NRC Generic Letter 1981-24: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:tA REG(,, kUNITED STATES-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION< &#xa3;i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555June 15, 1981LICENSEES OF ALL GE BWR FACILITIES (EXCEPT HUMBOLDT BAY)
{{#Wiki_filter:tA REG(,, kUNITED STATES-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION< &#xa3;i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555June 15, 1981LICENSEES OF ALL GE BWR FACILITIES (EXCEPT HUMBOLDT BAY)SUBJECT: MULTI-PLANT ISSUE B-56, CONTROL RODS FAIL TO FULLY INSERT(Generic Letter No. 81-24)Gentlemen:By letters dated August 29, 1978 and January 10, 1980, you were requestedto provide information on your experience with one or more control rodsstopping short of the fully inserted position on scram and then settlingback to notch position "02" or six inches short of full insertion.We have evaluated your responses, along with those provided by other BWRlicensees, and have concluded that the problem of control rods insertingonly to notch position "102" on scram is attributable to leakage past wornI stop and drive piston seals. We have determined that this problem is amaintenance problem, and is readily correctable by control rod drive over-haul at a subsequent outage. We have further concluded that TechnicalSpecification requirements regarding control rod operability and shutdownmargin provide adequate assurance of the capability to place and maintainthe plant in a safe shutdown condition. Consequently, the failure to fullyinsert events, as described herein, do not represent a significant safetyissue.The enclosed safety evaluation provides the basis for this determination.Sincerely,/ Darrell G. Eisenhut, rectorDivision of LicensingOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:Safety Evaluationcc w/encl:Service List,/: i10310295 610615PDR ADOCK 05000010P PDR  
 
ywBOILING WATER REACTOR LICENSEESDocket No. 50-293Pilgrim Unit 1Docket No. 50-245Millstone Unit 1Docket No. 50-263MonticelloDocket No. 50-325Brunswick Unit 1/Docket No. 50-324Brunswick Unit 2-.9 04 9Docket No. 50-10 .Dresden 1Docket No. 50-277Peach Bottom Unit 2Docket No. 50-237Dresden 2Docket No. 50-278Peach Bottom Unit 3Docket No. 50-249Dresden 3Docket No. 50-333FitzPatrickDocket No. 50-254Quad-Cities Unit 1Docket No. 50-259Browns Ferry Unit 1Docket No. 50-265Quad-Cities Unit 2Docket No. 50-260Browns Ferry Unit 2Docket No. 50-155Big Rock PointDocket No. 50-296Browns Ferry Unit 3Docket No. 50-409Lacrosse Swcj.Docket No. 50-271Vermont YankeeDocket No. 50-321Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1IDocket No. 50-366Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2Docket No. 50-331Duane ArnoldDocket No. 50-219Oyster CreekDocket No. 50-220Nine Mile Point Unit 1Docket No. 50-298Cooper Station  
SUBJECT: MULTI-PLANT ISSUE B-56, CONTROL RODS FAIL TO FULLY INSERT(Generic Letter No. 81-24)Gentlemen:By letters dated August 29, 1978 and January 10, 1980, you were requestedto provide information on your experience with one or more control rodsstopping short of the fully inserted position on scram and then settlingback to notch position "02" or six inches short of full insertion.We have evaluated your responses, along with those provided by other BWRlicensees, and have concluded that the problem of control rods insertingonly to notch position "102" on scram is attributable to leakage past wornI stop and drive piston seals. We have determined that this problem is amaintenance problem, and is readily correctable by control rod drive over-haul at a subsequent outage. We have further concluded that TechnicalSpecification requirements regarding control rod operability and shutdownmargin provide adequate assurance of the capability to place and maintainthe plant in a safe shutdown condition. Consequently, the failure to fullyinsert events, as described herein, do not represent a significant safetyissue.The enclosed safety evaluation provides the basis for this determination.
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Sincerely,/ Darrell G. Eisenhut, rectorDivision of LicensingOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
===Enclosure:===
Safety Evaluationcc w/encl:Service List,/: i10310295 610615PDR ADOCK 05000010P PDR ywBOILING WATER REACTOR LICENSEESDocket No. 50-293Pilgrim Unit 1Docket No. 50-245Millstone Unit 1Docket No. 50-263MonticelloDocket No. 50-325Brunswick Unit 1/Docket No. 50-324Brunswick Unit 2-.9 04 9Docket No. 50-10 .Dresden 1Docket No. 50-277Peach Bottom Unit 2Docket No. 50-237Dresden 2Docket No. 50-278Peach Bottom Unit 3Docket No. 50-249Dresden 3Docket No. 50-333FitzPatrickDocket No. 50-254Quad-Cities Unit 1Docket No. 50-259Browns Ferry Unit 1Docket No. 50-265Quad-Cities Unit 2Docket No. 50-260Browns Ferry Unit 2Docket No. 50-155Big Rock PointDocket No. 50-296Browns Ferry Unit 3Docket No. 50-409Lacrosse Swcj.Docket No. 50-271Vermont YankeeDocket No. 50-321Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1IDocket No. 50-366Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2Docket No. 50-331Duane ArnoldDocket No. 50-219Oyster CreekDocket No. 50-220Nine Mile Point Unit 1Docket No. 50-298Cooper Station}}


