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| number = ML17264A872
| number = ML17264A872
| issue date = 04/29/1997
| issue date = 04/29/1997
| title = Responds to NRC 970325 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/97-01 on 970105-970223.Corrective Actions:Held Meetings on 970211-12 W/Available Members of Nuclear Operations Group to Discuss Radiological Work Practices
| title = Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/97-01 on 970105-970223.Corrective Actions:Held Meetings on 970211-12 W/Available Members of Nuclear Operations Group to Discuss Radiological Work Practices
| author name = MECREDY R C
| author name = Mecredy R
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| addressee name = VISSING G
| addressee name = Vissing G
| addressee affiliation = NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| addressee affiliation = NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000244
| docket = 05000244
Line 11: Line 11:
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-244-97-01, 50-244-97-1, NUDOCS 9705070042
| document report number = 50-244-97-01, 50-244-97-1, NUDOCS 9705070042
| title reference date = 03-25-1997
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 22
| page count = 22
}}
}}
See also: [[followed by::IR 05000244/1997001]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:JAN-11-1988
{{#Wiki_filter:JAN-11-1988 87: 14 U.S.
87: 14 U.S.NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.82 AND ROQIESItR 64S AhQElFCTRIC
NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.82 AND ROQIESItR 64S AhQElFCTRIC CORPORAIION ~ 8P FASTAVEMIFROCIIESIER,PI Y. MiQP4%1 ARFAOAF''/6666 2250 808ERT C. MECREDY Vice lresdenl Nvdcer operol~
CORPORAIION
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:
~8P FASTAVEMIF
Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-l Washington, D.C. 20555 April29, 1997
ROCIIESIER,PI
 
Y.MiQP4%1 ARFA OAF''/6666
==Subject:==
2250 808ERT C.ME CREDY Vice lresdenl Nvdcer operol~U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection R'eport 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Commission
 
Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate
==Dear Mr. Vissing:==
I-l Washington, D.C.20555 April 29, 1997 Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection
Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02) submitted as an enclosure to a leer from Lawrence T. Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C. Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.
R'eport 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 Dear Mr.Vissing: Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E)provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02)
As a result of an inspection conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed'elow:
submitted as an enclosure to a leer from Lawrence T.Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C.Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.As a result of an inspection
"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as.deficicncies and deviations are promptly identified and corrected.
conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements
Contrary'to the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination
was identified.
'oundary control and poor radiological work practices noted in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
In accordance
50-244/94-29 and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No. 96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:
with the Enforcement
February 9, 1997, maintenance tools were removed from a designated contamination area on the A-Safety Injection pump.
Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed'elow:
Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an uncontaminated area.
"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,"Corrective
These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated area.
Action," requires in part that measures be established
Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination beforehand.
to assure that conditions
 
adverse to quality, such as.deficicncies
JAN-11-1988 87: 14 U. S.
and.deviations
NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 83 Page 2 2)
are promptly identified
February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter of a flow instrument (FI-116) was dripping from inside a contaminated area onto a clean fioor surface that was designated as uncontaminated.
and corrected.
A towel had been placed on the fioor was collecting the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive fiuid. Vfater was fiowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating previously clean fioor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.
Contrary'to
No coHecuoa device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated water to uncontaminated areas.
the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination
The radiological protection technician on duty at the time was aot aware of this condition.
'oundary control and poor radiological
BACKGROUND 1.
work practices noted in NRC Inspection
Inspection Report 94-29 NRC Inspection Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological postings were posted as required.
Report Nos.50-244/94-29
Some variability in the use of contamination bouadary demarcation tape (rad tape) was noted.
and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No.96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:
In some areas, rad tape was used on the fioor to define the contamination area boundary marker line, and in other areas this was not used.
February 9, 1997, maintenance
For example, for one area a contamination rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.
tools were removed from a designated
The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean gaea into a, contaminated area without a clear definition of the clean or contaminated portion of the cord and hose.
contamination
Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.
area on the A-Safety Injection pump.Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination
RGErE reestablished a clear contamination boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.
were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an uncontaminated
NRC Inspection Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection Report 96-11, NRC inspectors observed a
area.These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated
work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination area.
area.Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated
The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within thc contamination area.
area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination
Significant amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous debris generated from welding and grinding work had Mea to the floor and were accumulating outside the contamination area boundary.
beforehand.  
The step-off pad for exiting the contamination area was not securely attached to the floor. Several buckets that
JAN-11-1988
 
87: 14 U.S.NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.83 Page 2 2)February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter
Page 3 were used to collect contaminated fluids were not labeled properly.
of a flow instrument (FI-116)was dripping from inside a contaminated
NRC inspector also noted additional contanunation boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.
area onto a clean fioor surface that was designated
Cords and test leads were not secured to thc fioor to prevent them from canying contamination out of the area.
as uncontaminated.
When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent thein from being moved across the boundary marker line. Radiological surveys were taken and no spread of contamination was detected.
A towel had been placed on the fioor was collecting
However, RG&E agreed that management expectations for proper contamination boundary controls had not been met.
the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive
Site personnel working in these areas were subsequently counseled.
fiuid.Vfater was fiowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating
3.'CTION Report 964902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated tools/equipment found in unrestricted area tool storage areas.
previously
These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP) surveys of these areas.
clean fioor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.
(1)
No coHecuoa device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated
The reasons for the violation, or, ifcontested, the basis for disputing the violation; RG&E accepts the violation. We agree that problems regarding contamination boundary control*and poor radiological work practices have not been programmatically corrected.
water to uncontaminated
(a)
areas.The radiological
Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections pumps is very congested.
protection
Contaminated surface area boundaries are denoted by rad tape.
technician
The initial work planned for the area was to inspect and, ifnecessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings. Typically, the small contamination control area established for this work scope is adequate.
on duty at the time was aot aware of this condition.
Based on inspection of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.
BACKGROUND
Discussions occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP) technician relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamnation control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.
1.Inspection
Enlarging the work area would have better accouunodated the expanded work scope and eliminated the need to
Report 94-29 NRC Inspection
 
Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible
JAN-11-1988 87: 16 U.S.
areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological
NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.85 Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated area that had previously been established.
postings were posted as required.Some variability
There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician that the contamination area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination control.
in the use of contamination
The tool removed from the contaminated area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously smeared and was free of loose contamination.
bouadary demarcation
Athough full compliance to contaminated area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.
tape (rad tape)was noted.In some areas, rad tape was used on the fioor to define the contamination
The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated area.
area boundary marker line, and in other areas this was not used.For example, for one area a contamination
A contributing factor was the small contaminated area boundary.
rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean gaea into a, contaminated
An enlarged boundary would have eliminated the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminated area.
area without a clear definition
Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished as a standard, acceptable work practice, ifthe contaminated area had been properly enlarged.
of the clean or contaminated
(b)
portion of the cord and hose.Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.
Leak from How Transmitter FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified the
RGErE reestablished
: problem, RG&E acknowledges that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate method for containing contaminated liquid. This is an unacceptable work practice.
a clear contamination
A catch containment or bucket should have been used.
boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.
As background for how this situation developed, a Maintenance Work Order had previously identified a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to Pl-116.
NRC Inspection
This prompted RP to provide contamination boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to Fl-116. Initiallydescribed as a dry boron buildup,
Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection
'he leak progressed to thc point of a steady drip. It could not be ascertained at what stage in leak development the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.
Report 96-11, NRC inspectors
(c)
observed a work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination
Contaminated Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges that corrective actions for previously identified poor radiological work practices and inadequate contamination boundary controls were not effective.
area.The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within thc contamination
There have been additional incidents in these areas.
area.Significant
The programmatic requirements need to be strongly reinforced.
amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous
These incidents are the result of lapses in performance and failure to adhere to the established management expectations and standards.
debris generated from welding and grinding work had Mea to the floor and were accumulating
 
outside the contamination
JAN-11-1988 87: 17 U. S.
area boundary.The step-off pad for exiting the contamination
NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 86 Page 5 clear and Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective actions the fo
area was not securely attached to the floor.Several buckets that  
'0 be cus wl 011 additional mana e
Page 3 were used to collect contaminated
and unambiguous expectations for boundary demarcat'ious an
fluids were not labeled properly.NRC inspector also noted additional
: control,
contanunation
'n management coaching and counscliag, heightened awareness of th anced training, enforcing consistency in application of ness 0 cse standards, reinforcement of individual accountability and responsibility, and monitoring to ensure continuing compliance.
boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination
The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.Cords and test leads were not secured to thc fioor to prevent them from canying contamination
(a)
out of the area.When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately
On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations Group.
cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination
These meetings provided an opportunity for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological work adherence to practices and contamination boundary control.
area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent thein from being moved across the boundary marker line.Radiological
The im importaace of a
surveys were taken and no spread of contamination
crence to procedures and the seriousness of lapses in acceptable practices coacerniag contamination boundary control was personally conveyed by plant management.
was detected.However, RG&E agreed that management
(b}
expectations
At the request of'aintenance Supervision the Ginn Stat' irma tion rmcrpal ysicist mct with members of appropriate shops to outline concerns with improper contamination boundary control and to review station requirements and management expectations.
for proper contamination
Separate meetings were held with each of the followiag shops:
boundary controls had not been met.Site personnel working in these areas were subsequently
Mechanical Maintenance Electrical Maintenance Instrument and Control (E&C)
counseled.
I&C Special Projects.
3.'CTION Report 964902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated
(c)
tools/equipment
A letter was issued by the Plant Manager'nd Superintend ts t all p
found in unrestricted
personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management em hasized tha expectations for contamination boundary control. Thi I is etter emp size that all personnel are accountable for obeying established radiological boundaries when entering the restricted
area tool storage areas.These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP)surveys of these areas.(1)The reasons for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation;
. I furth em hasized t ri area.
t er the p as that ifinstructions are not clear or fullyunderstood th planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's en responsibi ity to ensure that all instructions are understood.
The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable radiological work practice willresult in a meeting with supervisiou, and further disciplinary action may=be necessary.
 
JAN-11-1988 87: 17 U.S.
NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 87 Page 6 (3)
The corrective steps that willbe taken to avoid further violations.
The Radiation Protection (RP) Group has been assigned responsibility to coordinate implemention of all corrective actions discussed below.
( )
rocedures willbe reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide (a)
Procedur clear and unambiguous management direction.
Any changes will clearly state acceptable practices for contamination boundary control.
In addition, any changes willinclude clear definitions of the various types of acceptable contamination boundary markers.
(b)
Contamination boundary control issues willbe discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance Supervision, to reinforce its importance.
Periodically, RP personnel willbe requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification and foster increased communications between groups.
(c)
RP Supervision has directed the RP staff and RP techni'd strong coaching to radiological workers.
This is being done to ensure contamina
'P personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining ff e ective mination boundary control.
Vfhen practicable, assigned RP personnel arc expected to be iu the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated areas, to ensure management expectations are being met.
raining Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced (d)
Tra'raining in contaminated area situations.
(e)
A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed to poor radiological work practices in the past.
Corrective actions, ifneeded, willaddress these factors, to assist in eve oping other appropriate means to strengthen the programmatic requirements and to increase compliance with these requirements.
'As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training, "Project Boundary" has been established.
Major attributes of this project include:
Communication of management expectations Boundary Control policies that are easy to use Training for ALLgroups oa revisions to boundary control policies
 
JAN-11-1988 87: 18 U.S.
HRC GthNA 315 524 6937 P. 88 Page 7 Reinforcing and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages) to the same level as RGB workers Verifyadequacy ofthese actions against predetermined indicators (g)
An independent effectiveness Review wiHbe conducted to verifythe adequacy ofthe above listed corrective actions.
This review willbe completed by October, 1997.
C (4)
The date when fullcompliance willbe achieved:
Pull compliance has been achieved as ofMarch 20, 1997, when short term corrective actions, including heightened awareness and restatement ofmanagement expectations, were completed.
Purther long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective actions (a) through (g) above, willresult in a more effective program.
Very y yours, Robert C. Mecredy xc:
Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)
Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King ofPrussia, PA 19046 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector TOTAL P.88
 
CATEGORY
. 1 1
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
( RIDS )
Iy ACCESSION NBR: 970507004 2 DOC. DATE: 97/04/29 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G
05000244 AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ECREDY, R ~ C ~
Rochester Gas
& Electric Corp.
RECIP
~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING F G ~
 
==SUBJECT:==
Responds to NRC 970325 1tr re violations noted in insp rept 50-244/97-0 1 on 970 1 05-970223
~ Corrective actions: held meetings on 9702 1l-l2 w/avai lable members of Nuclear Operations Group to discuss radiological work practices
~
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3 ENCL Q SIZE:
TITLE: General
( 50 Dkt ) -Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES: License Exp date in accordance with 1 OCFR2, 2. 109 ( 9/19/72 )
05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO NRR/DISP/P IPB NRR/DRPM/PECB NUD0 C S-ABS TRACT OGC/HDS 3 ERNAL: LITCO BRYCE, J H
NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING, G ~
AEOD TTC
~F CE TE~
NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN1 FILE 01 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT COPIES LTTR ENCL NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPZENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROI DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 18 ENCL R'
 
AND y
ROCHESTER GAS ANDElECTRIC CORPORATIOhf
~ 89EASTAVENU~ RO HESTER, Ar.Y Idod9.cr'C
'PEA COD! 7ID5I52.'K ROB"RT C. NtECREDY Vice President Nvcfeor operations April29, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:
Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555
 
