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{{#Wiki_filter:0 REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 0      (RIOS)
{{#Wiki_filter:0 0
ACCESSION NdR:8102180444                     DUC ~ DATE:               81/02/10     NOTARIZED:   NO               &#xb9; FACIL:50- 87 Susquehanna                 Steam   Electric Station< Unit                     IR pennsylva 05000387 sguehanna     Steam   El.ectric Station< Unit                     2R Pennsylva 05000388 A,I CU T S
REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIOS)
        ~
ACCESSION NdR:8102180444 DUC ~ DATE: 81/02/10 NOTARIZED:
g >I ~ Ti ~
NO FACIL:50- 87 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station<
AU THUR  AF F ILIATION Pennsylvania Power                   tr I ight   Co.
Unit IR pennsylva sguehanna Steam El.ectric Station<
RECIP.~A~~E                   REC IPIc'NT AFFILIATION GR IER r 8, h.                   Reason IR Philaaelphia<                       Office of the Director SUBJECT;       Final deficiency rept re ovality of small diameter pipe at amends'OCKET bends exceeoina AS4lE Boiler tt Pressure Vessel Code tolerancesiin>tiatly reported on 800411.Benos will oe dispositioned in accordance w/cr iteria by 810331R OISTRISUTIOR COOE: SOISS                   OORIES RECEIVES:LTR 3 ERCL TI TLE: Construction Oe f i c i ency Report (10CFR50 ~ 55E) f  SIZE:
Unit 2R Pennsylva A,
NOTES:Send           IH,E 3   copies   FSAR 4     all                                                     05000387 16E 3     copies   f-SAR 4   all amends'enal 05000388
~
                    ~ECIP I ENT             COVIES                            PEC IP IENT          COPIES ID CODE/ "lAt.1E           LTl'R ENCL                      IO CODE/NAME          LrTR ENCL ACTION:         A/9 LICEHSI'tG       Ow         1      1                  YOUNGBLOODEB 05          1    1 RUSHBRODKztor ~       nb         1      1                  STARKERS          07      1    1 INTERNAL:       AO/RC     I/IE       I?               1                  ASLt3P/J.HARD DIR pOIV OF LIC 1    1 D/OIR Huq FAC15                         1                                              1    1 EOU     tt STAFF   19               1                  FAUIP ilUAL BR11                1 HYg/GEO BR                             1                  IhE              09      1    1 LIC QUAL BR           lg               1                  SPA              20      1    1 t~Rt: POR             02               1                   OELO              21      1   1 EV  I>                1                  QA BR             14       1   1 nl                1                   RUTHERFORDRH,    IE      1   1 ST~NORDS        OEV 21                I EXTERNAL: ACRS                       lo       la     16                   LPOR             03 r~SIC                Oo                1 TOTAL 'tu>lBEEr OF COP IES rCEVUIRKO: LTTR                                 39   FNCL     39
AU THUR AF F ILIATION CU T I S g >I ~ Ti ~
Pennsylvania Power tr I ight Co.
RECIP.~A~~E REC IPIc'NT AFFILIATION GR IER r 8, h.
Reason IR Philaaelphia<
Office of the Director SUBJECT; Final deficiency rept re ovality of small diameter pipe at bends exceeoina AS4lE Boiler tt Pressure Vessel Code tolerancesiin>tiatly reported on 800411.Benos will oe dispositioned in accordance w/cr iteria by 810331R OISTRISUTIOR COOE:
SOISS OORIES RECEIVES:LTR 3 ERCL f SIZE:
TITLE: Construction Oe fi c i ency Report (10CFR50
~ 55E)
NOTES:Send IH,E 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'enal 16E 3 copies f-SAR 4 all amends'OCKET
&#xb9; 05000387 05000388 05000387 05000388
~ECIP I ENT ID CODE/ "lAt.1E ACTION:
A/9 LICEHSI'tG Ow RUSHBRODKztor ~
nb INTERNAL: AO/RC I/IE I?
D/OIR Huq FAC15 EOU tt STAFF 19 HYg/GEO BR LIC QUAL BR lg t~Rt:
POR 02 EV I>
nl ST~NORDS OEV 21 COVIES LTl'R ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 I
PEC IP IENT IO CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODEB 05 STARKERS 07 ASLt3P/J.HARD DIR pOIV OF LIC FAUIP ilUAL BR11 IhE 09 SPA 20 OELO 21 QA BR 14 RUTHERFORDRH, IE COPIES LrTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
EXTERNAL: ACRS r~SIC lo Oo la 16 1
LPOR 03 TOTAL 'tu>lBEEr OF COP IES rCEVUIRKO: LTTR 39 FNCL 39


l TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA. 18101       PHONEr (215) 770 5151 NORMAN W. CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 3 Construction-Nuclear 770.5381 February 10, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier-Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY RELATING TO OVALITY OF BENT PIPE ERs     100450/100508               FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-630
l TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA. 18101 PHONEr (215) 770 5151 NORMAN W. CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 3 Construction-Nuclear 770.5381 February 10, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier-Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY RELATING TO OVALITY OF BENT PIPE ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-630


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
PLA-498 (6/20/80)
PLA-498 (6/20/80)
              '


==Dear Mr. Grier:==
==Dear Mr. Grier:==
This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a deficiency relating to excessive ovality of small diameter pipe caused by bends which were produced in the field prior to the installation.
The ovality of the pipe at the bends exceeds the tolerances specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, NB4223.2.
The condition was originally reported in PLA-498, and the information contained herein is submitted as a final report pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The attachment to this letter contains a description of the problem; its
: cause, safety implications and significance; and the corrective action taken and planned to preclude recurrence.
We trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.
Very truly yours, N.
W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering
& Construction-Nuclear FLW:sab Qorrt 5
I/i Attachment al ezlaO PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5
LIGHT COAIPANY


This    letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a deficiency relating to excessive ovality of small diameter pipe caused by bends which were produced in the field prior to the installation.
~
The ovality of the pipe at the bends exceeds the tolerances specified in the      ASME    Boiler        and Pressure  Vessel Code, Section    III, NB4223.2.
V ~
The    condition was originally reported in PLA-498, and the information contained herein is submitted as a final report pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The    attachment to this              letter contains a description of the problem; its cause,        safety implications and significance; and the corrective action taken and planned to preclude recurrence.
We    trust the Commission will find                the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.
Very truly yours, Qorrt N. W.      Curtis                                                                        5 Vice President-Engineering                  & Construction-Nuclear FLW:sab                                                                                  I/i Attachment PENNSYLVANIA POWER      5 LIGHT COAIPANY al ezlaO
 
~ V ~
I
I


Mr. Boyce H. Grier                                 February 10, 1981 cc: Mr. Victor Stello (15)
Mr. Boyce H. Grier February 10, 1981 cc:
Director-Office of Inspection   a Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 45 Office of Management Information & Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Robert M. Gallo U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 52 Shickshinny, PA 18655
Mr. Victor Stello (15)
 
Director-Office of Inspection a Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
1
20555 45 Office of Management Information
: 1. Description of Problem NCR-5523 dated        April 11,.1980, identified a nonconforming condition in. which small diameter pipe bent in'the field exceeds the tolerance stated in ASME, Section III, "NB-4223.2. Ovality Tolerance.
& Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Robert M. Gallo U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Unless otherwise justified by the Stress Report, the ovality of piping after bending shall not exceed 8 percent as determined by 100 K (D      - .D  .  )/D where.
Box 52 Shickshinny, PA 18655
D 0
The minimum      pipe outside diameter before bending or forming, in. (mm)
D      = The minimum outside diameter 'after bending or forming, in.
min  'mm)    .
D      = The maximum outside diameter after bending or forming, in.
max          1  I (mm)
Nuclear Class        II  and  III  piping are subject to the same provisions.
    . This formula is derived from the 1971 edition of Section                    III with
  . Addenda thru Winter, 1972. .This is the Code in effect for. this pro j e'ct.
Construction determined the values for D , D . , D                      through actual measurement of the pipe. D . anl D                      were 5etermined by taking 3 sets of readings inside tEe oend. Ponstruction used .the values from the point that produced the greatest variation. D was determined by a reading taken adjacent to the bend.
The  deficiency identified four stainless steel pipe bends where the ovality    exceeds    8g.
: 2.    'Cause  .of Deficiency The subject non-conforming condition has been primarily on pipe bends that were made in place, apparently using the Greenlee Model jj884 One Shot. hydraulic ram type bender; Sample bends made on this bender did not meet the 8$ ovality requirement.                    Bends made in the onsite pipe prefab          facility  on  the  Pedrick    mechanical  bender have been observed        to  be  better  than  those    made    on the  Greenlee  machine.
However,    even    these  bends  have  very  little    margin  with respect  to ovality.      Bends    made  in place  with  the    Ensley  mechanical  bender  d'o not appear to have ovality discrepancies.
Another contributing factor          is the lack of specific instructions to construction forces (via          specifications      for fabrication and installation of piping) for qualification          and  control      of pipe bending performed at the jobsite.
1of  3


