11,2004)3. Reactor Manually Tripped Due to Fire in 2B Condensate Pump (Event# 41002August 31, 2004)4. Relief Requests for Reactor Vessel Head Penetration problems (NMC Request10/4/04)5. Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle Cracking
-Through Wall Cracks (Degraded Condition 10/17/2004)
: 6. Manual Reactor Trip/Main Condenser Vacuum (Event # 41319)26
: 7. Emergency Declared on Primary-Coolant System Integrity
( Event # 41681)8. Control Rod Stuck in Reactor Core (Event #42569 May 11, 2006)The embrittlement at Palisades, the unresolved risks of PTS, and the ever-increasing likelihood of the failure of the RPV as Palisades ages warrant special environmental considerations.
This type of accident is considered one that goes beyond the design ofthe reactor.
NRC has not, however, included the issue in the EIS nor incorporated it in"Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" scenarios for Palisades as a potential accident.
: Further, NMC in its Environmental Report, has declined to undertake majorrefurbishment for Palisades' license renewal, despite Consumers Energy's earlier pledgeto "anneal" (super-heat) the reactor pressure vessel. This super-heating theoretically can bring back ductility or flexibility to the metal, thus reducing potential for PTS.Annealing has never been performed in the U.S., however, and thus raises concernsitself as an experimental procedure.
Please include for the record the Adobe PDF document entitled "Palisades NuclearPlant Yearly Capacity Factors"
& "Palisades Plant -Record of Transients or Operational Cycles" for Occurrence
#1 dated 1/11/1972 through Occurrence
# 126 dated 1/9/2005.
This is a record which has major implications for embrittlement and the ReactorPressure Vessel at Palisades.
A hard copy will be sent. Please enter it into the record.Age-related deterioration also increases the likelihood of unintentional leaks, as plantsystems, structures and components wear out and fail. Palisades' age-related degradation means increasing amounts of radioactivity will be "routinely" releasedover time. Plans for addressing embrittlement and other aging issues at Palisades arenot provided in NMC's Environmental Report or in the EIS. Any discussion of 20additional years of operation at Palisades necessitates a specific plan for addressing embrittlement and aging issues.The most recent NRC report on a potential accident at Palisades, done in 1982,(Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences or CRAC- 2), predicted that a meltdownand large-scale radiation release from the Palisades reactor would cause 1,000 fatalities and 7,000 injuries in just the first year, 10,000 cancer deaths over time, $52.6 billion inproperty damage (based on 1980 census, expressed in 1980 dollars, thus significantly underestimating current and future impacts due to population growth and inflation; adjusting for inflation, property damage could exceed $100 billion expressed in year2005 dollars).
The above CRAC -2 report did not take into account a "BeyondMaximum Credible Accident" scenario.
We request the EIS provide assessment of theconsequences of a "Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" as Palisades' embrittlement status increases the likelihood of such an accident.
27 XII. Emergency Evacuation Plans Need UpdatingEmergency responders in the 50-mile zone around the Palisades nuclear reactor arelikely to be inadequately trained and inadequately equipped to respond to a majorradioactivity release during an accident or attack at the Palisades plant. CovertTownship does not have the staffing, equipment, training or preparedness for a majorradiological emergency, the risk of which increases with 20 additional years ofoperation at Palisades.,
as the plant ages.Other communities within the 50-mile zone are mostly rural, and maintain onlyvolunteer fire departments, which have even less equipment and training than CovertTownship.
Radiation monitors and radiation-protective gear are unheard of, or inlimited supply. Isolation wards for radioactively contaminated victims -the patientsthemselves posing a hazard to emergency medical technicians,
: doctors, and nurses --are limited as well at hospitals within 50 miles of Palisades NMC/Consumers are obligated to demonstrate how the communities that surround itsfacility are equipped for such a risk referenced in NRC's 1982 report, of a catastrophic radiation
: release, as well as ensuring that the plant's current Radiological Emergency Response Plan projects 20 years forward and incorporates population trends anddevelopment, highway construction
: projects, transitory populations of migrantworkers, and provisions for bi-lingual notifications and dissemination of information.
XIII. Dispute Regarding Violations of Palisades' NPDES Permitted Discharges Remains Unresolved There are questions regarding the status of the NPDES permit of Palisades to utilize andeventually discharge a compound, Betz Clam-Trol, to Lake Michigan to control musseland clam mussel colonization in discharge and intake pipes. Reports posted by theMichigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) in 2000 and through 2004indicated "continued non-compliance."
Subsequent updating of the reports nowappears to indicate that the plant is and was in compliance with its permit; To furtherconfuse the matter, MDEQ has stated that the original reports were erroneous.
We askthat a full explanation be provided for this situation and how it will be considered inthe re-licensing decision.
The impact of 20 additional years of pollution improperly controlled under requirements of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systemwill adversely affect the water quality of nearby sources, including Lake Michigan.
In its "Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality,"
the International JointCommission urged that "[g]overnments monitor toxic chemicals used in large quantities at nuclear power plants, identify radioactive forms of the toxic chemicals and analyzetheir impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem."
The draft EIS must address how the NRCor the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has met this obligation.
28 XIV. Analysis of Alternatives to License Extension Flawed and Self-ServingIn the draft EIS, Section 7.0, "Alternatives to the Proposed Action,"
renewable energysources such as wind power and solar power, as well as alternatives such as energyefficiency and conservation, are not given credible consideration.
Polluting electricity sources such as fossil fuels are cited by NMC/Consumers as the only realistic alternatives to approval of a 20-year license extension at Palisades.
This is notsurprising, as nearly three-quarters of Consumers' electricity generation (in 2002) comesfrom fossil fuel facilities.
But the choice is not just between nuclear power and coal assources for electricity generation.
NMC/Consumers reveal a bias in favor of fossil fueland nuclear power use by presenting only those two sources favorably in theirEnvironmental Report, and by downplaying the potential for energy efficiency, energyconservation, and renewable sources of electricity.
NRC echoes this as well in its draftEIS.Renewables, efficiency and conservation are not only available,
: reliable, safe, clean andaffordable options for electricity generation and savings, but also a source fortremendous job growth and cost savings.
Using simple energy efficient techniques, Michigan citizens and businesses could easily reduce the state's energy demand by 1%,the energy used by 40,000 homes. In the state of Michigan there is currently 19,250megawatts of generating capacity.
Palisades generates 798 megawatts, or 4% of thepower generation in the state of Michigan.
Wind power potential in Michigan, according to the DOE, is 16,000 megawatts, or twenty fold the mega-wattage ofPalisades, and could be a viable replacement for the energy that Palisades provides.
Infact, wind power is the fastest growing new source of electricity in the United States,relative to all other sources.NRC staff's assertion in the draft EIS that such wind power expansion would have alarge negative impact due to the large surface area of land it would require is incorrect, and ignores the fact that small-scale family farmers could benefit from the placement ofwind turbines on their fields. These farmers could either benefit from the leasepayments from wind power companies for use of their land's "windshed,"
or couldwork towards owning their own wind turbines on their own land, and thus receive thefull income from wind powered electricity generation.
Wind turbines would notpreclude the farmers' continued use of fields for agricultural crop or livestock production, Wind power could serve as a valuable source of income for farmingfamilies, complementing their agricultural livelihood, while also providing safe, clean,reliable, and inexpensive electricity for the region.There are also many examples of new efforts underway in Michigan to move forwardwith renewable energy, with the deployment by Mackinaw Power of modern, largecapacity wind turbines on the northern tip of Michigan's lower peninsula, plans todeploy more wind turbines
.on the Lake Michigan shoreline of west Michigan, andadvances in solar electricity by United Solar Ovonics in Troy, Michigan (which29 manufactures solar electricity generating roofing shingles).
President Bush visited theheadquarters of United Solar Ovonics earlier this year to promote promising renewable energy technologies.
It is especially significant that on April 6, 2006, Michigan Governor Jenlifer Granholmsigned Executive Directive No. 2006 -2, which charges the Michigan Public ServiceCommission to prepare an "Energy Plan for the State of Michigan" by December 31,2006. The directive calls for the development of a renewable portfolio standard that"establishes targets for the share of this state's energy consumption derived fromrenewable energy sources" and initiates the "appropriate use and application of energyefficiency, alternative energy technology, and renewable energy technologies....
consistent with the goal of assuring
: reliable, safe, clean and affordable energy."
Thisputs the state of Michigan in a favorable position to promptly substitute clean energysources for those with adverse impacts, such as nuclear power, as it moves into theforefront of renewable energy technology.
The full cycle of nuclear power illustrates its complete adverse environmental impactThere are many different types of nuclear power reactors.
In the U.S. there are twotypes of light water reactors, Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) and Pressurized WaterReactors (PWR). Palisades is a pressurized water reactor.
All, however, rely on anuclear fission chain reaction to generate heat to boil water, to create steam, which isthen used to drive an electrical generator.
The radioactive material used in the fissionprocess is uranium.Mining for uranium involves separating the ore from rock, which leaves "tailings" thatcontain residues of uranium, and other radioactive materials (such as radium, radon,and thorium) from the radioactive decay of uranium and, although being considered "low-level" radioactive waste, actually contain around 85% of the natural uranium's original radioactivity.
Mining of uranium is likely to impact the quality of Michigan's environment with an extension of Palisades'
: license, as there have been recentproposals to mine uranium in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.
The Great Lakes havealready been damaged by such mining activities.
Uranium mining at Elliot Lake,Ontario from the 1940s to the 1990s released vast quantities of radiological and toxicchemicals into Lake Huron. Despite the mines shutting down in the late 1990s, harmfuleffluents still flow into the Great Lakes. Mine tailings were flooded over with water toprevent oxidation, thus creating "dead," artificial lakes which dot the landscape.
After mining, raw ore is milled, ground up, and chemically leached into a powdercalled "yellowcake."
The yellowcake powder is chemically processed or enriched, intoeither uranium dioxide for use in power plants or uranium metal, used in makingnuclear weapons.
Wastes from the enrichment
: process, also miss termed a "low-level" radioactive waste by NRC, are called depleted uranium or DU. The U.S. and some othercountries use DU to coat tank armor and armor piercing shells/weapons.
There isconsiderable controversy regarding DU coated weapons and the potential for exposureto depleted uranium to cause kidney and lung damage, and cancer and birth defects.30 According to Dr. Arjun Makhijani, Director of the Institute for Energy andEnvironmental
: Research, uranium mining and milling inflicts some of the worst humanhealth impacts of the entire uranium fuel chain. This is due to the careless handling ofthe radioactive materials
: involved, and dumping of waste materials upon the surface ofthe land, where they can be dispersed in air and water. Because of this, the NavajoIndian Tribe in the Southwestern United States -the largest Indian tribe in the country-has officially banned the mining, milling, or processing of uranium upon itsreservation territory.
Nuclear power is not carbon-free.
Considerable amounts of fossil fuel energy are usedto mine, mill, process, and transport, and manage uranium ores and byproducts.
Asmore reactor licenses are extended, fossil fuel use is likely to increase as poorer-quality ores are used due to the depletion of higher quality ore reserves because poorer qualityores require much more conventional energy for extraction and processing.
Mining ofmore distant deposits also contributes greater carbon dioxide inputs to the atmosphere.
Uranium enrichment is also energy intensive, and has historically involved the releaseof very large amounts of ozone layer destroying chlorofluorocarbons.
NRC's draft EISdoes not address such negative environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel chain. A fullcost accounting of the uranium fuel chain's negative impacts on health and theenvironment is required to properly evaluate Palisades' twenty-year license extension request.Nuclear power generation is more costly than readily available alternatives Many costs associated with nuclear power are often hidden or externalized; forexample, the very existence of the nuclear industry is only possible due to thegovernment's assumption of the accident liability risk. According to Public Citizen("Renewable Energy Is Capable of Meeting Our Energy Needs" fact sheet, 2006) directtaxpayer subsidies to the nuclear energy industry totaled $115 billion between 1947 and1999, with a further $145 billion in indirect subsidies.
In contrast, subsidies to wind andsolar during the same period amounted to only $5.5 billion.Decommissioning, or the closing and dismantling of nuclear power plants, ranges from$280-$612 million for each plant, ultimately paid for by utility customers.
DOE's latestcost prediction for the Yucca site for high-level radioactive waste generated up to theyear 2010 is $58 billion.
Energy Secretary Bodman has recently
: admitted, however, thatDOE has no total price tag predictions for the project and the state of Nevada predictsthe cost will top $100 billion.