==Subject:==
Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
 
==Dear Mr. Vissing:==
Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02) submitted as an enclosure to a letter from Lawrence T. Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C. Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.
As a result of an inspection conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed below:
"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and deviations are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination boundary control and poor radiological work practices noted in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-244/94-29 and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No. 96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:
February 9, 1997, maintenance tools were removed from a designated contamination area on the A-Safety Injection pump.
Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an-uncontaminated area.
These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated area.
Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination beforehand.
9705070042 970429 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8
PDR g[llllllllllllllllllllltll lllllll
 
Page 2 2)
February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter of a flow instrument (FI-116) was dripping from inside a contaminated area onto a clean; floor surface that was designated as uncontaminated.
A towel had been placed on the floor was collecting the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive fluid. Water was flowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating previously clean floor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.
No collection device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated water to uncontaminated areas.
The radiological protection technician on duty at the time was not aware of this condition.
BACKGROUND Inspection Report 94-29 NRC Inspection Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological postings were posted as required.
Some variability in the use of contamination boundary demarcation tape (rad tape) was noted.
In some areas, rad tape was used on the floor to define the contamination area boundary marker line, and in other areas this'was not used.
For example, for one area a contamination rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.
The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean area into a contaminated area without a clear definition of the clean or contaminated portion of the cord and hose.
Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.
RG&E reestablished a clear contamination boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.
2.
NRC Inspection Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection Report 96-11, NRC inspectors observed a
work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination area.
The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within the contamination area.
Significant amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous debris generated from welding and grinding work had fallen to the floor and were accumulating outside the contamination area boundary.
The step-off pad for exiting the contamination area was not securely attached to the floor.
Several buckets that
 
Page 3 were used to collect contaminated fluids were not labeled properly.
NRC inspector also noted additional contamination boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.
Cords and test leads were not secured to the floor to prevent them from carrying contamination out of the area.
When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent them from being moved across the boundary marker line.
Radiological surveys were taken and no spread of contamination was detected.
However, RG&E agreed that management expectations for proper contamination boundary controls had not been met.
Site personnel working in these areas were, subsequently counseled.
ACTION Report 96-0902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated tools/equipment found in unrestricted area t'ool storage areas.
These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP) surveys of these areas.
(1)
The reasons for the violation, or, ifcontested, the basis for disputing the violation:
RG&E accepts the violation.
RG&E accepts the violation.
We agree that problems regarding contamination
We agree that problems regarding contamination boundary control and poor radiological work practices have not been programmatically corrected.
boundary control*and
(a)
poor radiological
Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections pumps is very congested.
work practices have not been programmatically
Contaminated surface area boundaries are denoted by rad tape.
corrected.(a)Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections
The initial work planned for
pumps is very congested.
~
Contaminated
the area was to inspect and, ifnecessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings. Typically, the small contamination control area established for this work scope is adequate.
surface area boundaries
Based on inspection of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.
are denoted by rad tape.The initial work planned for the area was to inspect and, if necessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings.Typically, the small contamination
Discussions occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP) technician relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamination control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.
control area established
Enlarging the work area would have better accommodated the expanded work scope and eliminated the need to
for this work scope is adequate.Based on inspection
 
of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.
Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated area that had previously been established.
Discussions
There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician that the contamination area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination control.
occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP)technician
The tool removed from the contaminated area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously smeared and was free of loose contamination.
relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamnation
Athough full compliance to contaminated area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.
control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.
The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated area.
Enlarging the work area would have better accouunodated
A contributing factor was the small contaminated area boundary.
the expanded work scope and eliminated
An enlarged boundary would have eliminated the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminate'd area.
the need to  
Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished as a standard, acceptable work practice, ifthe contaminated area had been properly enlarged.
JAN-11-1988
Leak from Flow Transmitter FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified the problem.
87: 16 U.S.NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.85 Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated
RG&E acknowledges that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate method for containing contaminated liquid. This is an unacceptable work practice.
area that had previously
A catch containment or bucket should have been used.
been established.
As background for how this situation developed, a Maintenance Work Order had previously identified a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to FI-116.
There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician
This prompted RP to provide contamination boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to FI-116. Initially described as a dry boron buildup, the leak progressed to the point of a steady drip. It could not be ascertained at what stage in leak development the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.
that the contamination
Contaminated Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges that corrective actions for previously identified poor radiological, work practices and inadequate contamination boundary controls were not effective.
area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination
There have been additional incidents in these areas.
control.The tool removed from the contaminated
The programmatic requirements need to be strongly reinforced.
area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously
These incidents are the result of lapses in performance and failure to adhere to the established management expectations and standards.
smeared and was free of loose contamination.
 
Athough full compliance
Page 5 Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective actions, the focus willbe on clear and unambiguous expectations for boundary demarcations and control, additional management coaching and counseling, heightened awareness of these expectations, enhanced training, enforcing consistency in application of standards, reinforcement of individual accountability and responsibility, and monitoring to -ensure continuing compliance.
to contaminated
The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative
(a)
of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.
On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations Group.
The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated
These meetings provided an opportunity for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological work practices and contamination boundary control.
area.A contributing
The importance of adherence to procedures and the seriousness of lapses in acceptable practices concerning contamination boundary control was personally conveyed by plant management.
factor was the small contaminated
(b)
area boundary.An enlarged boundary would have eliminated
At the request of Maintenance Supervision, the Ginna Station Principal Health Physicist met with members of appropriate shops to outline concerns with improper contamination boundary control and to review station requirements and management expectations.
the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminated
Separate meetings were held with each of the following shops:
area.Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished
Mechanical Maintenance Electrical Maintenance Instrument and Control (I&C)
as a standard, acceptable
ISAAC Special Projects (c)
work practice, if the contaminated
A letter was issued by the Plant Manager and Superintendents to all plant personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management expectations for contamination boundary control.
area had been properly enlarged.(b)Leak from How Transmitter
This letter emphasized that all personnel are accountable for obeying established radiological boundaries when entering the restricted area.
FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified
It further emphasized that ifinstructions are not clear or fully understood, then the planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's responsibility to ensure that all instructions are understood.
the problem, RG&E acknowledges
The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable radiological work practice willresult in a meeting with supervision, and further disciplinary action may be necessary.
that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate
 
