ML18024B028: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 2: Line 2:
| number = ML18024B028
| number = ML18024B028
| issue date = 08/29/1979
| issue date = 08/29/1979
| title = Responds to NRC 790807 Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-259/79-14,50-260/79-14 & 50-296/79-14.Corrective Actions:Training Initiated for All Operating Groups & Valves Locked After Being Found in Unlocked Condition
| title = Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-259/79-14,50-260/79-14 & 50-296/79-14.Corrective Actions:Training Initiated for All Operating Groups & Valves Locked After Being Found in Unlocked Condition
| author name = Mills L
| author name = Mills L
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Line 11: Line 11:
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = NUDOCS 7909280522
| document report number = NUDOCS 7909280522
| title reference date = 08-07-1979
| package number = ML18024B027
| package number = ML18024B027
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
Line 17: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA.
{{#Wiki_filter:TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 8 f401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 29, 1979 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
TENNESSEE 8 f401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 29, 1979 Mr.James P.O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II-Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303  


==Dear Mr.O'Reilly:==
==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
~~Enclosed is our response to R.C.Lewis'ugust 7, 1979, letter, RII:HDJ 50-259/79-14, 50-260/79-14, and 50-296/79-14, which requested a supplementary response to TVA's July 30, 1979, letter concerning the same subject.We have reviewed the enclosed supplementary.response and find no proprietary information in it.If we can provide additional information, please get in touch with us.Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L.M.Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure<909280 OPS An Equal Opportunity Employer  
~ ~
't Corrective Ste s Taken to Avoid Further Noncom liance These actions taken as described above will avoid further noncompliance.
Enclosed is our response to R.
Date Full Com liance Achieved Ualves were verified to be in proper position on June 24, 1979.All core Cooling Instructions will be revised and approved for second-person verification of valve checklists by November 1, 1979.Group Supplemental Training will be completed by September 14, 1979.
C. Lewis'ugust 7, 1979, letter, RII:HDJ 50-259/79-14, 50-260/79-14, and 50-296/79-14, which requested a supplementary response to TVA's {{letter dated|date=July 30, 1979|text=July 30, 1979, letter}} concerning the same subject.
We have reviewed the enclosed supplementary.response and find no proprietary information in it. If we can provide additional information, please get in touch with us.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure
< 909280 OPS An Equal Opportunity Employer


ENCLOSURE SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC-OIE LETTER FROM R.C.LEWIS TO H'i'.-G.PARRIS DATED AUGUST 7, 1979, (REFERENCE RII:BXM 50-259/79-14$
't
 
Corrective Ste s Taken to Avoid Further Noncom liance These actions taken as described above will avoid further noncompliance.
Date Full Com liance Achieved Ualves were verified to be in proper position on June 24, 1979.
All core Cooling Instructions will be revised and approved for second-person verification of valve checklists by November 1, 1979.
Group Supplemental Training will be completed by September 14, 1979.
 
