ML17229A852

Requests Approval,Prior to Implementation of Change to Plant Radiological Emergency Plan.Proposed Change Clarifies Criteria Used in Classification of Radiological Emergency. Attachment 1 Provides Explanation of Changes

ML17229A852
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/31/1998
From:	STALL J A FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-98-200, NUDOCS 9809090273
Download: ML17229A852 (66)

Text

CATEGORY1iREGULATYINFORM'ATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9809090273DOC.DATE:98/08/31NOTARIZED:NOSCIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPowerELightCo.50-3S9St'.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerELightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSTALL,J.A.FloridaPowerELightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONRecordsManagementBranch(DocumentControlDesk)DOCKET¹0500033505000389

SUBJECT:

Requestsapproval,priortoimplementationofchangetoplantCradiologicalemergencyplan.Proposedchangeclarifiescriteriausedinclassificationofradiologicalemrgency.AAttachment1providesexplanationofchanges.T.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:EmergencyPreparednessPlans,'Implement'gProedures,(8NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PD~INTERNAL:AEOD/HAGAN,DNRR/DRPM/PERBEXTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEGLEFILECENTERSTRACTNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111RY0UNOTETOALLnRIDSnRECIPIENTSPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR9ENCL9

'~5 PI@IFloridaPower&LightCompany.6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957August3'1,1998L-98-20010CFR550.54(q)U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProosedChanetoEmerencPlanTable3-1:ClassificationofEmerenciesPursuantto10CFR50.54(q),FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)requestsapproval,priortoimplementation,ofachangetotheSt.LuciePlantRadiologicalEmergencyPlan.Theproposedchangeclarifiesthecriteriausedintheclassificationofaradiologicalemergency.EmergencyactionlevelsremainconsistentwiththeclassificationcriteriacurrentlyapprovedbytheNRC.Attachment1providesanexplanationofchangestotheemergencyclassificationtablecontainedintheSt.LuciePlantRadiologicalEmergencyPlan,Table3-1.Attachment2providesadraftrevisionofTable3-1asitwouldappearintheRadiologicalEmergencyPlan.Verticallinesareusedtoindicatechangestothetable.TheproposedchangewasreviewedbytheSt.LuciePlantFacilityReviewGrouponJuly14,1998.OnreceiptofapprovalfromtheNRCoftheproposedchange,FPLwillrevisetheSt.LuciePlantEmergencyPlanandEmergencyPlanImplementingProcedureEPIP-01toimplementtherevisedclassificationcriterion.Ifyouhaveanyquestions,pleasecontactMr.EdWeinkamat561-467-7162.Sincerely,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LucieNuclearPlantAttachmentQwJ'c:RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionII(2copies)SeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant98090'F0278980831PDRADOCK05000335FPDRanFPLGroupcompany I'l Attachment1ExplanationofProposedChangestoSt.LucieRadiologicalEmergencyPlanTable3-1;EmergencyClassificationTable

Background:

EmergencyClassificationTable3-1(Revision34oftheEmergencyPlan)wasreviewedtoidentifysectionswherethedescriptiveinstructiontolicensedoperatorsandPlantmanagementcouldbeimproved.Specifically,thereviewaddressedareaswhereclarificationcouldbeprovidedtoemergencyactionlevelswithoutchangingtheintentoftheclassificationcriteria.Regulatoryguidanceandindustrystandardshavebeenconsultedaspartofthisreview.Thefollowingchangesareproposed:Event/ClassEPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFTProosedReasonforChane1.AAbnormalPrimaiyLeakNoCAUTIONstatementRateCAUTION:THISSECTIONSHOULDNOTBEUSEDFORSTEAMGENERATORTUBELEAK/RUPTURE.Clarifydifferencebetweenclassificationcriteriaforprimary/secondaryleakage.UNUSUALEVENT2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow~1600sia.UNUSUALEVENT2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:Unit1-1600siaUnit2-1736slaReliefvalvesettingsdifferentforUnits1and2.ALERT1.Charging/letdownmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthan132gpm.ALERT1.Charging/letdownmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailablecharincagelt.CurrentsectiondoesnotrecognizelossofchargingcapacityandconflictswithSiteAreaEmergencysection.

Event/Class1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRate(continued)1.BAbnormalPrimarytoSecondaryLeakRateEPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.RCSleakagegreaterthan132gpmoccurringwithRCSpressureaboveHPSIshutoffhead.OR2.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailablemakeupoccurringwithRCSpressurebelowHPSIshutoffhead.OR3.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).OR4.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorsindicate7.3x10'/hr(ifCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr).SITEAREAEMERGENCYRaidfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHANcharinumcaaciwithsteamreleaseinroressEPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthanavailablechargingcapacity.OR2.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).SITEAREAEMERGENCYRaidfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHANcharinumcaacitwithsteamreleaseinroressReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotrecognizelossofchargingcapabilityinsomecaseswhereleakageislessthan132gpm.Currentrevisiondoesnotclarifycreditfornormalmakeup(charging)onlyoranymakeup.~ProposedrevisionprovidesforclearclassificationcriteriaforLOCAgreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthan(normal)chargingcapacity,whichisconsistentwithNUREGguidanceandindustryexamples.CriteriaforradiationmonitorreadingsareidentifiedinEvent/Class2.A(UncontrolledEffluentRelease).Currentrevisioncausedconfusiontousers,specificallyconcerning"unisolablestatusofslightreleasepotentialfromequipment(suchassteamdrivenAFW).3.Secondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator(i.e.,ADVs,SteamSafety(s),orUnisolable.)3.SecondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffecledgeneratorieeAADDVVasstucksteamsafesunisolable~leakProposedrevisionprovidesadditionalclarificationtouserontypesofsecondarysteamreleasestobeconsideredwhenclassifyingevent.

Event/Class2.AUncontrolledEffluentRelease3.FireExplosionEPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation(EPIP-09)worksheetvaluesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)for~/ihour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)fortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolledfirewithintheplantlastingmorethan10minutes.NoNOTEinsection.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation(EPIP-09)worksheetvaluesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor250mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefor/ghour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor2500mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolledfirewithinthegowerblocklastingmorethan10minutes.NOTE:EXPLOSIONISDEFINEDASARAPIDCHEMICALREACTIONRESULTINGINNOISEHEATANDTHERAPIDEXPANSIONOFGAS.ReasonforChaneConfusionbyusersondoseratesversustotaldose.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriabasedondoserate.Useof"powerblockprovidescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification."Powerblock"isspecificallydefinedinEPIP-01.NOTEprovidescleardefinitionofexplosionevent.

Event/ClassEPlanRev.34Current3.Explosion(continued)ALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYSeveredamagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromexplosion.Damagetofacilitybyexplosionwhichaffectsplantoperation.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedALERTDamagetostructures/comonentswithintheProtectedAreabyexplosionwhichaffectsplantoperation.SITEAREAEMERGENCYSeveredamagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromexplosionJi.e.bothtrainsrenderedinoerable.ReasonforChaneProposedrevisionprovidesclearidentificationofthelocation(ProtectedArea)whereconsiderationforciassiTieationofexplosionsoccur.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriaforthemeaningofseveredamagetosafeshutdownequipment,whichappliesregulatoryguidancedefinitionforlossofequipmentfunctions.4.BFuelHandlingAccidentSITEAREAEMERGENCYMajordamagetoirradiatedfuelinContainmentorFuelHandlingBuilding1.Stepincreaseinthereadingofradiationmonitorsintheplantventand/orintheFuelHandlingBuildingAND2.Damagetomorethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly.OR3.UncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPool.SITEAREAEMERGENCYMajordamagetoirradiatedfuelinContainmentorFuelHandlingBuilding1.Affectedarearadiationmonitorlevelsreaterthan1000mr/hr.AND~2.MaorDamagetooneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesOR3.MaordamaeresultinfromuncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPoolCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidespecificradiationdoseratethreshold.Currentrevisioncriteriarequiresknowledgeofextentofdamage("morethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly")whichwilllikelynotbeknown.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecificradiationdoseratethreshold(consistentwithotherclassificationcriteria)anddoesnotlimitclassificationbasedonunknownextentofdamage.