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Revision as of 17:46, 6 April 2018

NRC Generic Letter 1981-024: Multi-Plant Issue B-56, Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert
ML031210452
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/15/1981
From: Eisenhut D G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
GL-81-024, NUDOCS 8107310298
Download: ML031210452 (2)


tA REG(,, kUNITED STATES-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION< £i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555June 15, 1981LICENSEES OF ALL GE BWR FACILITIES (EXCEPT HUMBOLDT BAY)SUBJECT: MULTI-PLANT ISSUE B-56, CONTROL RODS FAIL TO FULLY INSERT(Generic Letter No. 81-24)Gentlemen:By letters dated August 29, 1978 and January 10, 1980, you were requestedto provide information on your experience with one or more control rodsstopping short of the fully inserted position on scram and then settlingback to notch position "02" or six inches short of full insertion.We have evaluated your responses, along with those provided by other BWRlicensees, and have concluded that the problem of control rods insertingonly to notch position "102" on scram is attributable to leakage past wornI stop and drive piston seals. We have determined that this problem is amaintenance problem, and is readily correctable by control rod drive over-haul at a subsequent outage. We have further concluded that TechnicalSpecification requirements regarding control rod operability and shutdownmargin provide adequate assurance of the capability to place and maintainthe plant in a safe shutdown condition. Consequently, the failure to fullyinsert events, as described herein, do not represent a significant safetyissue.The enclosed safety evaluation provides the basis for this determination.Sincerely,/ Darrell G. Eisenhut, rectorDivision of LicensingOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:Safety Evaluationcc w/encl:Service List,/: i10310295 610615PDR ADOCK 05000010P PDR

ywBOILING WATER REACTOR LICENSEESDocket No. 50-293Pilgrim Unit 1Docket No. 50-245Millstone Unit 1Docket No. 50-263MonticelloDocket No. 50-325Brunswick Unit 1/Docket No. 50-324Brunswick Unit 2-.9 04 9Docket No. 50-10 .Dresden 1Docket No. 50-277Peach Bottom Unit 2Docket No. 50-237Dresden 2Docket No. 50-278Peach Bottom Unit 3Docket No. 50-249Dresden 3Docket No. 50-333FitzPatrickDocket No. 50-254Quad-Cities Unit 1Docket No. 50-259Browns Ferry Unit 1Docket No. 50-265Quad-Cities Unit 2Docket No. 50-260Browns Ferry Unit 2Docket No. 50-155Big Rock PointDocket No. 50-296Browns Ferry Unit 3Docket No. 50-409Lacrosse Swcj.Docket No. 50-271Vermont YankeeDocket No. 50-321Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1IDocket No. 50-366Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2Docket No. 50-331Duane ArnoldDocket No. 50-219Oyster CreekDocket No. 50-220Nine Mile Point Unit 1Docket No. 50-298Cooper Station

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