ML20309A798

Potential Security Measures - Abilene Christian University, NRC Slides from November 3, 2020 Closed Meeting

ML20309A798
Person / Time
Site:	99902088
Issue date:	11/03/2020
From:	Beth Reed NRC/NRR/DANU/UNPO
To:
Helvenston E
Shared Package
ML20309A797	List: ML20309A798 ML20309A799
References
Download: ML20309A798 (17)

Text

Potential Security Measures Beth Reed, NRR November 3, 2020

Security Regulations and Guidance 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)

- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59

- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)

- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G

• Draft final rule with commission (ADAMS No.

ML16264A000) 2

Security Regulations and Guidance (continued) 10 CFR 73Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- Transportation:

• Fresh fuel: 10 CFR 73.67

• Spent fuel: 10 CFR 73.37 and 38

- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75

- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060) 3

Approach

• Regulatory Basis for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM

- In ADAMS under ML14321A007

• Rule was discontinued, but approach remains

- Graded approach

- Risk informed

- Based on the attractiveness of the material

- Driven by the dilution of the material 4

Dilution Factor

• The weight of uranium-235, uranium-233 and plutonium divided by the total weight of the SNM material and non-SNM materials which are not mechanically separable from the SNM) for solids.

• Three Levels

- Non-dilute

- Moderately dilute

- Highly dilute

Non-dilute

• Material with a dilution factor equal to or greater than 20 percent for uranium-235 and equal to or greater than 10 percent for uranium-233 and plutonium.

• Non-dilute materials include, for example, highly attractive HEU, uranium-233, and plutonium metals and compounds.

Moderately Dilute

• Material with a dilution factor equal to or greater than 1 percent but less than 20 percent for uranium-235 and equal to or greater than 1 percent but less than 10 percent for uranium-233 and plutonium.

• MOX and certain non power reactor fuels, for example, can be considered moderately dilute SNM.

Highly Dilute

• Material containing SNM but with a dilution factor less than 1 percent for uranium-235, uranium-233 and plutonium.

• HEU-contaminated processing waste, for which the recovery of SNM is uneconomic, is an example of highly dilute materials.

Uranium-235 Nuclear Material Attractiveness Level Cat I Cat II Cat III High-Grade Materials Metals and compounds (20 wt %), solutions (25 g/l)

A 5 kg 1 kg

<5 kg RQ

<1 kg Low-Grade Materials Metals and compounds (1 wt % and <20 wt %);

solutions (1 g/l and <25 g/l)

B N/A 25 kg?

RQ

<25 kg?

All Other Materials Uranium (<10% U-235); highly irradiated material (1000 R/h @ 1 m); metals and compounds (<1 wt

%); solutions (<1 g/l)

C N/A N/A RQ 9

Material Attractiveness - U-235

Plutonium and Uranium-233 Nuclear Material Attractiveness Level Cat I Cat II Cat III High-Grade Materials Metals and compounds (20 wt %); solutions (25 g/l)

A 2 kg 0.4 kg

<2 kg RQ

<0.4 kg Low-Grade Materials Metals and compounds (1 wt % and <20 wt %);

solutions (1 g/l and <25 g/l); Pu (80 % Pu-238)

B N/A 10 kg?

RQ

<10 kg?

All Other Materials Uranium (<6% U-233); highly irradiated material (1000 R/h @ 1 m); metals and compounds (<1 wt

%); solutions (<1 g/l)

C N/A N/A RQ 10 Material Attractiveness - Pu & U-233

Potential Security Measures Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT of theft and diversion and radiological sabotage Prevent the removal of SNM and other unauthorized activities involving SNM Diversion Path Analysis Immediately detect attempts to remove of SNM and provide sufficient delay through the use of barriers and/or armed responders to allow LLEA to promptly recover SNM Promptly detect attempts to remove SNM and notify local law enforcement agencies to allow recovery of SNM.

Timely detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify LLEA to recovery SNM Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual.

Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual.

Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan 11

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Security Organization Implement Program Management System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -

Manage Fatigue Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier System/blast analysis Isolation Zone Protected Area Vital Area Material Access Area Locked Processes Vault Hardened CAS Vehicle Barrier System Isolation Zone Protected Area Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Hardened CAS Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Controlled Access Area 12

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access Part 11 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Protected Area &

Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM -

shielding)

Material Access Area - entry and exit (SNM - shielding)

Vault (weapons)

Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - entry (contraband) random exit (SNM &

shielding)

None 13

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Detection and Assessment Protected Area &

Material Access Area Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station Surveillance Program -

Protected Area &

unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination Protected Area &

Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Illumination Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Central Alarm Station (CAS)

Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas 14

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS Two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication among security force Non-portable equipment on UPS

Response

10 Tactical Response Team -

interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force Armed Security Officers LLEA Liaison Heightened Security Deadly Force Armed Security Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison 15

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III 16 Security Program Review Annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Maintenance &

Testing Required Required Required None Compensatory Measures In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Suspension of Security Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed

Commission Direction for Moly-99 Production

• Use supplemental security measures

- Measures to supplement the regulation

- Measures in past Orders apply

- Apply as license conditions

• Site specific

- Dependent on design, use, product, etc

• Graded approach

- Accounts for type and quantity of material used 17