Event/Class5.AEarthquakeEPlanRev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments.ALERTAconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05g.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstrumentsorothermeans.ALERTAconfirmedearthuakehasoccurred1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlledArea.OR2.Aconfirmedearthuakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedatrioftheturbineeneratororreactor.ReasonforChaneCurrentclassificationdoesnotprovideforclassificationbasedoninformationreceivedbyother(non-plant)seismicmonitors,suchasfromothernuclearsites,colleges,orscientificmonitoringequipment.Thecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyidentifythelocationoftheincreasedseismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlledArea,asinUNUSUALEVENT).TheproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurementofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlledAreaandprovidesfordirectindicationsforeffectsoftheearthquakeonplantconditions(turbineorreactortrip).

Class/Event5.AEarthquake(continued)EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCYAconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.1g.withplantnotincoldshutdown.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCYAconfirmedearthuakehasoccurred1.AconfirmedearthuakeoccurswhichreistersGREATERTHAM0.1.withintheOwnerControlledAreaandthelantisnotincoldshutdown.ORReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyidentifythelocationoftheincreasedseismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlledArea,asinUNUSUALEVENT).TheproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurementofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlledAreaandprovidesfordirectindicationsforeffectsoftheearthquakeonplantconditions(lossofsafetyrelatedfunctions).2.Aconfirmedearthuakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofansafetrelatedsstemfunctioni.e.both5.CTornadoALERTAnytornadostrikingfacility.ALERTAnytomariostriking~theowerblock.Thecurrentrevisiondidnotidentifyspecificaffectedareasoftheplanttobeconsideredforatornadostrike.Useof"powerblock"providescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification.'Powerblock"isspecificallydefinedinEPIP-01.

Event/Class6.AIncreasedAwarenessorPotentialCoreMeltEPlanRev.34CurrentALERTEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichwarrant:1.IncreasedawarenessandactivationofEmergencyResponsepersonnel.EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentALERTEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichhaveaotentialtoderadethelevelofsafetattheplant.ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusiontowhetheruseofemergencyresponsefacilitiesoractivationofanyemergencyresponsepersonnelinitsselfjustifiesALERTclassification.ProposedrevisionmakesjudgementcriteriaclearthatdegradationofplantconditionsjustifyclassificationofanALERT.1.EmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhicharesinificantluncontrollablemanner.1.Activationofemergencyresponsefacilitiesandmonitoringteamsoraprecautionarynotificationofthepublicnearthesite.SITEAREAEMERGENCYSITEAREAEMERGENCYEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichwarrant:Thecurrentrevisioncausesconfusiontowhetheruseofemergencyresponsefacilitiesin~ifsselfustifiesSITEAREAEMERGENCYclassification.(ClassificationofSITEAREAEMERGENCYalwaysresultsinnotificationofthepublic.)ProposedrevisionmakesjudgementcriteriaclearthatdegradationofplantconditionsjustifyclassificationofaSITEAREAEMERGENCY.GENERALEMERGENCY2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmenthearremovalsystemsforseveralhours.GENERALEMERGENCY2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmentheatremovalhours.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassificationconsiderations.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecifictimespan,afterwhichaGENERALEMERGENCYclassificationiswarranted.

Event/Class6.AIncreasedAwarenessorPotentialCoreMelt(continued)EPlan,Rev.34CurrentGENERALEMERGENCY4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergencyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityforseveralhours.EPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedGENERALEMERGENCY4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofave:gemyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityforP-"ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusionwithuserinregardtowhatis"emergencyfeedwater".Theplantdoesnotdesignateanyequipmentas'emergencyfeedwater.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassificationconsiderations.Theproposedrevisionprovidesclearindicationthatifthereisnofeedwaterfor'greaterthan2hours,thenaGENERALEMERGENCYclassificationiswarranted.7.ALossofPowerALERT2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorsynchronize.SITEAREAEMERGENCY2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorsynchronize.ALERT2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.SITEAREAEMERGENCY2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.Currentrevisiondoesnotaddressabilityofdieselgeneratortoperformitsintendedfunction(loadtontoemergencybuses)Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindicationthatifthedieselisnotloaded,thenclassificationiswarranted.

Event/Class8.8LossofAlarms/Communication/Monitoring9.AAircraft/MissileEPlan,Rev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT3.UnplannedlossofmostorallSafetySystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Inabilitytomonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.ALERT1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlle'dAreadamagingplantstructures.EPlan,Rev.DRAFTCurrentUNUSUALEVENT1.Unplannedlossofmostigrester~than75%oraltSafetySystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Inabilityto~effecttvetmonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.NOTE:Sinificanttransientexamlesinclude:reactortriturbinerunbackreaterthan25%andthermaloscillationsreaterthan10%.ALERT1.Aircraftcrashintheowerblock.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovideforaquantitativevalueforlossof"most'nnunciators.ProposedrevisionindicatesaspecificpercentageofannunciatorslostneededtoclassifyanUNUSUAL~EVENT.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovideguidanceondegreeofabilityinwhichatransientcanbemonitoredinclassifyingtheevent.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidedefinitionofsignificanttransient.Proposedrevisionprovidesadditionalguidancefortheusertodeterminethat,ifatransientcannotbeeffectivelymonitored,thenaSITEAREAEMERGENCYiswarranted.Additionally,examplesofsignificanttransientsareprovided.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidereferencetocrashormissileimpacttospecificplantstructures.OR2.Visualoraudibleindicationofmissileimpactonplantstructures.OR2.VisualoraudibleindicationofProposedrevisionprovidesclearindication(i.e.,thepowerblock)whereacrashormissileimpactwouldwarrantclassificationofALERT.

