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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000293/LER-2016-002]]
| number = ML16250A013
| issue date = 08/18/2016
| title = LER 16-002-01 for Pilgrim Regarding Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited by Technical Specifications
| author name = Perkins E P
| author affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000293
| license number = DPR-035
| contact person =
| case reference number = 2.16.048
| document report number = LER 16-002-01
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 10
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:., August 1 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth. MA 02360
 
==SUBJECT:==
Licensee Event Report 2016-002:.01, Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Renewed License No. DPR-35 LETTER NUMBER: 2.16.048
 
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
The attached supplemental Licensee Event Report (LER) 2016-002-01, Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications, is submitted in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.73. The supplement includes causal evaluation results, planned corrective actions, and editorial clarifications. If you have any questions or require additional information, contact me at (508) 830-8323. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Sincerely, Everett P. Perkins, Jr. Manager, Regulatory Assurance EPP/jjl
 
==Attachment:==
Licensee Event Report 2016-002-01, Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications (7 pages)
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station cc: Mr. Daniel H. Dorman Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Ms. Booma-Venkataraman, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8C2A Washington, DC 20555 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Letter No. 2.16.048 Page 2 of 2 Attachment Letter Number 2.16.048 Licensee Event Report 2016-002-01 Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications (7 Pages)
NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. ............. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry . Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections !&#xa5;s LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-..... :I mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currenlly valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infmmation collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 1 OF7 4. TITLE Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 19 2016 2016 -002 -01 08 18 2016 N/A N/A 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR &: fCheck all that ann/vJ D 20.2201 (b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) N D 20.2201 (d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) D 20.2203(a><1> D 20.2203(a)(4) D 50.73(a)(2)(m> IRJ 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A) D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) D 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A) D 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) IRl 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) D 13.11(a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(m> D 50.36(c)(2> IRl 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B) D 73.71(a)(5) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) D IRl 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C) D 13.77(a)(1> 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) IRl 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D) D 73.77(a)(2)(i) D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) IR] 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) IRl 50. 73(a)(2)(vii) D 73.71(a)(2)(ii) D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Mr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr. -Regulatory Assurance Manager 508-830-8323 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANU-REPORTABLE MANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TOEPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TOEPIX D EA NA NA YI ; 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR -D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) IR] NO SUBMISSION . DATE ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On April 19, 2016, at approximately 1450 hours, it was discovered that a maintenance activity performed between 2010 hours on August 26, 2014 and 0143 hours on August 27, 2014, had rendered the Startup Transformer (X4) and the standby Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) (X-107 A&B) unable to automatically supply power to Buses A5 and A6, due to the breaker interlock that would prevent Startup Transformer breakers (152-504 and 152-604) and standby EDG breakers (152-509 and 152-609) from closing, when Bus AB to Bus A5 breaker (152-501) and Bus AB to Bus A6 breaker (52-601) are in the TEST position and CLOSED. During the maintenance activity, the plant was operating at 100 percent power and the_ Unit Auxiliary Transformer (X3) was providing power to Emergency Buses A5/A6. The functional testing of negative sequence relays (146-600/A and B) and 23kV feed undervoltage relays (127-600A/1 and 2, and 127-600B/1 and 2) created a test configuration, lasting less than 1-hour, whereby power to Buses A5 and A6 was not automatically available from either the startup transformer or from the EDGs. As a result, Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Action Statement 3.9.B.2 was not met. The root cause is that the decision to perform the described surveillance testing online, instead of during cold shutdown, lacked sufficient rigor to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications. Corrective actions will establish and ' institutionalize expectations and accountability for station leadership regarding consequence-biased decision-making and effective risk manaaement. There was no imoact to nublic health and safetv. NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page 2of7 NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send rt) comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnfonnation Collections Branch (T-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to ..... lnfocollects.Resoun:e@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonnation and Regulatory Affairs, CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (315().0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonnation collection does not display a currenUy valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infonnation collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 2016* 002 01 NARRATIVE BACKGROUND There are six 4, 160 volt alternating current (AC) buses (A 1, A2, A3, A4, AS, and A6) in the station auxiliary power distribution system. The six buses are divided into emergency service and normal service buses. The two emergency service buses, AS and A6, supply power to essential loads required during abnormal operational transients and accidents. The four normal service buses, "A 1, A2, A3, and A4, supply power to other station auxiliaries requiring AC power during planned operations. The maintenance activity had no effect on the normal service buses.