Ratepayers who receive electricity from nuclear reactorspay a Nuclear Waste Fee on their electricity bills. Several billion dollars of the Fundhave already been spent at Yucca; about $20 billion remains in the Fund, far short ofDOE's now underestimate of $58 billion for Yucca. The shortfall will have to be paid,yet again, by US taxpayers, many of whom have already paid as ratepayers.
Nuclear power is not, as currently
: promoted, cost effective compared with other energysources.
In a 2006 paper on the "economics and climate-protection potential" of nuclearpower, Amory Lovins, energy researcher and director of the Rocky Mountain Institute, 31 describes the advantages of energy efficiency and explains that ".... nuclear power savesas little as half as much carbon per dollar as wind power and traditional cogeneration, half to a ninth as much as innovative cogeneration, and as little as a tenth as muchcarbon per dollar as end-use efficiency
...... Empirically, on the criteria of both cost andspeed, nuclear power seems about the least effective climate-stabilizing option on offer."[Amory B. Lovins, "Nuclear power: economics and climate-protection potential, RockyMountain Institute, 11 September 2005, updated 6 January 2006, p. 15.]Lovins puts it succinctly in his recent analysis:
"No other energy technology spreadsdo-it-yourself kits and innocent disguises for making weapons of mass destruction, norcreates terrorist targets or potential for mishaps that can devastate a region, nor createswastes so hazardous, nor is unable to restart for days after an unexpected shutdown."
The full costs of operating the Palisades nuclear plant for 20 additional more years,including the costs of accidents, waste storage, and decommissioning, must be assessedas part of the EIS.Impacts from extreme weather/
global climate change discounted by NRCA majority of scientists throughout the world now believe that increased emissions ofcarbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution are enhancing the greenhouse effect ofthe atmosphere that surrounds the earth, and causing a warming that will causedangerous effects to the earth's climate and inhabitants
-global warming.
The NRCconfirms it as well, in its analysis of impacts of alternatives that might be moreappropriate options than extending the license for Palisades, as it concludes that theimpacts of substituting coal plants for Palisades would be a "large" impact, due to theircontribution to global warming.A one-degree Celsius warming of the earth's surface may seem insignificant, but it isnot. The temperature of the earth's surface greatly affects our climate in many ways. Inparticular, a warmer planetary climate means more rain, flooding, and snow in variousregions, earlier spring arrivals, hurricanes, heat waves, drought and fires in someplaces, frigid cold in others.The effects are already seen in Michigan, where water in the Great Lakes is warming.According to Dr. Natalia Andronova, research scientist at the Department ofAtmospheric,
: Oceanic, and Space Sciences at the University of Michigan in a May 7,2006 interview with the Ann Arbor News "Measurements of the near-surface temperature over the northern part of Lake Michigan and southern part of Lake Huronshowed that for both lakes the period from 2000 to 2005 was warmer by at least twodegrees Celsius than the period from 1981 to 1985." An increase of Lake Michigan watertemperatures may eventually affect Palisades' operation, since the condenser within theplant requires cooler water to operate efficiently.
During a heat wave in the late 1990s,reactors on the U.S. side of Lake Ontario shut down because the water temperature wastoo high to efficiently cool the reactor and generate steam for electricity production.
During the extreme heat wave in France in recent years, nuclear reactors released so32 much superheated water to rivers that fish kills occurred; operators had to hose downthe exterior of reactors as an emergency measure to provide additional cooling at thesame time.In the recent interview, Dr. Andronova also noted conditions particular relevant to re-licensing of Palisades.
She commented that "it is becoming windier over, the GreatLakes. The extreme winds increased from the one period to the next by more than 3meters per second."
More extreme winds, as well more frequent and intense tornadoes
-all of which global warming could cause -could make operation of Palisades moreand more risky over time. For example, documents received by the NuclearInformation and Information Resource from NRC during a Freedom of Information Actrequest regarding the October 2005 "near-drop" of a storage cask into the irradiated nuclear fuel pool at Palisades revealed that on extremely windy days, Palisades isprohibited from lifting loaded dry casks from the pool, as the high winds make craneoperations too dangerous.
The potential danger presented by tornadoes to reactors was clearly shown in 1998,when a tornado struck the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio, knocking out the off-siteelectricity supply; the emergency back up diesel generators also malfunctioned.
If notfor extreme efforts by staff, the plant could have lost coolant, leading to a meltdown.
An increase in severe weather due to global climate destabilization in the region couldwell increase risks at Palisades.
Far from being a solution to global warming, nuclearpower could become unacceptably dangerous and unreliable due to global warming.The draft EIS prepared by the NRC unaccountably discounts the effects of globalwarming, noting that its effects cannot be predicted.
We assert that there is sufficient information currently available that should be investigated and considered regarding the impacts of changes in weather that may occur in a 20-year extension to Palisades' license.
This must also include an analysis of the increased potential for an electrical station loss of power that could lead to loss of cooling in the reactor core and wastestorage pool, with the potential for core meltdown and waste pool fires, withconsequent catastrophic large-scale radiation releases to the environment.
The warmingof the cooling water supply from Lake Michigan must also be considered in regards tothe efficiency and safety of Palisades continued operation till 2031.XV. Endangered Species Harmed by Radioactive Discharges Plant and wildlife species become endangered for a variety of reasons, including loss ofhabitat, overexploitation, disease and pollution, and the introduction of invasivespecies..
Official designation of a species by federal or state government as endangered or threatened not only acknowledges the importance of that species, but also its fragilestatus that requires special protection efforts.
These special protection efforts mostcertainly encompass protection against the routine and cumulative exposure toradioactive substances.
33 Frameworks for radiological protection have traditionally been focused on theprotection of humans. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), which provides recommendations on protection against ionizing radiation, hasmaintained that "if man is adequately protected then other living things are also likelyto be sufficiently protected" (ICRP, 1977). There is no scientific
: evidence, however, tosupport this viewpoint.
In addition, it is well established that ionizing radiation is one of the causes of geneticmutation.
Species exposed to cumulative exposures from the radioactive discharges ofa nuclear power plant may over time develop subtle genetic alterations that are notobservable in the short term, but that could have subtle, but large impacts within apopulation.
This has significant implications for threatened and endangered species.NMC/Consumers' Environmental Report identifies numerous federal and State ofMichigan endangered, threatened, candidate or species of special concern -such as theeastern box turtle, lake sturgeon, lake herring, creek chub sucker, Pitcher's thistle,prairie warbler, prairie vole, eastern massasauga rattlesnake, spotted turtle, Indiana bat,globe-fruited
: seedbox, scirpus-like rush, bald rush, Carey's smartweed, and sedges thateither already live at or near the Palisades reactor or along its transmission lines, or verylikely could in the future.Approving a license extension of 20 more years of reactor operations at Palisades increases the fragile status of these already threatened, endangered, or candidate
: species, from daily "routine" radiation releases and/or potential large-scale radiation releases.
At minimum, NMC/ Consumers must be required to establish a baseline forthe status of the endangered species listed above and conduct appropriate monitoring to ensure that Palisades is not further endangering their health and viability.
XVI. Conclusions For the reasons laid out in this document, the coalition of aforementioned environmental, social justice, and public interest organizations oppose the application by Palisades nuclear power plant to operate for an additional 20 years beyond itsoriginal 40 year license.
The decision to sanction approval of the 20-year licenseextension appears to have been predetermined and the invitation to members of thepublic and citizens of this region to participate in this decision making process has beenmerely perfunctory.
This coalition of organizations protests the severe limitations of theprocess and advocates for a decision-making framework that allows for an unbiased, deliberative, participatory discussion as to whether or not to allow 20 more years ofoperation by the Palisades nuclear power plant.With a fair and just Environmental Impact Statement
-the conclusion reached in theEIS would not have been the continued operation of a potentially catastrophic accidentrisk and terrorist target on our beloved Lake Michigan shoreline.
These risks are34 exacerbated by the already regrettable high-level radioactive waste storage -- or de factohigh-level nuclear dump -- in the heart of the Great Lakes.There are too many explicit threats to the region's environment and people that havebeen ignored in order to promote the use of an energy that is far too costly, exceedingly hazardous, increasingly risky and highly irresponsible, as the question of a solution tothe waste problem is passed down as a regrettable legacy to future generations.
For these reasons we urge that the proposed 20-year license extension be denied untilall environmental impact concerns raised here and by other stakeholders are addressed in an objective process that is deemed acceptable by the public as prescribed by the 1969National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).Recommendations Security issues at Palisades must be addressed immediately.
If a mock attack or forceon force demonstration has not been conducted at Palisades, it should be conducted assoon as possible.
Classified results of the demonstration should then be directlycommunicated to the region's U.S. Congressional representatives and senators, as wellas the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Michigan, for their thoroughreview and approval and reporting back to the public..
The following securitysafeguards, if not instituted
: already, must be put in place immediately:
Sufficient cameras and patrols;Delay measures, such as fences outside buildings and entrances that would delaypotential attackers; Bullet resistant structures in the protected areas of-the plant site;Adequate and specific training for security officers; Several levels of intrusion detection systems (Needed especially by Palisades toprotect against intrusion from potential attackers that may enter from Van BurenState Park, adjacent to the plant site.);Vehicle barrier systems to prevent vehicles with bombs from entering the site;Anti-aircraft capability, and;Shore patrol equipped with stationary weaponry capable of preventing anoffshore assault.NRC and Palisades must also ensure that the plants irradiated nuclear fuel storagepools are safeguarded from terrorist activities as well as address civil liberties ramifications of increased security to the host and surrounding communities ofPalisades.
Native American interests must be addressed.
All Native American tribes and bandsthat could be expected to have an interest in the application by Palisades to operate anadditional 20 years deserve both notification of this process, as well as the opportunity to share government-to-government decision making regarding the application, asallowed for under NEPA and other federal laws. A comprehensive site wide survey35 should be performed on the entire Palisades property
-as recommended by Palisades' own cultural resource assessment subcontractor as described in the draft EIS -carriedout in close consultation with all affected tribes.Effects on the health of populations surrounding Palisades and subject todownstream or downwind discharges must be studied and quantified.
Theimplications of the National Academy of Science's recent findings require a thoroughanalysis by the NRC in its EIS of the human health impacts of the radioactive substances released by Palisades.
NMC/Consumers are obligated to provide thecommunities in the vicinity of the Palisades plant, with a monitoring program toprovide them with independent information regarding radioactive discharges andreleases.
There is also a need to establish a baseline assessment of cancer and otherdisease rates, as well as a program of regular monitoring, prior to consideration of theproposal for a 20-year license extension.
This should also include an evaluation of thepotential for the synergistic effects of chronic or catastrophic radiation releases combined with the toxic pesticides to which migrant field workers in the regionhave been exposed.NRC must provide a detailed explanation to the public as to the ultimate disposition of the wastes stored currently on the Palisades plant site, as well as the 290 additional tons expected as part of 20 additional years of operation.
The proposed national repository for high-level wastes from nuclear power plants,Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is not expected to open until at least 2020, and is likely to bedelayed beyond that date. Further, by law, the repository can only store 70,000 metrictons, which will not include the additional wastes generated at Palisades during alicense extension.
NRC in its EIS, must also explain how Palisades will deal with its"low" level radioactive wastes when its current repository site in Barnwell, SouthCarolina closes in 2008.Barging of high-level radioactive wastes in Lake Michigan must be removed as atransportation option. The barging of 125 or more shipments of high-level radioactive waste on Lake Michigan is simply too risky. Any submersion of the casks containing the wastes in water, could stimulate the fissile uranium-235 and plutonium, bothpresent in the high-level waste, to cause a nuclear chain reaction.
The slightest leakageof even a small amount of this waste could not only threaten Lake Michigan as a sourceof drinking water for ten million people, but also cause a host of other irrevocable impacts on the lake's fish, wildlife, people, and economy.NRC must require Palisades to develop and implement a specific plan for addressing embrittlement and aging issues. Plans for addressing embrittlement at Palisades arenot provided in by NMC or in the EIS. Any discussion of 20 additional years ofoperation at Palisades necessitates such a plan to address the aging of plant structures and components.
We request the EIS provide assessment of the consequences of a"Beyond Maximum Credible Accident" as Palisades' embrittlement status increases thelikelihood of such an accident.
36 NMC/Consumers must demonstrate how the communities that surround its facilityare equipped for a catastrophic radiation release.
The plant's current Radiological Emergency Response Plan is inadequate and must be revised to project 20 yearsforward and incorporate population trends and development, highway construction
: projects, transitory populations of migrant workers, and provisions for bi-lingual notifications and dissemination of information.