Event/Class9.AAircraft/Missile(continued)EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlledAreadamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Aircrahcrash~intheowerblockdamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damageresultininlossofsafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidereferencetocrashormissileimpactonspecificplantstructures.Proposedrevisiondefinesspecificareaoftheplantwheredamageisconsideredclassifiable.ProposedrevisionidentifieseffectonsafeshutdownequipmentascriteriafordeterminingclassificationofSITEAREAEMERGENCY.Useof"powerblock"providescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification."Powerblock"isspecificallydefinedinprocedure.9.CToxicorFlammableGasSITEAREAEMERGENCYToxicorflammablegashasdiffusedintovitalareasaffectingaccesstoortheoperationofsafeshutdownequipment.SITEAREAEMERGENCYToxicorflammablegashasdiffusedintovitalareascompromisingthefunctionofsafetyrelatedequipment(i.e.,bothtrainsrenderedinoperable)CurrentrevisioncausedconfusionwithuserdifferentiatingbetweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.Currentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyrelatelossofsafetysystemfunctionwithotherclassificationcriteria.ProposedrevisionprovidescleardifferencebetweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.10 ATTACHMENT2DRAFTREVISIONOFST.LUCIERADIOLOGICALEMERGENCYPLANTABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLE TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSt.A.ABNIBRMA,QRIMA~Y~IQUNUSUALEVENTrlnALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYTTHAN-LRATRTHAN<~in~~m~GENERALEMERGENCYrrrIlninCAUTtONThissectionshouldNOTbeusedforasteamgeneratortubeleak/rupture.1.RCSleakageGREATERTHAN10gpmasindicatedby:A.ControlRoomobservationQBB.InventorybalancecalculationQBC.FieldobservationQBD.EmergencyCoordinatorjudgementQB2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:-Unit1-1600PSIA-Unit2-1736PSIA1.Charging/letdownmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavaihblechargingcapacity.1.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailablethan50gpmandgreaterthanavailablechargingcapacity.QB2.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan146X10sR/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.PerformanceofEPIP-09(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesun/eysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)Lhhif(anytwoofthefolloviing~xiandthethirdisimminent).1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQl-131activitygreaterthan275IiCI/mL).~N2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunlsolablesteamgenerator.~N3.ContainmentIntegrityBreached.~NTAlsoreferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3:43-5St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSlFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS1.B.~BN~RMA~PRiMARYT~EQNDAfIY~LEAKRATUNUSUALEVENTRPRI/ELk1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakageexceedsTech.Spec.limits.AND2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.ALERTRirfilrftnrtrtITHINcharinmiwithle~iff.sitewr1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthanTech.Spec.Umitsandwithinchargingpumpcapacity.AND2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.~ND3.LossofbothNon-Vital4.16KVbuses.RifilrftmnrtrtubeREATERTHANhrin~um>~caacittf}1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.~ND2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.SITEAREAEMERGENCYirfailureofsteanrtrtRATTHANrinmwithlofff-itwr1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakageisgreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.~ND2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.AND3.LossofbothNon-Vital4.16KVbuses.RifiirftmnrtrtREATERTHANrinmiwithtmrI~inrerr,~1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.AND2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.AND3.Secondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator.(e.g.,ADVs,StuckSteamSafety(s),orUnisolableLeak.)GENERALEMERGENCYLossof2ofthe3fissionroductarriwithimminntIfth~thir(anytwoofthefollowingexistandthethirdisimminent).1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQl-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolablesteamgenerator.AND3.Containmentintegritybreached.NOTEAlsoreferto'PotentialCoreMe!t'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3I43-6St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS1.C.LOSSOFSECONDARYCOOLANTUNUSUALEVENTRaidereurizationof~ondan~lant1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.ALERTMrtmlkwithREATRTHAN1mrimnIk1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.AND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan10gpm.~ND3.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.Totallossoffeedwater1.Nomainorauxiliaryfeedwaterflowavailableforgreaterthan15minuteswhenrequiredforheatremovaLAND2.SteamGeneratorlevelsarelessthan40%widerange.SITEAREAEMERGENCYMaorstamleakwithRETRHANrnrinIkandfuelinitd1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.~ND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan50gpm.~ND3.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.AND4.Fuelelementdamageisindicated(Referto'FuelElementFailure'vent/Class4.A).TLFwith-thrhlin~inititd1.Nomainorauxiliaryfeedwaterflowavailable.AND2.PORV(s)havebeenopenedtofacilitatecoreheatremoval.GENERALEMERGENCYreleashasrrriirressrultinin1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan-1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QR2.PerformanceofEPIP%9(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)Lossof2ofthefissionroductbarrierswithimminentlossofththird(anytwoofthefollowing~xiandthethirdisimminent).1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQI-131actiVitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolablesteamgenerator.AND3.ContainmentInteriBreached.NOTEAlsoreferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.EP3:43-7St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSUNUSUALEVENTiIiIALERTArleahrrriiSITEAREAEMERGENCYriinGENERALEMERGENCYrrrliQFFQQNT~EE~AI=,1.Planteffluentmonitor(s)exceedalarmsetpoint(s).~N2.ConfirmedanalysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichexceedsODCMlimits.~OIfanalysisisnotavailablewithinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisgreaterthanODCMlimit,dassifyas+~~I.gVVN:'rhis10timesthe~ffli~nflr+I1.Planteffluentmonitor(s)significantlyexceedalarmsetpoints.AND2.ConfirmedanalysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichNOTEIfanalysisisnotavailableviithinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisequaltoorgreaterthan10timesODCMlimit,dassifyas~T'.rrrIinin1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorgreaterthan7.3X10'/hr(Post-LOCAmonitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr,ifCHRRMinoperable).QQ2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOff-siteDoseCalculation(EPIP-09)worksheetvaluesatonemilelnexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)for1/2hour.QBB.500mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)fortwominutesatonemile.rrrIinin1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QQ2.PerformanceofEPIP-09(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,orDbelovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDODCM-ReferstoChemistryProcedureC-200,'Off-siteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)./RNRCEP3I43-8St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS~VII~PNTUNUSUALEVENTALERTiiiIvlrimnmiinwhiIvrIninhrfiivriISITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY1.Anyvalidareamonitoralarmfromindeterminablesourcewithmeternearorgreaterthanfullscaledeflection(10'R/hr).QQ2.Unexpectedplantiodineorparticulateairborneconcentrationof1000DACasseeninroutinesurveyingorsampling.QB3.Unexpecteddirectradiationdoseratereadingorunexpectedairborneradioactivityconcentrationfromanundeterminablesourceinexcessof1000timesnormallevels.3.PIIIEXPLOIONriii'hihwrIirrnfnxIInwihlnhwnrnrllAr!~nfLnnrll,~flr1.Potentiallyaffectingsafetysystems.~N2.Requiringoff-sitesupportintheopinionoftheNPS/EC.r/mnnwihinhPrArxIInwhihffIngfKEQiinirmrmiinhniImirnrinrIvrmfimnfrmI'nhinrnrinIReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.~NTExplosionisdefinedasarapidchemicalreactionresultinginnoise,heat,andtherapidexpansionofgas./RNRCEP3:43-9St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS4A.jgg~~E~IQQgUNUSUALEVENTulIn1.Processmonitorsorarearadiationsurveysindicateincreasedletdownactivity~N2.ConfirmedRCSsampleindicating:A.CoolantactivitygreaterthantheTechSpeclimitforiodinespike(TechSpecFigure3.4-1.).~OB.Coolantactivitygreaterthan100/EpCi/gramspecificactivity.~TIfanalysisisnotavailablewithin1hour,anditisexpectedthatactivityisgreaterthanTechSpeclimit,dassifyas~~NT'.ALERTFIlmnfilr1.ProcessmonitorsorarearadiationsurveysindicateincreasedletdownactivityandconfirmedRCSSamplesindicatingDEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCI/mL~NOIfanalysisisnotavailablewithin1hour,anditisexpectedthatRCSactivityforDEQ1-131isgreaterthan275pCi/mL,dassifyasanSITEAREAEMERGENCYImnfilrwitntrIin1.RCSDEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCi/mL.~ND2.HighestCETpercorequadrantindicatesgreaterthan10'Fsuperheator700'F.GENERALEMERGENCYIriIIrItininContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QR2.PerformanceofEPIP%9(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)FIhnIiniesultinthrIfdiiviIntinmnrFIHandlin8ilin1.NPS/ECdeterminesthatanirradiatedfuelassemblymayhavebeendamaged.~ND2.Associatedareaorprocessradiationmonitorsareinalarm.rmtirriliContainmentorFelHnIin1.Affectedarearadiationmonitorlevelsgreaterthan1000mR/hr.AND2.Majordamagetomorethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly.QQ3.MajordamageresultingfromuncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPool./RNRCEP3:43-10SLLucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS5.A.QAA'~QAl<gUNUSUALEVENTnfirmedrthuakeha1.AconfirmedearthquakehasbeenexperiencedwithintheOwnerControlledArea.QQ2.Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstrumentsorothermeans.ALERTAnfirmrthkhoccurred1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlledAreaQR2.Aconfirmedearthquakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedtripoftheturbinegeneratororreactor.SITEAREAEMERGENCYnfirmrthkhgcg~rrII1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.1gwithintheOwnerControlledAreaandtheplantnotincoldshutdown.QR2.Aconfirmedearthquakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofanysafetysystemfunction(Le.,bothtrainsinoperable).GENERALEMERGENCYNOTEReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.5.B.HIIRRI~ANnWmin1.Confirmedhumcanewarningisineffect.Hurricanewminwithwindnr~dedsbess1.Confirmedhumcanewarningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed175mphwithintheOwnerControlledArea.NOTEAtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojectionofwindspeedson-site24hourspriortotheonsetothurricaneforcewinds.Ifthatprojectionisnotavailablewithin12hoursotenteringintothewarning,classifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.Forexample,projectedon-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricanewindspeedifthetrackisawayfromPSLHrrinwminwithviinRATRTHANini1.Plantnotatcoldshutdown.AND2.Confirmedhurricanewarningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed194mphwithintheOvmerControlledArea.NOTEAtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojectionofviindspeedson-site24hourspriortotheonsetofhurricanetorcewinds.Ifthatprojectionisnotavailablewithin12hoursofenteringintothewarning,dassifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.Forexample,projectedon-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricaneviindspeedifthetrackisawaytromPSL.NOTEReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3:43-11St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

