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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000293/LER-2013-007]]
| number = ML13266A242
| issue date = 09/13/2013
| title = LER 13-007-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power, Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink and Salt Service Water System Declared Inoperable
| author name = Lynch J R
| author affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000293
| license number = DPR-035
| contact person = RES-Library
| document report number = LER 13-007-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 7
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:SEn tergyEntergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.600 Rocky Hill RoadPlymouth, MA 02360Pilgrim Nuclear Power StationSeptember 13, 2013U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555
 
==SUBJECT:==
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.Pilgrim Nuclear Power StationDocket No.: 50-293License No.: DPR-35Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00, Ultimate Heat Sink and Salt Service WaterSystem Declared Inoperable LETTER NUMBER: 2.13.075
 
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-007-00, "Ultimate Heat Sink and Salt Service WaterSystem Declared Inoperable" is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.This letter contains no commitments.
Please do not hesitate to contact me at (508) 830-8403, if there are any questions regarding thissubmittal.
Sincerely, Joseiph R. Ly~ncLicensing ManagerJRL/fmAttachment 1: Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00, Ultimate Heat Sink and Salt Service Water SystemDeclared Inoperable e 9 PNPS Letter 2.13.075Page 2 of 2cc:Mr. William M. DeanRegional Administrator, Region 1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 INPO Records700 Galleria ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30399-5957 Ms. Nadiyah Morgan, Project ManagerDivision of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint NorthMail Stop O-8C2A11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD. 20852USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Attachment ILetter Number 2.13.075Licensee Event Report 2013-007-00 Ultimate Heat Sink and Salt Service Water System Declared Inoperable (4 Pages)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
10/31/2013 (10-2010)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIAPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail toLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MBcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGEPilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 1 OF744. TITLEUltimate Heat Sink and Salt Service Water System Declared Inoperable
: 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDRE FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL V MONTH DAY YEAR N/ANUMBER N0FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER07 16 2013 2013 007 00 9 16 2013 N/A9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
.50.73(a)(2)(vii)
N 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[ 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
E 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
: 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) i 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71 (a)(5)E- 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER100% -i 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or inNRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERNAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Joseph R. Lynch, Licensing Manager (508)-830-8403
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FMANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
: 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION LI Yes (If yes, complete
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE NNO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On Tuesday, July 16, 2013 at 1652 [EDT] and again on Wednesday, July 17, 2013 at 1054 [EDT] with the reactor at100% core thermal power (CTP) the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) declared the ultimate heat sink (UHS) andthe salt service water (SSW) system inoperable due to high sea water inlet temperatures greater than 750F. A maximumsea water inlet temperature reading of 75.50F was observed and the maximum duration for either event was 5.5 hours.The limiting condition for operation (LCO) action for technical specification (TS) 3.5.B.4 was entered then exited basedon the rise and fall of sea water inlet temperature.
Plant systems and components operated as required and noequipment failures occurred.
The plant was not shutdown due to the short duration of the sea water temperature excursion.
The cause of the high sea water inlet temperature readings was sustained increased sea water surface temperature inCape Cod Bay due to hot summer weather conditions and the contribution from recirculation of water from the plant'soutfall due to wind and tidal conditions.
Corrective action was completed to establish an operational decision makingissue (ODMI) action plan to reduce station power levels prior to reaching the TS UHS LCO temperature limit.This event posed no threat to public health and safety.NRUI FORM 366 (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVPilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 Y NUMBER NO. 2 OF 42013- 007 -00NARRATIVE BACKGROUND:
Cape Cod Bay is the ultimate heat sink (UHS) for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The circulating watersystem (CWS) and the salt service water (SSW) system take sea water suction from Cape Cod Bay via the plantintake canal and Intake Structure and provide cooling water for various plant heat loads. These systemsdischarge the heated cooling water back into Cape Cod Bay via system discharge piping and the plantdischarge canal.The safety objective of the SSW system is to provide a heat sink for the reactor building closed cooling water(RBCCW) system under normal transient, and accident conditions.
The SSW system has five (5) SSW pumpsand is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active system component failure can prevent thesystem from achieving the safety objective.
The system is designed to continuously provide a supply of coolingwater to the secondary side of the RBCCW heat exchangers adequate to meet the requirements of the RBCCWsystem under all conditions.
The RBCCW system provides the necessary cooling requirements for the residualheat removal (RHR) system and ultimately the reactor and primary containment.
The design and licensing basis maximum temperature of the UHS for PNPS is 75°F. This limit was established via license amendments
#173 and #176 which were approved in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
