ML20196G721

Discusses Insp Repts 50-317/98-05 & 50-318/98-05 on 980420-24,0511-14 & 0519-2 & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $55,000

ML20196G721
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/02/1998
From:	Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Cruse C BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20196G727	List: ML20196G721 ML20196G739
References
50-317-98-05, 50-317-98-5, 50-318-98-05, 50-318-98-5, EA-98-280, NUDOCS 9812080063
Download: ML20196G721 (5)

See also: IR 05000317/1998005

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UNrrED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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475 ALLENDALE ROAD

KING oF PRUsslA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

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September 2,1998

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EA 98-280

Mr. Charles H. Cruse

Vice President - Nuclear Energy

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE)

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

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1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway

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Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702

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SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VlOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF ClVil

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PENAL.TY - $55,000

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(NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/98-05 and 50-318/98-05)

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Deer Mr. Cruse:

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This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

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during the period April 20-24, May 11-14, and May 19-20,1998, the findings of which were

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provided to you during exit meetings on . April 24, May 14, and May 20,1998. The inspection

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report was sent to you on June 2,1998. During the inspection, several apparent violations

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were identified related to the failure to properly implement your radiological control procedures

for activities in the reactor annulus on, April 9,1998. On June 18,1998, a Predecisional,

Enforcement Conference was conducted with you and members of your staff, to discuss the

violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.

Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information provided during

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the enforcement conference, three violations of NRC requirements are being cited and are

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descr; bed in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).

The violations, which involved multiple failures to adhere to your radiological control

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procedures during replacement of nuclear instrumentation (NI) detectors in the reactor annulus,

included: (1) the failure of workers to wear alarming dosimetry when entering the reactor

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annulus; (2) the failure of radiation protection personnel to stop work when unexpected alarms

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and radiological conditions were encountered; and (3) the failure to properly determine worker

stay times for work in a high radiation area.

The violations are associated with two instances, both of which occurred on April 9,1998,

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wherein personnel failed to follow radiological control procedures for personnel monitoring.

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In the first instance, in the early morning hours of April 9,1998, six workers entered the

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reactor vessel cavity to prepare for removal of insulation and replacement of the Ni detectors.

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Four of these workers then entered the reactor annulus, a high radiation area (HRA) with

accessible radiation dose rates that ranged from 2000 mR/hr to 6000 mR/hr. However, the

individuals were not wearing alarming dosimetry as required by the special work permit (SWP).

Although radiation safety personnel were required to physically verify that the workers were

wearing the required dosimetry prior to entering the HRA, these checks were not adequately

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Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

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performed. The alarming dosimeters were apparently prepared for use by the lead radiation

safety technician (RST); however, the dosimeters were not provided to the workers and use

of the dosimeters was not discussed at the pre-job briefing.

In the second instance, later that morning, an instrumentation and controls (l&C) technician

entered the reactor annulus to attempt to relatch a detector well. Although the I&C technician

was provided with alarming teledosimetry as required by the SWP, the dose and dose rate

alarms for three of the five detectors were not set properly in accordance with applicable

procedures. The three incorrectly set detectors alarmed almost immediately when the worker

entered the annulus area and continued to alarm until the worker left the area approximately

nine minutes later. However, the RST assigned to monitor the teledosimetry data did not react

to the alarms nor stop the work, as required, when unexpected alarms occurred as he was

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apparently focused on the observation of only one of the correctly set detectors. Furthermore,

although one of the detectors encountired dose rates in excess of the SWP limit, the RST,'

who was in voice contact with the l&C technician, did not instruct the I&C technician to exit

the area, as required, when unexpected radiological conditions are encountered. As a result,

the l&C technician received an unplanned exposure of approximately 760 mR to the left thigh

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which was in excess of the SWP dose limit of 600 mR. In addition to the failures to wear the

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proper dosimetry and to properly monitor personnel exposure, the stay time:s for both HRA

entries were calculated incorrectly, resulting in non-conservative estimates of the time

available for the workers to remain in the HRA.

