ML17250A828: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ORMATIONDISTRIBUTION SYSM(RIDS)ACCESSION ABR:80122203<ii DOC~DATE:80/12/15NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS M (RIDS)ACCESSION ABR:80122203<ii DOC~DATE: 80/12/15 NOTARIZED:
NODOCKETFACIL:50"244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantrUnitliRochester G05000200AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MAIERgJ~E>Rochester Gas8ElectricCorp.RECIP~NAMERECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHFIELDgD~Operating ReactorsBranch5
NO DOCKET FACIL:50"244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plantr Unit li Rochester G 05000200 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAIERg J~E>Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp.RECIP~NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHF IELD g D~Operating Reactor s Branch 5


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Suppls801031submittal re"EnvironQualification ofElectrical Equipments
Suppls 801031 submittal re"Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipments
~"Possibleeffectsofmotordrivenauxiliary feedwater pumpsfailureduetohighenergylinebreakonClass1Esysprovided.
~" Possible effects of motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps failure due to high energy line break on Class 1E sys provided.DISTRIBUTION CODE: A035S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:/TITLE: SEP Topics NOTES: 1 copy:SEP Sect, Ldr.05000204 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAh1E ACTION: CRUTCHF IELD Og COPIES LTTR ENCL REC IPIENT ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL INTERNAL: A/D MATLLQUAL13 HYD/GEO BR 10 02 G FILE 01 1 2 1 1 CONT SYS A 07 1 ILE 06 2 OR ASSESS BR 11 1 SEP BR 12 3 EXTERNAL: ACRS NSIC 10 05 16 1 1 LPDR 03 1 DEC 2g tgeg TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR~ENCL I'I ll f F'I I lf, f ff tl II tf g II Il I I I l f.l ff Cs.off rI/I/I/////I///AND Ilflllgll/
DISTRIBUTION CODE:A035SCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:/TITLE:SEPTopicsNOTES:1copy:SEPSect,Ldr.05000204RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAh1E ACTION:CRUTCHFIELDOgCOPIESLTTRENCLRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME COPIESLTTRENCLINTERNAL:
/////////I 885K 2///l///l///l/
A/DMATLLQUAL13 HYD/GEOBR1002GFILE011211CONTSYSA071ILE062ORASSESSBR111SEPBR123EXTERNAL:
ROCHESTER GAS AND JOHN E.MAIER VICE PRESIDENT 4+LCPHONC c<5ot 7ia 546-2700 C4~p)G ARCA C kP 19 gb~C,')~C&4~a)~(hn~I&December 15,ELECTRIC CORPORATION S9 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 I"~e"C l~I 4 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
ACRSNSIC10051611LPDR031DEC2gtgegTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
Mr.Dennis M.Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch N5 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555  
LTTR~ENCL I'IllfF'IIlf,ffftlIItfgIIIlIIIlf.lffCs.off rI/I/I/////I///
ANDIlflllgll/
/////////I 885K2///l///l///l/
ROCHESTER GASANDJOHNE.MAIERVICEPRESIDENT 4+LCPHONCc<5ot7ia546-2700C4~p)GARCACkP19gb~C,')~C&4~a)~(hn~I&December15,ELECTRICCORPORATION S9EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649I"~e"Cl~I4DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:
Mr.DennisM.Crutchfield, ChiefOperating ReactorsBranchN5U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
SEPTopicIII-12,Environmental Qualification ofElectrical Equipment R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
SEP Topic III-12, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244  


