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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000410/LER-2014-002]]
| number = ML14135A188
| issue date = 04/28/2014
| title = LER 14-002-00 for Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, High Pressure Core Spray System Inoperability Due to Inoperable High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator
| author name = Stanley J
| author affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000410
| license number = NPF-069
| contact person =
| document report number = LER 14-002-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 7
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:AdomwJim StanleyPlant Manager -Nine Mile PointP.O. Box 63Lycoming, NY 13093315 349 5205 Officewww.exeloncorp.comExelon Generation.James.stanley@exeloncorp.comApril 28, 2014U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
 
==SUBJECT:==
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69Docket No. 50-410Licensee Event Report 2014-002, High Pressure Core Spray System Inoperability Due toInoperable High Pressure Core Spray Diesel GeneratorIn accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), please find attached Licensee Event Report 2014-002,High Pressure Core Spray Inoperability due to Inoperable High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator.There are no regulatory commitments in this submittal.Should you have questions regarding the information in this submittal, please contact Everett (Chip)Perkins, Director Licensing, at (315) 349-5219.JJS/KP
 
==Attachment:==
Licensee Event Report 2014-002, High Pressure Core Spray System InoperabilityDue to Inoperable High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generatorcc: NRC Project ManagerNRC Resident InspectorNRC Regional Administrator ATTACHMENTLICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2014-002HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY DUETO INOPERABLE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESELGENERATORNine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLCApril 28, 2014 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017(02-2014)Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.( ) Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pnvacy and Information CollectionsBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGENine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 1 OF 54. TITLEHigh Pressure Core Spray System Inoperability Due to Inoperable High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FCLT AEDCENMENUMBER NO. IHA NAFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER2 27 2014 2014- 002 -_001 4 28 2014 NA NA9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)[1 20.2201(b) El 20.2203(a)(3)(i) El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)El 20.2201(d) [I 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) [: 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)El 20.2203(a)(1) El 20.2203(a)(4) El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) [1 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(iii) El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(x)El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) El 50.36(c)(2) El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) El 73.71(a)(4)El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) [] 50.46(a)(3)(ii) [] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) El 73.71(a)(5)100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) El OTHERI] 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or inNRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Everett Perkins, Director, Licensing (315) 349-521913. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUE SYS MANU- REPORTABLEC S FACTURER TO EPIX S T COMPONENTEPIXX BG DG GE N NA NA NA NA NA14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION[E YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) O NO DATE NA NA NAABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)At 0330 on February 27, 2014, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System was declared inoperable. Theunplanned inoperability of the HPCS System is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The event occurred during the Division III Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG),2EGS*EG2, post maintenance testing (PMT). The EDG testing identified erratic performance of a voltageregulator that was subsequently attributed to a degraded motor operated potentiometer (MOP) and otherpotentiometers within the voltage regulator. With EDG inoperability due to ongoing PMT, HPCS inoperabilitywas declared. This action prevented NMP2 from exceeding a TS LCO action statement associated with EDGinoperability. The corrective action taken was to replace the defective potentiometers. With the satisfactorycompletion of the EDG PMT, the HPCS and EDG were declared operable on February 27, 2014 at 1013.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
NIRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/201702-2014) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information CollectionsBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by*
* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Informationand Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEY SEQUENTIAL REVIYEAR NUMBER NO.Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 NUMBER 12 OF 52014 002 -00NARRATIVEI. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTA. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:Prior to the event, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) was operating at rated reactor power.B. EVENT:On February 24, at 0400, the Division III emergency diesel generator (EDG) known as the, "HPCSdiesel", was declared inoperable for planned maintenance. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1Condition B was entered with a required action to restore the EDG to operable status within 72hours. Shortly after starting the EDG for post maintenance testing (PMT), Operations observederratic voltage regulator operation. The EDG was secured at 1621 on February 24 beforecompleting the required post maintenance operability test. On February 27 at 0330, the HighPressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was declared inoperable and the action statement for TS 3.5.1Condition B was entered. This action prevented the plant from exceeding the TS LCO actionstatement time limit associated with EDG inoperability. When the HPCS System was declaredinoperable, the action statement for TS 3.8.1 Condition B was exited in accordance with a TS 3.8.1Note which indicates, "Division 3 AC electrical power sources are not required to be OPERABLEwhen HPCS is inoperable." With implementing this TS provision and entering TS 3.5.1, ConditionB, personnel were permitted to continue troubleshooting the EDG hardware malfunction.The erratic EDG voltage regulator performance was corrected with the replacement of a degradedmotor operated potentiometer (MOP) and replacement of degraded R3 and R4 potentiometers onthe voltage regulator board. These hardware changes enabled the EDG PMT to concludesatisfactorily on February 27 at 1013.The reportable condition has been entered into the plant's corrective action program as CR-2014-001623. Nine Mile Point Unit I (NMP1) was unaffected by the declaration of HPCS inoperabilityat NMP2.C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TOTHE EVENT:The inoperable Division III EDG contributed to this event. The TS time constraint required toaddress the erratic operation of the EDG voltage regulator led to the declaration of HPCSinoperability.NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVIYEAR NUMBER NO.Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 .3 OF2014 -002 -00NARRATIVED. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:DateFebruary 24February 24February 27February 27February 27Time Occurrence0400 Declared Division III EDG inoperable for planned maintenance.TS 3.8.1, Condition B action statement entered1621 Secured EDG prior to completion of PMT0330 Declared HPCS inoperable, entered TS 3.5.1 Condition B.1013 Declared Division III EDG operable and HPCS operable1013 Exited TS 3.5.1, Condition B and 3.8.1, Condition BE. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:No other systems or secondary functions were affected beyond systems discussed in Section I.BF. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:The declaration of the HPCS as inoperable due to the status of EDG PMT was determined as areportable condition.G. MAJOR OPERATOR ACTION:The HPCS was declared inoperable and the action statement for TS 3.5.1, Condition B was entered.Following this action, TS 3.8.1, Condition B was exited. Completion of successful EDG PMToccurred on February 27 and the plant exited the action statements for TS 3.5.1 and 3.8.1 onFebruary 27 at 1013.H. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:No operational conditions requiring the response of safety systems occurred as a result of thiscondition.II. CAUSE OF EVENT:The cause of event was the erratic operation of the Division III EDG voltage regulator during PMT.Repairs to address this condition were projected to exceed the 72 hour TS action statement completiontime provided by TS 3.8.1 Condition B. Prior to exceeding this time duration, the HPCS was declaredinoperable.III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:This event is considered reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b) (3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 notes the provisions of paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as: "Any event or conditionthat could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are neededto: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident". The HPCS system unplanned inoperability resultedfrom a decision to prevent the PMT of Division III EDG from exceeding Technical Specification (TS)3.8.1, Condition B time constraint associated with Division III EDG inoperability.NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVIYEAR NUMBER NO.Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 4 OF 52014 -002 -00NARRATIVETS Bases 3.8.1 provides an explanation of TS Note 3.8.1, which permits an exit from TS 3.8.1,Condition B for the inoperable HPCS diesel when the HPCS is declared inoperable. This Note isintended to allow declaring of the HPCS inoperable either in lieu of declaring the HPCS dieselinoperable, or at any time subsequent to entering the TS action statement for the inoperable HPCSdiesel. This exception is acceptable since, with the HPCS inoperable and the associated TS actionstatement entered, the HPCS diesel provides no additional assurance of meeting criteria for Modes 1, 2and 3.HPCS is an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) designed to pump water into the reactor vesselover a wide range of pressures. For a small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) that does notresult in rapid reactor depressurization, the system maintains reactor water level and coolant inventory.For large breaks, the HPCS cools the core by a spray. If the HPCS System were to fail, and RCICcapacity is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel level, the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)automatically initiates depressurization of the reactor to permit low-pressure ECCS to provide makeupcoolant.The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is not part of the ECCS. It is designed to assurethat sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel to permit adequate corecooling in the event that the reactor is isolated from the main condenser. The RCIC system, like theHPCS, can operate over a large pressure range (165 -1215 psia). During an accident with the RPV athigh pressure, either the HPCS or the RCIC system can be used to provide makeup flow to the reactor.When the low-pressure ECCS operates in conjunction with the ADS, the effective core coolingcapability of the low-pressure ECCS is extended to all break sizes. The low-pressure ECCS consists ofthe Low-Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system and the Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system.The RCIC, ADS, LPCS and the LPCI systems were operable during the event. Based on the aboveconsiderations, it has been concluded that the safety significance of this event is low, and the event didnot pose a threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.This event does not affect the NRC Regulatory Oversight Process Indicators.IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:A defective potentiometer on the Division III EDG voltage regulator was replaced; subsequentlythe Division III EDG testing was completed satisfactorily. The EDG and HPCS were declaredoperable at 1013 on February 27, 2014. Action Statements for TS 3.8.1 and 3.5.1 were exited.B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:The defective potentiometer on the EDG voltage regulator identified as the cause of the erraticvoltage regulator performance during PMT was replaced.NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVIIYEAR I NUMBER NO.Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 5 OF 52014 -002 -00NARRATIVEV. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:A. FAILED COMPONENTS:There were no other failed components that contributed to this event.B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:No previous NMP LERs were identified that document a similar event.C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTIONIDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TOIN THIS LER:IEEE 803 FUNCTION IEEE 805 SYSTEMCOMPONENT IDENTIFIER IDENTIFICATIONDivision III EDG DG EKHPCS NA BGD. SPECIAL COMMENTS:NoneNRC FORM 366A (02-2014)}}

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