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The failure to adhere to radiological control procedures for monitoring and controlling personnel

exposure resulted in one worker receiving an unplanned exposure in excess of the SWP limit,

and also created the potential for additional workers to receive unplanned exposures. Multiple

barriers for control of personnel exposure failed or were ineffective, including procedural

controls, training, and management oversight These failures represent a significant lack of

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attention toward control of radiological activities, in particular the control of personnel

exposure. Therefore, the violations in this Notice are of significant concern and are classified

in the aggregate as a Severity Levellli problem in accordance with the " General Statement of

Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions " (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

The NRC is particularly concerned that these failures involve recurrence of the some of the

same fundamental problems in your radiological protection program that caused a serious

event in April 1997, in which you failed to implement appropriate radiological contro!s during

diving operations in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. A $176,000 civil penalty was previously

issued to you for the related violations that were categorized at Severity Level ll. A Severity

Level lli NOV without a civil penalty was also issued for your failure to establish adequate

controls for airborne radioactivity for work in the reactor cavity in May 1997. Although a civil

penalty could have been considered for the Severity Level 111 problem, discretion was exercised

not to propose a civil penalty because the violations related to the cavity event occurred

approximately one month after the diver event and appeared to be the result of the same

fundamental performance deficiencies. During the April 9,1998, entries to the annulus,

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deficiencies similar to those identified during the 1997 events were identified, including

ineffective pre-job briefings, failure of radiation protection personnel to provide adequate

monitoring of personnel exposure, and ineffective management oversight. As you explained

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at the conference, your corrective actions following the diver event were focused on improving

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the preparation and planning of radiological control activities. However, you failed to

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recognize that behavioral changes were needed, and you did not follow through with the

implementation of those necessary controls. Although you established and communicated

your expectations for the safe conduct of work in radiologically controlled areas, it appears

that the plant staff, including radiation safety personnel, had not fully embraced or internalized

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these standards.

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in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000is

considered for a Severity Level Ill problem. Since Calvert Cliffs has been the subject of

escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years', the NRC woul normally consider

whether credit was warranted for /denti// cation and Corrective Action in accordance with the

civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Although

another RST technician recognized the alarms upon completion of work in the annulus area,

the unplanned exposure to the l&C technician occurred due to the failure of the assigned RST

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to respond to the conditions that were clearly indica'ted by the alarms and teledosimetry data.

Following the identification of the unplanned exposure, you took appropriate actions to stop

work in the Unit 1 reactor annulus and perform an investigation of the event and assessment

of your radiological control activities. As a result of this investigation, you identified the failure

to wear alarming dosimetry in the early morning hours of April 9,1998, and the incorrect stay

time calculations. Your corrective actions which include: (1) providing increased management

involvement and supervisory oversight of pre-job planning, pre-job briefing, and actual work

activities; (2) plans to update the Radiation Protection improvement Plan (RPIP) with lessons

learned from these events; and (3) plans to standardize radiation protection work practices and

improve procedures for work in the RCA appear to be comprehensive.

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Notwithstanding these actions, your performance in the last year in the area of radiological

controls has been particularly poor as evidenced by the diver event in April 1997, the failure

to establish adequate controls for airborne radioactivity f'or work in the reactor cavity in May

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1997, and the events associated with replacement of Ni detectors in the reactor annulus in

April 1998. These three cases each had similar root causes and demonstrate a lack of regard

for the importance of radiation protection by a number of your personnel. The implementation

of your corrective actions for the 1997 events, which included an assessment of all aspects

of your radiation safety program and which should have precluded the 1998 violations, were

ineffective. Therefore, I have decided, in light of your previous performance and your failure

to preclude recurrence of these violations, to propose a civil penalty at the base amount in

accordance with Section Vll.A.1(c) and (d) of the Enforcement Policy.

Accordingly, to emphasize the importance of appropriate management oversight and control

of radiation protection activities and the need for ensuring that your corrective actions are

effectively implemented,I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office

of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, to issue the

enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount

of $55,000 for the violations.

'e.g., A Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount

of $176,000 was issued on August 11,1997 (EA 97-192) and a Notice of Violation without

a civil penalty was issued on March 20,1998 (EA 98-106). Both of these actions involved

deficient radiological controls during the 1997 Unit 2 refueling outage.

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Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

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You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice when preparing your response. As noted above, your corrective actions do

appear to be comprehensive. However, you had previously described corrective actions that

were thought to be comprehensive. In light of this being your third radiation protection

incident within a year, your response should address why you have confidence that your

corrective actions this time will effectively preclude similar events in the future. Failure to

achieve effective lasting corrective action may result in more significant enforcement action.

The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is

necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

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Sincerely,

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J.

iller

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Regional Administrator

Docket / License Nos: 50-317/DPR-53

50-318/DPR-69

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Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of

. Civil Penalty

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cc w/ encl:

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T. Pritchett, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters (CCNPP)

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R. McLean, Administrator, Nuclear Evaluations

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J. Walter, Engineering Division, Public Service Commission of Maryland

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K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel

R. Ochs, Maryland Safe Energy Coalition

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State of Maryland (2)

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