==DearMr.Crutchfield:==
==Dear Mr.Crutchfield:==


Rochester GasandElectrichasreviewedthepossibleeffectsofafailureofthemotor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps,duetothepostulated occurrence ofahighenergylinebreakintheIntermediate
Rochester Gas and Electric has reviewed the possible effects of a failure of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, due to the postulated occurrence of a high energy line break in the Intermediate Building, on the Class 1E electrical systems, as discussed below.This information supplements information provided in paragraph IV-11 of RG6E's October 31, 1980 submittal concerning"Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment".
: Building, ontheClass1Eelectrical systems,asdiscussed below.Thisinformation supplements information providedinparagraph IV-11ofRG6E'sOctober31,1980submittal concerning "Environmental Qualification ofElectrical Equipment".
The power feeder cables for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are routed from motor control centers (MCC's)14 and 16, located on separate floors of the Auxiliary Building, to these pumps.The current flow in each feeder circuit is controlled by a DB-50 circuit breaker, located at the MCC's, with overcurrent settings matched to the pump characteristics and the bolted fault magnitude for the feeder circuit.Any faults generated by a pump failure will be cleared by these breakers.A single failure of a breaker will affect only one of the two safety-related"trains".Since the breakers and MCC's are located in the Auxiliary Building, and would therefore not be subject to the harsh high energy line break environment, they are not subject to a common mode failure.Control circuits for the-pumps are routed from the Control Room and Relay Room to the Auxiliary Building.These circuits also have overcurrent protection, and are not exposed to the high energy line break environment.
Thepowerfeedercablesforthemotordrivenauxiliary feedwater pumpsareroutedfrommotorcontrolcenters(MCC's)14and16,locatedonseparatefloorsoftheAuxiliary
C m f I ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP.December 15, 19 80 Mr.Dennis M.Crutchfield, Chief SHEET NO.It is therefore concluded that the Class IE electrical systems will not be degraded by a high energy line break in the Intermediate Building.Very truly yours, J.E.Maier JEM:ng cc: John Archer, FRC N II V V v}}
: Building, tothesepumps.Thecurrentflowineachfeedercircuitiscontrolled byaDB-50circuitbreaker,locatedattheMCC's,withovercurrent settingsmatchedtothepumpcharacteristics andtheboltedfaultmagnitude forthefeedercircuit.Anyfaultsgenerated byapumpfailurewillbeclearedbythesebreakers.
Asinglefailureofabreakerwillaffectonlyoneofthetwosafety-related "trains".
SincethebreakersandMCC'sarelocatedintheAuxiliary
: Building, andwouldtherefore notbesubjecttotheharshhighenergylinebreakenvironment, theyarenotsubjecttoacommonmodefailure.Controlcircuitsforthe-pumpsareroutedfromtheControlRoomandRelayRoomtotheAuxiliary Building.
Thesecircuitsalsohaveovercurrent protection, andarenotexposedtothehighenergylinebreakenvironment.
CmfI ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORP.December15,1980Mr.DennisM.Crutchfield, ChiefSHEETNO.Itistherefore concluded thattheClassIEelectrical systemswillnotbedegradedbyahighenergylinebreakintheIntermediate Building.
Verytrulyyours,J.E.MaierJEM:ngcc:JohnArcher,FRC NIIVVv}}

Revision as of 14:54, 7 July 2018

Suppls 801031 Submittal Re Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipments. Possible Effects of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Failure Due to High Energy Line Break on Class IE Sys Provided
ML17250A828
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1980
From: MAIER J E
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: CRUTCHFIELD D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-03-12, TASK-3-12, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8012220341
Download: ML17250A828 (6)


Text

REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS M (RIDS)ACCESSION ABR:80122203<ii DOC~DATE: 80/12/15 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50"244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plantr Unit li Rochester G 05000200 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAIERg J~E>Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp.RECIP~NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHF IELD g D~Operating Reactor s Branch 5

SUBJECT:

Suppls 801031 submittal re"Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipments

~" Possible effects of motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps failure due to high energy line break on Class 1E sys provided.DISTRIBUTION CODE: A035S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:/TITLE: SEP Topics NOTES: 1 copy:SEP Sect, Ldr.05000204 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAh1E ACTION: CRUTCHF IELD Og COPIES LTTR ENCL REC IPIENT ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL INTERNAL: A/D MATLLQUAL13 HYD/GEO BR 10 02 G FILE 01 1 2 1 1 CONT SYS A 07 1 ILE 06 2 OR ASSESS BR 11 1 SEP BR 12 3 EXTERNAL: ACRS NSIC 10 05 16 1 1 LPDR 03 1 DEC 2g tgeg TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR~ENCL I'I ll f F'I I lf, f ff tl II tf g II Il I I I l f.l ff Cs.off rI/I/I/////I///AND Ilflllgll/

/////////I 885K 2///l///l///l/

ROCHESTER GAS AND JOHN E.MAIER VICE PRESIDENT 4+LCPHONC c<5ot 7ia 546-2700 C4~p)G ARCA C kP 19 gb~C,')~C&4~a)~(hn~I&December 15,ELECTRIC CORPORATION S9 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 I"~e"C l~I 4 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr.Dennis M.Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch N5 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

SEP Topic III-12, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244

Dear Mr.Crutchfield:

Rochester Gas and Electric has reviewed the possible effects of a failure of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, due to the postulated occurrence of a high energy line break in the Intermediate Building, on the Class 1E electrical systems, as discussed below.This information supplements information provided in paragraph IV-11 of RG6E's October 31, 1980 submittal concerning"Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment".

The power feeder cables for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are routed from motor control centers (MCC's)14 and 16, located on separate floors of the Auxiliary Building, to these pumps.The current flow in each feeder circuit is controlled by a DB-50 circuit breaker, located at the MCC's, with overcurrent settings matched to the pump characteristics and the bolted fault magnitude for the feeder circuit.Any faults generated by a pump failure will be cleared by these breakers.A single failure of a breaker will affect only one of the two safety-related"trains".Since the breakers and MCC's are located in the Auxiliary Building, and would therefore not be subject to the harsh high energy line break environment, they are not subject to a common mode failure.Control circuits for the-pumps are routed from the Control Room and Relay Room to the Auxiliary Building.These circuits also have overcurrent protection, and are not exposed to the high energy line break environment.

C m f I ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP.December 15, 19 80 Mr.Dennis M.Crutchfield, Chief SHEET NO.It is therefore concluded that the Class IE electrical systems will not be degraded by a high energy line break in the Intermediate Building.Very truly yours, J.E.Maier JEM:ng cc: John Archer, FRC N II V V v