Siace there  is  no record of which bends were made on which machiae, all installed    bends are being checked for ovality. Only after a complete iaspection will the       full  magnitude of the problem be Mown. This inspectioa is being performed and documented as part of the'isposition of NCR-5523,. NCR-5674 aad additional NCR's.
1 1.
: 3. Analysis of Safety Impli'cation Project Engiaeeriag has developed acceptaace criteria based on stress analysis for pipe bends with.ovality up'to 15$ . Maximum
Description of Problem NCR-5523 dated April 11,.1980, identified a nonconforming condition in. which small diameter pipe bent in'the field exceeds the tolerance stated in ASME, Section III, "NB-4223.2.
Ovality Tolerance.
Unless otherwise justified by the Stress
: Report, the ovality of piping after bending shall not exceed 8 percent as determined by 100 K (D
-.D
. )/D where.
D0 Dmin Dmax The minimum pipe outside diameter before bending or forming, in.
(mm)
= The minimum outside diameter 'after bending or forming, in.
'mm)
= The maximum outside diameter after bending or forming, in.
(mm) 1 I Nuclear Class II and IIIpiping are subject to the same provisions.
. This formula is derived from the 1971 edition of Section IIIwith
. Addenda thru Winter, 1972.
.This is the Code in effect for.this proje'ct.
Construction determined the values for D,
D D
through actual measurement of the pipe.
D anl D
were 5etermined by taking 3 sets of readings inside tEe oend.
Ponstruction used.the values from the point that produced the greatest variation.
D was determined by a reading taken adjacent to the bend.
The deficiency identified four stainless steel pipe bends where the ovality exceeds 8g.
2.
'Cause.of Deficiency The subject non-conforming condition has been primarily on pipe bends that were made in place, apparently using the Greenlee Model jj884 One Shot. hydraulic ram type bender; Sample bends made on this bender did not meet the 8$ ovality requirement.
Bends made in the onsite pipe prefab facility on the Pedrick mechanical bender have been observed to be better than those made on the Greenlee machine.
: However, even these bends have very little margin with respect to ovality.
Bends made in place with the Ensley mechanical bender d'o not appear to have ovality discrepancies.
Another contributing factor is the lack of specific instructions to construction forces (via specifications for fabrication and installation of piping) for qualification and control of pipe bending performed at the jobsite.
1of 3