~~!'VENT/CLASS5.C.~TNA~5.0.~N(~RMAW~AT~VFQEP3I4UNUSUALEVENTrilrnIvliirffin1.Lowintakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormore.QQ2.Visualsightingsbystationpersonnelthatwaterlevelsareapproachingstormdrainsystemcapacity.TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLESITEAREAEMERGENCYALERTrikinhPwrIwrhnIvniininilrfhniwgranii~n1.Thestormdrain'scapacityisexceededduringhurricanesurgeorknownfloodconditions.QQ2.LowIntakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormoreviithemergencybarriervalvesopen.1.Flood/surgewatertevelreachingelevation+19.5ft.(turbinebuilding/RABgroundfloor).QQ2.LowintakecanallevelhascausedthelossofallICWflow.3-12GENERALEMERGENCYEQIKReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT/RNRC

~~'fIIItgq1 TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLENOTEActivationoftheEmergencyResponseFacilitiesdoesnotrequiredeclarationofanemergencyorentryintoaspecificemergencyclassification.EVENT/CLASS6.A.LNNI~AcjgQ~PTF~NTIAQQ~MIT(Page1of2)UNUSUALEVENTmnhIInninwhiwnlnWiffnIIgLi~hriii~ALERTEmerendmnthnniinniIxiwhivthlevlffhSITEAREAEMERGENCYmrnmnhir'ni'nxiwhirnifinrinlnnnnrImnnrGENERALEMERGENCYrnir'nhnniinxihmkIfirrnunii'hri~~l~lily(Anycoremeltsituation.)1.Theplantisshutdownunderabnormalconditions(e.g.,exceedingcooldownratesorprimarysystempipecracksarefoundduringoperation).QQ2.AnyplantshutdovmrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsinwhichtherequiredshutdownIsnotreachedwithinactionlimits.1.LOCAwithfailureofECCSleadingtoseverecoredegradationormelt.QQ2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmentheatremovalsystemsforgreaterthan2hours.QQ3.Totallossoffeedwaterfollowedbyfailureofonce-through-cooling(ECCS)toadequatelycoolthecore.QQ4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithtotallossofemergencyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityforgreaterthan2hours.QQ5.ATWSoccurswhichresultsincoredamageorcausesfailureofcorecoolingandmake-upsystems.QQ6.AnymajorInternalorexternalevent(e.g.,fire,earthquakeortornadosubstantiallybeyonddesignbasis)whichintheEC'sopinionhasorcouldcausemassivedamagetoplantsystemsresultinginanyoftheabove.(continuedonnextpage)/RNRCEP3:43-13St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEA~EVENT/CLASS6.A~INR~AEIED~PTENTtALQQREMELT(Page2of2)UNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY~NOTE1.Mostlikelycontainmentfailuremodeismelt-throughwithreleaseofgasesonly.Quickerreleasesareexpectedforfailureofcontainmentisolationsystem.2.GeneralEmergencymustbedeclaredfortheabovelistedevents.Thelikelihoodofcorrectiveaction(repairofAFWpump,etc.)shouldnotbeconsidered.on-siteAwercabili1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.QR2.Lossofcapabilitytopoweratleastonevital4.16kvbusfroma~navailableemergencydieselgenerator.ttinBIkttIsofA1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.AND2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.Lflion-siteDwr1.DropinAandBDCbusvoltagestolessthan70VDC.tationBlkuotalLofAfrREATRTHAN1minut1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.AND!2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.AND3.FailuretorestoreACpowertoatleastonevital4.16kvbuswithin15minutes.NOTEReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.Lossofailvitalon-siteDforreaterthan1minutes1.SustaineddropinAandBDCbusvoltagesto70VDCforgreaterthan15minutes./RNRCEP3:43-14St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLE'EVENT/CLASS~ONTRO~FN~TII~NUNUSUALEVENTALERTfInntrlFnin1.Completelossofanyfunctionneededforplantcoldshutdown.QQ2.FailureoftheReactorProtectionSystemtobringthereactorsubcriticalwhenneeded.QQ3.ControlRoomisevacuated(forotherthandrillpurposes)viithcontrolestablishedlocallyattheHotShutdownControlPanel.fhtwnIin1.Completelossoffunctionsneededtomaintaincoldshutdown.A.Failureofshutdowncoolingsystems,resultinginlossofcoldshutdownconditions.~NB.RCSsubcooiingcannotbemaintainedgreaterthanO'.SITEAREAEMERGENCYCritiIfPlnntr~n~tin1.Lossofanyfunctionorsystemwhich,intheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinator,predudesplacingtheplantinHotShutdown.QQ2.FailureoftheRPStotiipthereactorwhenneeded,andoperatoractionsfailtobringthereactorsubcritical.QB3.ControlRoomisevacuated(forotherthandrillpurposes)andcontrolcannotbeestablishedlocallyattheHotShutdownControlPanelwithin15minutes.GENERALEMERGENCYReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.S.B.LOSSOFALARMS/~MONITRINinifinIffflnmmnitiniiinIItwhiimirrnmn1.Lossofeffluentorradiologicalmonitoringcapabilityrequiringplantshutdown.QB2.Lossofallpnmary~nbackupcommunicationcapabilitywithoff-sitelocations.QQ3.Unplannedlossofmost(greaterthan75%)orallsafetysystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.1.UnplannedlossofglIsafetysystemannunciators.~N2.Planttransientinprogress.~L~fl~rm1.Inabilitytoemergencymonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.Significanttransientexamplesinclude:Reactortrip,turbinerunbackgreaterthan25%andthermaloscillationsgreaterthan10%./RNRCEP3:43-15SLLucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT A

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSOA~ICRAFT~~ILUNUSUALEVENTnIlrr'i1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlledAreaorunusualaircraftactivityoverfacilitythatintheopinionoftheNPS/EC,couldthreatenthesafetyoftheplantorpersonnel.TininnnfilrALERTiriili1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlock.QQ2.VisualoraudibleIndicationofmissileimpactonthePowerBlock.VIII<ih'nnnrSITEAREAEMERGENCYDmviImfrgllr;ryt~mIi~i1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlockdamagingvitalplantsystems.QQ2.Damageresultinginlossofsafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.GENERALEMERGENCY9.C.~TXI~nirIiwnrIhIffInnffxirflmmIinniIIffinInTxirmmIiinviIrmrmiinhninfIIimnnrdinrIKGllEXXT~HgfQ'TYThIIhriFrinnrfhiI1.Bombthreat2.AttackthreatS.Civildisturbance4.ProtectedAreaintrusion5.Sabotageattempt6.Internaldisturbance7.Vitalareaintrushn8.SecurityforcestrikeIMYhnIIhriFfinInhfRITYEMERENYnvIvinimminnnhnrlrrrrviIhrifhfininhfrflkvrfhlnIIihrrnIIEP3I43-16St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT CATEGORY1REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9809090273DOC.DATE:98/08/31NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower6LightCo.50-389St.'uciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerSLightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSTALL,J.A.FloridaPowerSLightCo.RECIP.NAMERECXPIENTAFFILIATIONRecordsManagementBranch(DocumentControlDesk)DOCKET0500033505000389