This requires Spanish languageemergency evacuation instructions and notifications prepared to serve the Spanishspeaking Latino population.
A comprehensive analysis of socio-economic conditions in Covert Township and VanBuren County must be conducted to encompass income disparities.
NRC mustaccount for the lack of positive benefit by Covert Township residents as a result of thepresence of Palisades' nuclear power plant and potential license extension.
NRC mustalso direct NMC/Consumers to address the potential for disproportionate harm to theLatino migrant labor workforce from harm to the agricultural base from a radiation release.The safety of the concrete pads and the storage casks of high-level wastes must beresolved to the satisfaction of citizens of the region. The potential for earthquake activity to damage Palisades' outdoor dry cask storage pads, upon which the casks havebeen placed, warrants rigorous consideration, which unfortunately, is not in evidence inthe EIS. Further,
: blowouts, areas of blowing and unstable sands, in dunes in thevicinity of Palisades' dry cask storage system could threaten the integrity of the drycask storage waste system, by clogging vents in the casks, and causing the wastes tooverheat, which could lead to an explosion.
Palisades must be required to monitor thedunes for potential blowouts and ensure that the dunes are consistently vegetated andstable.NRC must revise its analysis of energy alternatives.
Full and objective consideration must be afforded the options of renewable energy and efficiency.
NRC must alsoprovide a thorough cost accounting of the uranium fuel chain's negative impacts onhealth and the environment.
The EIS should be revised to include how the NRC meets its obligations as described in the International Joint Commission's (IJC) "Ninth Biennial Report on Great LakesWater Quality."
In it, the IJC urged that "[g]governments monitor toxic chemicals usedin large quantities at nuclear power plants, identify radioactive forms of the toxicchemicals and analyze their impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem."
NRC must assess and consider as part of the EIS, the information currently available regarding the impacts of global warming to the region. This must also include ananalysis of the increased potential for an electrical station loss of power that could leadto loss of cooling in the reactor core and waste storage pool, with the potential for coremeltdown and waste pool fires, with consequent catastrophic large-scale radiation releases to the environment.
The warming of the cooling water supply from Lake37 Michigan must also be considered in regards to the efficiency and safety of Palisades continued operation till 2031.NMC/Consumers must be required to establish a baseline for the status of theendangered species and conduct appropriate monitoring to ensure that Palisades isnot further endangering their health and viability.
Approving a license extension of20 more years of reactor operations at Palisades increases the fragile status of thesealready threatened, endangered, or candidate
: species, from daily "routine" radiation releases and/or potential large-scale radiation releases.
These Comments are Submitted by the Following Organizations:
Gordon Edwards, Ph.D., President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility Regroupement pour la surveillance du nuclkaire, c.p. 236 Station SnowdonMontreal H3X 3T4CanadaKay Cumbow, DirectorCitizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination 8735 Maple Grove RoadLake, MI 48632Keith GunterCitizens Resistance at Fermi Two (CRAFT)& Nuclear-Free Great Lakes Campaign15784 Whitby StreetLivonia, Michigan 48154S. (Ziggy) Kleinau, Co-coordinator Citizens for Renewable Energy462 East RoadR.R. #4, Lion's HeadOntario NOH 1WOCanadaMichael Keegan, ChairmanCoalition for a Nuclear-Free Great LakesP.O. Box 331Monroe, MI 48161Alice HirtDon't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 4850538 Bill FreeseHuron Environmental Activist LeagueP.O. Box 302Alpena, MI 49707Joanie McCoyHome for Peace and JusticeP.O. Box 67777Saginaw, MI 48608Robert ShimekIEN Mining Organizer Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN)IEN National OfficesP.O. Box 485Bemidji, Minnesota 56619Dr. Rosalie Bertell, Retired President International Institute of Concern for Public HealthToronto, Canada(Currently, Member of the International Science Oversight Committee National Association of Public Health Policy, Washington DC,and Regent on the Board of Regents, International Physicians for Humanitarian
: Medicine, Geneva)Dayle HarrisonKalamazoo River Protection Association 3108 -62 St.Saugatuck, Michigan 49453Terry MillerLone Tree Council4649 David Ct.Bay City, MI 48706Terry Swier, President Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation P.O. Box 1Mecosta, Michigan 49332Lana Pollack, President Michigan Environmental Council119 Pere Marquette Dr., Ste. 2ALansing, MI 48912Patti Gillis, Coordinator 39 Michigan Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign/Voices for Earth Justice26672 Elm St.Roseville, MI 48066Maynard Kaufman and Barbara GeislerMichigan Land TrusteesBangor, MichiganVicki Levengood Michigan Representative National Environmental Trust1606 Melrose Ave.East Lansing, MI 48823Dave Kraft, Executive DirectorNuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS)3411 W. Diversey, Ste. 16Chicago, IL 60647Kevin Kamps, Nuclear Waste Specialist Nuclear Information and Resource Service6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 340Takoma Park, Maryland 20912Dr. Helen Caldicott, Founder and President Nuclear Policy Research Institute 1925 K St N.W., Suite 210Washington, D.C. 20006Henry W. Peters, DirectorRadiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes(REAP-GL)
Rt. 1, Box 193Ewen MI 49925Anna Holden, ChairConservation Committee Sierra Club, Mackinac (Michigan)
Chapter8430 E. Jefferson Ave., Apt. 217Detroit, Michigan 48214Chuck Jordan, Co-ChairVan Buren County Greens50521 34th Ave.Bangor, Michigan 4901340 Tom LeonardExecutive DirectorWest Michigan Environmental Action Council1007 Lake Drive, Southeast Grand Rapids, Michigan 49506The Following Individuals Add Their Support to the Submission of These Comments:
Official Individual Intervenors Against the License Extension Who Live Within 50 Milesof Palisades:
Sandra J. Adams, 744 Garland Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Wade J. Adams, 744 Garland Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Ann Aliotta, 79955 Fernwood Walk, Covert, MI 49043Amy Anderson, 3819 Devonshire, Kalamazoo, MI 49006Elizabeth (Beth) Anderson, 145 66 Street, South Haven, MI 49090Robert C. Anderson, 3819 Devonshire Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49006-2703 Anthony Badalamenti, 9251 West R Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49009Joan Badalamenti, 9251 West R Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49009Laura Barringer, 01655 67th Street, South Haven, MI 49090Katherine (Katy) Beck, 30018 Lake Bluff Drive, Covert, MI 49043Thomas Beck, 30018 Lake Bluff Drive, Covert, MI 49043James F. Brisky, 24154 W. McGillen Avenue, Mattawan, MI 49071Lee Burdick, 7130 Austrian Pineway #13A, Portage, MI 49024Drucilla D. Carter, 96 S. Lake Doster Drive, Plainwell, MI 49080Henry Cohen, 903 Pinehurst Blvd., Kalamazoo, MI 49006Don Cooney, 1221 Vassar Drive, Kalamazoo, MI 49001Bruce Cutean, A 3997 64th Street, Holland, MI 49423W. Roland Elmore, 403 Water Street, Saugatuck, MI 4945341 John Ephland, 714 Fairview Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Jane Gardner, 28386 Sturtevant Walk, Covert, MI 49043Barbara Geisler, 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013Joseph A. Gump, 45511 CR 380, Bloomingdale, MI 49026Rachel Hayward, 827 W. Maple St., 2-B, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Samuel Hayward, 1930 S. Westnedge Avenue, Apt. 4, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Karen Heavrin, 80012 Ramblewood Drive, Covert, MI 49043Janine Heisel, 29818 Lake Bluff Drive, Covert, MI 49043Mary Lou Hession, 29818 Lake Bluff Drive, Covert, MI 49043Alice H. Hirt, 6677 Summit View Drive, Holland, MI 49423Shaun Hittle, 827 W. Maple St., 2-B, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Lauretta Holmes, 2923 Memory Lane, Kalamazoo, MI 49006Lee Amn Johnson, 1602 Jefferson, Kalamazoo, MI 49006Chuck Jordan, 50521 34th Avenue, Bangor, MI 49013Raelyn Joyce, 1920 Hillsdale, Kalamazoo, MI 49006Judy Kamps, 441 Fairfax Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49001Gary Karch, 251 Cass Street #714, Niles, MI 49120Maynard Kaufman, 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013Joan Khaled, 3609 Devonshire, Kalamazoo, MI 49006Nelly Kurzmann, 301 Edgemoor, Kalamazoo, MI 49001Nan Lewis, 80078 Ramblewood Drive, Covert, MI 49043Larry Mahamnah, 3504 Tamsin, Kalamazoo, MI 4900842 Michael Martin, 25741 31st Street, Gobles, MI 49055Carol McGeehan, 568 W. 31st Street, Holland, MI 49423Brenda F. Mehagan, 29886 Lake Bluff Walk, Palisades Park, Covert, MI 49043Michael W. Mehagan, 29886 Lake Bluff Walk, Palisades Park, Covert, MI 49043Jeanice Morgan, 01651 67th Street, South Haven, MI 49090Maria Ochs, 4660 Sailview Drive, Holland, MI 49423Maria Ogston, 2717 Ridgeview Drive, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Elizabeth Paxson, 3258 Lorraine Lane, Saugatuck, MI 49453Ken Richards, 72772 County Road 380, South Haven, MI 49090Margaret Roche, 27842 Shorewood Walk, Covert, MI 49043Pamela S. Rups, 2705 Pine Ridge Rd., Kalamazoo, MI 49008James 0. and Sally P. Schlobohm, 28324 Shorewood Drive, Windjammer, Palisades Park, Covert, MI 49043;Stephen M. Senesi, 439 Park Place, Kalamazoo, MI 49001Thomas E. and Nancy Cutbirth Small, 2502 Waite Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Daniel B. Smith, 3022 Fleetwood Drive, Portage, MI 49024Catherine Sugas, 410 S. Sherman St., Otsego, MI 49078Elizabeth M. Sugas, 10888 Douglas Avenue, Plainwell, MI 49080Kimeri Swanson-Beck, 30018 Lake Bluff Drive, Covert, MI 49043Robin Tinholt, 6187 Bayou Trail, Saugatuck, MI 49453Barbara Trumball, 80009 Ramblewood Drive, Covert, MI 49043Ineke Way, 1938 Oakland Drive, Kalamazoo, MI 49008Sally Zigmond, 79955 Fernwood Walk, Covert, MI 4904343 Additional Individuals Adding Their Support to the Submission of these Comments:
Laurel and Mark Goetzinger 4453 Central Ave.Indianapolis, IN 46205Eldredge cottage in Palisades Park Community Martha Eldredge HeckJean KellerOwner of Grapevine
: Cottage,
#182, at Palisades Park Country ClubHome address:
15691 Aulnay LaneHuntington Beach, CA 92647Phone 714 230 6528Ryan and Cheryl McCoy208 S. Haven St.South Haven, MI 49090Tim O'BrienIndiana residentFrequent visitor to Palisades Park/South Haven area since 1978Owner of a vacation home in the area.Terry & Laura O'Brien7390 Holliday Drive EastIndianapolis, IN 46260Palisades Park cottage ownersJean S. Prokopow24390 Sandpiper Isle Way #104Bonita Springs, FL 34134Catherine Quigg838 Harriet LandBarrington, IllinoisPamela Rups2705 Pine Ridge RoadKalamazoo, Michigan 49008Mary E. Schmidt6684 Sunset Concourse
: Holland, Michigan 4942344 45 Based on an article published in the journal "Kagaku" July 2011 + * *Hiromitsu InoAging Nuclear Power Plantsfocusing in particular on irradiation embrittlement of pressure vesselsJapan's Aging Nuclear Power PlantsJapan began generating nuclear power in 1970. The Tsuruga-1 plant beganoperations on March 14, 1970, just in time to provide atomic energy for theOsaka Expo. At the time most people were not aware of the dangersassociated with nuclear power. It is fair to say that they hoped that scientific and technical progress would enable the same nuclear energy that broughtabout the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be used for peacefulpurposes.
After Tsuruga-1, which was a boiling water reactor (BWR), on November 28of the same year the Mihama-1 pressurized water reactor (PWR) beganoperations.
Thereafter, as can be seen in Figure 1(1), the number of nuclearpower plants in Japan increased rapidly.
