ML20134G510

Responds to FOIA Request for ACRS Jul 1985 Ltr to NRC Re ACRS Position on NRC Policy on Safety Goals.Forwards Document Listed in App.Document Also Available in PDR

ML20134G510
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/20/1985
From:	Felton J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Weiss E UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
References
FOIA-85-572 NUDOCS 8508260288
Download: ML20134G510 (2)

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UNITED STATES g 3 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 WASHINGTON. D C. 20555 l

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AUG 2 0 1985 Ms. Ellyn R. Weiss, General Counsel Union of Concerned Scientists 1616 P Street, NW, S. 310 IN RESPONSE REFER Washington, DC 20036 TO F01A-85-572

Dear Ms. Weiss:

This is in response to your letter dated August 9, 1985, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a copy of an ACRS letter to the Commission in July 1985 on the ACRS position on the Commission's policy on safety goals. The requested document, identified on the enclosed appendix, is being placed in the NRC Public Document Room located at 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, in file folder F01A-85-572 in your name.

Sinc ely, J. M. Felton, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

Enclosure:

As stated l

l 8508260288 850820 PDR FOIA 1 WEISS85-572 PDR l I

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. .- Re: F01A-85-572 APPENDIX Document Being Placed in the PDR

1. 07/17/85 Letter to Palladino from D. Ward, ACRS,

Subject:

ACRS Coments on Proposed NRC Safety Goal Evaluation Report.

(8 pages)

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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r, j ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS W A$HINGTON D. C. 20555

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July 17,1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT:

ACRS COMMENTS ON PROPOSED NRC SAFETY GOAL EVALUATION REPORT During its 303rd meeting, July 11-13, 1985 and its 302nd meeting, June 6-8, 1985, the Advisory Comittee on Reaccor Safeguards met with repre-sentatives of the NRC Staff and reviewed the NRC Safety Goal Evaluation Steering Group report dated April 1985 (Reference 1). During our review, we had the benefit of three meetings of the ACRS Subcomittee on Safety Philosophy, Technology, and Criteria held on December 12, 1984, May 8,1985, and July 10, 1985. We also had the benefit of the docu-ments referenced.

The Executive Director for Operations has not completed his fomulation of recommendations to the Comission. However, recomendations have been provided by the Steering Group, by Mr. Harold Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, by Mr. Robert Minogue. Director.

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and by other senior NRC Staff members. Some of these recommendations suggest significant changes in the proposed 1983 Safety Goal Policy Statement.

Our coments at this time are based primarily on our review of the Steering Group report. We expect to make further coments after the Executive Director for Operations has forculated his recomendations to the Comission.

We conclude that the NRC is not ready to reaffirm and implement the 1983 Safety Goal Policy Statement in its original or even some slightly modified fom. Much progress has been made and the effort should continue. However, the form of the design objectives and the plan for implementation are not yet well enough developed. We believe that greater attention should be placed on working toward an objective of a mean-core-melt frequency of 10-4 per reactor year and use of a contain-ment performance objective. We are concerned that the Safety Goal Policy Statement may not give sufficient emphasis to defense-in-depth and may place too much emphasis on benefit-cost analyses.

Areas of Agreement We agree with many of the findings and conclusions of the NRC Staff Safety Goal Steering Group, including the following:

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July 17,1985 N:norableNunzioJ.Palladino PRA methods and resulting insights have proven to be very valuable in establishing priorities for regulatory activities, the develop-ment of regulatory positions on generic safety issues, and the assessment of plant-specific safety issues.

. PRA has limitations that must be understood when the results are used. The results of a PRA should nortnally be used in conjunction with traditional safety review methods in making regulatory de-cisions.

The statement of the Qualitative Safety Goals in the 1983 Safety Goal Policy Statement is satisfactory.

For sites where no people reside within a mile of the site bound-ary, for purposes of calculation of early fatalities, an individual should ordinarily be assumed to reside one mile from the site boundary.

In applying the latent cancer fatality numerical guideline, we agree with the Steering Group that it is better to consider the population within 10 miles of the site, rather than 50 miles as proposed in the 1983 Policy Statement. This goal is not a societal risk goal but an individual risk goal because it is not related to the number of persons affected. Consideration should be given to the use of a one-mile distance, as suggested by Mr. Denton.

. We support the general principle that no more than about 10 percent of any quantitative design objective should be accounted for by a single major issue or accident.

Implementation Procedures, Particularly Core Melt Objective The Steering Group has proposed a number of detailed inplementation procedures. The Cormlittee has a range of questions on the proposed operating limits, and wishes to discuss these matters in detail with the NRC Staff. The implementation procedures should not be adopted in their current form.

In its letter to you dated September 15,1982 (Reference 2), the ACRS '

stated that mean, not median, va{ues should. be used and that an opera-tional level for core melt of 10- per reactor-year is too large for all but a few, small, existing nuclear plants. Even a mean value of core melt of 10-3 per reactor-year is too large. As part of defense-in-depth, action to reduce such a core-melt-frequency should be part of the Comission's policy, not subject to the current benefit-cost backfit requirements as specified in the proposed Backfit Rule and implementing Manual Chapter.

We believe that the Comiss4on should state that a mean-core-melt frequency of not more than 10 4 per reactor year is an NRC objective for all but a few, small, existing nuclear plants, and that, keeping in mind l

July 17,1985

' Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino the considerable uncertainties, prudence and judgment will tend to take priority over benefit-cost analysis in working toward this goal.

Containment Perfonnance Objective The NRC Staff has not developed a containment perfonnance guideline, nor has any serious NRC Staff effort to do so been apparent to the Comit-tee.

The ACRS continues to believe, as it did in its report of June 9, the development of a containment performance 1982 (Reference 3) that and recomends that the Comission guideline warrants high priority, require early NRC Staff attention Approximate compliance to an appro-its defense-in-depth principle.

priate criterion should be an NRC objective.

Use of Median Values _

The Steering Group proposes to use median values for assessing compli-ance with the quantitative guidelines "so as to provide stability to estimates even if the uncertainties are much larger in one case than We disagree with the use of median values for purposes of another." If it is available, we believe that knowl-input into decision making.

edge of the uncertainty range and the frequency distribution of conse-quences (whether they be core melt or individual risk) is import have for decision making.is used for comparisonThe against a numerical gu mean should mean, not the median value of the parameter involved.b permits.  !

While addition of the mean values for each of a set of sequences f the does provide the mean value of the combined sequences, the addition o medians does not provide the median value for the combined set nor, for that matter, does it provide any clearly defined property of the com-l bination.

l If the pattern and extent of uncertainties are so ill-defined as to make '

i any assignment of mean-core-melt frequency or risk not meaningful, median likewise will lack sufficient meaning to have an important input into decision making.

l Additional coments by ACRS Members Harold W. Lewis, Forrest J. Rem Max W. Carbon, and Glenn A. Reed are presented below.

Sincerely, i

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y David A. War Chairman l

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m NonorableNunzioJ.Palladino July 17, 1985 Additional Coments by ACRS Member Harold W. Lewis I disagree very strongly with the overall thrust of the Comittee's letter on the Safety Goal Policy Statement, even though I agree com-pletely with the recomendation that the Comission not affirm the 1983 Statement. My reasons are so different from those of the Comittee that they point toward different directions for future development, and therefore warrant separate expression. Some reasons have been expressed t i

before [see additional coments to ACRS letter dated June 9, 1982 incorporated herein by reference (Reference 3)].

To avoid wallowing in the details and thereby losing the point, it may be useful to first say what I think the Comission should do. The rest will fall into context.

i.

F I believe the Comission should issue a declarative and arbitrary quantitative safety goal statement at this time, stating it as an objective, acknowledging its arbitrariness, inviting discussion of the exact numbers, and acknowledging that tradeoffs between containment and It preventien will sometimes be necessary to meet the objectives.

should nonetheless -- this is not contradictory -- comit itself to  :

maintaining the principle of defense-in-depth. The risk used should be l societal -- that is NRC's responsibility. It should recognize uncer-tainty, and accept the responsibility for decision making in the face of '

uncertainty -- there are no pat formulas.

The Comission should further comit itself to cost-benefit analysis --

not to assure , adequate level of safety, but to assess the value of improvements to safety. Cost-benefit analysis is not now done very well by the NRC Staff, but the proper response to that is to improve crafts-  !

manship, not reject the tool. (This is also important for the back- l fitting issue.) There will indeed be great uncertainties in both cost-benefit analyses and in the assessment of where a particular reactor stands with respect to the quantitative goals. These uncer-tainties are not created by the analysis -- they are revealed by it. ,

The Comission should acknowledge this.

With that preamble, detailed coments on the Comittee letter follow:

The Comittee is concerned that "too much emphasis [may be placed] on benefit-cost analyses." That will surely be read by some to mean that i the Committee rejects cost-benefit analysis as a tool in the management i of nuclear safety. If it does mean that, it is a grievous errrr. If it does not, it is inappropriate wording. It is particularly dirturbing in ,

view of the Comission's efforts to rationalize the regulatory process.

The Comittee agrees with the statement of the Qualitative Goals in the 1983 Comission Statement. For my disagreement, see the reference cited above. .

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F July 17, 1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino The Committee has a series of detailed coments about averaging radii, It which serve to further obfuscate the societal / individual risk issue.

further states, incorrectly in my view, that the latent cancer fatality goal is an individual goal. It is,Iin fact, an obscure mixture of the support societal goals, and would two -- neither fish nor fowl.

rather deal with individuals as individuals. I even believe that is NRC's charter.

The Comittee takes no position on the on-site /off-site question. I believe that on-site costs of an accident are not the responsibility of NRC, which is charged with the protection of the health and safety of the public. The exception is that of on-site radiation exposure of people, which is its responsibility.

The Committee coments about median versus mean are, if anything, understated. It is a disgrace that NRC Staff should continue to recom-mend criteria based on medians of core-melt probabilities. This is notI a matter of taste -- it is simply wrong to add median probabilities.

find it extremely disturbing that, despite the number of times this has been brought up, your Staff continues to fall short of even elementary If this is harsh, so be it.

textbook-level awareness of this.

The Committee states that a core-melt probability of 10-3 per reactor-I do not year is too large, independent of containment considerations.

believe the core-melt probability should be so arbitrarily separated

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from the other issues. It may be convenient for regulatory purposes, but it is not appropriate public policy.

I would also have made some coments about the importance of pressing the Staff to make realistic calculations for safety goal compliance.

The regulatory habit of erring on the conservative side is inappropriate here, and people seem to have trouble shedding their regulatory customs.

In summary, I recommend that the Comission continue the tedious process -

of learning how to deal with quantitative risk The analysis, time is notand with yet ripe decision making in the face of uncertainty.

for the promulgation of quantitative safety goals other than on an arbitrary basis, as recomended above. Progress is being made on the "how safe is safe enough" question. Let it continue Additional Coments by ACRS Member Forrest J. Remick I disagree very strongly with much of the Comittee's letter on the I see a number of the Comittee's com-i Safety Goal Policy Statement.

ments as restatements of prior views which indirectly attack the Com-mission's promulgation of a safety goal policy statement, in contrast to l

a thorough evaluation of the Safety Goal Evaluation Report prepared by the Safety Goal Evaluation Steering Group at the end of a two-year ,

evaluation period.

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-Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino July 17, 1985 4 I think that, based on the two-year evaluation and the generally excel-lent Steering Group report, the Comission is ready to utilize its Safety Goal Policy Statement to augment its traditional safety review methods in making regulatory decisions. Like the Steering Group, ! ,

think such use will help add objectivity and predictability to the  ;

regulatory process and can be used as a regulatory yardstick against which a wide range of regulatory issues can be measured.

I do take exception to the Steering Group's proposed change to the benefit-cost guideline from that defined in NUREG-0880, Revision 1. The basis for my exception is as follows:

The Comission's responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act is to promote comon defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public. The extent to which the health and safety of the public is to be protected is neither specified in the Act nor in the Com-mission's regulations.