SUBJECT:

Requestsapproval,priortoimplementationofchangetoplantCradiologicalemergencyplan.Proposedchangeclarifiescriteriausedinclassificationofradiologicalemrgency.AAttachment1providesexplanationofchanges.TDISTRIBUTIONCODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:EmergencyPreparednessPlans,'Implement'gProedures,CENOTES:GRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:AEOD/HAGAN,DNRR/DRPM/PERBEXTERNAL:NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECXPIENTXDCODE/NAMEGLEAVES,WCENTER01NUDOCS-ABNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111NOTETOALL"RIDSnRECIPIENTSPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOP'IESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR9ENCL9

FloridaPower&LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957August31,1998L-98-20010CFR550.54(q)U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDesk*Washington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProosedChanetoEmerencPlanTable3-1:ClassificationofEmerenciesPursuantto10CFR50.54(q),FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)requestsapproval,priortoimplementation,ofachangetotheSt.LuciePlantRadiologicalEmergencyPlan.Theproposedchangeclarifiesthecriteriausedintheclassificationofaradiologicalemergency.EmergencyactionlevelsremainconsistentwiththeclassificationcriteriacurrentlyapprovedbytheNRC.Attachment1providesanexplanationofchangestotheemergencyclassificationtablecontainedintheSt.LuciePlantRadiologicalEmergencyPlan,Table3-1.Attachment2providesadraftrevisionofTable3-1asitwouldappearintheRadiologicalEmergencyPlan.Verticallinesareusedtoindicatechangestothetable.TheproposedchangewasreviewedbytheSt.LuciePlantFacilityReviewGrouponJuly14,1998.OnreceiptofapprovalfromtheNRCoftheproposedchange,FPLwillrevisetheSt:LuciePlantEmergencyPlanandEmergencyPlanImplementingProcedureEPIP-01toimplementtherevisedclassificationcriterion.Ifyouhaveanyquestions,pleasecontactMr.EdWeinkamat561-467-7162./j'Sincerely,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LucieNuclearPlant.Attachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionII(2copies)SeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant980909027398083iPDRADQCK05000335FPDRanFPLGroupcompany

Attachment1ExplanationofProposedChangestoSt.LucieRadiologicalEmergencyPlanTable3-1;EmergencyClassificationTable

Background:

EmergencyClassificationTable3-1(Revision34oftheEmergencyPlan)wasreviewedtoidentifysectionswherethedescriptive,instructiontolicensedoperatorsandPlantmanagementcouldbeimproved.SpeciTically,thereviewaddressedareaswhereclarificationcouldbeprovidedtoemergencyactionlevelswithoutchangingtheintentoftheclassiTicationcriteria.Regulatoryguidanceandindustrystandardshavebeenconsultedaspartofthisreview.Thefollowingchangesareproposed:Event/ClassEPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFTProosedReasonforChane1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRateNoCAUTIONstatementUNUSUALEVENT2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow~1600ele.CAUTION:THISSECTIONSHOULDNOTBEUSEDFORSTEAMGENERATORTUBELEAK/RUPTURE.UNUSUALEVENT2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:Unit1-1600siaUnit2-1736siaClarifydifferencebetweenclassificationcriteriaforprimary/secondaryleakage.ReliefvalvesettingsdifferentforUnits1and2.ALERT.1.Charging/letdownmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthan132gpm.ALERT1.Charging/letdownmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailablecharincaaciCurrentsectiondoesnotrecognizelossofchargingcapacityandconflictswithSiteAreaEmergencysection.

Event/ClassEPlan,Rev.34CurrentEPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosed1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRate(continued)1.8AbnormalPrimarytoSecondaryLeakRateSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.RCSleakagegreaterthan132gpmoccurringwithRCSpressureaboveHPSIshutoffhead.OR2.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailablemakeupoccurringwithRCSpressurebelowHPSIshutoffhead.OR3.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).OR4.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorsindicate7.3x10'/hr(ifCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsindicate.between100and1000mR/hr).SITEAREAEMERGENCYRaidfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHANcharinumcaaciwithsteamreleaseinroress3.Secondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator(i.e.,ADVs,SteamSafety(s),orUnisoiable.)SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthanavailablechargingcapacity.OR2.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).SITEAREAEMERGENCYRaldfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHANcharinumcaaciwithsteamreleaseinroress3.Secondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffededgenerator~e..ADVsstucksteamsafesunlsolable~leakCurrentrevisiondoesnotrecognizelossofchargingcapabilityinsomecaseswhereleakageislessthan132gpm.Currentrevisiondoesnotctadfycreditfornormalmakeup(charging)onlyoranymakeup.ProposedrevisionprovidesforclearclassificationcriteriaforLOCAgreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthan(normal)chargingcapacity,whichisconsistentwithNUREGguidanceandindustryexamples.Criteriaforradiationmonitorreadingsareidentifiedin-Event/Class2.A(UncontrolledEffluentRelease).Currentrevisioncausedconfusiontousers,specificallyconcerning"unisolablestatusofslight-releasepotentialfromequipment(suchassteamdrivenAFW).Proposedrevisionprovidesadditionalclarificationtouserontypesofsecondarysteamreleasestobeconsideredwhenclassifyingevent.

Event/Class2.AUncontrolledEffluentRelease.3.FireEPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation(EPIP-09)worksheetvaluesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)forI*hour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)fortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolledfirewithintheplantlastingmorethan10minutes.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation(EPIP-09)worksheetvaluesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor250mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefor/~hour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor2500mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolledfirewithinthepowerblocklastingmorethan10minutes.ReasonforChaneConfusionbyusersondoseratesversustotaldose.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriabasedondoserate.Useof"powerblockprovidescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification.Powerblock"isspecificallydefinedinEPIP-01.ExplosionNoNOTEinsection.NOTE'XPLOSIONISDEFINEDASARAPIDCHEMICALREACTIONRESULTINGINNOISEHEATANDTHERAPIDEXPANSIONOFGAS.NOTEprovidescleardefinitionofexplosionevent.

Event/ClassEPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFTProosedReasonforChane3.Explosion(continued)ALERTDamagetofacilitybyexplosionwhichaffectsplantoperation.SITEAREAEMERGENCYSeveredamagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromexplosion.ALERTDamagetostructures/comonentswithintheProtectedAreabyexplosionwhichaffectsplantoperation.SITEAREAEMERGENCYSeveredamagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromexplosion~i.e.bothtrainsrenderedinoerable.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearidentificationofthelocation(ProtectedArea)whereconsiderationforclassificationofexplosionsoccur.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriaforthemeaningofseveredamagetosafeshutdownequipment,whichappliesregulatoryguidancedefinitionforlossofequipmentfunctions.4.BFuelHandlingAccidentSITEAREAEMERGENCYMajordamagetoirradiatedfuelinContainmentorFuelHandlingBuilding1.Stepincreaseinthereadingofradiationmonitorsintheplantventand/orintheFuelHandlingBuildingAND2.Damagetomorethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly.OR3.UncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPool.SITEAREAEMERGENCYMajordamagetoirradiatedfuelinContainmentorFuelHandlingBuildingAffectedarearadiationmonitorlevelsreaterthan1000mr/hr.AND~2.MaorDamagetooneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesOR3.MaordamaeresultinfromuncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPoolCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidespecificradiationdoseratethreshold.Currentrevisioricriteriarequiresknowledgeofextentofdamage("morethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly")whichwilllikelynotbeknown.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecificradiationdoseratethreshold(consistentwithotherclassificationcriteria)anddoesnotlimitclassificationbasedonunknownextentofdamage.