By the 1990s Japan was third inthe global nuclear energy stakes after the United States and France. In 2005the Higashidori and Shika-2 reactors came on line bringing the number ofreactors to 55, with a total generating capacity of 49.58 GW. Since then,Hamaoka Units 1 and 2 were permanently closed down (January 2009),Tomari-3 came on line (December 2009), and six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were effectively knocked out by the GreatEast Japan Earthquake, bringing the number of "surviving" reactors to 48.(As of the end of March 2012, TEPCO has officially recognized thepermanent shutdown of Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 4.) However, of thosethere is no indication that eleven reactors will restart:
three reactors (Units2, 3, 4) of the seven-reactor Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station1 have not restarted since the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July 2007; the threeOnagawa reactors, the four Fukushima Daini reactors and the Tokai Dainireactor were all shut down by the Great East Japan Earthquake.
Besidesthese, Japan's other nuclear reactors have not yet passed stress tests, so allJapan's reactors are likely to be out of action by early May 2012.Japan's nuclear power plants began commercial operations over ten yearslater than the first plant in the United States. With the exception of tworeactors (USA) started up in 1969, the power plants which began operations in the 1960s in countries such as the United States and Germany have beendecommissioned, so Japan is now a world leader in the operation of agingreactors(2).
Unlike when the plants were built, there is no model formanaging aging plants.Before nuclear power plants reach 30 years of operations, and every tenyears thereafter, utilities are required to produce a technical assessment forthe operation of aging plants. Utilities may be granted approval to continueoperating aging plants on the basis of a review by The Ministry of EconomyTrade and Industry's (METI) Aging Response Review Committee.
At themoment there are over 20 reactors in Japan which have been operating inexcess of 30 years, including Tsuruga-1, Mihama-l-3, Fukushima Daiichi-1-6, Shimane-1, Takahama-1&2, Genkai-1.
Of those, Tsuruga-1, Mihama-1 and Fukushima Daiichi-1 have already been operating for 40years and been granted approval to operate for a further 10 years.How long were nuclear power plants designed to operate?
These daysutilities and METI claim that no life expectancy was determined, but in factJapan's nuclear power plants were designed with an expected life of 40 years.That is evident if one looks at the pressure vessel. In the 1970s the utilities' license applications included an evaluation of neutron irradiation embrittlement (see below) based on an assumed operating life of 40 years.Furthermore, monitoring specimens placed in the reactors assume 40 yearsof inspections.
In most cases only five or six sets of specimens were placed in2 the reactors.
This became a problem when the issue of life extensions arose,so in 2007 a rule (JEAC 4201-2007) was hurriedly introduced which allowedthe specimens to be cut and re-used.It is thought that the reason why Japan's reactors were designed to last 40years was because the license to operate nuclear power plants in the UnitedStates was for 40 years. However, these is evidence that at first theestimated life was 30 years. According to a Toshiba engineer who worked onnuclear power plants, Shiro Ogura (personal correspondence),
the design lifewritten in specifications at the time when GE was prime contractor forFukushima Daiichi-1&2 was 30 years. He said that when Toshiba becamethe prime contractor for Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 the design life waschanged to 40 years.Articles(3) about changes due to aging written in the 1980s by researchers atthe Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute were based on the assumption of a 40-year life, so it can be assumed that at the time the sharedunderstanding was that the life expectancy of nuclear power plants was 40years.No matter what the equipment or machinery, as it gets older the frequency of breakages and other problems increases, making maintenance difficult.
Associated costs and labor also increase.
Nuclear power plants are noexception.
Rather, it is normally assumed that damage will occur sooner innuclear power plants because of their high technology nature, which pushesdesign capabilities to the limit.In 2003, immediately after revelations of cover-ups of cracks at TokyoElectric Power Company's (TEPCO) nuclear power plants, we set up theNuclear Aging Research Team to focus on issues associated with aging ofnuclear power plants. The pamphlet "Rokyuka suru genpatsu:
gijutsu wo tou"(Aging Nuclear Power Plants: Questioning Technology)(5),
which wepublished in 2005, raised the alarm about the dangers of aging nuclear3 power plants. Thereafter, in July 2007 the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NuclearPower Station was struck by the Chuetsu-oki Earthquake and then in March2011 the Great East Japan Earthquake caused a severe accident at theFukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
As a consequence the world isnow concerned about the seismic resistance of nuclear power plants, butaccidents can be caused by other things besides earthquakes.
Even if there isno earthquake, or else in combination with an earthquake, deterioration ofequipment and machinery could trigger a severe accident.
We cannot relaxour vigilance towards nuclear power plants whose lives have been extendedbeyond their use-by date.The above mentioned "technical assessment for the operation of agingplants" contains headings related to aging, such as stress corrosion crackingand reduction of insulation of electrical equipment and instruments, butmost importance is placed on the neutron irradiation embrittlement specimens in the pressure vessel. This is the issue that I will focus on in therest of this article.Outline of Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement in Aging Nuclear PowerPlantsDestruction of the reactor pressure vessel due to neutron irradiation embrittlement should be called an extreme severe accident.
If the pressurevessel breaks, there is almost no way of preventing a runaway chain reaction.
There is also no way of preventing melt down of the nuclear fuel. Suchextreme damage must be avoided at all costs.The benchmark for irradiation embrittlement is the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT). If an extreme situation arises such as pipe rupture dueto an earthquake, it is necessary to cool the core using the emergency corecooling system (ECCS). However, if the DBTT is high, this is a dangerous operation.
When cooled suddenly, a temperature difference arises betweenthe inner and outer walls of the pressure vessel and strong tensile stress is4 brought to bear on the inner wall. If such tensile stress is applied when thetemperature is below the DBTT range, there is a danger that the pressurevessel could suddenly break completely.
Table 1 shows Japanese nuclear power plants in descending order of theDBTT of their pressure vessels.
(*Recently the DBTT of Takahama-1 wasreported to have been measured at 95&deg;C, making it the second worst.) Thetable shows seven reactors in which DBTT exceeds 50&deg;C. They are all oldreactors that began operating in the 1970s.Table 1: Readctr Vessel Du[flce-
-e Tiansibon Temperatue (DB1T) -Waxs 7Rank Reactor Unit Type Startup Classatn T Neutron fence Date of ecpenme(1 019 n/cm n) (reoval)1 Genkal-1 PWR Oct. 15, 1975 Mother mater~l 980C 7.0 _pri 20092 Mlhama-1 PWR Nov. 28. 1970 mother material 746c 3.0 May 2001Weld material 810c3 Mihama-2 PWR July 25, 1972 Mother material 780C 4. Sep. 20034 Ohi-2 PWR Dec. 5, 1979 Mother material 700C 4.7 March 20005 Takahama-1 PWR Nov. 19, 1974 Mother materil 680C
* 1.3 Nov. 2002Mother material 51oc6 Tsuruga-1 BWR Mar. 14, 1970 Weod materlal 43oc 0.094 June 20037 Fuishi-a BWR Mar. 26 1971 Mother materil 500C 0.09 Aug. 1999Dahiti_______
_______Source: Prepared by the author from "Results of Monitorinq Tests on Steel in Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessels,"
CNIC*As of July 2(011. A DBTI of 95'c was later observed in Pakahama-1.
Genkai- 1 is the worst. The DBTT for this reactor was announced in October2010. The figure comes from the most recent test of monitoring specimens inApril 2009. The DBTT rose 42&deg;C since the previous test result of 56&deg;C inFebruary 1993. This is a new record for Japan. This reactor is discussed indetail in the next section.All the reactors listed from second to fifth place in the table are located inFukui Prefecture and owned by Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO).In particular, we have been concerned about the continued operation ofMihama-1&2, where high DBTTs have been observed since the beginning ofthe 1990s. KEPCO asserts that results of pressurized thermal shock (PTS)analysis show that even if the ECCS was used in the event of a pipe rupturethe pressure vessel would not fail.06) However, the evaluation methodology forthe stress arising Ki has not been released, so it is not possible to knowwhether this analysis is reliable.
5 PTS analysis(7) assesses the pressurized thermal shock to the core of thepressure vessels of PWRs in the case of accidents such as loss of coolantaccidents and main steam pipe ruptures.
If sudden cooling occurs in the caseof accidents such as these, temperature differences arise between the innerand outer surfaces of the pressure vessel and strong tensile stress arises onthe inner surface.
If the pressure vessel has become brittle (below DBTT),cracks progress and the pressure vessel fails causing a severe accident.
It isnecessary to confirm that the stress intensity factor Kidoes not exceed thefracture toughness Kic.The reactors listed in sixth and seventh places in Table 1 are BWRs. Theinner diameter of BWR pressure vessels is large compared to PWRs and theamount (flux) of neutron irradiation received in a given time is one or twoorders of magnitude less than in PWRs. From the table it can be seen thatthe total amount (fluence) of irradiation received by Tsuruga-1 is about onethirtieth of that of Mihama-1, even though they began operating at much thesame time. (There is a slight difference in operating time and also in the datethe specimens were taken.) Consequently, it was thought that neutronradiation embrittlement was not such a big problem in BWRs as it was inPWRs. (Even now many researchers and engineers are still in the grips ofthat "common sense".)
: However, after many years of operation, as we came toknow the reality of irradiation embrittlement in BWRs, this "common sense"was overturned.
The total amount (fluence) of irradiation is not the onlydetermining factor for irradiation embrittlement.
It has become clear thatthe rate (flux) at which irradiation occurs is also a determining factor. As willbe discussed later, this led to an amendment to the monitoring specimenmethod JEAC-4201 and led to the situation where two BWRs are now listedamong the worst seven, besides other BWRs with high levels of irradiation.
Why Does Irradiation Embrittlement Occur? -Basic ConceptMetal materials are degraded for all sorts of reasons.
One reason is6 "radiation damage".
This phenomenon is investigated at the atomic level bymeans of the concept of lattice defects.
The Physical Society of Japan has hada section on lattice defects for over 50 years. Pardon me for speaking of mypersonal involvement in this field, but I have devoted myself to this field ofresearch since becoming interested in it as a university student.
I became atutor at Osaka University and experienced the student uprisings of the1960s. In hindsight I can see that this field of research, which originated inAmerica, developed in tandem with nuclear energy. Nevertheless, that factdid not lead me to abandon the field. I was eager to carry out materials research using radiation as a guest researcher of the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute..
However it was difficult to see a connection between this research and the social problems associated with nuclearenergy.The reason why irradiation defects became an important research themewas because when neutrons generated by nuclear fission hit reactor vesselsand pipes they damage metal materials.
This is called "neutron radiation damage".
If it causes materials to become brittle, it is called "neutronirradiation embrittlement".
Of particular importance is neutron irradiation embrittlement of the steel of the reactor pressure vessel, which is the heartof a nuclear power plant. If this is damaged it can lead directly to anuncontrollable severe accident.
What type of lattice defects arise from neutron radiation?
Atoms in theircrystals are precisely aligned in lattices, but if they are struck by a neutronthey are displaced, leaving a hole. This is called a "vacancy".
Displaced atoms are called "interstitial atoms". This phenomenon is called a "latticedefect".
In addition, secondary defects result when vacancies and interstitial atoms move about and accumulate, creating "vacancy clusters" and"interstitial atom clusters, respectively.
Impurities within the metal (copperatoms etc.) move to form "impurity clusters".
These "secondary lattice defects"cause metals to lose their characteristic ductility (plasticity) and make them7 brittle.
To compare it to the human body, it is like the hardening of thearteries which makes blood vessels vulnerable to rupture.Usually, when a force is applied to steel it just deforms without breaking, butbelow a given temperature, if the slightest force is applied, rather thandeforming plastically it breaks like pottery.
This critical temperature iscalled the ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT). This brittleness ofsteel used to be the bane of shipbuilders.
Many ships sank due to thisphenomenon.
The Titanic, which sank exactly 100 years ago in 1912 when itstruck an iceberg while crossing the North Atlantic Ocean, is a famousexample.
Subsequent studies showed that poor quality steel plate was usedand that the DBTT was 27&deg;C.When reactor pressure vessels are bombarded by neutrons the DBTT rises.When designing nuclear reactors it is necessary to predict how high theDBTT will rise and whether they can survive for the period of their designlives. However, assuming a design life for nuclear reactors of 40 years, it isimpossible to know how they will be after 40 years until 40 years has elapsed.That presents a problem, so accelerated experiments are conducted.
Accelerated experiments are commonly used tests to assess endurance by, forexample, applying beyond normal load, or operating plants at greater thannormal speed.Likewise, when conducting tests for neutron irradiation embrittlement, the amount(flux) of neutron exposure in a given period of time is increased far above normal amounts.
Materials test reactors can radiate materials at arate of 1012n/cm2.The "n" standards for "neutron".
This rate (flux) ofexposure is between 100 and 10,000 times the rate of exposure in normalreactors, given that the rate of exposure for PWRs is 1010n/cm2, while therate for BWRs is 108ni/cm2.That means the amount of irradiation a BWRwould sustain in 40 years can be applied in one or two days. Using such dataa formula predicting embrittlement was produced.
Furthermore, besides thenormal monitoring specimens, accelerated monitoring specimens are also8 placed in BWR reactor vessels.
They are placed not on walls of the vesselitself, but nearer to the core, where the rate (flux) of radiation is an order ofmagnitude higher. The idea is to predict the future state of the reactor.Likewise monitoring specimens are placed deeper inside PWRs than thewalls of the reactor vessel. For example, in the case of Genkai-1 discussed below, the rate of radiation is about double the normal rate. It is an attemptto read the future.However, there is an assumption underlying the notion that the future canbe predicted.
That is that regardless of the rate (flux) of irradiation, or, to putit another way, regardless of the period of exposure, if the total amount(fluence) of radiation is the same, the result will be the same. The formulafor this assumption is as follows:Rise in DBTT = material factor x F(08)The material factor is determined by the type and the concentration ofimpurities in the steel. For example, if there is a lot of copper, the materialfactor will rise. F(C is the irradiation factor. It is postulated to be a functionof the fluence of neutron irradiation "F alone.With accumulated experience of operating nuclear power plants, it becamepossible to obtain long-term data of monitoring tests in real life conditions and it became clear that this formula was suspect.
In particular, with regardto BWRs, for which the rate of irradiation is slower, it became clear that theresults for the normal monitoring specimens and the accelerated monitoring specimens placed in reactors did not agree. This trend is particularly pronounced in reactors like Tsuruga-1 and Fukushima Daiichi-1 where thereis a lot of copper impurity in the steel of the reactor pressure vessels.
It canbe seen from this that the irradiation factor F(A is dependent not only on thefluence of neutron irradiation "F, but also on the flux of irradiation.(9)
We noticed this over ten years ago and alerted researchers to the issue.(10)
: However, at the time, the results of American research refuting dependence on the flux of irradiation held sway, so Japanese researchers refused to take9 the matter seriously and they did not alter the embrittlement prediction formula.(
: 8) Faced with data from Tsuruga-1 showing unpredicted high levelsof DBTT, METI's Aging Response Review Committee dismissed the resultssaying they were due to data scatter.(11,12)
Thereafter, analysis of the micro-formation of copper progressed, and itbecame clear that when the rate of radiation is slow mainly clusters ofcopper atoms (obstructions) form, whereas in accelerated irradiation testsmainly clusters of vacancies form, so the cause of the hardening (embrittlement) is different.
The results of this micro-analysis backed up ourcomputer simulations.
Q 3) The outdated thinking described above was forcedto change and now the dependence of radiation embrittlement on the flux ofirradiation is the shared academic understanding.
The irradiation embrittlement prediction formula used in monitoring test methodology waschanged and a new methodology (JEAC 4201-2007) was produced.(14)
Frommid-2011 assessment of pressure vessels shifted to the 2007 formula, butwhen the increase of DBTT using this formula is smaller than that using theprevious 2004 formula, the 2004 formula is included as a reference.
: However, even the 2007 formula cannot explain high DBTT for metal weldsin Tsuruga-1 that we have drawn attention to. The metal welds in Tsuruga-1 have low levels of copper impurities, unlike the parent metal, so theyshouldn't have high DBTT. The amended JEAC-2007 was not able toadequately explain the complex reality.Unpredicted Embrittlement in Genkai-1 Reactor Pressure VesselWe looked into the "unpredicted" monitoring specimen data. The resultswere from Genkai-1.
At the October 25, 2010 meeting of Karatsu CityMunicipal Assembly's Pluthermal Special Committee, Kyushu ElectricPower Company announced that the DBTT observed in Genkai-l's fourthmonitoring test specimen, which was taken during a periodic inspection inApril 2009, had reached 98&deg;C. Previously, the highest DBTT for a reactor10 pressure vessel had been 81&deg;C for metal taken from a weld at Mihama-1 (seeTable 1). The Genkai-1 specimen exceeded this, so it would be fair toconclude that Genkai-1 is the most dangerous reactor pressure vessel inJapan.Furthermore, it is significant that this embrittlement was unpredicted.
The DBTT observed in the previous (third) monitoring test (February 1993)was 56&deg;C. That had increased by 42&deg;C, which was contrary to the predicted result. Figure 2 is a diagram submitted by Kyushu Electric in its December2003 Aging Technical Assessment, with a "X" added to the top right cornerto show the result of the fourth monitoring test. Up until the thirdmonitoring test the data points could be more or less plotted onto thepredicted curve, but the latest data point is way above that curve. If you lookclosely at the diagram you will see that the broken line is the predicted curveand that a line is added above that showing the upper limit of the margin forerror. However actual embrittlement is way above that upper limit.XXIC4-2004 Pteicbw curve + rP0agn c eorro100-- ]EK42)1-2DO4 P rektim urvso0; OM V4 *0 d dOft1140 1 2 3 4 5 6 7N4~O&M Ruuu~a p1o-'N/TI Flgure2Genkal- Monitonng Test Sample Data and JEAC 4201-2004 Prediction Curve.Kyushu Electric says that 989C is the value predicted for 2060 (85 yearsafter the start of operations),
while the predicted DBTT for 2035 (60 yearsafter the start of operations) is 919C and for August 2010 (35 years after thestart of operations
) is 80&deg;C. (*If the 2007 formula is used the predicted DBTT is somewhat higher, so Kyushu Electric has amended it.) Let us11 consider whether this is correct.We must first understand the data on which this is based. Table 2 shows theresults for the first to fourth monitoring tests. The amount of neutronirradiation is the amount for the specimens, not for the pressure vessel itself.The specimens were placed deeper inside the reactor than the reactor walls,so they were irradiated by more neutrons.
Since the specimens have beenirradiated by more neutrons than the reactor walls in the same time,operating years are converted to "effective operating years".Effective operating years for the fourth monitoring test specimen was 66years, -meaning the reactor walls would be irradiated by the same amount ofneutrons after 66 years. Since the reactors do not operate continuously, thisamount of irradiation would not actually be reached until 85 years after thereactor began operating.
How then are the present DBTT and the DBTTafter 60-years estimated?
Since DBTT is 989C after 85 years, bringing itback to 35 years and 60 years Kyushu Electric comes up with the lowertemperatures of 809C and 919C respectively.
The method used to derive this estimate is to redraw the prediction curve,adding a margin of error so that it passes through data point "X" in the topright corner of Figure 2, then to read off the DBTT corresponding to theamount of irradiation after 35 years and 60 years respectively.
But for such amethod to have a basis, the embrittlement prediction curve in Figure 2 musthave some legitimacy.
: However, as discussed above, the formula used in thepast has been pronounced invalid.So can the new 2007 prediction formula explain the DBTT of Genkai-1?
Theanswer is no.Figure 3 shows the irradiation embrittlement prediction curve drawn byus on the basis of the 2007 prediction
: formula, and the observed DBTT.Vi5)
Like Figure 2, this diagram shows both the scale for DBTT and also for the12 increase in;; a1000a,280a)E.2c=60-~40DBTT, the difference from the initial DBTT of minus 16&deg;C.I LU I1008060l i I lJEAC4201-2007 Prediction curve +2.OE+10 [n/cnM Is]5.OE+101.OE+11+ Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample DataI I I s i HI402020-16Lii I * .T J l I I01 2 3 4 5 6 7Neutron Fluence [10Qln/cm 2]Aonitorinq Data and JEAC-2007 Prediction Figure 3: Genkai-1 t\It can be seen that the observed data of 98&deg;C is 420C above the predicted curve. This cannot be explained in terms of margin of error. Compared toFigure 2, if anything the deviation is greater.
Thus the 2007 prediction formula fails completely to reproduce the irradiation embrittlement behaviorof Genkai-1.
Hence, there is no explanation why a high DBTT was observedin Genkai-1.
Given that such high DBTTs are observed when there is a highamount of copper impurity, or there is phosphorous grain boundarysegregation, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Genkai-1 pressurevessel contains, depending on the location of the monitoring specimens, lowquality steel with high levels of impurities.
In regard to Genkai-1, both the2004 formula (Figure 2) and the 2007 formula (Figure 3) have lost their13 predictive power. It is meaningless to estimate based on these formulas thatthe current DBTT is 80&deg;C, or that after 60 years operation it will be 91&deg;C.So what should we suppose the DBTT to be now? There is no soundmethod of estimating it. In that case, Kyushu Electric should respect theobserved data of 989C, assume that the pressure vessel itself has alreadyreached this high DBTT (that being a true safety margin) and consider whatresponse should be taken. The response should be to carry out theabovementioned PTS assessment based on a DBTT of 98&deg;C, reconsider theoperating sequence based on the 98&deg;C figure, and also carry out pressuretests based on 98&deg;C.NISA's Response and Public CommentsWe were surprised at the observed high DBTT for Genkai-1.
As soon as wefound out about it we requested Social Democratic Party leader MizuhoFukushima to arrange a hearing with officers of Nuclear Industrial andSafety Agency (NISA) to find out about the monitoring test methodology etc.To our amazement, at that point in time (December 15, 2010) NISA hadreceived no information about the results of the fourth monitoring test forGenkai-1.
The first they heard of it was from the questions in our letter.Kyushu Electric had not informed NISA of the strikingly high DBTT andNISA said they did not know because they had no obligation to inquire.
Whata careless and lax safety monitoring system. At the hearing we demandedthat NISA pay great attention to Genkai-l's DBTT, and that it publish rawdata for the Charpy test.It is a matter of great significance that the results of the fourth monitoring test for Genkai-1 cannot be accounted for by either the former prediction formula (JEAC 4201-1991),
or the current formula (JEAC 4201-2007),
andthat the high DBTT cannot be accounted for. NISA called for opinionsregarding the 2010 supplement to JEAC 4201-2007, so, in light of thisserious situation, the Nuclear Aging Research Team submitted a public14 comment to NISA articulating fundamental questions about the monitoring test methodology.'
The essence of our public comment was as follows (abbreviated):
* The 2007 prediction formula is totally unable to reproduce the results ofthe monitoring test on mother material in the Genkai- 1 reactor and metalwelds in the Tsuruga-1
: reactor, so the monitoring test system cannot beimplemented based on the 2007 prediction formula.* It is necessary to make a decision to permanently shut down nuclearreactors in which a high DBTT that cannot be explained by the prediction formula is observed.
* A fundamental review of JEAC-4201 is necessary, including whetherprediction is possible.
This public comment calls for a fundamental review of JEAC-4201, whichstipulates the monitoring test methodology for steel in pressure
: vessels, andfor an explicit statement in the rule that there are cases where the option ofpermanent shutdown should be selected.
NISA's response to our public comment was published on its web site onMay 6, 2011. There was no direct response to the points we made. Theresponse made no reference to the striking deviation in the Genkai- 1 data. Itsimply stated that where there is a deviation the margin for error should bereset and that there was no problem.
NISA's reply was an insult to ourintelligence.
What needs to be corrected is the thinking behind themonitoring test methodology that uses margin for error to paper overproblems.
