TXX-4098, Interim Deficiency Rept SDAR-124 Re Installation of Chlorine Sensors Not Conforming to GDC 4,5 & 19,FSAR Commitments to Reg Guides 1.78 & 1.95 & NUREG-0737,Item III.D.3.4.Sensor Relocated & Mods to Provide Adequate Calibr Instituted: Difference between revisions
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s Ts' TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY MKYWAY TOWElf | |||
* 400 NORTIE OLIVE MTHEET, L.H. M1 | * 400 NORTIE OLIVE MTHEET, L.H. M1 | ||
* DALLAM, TEXAM 3201 R.J. GARY smacutive v.cs reas.onese January 18, | * DALLAM, TEXAM 3201 R.J. GARY smacutive v.cs reas.onese January 18, 194'b @ @ ] @] V TXX-4098 1 | ||
JAN 2 31984 Mr. E. H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Project Branch 1 | |||
.O U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Docket Nos.: | |||
50-445 Arlington, TX 76012 50-446 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION CHLORINE DETECTION AND CONTCOL ROOM HVAC QA FILE: CP-83-22, SDAR-124 FILE N0.: | |||
10110 | |||
==Dear Mr. Johnson:== | ==Dear Mr. Johnson:== | ||
In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the chlorine detection and control room ventilation systems. | In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the chlorine detection and control room ventilation systems. | ||
Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspectors review. | Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspectors review. | ||
\\ery truly yours, RJG:ln l | |||
1 | 1 cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy) | ||
Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies) | Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies) | ||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l | ||
_T_E- a7 A DRV8NRON OF TEXAN UTILITREN ELECTRIC COMI%N,7 | Washington, DC 20555 8401270275 840118 PDR ADOCK 05000445 6 | ||
PDR | |||
_T_E-a7 A DRV8NRON OF TEXAN UTILITREN ELECTRIC COMI%N,7 Ilg4 | |||
s | s TXX-4098 January 18, 1984 ATTACHMENT CHLORINE DETECTION AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION Description During pre-operational testing, a Design Change Request was submitted to site Engineering requesting review of control room and primary plant ventilation. | ||
Subsequent evaluation revealed tne chlorine detection ~and control room ventilation systems were not in conformance with NRC regulations (General Design Criteria 4, 5 and 19), FSAR commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95, and NUREG-0737 (Item III.D.3.4). | |||
In the chlorine detection system, the actual installation of the chlorine sensors did not conform to the design documents. The installed configuration placed the sensors inside structures prohibiting proper sampling. In addition, power supplies to the chlorine detectors did not provide diversity of power and were not supported seismically. The design of the power supply did not provide protection to assure operability of the chlorine protection system after a single failure or common mode failure in a seismic event. | In the chlorine detection system, the actual installation of the chlorine sensors did not conform to the design documents. The installed configuration placed the sensors inside structures prohibiting proper sampling. | ||
In tho ventilation system, the chlorine detectors were not properly aligned to provide train (A&B) redundancy. This condition could also preclude protection during a common mode failure. | In addition, power supplies to the chlorine detectors did not provide diversity of power and were not supported seismically. | ||
The design of the power supply did not provide protection to assure operability of the chlorine protection system after a single failure or common mode failure in a seismic event. | |||
In tho ventilation system, the chlorine detectors were not properly aligned to provide train (A&B) redundancy. | |||
This condition could also preclude protection during a common mode failure. | |||
Safety Implication In the event the deficient conditions had not been detected, a single or common mode failure during a seismic event could result in incapacitation of control room occupants. | Safety Implication In the event the deficient conditions had not been detected, a single or common mode failure during a seismic event could result in incapacitation of control room occupants. | ||
Corrective Action Corrective actions will cor,,ist of: | Corrective Action Corrective actions will cor,,ist of: | ||
1) | |||
Relocation of chlorine sensors and modifications to provide adequate calibration; 2) | |||
Reverse power supplies for two chlorine detectors; 3) | |||
Provide seismic supports for detector power supplies; and, 4) | |||
Realign detectors with proper trains for respective control room inlet dampers. | |||
TXX-4098 | |||
.Page 2 Engineering will be completed no later than March 30, 1984. Construction activities should be completed no later than thirty (30)-days prior to | |||
The corrective actions will-result in an evaluation for possible human factors engineering changes to the heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) panel or safety system inoperable indication (SSII) on the main control board. Damage study and cable separation reviews will also be actuated. These activities will be completed immediately following the construction activities. | - fuel load. | ||
The corrective actions will-result in an evaluation for possible human factors engineering changes to the heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) panel or safety system inoperable indication (SSII) on the main control board. | |||
Damage study and cable separation reviews will also be actuated. These activities will be completed immediately following the construction activities. | |||
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Latest revision as of 00:07, 15 December 2024
| ML20079M343 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1984 |
| From: | Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Johnson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM SDAR-124, TXX-4098, NUDOCS 8401270275 | |
| Download: ML20079M343 (3) | |
Text
p-.
s Ts' TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY MKYWAY TOWElf
- 400 NORTIE OLIVE MTHEET, L.H. M1
- DALLAM, TEXAM 3201 R.J. GARY smacutive v.cs reas.onese January 18, 194'b @ @ ] @] V TXX-4098 1
JAN 2 31984 Mr. E. H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Project Branch 1
.O U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Docket Nos.:
50-445 Arlington, TX 76012 50-446 COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION CHLORINE DETECTION AND CONTCOL ROOM HVAC QA FILE: CP-83-22, SDAR-124 FILE N0.:
10110
Dear Mr. Johnson:
In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding the chlorine detection and control room ventilation systems.
Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspectors review.
\\ery truly yours, RJG:ln l
1 cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy)
Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, DC 20555 8401270275 840118 PDR ADOCK 05000445 6
_T_E-a7 A DRV8NRON OF TEXAN UTILITREN ELECTRIC COMI%N,7 Ilg4
s TXX-4098 January 18, 1984 ATTACHMENT CHLORINE DETECTION AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION Description During pre-operational testing, a Design Change Request was submitted to site Engineering requesting review of control room and primary plant ventilation.
Subsequent evaluation revealed tne chlorine detection ~and control room ventilation systems were not in conformance with NRC regulations (General Design Criteria 4, 5 and 19), FSAR commitments to Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95, and NUREG-0737 (Item III.D.3.4).
In the chlorine detection system, the actual installation of the chlorine sensors did not conform to the design documents. The installed configuration placed the sensors inside structures prohibiting proper sampling.
In addition, power supplies to the chlorine detectors did not provide diversity of power and were not supported seismically.
The design of the power supply did not provide protection to assure operability of the chlorine protection system after a single failure or common mode failure in a seismic event.
In tho ventilation system, the chlorine detectors were not properly aligned to provide train (A&B) redundancy.
This condition could also preclude protection during a common mode failure.
Safety Implication In the event the deficient conditions had not been detected, a single or common mode failure during a seismic event could result in incapacitation of control room occupants.
Corrective Action Corrective actions will cor,,ist of:
1)
Relocation of chlorine sensors and modifications to provide adequate calibration; 2)
Reverse power supplies for two chlorine detectors; 3)
Provide seismic supports for detector power supplies; and, 4)
Realign detectors with proper trains for respective control room inlet dampers.
.Page 2 Engineering will be completed no later than March 30, 1984. Construction activities should be completed no later than thirty (30)-days prior to
- fuel load.
The corrective actions will-result in an evaluation for possible human factors engineering changes to the heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) panel or safety system inoperable indication (SSII) on the main control board.
Damage study and cable separation reviews will also be actuated. These activities will be completed immediately following the construction activities.
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L.
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