ovality permitted is 8$ for pipiag which is subject to temperature traasients and 15$ for piping which is not subject.to temperature transients. Additionally the bends must be free of rapid chaages in curvature aad circumferential kinks or concavity as defined in the criteria. Wall thickaess, after bending, must meet desiga
Siace there is no record of which bends were made on which machiae, all installed bends are being checked for ovality.
  . minimum; The effect on flow (pressure drop) due to reduced cross
Only after a
  ~
complete iaspection will the full magnitude of the problem be Mown.
sectional area of bends with up to 15$ ovality was addressed and .
This inspectioa is being performed and documented as part of the'isposition of NCR-5523,. NCR-5674 aad additional NCR's.
found to be insignificaat.
3.
Approximately 700 bends, including all bends in small piping within the primary reactor pressure vessel bouadary have been iaspected aad dispositioaed ia accordance with the criteria; Although the balance of bends (approximately 5,000), in safety related systems have not been inspected   it   is felt that the work to date i's a represeatative sample and is adequate to evaluate the safety impli-cations.
Analysis of Safety Impli'cation Project Engiaeeriag has developed acceptaace criteria based on stress analysis for pipe bends with.ovality up'to 15$.
Of the approximately 700 bends checked as of Dec. 1980, one exceeded 15X ovality and two exceeded the 8$ ovality limit for piping subject. to temperature transients. These three bends have been replaced.
Maximum ovality permitted is 8$ for pipiag which is subject to temperature traasients and 15$ for piping which is not subject.to temperature transients.
Additionally the bends must be free of rapid chaages in curvature aad circumferential kinks or concavity as defined in the criteria.
Wall thickaess, after bending, must meet desiga
. minimum; The effect on flow (pressure drop) due to reduced cross
~ sectional area of bends with up to 15$ ovality was addressed and found to be insignificaat.
Approximately 700 bends, including all bends in small piping within the primary reactor pressure vessel bouadary have been iaspected aad dispositioaed ia accordance with the criteria; Although the balance of bends (approximately 5,000), in safety related systems have not been inspected it is felt that the work to date i's a represeatative sample and is adequate to evaluate the safety impli-cations.
Of the approximately 700 bends checked as of Dec.
: 1980, one exceeded 15X ovality and two exceeded the 8$ ovality limit for piping subject. to temperature transients.
These three bends have been replaced.
Approximately 240 bends measured fell between the 8-15$ limit allowed for systems not subject to temperature transients.
Approximately 240 bends measured fell between the 8-15$ limit allowed for systems not subject to temperature transients.
Three installed bends in safety related piping had to be replaced to'meet the project engineering acceptance criteria. Aay bends which d'o not meet the acceptaace criteria are ass~ed to fail in service. Such failures could'ave affected adversely the safety of operatioas of 'the plant. Therefore, this coaditioa is -considered reportable under 10 CZR 50.55(e)'.
Three installed bends in safety related piping had to be replaced to'meet the project engineering acceptance criteria.
: 5. Corrective Action The acceptance   criteria was   issued on May 30, 1980. Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250 bends per month         and that final corrective action will be completed, for Unit 1 aad         Common, by March, 1981.               ~     ~               ~
Aay bends which d'o not meet the acceptaace criteria are ass~ed to fail in service.
Specificatioa   M-204 for fabrication and, installation of pi>fag has been amended   to require field procedures to control and monitor future bending to ensure that 8$ ovality is not exceeded and that
Such failures could'ave affected adversely the safety of operatioas of 'the plant.
                                            .
Therefore, this coaditioa is -considered reportable under 10 CZR 50.55(e)'.
beads exceeding this limit or any other criteria shall be rejected.
5.
2qf   3
Corrective Action The acceptance criteria was issued on May 30, 1980.
Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250 bends per month and that final corrective action will be completed, for Unit 1 aad
: Common, by March, 1981.
~
~
~
Specificatioa M-204 for fabrication and, installation of pi>fag has been amended to require field procedures to control and monitor future bending to ensure that 8$. ovality is not exceeded and that beads exceeding this limit or any other criteria shall be rejected.
2qf 3


Corrective Action'to Preclude Recurrence 6.
6.
    -E~bdb'd'p''d'd*'PP Engineering- acceptance criteria. All measurements are being verified by on site quality control personnel. For future bends, a program has been instituted to'ave all bends checked for ovality by the responsible system engineers prior to installation of the bend.
Corrective Action'to Preclude Recurrence
Also, all applicable superintendents have been directed to insure that proper bending equipment, and techniques are used for all. pipe .
-E~bdb'd'p''d'd*'PP Engineering-acceptance criteria.
behds. In addition, Quality Control has been requested to inspect and document all Q-bends for ovality.
All measurements are being verified by on site quality control personnel.
Use of the Greenlee "one shot" bender has been discontinued for bending pipe. Also, a Pedrick representative visited the jobsite and.provided instruction as to the proper use and maintenance of the Pedrick bending machine, and re'commended some replacement parts where the shoes were worn. Those. parts have been replaced.
For future bends, a program has been instituted to'ave all bends checked for ovality by the responsible system engineers prior to installation of the bend.
2U/AAW 3of 3}}
Also, all applicable superintendents have been directed to insure that proper bending equipment, and techniques are used for all. pipe behds.
In addition, Quality Control has been requested to inspect and document all Q-bends for ovality.
Use of the Greenlee "one shot" bender has been discontinued for bending pipe.
: Also, a Pedrick representative visited the jobsite and.provided instruction as to the proper use and maintenance of the Pedrick bending machine, and re'commended some replacement parts where the shoes were worn.
Those. parts have been replaced.
2U/AAW 3of 3}}