method for containing
Page 6 (3)
contaminated
The corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
liquid.This is an unacceptable
The Radiation Protection (RP) Group has been assigned responsibility to coordinate implemention of all corrective actions discussed below.
work practice.A catch containment
(a)
or bucket should have been used.As background
Procedures willbe reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide
for how this situation developed, a Maintenance
'lear and unambiguous management direction.
Work Order had previously
Any changes will clearly state acceptable practices for contamination boundary control.
identified
In addition, any changes will include clear definitions of the various types of acceptable contamination boundary markers.
a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to Pl-116.This prompted RP to provide contamination
(b)
boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to Fl-116.Initially described as a dry boron buildup,'he leak progressed
Contamination boundary control issues willbe discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance Supervision, to reinforce its importance.
to thc point of a steady drip.It could not be ascertained
Periodically, RP personnel willbe requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification and foster increased communications between groups.
at what stage in leak development
(c)
the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.(c)Contaminated
RP Supervision has directed the RP staff and RP technicians to provide strong coaching to radiological workers.
Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges
This is being done to ensure RP personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining effective contamination boundary control.
that corrective
When practicable, assigned RP personnel are expected to be in the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated
actions for previously
: areas, to ensure management expectations are being met.
identified
(d)
poor radiological
Training Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced training in contaminated area situations.
work practices and inadequate
(e)
contamination
A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed to poor radiological work practices in the past.
boundary controls were not effective.
Corrective actions, ifneeded, willaddress these factors, to assist in developing other appropriate means to strengthen the programmatic requirements and to increase compliance with these requirements.
There have been additional
I (f)
incidents in these areas.The programmatic
As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training, "Project Boundary" has been established.
requirements
Major attributes of this project include:
need to be strongly reinforced.
Communication of management expectations Boundary Control policies, that are easy to use Training for ALLgroups on revisions to boundary control policies
These incidents are the result of lapses in performance
 