Event/Class5.AEarthquakeEPlanRev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments.ALERTAconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05g.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedUNUSUALEVENT2Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstrumentsorothermeans.ALERTAconfirmedearthuakehasoccurred1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlledArea.OR2.Aconfirmedearthuakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedatrioftheturbineeneratororreactor.ReasonforChaneCurrentclassificationdoesnotprovideforclassificationbasedoninformationreceivedbyother(non-plant)seismicmonitors,suchasfromothernuclearsites,colleges,orscientiTicmonitoringequipment.Thecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyidentifythelocationoftheincreasedseismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlledArea,asinUNUSUALEVENT).TheproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurementofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlledAreaandprovidesfordirectindicationsforeffectsoftheearthquakeonplantconditions(turbineorreactortrip).

Class/Event5.AEarthquake(continued)EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCYAconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.1g.withplantnotincoldshutdown.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCYAconfirmedearthuakehasoccurred1.AconfirmedearthuakeoccurswhichreistersGREATERTHAN0.1.withintheOwnerControlledAreaandthelantisnotincoldshutdown.ORReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyidentifythelocationoftheincreasedseismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlledArea,asinUNUSUALEVENT).TheproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurementofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlledAreaandprovidesfordirectindicationsforeffectsoftheearthquakeonplantconditions(lossofsafetyrelatedfunctions).2.Aconfirmedearthuakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofansafetrelatedsstemfunctioni.e.both5.CTornadoALERTAnytornadostrikingfacility.ALERT,Anytomedostrikingtaheowerblock.Thecurrentrevisiondidnotidentifyspecificaffectedareasoftheplanttobeconsideredforatornadostrike.Useof"powerblock"providescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification.PowerblockisspecificallydefinedinEPIP-01.

Event/Class6.AIncreasedAwarenessorPotentialCoreMeltEPlanRev.34CurrentALERTEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichwarrant:1.IncreasedawarenessandactivationofEmergencyResponsepersonnel.EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentALERTEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichhaveaotentialtoderadethelevelofsafeattheplant.ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusiontowhetheruseofemergencyresponsefacilitiesoractivationofanyemergencyresponsepersonnelinitsselfjustifiesALERTclassification.ProposedrevisionmakesjudgementcriteriaclearthatdegradationofplantconditionsjustifyclassificationofanALERT.SITEAREAEMERGENCYEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsexistwhichwarrant:1.Activationofemergencyresponsefacilitiesandmonitoringteamsoraprecautionarynotificationofthepublicnearthesite.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.EmergencyCoordinator'sjudgementthatplantconditionsuncontrollablemanner.Thecurrentrevisioncausesconfusiontowhetheruseofemergencyresponsefacilitiesinitsse)fjustifiesSITEAREAEMERGENCYclassification.(ClassificationofSITEAREAEMERGENCYalwaysresultsinnotificationofthepublic.)ProposedrevisionmakesjudgementcriteriaclearthatdegradationofplantconditionsjustifyclassificationofaSITEAREAEMERGENCY.GENERALEMERGENCY2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmenthearremovalsystemsforseveralhours.GENERALEMERGENCY2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmentheatremovalhours.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassificationconsiderations.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecifictimespan,afterwhichaGENERALEMERGENCYclassificationiswarranted.

Event/Class6.AIncreasedAwarenessorPotentialCoreMelt(continued)EPlan,Rev.34CurrentGENERALEMERGENCY4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergencyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityforseveralhours.EPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedGENERALEMERGENCY4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergencyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityfor8-'""'ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusionwithuserinregardtowhatis"emergencyfeedwater".Theplantdoesnotdesignateanyequipmentas'emergencyfeedwater.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassificationconsiderations.Theproposedrevisionprovidesclearindicationthatifthereisnofeedwaterforgreaterthan2hours,thenaGENERALEMERGENCYcIassificationiswarranted.7.ALossofPowerALERT2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorsynchronize.SITEAREAEMERGENCY2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorsynchronize.ALERT2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.SITEAREAEMERGENCY2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.Currentrevisiondoesnotaddressabilityofdieselgeneratortoperformitsintendedfunction(loadontoemergencybuses)Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindicationthatifthedieselisnotloaded,thenclassificationiswarranted.

Event/Class8.8LossofAlarms/Communication/Monitoring9.AAircraft/MissileEPlan,Rev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT3.UnplannedlossofmostorallSafetySystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Inabilitytomonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.ALERT1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlledAreadamagingplantstructures.OR2.Visualoraudibleindicationofmissileimpactonplantstructures.EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentUNUSUALEVENT1.Unplannedlossofmostigreatert~han75%oratlSafetySystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Inabilitytoe~ffeottvetmonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.NOTE:Sinificanttransientexamlesinclude:reactortriturbinerunbackreaterthan25%andthermaloscillationsreaterthan10%.ALERTblock.OR2.VisualoraudibleindicationofReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovideforaquantitativevalueforlossof"mostannunciators.ProposedrevisionindicatesaspecificpercentageofannunciatorslostneededtoclassifyanUNUSUALEVENT.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovideguidanceondegreeofabilityinwhichatransientcanbemonitoredinclassifyingtheevent.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidedefinitionofsignificanttransient.Proposedrevisionprovidesadditionalguidancefortheusertodeterminethat,ifatransientcannotbeeffectivelymonitored,thenaSITEAREAEMERGENCYiswarranted.Additionally,examplesofsignificanttransientsareprovided.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidereferencetocrashormissileimpacttospecificplantstructures.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindication(i.e.,thepowerblock)whereacrashormissileimpactwouldwarrantclassificatioofALERT.

Event/Class9.AAircraft/Missile(continued)EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlledAreadamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damagetosafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY1.Aircraftcrash~totheowerblockdamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damageresultininlossofsafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidereferencetocrashormissileimpactonspecificplantstructures.Proposedrevisiondefinesspecificareaoftheplantwheredamageisconsideredclassifiable.ProposedrevisionidentifieseffectonsafeshutdownequipmentascriteriafordeterminingclassificationofSITEAREAEMERGENCY.Useofpowerblockprovidescleardescriptionofstructuresofequipmentthatshouldbeconsideredinthisclassification."Powerblockisspecificallydefinedinprocedure.9.CToxicorFlammableGasSITEAREAEMERGENCYToxicorflammablegashasdiffusedintovitalareasaffectingaccesstoortheoperationofsafeshutdownequipment.SITEAREAEMERGENCYToxicorflammablegashasdiffusedintovitalareascompromisingthefunctionofsafetyrelatedequipment(i.e.,bothtrainsrenderedinoperable)CurrentrevisioncausedconfusionwithuserdifferentiatingbetweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.Currentrevisiondoesnotconsistentlyrelatelossofsafetysystemfunctionwithotherclassificationcriteria.ProposedrevisionprovidescleardifferencebetweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.10 ATTACHMENT2DRAFTREVISIONOFST.LUCIERADIOLOGICALEMERGENCYPLANTABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLE

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS1A./~Nfl/~MAEGGQAAQIQIJiThissectionshoukiNOTbeusedforasteamgeneratortubeleak/rupture.UNUSUALEVENT1.RCSleakageGREATERTHAN10gpmasindicatedby:A.ControlRoomobservationQBB.InvenlorybalancecalculationQBC.FieldobservationQBD.EmergencyCoordinatorJudgementQB2.IndicationofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:-Unit1-1600PSIA-Unit2-1736PSIAALERT1.Charging/letdovmmismatchormeasuredRCSleakageIndicatesgreaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailablechargingcapacity.SITEAREAEMERGENCY1.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailablethan50gpmandgreaterthanavailablechargingcapacity.QB2.LossofRCSsubcooledmarginduetoRCSleakage(saturatedconditions).GENERALEMERGENCY1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post.LOCAmon!torsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.PerformanceofEPIP<9(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysIndicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,or0betovcA.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)8.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.6000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)0.6000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)fhh~}(anytwoofthefollowing~landthethirdisimminent):1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQ1-131activitygreaterthan275yCI/mL).hhl22.LOCAorTuberuptureonunlsolablesteamgenerator.hHQ3.ContainmentIntegrityBreached.HITCHAlsoreferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3:43-5St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT 0

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS'I.B.BBBRRRMMAALL~PRIMAYT~EQNDARY~AKRATI;UNUSUALEVENTPRI/'I<1.MeasuredRCStosecondary"leakageexceedsTech.Spec.limits.~ND2.Secondaryphntactivityisdetected.ALERTRirfilrfttrtIINrim~fff-~~itILr1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthanTech.Spec.Umitsandwithinchargingpumpcapacity.~ND2.Secondaryphntactivityisdetected.~ND3.LossofbothNon-Vital4.16KVbuses.ifilrftmntrRRTHANrig~m~ggi~)1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.~ND2.Secondaiyplantactivityisdetected.SITEAREAEMERGENCYRirilrftntrtRATTHANimfff-itr1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakageisgreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.~N2.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.AND3.LossofbothNon-Vital4.16KVbuses.RiilrftrnnrtrtsRARTHANrinwithIri1.MeasuredRCStosecondaryleakagegreaterthancharging~pumpcapacity.~ND2.Secondaryphntactivityisdetected.~N3.Secondarysteamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator.(e.g.,ADVs,StuckSteamSafety(s),orUnisolableLeak.)GENERALEMERGENCYffthfiirrriwithimminnIt~hir(anytwoofthefollowingexistandthethirdisimminent).1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQI-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~N2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisohbiesteamgenerator.IitND3.Containmentintegritybreached.Alsoreferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Chss6.A./RNRCEP3:4St.LucieRev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS1.C.~LQ~F~QQNDARYQQQPNTUNUSUALEVENTidreuiitifggggn~gllnI1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.ALERTRETHAN1miiIk1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.AND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan10gpm.~ND3.Secondaryphntactivityisdetected.1.Nomainorauxiliaryfeedwaterflowavaihbleforgreaterthan15minuteswhenrequiredforheatremoval.~ND2.SteamGeneratorlevelsarelessthan40/owiderange.SITEAREAEMERGENCYFwitinitit-thrhli1.Nomainorauxiliaryfeedwaterflowavaihble.~N2.PORV(s)havebeenopenedtofacilitatecoreheatremoval.RTTHANrikndfelfI~mggIndi~tII1.Rapiddropineithersteamgeneratorpressuretolessthan600psia.~AN2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan50gpm.AND3.Secondaryplantactivityisdetected.~AN4.Fuelelementdamageisindicated(Referto'FuelElementFailureEvent/Chss4.A).GENERALEMERGENCYrlaharrriinrrritinin1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan.1.46X10R/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QQ2.PerformanceofEPIP~(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,8,C,orDbelovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)LIfthefissionrrriwithimminntIIth~thir(anytwoofthefollowingexistandthethirdisimminent).1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmedDEQI-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolablesteamgenerator.~ND3.ContainmentIntriBreached.~NTEAlsoreferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.EP3:43-7St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSUNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY2.AiIIlimirrIrIi1.Planteffluentmonitor(s)exceedalarmselpoint(s).~N2.ConfirmedanalysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichexceedsODCMlimits.HQXKIfanalysisisnotavailablewithinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisgreaterthanODCMlimit,dassifyas~~V~1.Planteffluentmonitor(s)significantlyexceedalarmsetpoints.BED2.ConfirmedanalysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichHQKIfanalysisIsnotavailablewithinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseIsequaltoorgreaterthan~iODCMlimit,dassifyasAiKBZ-1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitorgreaterthan7.3X10R/hr(Post-LOCAmonitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr,ifCHRRMInoperable).QB2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOff-siteDoseCalculation(EPIP49)worksheetvaluesatonemileInexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)for1/2hour.QBB.500mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)fortwominutesatonemile.1.ContaInmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.PerformanceofEPIP-09(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,B,C,or0belovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDODCM-ReferstoChemistryProcedureC-200,'Off.siteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM).'RNRCEP3I43-8St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSUNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY.2.8iihI1.AnyvalidareamonitoralarmfromIndeterminablesourcewithmeternearorgreaterthanfullscaledeflection(10'R/hr).QB2.Unexpectedplantiodineorparticulateairborneconcentrationof1000DACasseenInroutinesurveyingorsampling.QB3.'nexpecteddirectradiationdoseratereadingorunexpectedairborneradioactivityconcentrationfromanundeterminablesourceinexcessof1000timesnormallevels.nriiIIihiwrgggg0~II~ffLI1.Potentiallyaffectingsafetysystems.hE22.Requiringoff-sitesupportIntheopinionoftheNPS/EC.inhReferto'PotenflalCoreMelt'venVCtass6.A.IwihihwnrrlirHQKExplosionIsdefinedasarapidchemicalreactionresultinginnoise,heat,andtherapidexpansionofgas./RNRCEP3:43-9St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASS4>EUElZKhKEEEvil.llBKUNUSUALEVENT1.Processmonitorsorarearadiationsurveysindicateincreasedletdownactivity~N2.ConfirmedRCSsampleindicating:A.CoolantactivitygreaterthantheTechSpeclimitforiodinespike(TechSpecFigure3.4-1.).QQB.Coolantactivitygreaterthan100/EpCi/gramspecificactivity.IfanalysisIsnotavailablewithin1hour,anditisexpectedthatactivityisgreaterthanTechSpeclimit,dassifyas~ALERTIil1.ProcessmonitorsorarearadiationsurveysindicateincreasedletdownactivityandconfirmedRCSSamp!esindicatingDEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275yCI/mLIfanalysisisnotavailablewithin1hour,anditisexpectedthatRCSactivityforDEQI-131isgreaterthan275pCi/mL,dassifyasanKBZ-SITEAREAEMERGENCYIil1.RCSOEQ1-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCi/mL.2.HighestCETpercorequadrantindicatesgreaterthan10'Fsuperheator700'F.GENERALEMERGENCY1.ContainmentHighRangeRadiationmonitorgreaterthan1.46X10~R/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable,Post-LOCAmonitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.PerformanceofEPIP49(Off-siteDoseCalculations)ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicatedbyeitherA,8,C,orDbelch.