* When the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) is on line and buses AS and A6 are powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, on a turbine trip or reactor scram, Buses AS and A6 should fast transfer to the startup transformer or dead bus transfer to EDGs if the startup transformer is unavailable or dead bus transfer to the shutdown transformer if both the startup transformer and EDGs are unavailable. Another 4160 volt bus, Bus A8, is powered from either the shutdown transformer through Breaker A802 or the Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG) through Breaker A801. Bus A8 provides power to Emergency Bus AS through Breakers A600 and AS01 and to Emergency Bus A6 through Breaker A600 and A601. Relays in the Bus A8 to Bus AS and Bus A8 to Bus A6 control circuits are tested while the plant is online, at a two year interval, in accordance with Procedure 3.M.3-1, AS/A6 Buses 4kV Protective Relay Calibration/Functional Test and Annunciator Verification, Attachment 10, Bus A8 to AS & A6 Relays. See Figure 1 for bus and breaker arrangement. ' Procedure 3.M.3-1, Revision 136, step 6.2[S] and Attachment 10, provide a caution that during the performance of Attachment 10, with breakers 1 S2-S01 and 1 S2-601 in the TEST position and CLOSED, in the presence of a plant Scram neither AS nor A6 would automatically transfer to the Startup Transformer rendering both buses unavailable. Based upon this caution, activity risk compensatory measures for the August 2014 maintenance activity included a compensatory measure for operators to be briefed such that in the event of a plant trip the 1 S2-S01 and1 S2-601 breakers would be tripped to restore the automatic load transfer function. The compensatory measure is a simple single control switch manipulation for each of the two buses. Procedure 3.M.3-29, Shutdown Transformer and 23kV Relay Calibration and Functional Test, Revision 23, included, Prerequisite step 7.1[4], which states: "With permission from the Shift Manager (depending on weather conditions), the relays in Attachment 1 Step [2] may be calibrated with the Shutdown Transformer on line. The relays are to be calibrated one at a time. If plant electrical distribution will require the Shutdown Transformer to be loaded, the relay will be installed in an expeditious manner." Consistent with this prerequisite, a Control Room Narrative Log entry on February 20, 2014, at 1200 hours 17 seconds, indicates that a Brief (PEB) was conducted for 3.M.3-29 to bring attention to the following: the limiting condition for operation (LCO) for shutdown transformer (SOT) will be entered but SOT will remain available; and per procedure, the associated protection relays will be removed from service for functional test and calibration, one at a time, with procedures in place to return to service expeditiously in the event that plant electrical distribution requires the SOT to be loaded; and that E-lab personnel have been briefed and will remain on-site with no concurrent duties while the relays are out of service (OOS)." NRG FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page 3of7 NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported , ...... lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send \&#xa5;) comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnfonmation Collections Branch (T-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to ..... lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonmation collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person. is not required to respond to, the infonmation collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 2016 002 01 NARRATIVE For general information, when a 4160 volt breaker is required to be in TEST position, the breaker shall have been racked down, test position spindle inserted, test position cable assembly in place, 125 volt direct current (DC) control knife blade disconnect in closed position, and 4160 volt breaker springs charged. As specified under Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) Action Statement 3.9.B.2, "From and after the date that incoming power is not available from both startup and shutdown transformers, continued operation is permissible, provided both diesel generators and associated emergency buses remain operable, all core and containment cooling systems are operable, and reactor power level is reduced to 25 percent of design". EVENT DESCRIPTION On April 19, 2016, at approximately 1450 hours, it was discovered, and documented in the Corrective Action Program under Condition Report CR-PNP-2016-02735, that maintenance activities performed on protective relays between 2010 hours on August 26, 2014 and 0143 hours on August 27, 2014, had rendered the Startup Transformer (X4) and the standby EDGs (X-107A&B) unable to automatically supply power to Buses A5 and A6, due to the breaker interlock that prevents Startup Transformer breakers (152-504 and 152-604) and Standby EOG breakers (152-509 and 152-609) from closing when Bus A5 breaker (152-501) and Bus A6 breaker (52-601) are in the TEST position and CLOSED. With incoming power unavailable from the shutdown transformer and power not automatically