and failure to adhere to the established
Page 7 Reinforcing and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages) to the same level as RGB'orkers Verifyadequacy ofthese actions against predetermined indicators (g)
management
An independent EQectiveness Review willbe conducted to verify the adequacy ofthe above listed corrective actions.
expectations
This review willbe completed by October, 1997.
and standards.  
(4)
JAN-11-1988
The date when full compliance willbe achieved:
87: 17 U.S.NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.86 Page 5 clear and Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective
Full compliance has been achieved as ofMarch 20, 1997, when short term corrective actions, including heightened awareness and rest'atement ofmanagement expectations, were completed.
actions the fo'0 be cus wl 011 additional
Further long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective actions (a) through (g) above, willresult in a more e6ective program.
mana e and unambiguous
Very
expectations
: lyyours, Robert C. Mecredy XC:
for boundary demarcat'ious an control,'n management
Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)
coaching and counscliag, heightened
Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King ofPrussia, PA 19046
awareness of th anced training, enforcing consistency
'h Ginna Senior Resident Inspector}}
in application
of ness 0 cse standards, reinforcement
of individual
accountability
and responsibility, and monitoring
to ensure continuing
compliance.
The corrective
steps that have been taken and the results achieved: (a)On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations
Group.These meetings provided an opportunity
for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological
work adherence to practices and contamination
boundary control.The im importaace
of a crence to procedures
and the seriousness
of lapses in acceptable
practices coacerniag
contamination
boundary control was personally
conveyed by plant management.(b}At the request of'aintenance
Supervision
the Ginn Stat'irma tion rmcr pal ysicist mct with members of appropriate
shops to outline concerns with improper contamination
boundary control and to review station requirements
and management
expectations.
Separate meetings were held with each of the followiag shops:Mechanical
Maintenance
Electrical
Maintenance
Instrument
and Control (E&C)I&C Special Projects.(c)A letter was issued by the Plant Manager'nd
Superintend
ts t all p personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management
em hasized tha expectations
for contamination
boundary control.Thi I is etter emp size that all personnel are accountable
for obeying established
radiological
boundaries
when entering the restricted
.I furth em hasized t ri area.t er the p as that if instructions
are not clear or fully understood
th planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's en responsibi
ity to ensure that all instructions
are understood.
The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable
radiological
work practice will result in a meeting with supervisiou, and further disciplinary
action may=be necessary.  
JAN-11-1988
87: 17 U.S.NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.87 Page 6 (3)The corrective
steps that will be taken to avoid further violations.
The Radiation Protection (RP)Group has been assigned responsibility
to coordinate
implemention
of all corrective
actions discussed below.()rocedures will be reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide (a)Procedur clear and unambiguous
management
direction.
Any changes will clearly state acceptable
practices for contamination
boundary control.In addition, any changes will include clear definitions
of the various types of acceptable
contamination
boundary markers.(b)Contamination
boundary control issues will be discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance
Supervision, to reinforce its importance.
Periodically, RP personnel will be requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification
and foster increased communications
between groups.(c)RP Supervision
has directed the RP staff and RP techni'd strong coaching to radiological
workers.This is being done to ensure contamina'P personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining
ff e ective mination boundary control.Vfhen practicable, assigned RP personnel arc expected to be iu the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated
areas, to ensure management
expectations
are being met.raining Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced (d)Tra'raining
in contaminated
area situations.(e)A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed
to poor radiological
work practices in the past.Corrective
actions, if needed, will address these factors, to assist in eve oping other appropriate
means to strengthen
the programmatic
requirements
and to increase compliance
with these requirements.
'As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training,"Project Boundary" has been established.
Major attributes
of this project include: Communication
of management
expectations
Boundary Control policies that are easy to use Training for ALL groups oa revisions to boundary control policies  
JAN-11-1988
87: 18 U.S.HRC GthNA 315 524 6937 P.88 Page 7 Reinforcing
and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages)to the same level as RGB workers Verify adequacy of these actions against predetermined
indicators (g)An independent
effectiveness
Review wiH be conducted to verify the adequacy of the above listed corrective
actions.This review will be completed by October, 1997.C (4)The date when full compliance
will be achieved: Pull compliance
has been achieved as of March 20, 1997, when short term corrective
actions, including heightened
awareness and restatement
of management
expectations, were completed.
Purther long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective
actions (a)through (g)above, will result in a more effective program.Very y yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)Project Directorate
I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19046 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector TOTAL P.88
CATEGORY.1 1 REGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM (RI DS)Iy ACCESSION NBR: 970507004 2 DOC.DATE: 97/04/29 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH~NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
ECREDY, R~C~Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP~NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
VISSING F G~SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 970325 1 t r re violations
noted in insp rept 50-244/97-0
1 on 970 1 05-970223~Corrective
actions: held meetings on 9702 1 l-l 2 w/avai lable members of Nuclear Operations
Group to discuss radiological
work practices~DISTRIBUTION
CODE: IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
3 ENCL Q SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice
of Violation Response NOTES: License Exp date in accordance
with 1 OCFR2, 2.109 (9/19/72)05000244 RECIPIENT I D CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RAB
DEDRO NRR/D I SP/P I PB NRR/DRPM/PECB
N U D 0 C S-A B S T RA C T OGC/HDS 3 ERNAL: L I TCO BRYCE, J H NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL RECIPIENT I D CODE/NAME VI SSING, G~AEOD TTC~F CE TE~NRR/DRCH/HHFB
NRR/DRPM/PERB
OE DIR RGN1 FILE 01 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT COPIES LTTR ENCL NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPZENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION
REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION
LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROI DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 18 ENCL R'
AND y ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRIC CORPORATIOhf
~89EASTAVENU~
RO HESTER, Ar.Y Idod9.cr'C
'PEA COD!7ID5I52.'K
ROB" RT C.NtECREDY Vice President Nvcfeor operations
April 29, 1997 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate
I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection
Report 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 Dear Mr.Vissing: Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E)provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02)
submitted as an enclosure to a letter from Lawrence T.Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C.Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.As a result of an inspection
conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements
was identified.
In accordance
with the Enforcement
Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed below: "10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,"Corrective
Action," requires in part that measures be established
to assure that conditions
adverse to quality, such as deficiencies
and deviations
are promptly identified
and corrected.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination
boundary control and poor radiological
work practices noted in NRC Inspection
Report Nos.50-244/94-29
and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No.96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:
February 9, 1997, maintenance
tools were removed from a designated
contamination
area on the A-Safety Injection pump.Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination
were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an-uncontaminated
area.These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated
area.Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated
area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination
beforehand.
9705070042
970429 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8 PDR g[llllllllllllllllllllltll
lllllll
Page 2 2)February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter
of a flow instrument (FI-116)was dripping from inside a contaminated
area onto a clean;floor surface that was designated
as uncontaminated.
A towel had been placed on the floor was collecting
the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive
fluid.Water was flowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating
previously
clean floor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.
No collection
device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated
water to uncontaminated
areas.The radiological
protection
technician
on duty at the time was not aware of this condition.
BACKGROUND
Inspection
Report 94-29 NRC Inspection
Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible
areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological
postings were posted as required.Some variability
in the use of contamination
boundary demarcation
tape (rad tape)was noted.In some areas, rad tape was used on the floor to define the contamination
area boundary marker line, and in other areas this'was not used.For example, for one area a contamination
rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean area into a contaminated
area without a clear definition
of the clean or contaminated
portion of the cord and hose.Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.
RG&E reestablished
a clear contamination
boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.
2.NRC Inspection
Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection
Report 96-11, NRC inspectors
observed a work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination
area.The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within the contamination
area.Significant
amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous
debris generated from welding and grinding work had fallen to the floor and were accumulating
outside the contamination
area boundary.The step-off pad for exiting the contamination
area was not securely attached to the floor.Several buckets that
Page 3 were used to collect contaminated
fluids were not labeled properly.NRC inspector also noted additional
contamination
boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination
area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.Cords and test leads were not secured to the floor to prevent them from carrying contamination
out of the area.When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately
cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination
area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent them from being moved across the boundary marker line.Radiological
surveys were taken and no spread of contamination
was detected.However, RG&E agreed that management
expectations
for proper contamination
boundary controls had not been met.Site personnel working in these areas were, subsequently
counseled.
ACTION Report 96-0902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated
tools/equipment
found in unrestricted
area t'ool storage areas.These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP)surveys of these areas.(1)The reasons for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation:
RG&E accepts the violation.
We agree that problems regarding contamination
boundary control and poor radiological
work practices have not been programmatically
corrected.(a)Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections
pumps is very congested.
Contaminated
surface area boundaries
are denoted by rad tape.The initial work planned for~the area was to inspect and, if necessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings.Typically, the small contamination
control area established
for this work scope is adequate.Based on inspection
of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.
Discussions
occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP)technician
relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamination
control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.
Enlarging the work area would have better accommodated
the expanded work scope and eliminated
the need to
Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated
area that had previously
been established.
There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician
that the contamination
area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination
control.The tool removed from the contaminated
area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously
smeared and was free of loose contamination.
Athough full compliance
to contaminated
area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative
of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.
The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated
area.A contributing
factor was the small contaminated
area boundary.An enlarged boundary would have eliminated
the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminate'd
area.Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished
as a standard, acceptable
work practice, if the contaminated
area had been properly enlarged.Leak from Flow Transmitter
FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified
the problem.RG&E acknowledges
that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate
method for containing
contaminated
liquid.This is an unacceptable
work practice.A catch containment
or bucket should have been used.As background
for how this situation developed, a Maintenance
Work Order had previously
identified
a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to FI-116.This prompted RP to provide contamination
boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to FI-116.Initially described as a dry boron buildup, the leak progressed
to the point of a steady drip.It could not be ascertained
at what stage in leak development
the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.
Contaminated
Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges
that corrective
actions for previously
identified
poor radiological, work practices and inadequate
contamination
boundary controls were not effective.
There have been additional
incidents in these areas.The programmatic
requirements
need to be strongly reinforced.
These incidents are the result of lapses in performance
and failure to adhere to the established
management
expectations
and standards.
Page 5 Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective
actions, the focus will be on clear and unambiguous
expectations
for boundary demarcations
and control, additional
management
coaching and counseling, heightened
awareness of these expectations, enhanced training, enforcing consistency
in application
of standards, reinforcement
of individual
accountability
and responsibility, and monitoring
to-ensure continuing
compliance.
The corrective
steps that have been taken and the results achieved: (a)On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations
Group.These meetings provided an opportunity
for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological
work practices and contamination
boundary control.The importance
of adherence to procedures
and the seriousness
of lapses in acceptable
practices concerning
contamination
boundary control was personally
conveyed by plant management.(b)At the request of Maintenance
Supervision, the Ginna Station Principal Health Physicist met with members of appropriate
shops to outline concerns with improper contamination
boundary control and to review station requirements
and management
expectations.
Separate meetings were held with each of the following shops: Mechanical
Maintenance
Electrical
Maintenance
Instrument
and Control (I&C)ISAAC Special Projects (c)A letter was issued by the Plant Manager and Superintendents
to all plant personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management
expectations
for contamination
boundary control.This letter emphasized
that all personnel are accountable
for obeying established
radiological
boundaries
when entering the restricted
area.It further emphasized
that if instructions
are not clear or fully understood, then the planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's responsibility
to ensure that all instructions
are understood.
The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable
radiological
work practice will result in a meeting with supervision, and further disciplinary
action may be necessary.
Page 6 (3)The corrective
steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
The Radiation Protection (RP)Group has been assigned responsibility
to coordinate
implemention
of all corrective
actions discussed below.(a)Procedures
will be reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide'lear and unambiguous
management
direction.
Any changes will clearly state acceptable
practices for contamination
boundary control.In addition, any changes will include clear definitions
of the various types of acceptable
contamination
boundary markers.(b)Contamination
boundary control issues will be discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance
Supervision, to reinforce its importance.
Periodically, RP personnel will be requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification
and foster increased communications
between groups.(c)RP Supervision
has directed the RP staff and RP technicians
to provide strong coaching to radiological
workers.This is being done to ensure RP personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining
effective contamination
boundary control.When practicable, assigned RP personnel are expected to be in the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated
areas, to ensure management
expectations
are being met.(d)Training Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced training in contaminated
area situations.(e)A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed
to poor radiological
work practices in the past.Corrective
actions, if needed, will address these factors, to assist in developing
other appropriate
means to strengthen
the programmatic
requirements
and to increase compliance
with these requirements.
I (f)As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training,"Project Boundary" has been established.
Major attributes
of this project include: Communication
of management
expectations
Boundary Control policies, that are easy to use Training for ALL groups on revisions to boundary control policies
Page 7 Reinforcing
and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages)to the same level as RGB'orkers
Verify adequacy of these actions against predetermined
indicators (g)An independent
EQectiveness
Review will be conducted to verify the adequacy of the above listed corrective
actions.This review will be completed by October, 1997.(4)The date when full compliance
will be achieved: Full compliance
has been achieved as of March 20, 1997, when short term corrective
actions, including heightened
awareness and rest'atement
of management
expectations, were completed.
Further long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective
actions (a)through (g)above, will result in a more e6ective program.Very ly yours, Robert C.Mecredy XC: Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)Project Directorate
I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19046'h Ginna Senior Resident Inspector
}}