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-COE)4,B.@+~ANhGQDKKElinP~nLfili3ijiilin,.1.NPS/ECdeterminesthatanirradiatedfuelassemblymayhavebeendamaged.~N2.Associatedareaorprocessradiationmonitorsareinalarm./grig1.Affectedarearadiationmonitorlevelsgreaterthan1000mR/hr.hHQ2.Majordamagetomorethanoneirradiatedfuelassembly.QB3.MajordamageresultingfromuncoveringofoneormoreirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSpentFuelPool./RNRCEP3:43-10Sl.Wcie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFjCATjONTABLEEVENT/CLASS5.A.~A~AKUNUSUALEVENTnfihk1.AconfirmedearthquakehasbeenexperiencedwithintheOwnerControlledArea.QQ2.Anearthquakeisdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstrumentsorothermeans.ALERTfirm1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlledAreaQQ!2.Aconfirmedearthquakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedtripoftheturbinegeneratororreactor.SITEAREAEMERGENCYitk1.AconfirmedearthquakeoccurswhichregistersGREATERTHAN0.1gwithintheOwnerControlledAreaandtheplantnotincoldshutdown.QQ2.Aconfirmedearthquakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofanysafetysystemfunction(i.e.,bothtrainsinoperable).GENERALEMERGENCY~NReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.5.B.ARRI~ANnWmin1.Confirmedhurricanewarningisineffect.Hu'iwithwinrit~in~i1.Confirmedhurricanewarningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed175mphwithintheOwnerControlledArea.~NTAtFPL'srequest,NOAAviillprovideanaccurateprojectionofwindspeedson-site24hourspifortotheonsetofhumcaneforcewinds.Itthatprojectionisnotavailablewithin12hoursofenteringintothewarning,cfassitytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.Forexample,projectedon-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhumcanewindspeedifthetrackisawayfromPSLRTANini1.Plantnotatcoldshutdown.~N2.Confirmedhurricanewarningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed194mphwithintheOwnerControlledArea.AtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojectionofwindspeedson-site24hourspriortothe.,onsetofhurricaneforcewinds.Ifthatprojectionisnotavaiiabfewithin12hoursofenteringIntothewarning,classifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.Forexample,projectedon-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricanewindspeeditthetrackIsawaytromPSLRefertoPotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3:43-11St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSS.C.~~MAQUNUSUALEVENTifinfmiALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCYHQIEReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.5.0./~~A~WAT~~nIIiirIwwrlwvIni'.Lowintakecanallevelof-10$ft.MLWfor1hourormore.QB2.Visualslghtingsbystationpersonnelthatwaterlevelsareapproachingstormdrainsystemcapacity.1.Thestormdrain'scapacityisexceededduringhurricanesurgeorknownfloodconditions.QB2.Lowintakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormorewithemergencybarriervalvesopen.1.Flood/surgewatertevelreachingelevation+19.5ft.(turbinebuilding/RABgroundfloor).QB2.LowIntakecanallevelhascausedthelossofallICWflow./RNRCEP3:43-12St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEHQIKActivationoftheEmergencyResponseFacilitiesdoesnotrequiredeclarationofanemergencyorentryintoaspecificemergencyclassification.EVENT/CLASS6.A.~NQfAA'jgQQgj'~NTIA~)ffMQIT(Page1of2)UNUSUALEVENTnIhniIwninrhfhriffnIgtt~hrii~1.Theplantisshutdovmunderabnormalconditions(e.g.,exceedingcooldownratesorprimarysystempipecracksarefounddurfngoperation).QB2.AnyplantshutdovmrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsinwhichtherequiredshutdownisnotreachedwithinactionlimits.ALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCYitxigg~ifLgLLIIIIIhf,(Anycoremeltsituation.)1LOCAvnthfailureofECCSleadingtoseverecoredegradationormelt.QB2.LOCAwithinitiallysuccessfulECCSandsubsequentfailureofcontainmentheatremovalsystemsforgreaterthan2hours.QB3.Totallossoffeedwaterfollowedbyfailureofonce-through-cooling(ECCS)toadequatelycoolthecore.QB4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithtotallossofemergencyfeedwatermakeupcapabilityforgreaterthan2hours.QB5.ATWSoccurswhichresultsincoredamageorcausesfailureofcorecoolingandmake-upsystems.QB6.AnymajorInternalorexternalevent(e.g.,fire,earthquakeortornadosubstantiallybeyonddesignbasis)whichIntheEC'sopinionhasorcouldcause.massivedamagetoptantsystemsresultinginanyoftheabove.(continuedonnextpage)/RNRCEP3:43-13St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSUNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY6A~INRF~AEDQQTTM~TIAQQRRMELT(Page2of2)~TE1.Mostlikelycontainmentfailuremodeismelt-throughwithreleaseofgasesonly.Quickerreleasesareexpectedforfailureofcontainmentisolationsystem.2.GeneralEmergencymustbedeclaredfortheabovelistedevents.Thelikelihoodofcorrectiveaction(repairofAFWpump,etc.)shouldnotbeconsidered.7.A.FPWfff-twrrlfIIn-itAr1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.QR2.Lossofcapabilitytopoweratleastonevital4.16kvbusfrom~navailableemergencydieselgenerator.tatinBIttIf1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.~ND2.Failureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.fII-it1.DropinAandBDCbusvoltagestolessthan70VDC.ttiBIktlfrRATTHAin1.Lossofoff.siteACpower.~AN!2.Sustainedfailureofbothemergencydieselgeneratorstostartorload.~N3.FailuretorestoreACpowertoatleastonevital4.16kvbuswithin15minutes.II'II~itrrit~NTEReferto'PotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A.1.SustaineddropinAand8DCbusvoltagesto70VDCforgreaterthan15minutes./RNRC.EP3:43-14St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONTABLEEVENT/CLASSUNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCYGENERALEMERGENCY8>LQGRQEZLBKQQHXEQI.~NQ~NS.B.MIQ~N~IQinifinlffflnInIIwhiiiiiifmrn1.Lossofeffluentorradiologicalmonitoringcapabilityrequiringplantshutdown.QB2.LossofallprimaryggIIbackupcommunicationcapabilitywithoff-sitelocations.QB3.Unpiannedlossofmost(greaterthan75%)orallsafetysystemannunciatorsforgreaterthan15minutes.I'n1.Completelossofanyfunctionneededforplantcoldshutdovm.QB2.FailureoftheReactorProtectionSystemtobringthereactorsubcnVcalwhenneeded.QB3.ControlRoomisevacuated(forotherthandrillpurposes)withcontrolestablishedlocallyattheHotShutdovmControlPanel.in1.Completelossoffunctionsneededtomaintaincoldshutdown.A.Failureofshutdowncoolingsystems,resultinginlossofcoldshutdowncondiVons.B.RCSsubcoolingcannotbemaintainedgreaterthanO'.1.Unplannedlossofgffisafetysystemannunciators.2.Planttransientinprogress.1.Lossofanyfunctionorsystemwhich,intheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinator,predudespladngtheplantinHotShutdown.QB2.FailureoftheRPStotripthereactorwhenneeded,andoperatoractionsfailtobringthereactorsubcriVeal.QB3,ControlRoomisevacuated(forotherthandrillpurposes)andcontrolcannotbeestablishedlocallyattheHotShutdownControlPanelwithin15minutes.M~Mium1.Inabilitytoemergencymonitorasignificanttransientinprogress.EQIFSignificanttransientexamplesindude:Reactortrip,turbinerunbackgreaterthan25%andthermalosdffatlonsgreaterflail10%.HQXKRefertoPotentialCoreMelt'vent/Class6.A./RNRCEP3:43-15St.Lvcie,Rev.NRCDRAFT sTABLE3-1EMERGENCYCLASSlFlCATlONTABLEEVENT/CLASS9>.~IRRAFF)~MIIUNUSUALEVENT1.AircraftcrashlntheOwnerControlledAreaorunusualaircraftactivityoverfacilitythatintheopinionoftheNPS/EC,couldthreatenthesafetyoftheplantorpersonnel.ALERTIrII1.AircraftcrashfnthePowerBlock.QB2.VisualoraudibleIndicationofmlssgeimpactonthePowerBlock.SITEAREAEMERGENCV1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlockdamagingvitalplantsystems.QB2.Damageresultinginlossofsafeshutdownequipmentfromanymissile.GENERALEMERGENCV9B.INIIiIii9.C.~T)~lnnnrIIIIrhnIfiIffiIIin1o.GKLlEZf.THffg~TIIhfinIninnini1.Bombthreat2.Attackthreat3.Civildistutbance4.ProtectedAreaIntrusion5.Sabotageattempt8.Internaldisturbance7.Vitalareaintrusion8.Securityforcestrike/RNRCEP3I43-16St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT