ENS 54546: Difference between revisions
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| utype = | | utype = | ||
| cfr = Non | | cfr = Non | ||
| emergency class = | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 02/26/2020 18:15 | | notification date = 02/26/2020 18:15 | ||
| notification by = Robert Busch | | notification by = Robert Busch | ||
| NRC officer = Kerby Scales | | NRC officer = Kerby Scales | ||
| event date = 02/25/2020 13:30 MST | | event date = 02/25/2020 13:30 MST | ||
| last update date = 02/26/2020 | | last update date = 02/26/2020 | ||
| title = Technical Specification Non-Compliance | | title = Technical Specification Non-Compliance | ||
| event text = The following is a summary received from the University of New Mexico Reactor Facility via email: | | event text = The following is a summary received from the University of New Mexico Reactor Facility via email: | ||
At 1330 MST, February 25, 2020, a pre-operational checkout was being performed on the reactor while it was shutdown. The pre-operational checkout includes confirming operation of the rod interlocks, scram systems, and control rods. The interlock check was performed and all requirements were fulfilled. During the manual scram test, Operators determined that only Safety Rod #2 and the Coarse Control Rod scrammed. | At 1330 MST, February 25, 2020, a pre-operational checkout was being performed on the reactor while it was shutdown. The pre-operational checkout includes confirming operation of the rod interlocks, scram systems, and control rods. The interlock check was performed and all requirements were fulfilled. During the manual scram test, Operators determined that only Safety Rod #2 and the Coarse Control Rod scrammed. Safety Rod #1 was still attached to the magnet and was being driven out along with the drive motor. As a result, the licensee was not in compliance with Limiting Conditions for Operations, Section 3.2a, which requires the fine control rod, coarse control rod, and the two safety rods be operable and the carriage position of the fine and coarse control rods be displayed at the console whenever any rod is above its lower limit. | ||
Operators performed a series of tests to determine the cause of the problem. | Operators performed a series of tests to determine the cause of the problem. Operators determined that the rod and plate were sticking to the magnet, but could not be separated when the rod was subject to downward force. Corrective actions included cleaning the plate and magnet, and breaking any potential air seals at the plate. After a series of satisfactory tests, Safety Rod #1 was returned to operable condition and reinstalled in the reactor. The rod was tested to reassure it would scram in its original configuration. The issue with Safety Rod #1 did not affect the shutdown margin of the reactor, and at no time was the reactor operated when Safety Rod #1 was not in operable condition. | ||
This notification is required per Technical Specification 6.9. | This notification is required per Technical Specification 6.9. | ||
The licensee notified the NRR Project Manager (Helvenston). | The licensee notified the NRR Project Manager (Helvenston). | ||
Latest revision as of 12:54, 15 January 2021
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Univ Of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico (NRC Region 0) | |
| License number: | R-102 |
| Reporting | |
| Non | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+21.75 h0.906 days <br />0.129 weeks <br />0.0298 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Robert Busch 18:15 Feb 26, 2020 |
| NRC Officer: | Kerby Scales |
| Last Updated: | Feb 26, 2020 |
| 54546 - NRC Website | |