Latest revision as of 09:48, 8 January 2025

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/97-01 on 970105-970223.Corrective Actions:Held Meetings on 970211-12 W/Available Members of Nuclear Operations Group to Discuss Radiological Work Practices
ML17264A872
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/29/1997
From: Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: Vissing G
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-244-97-01, 50-244-97-1, NUDOCS 9705070042
Download: ML17264A872 (22)


Text

JAN-11-1988 87: 14 U.S.

NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.82 AND ROQIESItR 64S AhQElFCTRIC CORPORAIION ~ 8P FASTAVEMIFROCIIESIER,PI Y. MiQP4%1 ARFAOAF/6666 2250 808ERT C. MECREDY Vice lresdenl Nvdcer operol~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:

Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-l Washington, D.C. 20555 April29, 1997

Subject:

Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection R'eport 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02) submitted as an enclosure to a leer from Lawrence T. Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C. Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.

As a result of an inspection conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed'elow:

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as.deficicncies and deviations are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary'to the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination

'oundary control and poor radiological work practices noted in NRC Inspection Report Nos.

50-244/94-29 and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No. 96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:

February 9, 1997, maintenance tools were removed from a designated contamination area on the A-Safety Injection pump.

Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an uncontaminated area.

These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated area.

Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination beforehand.

JAN-11-1988 87: 14 U. S.

NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 83 Page 2 2)

February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter of a flow instrument (FI-116) was dripping from inside a contaminated area onto a clean fioor surface that was designated as uncontaminated.

A towel had been placed on the fioor was collecting the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive fiuid. Vfater was fiowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating previously clean fioor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.

No coHecuoa device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated water to uncontaminated areas.

The radiological protection technician on duty at the time was aot aware of this condition.

BACKGROUND 1.

Inspection Report 94-29 NRC Inspection Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological postings were posted as required.

Some variability in the use of contamination bouadary demarcation tape (rad tape) was noted.

In some areas, rad tape was used on the fioor to define the contamination area boundary marker line, and in other areas this was not used.

For example, for one area a contamination rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.

The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean gaea into a, contaminated area without a clear definition of the clean or contaminated portion of the cord and hose.

Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.

RGErE reestablished a clear contamination boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.

NRC Inspection Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection Report 96-11, NRC inspectors observed a

work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination area.

The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within thc contamination area.

Significant amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous debris generated from welding and grinding work had Mea to the floor and were accumulating outside the contamination area boundary.

The step-off pad for exiting the contamination area was not securely attached to the floor. Several buckets that

Page 3 were used to collect contaminated fluids were not labeled properly.

NRC inspector also noted additional contanunation boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.

Cords and test leads were not secured to thc fioor to prevent them from canying contamination out of the area.

When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent thein from being moved across the boundary marker line. Radiological surveys were taken and no spread of contamination was detected.

However, RG&E agreed that management expectations for proper contamination boundary controls had not been met.

Site personnel working in these areas were subsequently counseled.

3.'CTION Report 964902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated tools/equipment found in unrestricted area tool storage areas.

These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP) surveys of these areas.

(1)

The reasons for the violation, or, ifcontested, the basis for disputing the violation; RG&E accepts the violation. We agree that problems regarding contamination boundary control*and poor radiological work practices have not been programmatically corrected.

(a)

Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections pumps is very congested.

Contaminated surface area boundaries are denoted by rad tape.

The initial work planned for the area was to inspect and, ifnecessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings. Typically, the small contamination control area established for this work scope is adequate.

Based on inspection of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.

Discussions occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP) technician relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamnation control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.

Enlarging the work area would have better accouunodated the expanded work scope and eliminated the need to

JAN-11-1988 87: 16 U.S.

NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P.85 Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated area that had previously been established.

There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician that the contamination area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination control.

The tool removed from the contaminated area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously smeared and was free of loose contamination.

Athough full compliance to contaminated area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.

The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated area.

A contributing factor was the small contaminated area boundary.

An enlarged boundary would have eliminated the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminated area.

Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished as a standard, acceptable work practice, ifthe contaminated area had been properly enlarged.

(b)

Leak from How Transmitter FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified the

problem, RG&E acknowledges that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate method for containing contaminated liquid. This is an unacceptable work practice.

A catch containment or bucket should have been used.

As background for how this situation developed, a Maintenance Work Order had previously identified a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to Pl-116.

This prompted RP to provide contamination boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to Fl-116. Initiallydescribed as a dry boron buildup,

'he leak progressed to thc point of a steady drip. It could not be ascertained at what stage in leak development the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.

(c)

Contaminated Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges that corrective actions for previously identified poor radiological work practices and inadequate contamination boundary controls were not effective.

There have been additional incidents in these areas.

The programmatic requirements need to be strongly reinforced.

These incidents are the result of lapses in performance and failure to adhere to the established management expectations and standards.

JAN-11-1988 87: 17 U. S.

NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 86 Page 5 clear and Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective actions the fo

'0 be cus wl 011 additional mana e

and unambiguous expectations for boundary demarcat'ious an

control,

'n management coaching and counscliag, heightened awareness of th anced training, enforcing consistency in application of ness 0 cse standards, reinforcement of individual accountability and responsibility, and monitoring to ensure continuing compliance.

The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:

(a)

On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations Group.

These meetings provided an opportunity for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological work adherence to practices and contamination boundary control.

The im importaace of a

crence to procedures and the seriousness of lapses in acceptable practices coacerniag contamination boundary control was personally conveyed by plant management.

(b}

At the request of'aintenance Supervision the Ginn Stat' irma tion rmcrpal ysicist mct with members of appropriate shops to outline concerns with improper contamination boundary control and to review station requirements and management expectations.

Separate meetings were held with each of the followiag shops:

Mechanical Maintenance Electrical Maintenance Instrument and Control (E&C)

I&C Special Projects.

(c)

A letter was issued by the Plant Manager'nd Superintend ts t all p

personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management em hasized tha expectations for contamination boundary control. Thi I is etter emp size that all personnel are accountable for obeying established radiological boundaries when entering the restricted

. I furth em hasized t ri area.

t er the p as that ifinstructions are not clear or fullyunderstood th planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's en responsibi ity to ensure that all instructions are understood.

The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable radiological work practice willresult in a meeting with supervisiou, and further disciplinary action may=be necessary.