15 Tables and FiguresH. INO TaI,& 1: R~mb reimrThre VAm Ed U tkBriie Trauni Taeif afte (EDTT) -VftS 7Ra.* Reactb Unt TyVe Startup classIr*a DBTTU WA fw coi ~af op wimur1 Gorfti1 PWR Cc. 15. :975 Moiw nututW 9M 7. AiI20092 MIhana-1 PWR Nov. 28, 1970 W"rImw 1 .aV203 M~ihomo-PJWR Jult 25, 1972 Mokw nuwftuW 78CC 4.* 40 2003L4 OW1 PWR DKc. 5, 1979 MoVie nraWW 700C 4&#xfd;. March 2M05 Tak~aIwma 1 PtNR Now. 19, 1974 Moher nvtetel 6H 1. Nov. 20026 TsiunW-1 OWR Mar. 14, 1970 dwmao I 0. Jn 2M07 Fuhnia OWR M~r. 26 1971 moher nfamwm N0'C a. A, 1999b dr d w auho frim R" f rT a ie in Nudeaw Reim r Pressure Vsels,&#xfd; OJIC A2.2OO3*3913LM 1 AIRMS#(2OO3*12A
)p 15, rz2.3-1..
it A l$:-&sect; (2O1O*-1O) 2519 ) TOYAFIWM4, V5 NO)M*bl"AI N-1 2141q21 V*43KJ.&#xfd; 7D1975*1 OP RIN819761f-11 P1 9801*4A1 9934-2P2009*4-4-1 60C350C370C560C980C(x 109n/cm2) 00.52.13.56.5051J2Ot* 231f3 3 If-52 ~48,.I40!-2826824~ ~ -d if 220-1214 I:-L3Y' A R. 1:~~ri~ ~ lo 1_ _ __12 120_ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _66~~~~~I L- 307 47 88 28 08 09 49 80 20 6010M 171I ----T----7-1]-I l EAC4( -!'- --14 r, :::J ijt, .-,- --i --JL.'&#xfd;- -Q -e:!inn car;.e1,0!i ctA.IFfl IA AllihrFigure 1.Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample Data and JEAC 4201-2004 Prediction Curve
.D80COE060CU)S40-oa)4-,C:a)-a)120100JEAC4201-2007 Prediction curve2.OE+ 10 [n/cnr Is]5.OE+101.OE+11+ Genkai-1 Monitoring Test Sample Data+80k.0aw~&#xf7;604w4020&#xfd;20/,0-160nI!)12345 6 7Neutron Fluence [1019n/cm2]
A M 2 t PTS;;Tid5 300E 250LJ2.200f-n0 4"M~150100500-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300-94 K1c:-25%, -50%300250I -l--------
--------
-------- I ---- --- -,OfRTNDT=98*C 0%0-25% V-50% VJEAC4206-2007 RI, IN 71 c -A(8)TP =99Tp=105Tp=137RIN -EfA 5(7)RTNo T=98 0C ...............
200150100I -g mmm ml'I .o.p I, I ,Ill / ! II .I 0..II. .n ..I ....M ,4 K,5000 501001502002503000C)9~5 3&#xfd;l -'"FPTSm--TIfiZ:)UxCL' bO&#xfd;4 0nMoJEAC4206-2007IRf4Jr%'C IR14 Part IJDiscussion and Issues in the "NISA Advisory Committee on theTechnological Assessment of Aging in Nuclear Reactors" Hiromitsu InoLaunch of the "NISA Advisory Committee on the Technological Assessment of Aging in Nuclear Reactors" Last November the Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency (NISA) initiated the NISA Advisory Committee on the Technological Assessment of Agingin Nuclear Reactors.
As it turned out, I was invited to become a member ofthe committee.
: Hitherto, NISA has ignored our ideas. I decided toparticipate in the Hearings because I believed it was necessary to have aforum in which to communicate our thoughts about the issue of agingnuclear power plants, in particular concerning the extraordinary embrittlement of the Genkai-1 plant. However, these Hearings are, astheir name implies, a forum in which committee members' views are heardand debate takes place, but in the end NISA takes responsibility forwriting the report. I was aware of this limitation when I decided to becomea committee member.The following three issues have been considered during the Hearings:
(1) Assessment of the aging of individual plants:Technical assessment reports on ageing have to be submitted to NISA fornuclear power plants that have been in operation for over 30 years, andevery 10 years after that. If the review confirms their safety they cancontinue to operate.
Assessment reports were submitted for Ikata Unit 2(commenced operation 19 March 1982) and Fukushima Daini Unit 1(commenced operation 20 April 1982) for the first time last year. A 40-yearreport was also submitted for Mihama Unit 2 (commenced operation 25July 1972).(2) Relation between aging and the Fukushima Daiichi accident:
This refers to consideration of the question of whether aging (deterioration of equipment and materials) contributed to or exacerbated the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
(3) Cause of the greater than predicted embrittlement of Genkai- 1:Consideration of how to interpret the results of the monitoring tests of theGenkai- 1 ductile-brittle transition temperature (DBTT), which exceededthe predicted 98C, and whether the equation for predicting embrittlement is appropriate.
So far 16 meetings of the NISA Advisory Committee on theTechnological Assessment of Aging in Nuclear Reactors have been held(mid-June 2012). NISA's intention was to disband the committee at theend of March 2012, but due to the delay in the establishment of the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Hearings are continuing unchanged.
Theme (1) relates to life extensions for aging nuclear power plants andwas the province of the Aging Countermeasures Examination Committee Working Group of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE),which is part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).After the Fukushima accident occurred on March 11, 2011 this workinggroup was disbanded and the role was shifted to the NISA AdvisoryCommittee on the Technological Assessment of Aging in Nuclear Reactors.
Consideration of Ikata-2 has already finished and NISA has announced the conclusion that it is possible to extend operation.
Regarding Fukushima Daini-1, an investigation was carried out into whether or not astate of cold shutdown has been safely maintained.
The debate aboutMihama-2 is approaching the final stages. The life extension of Mihama-2impinges on the amendment to the regulations, which states that inprinciple the period for which nuclear power plants may be operated is 40years calculated from commencement of operation.
However NISA is of theopinion that these are separate issues. It says, "The technical assessment of aging ... is a matter required by law ... which must be solemnlyundertaken."
It compiled an investigation report which accepted a lifeextension beyond 40 years based on the argument that "if a new systemwhich limits operation to 40 years comes into effect, regardless of theresults of the technical assessment of aging, just those reactors whichclear the new standard to be established in the future will be able, as anexception, to have their lives extended."
My proposals that these Hearingsshould debate the details of how to close down aging reactors such as thesewith advanced irradiation embrittlement and that a conclusion should bedeferred until a new nuclear regulatory agency is established were notincluded.
Theme (2) is already finished.
A report was compiled (February 16, 2012)which said, "The conclusion was that it is difficult to believe that aging ofequipment contributed to or exacerbated the accident."
: However, "Theassessment of the effects of aging was a desktop assessment, so it isnecessary to carry out further studies in future through on-siteconfirmation, etc." The contents are sloppy, based on technical assessment methods of aging and past results, and simply adding on an assessment ofthe 3.11 seismic movement.
The original draft drew the conclusion, "It isbelieved that [aging] did not cause or exacerbate the accident."
However,even committee members besides myself expressed the view that this wasodd. They pointed out that without even seeing the scene of the accidentsuch a conclusion was premature, and that it was unclear whether theobject of the investigation was clarification of the causes of the accident orfuture improvement.
Consequently these words were deleted and replacedby the underlined words above.Theme (3), which relates to irradiation embrittlement in Genkai-1 and whether the existing prediction equation is appropriate, is the issue thatinterests me most. Debate about the cause of the high DBTT (980C)observed in the Genkai- 1 pressure vessel monitoring tests revolved aroundtwo theories:
[i] was it caused by poor quality pressure vessel material or abad manufacturing method, or [ii] was it because the embrittlement prediction equation does not accurately reflect reality in the highirradiation range?Kyushu Electric claimed that the results of chemical analysis of the steelmaterials showed that there were no irregularities and that uniformity was maintained.
They also claimed that examinations carried out by theCentral Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) andothers into micro-organization in the monitoring samples showed a goodcorrelation between embrittlement and the formation of impurity
: clusters, so there was no abnormal embrittlement.
: However, to confirm theaccuracy of this judgment and form a conclusion about whether or not thematerial of the pressure vessel is sound, instead of getting a researchorganization like CRIEPI, which is part of the nuclear industry, to assessthe samples, they should be given to fair and trustworthy university researchers to examine their micro-organization.
To support Kyushu Electric's claim, a report entitled "Preliminary Consideration towards Improvement of the Accuracy of the Embrittlement Prediction Method " jointly produced by CRIEPI and the Federation ofElectric Power Companies (FEPC) was submitted to the eighth meeting(February 22, 2012, document 10). It concluded that it is not necessary tochange the thinking behind the embrittlement model and the reaction rateequation, which form the basis of the current prediction
: equation, andthat the variation from reality arose due to the lack of data in the highirradiation range. Further, by giving importance to the high irradiation range data (applying a weighting) and resetting the parameters of theequation (impurity cluster formation rate equation coefficient) the Genkai-1 data fit was improved.
In fact, however, the fourth data point of 98tC isstill above the standard deviation margin and the second and third datapoints drop below, making the curve look very suspicious.
In other words,they were unable to draw a meaningful curve connecting the third (560C)and fourth (980C) data points.It is problematic that in order to improve the fit in the high irradiation range the coefficients for the reaction rate equation etc. were greatlychanged.
These reaction rate equations are the master equations thatdetermine the whole method, so for the parameters to change greatlydepending on the data sets that are used indicates the brittleness of themodel itself. The reliability of the embrittlement prediction equationmodel, which is the basis of JEAC4201-2007, is therefore called intoquestion.
The problem goes beyond the Genkai Nuclear Power Plant. Itextends to all aging nuclear power plants.
Looking at the diagram in which NISA compared the prediction equationfor aging nuclear power plants with the observed data (Hearing number 5,23 January 2012, document 2), a large gap between the predicted figureand the observed figure can be seen in the high irradiation region. It is afact that the prediction equation is unable to predict reality.
: However, theinaccuracy for Genkai-1 is particularly striking.
The inaccuracy for otherreactors is within 20&deg;C, but the data from the fourth monitoring samplefor Genkai-1 is out by 42&deg;C. Besides the fact that the embrittlement prediction equation does not match the pressure vessel of Genkai-1 (see[ii] above), we must consider that the extraordinary embrittlement is dueto the materials or the manufacturing method ([i]).Another surprising thing was that when we investigated CRIEPI'sembrittlement prediction
: equation, we discovered an elementary butimportant error in the equation itself. This prediction equation expresses changes in the micro-organization, namely the formation of impurityclusters and lattice defect clusters, which are the cause of irradiation embrittlement, as a reaction equation set, by tracing impurity atoms(copper atoms, etc.) and point flaw reaction (combination anddisappearance) processes, and relating this to the rise in DBTT. This canbe said to be an epoch-making change, compared to the rough and ready2004 equation that just tried to fit the data, ignoring the rate ofirradiation.
: However, there was a vital error in the reaction rate equation.
The main cause of irradiation embrittlement is the formation of copperclusters (or impurity clusters in general).
In the model there are two types,irradiation induced clusters and irradiation promoted clusters.
Irradiation induced clusters are accumulations of copper atoms in lattice defectscaused by neutron irradiation.
The rate of formation is proportional to theconcentration of copper atoms and the rate of diffusion of copper atoms(the speed at which they move). Physically this is an appropriate assumption.
: However, CRIEPI's report says, "Because the formation ofirradiation-enhanced clusters is a process in which copper atoms thatexceed the solid solubility limit form a nucleus together, it is described bythel squar&#xfd; of the quantity of copper above the solid solubility limit andalso the square of the diffusion coefficient."
It must be said that this is amistake.
Because two (or more) copper atoms come together to form acluster, it is appropriate to the think that it is proportional to the square ofthe concentration of copper atoms, but it is a mistake to sa that it isproportional to the square of the dispersion coefficient.
Becausetwo atoms move, at first sight it might seem that it would be proportional to the square of the speed, but that is not the case. Whether one atom ismoving or stationary at one point, the rate at which they come together isthe same. This can be proved mathematically.
For example, the chance oftwo people meeting in a crowd in a stadium is the same whether one of thetwo is moving or stationary.
As stated above, there is an error in the basic model of CRIEPI's prediction equation.
Naturally, any arithmetical calculation using thisequation will produce the wrong result. Since the JEAC4201-2007 embrittlement prediction equation includes this fundamental error, it is auseless equation for predictions.
In addition to the abovementioned brittleness of the embrittlement prediction
: equation, a mistake in the derivation of the equation itself wasdiscovered.
The JEAC4201-2007 embrittlement prediction equation mustbe discarded.
The current situation is that there is no reliable prediction equation.
Is Genkai- 1 Pressure Vessel Sound? NISA's Predictable Assessment At the 12th Hearing, held on March 29. NISA submitted a draft reportentitled "Concerning Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement of ReactorPressure Vessels (Draft)"
(referred to hereon as "Draft Report")
(17). Thepurpose was to bring to a close the debate since January this year about"the cause of embrittlement in excess of predictions in the Genkai- 1reactor."
I strongly opposed the Draft Report and listed the problems.
Inthe end the report was not finalized in March as planned and debatecontinued.
I strongly opposed the report because even though the reason why a highDBTT of 98cC was observed was hardly explained, the conclusion wasdrawn that the pressure vessel of Genkai- 1 was sound, and the fact thatthe DBTT failed to agree with predictions was blamed on flaws in theprediction equation.
Furthermore, NISA concluded that the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) assessment carried out by Kyushu Electric wasappropriate and that the pressure vessel was in sound condition.
Howeverthis type of assessment is totally inappropriate.