Technical specification (TS) 4.5.B.4.2 requires verification of sea water inlet temperature to be -<750F in order to assureUHS operability.
If the UHS is not operable, the plant is required to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours per TS3.5. B.4.During routine operation Pilgrim operators monitor sea water inlet temperature via temperature elementsinstalled on redundant SSW piping feeds to the RBCCW heat exchangers.
Routine surveillance is performed and alarms are provided in the Control Room to alert operators of increased SSW inlet temperature.
For TScompliance
: purposes, operators will obtain instantaneous sea water inlet temperature readings locally in theIntake Structure in order to determine UHS operability when alarms indicate that SSW temperature at theRBCCW heat exchanger inlet has exceeded 74*F.EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On Tuesday, July 16, 2013 at 1652 [EDT] and again on Wednesday, July 17, 2013 at 1054 [EDT] with thereactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) the PNPS declared the UHS and SSW system inoperable due tohigh sea water inlet temperatures greater than 750F. A maximum sea water inlet temperature reading of 75.5&deg;Fwas observed and the maximum duration for either event was 5.5 hours. The LCO action for TS 3.5.B.4 wasentered then exited based on the rise and fall of sea water inlet temperature.
Plant systems and components operated as required and no equipment failures occurred.
The plant was not shutdown due to the short durationof the sea water temperature excursion.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT:The cause of the high sea water inlet temperature readings was sustained increased sea water surfacetemperature in Cape Cod Bay due to hot summer weather conditions and the contribution from recirculation ofwater from the plant's outfall due to wind and tidal conditions.
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A(10-2010)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUBR N. 3O4Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 NUMBER NO. 3 OF 42013- 007 -00CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:Corrective action was completed to establish an ODMI action plan to reduce station power levels prior toreaching the TS UHS LCO temperature limit.Additional corrective actions are planned to:-Revise procedures to address operator actions to lower reactor power before reaching the UHS TS LCOtemperature limit.-Reassess engineering actions necessary to increase the established 750F UHS limit to a higher temperature in accident and transient analyses.
Corrective actions are captured in the corrective action program under Condition Report, CR-PNP-2013-5246.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES:
This condition posed no threat to the public health and safety.The safety significance of this event is associated with the UHS temperature and systems relied on to providecooling during accident and transient conditions.
The safety function of SSW is to transfer heat from all systemsand components cooled by the RBCCW system to Cape Cod Bay by continuously providing adequate coolingwater flow to the secondary side of the RBCCW heat exchangers.
Design and accident analyses for the stationhave been performed with an assumption that the seawater temperature is 750F.Although long term accident analyses do not address sea water temperatures above 750F, an engineering evaluation was performed to address the reported events. This evaluation assumed a short duration event (i.e.,12 hours) where UHS inlet temperatures exceeded 750F and remained less than 780F. This evaluation concluded all structures,
: systems, and components (SSCs) would be capable of performing their safetyfunctions with UHS/seawater temperatures of up to 780F for short durations provided that average sea watertemperature is less than 750F for the 12 hour time period evaluated.
Additionally, the LCO shutdown action statement identified in TS 3.5.B.4 (i.e., cold shutdown required within 24hours) addresses the reported events. Although plant shutdown was not required, the potential nuclear safetyimplications were previously evaluated by the approved technical specification which determined that plantshutdown would be accomplished in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.Therefore, this event does not involve any radiological or industrial safety concerns; and there are noradiological or industrial safety implications.
REPORTABILITY:
These events were initially reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as documented inEvent Numbers #49196 and #49201. This LER is submitted based on NUREG 1022 Rev 3, Section 3.2.7guidance which identifies that the requirements of 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D) apply due to the fact that a system(i.e., UHS and SSW) used to remove residual heat and/or mitigate the consequences of an accident wasdeclared TS inoperable and no redundant system or equipment could be declared operable.
The reportedevents did not involve plant equipment failure and the subsequent engineering evaluation indicates that thesafety function of the UHS would have been satisfied based on the maximum temperature recorded and theshort duration of each event.NFRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVPilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 YA NUMBER NO. 4 OF 42013- 007 -00PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
LER 1997-17-00 and supplement
-01 were issued to address a design basis concern involving high sea waterinlet temperatures that exceeded the then specified Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) limit of 65*F.Corrective action related to this LER resulted in increasing the UHS operability temperature limit to 75&deg;F viaLicense Amendment
#176 in 1998.Subsequent to revising the UHS operability temperature limit in 1998, no LERs related to high sea water inlettemperatures were issued. However, in 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 specific high sea water inlet temperatures were noted to have exceeded 740F based on installed instrumentation.
These events were evaluated under thecorrective action program:
See CR-PNP-2003-3256; CR-PNP-2006-2895; CR-PNP-2008-261 1; and CR-PNP-2010-2354.
ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) CODES:The EIIS codes for Components and Systems referenced in this report are as follows:SYSTEMS CODESUltimate Heat Sink (UHS) System (Cape Cod Bay) BS
 
==REFERENCES:==
 
Condition Report, CR-PNP-2013-5246, Technical Specification Limit Exceeded for UHS Temperature.
NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)}}

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