JAN-11-1988 87: 17 U.S.

NRC GINNA 315 524 6937 P. 87 Page 6 (3)

The corrective steps that willbe taken to avoid further violations.

The Radiation Protection (RP) Group has been assigned responsibility to coordinate implemention of all corrective actions discussed below.

( )

rocedures willbe reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide (a)

Procedur clear and unambiguous management direction.

Any changes will clearly state acceptable practices for contamination boundary control.

In addition, any changes willinclude clear definitions of the various types of acceptable contamination boundary markers.

(b)

Contamination boundary control issues willbe discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance Supervision, to reinforce its importance.

Periodically, RP personnel willbe requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification and foster increased communications between groups.

(c)

RP Supervision has directed the RP staff and RP techni'd strong coaching to radiological workers.

This is being done to ensure contamina

'P personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining ff e ective mination boundary control.

Vfhen practicable, assigned RP personnel arc expected to be iu the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated areas, to ensure management expectations are being met.

raining Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced (d)

Tra'raining in contaminated area situations.

(e)

A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed to poor radiological work practices in the past.

Corrective actions, ifneeded, willaddress these factors, to assist in eve oping other appropriate means to strengthen the programmatic requirements and to increase compliance with these requirements.

'As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training, "Project Boundary" has been established.

Major attributes of this project include:

Communication of management expectations Boundary Control policies that are easy to use Training for ALLgroups oa revisions to boundary control policies

JAN-11-1988 87: 18 U.S.

HRC GthNA 315 524 6937 P. 88 Page 7 Reinforcing and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages) to the same level as RGB workers Verifyadequacy ofthese actions against predetermined indicators (g)

An independent effectiveness Review wiHbe conducted to verifythe adequacy ofthe above listed corrective actions.

This review willbe completed by October, 1997.

C (4)

The date when fullcompliance willbe achieved:

Pull compliance has been achieved as ofMarch 20, 1997, when short term corrective actions, including heightened awareness and restatement ofmanagement expectations, were completed.

Purther long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective actions (a) through (g) above, willresult in a more effective program.

Very y yours, Robert C. Mecredy xc:

Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)

Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King ofPrussia, PA 19046 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector TOTAL P.88

CATEGORY

. 1 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

( RIDS )

Iy ACCESSION NBR: 970507004 2 DOC. DATE: 97/04/29 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G

05000244 AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ECREDY, R ~ C ~

Rochester Gas

& Electric Corp.

RECIP

~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING F G ~

SUBJECT:

Responds to NRC 970325 1tr re violations noted in insp rept 50-244/97-0 1 on 970 1 05-970223

~ Corrective actions: held meetings on 9702 1l-l2 w/avai lable members of Nuclear Operations Group to discuss radiological work practices

~

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3 ENCL Q SIZE:

TITLE: General

( 50 Dkt ) -Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES: License Exp date in accordance with 1 OCFR2, 2. 109 ( 9/19/72 )

05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRO NRR/DISP/P IPB NRR/DRPM/PECB NUD0 C S-ABS TRACT OGC/HDS 3 ERNAL: LITCO BRYCE, J H

NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING, G ~

AEOD TTC

~F CE TE~

NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OE DIR RGN1 FILE 01 NOAC NUDOCS FULLTEXT COPIES LTTR ENCL NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPZENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROI DESK (DCD)

ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 18 ENCL R'

AND y

ROCHESTER GAS ANDElECTRIC CORPORATIOhf

~ 89EASTAVENU~ RO HESTER, Ar.Y Idod9.cr'C

'PEA COD! 7ID5I52.'K ROB"RT C. NtECREDY Vice President Nvcfeor operations April29, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:

Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 50-244/97-01, dated March 25, 1997 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) provides this reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO 50-244/97-01-02) submitted as an enclosure to a letter from Lawrence T. Doerflein, USNRC, to Robert C. Mecredy, RG&E, dated March 25, 1997.

As a result of an inspection conducted from January 5 to February 23, 1997, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), the violation is listed below:

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and deviations are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to correct problems regarding contamination boundary control and poor radiological work practices noted in NRC Inspection Report Nos.

50-244/94-29 and 50-244/96-11, and RG&E ACTION Report No. 96-0902 dated September 27, 1996, as evidenced by the following:

February 9, 1997, maintenance tools were removed from a designated contamination area on the A-Safety Injection pump.

Several rags and a wire brush that had been used inside an area with loose smearable surface contamination were allowed to straddle across the boundary marker line and extend into an-uncontaminated area.

These items were not surveyed prior to being removed from the contaminated area.

Other wrenches and tools that had been used inside a contaminated area were removed and placed on a clean surface without having been bagged or surveyed for contamination beforehand.

9705070042 970429 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8

PDR g[llllllllllllllllllllltll lllllll

Page 2 2)

February 17, 1997, a leak from a fitting on the transmitter of a flow instrument (FI-116) was dripping from inside a contaminated area onto a clean; floor surface that was designated as uncontaminated.

A towel had been placed on the floor was collecting the leakage (sic), but the towel was saturated with the radioactive fluid. Water was flowing away from the towel to a low point in the floor, forming a puddle, and contaminating previously clean floor areas up to 2700 dpm/100cm'.

No collection device was in place that could prevent the spread of contaminated water to uncontaminated areas.

The radiological protection technician on duty at the time was not aware of this condition.

BACKGROUND Inspection Report 94-29 NRC Inspection Report 94-29 dealt with review of accessible areas of the plant to verify that high radiation doors were locked, and radiological postings were posted as required.

Some variability in the use of contamination boundary demarcation tape (rad tape) was noted.

In some areas, rad tape was used on the floor to define the contamination area boundary marker line, and in other areas this'was not used.

For example, for one area a contamination rope barricade and posting were used without a floor rad tape boundary marker line.

The inspector also noted an extension cord and a hose running from a clean area into a contaminated area without a clear definition of the clean or contaminated portion of the cord and hose.

Both the cord and hose had been pulled loose during the work evolution and the original position of the cord and hose could not be determined.

RG&E reestablished a clear contamination boundary marker line and stated that the use of rad tape would be reevaluated.

2.

NRC Inspection Report 96-11 As reported in NRC Inspection Report 96-11, NRC inspectors observed a

work area with some work partially conducted inside a roped-off contamination area.

The inspector noted that several equipment service lines and power cords were not secured within the contamination area.

Significant amounts of tape, grinding dust, and miscellaneous debris generated from welding and grinding work had fallen to the floor and were accumulating outside the contamination area boundary.

The step-off pad for exiting the contamination area was not securely attached to the floor.

Several buckets that

Page 3 were used to collect contaminated fluids were not labeled properly.

NRC inspector also noted additional contamination boundary control concerns, where loose bags and papers within the contamination area were allowed to collect on the floor and extend across the boundary marker line.

Cords and test leads were not secured to the floor to prevent them from carrying contamination out of the area.

