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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000388/LER-2017-008]]
| number = ML18019A352
| issue date = 01/19/2018
| title = LER 17-008-01 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to a Loose Terminal Block Associated with Primary Containment Isolation Valves
| author name = Berryman B
| author affiliation = Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC, Talen Energy
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000388
| license number = NPF-022
| contact person =
| case reference number = PLA-7661
| document report number = LER 17-008-01
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 4
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:JAN 1 9 2018 Brad Berryman Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington
, DC 20555-0001 Susquehanna
: Nuclear, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 Brad.Berryman@TalenEnergy
.com SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388/2017-008-01 UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF -22 PLA-7661 ENERGY 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-388 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) Supplement 50-388/2017-008-01.
The original LER reported an event involving inoperability of a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) due to a loose terminal block. Based on further evaluation of the repm1ed condition, Susquehanna determined that the condition existed for longer than previously repmied.
This supplement provides infmmation conceming the longer duration.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
..
B. Benyman
 
==Attachment:==
 
LER 50-388/2017-008-01 Copy: NRC Region I Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Ms. L. H. Micewski, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
0313112020 (04-2017) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. ... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated inlo the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to lhe Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to tnfocollects. Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (See NUREG-1022
, R3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, httg://www.nr c.govlreading-rm/doc-collectionslnuregslstafflsr1 0221r3D the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER .PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 05000388 1 OF 3 4. TITLE Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to a Loose Terminal Block Associated with Primary Containment Isolation Valves 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO. 05000 04 21 2013 2017 -008 -01 01 ICf 2018 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 9. OPERAllNG MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check all that apply) 1 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(
iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(
x) 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 73.77(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 0 73.77(a)(2)(i) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 18:1 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73 (a)(2)(vi i) 0 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(
2)(i)(C) 00THER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT rrLEPHONE NUMBER (lndude Area Code) Jc. E. Manges, Jr., Senior Engineer-Nuclear Regulatory Affairs j(570) 542-3089
: 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TOEPIX A JM Terminal USD y Block 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
: 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) SUBMISSION DATE f"-BSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On July 19, 2017 at approximately 02:25, while performing a control room panel walk down, Operations observed indication for Primary Containment Isolation Valves HV21313 and HV21314 extinguished
. Troubleshooting commenced and Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1, Condition A was entered for loss of remote position indication for HV21313 and HV21314. On July 19, 2017 at approximately 10:49, investigation of the condition concluded that the isolation circuit for HV21314 was affected and the valve would not close if called upon to do so, and TS 3.6.1.3, Condition A was entered. The investigation identified a loose terminal block. The block was securely snapped back into the seat and the mounting screw was tightened
. On July 19, 2017 at approximately 13:56, TS 3.3.3.1, Condition A and TS 3.6.1.3, Condition A were exited. The loose terminal block was caused by improper seating during installation on April21, 2013. Seismic evaluation concluded that the installed configuration (i.e., not properly seated) is not a dynamically qualified configuration and that operability in this condition is therefore indeterminate
. Based on this information
, the affected components are considered to have been inoperable since installation in April 2013. Since the amount of time between the installation and restoration of operability was greater than allowed by Technical Specifications, this is a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications
. The cause was determined to be a loose terminal block due to a human performance error during installation in 2013. Planned corrective actions include a read and sign for applicable electricians and procedure changes regarding how to verify proper seating of terminal blocks. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. NRC FORM 366 (04-2017)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 (04-2017)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://IINIW
.nrc.gov/readinq-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 022/r3D Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington
, DC 20555-000 1, or by e-mail to lnfocollects
.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Olftcer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 05000-0388 NARRATIVE CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT Unit 1 -Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 -Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2017 -008 There were no structures,
: systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event. EVENT DESCRIPTION REV NO. -01 On July 19, 2017 at approximately 02:25, while performing a control room panel walk down, Operations observed amber and red indication for Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) HV21313 and HV21314 (Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Outboard Isolation Valves) [EllS System/Component Identifier:
CC/ISV] extinguished (should have been showing red indication with valves open). The red LED indicating lamp was changed with a known good bulb and the red indication briefly returned along with a dim amber indication while the bulb was being changed.
Locally, an operator found normal indication at HV21313, but no indication for HV21314.
The operator replaced the red and amber indicating lamps at the local panel with no return of indication.
During the process of changing the bulb at the local panel, the red indication in the control room briefly displayed a dim indication but extinguished after approximately one minute. The operator verified Breaker 2B236092
[EllS Component Identifier:
BKR] to HV21314 closed and the valve itself open. Additionally, no Bypass Indication System (BIS) alarms were indicated for a loss of power to a containment isolation indicating the issue was with indication only and not control power. Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Condition A was entered for loss of remote position indication for HV21313 and HV21314.
During troubleshooting, an open neutral was identified, and on July 19, 2017 at approximately 10:49, investigation of the condition concluded that the loss of continuity revealed that the isolation circuit for HV21314 was affected and the valve would not close if called upon to do so. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Condition A was entered.
The investigation identified a loose terminal block in 2B236092 due to not being seated properly.
The block was subsequently securely snapped back into the seat and the mounting screw was tightened
. On July 19, 2017 at approximately 13:56, Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Condition A and Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Condition A were exited. Further investigation identified the following timeline:
On April 21, 2013, a new bucket was installed into Breaker 2B236092. On May 21, 2013, the post-maintenance testing (PMT) for the new bucket was completed.
NRC FORM 3668 (04-2017) Page 2 of 3 I NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (04-2017) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)
'*....... CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://vwwv.nrc.gov/readinq
-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 022/r3[)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the lnfonmation Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio n, Washington, DC 20555-000 1, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnfonmation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collectio
: n. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 05000-0388 2017 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -008 REV NO. -01 The terminal block affects HV21314 as well as the control room indication for both HV21313 and HV21314. The loose terminal block was caused by improper seating during installation on April21, 2013. Seismic evaluation concluded that the installed configuration (i.e., not properly seated) is not a dynamically qualified configuration and that operability in this condition is therefore indeterminate
. Based on this information, HV21314 as well as the control room indication for both HV21313 and HV21314 are considered to have been inoperable since installation of the new bucket in April 2013 when the terminal block was not properly seated. Since the amount of time between the installation and restoration of operability was greater than allowed by Technical Specifications, this is a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Although the event date is listed as April 21, 2013, I the discovery date is considered to be July 19, 2017. CAUSE OF EVENT The cause was determined to be a loose terminal block caused by a human performance error during installation in 2013. ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE PCIV HV21314 would not have been able to electrically close with the identified condition.
HV21314 is the outboard containment isolation valve. The inboard containment isolation valve, HV21346, was operable and would have provided the required isolation of the containment penetration.
The containment design and testing only requires one containment isolation valve in each penetration to close for successful isolation.
All containment leakage rates and all containment isolation requirements would have been met. In addition, no inoperability of control room indication associated with the redundant PCIVs was identified during the period of inoperability based on review of Technical Specification logs. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Key corrective actions include the following:
: 1. Applicable electricians will be required to complete a read and sign regarding how to verify proper seating of terminal blocks. 2. A step will be added to applicable procedures regarding how to verify proper seating of terminal blocks. COMPONENT FAILURE INFORMATION Terminal Block, Pull Apart, 8 Pole 11330 Series manufactured by USD. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS No previous similar events were identified.
NRC FORM 366B (04-2017)
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Latest revision as of 01:49, 12 July 2018