The Comission's Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants expresses the Comission's view on the acceptable

' level of risk to public health and safety and on the safety-cost trade-

offs in regulatory decision making. Therefore, the Comission has defined for the first time how safe is safe enough with respect to protecting the health and safety of the public from the risks of the operation of nuclear power plants.

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The Atomic Energy Act does not indicate that the Comission has the responsibility to protect licensees from the risk of potential economic loss of investment resulting from the operation of their nuclear power plants. Therefore, the Comission's Policy Statement on Safety Goals does not define acceptable levels of risk of such losses.

The Comission adopted a benefit-cost guideline in its Policy Statement to encourage the efficient allocation of resources in safety-cost tradeoff decisions related to Comission-imposed plant modifications.

Consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, the benefit in the benefit-cost guideline is defined as a reduction in public risk (in tems of a reduction in the collective population exposure measured in person-rems). Averted economic risks to the licensee which hypothetically

might result from a Commission-imposed modification, rigntfully are not defined as a benefit in the benefit-cost guideline. Therefore, a Comission-imposed modification could not be justified on the basis that it might reduce economic risk to the licensee.

Earlier the Comission solicited and received public coments on this point. Most commenters were opposed to the proposed change in the l

benefit-cost guideline. The following partial quote from the coment by Duke Power Company sumarizes the views of the twenty-four comenters opposed: "The benefit side of the benefit-cost analysis should repre-sent a measure of the potential reduction in risk only in tems of public health and safety. The NRC is not charged with, and should not

. . July 17,1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino <

ility concern itself with, protecting the financial investment Rev. of a ut and its shareholders in a nuclear plant ...." (p. 74, NUREG-0880 1).

h Some proponents of including hypothetically plant modifications or unless this is perinitted, certain proposedThat is, the cost of the backfits might not prove cost beneficial. imposition thebecause modification its d f ty of the modification would precludewould not substantially reduce risk to public. t The continued efforts to impose modifications tregardless ibuted of the 1 compared to their public health and safety benefit Further, they con r have h less greatly to the loss of control of the regulatory proce safe than would be the case othemise. h For these reasons, Hypothetically I strongly disagree with the averted economic proposed chan risks to benefit-cost guideline. i licensees are not justifiable Therefore, they benefits from should not the standpoint be included as a of public health and safety. guideline of the Comission's Policy benefit under the benefit-costStatement on Safety Goals for the Max W. Carbon

. Additional Comments by ACRS Member d REG-0880, change to the benefit-cost guideline from tha Revision 1.

Additional Coments by ACRS Member Glenn A. Reed I agree with most of the ACRS letter Also, and I agree particularly with the I ag safety goal for core-melt frequency of 10-4It is my consideredseopinion of that additional the adoption comments of Forrest frequency of the core-melt Remick. approach, rather ft than any averted on-site benefit-cost analysis, is more likely to lead to s improvements since averted costs will involve many mor delay and confusion.

il 1985,

References:

Nr<C Safety Goal Evaluation Steering Group report dated Apr L " Safety Goal Evaluation Report," transmitted by memorandu l Thomas E. Murley, Chairinan, Safety 18, Goal 1985 Steering Grou

F. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS, dated April

2. Letter from P. Shewmon, ACRS Chairman, Plants, to Nu i

Chairman,

Subject:

i menting the Comission's Safety Goals for Nuclear Power dated September 15, 1982 l

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• 5

' July 17,1985 m K:norable Nunzio J. Palladino

3. Letter from P. Shewmon, ACRS Chairman, to Nunzio J. Palladino, NRC Chairman,

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Policy Statement on Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0880, A Discussion Paper),

dated June 9, 1982

4. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plant Operation," USNRC Report NUREG-0880, Revision 1, dated May 1983

5. Memorandum from Malcom L. Ernst, Deputy Director', Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, to Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I,

Subject:

Emphasis on Defense-in-Depth and Accident Pre-vention in Safety Goals, dated May 10, 1985

6. Memorandum from Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, to William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations,

Subject:

Safety Goal Evaluation Report, dated May 21, 1985

7. Merorandum from Harold Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, 1985

Subject:

Safety Goal Evaluation Report, dated June 12, t

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