available from the startup transformer or the standby EDGs, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.9.B.2 was not met. See Figure 1 for bus and breaker configuration. During functional testing of negative sequence relays 146-600/A and B undervoltage relays 127-600A/1 and 2 and 127-600B/1 and 2, breakers 152-501 (shutdown transformer supply to Bus A5) and 152-601 (shutdown transformer supply to A6) are closed briefly and tripped on three different occasions in accordance with Procedure 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10. Based on a review of associated alarm data, operator logs, and interviews with maintenance personnel, the longest single duration when the buses were not operable was approximately 13 minutes; the combined duration is estimated to be approximately 33 minutes. Since this event occurred in the past, no immediate actions were required. Work Order (W0-52581_885) for the next scheduled functional test has been placed on administrative hold pending implementation of associated corrective actions. CAUSE OF THE EVENT While performing the extent of condition review for this event it was discovered, and entered into the Corrective Action Program under CR-PNP-2016-04139, that surveillance procedure 3.M.3-29, Shutdown Transformer and 23kV Relay Calibration and Functional Test, places the 4160V AC System in similar test configurations and operating conditions as procedure 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10. When the four year interval functional test required by procedure 3.M.3-29 was performed in February of 2014 it placed the plant in a configuration where both 4kV Emergency Buses A5 and A6 would have been prevented from automatically transferring to back-up power sources for approximately 26 minutes. Accordingly, the scope of the causal evaluation addresses the surveillance test configurations established by procedure 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10, and procedure 3.M.3-29. NRG FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page 4of7 NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150--0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnfonnation Collections Branch (T-5 I F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to ..... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonnation and Regulatory Affairs, CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonnation collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infonnation collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 2016 002 01 NARRATIVE The root cause for placing the plant in a configuration where both Emergency Buses A5 and A6 would have been prevented from automatically transferring to back-up power sources is that the decision to perform 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10, and 3.M.3-29 online, instead of during cold shutdown, lacked sufficient rigor to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications. A contributing cause of this condition is corrective actions were ineffective in resolving identified risks with the online performance of 3.M.3-1Attachment10 and 3.M.3-29 protective relay functional tests. Another contributing cause is that Senior Reactor Operators have.less than adequate task specific knowledge of Limited Conditions.for Operation. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The corrective action to prevent recurrence is to establish and institutionalize expectations and accompanying accountability for station leadership (i.e., supervisor and above) regarding consequence-biased making and effective risk management. Other correction actions include:
* Revising procedures 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10, and 3.M.3-29 so that they1may only be performed while in the cold shutdown condition
* Providing training to personnel on condition report initiation (Problem Identification) and corrective action closure quality (Evaluation and Resolution)
* Developing and presenting training to SROs on integrated knowledge of operability, availability, risk mitigation, and LCO requirements SAFETY CONSEQUENCES The actual consequences of the procedure 3.M.3-1, Attachment 10, and procedure 3.M.3-29 surveillance test configurations placed the plant in a condition not allowed by Technical Specifications. As there was no initiating event, there were no actual safety consequences. The performance of procedure 3.M.3-1 and procedure 3.M.3-29 surveillance testing placed the plant in a configuration where both 4KV Emergency Buses A5 & A6 would have been prevented from automatically transferring to back-up power sources upon a plant scram. This testing placed the plant in a condition not allowed by Technical Specifications. Had there been an initiating event (plant scram) during the performance of procedure 3.M.3-1, both Emergency Buses A5 and A6 would be inoperable immediately and until the recovery action (tripping of breakers 152-501 and 152-601) took place. The recovery action is a simple action, capable of being performed in the main control room or locally, and was part of the pre-job brief. Because the test configuration was brief and because qualified, dedicated operators were briefed and available to perform simple compensatory measures, the potential safety consequence was considered minimal. NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page S of 7 NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported ...,... ...... :-.. lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send \&#xa5;) comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T*5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to ..... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Of!ice of Information and Regulatory Affairs, CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currenUy valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05&deg;000293 2016 002 / 01 NARRATIVE The potential safety consequence of this event if the "operator" barrier was removed is a station blackout condition. Had the resulting consequence of th'e August 2014 maintenance testing been a station blackout, PNPS Procedure S.3.31, Station Blackout, would have been entered and the prescribed immediate and subsequent actions taken until the preferred (34S kV Offsite) power source or the standby (onsite) EOG power source was restored. Had there been an initiating event (plant scram) during the performance of procedure 3.M.3-29, both Emergency Buses AS and A6 would be inoperable immediately and until the recovery actions (tripping of breakers 1S2-S01and1S2-601) took place. Unlike procedure 3.M.3-1, procedure 3.M.3-29 does not provide the following caution: "When breakers 1 S2-S01 and 1 S2-601 are placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, in the presence of a plant Scram neither AS nor A6 would automatically transfer to the Startup Transformer rendering both buses unavailable". In addition, unlike the testing performed under 3.M.3-1, it does not appear that risk activity compen.satory measures were identified to direct specific operator actions in the event of a plant scram. However, Bus AS and A6 recovery actions in the event of a plant scram while performing procedure 3.M.3-29 testing would be identical to recovery actions identified for procedure 3.M.3-1&deg;, Attachment 10. The potential safety consequence of this event if response (recovery) actions were delayed is the possibility of losing 4kV Buses AS & A6 for an extended period of time, resulting in a prolonged station blackout condition. Based on the anticipated success of operator action, the risk is considered Low. REPORT ABILITY This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR S0.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications and; 10 CFR S0.73(a)(2)(v)(A), S0.73(a)(2)(v)(B), S0.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and SO. 73(a)(2)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material; or mitigate the consequences of an accident and; 10 CFR SO. 73(a)(2)(vii) as any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is also reportable under 1 O CFR SO. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A) as any event or GOndition that as a result of a single cause could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or ' channels in different systems that are needed to (1) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (2) Remove residual heat; (3) Control the release of radioactive material; or (4) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page 6of7 NRG FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: BO hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and lnfonnation Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to ..... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonnation and Regulatory Affairs, CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an infonnation collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct -0r sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the infonnation collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 2016 002 NARRATIVE PREVIOUS EVENTS None ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EllS) CODES The EllS codes for Components and Systems referenced in this report are as follows: COMPONENTS: N/A SYSTEMS: EA REFERENCES CODES: N/A CODES: N/A
* Procedure 3.M.3-1, A5/A6 4kV Protective Relay Calibration/Functional Test and Annunciator Verification, Revision 136 "* REV NO. 01
* Procedure 3.M.3-29, Shutdown Transformer and 23kV Relay Calibration and Functional Test, Revision 23
* Condition Report CR-PNP-2016-02735
* Condition Report CR-PNP-2016-04139
* Work Order (W0-52581885) NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)
Page 7 of 7 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150--0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send , comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 ii ..... F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means CONTINUATION SHEET used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000293 NARRATIVE FIGURE 1 24KV 24KV UAT "A" EOG 801 600 505 1)509 PNPS REV. 001 04115/02 4160 BUS A-5 JEH )502 )503 507 )soa I TO BUSB*1 PNPS EMERGENCY BUS COMPOSITE 2016 002 01 345KV *a* EOG I 604 4160 BUS A-6 603 607 )608 I TO BUSB-2 (PROVIDED FOR GENERAL REFERENCE PURPOSES) NRC FORM 366A (06-2016)}}

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