ENCLOSURE SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC-OIE LETTER FROM R.
C.
LEWIS TO H'i'.-G. PARRIS DATED AUGUST 7, 1979, (REFERENCE RII:BXM 50-259/79-14$
50-260/79-14, AND 50-296/79-14)
50-260/79-14, AND 50-296/79-14)
Infraction As required by Technical Specification 6.3.a.l, detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists covering normal operation and components involving nuclear safety of the facility shall be prepared, approved, and adhered to.Operation Instruction 74',"RHR Systems", drawing No.47W811-1,"Flow Diagram RHR System", and drawing No.47W859-1,"Flow Diagram, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water" require certain valves lined up for LPCI mode during normal operation are locked open.Contrary to the above, two outlet valves (HCV 74-33 and HCV 74-44)at the discharge side of RHR Heat Exchangers 3B and 3D were not locked during the normal operation on May 24, 1979.Other ESF valves not locked during the operation were EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Valves Nos.561, 572, and 614.Su lemental Res onse Corrective Ste s Taken and Results Achieved The item.of noncompliance is being emphasized in Group Supplementary Training for a13.operating groups.With reference to the outlet valves on the RHR system, these valves were locked immediately after discovery of being in the unlocked condition; and similar valves on the other units were checked and verified to be correctly locked.The valve checklist in Operation'Instructions is being revised to include second-party verification for the valves.This includes not only valves on the RHR, but all emergency core cooling systems.This will prevent recurrence of this type of item of noncompliance.}}
Infraction As required by Technical Specification 6.3.a.l, detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists covering normal operation and components involving nuclear safety of the facility shall be prepared,
: approved, and adhered to.
Operation Instruction 74',
"RHR Systems",
drawing No. 47W811-1, "Flow Diagram RHR System",
and drawing No. 47W859-1, "Flow Diagram, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water" require certain valves lined up for LPCI mode during normal operation are locked open.
Contrary to the above, two outlet valves (HCV 74-33 and HCV 74-44) at the discharge side of RHR Heat Exchangers 3B and 3D were not locked during the normal operation on May 24, 1979.
Other ESF valves not locked during the operation were EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Valves Nos. 561,
: 572, and 614.
Su lemental Res onse Corrective Ste s Taken and Results Achieved The item. of noncompliance is being emphasized in Group Supplementary Training for a13. operating groups.
With reference to the outlet valves on the RHR system, these valves were locked immediately after discovery of being in the unlocked condition; and similar valves on the other units were checked and verified to be correctly locked.
The valve checklist in Operation 'Instructions is being revised to include second-party verification for the valves.
This includes not only valves on the RHR, but all emergency core cooling systems.
This will prevent recurrence of this type of item of noncompliance.}}

Latest revision as of 04:23, 7 January 2025

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-259/79-14,50-260/79-14 & 50-296/79-14.Corrective Actions:Training Initiated for All Operating Groups & Valves Locked After Being Found in Unlocked Condition
ML18024B028
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/1979
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18024B027 List:
References
NUDOCS 7909280522
Download: ML18024B028 (6)


Text

TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 8 f401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 29, 1979 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

~ ~

Enclosed is our response to R.

C. Lewis'ugust 7, 1979, letter, RII:HDJ 50-259/79-14, 50-260/79-14, and 50-296/79-14, which requested a supplementary response to TVA's July 30, 1979, letter concerning the same subject.

We have reviewed the enclosed supplementary.response and find no proprietary information in it. If we can provide additional information, please get in touch with us.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure

< 909280 OPS An Equal Opportunity Employer

't

Corrective Ste s Taken to Avoid Further Noncom liance These actions taken as described above will avoid further noncompliance.

Date Full Com liance Achieved Ualves were verified to be in proper position on June 24, 1979.

All core Cooling Instructions will be revised and approved for second-person verification of valve checklists by November 1, 1979.

Group Supplemental Training will be completed by September 14, 1979.

ENCLOSURE SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC-OIE LETTER FROM R.

C.

LEWIS TO H'i'.-G. PARRIS DATED AUGUST 7, 1979, (REFERENCE RII:BXM 50-259/79-14$

50-260/79-14, AND 50-296/79-14)

Infraction As required by Technical Specification 6.3.a.l, detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists covering normal operation and components involving nuclear safety of the facility shall be prepared,

approved, and adhered to.

Operation Instruction 74',

"RHR Systems",

drawing No. 47W811-1, "Flow Diagram RHR System",

and drawing No. 47W859-1, "Flow Diagram, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water" require certain valves lined up for LPCI mode during normal operation are locked open.

Contrary to the above, two outlet valves (HCV 74-33 and HCV 74-44) at the discharge side of RHR Heat Exchangers 3B and 3D were not locked during the normal operation on May 24, 1979.

Other ESF valves not locked during the operation were EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Valves Nos. 561,

572, and 614.

Su lemental Res onse Corrective Ste s Taken and Results Achieved The item. of noncompliance is being emphasized in Group Supplementary Training for a13. operating groups.

With reference to the outlet valves on the RHR system, these valves were locked immediately after discovery of being in the unlocked condition; and similar valves on the other units were checked and verified to be correctly locked.

The valve checklist in Operation 'Instructions is being revised to include second-party verification for the valves.

This includes not only valves on the RHR, but all emergency core cooling systems.

This will prevent recurrence of this type of item of noncompliance.