Figure 4 shows the results of Kyushu Electric's PTS assessment (18). Thecurve that looks lke a mountain in the bottom right hand corner is calledthe PTS state transition curve (K1 curve). In the case of a sudden largeloss of coolant (Loss of Coolant Accident
= LOCA), the Emergency CoreCooling System (ECCS) kicks in and coolant is fed into the reactor.
The K1curve shows the change over time in the force (strictly speaking the stressintensity factor K1) applied under those circumstances to the leading endof cracks that are presumed to exist in the inner surface of the pressurevessel. As a result of inserting cooling water, the temperature of theinternal surface drops. At the same time a temperature difference arisesacross the thickness of the pressure vessel and tensile stress is applied tothe inner wall. Eventually the temperature difference of the pressurevessel becomes smaller and the value of the K1 curve decreases towardsthe bottom left.
Kyushu Electric Power Company's PTS Assessment
-, 3003 1 Calculated based on theJEAC3201-2007 prediction curve: 250 2)FY2011
*1 After 60 years\ e l of operation
*1200:3) 0" *2 Most severe incidento 42 iassessment of all' 50assumed incidents
.2 / Curves do not intercept:
o 100 Assessed as soundMost severe large7"&#xfd; rupture LOCA 20 T~-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300Temperature
[0C]Figure 4: Kyushu Electric's Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Assessment for Genikai-1 Pressure Vessel.On the other hand, the curve rising to the right from the bottom left ofFigure 4 is called the fracture toughness transition curve (Kic curve). Itshows how the fracture toughness Kic changes depending on thetemperature.
If the material becomes brittle the curve shifts to the right.How is this curve derived?
Besides Charpy shock test specimens.,
specimens are placed inside the pressure vessel to measure fracturetoughness.
These are extracted and the fracture toughness is measured atvarious temperatures.
A curve is drawn as an envelope around the bottomlimit of the measurements, in other words below which there is no data. Inthe Japan Electric Association's standard JEAC4206-2007 this curve isderived using the following equation:
Kic-20.16+129.9exp
[0.0161 (TTp)] "" (C8)Parameter Tp is determined so as to draw an envelope around themeasured data (i.e. so that all the data falls above the curve).As the amount of neutron irradiation increases, the fracture toughness reduces and breakage due to embrittlement occurs at higher temperatures.
In order to derive a fracture toughness transition curve that corresponds to amounts of irradiation embrittlement other than those given by themeasurement test specimens, with the measurement data on thehorizontal axis the curve is shifted an amount A TKc parallel to this axisin the higher temperature direction.
In that case, A TKIc = A RTioris saidto hold. A RTNDT is the difference in the DBTT (the amount by whichDBTT shifts).
In other words, it is assumed that if the temperature atwhich the fracture toughness value was measured is shifted by the sameamount that the DBTT increased, the same fracture toughness value will be obtained.
There is no theoretical basis for this relationship, but since itmore or less works experimentally, JEAC4206 used this assumption.
Theoretically, an enveloping curve can therefore be drawn using all theobserved test data from the first to the fourth test at Genkai-1.
as well asdata measured before irradiation.
Also, for an arbitrary amount of neutronirradiation, a fracture toughness transition curve (C8) can be drawn. Inthis way the two curves in Figure 4 show the current Kic curve and theKic curve 60 years after commencement of operation for estimated amounts of irradiation of the inner surface of the pressure vessel.According to NISA's draft, "The fracture toughness measurement foraccumulated irradiation equivalent to that in 22 years from now (60 yearsfrom commencement of operations) was approximately double (over 50'Cin terms of temperature) the critical stress intensity factor. This fracturetoughness measurement is a directly measured value not related to theaccuracy and correlation equations of the prediction method. Even bearingin mind that in general there is a variation of -+/- 25% in fracture toughness for materials within the transition temperature range, it was confirmed that at this point in time there is sufficient margin for operation ofGenkai-l."
(p. 11)Is this true?The first problem is the qualification, "Even bearing in mind that ... thereis a variation of +/-25% in fracture toughness."
Is not the variation in thefracture toughness larger within the transition temperature range? Is itnot said that it is from double to half? If there is a variation of 50% in the80'C measurement of the fourth monitoring test, what will happen to theKic curve? I drew this in Figure 5. The result is that the Kic curveapproaches much closer to the K1 curve.The second problem follows on from the above quote, "In regard to thevariation in the monitoring measurement values, although themeasurements each time are few in number, they are carried outcontinuously for fracture toughness for temperatures which take intoaccount the increase in temperature (which can be thought of as theDBTT) for each monitoring test and it is considered rational to take theoverall lower limit." This is on page 11. This sentence refers to a shift inthe fracture toughness J RTNDT based on the abovementioned assumption that J TKAc = .2 RTNDT. However.
I submitted an opinion (19) to theHearings with an analysis that specifically showed that for Genkai-1, atleast, this assumption does not hold. It is unacceptable that NISAcompiled this draft with no reference to my analysis.
Kic:-25%.
-50%300,I 4th test sample RTNDr-g98'c
:,, i/ ( 0%o025 ... ..... /#''.-. ... -25%Y,-50% VL so -......,JEAC4206-2007/ O Appendix C, equation (8)C : 200 -- -- ----- -----oo-../ ..=9 -9Uj /105 P....... --- -.../ -. -------------...
150 0 /- --- / .Appendix A, equation (7)/ RTN r=98C .............
C0).10 0 ----------------
-- ----I ...............
----------------
; ....... .', Matsubara, Okamura Ki50. ..............
: ....... : -..... -- -------------w o --'- '--.......A.
Kyushu EPCO Ki0 50 100 150 200 250 300Temperature
[&deg;C]Figure 5: Results of Authors' Examination of Genkai-1 Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Assessment.
JEAC4206-2007 Appendix C andAppendix A, using references (17) and (20).If this assumption does not hold, the shifted data point is not valid and theonly two data points that can be used to draw the Kic curve are those fromthe fourth monitoring test. With such limited data it is hard to claim thata reliable value for fracture toughness can be derived.
I therefore presented the curve in Figure 5 taking into account a variation of 50%.However, in appendix A to JEAC4206-2007 there is a rule about whatshould be done "in the case where the value for fracture toughness is notderived."
This is an instruction to use the following equation to derive theKic curve from the DBTT values..Kic&#xfd;36.48+22.78exp
[0.036 (PRTNDT)]
... (A7)Figure 5 shows the curve derived by inserting the fourth monitoring testvalues for DBTT R2VDT = 98&deg;C into equation A7. This curve approaches almost to the point of touching the stress curve K1.If the curves were tocross that would mean the pressure vessel would break.Next I would like to consider the PTS state transition curve (K,, curve),which shows the size of the stress arising.
Are Kyushu Electric's calculations sufficiently conservative?
The assumption in JEAC4206 is fora semi-elliptical 10mm deep and 60mm long crack in the inner surface.
Itcalculates the stress applied to the leading edge of this crack (stress intensity factor K1). Figure 4 shows the PTS state transition curve derivedby Kyushu Electric for Genkai-1.
According to document 20 presented tothe Hearings by Kyushu Electric, for the PTS assessment the most severelarge rupture LOCA (loss of coolant accident) is assumed.
Kyushu Electricsaid that it is a conservative assessment in which, without considering thetemperature conditions of the inner surface or mixing with cooling water,the temperature would fall in steps from 2919C to 27&deg;C. (Kyushu Electricgave a confusing explanation implying that the temperature of the innersurface also falls in steps.)On the other hand, in Figure 5 the K1 curve referred to as 'Matsubara andOkamura' shows the results of a PTS assessment for a pressure vessel ofthe same dimensions as Genkai-1 (plate thickness 168mm, diameter 3.37)(21). It is a diagram showing the case of a 10mm deep crack (a ratio ofcrack depth to plate thickness of 0.06). This curve gives a much larger K1curve than the curve in Kyushu Electric's assessment.
Matsubara andOkamura's paper assumes a sufficiently long crack, so compared toassuming a crack of 60mm length the values are rather large, but thatvariation is about 15% based on stress calculations (personal correspondence from Dr. Aono). Even if that amount is subtracted it isabove Kyushu Electric's K1 curve. There is therefore a possibility thatKyushu Electric's assessment is not sufficiently conservative in regard topressure conditions, etc.On this point, committee member Meshii said that the K1 curve changesgreatly depending on the heat transfer coefficient h of the inner surface.
Ifthe equation is taken as h=lkW/m2K the result is close to KyushuElectric's
: analysis, but if it is taken as h=2kW/m2K the result is about thesame as the Matsubara and Okamura analysis, and for ho-- it crosses theKic curve. From this result, Meshii concluded, "The PTS assessment carried out by Kyushu Electric was judged to be close to realistic, but notso conservative that it was not necessary for variation in the fracturetoughness value to be taken into account."(22).
He is saying that the curvein the assessment is at the limit and that Kyushu Electric's analysis doesnot have sufficient
&#xfd;eewa.Seen in this light, the conclusion in NISA's draft report (17) that it hasbeen confirmed that Genkai- 1 is "sound enough" in regard to pressurized thermal shock must be seen as lacking foundation.
At the sixteenth meeting of the Hearings NISA submitted a new draft (23) which to someextent took into account the various critical views expressed.
Debate onthis draft is set to begin. However, even though the wording is slightlychanged and the data reinforced, the arguments and the conclusion in thisdraft are the same as before. The conclusion that the Genkai-1 pressurevessel is sound was there from the beginning.
The new draft does no morethan add all sorts of considerations.
For reactors with such extreme irradiation embrittlement that the conclusion concerning whether or not they are safe varies depending onthe analytical method and point of view, there is no other way to ensurepeople's sense of security than to make a decision to shut these reactorsdown.Destruction of the pressure vessel due to embrittlement is an accidentthat must not be allowed to happen. If the pressure vessel is destroyed thenuclear fuel will be spread over a wide area and there will be no way ofcooling the nuclear fuel to remove the decay heat. Emergency response firetrucks and power supply trucks will all become ineffective.
Reactors witheven a small risk of being destroyed due to embrittlement should be shutdown.A bill to wind up NISA and NSC and establish a new Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now being debated in the Diet. The bill proposed by thegovernment contains a clause saying, "The life of nuclear power plants willin principle be 40 years." This condition allows a life extension of 20 yearsin exceptional circumstances, so there is the possibility that the 40-yearcondition will be gutted of meaning.
It should state that nuclear powerplants will, without exception, be decommissioned after 40 years.All nuclear power plants that began operations in the 1970s will be over40 years old by 2019. All these early reactors have numerous problemswith manufacturing technology and quality of materials, and they aredeteriorating.
Of course Tsuruga-l and Mihama-1&2, which are alreadyover 40 years old, should be closed down, and Genkai-1 and Takahama-l, which have extreme irradiation embrittlement, should be closed downwithout waiting for them to turn 40.I would like to express my gratitude to Chihiro Kamisawa (Citizens' Nuclear Information Center) and Yuta Aono (Kyushu University Engineering Faculty) for their assistance with calculations, literature studies and production of diagrams.
References (17) Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency, "Concerning NeutronIrradiation Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels (Draft),"
Hearingson Technological Assessment of the Aging meeting 12 document 5, March29, 2012.(18) Kyushu Electric Power Company, "Concerning Integrity of theReactor Pressure Vessel of Genkai Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1", Hearingson Technological Assessment of the Aging meeting 5 document 3, January23, 2012, p. 10.The KIc curve in this diagram is a revision of a diagram published onKyushu Electric's web site in July 2011. Furthermore, the diagram on thewebsite, as noted in the August 2011 issue of Tsushin, is an incorrect curvewith ductile brittle transition temperature substituted as Tp. However Kyushu Electric did not acknowledge this and gave a transparent excusedrawing an image freehand for the curve (transcript of meeting 5).(19) Ino Hiromitsu, Hearings on Technological Assessment of the Agingmeeting 11 document 9, March 19, 2012, diagrams 1 and 2.(20) Kyushu Electric Power Company, "Responses to Committee MemberComments",
Hearings on Technological Assessment of the Aging meeting 8document 6, February 22, 2012, pp. 3-5.(21) Matsubara Masaaki and Okamura Hiroyuki, "Method of Assessing Integrity of Reactor Pressure Vessels' Resistance to Pressurized ThermalShock", Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers, Collected Articles EditionA, Volume 53, No. 488, 1987, pp. 843-847.(22) Meshii Toshiyuki, "Genkai-1 PTS Analysis Calculation",
Hearings onTechnological Assessment of the Aging meeting 14 document 8, May 9,2012.(23) Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency, "Concerning NeutronIrradiation Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels (Draft)",
Hearingson Technological Assessment of the Aging meeting 16 document 11, June 6,2012.Figure 4: Kyushu Electric's Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Assessment for Genkai- 1 Pressure Vessel.Figure 5: Results of Authors' Examination of Genkai- 1 Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Assessment.