When notified by the NRC inspector of this condition, RG&E personnel immediately cleaned up the debris in and outside of the contamination area and secured the service lines to the floor to prevent them from being moved across the boundary marker line.

Radiological surveys were taken and no spread of contamination was detected.

However, RG&E agreed that management expectations for proper contamination boundary controls had not been met.

Site personnel working in these areas were, subsequently counseled.

ACTION Report 96-0902 ACTION Report 96-0902 dealt with contaminated tools/equipment found in unrestricted area t'ool storage areas.

These tools were found as a result of the annual Radiation Protection (RP) surveys of these areas.

(1)

The reasons for the violation, or, ifcontested, the basis for disputing the violation:

RG&E accepts the violation.

We agree that problems regarding contamination boundary control and poor radiological work practices have not been programmatically corrected.

(a)

Safety Injection Pump The area around the safety injections pumps is very congested.

Contaminated surface area boundaries are denoted by rad tape.

The initial work planned for

~

the area was to inspect and, ifnecessary, tighten some leaking Swagelok fittings. Typically, the small contamination control area established for this work scope is adequate.

Based on inspection of the leaking fittings, the work scope was expanded to include tubing replacement.

Discussions occurred between the workers and Radiation Protection (RP) technician relative to the expanded work scope, but there was no decision to enlarge the contamination control area boundary to better optimize the work environment.

Enlarging the work area would have better accommodated the expanded work scope and eliminated the need to

Page 4 transfer hand tools and other items in and out of the contaminated area that had previously been established.

There was a lack of alertness on the part of the workers and RP technician that the contamination area boundary should have been enlarged for more effective contamination control.

The tool removed from the contaminated area was used to tighten a Swagelok nut that had been previously smeared and was free of loose contamination.

Athough full compliance to contaminated area boundary control was lacking, smearing the nut was a positive step which is representative of ongoing efforts at the work area to help minimize the spread of contamination.

The rags, wire brush, and wrench should have been bagged prior to removal from the contaminated area.

A contributing factor was the small contaminated area boundary.

An enlarged boundary would have eliminated the need to transfer these items in and out of the contaminate'd area.

Thus, bagging prior to final removal would have been accomplished as a standard, acceptable work practice, ifthe contaminated area had been properly enlarged.

Leak from Flow Transmitter FI-116 It is not known who placed the absorbent towel under the transmitter, nor how long the towel had been there before the NRC inspector identified the problem.

RG&E acknowledges that an absorbent towel is not an appropriate method for containing contaminated liquid. This is an unacceptable work practice.

A catch containment or bucket should have been used.

As background for how this situation developed, a Maintenance Work Order had previously identified a boron buildup on a Swagelok fitting to FI-116.

This prompted RP to provide contamination boundary controls to the immediate area adjacent to FI-116. Initially described as a dry boron buildup, the leak progressed to the point of a steady drip. It could not be ascertained at what stage in leak development the absorbent towel was placed under the transmitter.

Contaminated Area Boundary Control RG&E acknowledges that corrective actions for previously identified poor radiological, work practices and inadequate contamination boundary controls were not effective.

There have been additional incidents in these areas.

The programmatic requirements need to be strongly reinforced.

These incidents are the result of lapses in performance and failure to adhere to the established management expectations and standards.

Page 5 Therefore, as discussed in detail under corrective actions, the focus willbe on clear and unambiguous expectations for boundary demarcations and control, additional management coaching and counseling, heightened awareness of these expectations, enhanced training, enforcing consistency in application of standards, reinforcement of individual accountability and responsibility, and monitoring to -ensure continuing compliance.

The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:

(a)

On February 11/12, 1997, meetings were held with all available members of the Nuclear Operations Group.

These meetings provided an opportunity for the Plant Manager to discuss radiological work practices and contamination boundary control.

The importance of adherence to procedures and the seriousness of lapses in acceptable practices concerning contamination boundary control was personally conveyed by plant management.

(b)

At the request of Maintenance Supervision, the Ginna Station Principal Health Physicist met with members of appropriate shops to outline concerns with improper contamination boundary control and to review station requirements and management expectations.

Separate meetings were held with each of the following shops:

Mechanical Maintenance Electrical Maintenance Instrument and Control (I&C)

ISAAC Special Projects (c)

A letter was issued by the Plant Manager and Superintendents to all plant personnel, dated March 20, 1997, regarding management expectations for contamination boundary control.

This letter emphasized that all personnel are accountable for obeying established radiological boundaries when entering the restricted area.

It further emphasized that ifinstructions are not clear or fully understood, then the planned work should not be initiated, and that it is the worker's responsibility to ensure that all instructions are understood.

The letter further stated that any incident of unacceptable radiological work practice willresult in a meeting with supervision, and further disciplinary action may be necessary.

Page 6 (3)

The corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:

The Radiation Protection (RP) Group has been assigned responsibility to coordinate implemention of all corrective actions discussed below.

(a)

Procedures willbe reviewed, and revised as appropriate, to provide

'lear and unambiguous management direction.

Any changes will clearly state acceptable practices for contamination boundary control.

In addition, any changes will include clear definitions of the various types of acceptable contamination boundary markers.

(b)

Contamination boundary control issues willbe discussed at regularly scheduled shop meetings by Maintenance Supervision, to reinforce its importance.

Periodically, RP personnel willbe requested to attend these meetings to provide clarification and foster increased communications between groups.

(c)

RP Supervision has directed the RP staff and RP technicians to provide strong coaching to radiological workers.

This is being done to ensure RP personnel are effective in assisting workers in maintaining effective contamination boundary control.

When practicable, assigned RP personnel are expected to be in the work area when work activites are occurring within contaminated

areas, to ensure management expectations are being met.

(d)

Training Work Requests have been initiated to provide enhanced training in contaminated area situations.

(e)

A Root Cause Analysis is being performed to identify other factors that have contributed to poor radiological work practices in the past.

Corrective actions, ifneeded, willaddress these factors, to assist in developing other appropriate means to strengthen the programmatic requirements and to increase compliance with these requirements.

I (f)

As a joint effort between Maintenance, RP, and Nuclear Training, "Project Boundary" has been established.

Major attributes of this project include:

Communication of management expectations Boundary Control policies, that are easy to use Training for ALLgroups on revisions to boundary control policies

Page 7 Reinforcing and rewarding good behaviors Revising Training programs Train contractors (who work during outages) to the same level as RGB'orkers Verifyadequacy ofthese actions against predetermined indicators (g)

An independent EQectiveness Review willbe conducted to verify the adequacy ofthe above listed corrective actions.

This review willbe completed by October, 1997.

(4)

The date when full compliance willbe achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved as ofMarch 20, 1997, when short term corrective actions, including heightened awareness and rest'atement ofmanagement expectations, were completed.

Further long term enhancements, as discussed in corrective actions (a) through (g) above, willresult in a more e6ective program.

Very

lyyours, Robert C. Mecredy XC:

Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14C7)

Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King ofPrussia, PA 19046

'h Ginna Senior Resident Inspector