Latest revision as of 03:24, 7 January 2025

Final Deficiency Rept Re Ovality of Small Diameter Pipe at Bends Exceeding ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Tolerances,Initially Reported on 800411.Bends Will Be Dispositioned in Accordance W/Criteria by 810331
ML18030A031
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  
Issue date: 02/10/1981
From: Curtis N
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, ER-100450, ER-100508, PLA-630, NUDOCS 8102180444
Download: ML18030A031 (7)


Text

0 0

REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIOS)

ACCESSION NdR:8102180444 DUC ~ DATE: 81/02/10 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50- 87 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station<

Unit IR pennsylva sguehanna Steam El.ectric Station<

Unit 2R Pennsylva A,

~

AU THUR AF F ILIATION CU T I S g >I ~ Ti ~

Pennsylvania Power tr I ight Co.

RECIP.~A~~E REC IPIc'NT AFFILIATION GR IER r 8, h.

Reason IR Philaaelphia<

Office of the Director SUBJECT; Final deficiency rept re ovality of small diameter pipe at bends exceeoina AS4lE Boiler tt Pressure Vessel Code tolerancesiin>tiatly reported on 800411.Benos will oe dispositioned in accordance w/cr iteria by 810331R OISTRISUTIOR COOE:

SOISS OORIES RECEIVES:LTR 3 ERCL f SIZE:

TITLE: Construction Oe fi c i ency Report (10CFR50

~ 55E)

NOTES:Send IH,E 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'enal 16E 3 copies f-SAR 4 all amends'OCKET

¹ 05000387 05000388 05000387 05000388

~ECIP I ENT ID CODE/ "lAt.1E ACTION:

A/9 LICEHSI'tG Ow RUSHBRODKztor ~

nb INTERNAL: AO/RC I/IE I?

D/OIR Huq FAC15 EOU tt STAFF 19 HYg/GEO BR LIC QUAL BR lg t~Rt:

POR 02 EV I>

nl ST~NORDS OEV 21 COVIES LTl'R ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 I

PEC IP IENT IO CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODEB 05 STARKERS 07 ASLt3P/J.HARD DIR pOIV OF LIC FAUIP ilUAL BR11 IhE 09 SPA 20 OELO 21 QA BR 14 RUTHERFORDRH, IE COPIES LrTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

EXTERNAL: ACRS r~SIC lo Oo la 16 1

LPOR 03 TOTAL 'tu>lBEEr OF COP IES rCEVUIRKO: LTTR 39 FNCL 39

l TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA. 18101 PHONEr (215) 770 5151 NORMAN W. CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 3 Construction-Nuclear 770.5381 February 10, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier-Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY RELATING TO OVALITY OF BENT PIPE ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-630

Reference:

PLA-498 (6/20/80)

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a deficiency relating to excessive ovality of small diameter pipe caused by bends which were produced in the field prior to the installation.

The ovality of the pipe at the bends exceeds the tolerances specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, NB4223.2.

The condition was originally reported in PLA-498, and the information contained herein is submitted as a final report pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The attachment to this letter contains a description of the problem; its

cause, safety implications and significance; and the corrective action taken and planned to preclude recurrence.

We trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.

Very truly yours, N.

W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering

& Construction-Nuclear FLW:sab Qorrt 5

I/i Attachment al ezlaO PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5

LIGHT COAIPANY

~

V ~

I

Mr. Boyce H. Grier February 10, 1981 cc:

Mr. Victor Stello (15)

Director-Office of Inspection a Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 45 Office of Management Information

& Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Robert M. Gallo U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.

Box 52 Shickshinny, PA 18655

1 1.

Description of Problem NCR-5523 dated April 11,.1980, identified a nonconforming condition in. which small diameter pipe bent in'the field exceeds the tolerance stated in ASME,Section III, "NB-4223.2.

Ovality Tolerance.

Unless otherwise justified by the Stress

Report, the ovality of piping after bending shall not exceed 8 percent as determined by 100 K (D

-.D

. )/D where.

D0 Dmin Dmax The minimum pipe outside diameter before bending or forming, in.

(mm)

= The minimum outside diameter 'after bending or forming, in.

'mm)

= The maximum outside diameter after bending or forming, in.

(mm) 1 I Nuclear Class II and IIIpiping are subject to the same provisions.

. This formula is derived from the 1971 edition of Section IIIwith

. Addenda thru Winter, 1972.

.This is the Code in effect for.this proje'ct.

Construction determined the values for D,

D D

through actual measurement of the pipe.

D anl D

were 5etermined by taking 3 sets of readings inside tEe oend.

Ponstruction used.the values from the point that produced the greatest variation.

D was determined by a reading taken adjacent to the bend.

The deficiency identified four stainless steel pipe bends where the ovality exceeds 8g.

2.

'Cause.of Deficiency The subject non-conforming condition has been primarily on pipe bends that were made in place, apparently using the Greenlee Model jj884 One Shot. hydraulic ram type bender; Sample bends made on this bender did not meet the 8$ ovality requirement.

Bends made in the onsite pipe prefab facility on the Pedrick mechanical bender have been observed to be better than those made on the Greenlee machine.

However, even these bends have very little margin with respect to ovality.

Bends made in place with the Ensley mechanical bender d'o not appear to have ovality discrepancies.

Another contributing factor is the lack of specific instructions to construction forces (via specifications for fabrication and installation of piping) for qualification and control of pipe bending performed at the jobsite.

1of 3

Siace there is no record of which bends were made on which machiae, all installed bends are being checked for ovality.

Only after a

complete iaspection will the full magnitude of the problem be Mown.

This inspectioa is being performed and documented as part of the'isposition of NCR-5523,. NCR-5674 aad additional NCR's.

3.

Analysis of Safety Impli'cation Project Engiaeeriag has developed acceptaace criteria based on stress analysis for pipe bends with.ovality up'to 15$.

Maximum ovality permitted is 8$ for pipiag which is subject to temperature traasients and 15$ for piping which is not subject.to temperature transients.

Additionally the bends must be free of rapid chaages in curvature aad circumferential kinks or concavity as defined in the criteria.

Wall thickaess, after bending, must meet desiga

. minimum; The effect on flow (pressure drop) due to reduced cross

~ sectional area of bends with up to 15$ ovality was addressed and found to be insignificaat.

Approximately 700 bends, including all bends in small piping within the primary reactor pressure vessel bouadary have been iaspected aad dispositioaed ia accordance with the criteria; Although the balance of bends (approximately 5,000), in safety related systems have not been inspected it is felt that the work to date i's a represeatative sample and is adequate to evaluate the safety impli-cations.

Of the approximately 700 bends checked as of Dec.

1980, one exceeded 15X ovality and two exceeded the 8$ ovality limit for piping subject. to temperature transients.

These three bends have been replaced.

Approximately 240 bends measured fell between the 8-15$ limit allowed for systems not subject to temperature transients.

Three installed bends in safety related piping had to be replaced to'meet the project engineering acceptance criteria.

Aay bends which d'o not meet the acceptaace criteria are ass~ed to fail in service.

Such failures could'ave affected adversely the safety of operatioas of 'the plant.

Therefore, this coaditioa is -considered reportable under 10 CZR 50.55(e)'.

5.

Corrective Action The acceptance criteria was issued on May 30, 1980.

Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250 bends per month and that final corrective action will be completed, for Unit 1 aad

Common, by March, 1981.

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Specificatioa M-204 for fabrication and, installation of pi>fag has been amended to require field procedures to control and monitor future bending to ensure that 8$. ovality is not exceeded and that beads exceeding this limit or any other criteria shall be rejected.

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6.

Corrective Action'to Preclude Recurrence

-E~bdb'd'pd'd*'PP Engineering-acceptance criteria.

All measurements are being verified by on site quality control personnel.

For future bends, a program has been instituted to'ave all bends checked for ovality by the responsible system engineers prior to installation of the bend.

Also, all applicable superintendents have been directed to insure that proper bending equipment, and techniques are used for all. pipe behds.

In addition, Quality Control has been requested to inspect and document all Q-bends for ovality.

Use of the Greenlee "one shot" bender has been discontinued for bending pipe.

Also, a Pedrick representative visited the jobsite and.provided instruction as to the proper use and maintenance of the Pedrick bending machine, and re'commended some replacement parts where the shoes were worn.

Those. parts have been replaced.

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