JEAC4206-2007 Appendix C andAppendix A, using references (17) and (20).
Q: My question is, didn't Palisades first violate NRC's PTS safety standards 10 short years into its operations, by 1981? This was documented in thefollowing document:
July 8, 1993: "Pressurized Thermal Shock Potential atPalisades:
History of Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels inPressurized Water Reactors,"
prepared by Michael J. Keegan, Coalition for aNuclear Free Great Lakes, Monroe, Michigan (re-published August 3, 2005).In addition, the Associated Press's Jeff Donn pointed to NRC's weakening ofPTS safety regulations as his top example of NRC's weakening safetyregulations in order to allow dangerously degraded old reactors to continueoperating despite the worsening breakdown phase risks, in his four-part series "Aging Nukes," dated June 2011.Q: Has the NRC Region 3 Staff, NRC's Nuclear Regulatory Research staff,and other relevant staff read Mr. H. Ino's articles appearing in the CitizensNuclear Information Center-Tokyo newsletter in May/June 2012, andJuly/August 2012, about reactor pressure vessel embrittlement/PTS risks atJapanese pressurized water reactors?
I handed hard copies to every NRCstaff member who would take one from me when we met with NRCChairman Jaczko at the Beach Haven Event Center in South Haven on May25, 2012.Q: How many metal coupons or metal capsules are left within the Palisades' reactor pressure vessel? News reports have recently reported that Entergyhas said it will pull a capsule or coupon to examine this autum. How longhas it been since the last coupon/capsule examination?
Has NRC's assurance of PTS safety at Palisades all been based on computer models since the lastcoupon/capsule examination, by merely extrapolating expectedembrittlement rates, as opposed to actual physical measurements?
But Mr.H. Ino's articles in the CNIC-Tokyo newsletter contained the very significant warning that embrittlement predictions were significantly non-conservative.
For example, the Genkai-1 reactor pressure vessel had much worseembrittlement than had been previously predicted.
How can NRC andEntergy be so sure that Palisades' embrittlement has not reached a dangerous state, since no physical measurements have been taken in so long?Q: WHY does Palisades have the worst embrittled reactor pressure vessel inthe U.S., as NRC's Nuclear Regulatory Research staffer Jennifer Uhleadmitted was the case at a public meeting at the Beach Haven Event Centerin South Haven on Feb. 29, 2012? Is it due to the impurities in the RPV steel from its initial fabrication?
Q: Why compare aircraft landing gear to an atomic reactor like Palisades?
Besides the very different destructive forces the two objects have to endure(for example, aircraft landing gear are not subjected to 600 degreeFahrenheit temperatures then plunging by hundreds of degrees in a shortperiod of time, as well as 2,000 pounds of pressure per square inch, not tomention the neutron radiation bombardment, like Palisades is and has beenfor 42 years now?). If landing gear fails on an airplane, some hundreds ofpeople could perish -- if Palisades suffers a catastrophic radioactivity
: release, many thousands, or even tens of thousands, could die over time, asreported by the NRC-commissioned, Sandia National Lab-conducted 1982report CRAC-II (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, also knowas the Sandia Siting Study or NUREG/CR-2239).
Q: If the reactor pressure vessel at Palisades does succumb to a pressurized thermal shock rupture, will the primary reactor cooling water instantly turnto steam, because the pressure will be relieved?
Will it then escape the RPVthrough the fracture?
How could the reactor core be prevented from meltingdown at that point? Could the meltdown melt through the bottom of theRPV, like happened at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3? Could thePalisades meltdown even penetrate through the radiological containment structure?
Could this cause the casualties and property damages reported inNRC's 1982 CRAC-I1 report? What about the impacts on Lake Michigan, drinking water supply for 40 million people downstream?
Q: On Sept. 25, 2011, during the loss of power to half the control room atPalisades, the emergency core cooling system was inadvertently activated.
: However, it did not completely activate.
If it had completely operated asinstructed, albeit inadvertently, could the pressurized thermal shock on the100% power level and heat level Palisades RPV have fractured under thesudden temperature plunge, coupled with the high pressure level?Q: What is NRC's response to the March 29, 1982 (the third anniversary ofthe Three Mile Island meltdown) warning by its own safety engineer, Demetrios
: Basdekas, in an op-ed to the New York Times, that the nextmeltdown in the U.S. could very well be due to an embrittled RPV suffering catastrophic PTS?Q: Why did the NRC Staff and Office of General Counsel actively oppose environmental interveners' embrittled RPV/PTS risk contention during thePalisades 20-year license extension proceeding in 2005-2007?
As part andparcel of the license extension
: approval, didn't NRC's ASLB, as well asNRC Staff, require a plan by Entergy by 2011, to deal with Palisades' impending 2014 violation of PTS safety standards?
It appears the "plan" wassimply to weaken the PTS regulations, in order to allow Palisades to operatepast 2014, till at least 2017. Will NRC weaken its PTS regulations yet again,to allow Palisades to operate past 2017, even out to 2031? Will NRC alsoapprove 80 years of operations at Palisades
-- out to 2051 -- as the NuclearEnergy Institute has expressed interest recently in applying for permission todo?Q: Given the badly embrittled status of the Palisades RPV, might this notlead Palisades control room operators and senior management hesitating before activating the emergency core cooling system, for fear of fracturing the RPV? Might this not significantly increase the risks of an overheating
: accident, and even a meltdown?
Q: On May 25, 2012, 25-30 of us met with NRC Chairman Jaczko and manyother NRC staff, including from Region 3 (including Regional Administrator Chuck Casto). Embrittlement of the RPV and PTS risks were a primarysubject matter discussed during the meeting.
Dr. Barbara J. Pellegrini wasone of the concerned local residents who attended.
On May 30, she wroteNRC Chairman Jaczko her ideas for how Palisades' RPV embrittlement could be measured, and PTS risks defended
: against, including consultation with many experts in the field of materials science.
NRC never responded toher letter. Why not?Q: Just now annealing was held forth as a potential solution for theembrittled Palisades RPV. But Consumers Energy floated this emptypromise decades ago. Entergy has floated this empty promise years ago now.Now NRC is floating this empty promise.
What good is an empty promise,when obviously NRC will never require it to be done, and Entergy does notintend to do it?Q: Has annealing of an embrittled atomic reactor pressure vessel EVER beendone, anywhere in the world? If yes, what were the results?
Did it work? Issuccess guaranteed at Palisades, even if annealing is done? Was that RPV asbadly embrittled as Palisades' RPV is? How much would annealing cost atPalisades?
Isn't it so very expensive as to be cost-prohibitive for Entergy, which is currently facing tough economic times, as indicated by UBSFinancial
: analyses, which mentions that several of Entergy's reactors faceshutdown THIS YEAR due to such economic reasons (that is, the inability tomake a profit, due to exorbitant major safety repair bills)?Q: Consumers Energy told the Michigan Public Service Commission inspring 2006 that the reason it was selling Palisades to Entergy was that itcould not afford the major safety repairs needing to be done, such as on theembrittled reactor pressure vessel. Yet, even after owning Palisades for sixyears, Entergy has done absolutely nothing to deal with the Palisades RPVembrittlement risks. The public and even decision makers like MichiganPublic Service Commission have beenvictims of a bait and switch. How canNRC let such promises
-- that the embrittled reactor pressure vessel wouldbe dealt with -- be broken?Q: Did the Palisades power uprate which NRC so readily approved worsenthe neutron flux on the reactor pressure walls? Did NRC even consider theembrittlement and pressurized thermal shock risks of approving that poweruprate?Q: But how long has it been since the last capsule was removed?
Since thatlast capsule was analyzed, what if the embrittlement has taken place at amuch more accelerated rate than NRC's modeling would predict?Q: Since risk is probability times consequences, isn't it accurate to say thatembrittlement/pressurized thermal shock risks are significantly worse thanthey were in 1971, pre-operations?
Q: What about the synergistic effects of Palisades' many problems?
Not onlyis the RPV the worst embrittled in the US, but Palisades needs the 2nd steamgenerator replacement in its history, its badly corroded reactor lid is now 6years overdue for replacement, and a diversity of leaks, breakdowns, andfailures have occurred in the past few years. Might not all these problemsadd up to a catastrophic failure at Palisades?
Why doesn't NRC address thetotality of all these risks as a whole, as that is the reality of the situation, instead of just one system, structure, or component at a time, in isolation?
Tothe equipment
: problems, there are the safety culture violations at Palisades.
Q: If capsules were removed in the mid-1990s and 2000s, as NRC just said,that's a decade or two ago. Has NRC simply extrapolated to predict the severity of embrittlement?
What if NRC's understanding is flawed? What ifthe extrapolation is non-conservative?
How can NRC speak with anyconfidence, if the last physical data collected
-- and very few data points atthat -- are over a decade old? This is not science.
This is guesswork.
Thesafety risks are too high for this lack of science.Q: Reactor accident risk has gone DOWN because of operator experience and training?
I thought Palisades was busted for having a safety culture incomplete
: collapse, just one year ago. Doesn't that increase reactor disasterrisks? Has NRC forgotten all about that safety culture problem at Palisades?
Q: Isn't yet another INCREASE in reactor disaster risk at Palisades the sheer42 year old age? Break down phase risks? The NRC staffer just downplayed reactor risks at Palisades, which is misleading.
Another undermining of theNRCQ: Another undermining of the NRC's flip assurance that reactor operating experience and training is a risk reduction these days at Paliasades, is thefact that Entergy, as a cost cutting measure, has cut experienced staff overthe past 6 years. In fact, some of the best, most experienced staff at Palisades has been let go. Doesn't this fact increase the embrittlement/PTS risks atPalisades, given the increased risk of reactor problems?
Q: But it's called PRESSURIZED thermal shock! How can you sayPRESSURE doesn't add to PTS risks?!
List of organizations opposing 20 year license extension at Palisades nuclear power plant:Alliance for the Great Lakes, Grand Haven, MichiganCanadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility,
: Montreal, Quebec, CanadaCitizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Indianapolis, IndianaCitizens for Alternatives to Chemical Contamination,
: Mattawan, MICitizens for Renewable Energy (CFRE), Lion's Head, OntarioCitizens Resistance at Fermi Two, Monroe, MichiganClean Water Action, Grand Rapids, MichiganCoalition for a Nuclear-Free Great Lakes, Monroe, MichiganDon't Waste Michigan,
: Holland, MichiganGreat Lakes United, Buffalo, New YorkGreen Party of Michigan,
: Detroit, MichiganGreen Party of Van Buren County, Bangor, MichiganHome for Peace and Justice,
: Saginaw, MichiganHuron Environmental Activist League, Alpena, MichiganIHM Justice, Peace, and Sustainability Office, Monroe, MichiganIndigenous Environmental Network (IEN), Bemidji, Minnesota International Institute of Concern for Public Health, Toronto,
: Ontario, CanadaKalamazoo River Protection Association, Saugatuck, MichiganLeague of Women Voters of the Holland Area, Holland, MichiganLeague of Women Voters of Michigan,
: Lansing, MichiganLone Tree Council, Bay City, MichiganMichigan Citizens for Water Conservation,
: Mecosta, MichiganMichigan Environmental Council (MEC), Lansing, MichiganMichigan Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign/Voices for Earth Justice,Roseville, MichiganMichigan Land Trustees, Bangor, MichiganNational Environmental Trust, Michigan
: Chapter, Lansing, MichiganNuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS), Evanston, IllinoisNuclear-Free Great Lakes Campaign,
: Livonia, MichiganNuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), Washington, D.C.Nuclear Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.Nukewatch, Luck, Wisconsin Palisades Conversion Group, South Haven, MichiganPublic Interest Research Group in Michigan (PIRGIM),
Ann Arbor, MichiganRadiological Evaluation
& Action Project, Great Lakes (REAP-GL),
Ewen,MichiganSierra Club, Michigan
: Chapter, Lansing, MichiganToledo Coalition for Safe Energy, Toledo, OhioTransformations Spirituality Center, Sisters of Saint Joseph, Nazareth, MichiganWAND Michigan (Women's Action for New Directions),
Southfield, MichiganWest Michigan Environmental Action Council, Grand Rapids, Michigan(updated May 18, 2006)}}

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